ams02 mission operations

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02

Phase III PSRP / SRP

Mission Operations

January 12, 2010

Timothy J. Urban / ESCG / Barrios Technology


AMS02 Mission Operations

Outline• Timeline• Pre-Launch Operations• Ascent Operations• On-Orbit Operations

– STS– SRMS to SSRMS Hand-off– ISS

• EVA Compatibility• Contingency Operations• OCAD Summary

January 12, 2010 Timothy Urban / ESCG 2


3January 12, 2010 Timothy Urban / ESCG

Overall Milestone Timeline



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• Activate/checkout AMS-02 avionics subsystems and thermally condition payload

– Approximately 1000 ~ 1500 W for J-Crate, Cryo-valves, Cryo-coolers, Cryomagnet Avionics Box (CAB) critical functions, and Super Fluid Helium (SFHe)Tank Vent Pump

– Maximum of 2 kW (peak) for calibration and contingency based upon thermal load in purged Payload Bay (PLB)

No magnet charging possible on STS – Assembly Power Converter Unit (APCU) power supplied to prime Power Distribution System (PDS) side “B” has no connectivity to the CAB

• Final cryogenic servicing• Cryosystems monitoring

AMS02 Mission OperationsPAD Pre-Launch Operations

January 12, 2010 Timothy Urban / ESCG


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T0 Interfaces via Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical (ROEU) Payload Disconnect Assembly (PDA): On-Board Pump, Cryocoolers, valves, CAB critical monitoring functions, and J-Crate• Power (120 VDC) to Power Distribution System (PDS) • Direct feed to Vent Pump (110 VAC)

• 48VDC for diversion valve DV09C (momentary)• 1553 for command/telemetry requirements • High Rate Data via RS422

– Continuous data using both paths (redundancy) until L-9 min to monitor health status of Cryo systems (Vacuum Case pressure and SFHe pressure/temp), supporting AMS-02 Launch Commit Criteria #1 (details to follow)

AMS02 Mission OperationsT0 Umbilical Interfaces



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CB4 Closed

S16 - ON S18 - ON

NOTE: Placards may not represent flight configuration.

Standard Switch Panel Configuration – Ascent Switch List

AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch Configuration

CB2 Closed

AMS VENTVLV PRI

AMS VENTVLV SEC

AMS VENTVLV STATUS

ON

OFF

ON

OFF



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Standard Switch Panel (SSP) • Performed by ASP as late as possible in Ascent Switch

List.– Minimizes the amount of time in which the payload is at-risk:

• If the vent valve opens early (i.e. PAD EMI causes a failure), ingested air would freeze, rendering the vent useless and the Helium supply would be lost very early on-orbit resulting in no Magnet.

– Performed as part of crew strap-in procedures to delay activation?• Crew will disable switches S16 and S18 once on-orbit, the

payload is powered and the vent valve position has been confirmed at the Payload Operation and Control Center.

• DS16 talkback will confirm Vent Valve powered off.

AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch Configuration



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• Installation at L-22 days through L-30 minutes operations:– L-88 hours complete Top-off SFHe activities & payload GSE

interface disconnect– L-80 hours PLB door close

• At L-30 minutes – Close SFHe Tank Vent Valve and deactivate Vent Pump– Deactivate Cryo-coolers – Power down all equipment with the exception of J-Crate and

necessary CAB functions to monitor of cryogenics system health• Monitor health status of cryogenic systems until L-9 min:

GO / NO GO LCC#1 from AMS-02 based on Cryogenic System Health

• At L-9 minutes: Complete Payload Power-Down

AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch Timeline



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Safety Launch Commit CriteriaLoss of vacuum case seal immediately prior to launch results in over-pressurization of the SFHe Tank during ascent, over-pressurizing the PLB and possibly damaging the Aft Bulkhead

• Worst case leak in Vacuum Case (VC) requires 23 minutes to generate sufficient He to burst disks, releasing gas into PLB

• PLB over-pressurization must occur between L+30 seconds and L+1 minute to result in STS safety hazard

• Monitor VC health / status until L-9 minutes– Compared to trend data established over the lifetime of the experiment to

indicate occurrence, and make the GO / NO GO Call – Minimum of three measurements of temperature and pressure within the

SFHe Tank will provide this data on redundant paths For operational scenarios that involve the burst disks rupturing at any

other time, no hazard has been identified

AMS02 Mission OperationsPre-Launch



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SFHe Tank Nominal Vent Valve Operation• He Vapor pressure in SFHe tank must be maintained at

a pressure to keep LHe temperature superfluid Endurance & Mission Success

• Vent valve to open when PLB pressure is less than the SFHe vapor pressure (< 20 millibars)

• Must occur during Powered Flight– Porous plug, which allows He vapor vent while containing the

liquid within the tank– When the valve is opened, liquid must not be in contact with the

porous plug, which could act as a pump to drain the SFHe liquid from the tank

Not a safety issue, due the rate of pumping that would occur Endurance & Mission Success

– Porous plug is designed to be parallel to the acceleration vector during ascent. G-forces during powered flight will ensure only vapors are in contact with the plug at vent opening.

AMS02 Mission OperationsAscent



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SFHe Tank Nominal Vent Valve Operation (continued)• Avionics: Baroswitch Electronics (BSE) will open the vent

valve:– Barometric switch to trigger the BSE when PLB pressure is less than the

SFHe (15 ~ 20 millibars)– Time-tagged Discrete Output Low (DOL) command via Backup Flight

System (BFS) General Purpose Computer (GPC) to trigger BSE as a backup @ L+180 seconds

• Once on-orbit, if payload monitoring indicates that this valve failed to open during ascent, contingency operations provide for payload commanding of the valve to open commensurate with +X on-orbit maneuver.

• In the event of an STS abort, the barometric switch will trigger BSE to close the vent valve during descent (non-hazard)

AMS02 Mission OperationsAscent



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AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit Interfaces


Upstream Inhibits(first level)


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Configure AFD Equipment• Disable Baroswitch Electronics (BSE) [ascent vent

valve]• Configure PDIP1 and PDIP2• Un-stow and activate Digital Data Recorder System-02

(DDRS-02)– Operated on Payload General Support Computer (PGSC), as of

now referred to as “AMS Laptop” pending OPSNOM approval– Serves as a back-up recording device for payload data that is

down-linked via the Ku-Band– Single hard disk in the PGSC will provide recording capability

for 40 hours worth of check-out data– Stowed in Mid-Deck Locker– Back-up hard-disks flown (contingency)

• Activate Assembly Power Converter Units (APCUs)– Powers AMS-02 Payload

AMS02 Mission OperationsSTS On-Orbit



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Standard Switch Panel (SSP) • Crew will disable switches S16 and S18 once on-orbit, the

payload is powered and the vent valve position has been confirmed at the Payload Operation and Control Center.

• DS16 talkback will confirm BSE (Vent Valve) powered off.




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Configure Payload Data Interface Panel#1 (PDIP1)



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Configure Payload Data Interface Panel#2 (PDIP2)



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AMS02 Mission OperationsDigital Data Recorder System (DDRS02)

PGSC based “AMS Laptop”

USB/422 Adaptor Box with Integrated PDIP Cable



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Payload Power-up and Check-out• Cryo-coolers and housekeeping data at ~ MET 2 hr 30

minutes• Activate/checkout AMS-02 avionics subsystems and

thermally condition payload• Peak power draw on shuttle 2.5 kW based on APCUs• Thermal loads in PLB may constrain operationsNo magnet charging possible on STS – APCU

power supplied to prime PDS side “B” has no connectivity to the CAB.

• Dock with ISS (MET Day 3)• Make GO / NO GO Call prior to transfer on MET Day 4• Power down AMS-02 prior to transfer operations




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Payload Deploy• Grapple Flight Releasable Grapple Fixture (FRGF) with

Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) • Disconnect Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical

(ROEU) and operate Payload Retention Latch Actuators (PRLAs)

• AMS-02 removed from PLB by SRMS




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• Grapple Power and Video Grapple Fixture (PVGF) with Space Station RMS (SSRMS) located on Mobile Transporter– External Berthing Cues System (EBCS) utilized to verify final approach

to Attach Site (Power and Video functions routed through SSRMS)– SSRMS supplies power for AMS-02 Heaters during Transfer Ops

Magnet charging on SSRMS Operationally Controlled– SSRMS Nominal power bus is connected to Power Distribution System

(PDS) side “B”, which has no connectivity to the Cryomagnet Avionics Box (CAB)

– Magnet charge initiation requires a series of up-linked commands, none of which are stored on-board the computer

– The payload has no communications via the PVGF to receive these commands

AMS02 Mission OperationsPayload Deploy



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Payload Hand-Off (continued)• SRMS release of AMS• Transfer to S3 attach site • Attach AMS-02 to S3 upper inboard site mechanical/

electrical (via Passive Attach System [PAS])• Deactivate power via PVGF• SSRMS Un-grapple• Mate Umbilical Mechanism Assembly (UMA) and apply

power• Power up AMS avionics, perform abbreviated avionics

checkout to verify payload power and communications




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Transfer to ISS

AMS

AMS

AMS on ISS

AMS

SRMS

SSRMS

S3 attach site

1 2

3 4




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Berthing to ISS – S3 Upper / Inboard




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AMS02 Mission OperationsISS Interfaces


Upstream Inhibits(first level)


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• Power-up and complete systems check-out• Thermal monitor and condition cryosystems• Power-down all subsystems except those integral to

magnet charging• Begin magnet charging operations• Post-magnet charge systems power-up and check-out

AMS02 Mission OperationsISS On-Orbit



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Experiment Science:– 3+ years operation with magnet– After LHe depletion and magnet is no longer functional, the payload

will continue with further physics goals• Nominal End of Mission:

– No STS flights for return of AMS-02 Payload.– Will remain on ISS for duration of ISS mission life, and re-enter with

ISS vehicle




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• Primary control of AMS-02 is from groundOnly safety related operation is Cryomagnet charge

– Only safety hazard when EVA/EVR operations on AMS-02– Requires a series of up-linked commands (not stored on-board)

• Data down-linked via ISS Ku-Band• Contingency use of S-Band to downlink minimal health data• In case of loss of power and/or communications, payload is

safe without services




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Translation Paths• Translation paths were evaluated by Worksite Analysis and

in NBL• EVA translation in proximity to and in contact with AMS-02

payload approved for both STS and ISS EVA• EVA suit certification for operations in magnetic field:

– EMU: 300 Gauss– Orlan: 175 Gauss– Hazard avoided by magnet discharge prior to EVA or limiting EVA

exposure via Keep Out Zones for AMS-02 specific EVAs• Translation allowed between attach sites on truss with

magnetic field

AMS02 Mission OperationsEVA Compatibility



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S3 Truss Translation Paths (representative)




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Translation Path




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EVA Keep Out-Zones• The AMS-02 Vacuum Case (VC) ribs are not designed to

withstand EVA Kick-loads– Worked with the EVA Projects Office– Reviewed during NBL operation– Not deemed a concern– VC is classified as an STS EVA Keep Out Zone

• Additionally, the Star Tracker Baffles are also considered EVA Keep Out Zones (sharp edges)

• Detailed thermal analysis shall be performed to determine if any additional areas of concern are identified due to EVA touch temp violations




T. J. Urban / ESCG 32January 12, 2010

AMS02 Mission OperationsStar Tracker EVA Keep Out Zone

SHARP EDGES

Knife Edges

Star Tracker Locations

EVA Keep Out Zones

Star Tracker Baffles

EVA Keep Out Zones


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• AMS-02 designed to be compatible with:• Manual ROEU disconnect

– Access issue only– Can be performed from Orbiter Sill

• Manual Payload Retention Latch Actuators (PRLA) operation– Access issue only– Can be performed from Orbiter Sill

• Flight Releasable Grapple Fixture (FRGF) Release– Access issue only– Can be performed from Orbiter Sill or post-deploy

AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - STS



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AMS-02 in PLB (ROEU and PRLA Access)




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FRGF ReleaseStandard STS EVA Ops

FRGF Detail




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• EVA Connector Panel• Passive UMA Removal contingency operation as

required by SSP-57003• Capture Bar Unloading and Release contingency

operation as required by SSP-57003• PVGF Contingency Release

– PVGF Grapple Release– Latching End Effector (LEE) Release

AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs - ISS



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EVA Interface Panel• EVA Interface Panel allows for redundant avionics

interfaces in contingency scenario– Connectors are EVA mating/demating compatible– Connections are swapped to effect changing A (prime) / B

(redundant) channels in the event that prime capability is lost:• Data: Payload Redundancy Only• Power: Payload and ISS Redundancy

• Contingency release of failed UMA• Cryomagnet charge can be performed on UMA

powered PDS A-side (prime) bus only.




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Payload Power or Data Bus Swap




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UMA Contingency Release




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Capture Bar Unload/Release• WIF/PFR location identified on Truss for this operation

(as necessary)• Handrails on Keel accessible during operation, Keel

available for additional handhold location• Capture Bar Load Release Screws are captive and can

be loosened with PGT/extension• Once unloaded capture bar handle must be lifted and

pulled to release• Procedure/access verified by NBL Test




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Capture Bar Assembly

Guide Pin

UMA

UMABracket

With Removal Handle

PAS PlatformPassive Half




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Capture Bar Unload

Approximately 80 turnsAlternating for balanced load release

Aft Uprights To LUSS

Apex Upright to LUSS

Retractable Capture Bar Handle

Release Mechanism (2)

Load Release Screw (7/16 EVA Bolt)

EBCS




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Wedge

Locking Mechanism

Capture Bar


Capture Bar Unload



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Capture Bar Handle Release – Handrail Locations

Handrail LocationsCapture Bar Handle




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PVGF Release• PVGF can be released by releasing Grapple Pin or by

releasing LEE (ISS EVA standard procedure)• Handrail placement on USS provides translation path• WIF location on USS Sill Beam for PFR Access w/

nearby handrails for installation of PFR• Both Grapple Pin release and LEE release accessible

from same location, operation performed with PGT/extension

• Access verified by NBL Test




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PVGF Release

Detail of PVGF




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PVGF Handrails/WIF




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• First access test in NBL completed in March 2002 with low fidelity mockup (only Passive PAS)

• Second NBL access test (with higher fidelity mockup, full experiment envelope) performed in November 2002

• No mission specific NBL testing required• No specific EVA training requirements at this time, but

they are planned.

AMS02 Mission OperationsNBL Testing



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• Testing to evaluate AMS-02 Contingency EVA interfaces was performed November 12th thru 15th, 2002 (five astronauts performed tasks)

• Testing included:– PVGF Contingency Release

• PVGF Grapple Release• LEE Release

– Capture Bar Unloading and Release– Connector Panel Access/Evaluation– Passive Umbilical Mating Assembly (UMA) bolt access– And, crew translation path evaluation

AMS02 Mission OperationsContingency EVAs



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• All tested tasks were deemed “acceptable” as documented in Crew Consensus Report (reference letter CB-02-129)

• Only minor issues identified with:– Labeling (updates completed and approved)– Fit-checks (verified with flight hardware at Lockheed Martin)– Connector clocking (updated and approved)

• STS-134 Crew Review of EVA Hardware: JSC Oct. 2009

AMS02 Mission Operations NBL Test Results



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• In the event of an abort (e.g. RTLS, TAL, or any other return with AMS-02 still in STS [4 PRLAs engaged]):– Close vent valve when PLB pressure exceeds 15 – 20 millibars– SSP supplied 28 VDC only– APCU supplied 120 VDC to payload PDS powered off

• Upon landing, services should be applied via the T0 Umbilical, to perform the following:– Allow internal Electronics to Monitor He tank pressure– Operate vent valve and vent pump– Not a safety concern, but rather a refurbishment concern (don’t

want to rupture burst disks)– Initial projection from KSC for nominal landing indicates ~ 10 hrs.

Endurance & Mission Success for turn-around

AMS02 Mission Operations Contingency Mission Abort




AMS02 Mission Operations OCAD Sumamry

HR No.

AMS-02-F01 12 Reconfiguration of Mechanical Components12.1

The EVA release of the PAS mechanism is structurally capable of enduring Orbiter return loads with a positive margin of safety regardless of return configuration (fully reinstalled with preload release screws returned to hardstop configuration or disengaged). If the bar can not be reinstalled for some reason it is capable of sustaining orbiter landing loads, but it may strike other structure or hardware causing damage. 12.1.2

OCAD Requirement for the Contingency EVA to have available tethers that can be used to secure the mechanism if the nominal contingency process fails.

AMS-02-F05 9 M/OD Impact 9.2Release of residual He by ground procedures coordinated with ISS. 9.2.3 Acceptance by MOD of OCAD.

AMS-02-F05 9 M/OD Impact 9.3Release of residual TRD gas by ground procedures coordinated with ISS. 9.3.3 Acceptance by MOD of OCAD.

AMS-02-F06 4 Excessive Magnetic Field 4.2 Magnet not charged on SSRMS. 4.2.2 Flight procedure to power prime payload bus (PDS Side B).AMS-02-F06 4 Excessive Magnetic Field 4.4 Magnet not charged on SSRMS. 4.4.1 Flight procedure to discharge magnet prior to EVR.

AMS-02-F07 1 Excessive Magnetic Field 1.3

Magnet only charged while berthed in its ISS operational location at PAS Site on the S3 truss, upper inboard (PAS 2) 1.3.4 Acceptance by MOD of OCAD.

AMS-02-F07 1 Excessive Magnetic Field 1.6EVA hardware not affected by AMS magnetic field. 1.6.6

Flight procedure to discharge magnet prior to direct EVA operations, acceptance by MOD of OCAD.

AMS-02-F07 1 Excessive Magnetic Field 1.6EVA hardware not affected by AMS magnetic field. 1.6.9

Establishment of EVA Keep out Zones including for magnetic field strength through acceptance by MOD of an OCAD.

AMS-02-F07 1 Excessive Magnetic Field 1.7EVR hardware not affected by AMS magnetic field. 1.7.4

Robotic handling procedural requirements verified by formal acceptance by MOD of an OCAD.

AMS-02-F08 2Exposed terminals, connectors, energized conductive surfaces. 2.6

The Orbiter side of the ROEUwill be depowered for the disconnect operation 2.6.1

Formal Acceptance of procedural requirement by MOD through and OCAD

AMS-02-F08 3 Coronal discharge. 3.1During ascent and entry, high voltage sources will not be powered. 3.1.2

Formal acceptance of procedural requirements to turn off high voltages on AMS-02 by MOD through an OCAD. (Note: Ascent Checklist and Reentry)

AMS-02-F11 1

Inability to Open/Close Orbiter Payload Retention Latch Assembly (PRLA). 1.3

In the event that any latches cannot be closed either electrically or by EVA, the AMS-02 will have to be returned to be berthed upon the ISS until an Orbiter with working latches is available to return the AMS-02. 1.3.2

Formal acceptance of safety criteria for safety return configuration by MOD by way of OCAD acceptance.

Cause Control SVM



AMS02 Mission Operations OCAD Sumamry

HR No. Cause Control SVM

AMS-02-F12 1 Mate/Demate with power in connection. 1.1

A contingency EVA operation is provided for in the AMS-02 design to be able to switch the routing of power to the AMS-02 to swap the internal AMS-02 buses between the two ISS supplies. To accomplish this EVA task and provide the required two upstream inhibits to preclude arcing/sparking during connector demate/mate 1.1.1 OCADs for inhibits will be address in ISS EPS 309

AMS-02-F12 1 Mate/Demate with power in connection. 1.5

Nominally, the SSRMS will disconnect from the AMS-02 prior to engaging the UMA in order to preclude power (high) lines from one power source on the ISS to be interconnected with the output of another power source. 1.5.3

Requirement to physically separate SSRMS power path to the AMS-02 prior to engaging the UMA power connection to AMS-02 accepted by MOD through and OCAD.

AMS-02-F14 3 Sharp Edges/Corners 3.1The Star Tracker baffles will be noted as “no touch zones”. 3.1.3

Acceptance of EVA no touch zone for Star Tracker baffles by MOD through an OCAD.

AMS-02-F17 2Cross strapping of power sources damages vehicle circuitry. 2.4

The procedures for engaging the AMS-02’s power while on the truss will require a specific sequence that precludes the UMA to be connected when the PVGF is electrically connected to the SSRMS. Tthe UMA must be disconnected prior to being grappled by the SSRMS and the PVGF must be electrically disconnected prior to UMA engagement for installation on the ISS. This separation of connectors will preclude any interconnection of the power sources. 2.4.1

Requirement to physically separate SSRMS power path to the AMS-02 prior to engaging the UMA power connection to AMS-02 accepted by MOD through and an OCAD.

AMS-02-F18 1Preclude closure of Payload Bay Doors/Orbiter Return 1.5

The AMS-02 is safe to return only with all PRLAs and the Active Keel (latch) Assembly closed. The AMS-02 can only return with this safe configuration. In the event that all latches cannot be closed either electrically or by EVA, the AMS-02 will have to be returned to be berthed upon the ISS until an Orbiter with working latches is available to return the vehicle. 1.5.2 Formal acceptance of procedure requirement by MOD through and OCAD.


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Backup Slides




T. Martin / EA3 & T. J. Urban / ESCG 55October 14, 2009

AMS02 Mission OperationsBack-up Slides


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AMS02 Mission OperationsBack-up Slides

Payl

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Inte

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ams02 mission operations

Documents

vent valve position

vent useless

payload operation

psrp srp mission operations

sfhe pressuretemp

minutes operations

exception of j

assembly pda