An Analysis of the Causes of Police Militarization in America

by

Matt Ciepielowski

Senior Seminar in Political Science

Spring 2011

Prof. Driscoll

A Senior Thesis submitted for partial completion of the requirements

for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

Quinnipiac University

Hamden, Connecticut

May 2011

IntroductionOn Feb. 11, 2010, working on a confidential tip, police kicked in Jonathan Whitworths door, shot his dogs, and threw him to the ground in front of his 7-year-old son. The SWAT teams video of the incident has garnered over a million and a half hits on YouTube. The only crime Whitworth had committed was a misdemeanor charge of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia, punishable by a fine of $300 in Missouri. The story very quickly went viral, prompting outrage. Why had the police used such excessive force on an inconsequential nonviolent offender? The fact is that there is very little out of the ordinary when it comes to the Missouri raid. Similar raids are undertaken by police paramilitary units (PPUs) hundreds of times every day across the country. The only difference in this situation was the presence of the video camera. PPUs are often referred to as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. They are defined by a reliance on military-style equipment and tactics. The militarization of police in America is a trend that reaches far back into our history, though it has increased at a torrid pace over the last 30 years. There is little research available that is specifically aimed at policies leading to the militarization of American police forces, despite the statistical and anecdotal evidence pointing to an increase. This is partially because the consensus among academics seems to be that police in America are cooperating better with their communities and using force more responsibly. It is a curious problem with research on policing policy that so much time and effort is spent researching community-oriented policing when there is so little evidence verifying that it is even a trend that is truly occurring, while the militarization of police is ignored in spite of dramatic policy changes blurring the line between military and police. There is a large body of research on subjects that are tangentially related to the militarization of police, including research on the War on Drugs, the tough on crime mindset and changes in police funding priorities. Taken together, this research can paint a clearer picture of the militarization of American police.

Literature Review

Kappeler and Kraskas article Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, (1997) is the most widely cited work dealing with the militarization of American police forces. The authors undertake the most thorough nationwide survey of PPUs to date. PPUs use a wide array of equipment, including submachine guns, automatic shotguns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, percussion grenades, tear gas grenades, C4 explosives, and military armored personnel carriers (3). Most PPUs formed in the 1960s and 1970s as a response to riots, terrorism, barricaded suspects, and hostage situations. Since that time they have assumed a multitude of other responsibilities and duties.

Kraska and Kappeler created a survey that examined the growth and normalization of military tactics and ideology in American law enforcement agencies. They surveyed all non-federal law enforcement agencies that serviced jurisdictions of 50,000 or more citizens and employed at least 100 officers. They found that 690 agencies matched their criteria, 79 percent of which responded to their survey. They then followed up with phone interviews with the agencies that used PPUs. Of the 584 departments that responded, 89.4 percent had a PPU, and 20 percent of those who did not have one said they were planning on establishing one soon. Between 1982 and 1990, the percentage of surveyed departments with a PPU rose from 59 to 78. By 1995 it reached 89 percent. Figure 1 shows the growth of PPUs among the surveyed departments (6).

The second major area of inquiry for the survey focuses on the activities and use of PPUs. Figure 2 displays the average number of deployments, or call-outs, for each unit. There are two sets of data displayed in the graph. The first is for all departments that provided data for 1980-1995 (marked total). The second set has only the departments that had PPUs before 1980 (marked compl). The total data set shows that between 1983 and 1986, average deployments doubled. They tripled by 1989 and quadrupled by 1995. In 1995, 75.9 percent of all call-outs were for warrant work (Kappeler 1997, 6). The combination of these findings indicates that PPUs have evolved well beyond their original purpose.

Kraska and Kappeler link the increase in PPU use for warrant work in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the rise of the drug war (7). Using PPUs to produce cases against drug users and dealers instead of dealing with violent crimes directly led to the increase in call-outs displayed in Figure 2. Most of what the respondents referred to as warrant work referred to no-knock raids that involve forced entry and a heavy show of force to discourage suspects from disposing of evidence. Some respondents said that assets such as money and firearms that are confiscated in these raids sometimes end up funding the purchase of new paramilitary equipment (7). Another new method of utilizing PPUs is for routine patrol work, with the intent of suppressing crime problems in the area through the display of paramilitary equipment. Of the 487 interviewees that responded to the question, over 20 percent said that they used PPUs for proactive patrolling, including 21 agencies that served populations of less than 100,000. Another significant finding of the survey was that the vast majority of PPUs were trained by active-duty or retired military with special operations training (11). The authors findings lead them to be concerned about the emergence of a form of paramilitarized violence found in a rapidly expanding criminal justice-industrial complex, with both ideological and material connections to the military industrial complex (14).

In their research about the converging role of the military and police in the United States, Donald and Kathleen Campbell link the reframing of domestic social problems into national security problems with the end of the Cold War. By adopting a vocabulary focusing on war, politicians attempted to convince voters that they were fighting societal ills just as hard as they had been fighting enemies from without (2010, 338). They are also wary about law enforcement power becoming centralized in Washington DC, a result of the military becoming more involved in policing efforts. They say that political leaders realized that a national security justification not only gave the appearance of strong government action but also made the acceptance and passage of various policy initiatives easier (338). However, Campbell and Campbell are more optimistic than Kraska, concluding that organizational tensions will likely result in PPUs finding it hard to obtain additional resources, as they must be diverted from other units (347).

Radley Balko addresses a hole in research on this topic by identifying specific policies that have led to the developments that Kraska and others have chronicled. He begins by discussing the emphasis Ronald Reagan placed on taking a more confrontational approach to the War on Drugs. During Reagans term, Congress created large exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the use of military for civilian policing. This allowed the Pentagon to share intelligence, training, tactics, and equipment with federal, state and local departments.

Balko found that, especially in small towns, agencies convince citizens that PPUs are essential to fight terrorism, deal with hostage situations, and handle other violent situations. In reality, they are rarely used for this purpose today, as Kappeler and Kraska noted (1997, 7). Balko is very critical of the raids that PPUs are often used for, the militarization of police in general, and the War on Drugs. His critique is similar to Campbell and Campbells description of the effects of police adopting a war-based mentality. He says;

Given that police now tote military equipment, get military training, and embrace military culture and values, it shouldnt be surprising when officers begin to act like soldiers, treat civilians like combatants, and tread on private property as if it were part of a battlefield. Of course, its hard to overlook the fact that the soldiering-up of civilian police forces is taking place as part of the larger War on Drugs, which grows more saturated with war imagery, tactics, and phraseology every day. (15)

One common theme in scholarship dealing with police militarization, the War on Drugs, and tough on crime polices is a focus on racial motivations. In Police Militarization in Urban Areas: The Obscure War Against the Underclass (2005) Daryl Meeks links increasing police militarization with cuts in funding to inner city social programs. Meeks discussion of todays reformers is reminiscent of the original Progressive Era anti-immigrant reformers that I will describe later; Recent debate on the degeneration of inner-city urban areas has centered on the so-called criminal nature of the promiscuous behavior of the urban underclass and the need for law enforcement to control such behavior (2). Meeks claims that cutting social programs increases crime, which then leads to more aggressive policing. By blaming the residents of these areas and their character flaws, reformers are ignoring the true cause of the problem. Increased funding for policing can often mean further decreased funding for social programs, exacerbating the problem.

There is also research that shows a link between symbolic racism, support for punitive crime polices, and a lack of support for preventative policies (Green, Staerkl, and Sears 2006). Symbolic racism focuses on beliefs that discrimination is not a problem in our society, that Blacks have inferior work ethic, that they enjoy undeserved advantages, and that they are too demanding. Using a study of 849 White adults, conducted over the course of three years in Los Angeles, Green, Staerkl, and Sears concluded that symbolic racism was positively correlated with support for punitive crime polices and negatively correlated with support for preventative policies (2006).

Punitive measures to fight crime aim to punish offenders in order to minimize the chance of future criminal behavior. Examples would include policies such as the death penalty and three-strike laws that aim to make crime as unappealing an option as possible. It would not be much of a stretch to include policies associated with police militarization in this category, including violent raids of nonviolent offenders and heavily armed SWAT patrols. Preventative policies are attempts to reduce crime by addressing structural factors that contribute to crime. These include poverty, unemployment, and lack of education.

One problem with the findings of Green, Staerkl, and Sears research is that they generalize their conclusions from a study based entirely on residents of Los Angeles, notorious for crime and racial tensions. According to the Los Angeles Police Department, the city is home to 250 gangs made up of 26,000 members (Los Angeles Police Department 2011). It was also home to the infamous riots that followed the Rodney King trial, in which a jury acquitted four white police officers accused of beating a black motorist, despite the fact that there was strong video evidence indicating their guilt. Residents of one of the most racially charged cities in the country, sometimes referred to as the Gang Capital of America, would seem more likely to be race conscious than the country as a whole.

One trend that would seem to indicate progress in police industry race relations is the increase in minority hiring over the last few decades (King and Maguire 2004, 25). There are however, significant difficulties in collecting national policing statistics when it comes to other, more abstract categories. It is very difficult to measure changes in the use of force by police over time, for example (King and Maguire 2004, 32). Given the lack of reliable, nationwide policing data, it is very difficult to analyze trends. There is little reliable data on information sharing between agencies, measures of nonviolent police application of authority and community-police interaction.

The limited information available does indicate a pair of policy trends that relate to increased police militarization: an increased focus on domestic surveillance and an increase in federal funding for state and local departments. The increase in domestic intelligence collecting efforts appears to be a direct response to Sept. 11. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had a profound impact on policing in the United States. In fact, one survey found that only 6.6 percent of police agencies reported that they had made no changes in organizational goals as a result of Sept. 11 (King and Maguire 2004, 21).

There are numerous ways in which the federal government is beginning to exercise more control over local authorities. One such way is through the creation of multiagency task forces. These are organizations staffed by members are already members of preexisting organizations. The number of joint task forces has ballooned recently, mostly due to their use in anti-terrorism and anti-drug efforts. One example of a high profile task force is Task Force Guantanamo, the force that operates the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay.

Given the strong evidence of increased police militarization in the United States, one would expect there to be extensive research on the subject, but there is not. There is however, extensive research on community-oriented policing, a model which promotes cooperation between police and the community they serve. Community-oriented policing is nearly the opposite of militarized policing, in which suspects are often viewed as the enemy, instead of members of the community the officers are meant to serve. Since there are no longitudinal studies focusing on interaction between police and the community, it is nearly impossible to say with any certainty whether it is increasing at all (King and Maguire 2004, 23).

The body of literature on the militarization of American police is notably lacking investigation from a policy perspective. Though many of the sources mentioned thus far describe the atmosphere that contributed to militarization, they generally fall short of attributing it to specific laws or policies. Those that do generally just blame the War on Drugs, which leaves something to be desired, as it is catch-all term that includes many policies, both foreign and domestic. While the body of literature, particularly Kraska and Kappelers work, establishes that militarism has indeed increased over the last 50 years, there is little information about specific causes. I intend to research the history of policy decisions and changes in the U.S. that created or exacerbated the trend towards police militarization.

The research thus far would seem to indicate that most of the policies I find will be related to the following campaigns and events; the War on Drugs, the end of the Cold War, the War on Terror, and the increasing power of the federal government. The War on Drugs appears to have been the largest impetus for increased police militarization, as most PPU raids today focus on drug related crimes. The end of the Cold War meant a surplus of military equipment that often found its way into police hands.

I expect to see significant overlap between all of the categories, particularly the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Drugs, as the sudden availability of military technology following the Cold War may have influenced the development of the War on Drugs, as Campbell and Campbell theorize. Policies passed as part of the War on Terror will likely deal with increased use of military surveillance techniques and equipment, as terrorist threats pushed the federal government to search for enemies within just as vigilantly as it keeps tracks of enemies without. Both the War on Terror and War on Drugs were federal initiatives, so their effect on the growth of the federal government is fairly obvious.

Methods

To identify key factors in the militarization of American police forces, I will take a chronological look at the history of American policing policy. For the sake of brevity I will have to gloss over much of what happened before the first PPUs were formed. The majority of research of police militarization does not look farther back than the creation of the first SWAT teams in the 1960s and 1970s. However, some investigation of prior policing trends is necessary, as some researchers have asserted that militarization is not a recent phenomenon, but in fact atrend that ebbs and flows over the years.

I will also briefly investigate the emergence of community-oriented policing as the dominant model for American police forces. As community-oriented policing involves cooperation between police and citizens, which is nearly the exact opposite of militarization, in which police treat potential criminals as an enemy force, it is necessary to examine it to determine if it may be a mitigating factor for further militarization. As well as looking at specific policy proposals, I will research whether any economic factors contributed, as the monied interests involved in police militarization are very powerful. Once I have compiled my research, I will determine what factors were most crucial in the trend towards police militarization, and use this information to speculate as to whether the trend towards militarization will continue in the future.FindingsBefore investigating police militarization today, an understanding of the history of the American criminal justice system is necessary to determine exactly from what todays policies evolved. This will help me determine if this is a new phenomenon or if it represents a continuation of older trends. Knowledge of todays policies would not be helpful if the knowledge were simply in a vacuum, lacking any context. The first major movement to reform the police came during the Progressive Era in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In many respects the movement of the Progressive Era set the stage for police militarization. At that time there was a movement to professionalize the police. This arose as a response to years of corruption resulting from close relationships between politicians and police, especially in urban environments. As cities began to grow rapidly and the federal government had difficulty keeping pace with governing them, local governments became more powerful and frequently fell under the control of political machines (Leichtman 2007, 55).

Political machines developed in response to the massive influx of immigrants to American cities. Since there was little private sector opportunity due to racism, many immigrants sought employment in rapidly expanding government entities such as the fire, police, water, and sanitation departments, which were all superior to the vast majority of labor opportunities for immigrants. Political machines, through local ward leaders, would dole out favors and jobs in return for votes and other forms of political support. Since there was little in the way of policing standards and many officers were indebted to the ruling party, police often failed to apply the law in an evenhanded manner.

Driven in large part by middle and upper-class WASPs who found themselves at odds with the interests of immigrants, the Progressive Era brought many reforms to the criminal justice system (58). There were a variety of different models that were promoted by various interests, but according to Leichtman (2007), a reform consensus developed that focused on three assumptions:

(1) The main purpose for the police was to provide the best service possible at the lowest possible cost, not to reward people for voting a certain way in local elections; (2)all authority over the police, fire, and other city-wide agencies should be vested in the mayors, their appointees, or other city-wide appointees, not in ward leaders; and (3) ethnic life-styles, as well as their underlying values, morals, attitudes, and customs were incompatible with conventional morality and its corresponding values, attitudes, and customs. It was the duty of police, courts, and other municipal agencies to bring the latter in line with the former. (60)

During this time the military model of policing was very popular. Many former military members were recruited to high level police positions, police uniforms began to emulate those of the military, and police were mandated to carry weapons. Leichtman says that the military model was not, and still is not, a good fit for a country that is based upon participatory democracy, whereas it found some success in Europe because at that time their governments were run by a few elites (67). The military model ended up being absorbed into the more popular professional model of policing, which was the next large reform movement to come along.

The professional model of policing focused on redefining the role of police. Whereas up until this point, police had had a number of responsibilities, supporters of the professional model wanted to focus police entirely on crime fighting. The most lasting impact was of the military model upon the professional model was the development of a militaristic urban police. According to Leichtman, while the military model fell out of popularity with theorists, most officers retained a military mindset. To much of the rank-and-file, criminals became enemies, instead of members of the community that the police were meant to protect (69).

The most recent major paradigm shift in policing has been the adoption of the community policing model focused on cooperation and interaction between the police and the community. Leichtman dismisses community policing as a model worthy of studying, saying that it is too difficult to define and officers on the ground often do not buy into the necessary mindset. She also asserts that the governments response to 9/11 has pushed the development of the community policing model on the backburner, with more focus being placed on the military model once again (70).

It is also difficult to measure how widespread the adoption of community oriented policing is because the term can encompass so many different elements. The three primary components are organizational adaptation, community interaction and engagement, and problem solving. There is far less statistical support for increases in community interaction and engagement than there is for the other two components (King and Maguire 2004, 23). Given that community interaction and engagement is the element that runs directly counter to police militarization, it does not seem that community policing is a trend that needs to be investigated any further in research on police militarization. Police researchers have recommended that comparative ethnographies or some type of longitudinal studies be undertaken to determine whether community interaction and engagement is increasing.

Today PPUs are utilized by many police agencies, and they are used more and more for serving warrants to nonviolent drug offenders. Though there is not much literature directly relating this topic, there seems to be enough to say with relative certainty that this represents an increase in American police militarization. Lacking in the research, however, was much information on what specific policy changes spurred this on. Many researches discuss broad and vague themes, like the search for an enemy to fight after the end of the Cold War, racism among the public and law enforcement, and the War on Drugs as reasons for the increase in police militarization, but they do not go much more in-depth than this. I assume this is because there is so little research aimed at proving an increase in police militarization that researchers assume it would be an uphill battle to attempt to analyze the trend, given that it would be difficult to prove that it was even happening in the first place.

Though, as previously mentioned, the military model of policing has been around for quite some time, PPUs themselves are a relatively new phenomenon. The first SWAT team was established by the Los Angeles Police Department in 1968. It was originally called the Special Weapons Assault Team, but that it was soon changed to Special Weapons and Tactics, as the first name sounded too military. There is also evidence of Delano, a town north of Los Angeles, using SWAT tactics against protests organized by Csar Chavez United Farm Workers Union, though there appears to have been no formal PPU at the department. Incidents that contributed to the formation of the LAPD SWAT unit included the Watts Riots of 1965, the emergence of criminal snipers and the possibility of armed violence by militant groups. One particular sniper incident that helped build national public support for the creation of SWAT units took place in August 1966 at the University of Texas. A former marine took position at the top of a clock tower and proceeded to shoot 46 people, killing 15 (Balko, 6). The next events to spur the promulgation of SWAT teams nationwide were shootouts between LAPD SWAT and armed militant groups. In 1969, LAPD SWAT had its first high-profile deployment, a shootout with members of the Black Panthers. An even more publicized incident in 1974 saw members of the militant Symbionese Liberation Army fire thousands of rounds in L.A. streets. LAPD SWAT was widely praised because there were no police or civilian causalities, although all the militants were killed.

A look at the next step forward in police militarization requires a look back to the Civil War era. Following the end of the war, Congress declared martial law in the Southern states. There were significant controversies surrounding the use of the military to administer law in these states, including accusations of fraud by troops in the 1876 presidential election (Weber, 4). This prompted the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, which reads From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section and any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or by both such fine and imprisonment. (18 U.S.C. 1385)

There were many examples over the next century of the U.S. military being used for domestic policing, but their goals were generally limited and they were removed once the situation was dealt with. One such example was the use of federal forces to assist in the forced desegregation of Southern schools in the 1950s and 1960s. There was no congressional approval for these incidents, which were generally ordered by the sitting president. This shows that while there is a long history of violating Posse Comitatus, it was only more recently that Congress began chipping away at the law (Weber 1999, 4).

The first example of an exception to Posse Comitatus that appears to have contributed to the militarization of U.S. police forces was the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Act, passed in 1981. The act was heavily support by the Ronald Reagan administration, which pushed a more military approach to drug issues. It amended Posse Comitatus to allow the military to assist police in the enforcement of drug laws. It allowed and encouraged the military to make equipment, bases and research facilities available to police agencies, train civilian police, and assist in drug interdiction (Balko 2006, 7). The assistance in the form of training and equipment sped up the militarization of police, and the allowance of direct military assistance in drug interdiction was significant in that it institutionalized acceptance of military enforcement of domestic laws. The next significant policy decision that advanced the militarization of police was undertaken by President Reagan himself. In 1986 he issued a directive declaring drugs a national security threat (Richburg 1986). This directive did not directly alter policy, but it did set the stage for more military involvement in domestic law enforcement.

In 1987, Congress further developed the military-police bond by setting up an organization to make transactions between the two easier. It even operated an 800 number to handle police inquires about acquiring military hardware (Weber 1999, 5). Through the National Defense Authorization Act for 1990 and 1991, Congress authorized federal funding to state National Guards for anti-drug purposes (Rich 1994, 35). The law did state that the operations funded under the law must not be in federal service, but the hybrid status of the National Guard as a federal/state agency allows significant abuse of that provision, and on top of that it means that they are only restrained by the Posse Comitatus Act in certain situations. As a result of this act, there are now heavily armed National Guard helicopter patrols in all 50 states, often searching for marijuana fields.

The trend towards a militarized response to the War on Drugs continued under President George H.W. Bush. In 1989 he created six regional joint task forces within the Department of Defense (Balko 2006, 7). As previously stated, task forces are made of individuals that are already members of other departments, whether they are members of the military or police. These task forces were charged with assisting in counter-drug efforts. They provided a mechanism for the military to become directly involved with domestic anti-drug operations, at the request of police.Increased federal funding for state and local agencies often leads to the purchase of paramilitary equipment, in large part because the funding is so often tied to drug war initiatives. Federal funding is often linked to metrics such as drug arrests. This leads to an increase in paramilitary style, no-knock raids on nonviolent drug offenders homes, which often help fund the department through seizures. That money in turn buys more equipment, and the cycle continues.

Over the next several years, no major policy changes were made in regards to police militarization. However, Drug War funding steadily increased and the average number of callouts per year for PPUs continued to rise (see Figure 2). The next significant policy change that facilitated greater police militarization came in 1994. The Department of Justice and Department of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding that allowed the military greater freedom to share technology and equipment with state and local police agencies (Department of Justice, 1997).

Besides the policy changes that prompted an increase in police militarization, there were also economic factors. Manufacturers of arms and paramilitary equipment hold significant sway over policy development. Some of this influence comes from directly lobbying elected and appointed officials. In fact, Heckler and Koch, maker of the MP5, a submachine gun very popular among military special operations forces and PPUs, spent $160,000 on lobbying in the United States in 2008. However, arms manufacturers are more effective at influencing police agencies themselves through marketing techniques. The largest sway they hold over police policy-making is in their advertisements aimed at getting police agencies to purchase their weaponry and equipment. Facing the possibility of significant revenue cuts due to the end of the Cold War, manufacturers of arms, armor, and other military equipment turned their focus to law enforcement, helping to spur the rise in PPUs around that time.

Balko and Kraska both worry about the profit motives involved in the criminal justice-industrial complex. Balko notes that promotional materials from producers of paramilitary equipment often make little distinction between police and soldiers (13). Heckler and Koch put on tactical seminars for police. While they do provide training, the main purpose of these seminars is to sell weapons, creating conflicting interests. The slogan for the MP5 is From the Gulf War to the Drug War- Battle Proven (14). Balko posits that the trend of increased weapons advertising since the end of the Cold War is directly related to decreases in military spending at that time.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, the community-oriented model was thought to be the future of policing, though as I have already mentioned, its impact is difficult to measure. At any rate, the chances of widespread acceptance and implementation of the community-oriented model were virtually crushed by the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. The PATRIOT Act is the most notable policy change following the attacks. It allowed for greater military involvement in domestic counter-terrorism, as terrorism blurs the line between law enforcement and foreign policy. The act allowed alleged terrorists to be held indefinitely without the right to an attorney, allowed the Attorney General to request assistance from the Department of Defense in dealing with possible domestic terrorist attacks, expanded domestic wiretapping, and increased border militarization. There were a number of sunset provisions built into the act, but as of now Congress has voted to temporarily extend them without making a long-term decision.

Interestingly, while policies stemming from the War on Terror did extend the domestic surveillance capabilities of police forces and chipped away at certain civil liberties, the policies of the War on Terror do not seem to have an effect on police militarization as much as technological advances have. Techniques developed for the military and police to use in counter-terror situations have given police sensory capabilities that fall outside of current procedures such as probable cause. Technologies such as facial recognition for surveillance cameras and thermal imaging technology allow police to gather information that was once possible only with a warrant. Many of these technologies were developed for military use in anti-smuggling operations, but were later marketed at civilian police agencies (Nunn 2003, 454).

ConclusionsEach of the aforementioned policy changes has implications beyond the simple transfer or weapons and equipment, although that is a significant effect on its own. The close cooperation between police and military has led to the adoption of a military culture and mindset in many police agencies. Former New Haven police chief Nick Pastor says, I was offered tanks, bazookas, anything I wanted. I turned it all down because it feeds a mind-set that youre not a police officer serving a community, youre a soldier at war (Weber 1999, 7). It appears as though it is the combination of technology and the creation of a war mentality among police that is the driving factor behind police militarization. This makes me suspect that military training of police is actually one of the largest, if not the largest, contributing factors to militarization. While military weapons and equipment are the main focus of most researchers when it comes to these programs, the training of SWAT teams by former or current special operations servicemen does not allow law enforcement to tailor the technology for their own purposes. They are trained in how to use this equipment by someone whose only experience is in a military setting. Lawrence Korb, a former Reagan Assistant Defense Secretary, encapsulates the problem with this, saying of the military, We train them to vaporize, not Mirandize (Dickerson 1996).

Kappeler and Kraskas findings regarding PPU training may be just as significant as their widely cited findings on PPU creation and usage. They found that over 88 percent of PPUs were originally trained by either active duty military members with special operations training or police officers who had previous special operations experience. Their responses also indicated that training had a profound impact on the units subculture (1997, 11). One of the responses to their survey reads, Weve had teams of Navy Seals and Army Rangers come here and teach us everything. We just have to use our judgment and exclude the information like: at this point we bring in the mortars and blow the place up (12). It would seem that with this sort of training, police would adopt a military mindset regardless of what technology was available to them. Also, while investigation was beyond the scope of this paper, botched raids are incredibly common, and one of the most criticized aspects of police militarization. This would seem to be more an issue of training than technology. The availability of military equipment certainly creates the potential for abuse, but with proper training that should not be a problem.

Current trends would seem to indicate that the militarization of police is likely to continue, especially because of the fervor with which the U.S. is fighting the War on Terror. The War on Terror encourages police officers to think about suspects as enemy combatants, even more so than the Drug War did. However, there is a possibility of some trends toward militarization being reversed if the War on Drugs continues to lose steam. The Obama administration has officially dropped Drug War rhetoric, although most policies have remained unchanged. Also, 46.2 percent of California voters voted in favor of a 2010 ballot initiative to legalize marijuana. Though certain aspects of the War on Drugs continue unabated, criticism of it is no longer the political third rail it once was. Policies put in place during the War on Drugs, like equipment sharing programs and military training, will likely be around for some time, but the heyday of the War on Drugs has passed. At the same time that the Drug War is winding down, the War on Terror is heating up . Mired in a two-front war (four if you include the military operations in Pakistan and Libya), the U.S. will likely be entangled in the War on Terror for years to come. Though Osama bin Laden was recently killed in Pakistan, there is no sign of the War on Terror abating.

Since the militarization of police is a trend that is here to stay, there are some policy recommendations that may be able to retain effectiveness in fighting drugs and terrorism, while still protecting the liberties of U.S. citizens. First, severely limiting the militarys ability to train police would go a long way towards eliminating the military mindset that many PPUs have adopted. The creation of some sort of agency or school to oversee SWAT training would benefit both citizens and police, as the tactics that police learn from special operations members is not tailored to their needs. Also, the creation of some sort of oversight apparatus to monitor the transfer of equipment from the military to civilian police could limit abuses. While there is certainly overlap in the tasks of the military and police, and it makes sense reduce cost by obtaining used equipment, there is a ridiculous amount of overkill on some occasions. There is absolutely no tactical reason to have a turreted troop transport in most areas, but if an agency decides to obtain one the chances are good that they will succeed. A federal agency to monitor transfers and prevent those that put unnecessary or dangerous equipment in the hands of police would prevent such egregious examples as this, though it could not be expected to catch every unwise transfer.

Psychological or sociological research into what exactly promotes the development of a military mindset would also be useful in forming good policy. Another possible means of limiting militarization would be policies encouraging or mandating that police film SWAT raids, as well as laws ensuring that the recordings are available to the public. As several researchers have chronicled, these raids are commonplace, as are abuses. But the raid in Missouri that was recorded sparked the most intense uproar of criticism that PPUs have faced in recent memory. The increased public scrutiny that cameras bring would likely limit the use of excessive force and make police more accountable to the members of the community they serve.

(Kappeler & Kraska 1997, 6)

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