the road back to the nuclear brink · 2017-06-22 · kristensen/mckinzie, 2017 | slide 3 arsenals:...

The Road Back to the Nuclear Brink

HansM.Kristensen,Federa0onofAmericanScien0sts

Ma7hewMcKinzie,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil

UnitedNa0ons,NewYork,NY

June21,2017

www.fas.org

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Briefing Overview

Thisbriefingisgivenintwoparts:

1.Kristensengivesanoverviewofthethestatusandtrendsofnuclearforcesandhowthemissionofnuclearweaponsisevolving.

2.McKinziegivesanoverviewoftheeffectsofnuclearweaponsuseandsummarizesthefindingsandconclusionsoftheirrecentstudy(withTheodorePostol)ofwarheadfuzemoderniza0onsintheUSarsenal.

www.fas.org

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Arsenals: Status

Enormousreduc0onssincepeakof64,500stockpiledwarheadsin1986(70,300ifincludingre0redwarheads):

~55,000warheadstockpilereduc0on;~48,000+warheadsdismantled;~5,500+re0redwarheadsawai0ngdismantlement

Trend:paceofreduc.onsisslowing

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Today:~9,600warheadsinstockpiles(~14,900ifcoun0ngre0redwarheadsawai0ngdismantlement)

USandRussiapossess93%ofglobalinventory;eachhasmorethan4.mesmorewarheadsthanrestofworldcombined;150mesmorethanthird-largeststockpile(France)

Decreasing:US,Russia,Britain

Increasing:China,Pakistan,India

Steady:France,Israel

Emerging:NorthKorea

Arsenals: Status

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Modernizations: Global Situation UnitedStates:Acerextensiveweaponslife-extensions,embarkeduponcompletereplacementofarsenalandindustryinfrastructure.Producinglife-extendedwarheads,planningnewwarheads.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Reducingoverallsizeofarsenal.

Russia:Inmiddleofmoderniza0onofSoviet-eraweaponstonewersystems.Re-producingwarheadsandplanningnewones.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Reducingoverallsizeofarsenal.

China:Infinalphaseofmoderniza0onfromearlyweaponstomoreefficienttypes.Producingwarheads.AddingMIRV.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Increasingsizeofarsenal.

France:Infinalphaseofmoderniza0onofweaponsandinfrastructure.Researchingnext-genera0onalweapons.Producingwarheads.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Arsenalsizesteady.

Britain:Inearlyphaseofmoderniza0onofweapons.Researchingnext-genera0onalweapons.Producingwarheads.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Reducingsizeofarsenal.

Pakistan:Inmiddleofmoderniza0ontonewerandmorediversearsenal(Triad)andindustry,includinglonger-rangemissilesandshort-rangetac0calnuclearweapons.Producingwarheads.Increasingsizeofarsenal.

India:Inmiddleofmoderniza0ontonewerandmorediversearsenal(Triad)andindustry,includinglonger-rangemissiles.Producingwarheads.ExploringMIRV.Increasingsizeofarsenal.

Israel:Possibleupgradeofweapons.Arsenalsizeissteady.

NorthKorea:Rapiddevelopmentofseveraltypesofmissilesandplagorms.Conduc0ngnucleartes0ngandproducingwarheads.Increasingsizeofarsenalbutopera0onalstatusisunclear.

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Mission: War Planning and Trends

Allnuclear-armedstatesareproducingandrefiningnuclearstrikeplans.

US,Russia,France,Britainvariousdegreeofcounter-forcestrategywithweaponsonalert.

China,Indiahaveno-first-usestrategybutpossiblyincreasingreadiness.

Pakistanloweringthresholdwithtac0calweapons.

Prominenceofnuclearweaponsinlimited,regionalscenariosisincreasing.

USemphasizingregionalinmoderniza0onprogramsandopera0ons.

Russiausingexplicitthreatsofuse,modernizingshort/medium-rangeweapons.

Pakistanfieldingtac0calnuclearweapons.

Refinementofweaponstoincreaseaccuracyandreduceradioac0vefallout.

Mostmoderniza0onprogramsseektoincreasea7ackaccuracyandefficiency.

UShasstrategytobuildlower-yieldweaponstoreducefalloutofa7acks.

RussiareplacingsomeSoviet-erawarheadswithloweryields.

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•  Prolifera0onconcernand9/11a7ackstriggeredbroadeningofnotonlyconven0onalbutalsonuclearplanningto“regionalstates”armedwithWMD

•  Terminologychangedfromdeterring“nuclear”adversariestodeterring“WMD”adversaries

•  OPLAN8044Revision03includedexecutablestrikeop0onsagainstregionalproliferators

•  BasedonNSPD-14(2002)•  Effect:missionprolifera0on(domorewithless);planmorecomplex

Mission: War Planning and Trends (US example)

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•  OPLAN8010-12(July2012):StrategicDeterrenceandForceEmployment.

•  Includesfourtypesofnucleara7ackop0ons:o  BasicA7ackOp0ons(BAOs).o  Selec0veA7ackOp0ons(SAOs).o  EmergencyResponseOp0ons(EROs).

o  Directed/Adap0vePlanningCapabilityOp0ons.•  TherearenolongerMajorA7ackOp0ons(MAOs)inthestrategicwarplan.

•  Directedagainstsixadversaries:Russia,China,NorthKorea,Iran,Syriaand9/11-typeWMDscenario(Iranhasprobablybeendropped).

•  BroaderplanthanSIOP;includesconven0onal,cyber,missiledefense.

•  Geographiccommands(EUCOM/PACOM)alsohaveregionalnuclearplans.

Source:STRATCOMOPLAN8010briefingslideobtainedbyFASunderFOIA

Mission: War Planning and Trends (US example)

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Mission: War Planning and Trends (Others) Russia:HasweaponsonalertbutmorebasicstrategicwarplanthanUS.Greaterrelianceonnon-strategicnuclearweaponstocompensateforlesseffec0veconven0onalforces.Occasionaldirectnuclearthreats.Rumoredincreasedroleoflimiteduse(“escalate-to-deescalate”)butothersaysrumorsexaggerated.

China:No-first-use,counter-a7ackstrategy.Increasingweaponsaccuracyandresponsiveness.Discussingscenariosforwhenweaponsshouldbeusedandhowsoon.Noofficialchange.

France:Hasweaponsonalert.Hasadjustedwarheadloadingonsubmarinestoallowpoten0aluseofmorelimiteduseagainstregionaladversaries.Increasingrangeandaccuracyofweapons.

Britain:Hasweaponsonalert.HasreducedwarheadloadingbutisupgradingwithmoreefficientUSweaponstechnologies(warheadfuze).

Pakistan:Fieldingtac0calnuclearweaponsintendedforuseinscenariosshortofstrategicweapons.

India:Developingmissilesthatarecapableoflaunchingquicker.

Israel:Possiblefieldingsea-basedcruisemissiles(unclear).

NorthKorea:Strategyunclearbutfrequentlyissuesthreats.Developingmobileweaponsandmissilethatcanbelaunchedmorequickly.

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USandRussiahaveincreasedprominenceofnuclear-capablebomberopera0onsinrecentyears.RussiawithflightsaroundEuropeandAsiaandoffUnitedStates.UShasreinstatedpolarexercises,increasedNorthernEuropeandPacificopera0ons,ac0vatedOPLANforEUCOM

ExercisePolarGrowlonApril1,2015sawdeploymentoffourB-52sovertheNorthPoleandNorthSea.Thebomberswentallthewaytotheirlaunchpointsforair-launchedcruisemissiles. ExercisePolarRoaronAugust1,2016sawdeploymentofsix

bombers(4B-52and2B-2)overtheNorthPacific,NorthPole,NorthSea,andBal0cSea.Thedeterrenceexerciserequired24tankers.

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Mission: War Planning and Trends

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NewandResurgentDangersfromNuclearWeaponsManagementoftheUSNuclearArsenalandUSGovernmentCapacityonArmsControlandNonprolifera.on•  Riskofnuclearweaponsusesomewhereinthenextfouryears:HowwilltheTrumpadministra0onmanageacrisisinvolvingnuclearweapons?

•  ShicfromzeronuclearweaponsasaUSpolicygoal•  ExpansionofUSnuclearweaponsmoderniza0on-newnuclearweaponsandnewnuclearmissions

•  USfundingforarmscontrolandnonprolifera0onprogramsatrisk,includingfortheCTBTO;poten0alforareturntoexplosivenucleartes0ng

•  MissiledefenseissuesandNATOnuclearweaponspolicy

ArmsControlWorkbytheUnitedStatesandRussia•  WithdrawalfromNewSTART/withdrawalfromINF•  Strategicstabilitytalks-extendingtheSTARTprocess

RegionalNuclearThreats:AsiaandtheMiddleEast•  IranandthefutureoftheJCPOA•  ThreatofnuclearconflictontheKoreanpeninsula•  DangerofnuclearwarbetweenIndianandPakistan

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EffectsofaNuclearExplosion

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Nuclear Targeting: Cities PercentageofPopula0onKilledandInjuredasaFunc0onofPeakOverpressure

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Correla.onBetweenHeightofBurstandNuclearEffects

Level1.Countriestargeteachother’snon-strategictargetswithnuclearweapons–forexample:troopforma0ons,militarygarrisons,conven0onalmissileandairbases,conven0onalnavalbases,missiledefensesystems,nuclearweaponsproduc0onfacili0esortac6calnuclearweaponssites:escala0on;poten0alforfalloutonpopula0oncenters.

Level2.Countriestargeteachother’sstrategicnuclearweaponsdeterrent,includingcommand,controlandcommunica0onstargets:severeescala0on,targetsinci0es.

Level3.Countriestargeteachothersci.esdirectly.

ThreeBasicLevelsofNuclearTarge.ngandNuclearConflict:

Majorthemes:NuclearWarPlanning;NuclearTarge0ng;CommandandControlofNuclearForces;PromptLaunch;Delega0on

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(GraphicsbyTheodorePostol)

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How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze Hans M. Kristensen Matthew McKinzie Theodore A. Postol

h7p://thebulle0n.org/how-us-nuclear-force-moderniza0on-undermining-strategic-stability-burst-height-compensa0ng-super10578

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Findingsandconclusionsofrecentstudyofwarheadfuzemoderniza.onsintheUSarsenal:

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Increasedcapabilitycomesfrommodifica.onoffuzeratherthannuclearwarheaditself

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Howtheoldwarheadwouldperform:

Howthenewwarheadperforms:

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HistoryandStatusofSuper-FuzeDevelopment:

Colonel General Viktor Yesin (ret.), candidate of military sciences and Russian International Affairs Council expert with

The information published by U.S. experts that the Americans are carrying out profound modernization of their nuclear munitions in order to improving their effectiveness is nothing new to the Russian military and political leadership. This circumstance has been taken into account in forming and implementing the Russian defensive plan. Russia is taking effective measures to maintain missile and nuclear parity with the United States, both in terms of perfecting its strategic offensive weapons and in terms of developing the capability of its missile defence system, including the missile warning systems. In particular, in 2016 Russia completed the programme to establish complete radar coverage of the country’s borders, with a detection range capability of up to 6,000 kilometres for ballistic targets. Russia has also started deploying a new uniform space-based detection and combat command system, which is expected to be fully deployed by 2020.

With all these factors taken into consideration, it can be argued that Russia has the capability to promptly detect a nuclear missile attack and respond appropriately. As has been repeatedly stated at the highest military and political level, the missiles currently deployed as part of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are capable of overcoming the missile defences of any enemy in the foreseeable future. To ensure continued confidence in the reliability of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and its missile defence systems, relevant funds are planned to be allocated for research and development as part of the state arms programme for 2018–2025, which is currently under development. These research and development efforts will allow Russia to have weapons systems on a par with the best foreign equivalents.

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RussianReac.onsh7p://russiancouncil.ru/en/analy0cs-and-comments/analy0cs/US-Nuclear-Warheads-Scary-Moderniza0on/

MajorGeneralVladimirDvorkin,chiefresearcherattheCentreforInterna6onalSecurityatPrimakovNa6onalResearchIns6tuteofWorldEconomyandInterna6onalRela6onsundertheRussianAcademyofSciencesandRussianInterna6onalAffairsCouncilexpert

First.W76warheadshavebeeninservicewithTridentIImissilesforover30yearsnow,so,fromthepointofviewofsafetyandreliability,itisnotsurprisingthattheyarebeingupgraded.Thefusingmethodthatisbeingimplementedhasbeenknownforaround20years.Inessence,basedonthetargetmisses0mate,attheendoftheac0vetrajectorylegthemissileselectsthewarheaddetona0onmethod:ifthemissileisundershoo0ng,thewarheadisdetonatedbythecontactfuseonimpactwiththesurface;ifitisovershoo0ng,thewarheadisdetonatedmid-airattheclosestpointtothetarget.TheUnitedStatesisretrofiungvirtuallyallitsICBMandSLBMwarheadsthiswayaspartofupgradeprogrammes,andRussiaismostlikelydoingthesame.

Second.TheW76hasayieldofaround100kilotonsandis,therefore,classedasalightwarhead.Suchwarheadsarenotintendedtobeusedagainsthardtargetssuchasmissilesilos,andwillnotbeusedforthatpurpose,despitetherela.velyinsignificantimprovementintheirkillingaccuracythankstotheupgradedfusingmethod.Itwouldbemuchmoreefficienttoengagehardtargets,suchasmissilesilos,withW88warheads,whichyieldover400kilotonsandarealsousedwithTridentIISLBMs.ThewarheadsofMinutemanIIIICBMsalsofitthebill.Therefore,theUnitedStateswillnot“freeup”asignificantpor0onofitsarsenalforuseagainstothertargetsofthepoten0alenemy.

Third.ThereisnoneedforanymeasurestobetakeninresponsetotheW76moderniza0onprogramme.Russiafollowsitsownscheduleforreplacingobsoleteweaponssystemswithinitsstrategicnuclearforces,andisintroducingnewstrategicsystemsinlinewiththeNewSTARTtreaty,whichensuresguaranteednucleardeterrence.

Fourth.ThetemporaryincompletecapabilityoftheRussianspace-basedmissilewarningsystemcomponentwouldinnowayaffecttheretaliatorystrikecapability,seeingasthedecisiontolaunchsuchastrikemayjustaswellbebasedoninforma0onfromthesecond,radar-basedmissilewarning0er,whichRussiahasnoproblemswith.

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RussianReac.onsh7p://russiancouncil.ru/en/analy0cs-and-comments/analy0cs/US-Nuclear-Warheads-Scary-Moderniza0on/

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QUESTIONS?

Foraddi0onalinforma0on:

Federa0onofAmericanScien0sts(h7ps://www.fas.org)NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil(h7ps://www.nrdc.org)