an alliance dilemma? understanding romanian foreign policy in the context of transatlantic...

8/12/2019 AN ALLIANCE DILEMMA? UNDERSTANDING ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSATLANTIC DIVER

1/39

AN ALLIANCE DILEMMA? UNDERSTANDING ROMANIAN FOREIGN

POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSATLANTIC DIVERGENCES

by Mircea Micu*

ABSTRACT

There were at least four situations in which European and American stances over how

international politics should be conducted clashed and in which Romania was pressuredto take one side or another: international child adoptions, the Kyoto Protocol, the

International Criminal Court and the War in Iraq. Why did Romania decide to align

sometimes with the US and other times with European countries? This paper uses the

explanatory power of three leading theories of international relations to explain this

puzzle. Firstly, it shows that systemic forces of power relations are suitable for explaining

state behaviour, but only in security-related matters (neo-realism). Secondly, it shows that

public opinion is not translated into government policy either because public interest is

lacking or information about publics preferences is not available (liberalism). Thirdly, it

shows how inter-subjectively shared meanings, identity recognition and socialisation of

new norms offer the most compelling explanations of Romanias behaviour in the four

situations of transatlantic divergences (constructivism).

* This paper was awarded the Oxford Universitys Ralph Feltham Prize for the Best Dissertation in 2007and was published in the Romanian Journal of Political Science, Volume 7, Number 7, Autumn 2007.


2/39

I. INTRODUCTION

Rejoining the transatlantic family after almost 50 years on the dark side of the

Iron Curtain did not bring Romania the desired peace of mind. As certain American and

European international policies became excruciatingly divergent, Romania (like many

other former communist countries in the region) was caught in the middle and pressured

to take one side or another.

This paper tries to answer key questions such as What prompted Romania to

align sometimes with the US and other times with the EU when these two major allies

defended antagonistic positions?, Did Romania take a course of action out of fear oflosing the support of the stronger ally or fear of being confronted with retaliatory

measures?, Did Romania cunningly calculate the costs and benefits of each action in

order to maximise the benefits? or Were Romanias policy decisions the projection of

an ongoing process of societal transformation or the manifestation of evolving identities

and interests?. There are few research papers addressing these questions, situation which

allowed unsubstantiated and inconsistent interpretations dominate our understanding of

Romanian foreign policy.

Before answering these questions, I first describe briefly the context in which

Romanian foreign policy making takes place. I look at Romanias past and present

stances in foreign affairs, I try to determine what role Russia still plays in Romanias

foreign policy making (if any) and I analyse the nature and gravity of transatlantic

divergences. Subsequently, I employ the explanatory power of three dominant IR theories

(neo-realism, liberalism and constructivism) in order to generate explanations about the

Romanian foreign policy in four case studies where American and European stances

clashed and Romania had to support one side or another (International Child Adoptions,

Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal Court and War in Iraq).


3/39

II. THE CONEXT OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

Communist and post-communist years

Romanias foreign policy under the communist dictator Nicolae Ceauescu was

famous for its anti-Soviet features, which made Romania an awkward partner of the West

(especially of the US) and a unique case of communist-capitalist fusion in the

international affairs of those times. Despite the dreadful nature of its domestic politics,

Romania was shown a world-wide respect it had seldom enjoyed in its history for

splendid performances abroad (Brown, 1988: 263; Shafir, 1985: 193). This aspect is of

particular significance for the purpose of this paper as it indicates that Romaniasrelations with the transatlantic community were not completely frozen during its

communist history.

The discourse of Romanian foreign policy makers during the post-communist

period did not only catalyse the undisputed choice for a Euro-Atlantic agenda but also

constructed Romanias identity in relation to the other Russia and the Balkans (Hosu,

2002: 1-17). Romania used its status of European or Western or Latin to send a

clear message that Romanias place in the transatlantic community was a natural

phenomenon. During the transition from a former communist country to a member of this

community (to which it should have always been part had the country not tragically fallen

under Soviet influence), Romania defined her self as Central European, alongside the

other aspirants to NATO and EU membership. Romanian politicians rejected the

pejorative labels of Eastern European or Balkan country, from fear of being

perceived still under Russias dominance or part of the instability generated by

Yugoslavias disintegration.


4/39


5/39

addition, there is a temptation to play up the alterity of Russia in order to increase the

integration of the European self (Neumann, 1999: 110-2).

More recently, scholars have emphasised that while countries in the West saw

post-Cold War threats shifting to issues like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,

rogue states and other dangers that emanate from beyond Europes borders, Eastern

European countries saw NATO membership as protection against a resurgent Russia,

continuing to think of security in terms of territorial defence. Rather then relying on

military power, as his Soviet predecessors did, Vladimir Putin has sought to use

economic instruments, above all energy exports, [] to restore Russian influence in

Eastern Europe (Larrabee, 2006: 117-131).

Transatlantic Divergences - Irreversible or Not?

I argue that different perceptions of threats are central in explaining both

transatlantic divergences and Romanias attitudes when such divergences occur. Robert

Kagan (2003) claims that Europe cannot match the American military might, but is also

unwilling to spend as much as the US spends on its military capabilities, despite the fact

that Europes economy is stronger than ever. Europes economic power was not

translated into strategic and geo-political power. Kagan believes that weaker states tend

to perceive threats to international security from a less dramatic angle. In consequence,

Europe is inclined to use cultural and ideological means (soft power) and less forceful

diplomatic tools, giving priority to negotiations, strengthening of commercial ties and

international law over the use of military force and hard power. Nevertheless, we can

argue that the US believes Europe enjoys this luxury only because European diplomacy is

ultimately backed by US (not European) hard power.

Besides power disparities, Kagan gives two more explanations. The anti-war

psychology is deeply engrained in Europes societies, as a result of the ravages of the two

World Wars. Europe became war-phobic and systematically against any prospects for

future wars. Another explanation is that Europe is too inward looking, not paying too


6/39

much attention to outside problems, because Europe is kept busy with a difficult and

heavy integration agenda.

Some scholars suggest that today, it is doubtful whether we can talk of a

[transatlantic security community] with the same degree of confidence (Cox, 2005: 209),

proclaiming thus theend of Atlanticism , while others believe that that the recent strains

over the Atlantic, [which] all solved peacefully if at times painfully, do not signal the

demise of the transatlantic security community but, instead, empirically demonstrate how

alive and well it is (Pouliot, 2006: 119).

Pouliot believes that in any security community there are countries that

(willingly or not) dictate the norms and identities, and there are others that follow thelead and that the power politics of peace is a healthy and normal situation where allies

are struggling to impose identities, security cultures and norms on one another (2006:

124-5).

Conflicts are usually mitigated through consensus, but sometimes the resources

required for achieving it are huge, leading Pouliot to suggest that there may be a

threshold of conflict beyond which the we-ness constitutive of the community

dissolves (2006: 122-3). In the case of the current state of affairs of the transatlantic

relations there is no empirical evidence to imply that this threshold has been crossed.

Thomas Risse (2004: 181-213) is one of the optimistic scholars who believe that security

communities are founded on three elements: identity, interdependence and institutions,

and that in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, only the institutional fabric of the transatlantic

community suffered damage and now needs repair, though we can argue that identity

needs repair as well as there is no clear common enemy to provide it anymore.

Europe should not be considered a cohesive and unified entity when rifts in the

transatlantic relations occur. European states may behave antagonistically in relation to

one another mostly on political-military issues for various reasons. Former communist

countries are likely to favour stronger ties with the US, because in their view, their


7/39

security fears vis--vis Russia (which are not shared by older members of the EU) could

only be offset by a strong and powerful American partner and not by a rather politically

and militarily weak and impassive EU which they have just joined. Central Eastern

European countries are faced with an identity crisis where their commitment to

Atlanticism is opposed by a European identity, especially in the defence area. These

countries do not want to be forced to choose between the United States and Western

Europe; they want good relations with both and feel uncomfortable when transatlantic

divergences occur (Larrabee, 2006: 117-131).

III. ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY - THROUGH THE EYES OF IR

THEORIES

III.1. Theory and Research Methodology

International relations generate various theories and methods for the study of

international politics and the analysis of foreign policies. This paper examines Romanias

foreign policy decisions in four situations by using the methodological instruments

employed by three predominant and competing paradigms of international relations: neo-

realism, liberalism and constructivism. Within each IR theory, scholars have different

opinions on how their theory should be formulated. After reviewing the works of the

main scholars in each branch of IR, I select the methodologies that best fit the needs of

this exercise.

It is worth admitting that there are some IR theorists (especially neo-realists) who

reject the idea of using IR theories for the purpose of explaining particular foreign

policies. However, Schuster and Maier (2006: 224), in a similar experiment, have shown

that even those theorists who reject the explanatory power of IR theories to understand

foreign policy, in practice, analyse foreign policies with their IR theory toolbox.

This paper uses the process tracing method to determine the causal mechanisms

that link causes to effects in the four Romanian foreign policy cases presented below. As


8/39

recommended by process tracing scholars, I will examine histories, archival documents,

interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory

hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the

intervening variables in that case (George and Bennett, 2005: 6). I use data collected

from interviews with four elites (former ministers and principal advisers whose names, at

their request, I cannot disclose), as elite interviewing is highly relevant for process

tracing approaches to case study research due to its ability to gain information that may

not be included in released documents [] (Tansey, 2006: 1-3).

III.2. Four Major Cases of Transatlantic Divergences and Romanias Reactions

International Child Adoptions

The grim legacy of communism also affected Romanias child welfare system.

The social policies of the 1960s were meant to generate an increase in Romanias

population as part of a wider strategy for enhancing the countrys role in the region and

internationally. A ban on abortion and the use of contraceptives contributed to an increase

of population from 18.4 million in 1960 to 23.2 million in 1990. However, due to

economic shortages and severe rationalisation, many Romanian families decided to give

away their children to foster state-run institutions. In 1990, after the collapse of the

communist regime, Romania had over 100,000 institutionalised children. Their situation

deteriorated even further, making international adoptions one of the solutions to tackle

this problem. But the adoption system was open to corruption and abuse, encouraging

the development of a market where children were literally sold and bought at very high

prices. In 1998, for example, Romanias permissive stance placed her among the first

three largest inter-country adoptions suppliers after Russia and China, with more than

2,000 cases.

During negotiations preceding Romanias accession to the EU, the European

Commission (EC) argued that Romanias inter-country adoption policy was not

complying with the EUs political criteria in the field of human rights. As a consequence,


9/39

Romania suspended international adoptions until better procedures structures were put in

place.

Though Romania was a party to two international conventions concerning the

child protection - the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 and the Hague

Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Inter-Country

Adoptions 1993, the EC favoured the former because it gave preference to domestic

solutions over international adoptions (Kapstein, 2003: 115-25). During 2001 and 2004,

the period when adoptions were suspended, Romania became the subject of dispute

between the EC and the largest receiving countries like the US, France and Italy. In the

end, Romania decided to enforce legal measures that made international adoptions almost

impossible causing the discontent of mainly the US, which had reportedly pressuredRomania not to restrict adoptions either by promising laxer visa regime for Romanians or

by threatening with the discontinuation of military and economic aid to Romania ( Elite

Interviewee #2 ). However, the EC was satisfied with the new legislative package and

decided that Romania complied fully with EU requirements.

Kyoto Protocol

In March 2001, Romania became the first developed country to ratify the Kyoto

Protocol. Romania pledged to cut 8% of the 1989 emission gas levels between 2008 and

2012. The first positive aspect of the Protocol for Romania was that emission reduction

commitments were set at the 1989 level, when Romanias central-planned economy was

at its peak, and not at the 1990 level, like all the other developed countries, when

Romanias economy collapse followed that of the communist regime. As a result,

Romania managed to reduce her emissions by 58% between 1989 and 2001, mainly due

to the industrial production cut-back ( International Energy Agency, 2003 ). Thus, the

Protocols provisions became a lucrative business for Romania, which started to sell her

emission reduction units especially to other countries. However, Romanias decision to

be the first country to ratify the Protocol was not made only on an obvious economic gain

basis. Romanian politicians of those times believed that signing and ratifying multilateral


10/39

agreements (including this Protocol) would legitimise them internationally and fulfil

Romanias desire to be recognised as a European country which broke with her

communist past ( Elite Interviewee #3 ).

Being the first country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol saved Romania from external

pressure from any party to the conflicting debate on this matter. The dispute between EU

countries and the US reached its climax only later, after all EU countries became party to

the Protocol.

International Criminal Court

The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which came intoforce on 1 July 2002, grants the ICC jurisdiction over three classes of crime: genocide,

crimes against humanity and war crimes. Romania became a party to the treaty in April

2002.

The strongest opponent of the ICC was the US which considered that the

organisation of the court was not compatible with the concept of national sovereignty and

that the court lacked political accountability and oversight mechanisms for its actions.

Furthermore, the US argued that its personnel deployed for peace-making operations or

other military activities in more than 100 countries could be exposed to politically

motivated prosecutions. Not only that the US did not ratify the Rome Statue, but it also

passed two legislative acts (the American Servicemembers Protection Act in August

2002 and the Nethercutt Amendment to the Foreign Appropriations Bill in December

2004) which put an end to US military and economic aid to those countries that would

not grant US nationals and US-employed non-nationals immunity from the ICC under

Article 98 of the Rome Statue. Countries exempted from this requirement were NATO

countries and major non-NATO allies.

However, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1422 on 12 July 2002

instructing the ICC not to commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of


11/39


12/39

War in Iraq

In January 2003, five members of the EU (Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal and

Denmark) followed by other three EU candidates (Poland, Hungary and the Czech

Republic) signed a letter of implied support to the USs imminent invasion of Iraq meant

to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Shortly thereafter, another group (Vilnius 10) of

European states (including Romania) signed a similar letter of support. The sharpest

criticism came from the French president Jacques Chirac:

These countries have not been very well behaved [instead they were] rather

reckless of the danger of aligning themselves too rapidly with the American

position. [The letters were] infantile [and] dangerous. They missed a greatopportunity to shut up. Romania and Bulgaria were particularly irresponsible. If

they wanted to diminish their chances of joining Europe they could not have

found a better way. [When asked why he wasn't similarly critical of the EU

nations that signed the letter, Chirac said:] When you are in the family ... you

have more rights than when you are asking to join and knocking on the door

(CNN, 18 February 2003 ).

Romanians responded that beyond possible speculation on political or economic

reasons in relation to our partnership with the United States or interests in the energy

field, there was a real concern about the threats of terrorism and that these had to be

tackled preventively, as soon as they emerged, and not when they occurred on the

national territory. Also, understanding the terrors of a dictatorship from her own

experience, Romania felt that it was necessary to intervene in cases like Iraq. ( Elite

Interviewee #1 and Rompress News Agency, 23 October 2003 ).

Though it has been speculated that one of the reasons why Romania supported the

US intervention in Iraq was to not put in danger the ratification of her NATO accession

treaty by the US Congress, Romania remained a staunch US supporter long time after her

accession to NATO, until present days. Both Romanias government at the time of the


13/39

intervention and current administration declared their full and continued support for the

US, also mentioning that the withdrawal of her 730 troops from Iraq (currently the fifth

largest) will take place only in consultation with her allies and at the request of the Iraqi

government.

***

Next, I will use the lines of arguments of three IR theories (neo-realism,

liberalism and constructivism) in order to generate explanations about Romanias

behaviour in the four policy cases presented above.

III.3. Neo-Realism

Balance-of-power theory assumes that states are unitary actors whose aims might

range from merely state preservation to hegemonic domination, and in order to achieve

them, they either increase their internal capabilities or seek external allies in order to

balance against the stronger power. However, [i]n anarchy, security is the highest end

(Waltz, 1979: 126).

Stephen Walt argues that states do not balance against aggregate power alone but

against threats. The differentiation between power and threat is the central theme of

Walts theory. Strong states are not necessarily hostile; they can also be benevolent or

just neutral. Also, weaker states can pose danger to someone elses security, even if they

dont possess enormous power. Aggregate power is still important, but only together with

other factors, such as geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived

intentions can one explain what determines a state to ally with or against other states

(Walt, 1987: 5).

While trying to explain how alliances are formed as a response to threat, Walt

distinguishes two possible hypotheses: balancing (allying with others against the

dominant threat) and bandwagoning (aligning with the source of threat). This is a


14/39

departure from Waltzs definitions of balancing and bandwagoning, whereby states either

balance with other weaker states against the stronger power or bandwagon with the latter.

After analysing alliance formation in the Middle East between 1955 and 1979, Walt

suggests that balancing behaviour is more likely to occur. Bandwagoning appears only in

exceptional cases, when a state is weak and isolated and allies are not available (Walt,

1987: 147).

States prefer to ally with a distant superpower, especially if the source of threat is

a strong neighbouring country. The distant superpower would ideally be able to match the

offensive capabilities of the hostile state whose aggressive intentions are obvious. The

less threatening a superpower is, the more popular it is among weaker states. Walt

observes that when weak states have excessive confidence in the protecting superpower,they feel tempted to free-ride in terms of security acquisition leaving the entire burden

on the shoulders of the superpower. In turn, the superpower will try to extract an

advantage from the assisted states.

I deduce that the help received by a weaker state from its protecting superpower

to balance against the threat is reciprocated with the support given by the weaker state to

the superpower (even if of a lesser intensity) so that the superpower can build up its

efforts to balance against its own source of threat which can be the same or different from

that of the weaker state. As long as the protecting superpower poses no threat to the

assisted weaker state, and vice-versa, their relationship can only be described as

balancing behaviour. I argue that Romania and the US share at least one source of threat

(Russia) and that they jointly balance against it.

Neo-Realist Hypotheses & Results:

According to Walts balance-of-threat theory, Romania, like any other state facing

an external threat, will align with other states to oppose the source of threat. Ideally,

Romania will align with a stronger and more distant country, because nearer powerful

states are likely to be perceived as more threatening than distant ones. Actually, danger


15/39

almost always comes from neighbouring countries. As balancing behaviour is more

common than bandwagoning behaviour, Romania will most likely not ally with the most

threatening power but instead try to seek allies to balance against it.

Russia: Romanias source of threat

From all Romanias neighbours, Russia detaches itself as the country with the

largest aggregate power and offensive capabilities and the most aggressive perceived

intentions. One strong reason that supports this argument is Romanias historical adverse

experience with and exposure to Russia (see chapter II). Other reasons are: Russias open

opposition to Romanias NATO membership and deployment of US troops on Romanian

soil, the stationing of Russian troops in Transnistria, the dependency on Russias energyresources sometimes used to force certain political outcomes, and covert and suspicious

Russian expansion into the Romanian economy. The rather cold and sometimes

conflicting diplomatic discourse between Romania and Russia and the low level of

bilateral commercial exchanges reinforce Russias aggressive intentions towards

Romania.

As a consequence, since the fall of communism, Russia has been believed to be

Romanias source of threat. In order to avoid falling again under Russias influence,

Romania looked westwards to seek allies to balance against Russia, confirming thus

Walts hypothesis that a threatened state will try to form an alliance with a distant great

power.

Balancing with the US

Romania turned its face to Western European countries and the US in hope that it

would find guarantees for its own security. By far, the US is the biggest power both in

terms of aggregate capabilities and military resources. Following Walts logic, Romania

would prefer balancing with the US against its source of threat. The means to reach this

objective was considered to be Romanias accession to NATO, whose dominant actor


16/39

was the US. Though the fall of communism meant that the Soviet Union would no longer

represent the threat which NATO was supposed to counter, Romania continued to see

NATO (assimilated with the US) as a way to guarantee its security against the Soviet

Unions heir, Russia.

Other reasons why Romania decided to form an alliance with the US, rather than

with EU countries alone, were the perceived inability of EU countries to provide the

security that Romania needed and the EU countries own security dependency on the US.

Walt argues that superpowers will tend to balance against each other mostly

because of their aggregate power. Even if Russias power does not equal the power of the

defunct Soviet Union or the USs power, it can still be considered a great power againstwhich the US would normally balance. Thus, both the US and Romania will balance

against Russia even if they do it for different reasons. Besides balancing against other

superpowers, the US may also balance against other sources of perceived threat, such as

international terrorism. And even a superpower like the US will try to form alliances with

other states to balance effectively against its own sources of threat.

In order to gain the US support to balance against Russia, while avoiding free-

riding, Romania would have to reciprocate this assistance whenever it may be required

and feasible.

The Neo-Realist Answer: Exchange of Support (only in security matters)

Moving to explaining why Romania decided to align with either the US or EU

countries when transatlantic divergences occurred I separate those cases dominated by

security issues from non-security cases. A major limitation of neo-realist theories is that

they can only explain security-related situations. Political and economic matters are not

given significant importance.


17/39

As the exchange of support between allies contributes to effective balancing, we

should expect Romania to align with the US in those situations where Romanias NATO

accession is at stake. Only by becoming a member of NATO would Romania have been

able to balance against the perceived threat of Russia. Both the ICC and Iraq were such

situations.

ICC: Romania was the first country to sign an agreement with the US offering US

citizens immunity from ICC jurisdiction. This decision was taken before the NATO

Summit deciding whether Romania should join the organisation or not. The US support

was essential. It was because of this reason that Romania offered this exemption and not

because of the fear of losing US direct military and economic aid. The US did indeed put

pressure on Romania to take this favourable decision, but Romanias reaction should notbe seen as bandwagoning behaviour, for the simple reason that the US did not represent

Romanias source of threat. The US was the ally through which Romania can balance

effectively against her source of threat. Conceding to the US request did not only

represent a help given when the US needed it desperately, but also an accepted and

acceptable price which Romania had to pay in order to achieve its objective. The

diplomatic sacrifice that Romania made (and which Walt believes that should be

expected) was to draw the resentment of several [not all] EU states which in turn might

have led to losing their support in achieving another non-security-related objective: the

EU accession.

Iraq: Romanias decision to join the US-led coalition in Iraq has been harshly

criticised by some EU countries (especially France), but it needs to be mentioned that in

this case other EU countries supported the US Iraq policy in its initial stages as well.

Thus, the cost of supporting the US was more bearable than in the ICC case where the

opposition against US intentions was greater. Romanias decision to send its troops in

Iraq came at a moment between NATOs decision to invite Romania to become a

member of the organisation and the ratification of the accession treaty by the US

Congress. The difference in this situation was that the US did not put any pressure on

Romania to align with its plans for Iraq. However, we can still argue that Romanias


18/39


19/39

purposively in world politics (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). Thus, public opinion, elites

attitudes and interest groups are decisive factors for political action (Schuster and

Maier, 2006: 228).

Also, liberals argue that states realise their preferences under the constraints

imposed by the preferences of other states. States are prone to negotiate policy co-

ordination with other states, especially in those situations where an exchange of policy

concessions through co-ordination or pre-commitment can improve the welfare of both

parties. Here lies one of the major differences between neo-realism and liberalism: while

liberals think that the interaction between states can lead to a win-win situation, realists

believe that in such exchanges one party has to gain at the expense of the other

(Moravcsik, 1997: 521).

A series of studies on the domestic actors impact on the foreign policy making

revealed that mass public opinion matters (Risse-Kappen, 1991: 510), especially in

situations in which a broad public is activated (Powlick and Katz, 1998: 29-61) and in

which issue specific survey data become available to politicians (Holsti, 1996: 195).

Liberal Hypotheses & Results:

I test the liberal hypotheses by first assessing the impact that mass public opinion

has on governments foreign policy making. There are two criteria to measure public

opinion: through the results of surveys and the extent of public protests (Schuster and

Maier, 2006: 228). Secondly, I look at how elites attitudes shape foreign policy as a

result of a cost/benefit analysis by examining elites speeches and policy actions. Thirdly,

I will explore to what extent interest groups have determined governments policy by

studying the results of an elite interview and the lobby activities of such groups as

reflected in the media. Before I proceed with testing these hypotheses, I present the

results of the first comprehensive assessment of Romanias publics perceptions on

foreign affairs (Voinescu and Dobre, 2005: 4-48).


20/39


21/39

subscribe to the way Romanian foreign policy is conducted, can only mean that the

transmission belt between government and individuals is either weak or missing.

The type of democracy adopted by different countries could explain this state-of-

affairs. Romania is still considered to be a transitional democracy in which institutions

are weak and where elites and oligarchic-type interest groups dominate the policy

agenda. Also, the role of parliament and political parties in foreign policy making is

reduced (Roberts, 2002).

Elites attitudes, predominant

Adoptions: Initially, Romanias policy towards international adoptions washeavily influenced by domestic and external private interest groups, who extracted profits

from the creation of a market for the supply of and demand for adoptable children, which

seriously contravened international obligations. When adoptions were halted, it was the

will of supranational institutions that prevailed (the EC and the European Parliament

requested Romania to comply with international obligations if she wanted to join the

EU). Romanias (and other states) preference for a flexible international adoptions

regime (shaped almost entirely by private interest groups) was reversed by EU

institutions. We can argue that liberal hypotheses fail in this case because Romanias

preferences were not generated domestically but were shaped by an outside supra-state

entity. I argue that Romanias preference (shared both by individuals and elites) for EU

membership outweighed the interest of private groups in the adoptions business. In the

latter argumentation, elite policy-makers were instrumental in enforcing the suspension

of international adoptions in order to conform to Romanias more important EU

accession interest.

Kyoto: There is no doubt about Romanias net economic benefits emanating from

the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. Romanias adoption of the Protocol was also

realised under the pressure of oligarchic interest groups which wanted to take advantage

of this lucrative business ( Elite Interviewee #4 ). However, the main driving force behind


22/39


23/39

importance of the formation of state interests and the role that social interaction may play

in shaping states identities and interests (Reus-Smit, 2005: 188-212).

Structure shapes identities, interests and actions

In turn, constructivists articulate a completely different ontological set of

propositions about international relations. They claim that states are social and political

actors whose identities and interests are constituted by the social interactions between

them. The international society in which states co-exist and interact is a realm of inter-

subjective understandings and expectations that constitute their conceptions of self and

other or a realm of inter-subjectively shared social meanings that constitute the

structures which organise [states] actions and in which states acquire their identities(Wendt, 1992: 397).

Inter-subjectively shared social meanings relate to actors beliefs about each

others rationality, strategies, preferences and beliefs, as well as about states of the

external world. In addition, norms, rules, institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs

and laws are all made of common knowledge (Wendt, 2004: 159-60).

Despite arguing that structures consist of shared understandings and expectations,

constructivists do not deny the importance of the material conditions of structures

emphasised by rationalists. Material conditions make certain actions possible or

impossible, costly or cheap, whether or not actors perceive them as such (Wendt, 2004:

157). Nevertheless, material resources may acquire different meanings through the

structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded (Wendt, 1995: 73), which

can explain, for example, why a powerful country like the US is friendly towards Canada

and hostile towards Cuba.


24/39

Identities shape interests, interests shape actions

An actors identity is a subjective quality embedded in its self-understandings, but

these understandings need to be recognised as such by other actors in the system.

Identities are given a meaning by both the self and the other which means that they are

constituted by both internal and external structures (Wendt, 2004: 224). By participating

in collective meanings, actors acquire identities which are attached to a psychological

reality within a specific, socially constructed world (Wendt, 1992: 397; Berger, 1966:

111).

Constructivists argue that understanding how structures mould state identities is

important because identities shape interests, and interests, in turn, shape actions or policy.In their view, knowing how interests are generated is essential in explaining many aspects

of international politics that rationalists ignored or misunderstood. In order to explain the

formation of interests, constructivists look at the social identities of states and argue that

identities are the basis of interests (Wendt, 1992: 398). Identities refer to who actors

are, whereas interests refer to what actors want. An actor is not able to decide what it

wants before knowing who it is. Interests describe motivations that can help explain

actions. However, actions also depend on actors beliefs about how to meet their identity

needs and realise their consequent interests in a given context (Wendt, 2004: 231-2).

Structures and identities mutually constituted

Social inter-subjective structures may well shape actors identities and interests,

but these structures could not possibly be reproduced and reconstructed without the

knowledgeable practices [or policies] of those actors (Reus-Smit, 2005: 197).

Institutionalised norms and ideas define the meaning and identity of individual actors

and the patterns of appropriate economic, political and cultural activity engaged by those

individuals (Boli, Meyer and Thomas, 1989: 12) and it is through reciprocal interaction

that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which

we define our identities and interests (Wendt, 1992: 406).


25/39


26/39

(e.g. opposing the Soviet Unions division of labour principle among communist

countries aiming at converting Romania into an agriculture-based economy; deploring the

military intervention of Warsaw Pacts members in Czechoslovakia; opening political

and economic channels with countries of the West and Israel, etc.), singling out

Romania as one of the most West-friendly communist countries. However, the situation

reversed in the early 80s under the influence of the domestic regime shift towards a

personality cult-driven autocracy, which left Romania completely isolated.

Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the removal of the obstacles posed by

the Soviet Union, rekindled Romanias self-perceived European identity, and by

extension her transatlantic identity. The revival of this identity generated and shaped

Romanias new interests: being recognised by the West as no longer belonging to theEast, becoming a member of the European and transatlantic institutions and taking

advantage of the economic opportunities offered by free trade and open markets.

Romanias policies were calibrated accordingly: opening technical accession negotiations

with NATO and the EU, meeting NATO and EU accession criteria and pledging for

political, economic and social reform in order to reach the status of a liberal democracy

and functioning market economy, the main features of the transatlantic community.

Adhering to European and transatlantic norms and fulfilling NATOs and the EUs

accession criteria validated Romanias European identity by the other members of the

community.

Constructivists argue that many national security interests depend on a particular

construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others (Jepperson,

Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 60). In spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union,

Romanias negative perceptions of Russia, the driving force behind the Soviet Union, did

not change much; most of the enmity and mistrust about Russia remained vivid in

Romanias common knowledge. Russias identity, as perceived by Romanians [and

other Central Europeans], was believed to antagonise the identities that constituted the

European and transatlantic community which Romania wanted to join. In addition to

perceiving Russia as a threat to her identity, Romania tried to inflate Russias


27/39

aggressive intentions in order to boost its European/transatlantic identity and speed up

her acceptance by the West.

Michael Barnett criticises Stephen Walt for his failure (or unwillingness) to

incorporate ideational factors in his balance-of-threat theory. Barnett argues that

aggressive intentions trigger the construction of threat as a social inter-subjective

structure that can have an effect on states interests and policies in the sense that states

with shared identities will engage in alliance formation. However, threats can be

perceived differently by the members of the same alliance and they may disagree on the

means to confront the threat (Barnett, 1996: 406). In Romanias case, the

hypersensitiveness about the threat of the Russian other intensified her

European/transatlantic identity and need for quick integration with the West. In thislight, the USs political influence bolstered by its superior military and economic

capabilities was perceived as the key means by which Romania could pursue her

stringent interests. As a consequence, Romanias interest was to get closer to the US and

forge a strong alliance with it (which in reality took the shape of a quasi-institutionalised

strategic bilateral partnership). Romanias policies towards the US became thus fully co-

operative.

The transatlantic divergences generated by different understandings of norms

associated with the communitys members shared identities and disagreement over what

constituted acceptable behaviour for the members of the group in different areas (ICC,

Iraq, Kyoto, adoptions among others), faced Romania with a serious dilemma. Romanias

representation of the transatlantic community did not allow a detachment of her European

identity from her transatlantic identity. Both identities were interdependent and

inseparable.


28/39

Lines of constructivist arguments applied to the Romanian situation

Socialisation of European norms

Adoptions: A major distinction between the issue of international child adoptions

and the other cases analysed in this paper is that the former was formally linked toRomanias EU accession process as an institutional conditionality, whereas the others

were not.

The EU is seen as a unique case of regional integration, in which a more intense

network of norms shape the behaviour of members with shared identities and interests in

specified areas. Nevertheless, the issue of international adoptions has never been on top

of the EU agenda until Romania decided to join in. It has never been an issue because EU

members did not experience significant inter-state adoptions among themselves, and

because the member states regulations in this field (in relation to other countries), though

not uniform, were considered to be consistent with basic EU rules in the area of human

rights. Romanias policy and practice in this field was believed to breach fundamental

human rights. The EU did not impose Romania a certain set of norms for international

* Fall of the Soviet Union* US supremacy

* NATO and EU enlargement* Transatlantic divergences* Threat of the Russian other

* International recognition* NATO/EU membership

* Compliance withNATO/EU norms and otherinternational agreements* Political, economic andsocial reforms* Pro-American (security-related) policies

European/transatlanticidentity


29/39


30/39


31/39


32/39

unacceptable. Seen through constructivists lenses, this tension represents a continuous

debate over their collective identity which is possible whenever there are competing

definitions of collective identity that call for contradictory behaviours (Barnett, 1996:

411). In other words, Romania did not consider herself being less European than other

members by applying US-friendly policies. From a Romanian perspective being

European is also being transatlantic, a formula that does not allow the separation of

the US from Europe. This is one example of how Romanias perceptions attempt to shift

the inter-state structure towards a more coherent European/transatlantic unity. A

second example is that certain behaviours of the community members (e.g. going to war

for humanitarian purposes and/or to counter the international threat of terrorism) should

become a norm.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

After analysing the nature of transatlantic divergences we can argue that the

transatlantic alliance has not reached the threshold of conflict beyond which the we-

ness of the community dissolves. Divergences among the members of community are

normal because competing definitions of collective identities are at the heart of identity

formation. One of the explanations why transatlantic conflicts emerge comes from the

fact that the US and European countries perceive threats differently. The US seems to be

more sensitive to threats than its European allies, in part due to its role as military and

economic superpower that has to take most of the communitys security burden upon its

shoulders. In addition, Europe should not be seen as a homogenous entity, especially in

matters of defence and foreign policy. Both older and newer members of the EU perceive

threats differently despite the fact that norms to homogenise behaviours are in the

making. Interdependence between the members of the alliance is still strong, but identity

and especially institutional arrangements need repair.

Romanias saga in international politics of the past 15 years has been dominated

by a strong desire to be acknowledged as belonging to the West. This identity was

manifested before and even during the communist period. Romania defined herself by


33/39

opposition to the eternal other, the barbarian, totalitarian and offensive Russia, and

systematically tried to break away from its dominance. This is one of the reasons why

countries in Central and Eastern Europe (now NATO and EU members), perceive threats

in a different manner than older members of the community, and why they are inclined to

side with the US especially on security-military matters.

The neo-realist theory explains that Romanias decision to align with the US on

the issues of ICC and Iraq was motivated by the need to obtain the support of the stronger

ally to balance against the threat of Russia. Other non-security matters like international

adoptions and climate change remain unexamined by neo-realists.

Modern liberals argue that in a democracy individual and collective interests aretranslated into public policy by a perceptive government. The first problem encountered

by liberals is the lack of information about the public opinion on specific issues

(adoptions, Kyoto and ICC). Secondly, they fail to explain what happens when the

transmission belt is weak or missing (Iraq). Liberals fail at least on another two counts:

they do not explore how identities are formed (the decision behind Kyoto) and they reject

the idea that state preferences can be shaped by outside entities (adoptions). Nevertheless,

what liberals can argue is that the transmission belt did function on major issues such as

NATO and EU accession and that Romanians interest in joining these organisations was

more intense than whatever interests Romanians might have had in cases like adoptions,

ICC or Iraq.

Constructivist theory generates the most compelling explanations for all four case

studies. Constructivists can explain how Romanias policy was altered by a normative

structure through the socialisation of new norms (adoptions) and how Romania pursued

certain polices in order to have her identity recognised by the significant other

Europeans (Kyoto). Romanias meanings given to the US position in the international

system shifted her policies towards better co-ordination with the US (ICC and Iraq).

Romanias transatlantic identity could have only been materialised with US support.

Though initially her European identity was arguably put in danger, Romania found a


34/39

middle-way so that, in time, both US support and evolving EU norms were secured.

Constructivists also revealed Romanias participation in the shaping the environmental

structure, by contributing with her own definitions to the debate on what collective

identity and acceptable behaviour should be (Iraq).


35/39

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BARNETT, Michael N. - Identities and Alliances in the Middle East in KATZENSTEIN,

Peter J. (ed.) - The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics

(pp. 400-50). Columbia University Press

BERGER, Peter (1966) - Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge. European

Journal of Sociology (Vol.7, No. 1, pp. 32-40)

BOLI, J. and MEYER, J. and THOMAS, G. (1989) - Ontology and Rationalization in the

Western Cultural Account in BOLI, J. et all (eds) Institutional Structure: Constituting

State, Society and the Individual. London

BROWN, James (1988) - Eastern Europe and Communist Rule. Duke University Press

COX, Michael (2006) - Lets Argue about the West: Reply to Vincent Pouliot. European

Journal of International Relations (Vol.12, No.1, pp. 129-34)

DEUTSCH, Karl W. et all (1957) - Political Community and the North Atlantic Area:

International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton University

Press

DROZDIAK, William (2005) - The North Atlantic Drift. Foreign Affairs (Vol.84, No.1,

pp. 88-98)

GEORGE, Alexander L. and BENNETT, Andrew (2005) - Case Studies and Theory

Development in the Social Sciences. MIT Press

GIDDENS, Anthony (1991) - Modernity and Self-Identity. Stanford University Press


36/39

HAGAN, Joe D. (1995) - Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign

Policy in NEAK, Laura and HEY, Jeanne A. K. and HANEY, Patrick J. (eds) - Foreign

Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs:

Prentice-Hall

HOLSTI, Ole R. (1996) - Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. University of

Michigan Press

HOSU, Alina (2002) - State Identity and Western Integration. The Case of Post-Cold

War Romania. Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of

Tampere

IORDACHI, Constantin (1996) - The Anatomy of a Historical Conflict: Romanian-

Hungarian Diplomatic Conflict in the 1980's. Department of History, Central European

University

JEPPERSON, Ronald L. and WENDT, Alexander and KATZENSTEIN, Peter J. -

Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security in KATZENSTEIN, Peter J. (ed.) - The

Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics (pp. 33-78). Columbia

University Press

KAGAN, Robert (2003) - Power & Paradise: America and Europe in the New World

Order. London: Atlantic

KAPSTEIN, Ethan (2003) The Baby Trade. Foreign Affairs (Vol.82, No.6, pp. 115-25)

KUNDERA, Milan (1984) - The Tragedy of Central Europe. New York Review of Books

(26 April, pp.33-8)

LARABEE, Stephen F. (2006) - Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe. Foreign

Affairs (Vol.85, No.6, pp. 117-131)


37/39

MATTERN, Janice (2001) - The Power Politics of Identity. European Journal of

International Relations (Vol.7, No.3, pp. 349-97)

MICU, Mircea (2002) - Assessing the US-Romania Strategic Partnership (in Romanian).

Department of Political Science, National School of Political and Administrative Studies

of Bucharest

MORAVCSIK, Andrew (1991) Negotiating the Single European Act: National

Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. International

Organization (Vol. 45, No.1, pp. 19-56)

MORAVCSIK, Andrew (1997) - Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of

International Politics. International Organization (Vol. 51, No.4, pp. 513-53)

NEUMANN, Iver (1999) - Uses of the other: the "East" in European identity formation.

University of Minnesota Press

POULIOT, Vincent (2006) - The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A

Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox. European Journal of International Relations (Vol.12,

No.1, pp. 119-27)

POWLICK, Philip J. and KATZ, Andrew Z. (1998) - Defining the American Public

Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. Mershon International Studies Review (Vol.42, pp. 29

61)

REUS-SMIT, Christian et all (2005) - Constructivism in Theories of International

Relations (pp. 188-212). Palgrave Macmillan

REYNOLD, Gonzague (1950) - Le Monde Russe. La formation de lEurope (Vol.6).

Paris : Librairie Plan


38/39

RISSE-KAPPEN, Thomas (1991) - Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign

Policy in Liberal Democracies. World Politics (Vol.43, pp. 479512)

RISSE-KAPPEN, Thomas (2004) - Beyond Iraq: The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security

Community in HELD, David and KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI, Mathias (eds) - American

Power in the 21st Century (pp. 181-213). Cambridge Polity Press

ROBERTS, Henry L. (1964) - Reply in TREADGOLD, Donald W. (ed.) - The

Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views (pp. 386-8). University of

Washington Press

ROBERTS, Kari (2002) - Institutions and Individuals in the Making of Russian Foreign

Policy Toward the United States Since 1991. Department of Political Science, University

of Calgary. Paper prepared for presentation at the 43rd Annual International Studies

Association Convention in New Orleans (March 2002)

SCHUSTER, Jster and MAIER, Herbert (2006) - The Rift: Explaining Europes

Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on Iraq. Foreign Policy

Analysis (Vol.2, pp. 223-44)

SHAFIR, Michael (1985) - Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society. Boulder,

Colorado: Lynne Rienner

TANSEY, Oisn (2006) - Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-

probability Sampling. Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the

American Political Science Association (Philadelphia, September 2006)

VAJDA, Mihly (1989) - Who Excluded Russia from Europe? in SCHPHLIN, George

and WOOD, Nancy (eds) - In Search of Central Europe (pp. 168-75). Cambridge: Polity


39/39

an alliance dilemma? understanding romanian foreign policy in the context of transatlantic...

Documents