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ThePerfectStormExplainingtheRiseofISIS

CheriBalounMAIRCapstoneDecember2016

ABSTRACT

Al Qaeda changed the terrorism movement with aspirations of a global jihad.Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Washington DC, andPennsylvania,alQaedarosetothetopofAmerica’sthreatlist.Aftertheinvasionof Iraq in 2003, al Qaeda responded by expanding its influence into the newlyrestructured Iraq, establishing al Qaeda in Iraq. Differences in organizationalfocusandstrategyledtothesplitofalQaedaandalQaedainIraqin2014.Theorganizationwenowknowasthe IslamicStateof IraqandSyriawasborn. Theentitytransitionedfromaterroristorganizationtoaninsurgencygroup,capturingkey cities, likeMosul innorthern Iraq, anddeclaring the reestablishmentof theIslamic Caliphate, a theological empire. The civil war in Syria facilitated thespreadof thegroup intoSyria. ThewithdrawalofU.S.military forces fromIraqleft the Iraqi government weak, and religiously divided, the government wasunable to support or protect its people. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria hasarguably become the strongest and richest jihadist organization. Their globalrecruitment showcases the effectiveness of their technological capabilities andskills.ThepurposeofthispaperistoanalyzetheconditionsthatexplaintheriseoftheIslamicStateofIraqandSyria.

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TableofContents

Introduction...........................................................................................................................2

Background............................................................................................................................2TheBeginning..............................................................................................................................................................................2Jamaatal-Tawhidwa-l-Jihad.................................................................................................................................................3MajlisShuraal-Mujahedin......................................................................................................................................................5IslamicStateofIraq...................................................................................................................................................................5IslamicStateofIraqandSyria..............................................................................................................................................6ComparisonofalQaedaandISIS.........................................................................................................................................7ExpertViews...........................................................................................................................8Globalization................................................................................................................................................................................9Incomeinequality......................................................................................................................................................................9SectarianDivide..........................................................................................................................................................................9U.S.MilitaryWithdrawal......................................................................................................................................................11PoliticalInstability..................................................................................................................................................................11IraqiGovernment.....................................................................................................................................................................12SyrianCivilWar........................................................................................................................................................................13

TippingPointTheory............................................................................................................14LawoftheFew.........................................................................................................................................................................15StickinessFactor......................................................................................................................................................................15PowerofContext.....................................................................................................................................................................15

Analysis:ElementsofthePerfectStormandTheTippingPoint.............................................16Figure1:AQI/ISIOperatingAreaComparison...........................................................................................................16

TheTippingPoint....................................................................................................................................................................18Conclusion............................................................................................................................18

Appendix1...........................................................................................................................20Definitions..................................................................................................................................................................................20Insurgency..................................................................................................................................................................................20Terrorism...................................................................................................................................................................................20PerfectStorm............................................................................................................................................................................21CurrentISISDesignations....................................................................................................................................................21TABLE1.HistoryofISISNames........................................................................................................................................21

Bibliography.........................................................................................................................22

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IntroductionTheIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS)isarguablythemostpowerfuland

profitablejihadiorganizationseeninmoderntimes.ISIShasbeenabletoaccomplishwhatotherjihadiorganizationslikealQaeda,foundedinthelate1980s,haveonlydreamedofdoing.Inlessthantenyears,ISIShastransitionedfromterroristgrouptoinsurgentgroup,establishingaself-governingcaliphate,harshlyrulingoverthepeoplelivingintheterritorythegroupcontrols.Afterthe2003U.S.invasionofIraq,SaddamHussein’sgovernmentparty,theminoritySunnis,wereoustedfrompowerandreplacedbythemajorityShia.TheShiathenhadcontrolofIraq’ssecurityforcesandinstitutions.CenturiesofSunni-Shiatensionsweresurfacing.ThesuddenlossofpowerfortheSunnis,afterbeingincontrolformorethan20yearsunderthereignofSaddamwasatoughpilltoswallow.InitialviolenceinIraqduringthistransitionaltimehadsectariandimensions,butafterthe2004-2005appointmentofinterimgovernmentandsubsequentelections,theattacksturnedpolitical.TheSunnisfeltunderrepresented,eventhoughtheyelectedtonotparticipateintheinterimgovernment,whichwasresponsibleforwritingIraq’sconstitution.

ThewithdrawalofU.S.militaryforcesleftapowervacuum.AfterthereelectionofPrimeMinisterMaliki,therepressionofSunnissharplyincreased.SecurityforcesinIraqwereseeminglytargetingSunnis.TheIraqigovernmentappearedtobeunresponsivetotheblatanttargetingandattacksonSunnis,provingMalikiwasnotabletoprotectallofthepeopleofIraq.ThepoliticalsituationandinternalconflictinSyriablossomedintoacivilwar.ISIScapitalizedonthedisarrayinSyria,requisitioningcontroloflargeportionsofthecountryandnamingRaqqaasthecapitalafterthedeclarationofthecaliphateinJune2014.

ThefocusofmyresearchhasbeentothoroughlydescribetheestablishmentofISISbeginningwithitsfounder,AbuMusabalZarqawi.Afterhisdeathin2006,subsequentISISleaderscontinuedwithZarqawi’soriginalvisionforISIS,bestcapturedandcarriedoutbyAbuBakralBaghdadi.IwantedtounderstandwhyISISleadershavebeenabletoachievetheirgoals,surpassingalQaeda,ISIS’“parentorganization,”onallfronts.IchosetoexploretheconditionsexplaintheriseoftheISIS.IexaminedandgatheredcommonlyidentifiedreasonsbehindtheriseofISISinbothscholarlyandnewsarticles.

Ihypothesizedthatthecombinationofpoliticalinstability,inthecontextofthenewIraqigovernmentandtheSyrianCivilWarcoupledwithSunni-Shi’areligioustensionsinIraq,andthewithdrawalofU.S.militaryforcesexplaintheriseofISIS.Inmypaper,Iarguethatthereisnotonecondition,butaculminationofmultipleconditions,a“perfectstorm”ofsorts,thatexplainstheriseofISIS.

Background

TheBeginning AbuMusabalZarqawiwasbornAhmadFadhilNazzalalKbalaylabinZarqa,Jordanin1966.1Bornintoalargefamily,BedouinsfromtheBaniHassantribe,Zarqawigrewup

1Weaver,MaryAnne.2006."InventingAl-Zarqawi.(Coverstory)."Atlantic297,no.6:87-100.AcademicSearchPremier,EBSCOhost(accessedNovember11,2016).87-88.

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modestlyinaroughneighborhoodknownforitsheavyinfluenceofdrugsandguncrime.2Zarqawidroppedoutofschoolwhenhewasseventeen,afterthedeathofhisfather,andbecameviolent,turningtodrugsandalcohol.Knownforbeingabullyandathug,hisfirstprisonstintwasin1984fordrugpossessionandsexualassault.Zarqawiwasreleasedfromprisonin1988andmadehiswaytoAfghanistanin1989,tofightagainsttheinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Showinguptoolatetoparticipateinthefighting,hebecameinvolvedwithAbuMuhammadalMaqdisi,afellowJordanianandwell-knownradicalSalafist.ItisunclearwhereZarqawibeganhispathtoradicalization,prisonorhistimeinAfghanistan,3butMaqdisimagnifiedZarqawi’sradicalbeliefsandbroadenedhisterroristcontacts.TogethertheyformedBayatal-Imam,Zarqawi’sfirstjihadigroup. BothmenreturnedtoJordanin1992andquicklyfoundthemselvesontheradarofJordanianauthoritiesduetotheirpubliccriticismofthekingandthetreatyJordansignedwithIsrael.4ZarqawiandMaqdisiweresentencedtofifteenyearsinprisonin1994afteraraidonZarqawi’shouseproducedaweaponscache.Theyflourishedinprison,MaqdisiplayingthepartofreligiousadviserandZarqawifulfillingtheroleofenforcementandrecruitmentintoBayatal-Imam,whichultimatelyfailedtotakeoffinthewayZarqawihadhoped.Maqdisibeganwritingreligiouspiecesandfamilymemberssmuggledthemfromprisonforpublishing.SoonZarqawiwasalsopublishing.Hisviolent,radicalbeliefsanddeclarationthatanyonewhodisagreedwithhimwasaninfidelcaughttheattentionofOsamabinLaden,alQaeda’sleader,in1998.Zarqawiwasreleasedfromprisonin1999ingeneralamnesty. ZarqawileftJordanalmostimmediately,andultimatelyreturnedtoAfghanistanwherehepurportedlymetwithbinLaden,whodistrustedZarqawiforhisoutwardcriticismofalQaeda’ssupportoftheTaliban,hisintensehatredforShiites5aswellashiscriminalbackground,andhisstanceontargetingeveryone,includingotherMuslims,whodisagreedwithhim.6ItisallegedthatbinLadenaskedforZarqawitojoinalQaeda,butherefused,7anddesiringhisowntrainingcamp,ZarqawicommittedtotrainingotherJordanianprisoners,whowerealsoreleasedingeneralamnesty.WithasmallamountofmoneytostartthecampfrombinLaden,ZarqawisetupshopinwesternAfghanistanin2000.Itwasalsoaroundthistime,Bayatal-ImambegantransitioningitselftoJamaatal-Tawhidwa-l-Jihad(JTWJ).

Jamaatal-Tawhidwa-l-Jihad InresponsetotheSeptember11,2001attacks,theU.S.invadedAfghanistanin

shortlyaftertheattacks,forcingZarqawitorelocate.HefoundhimselfmovingbetweenIran,IraqiKurdistan,Syria,andtheSunniTriangleinIraq.Usingthistohisadvantage,

2Michael,George.2007."TheLegendandLegacyofAbuMusabal-Zarqawi."DefenceStudies7,no.3:338-357.InternationalSecurity&CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedNovember11,2016),339.3Gambill,Gary.2004.“AbuMusabal-Zarqawi:ABiographicalSketch.”JamestownTerrorismMonitor2,issue24.AccessedNovember11,2016.https://jamestown.org/program/abu-musab-al-zarqawi-a-biographical-sketch/.4Kirdar,M.J.2011.“AlQaedainIraq.”CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies.AccessedNovember11,2016.https://www.csis.org/analysis/al-qaeda-iraq,2.5Ibid.,2-3.6Zelin,AaronY. "TheWarBetween ISISandal-Qaeda forSupremacyof theGlobal JihadistMovement."WashingtonInstituteForNearEastPolicy:ResearchNotes20,(June10,2014):1.Military&GovernmentCollection,EBSCOhost(accessedSeptember25,2016),1-2.7StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”MappingMilitantOrganizations:April4,2016.FirstaccessedNovember10,2015.http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1.

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ZarqawicontinuedtomakeconnectionsandrecruitforJTWJ.8UpuntilColinPowell’sFebruary2003speechtotheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,Zarqawiwasanundistinguishedjihadifighter.9Powell’sspeech,meanttomakethecasefortheU.S.invasionofIraqaswellasgarneralliedsupport,launchedZarqawiintothespotlightonaninternationalplatform.ZarqawiwasfalselynamedasthelinkbetweenalQaedaandtheSaddamHusseinregime.10 WiththeinvasionofIraq,Zarqawibecameahouseholdname.JTWJhadrelocatedtonorthernIraqandcontinuedtogrowtheirforces,mostofwhichwereforeignfightersfromJordan,Syria,Afghanistan,Pakistan,andKurdishregions.11Thegrouphadafour-partplanaftertheirrelocation.First,theyworkedtodriveoutU.S.andcoalitionforces.Second,JTWJhinderedthegovernmentaltransitionandIraqisupportofthenewgovernment.Third,theirfocusturnedtostoppingthereconstructionofIraq.JTWJbegankidnappingciviliancontractors,humanitarianaidworkers,andotherforeignersinIraq.SoonbeheadingvideoswerebeingcirculatedacrosstheInternet,apracticeJTWJinitiated,themostinfamousbeingtheexecutionofAmericanNicholasBerginMay2004.ThebeheadingisbelievedtohavebeencarriedoutbyZarqawihimself.AtleasttenothermurdersconductedinasimilarmannerwereposthumouslylinkedtoJTWJ.ThefourthpartofJTWJ’splanwastheplacementofcarbombsoutsideShiitemosquesandreligioussites.Hundredsofworshipperswerekilled.JTWJwasquicklybecomingknownfortheirviolentmethodsandtargetingofnon-combatants,aidworkersandIraqiciviliansforexample.12

InOctober2004,ZarqawipledgedhisallegiancetobinLadenandJTWJchangedtheirnametoalQaedaintheLandofTwoRiversoralQaedainIraq(AQI).ThemergerputZarqawiincontrolofAQIandthustheflowofforeignfightersintoIraq.ThiswouldlaterprovetobeimportantwiththeconflictinSyriaandrepositioningforcestherethroughcontactsandconnectionsZarqawipreviouslymade.13TensionsbetweenAQIandalQaedawerebecomingapparent.AQIcontinuedtoconductextremeandviolentattacks,whichoncegarneredSunnisupport,wasstartingtodissuadecurrentsupportersaswellasalienatepotentialsupporters.14TopalQaedaleaderssentmultipleletterstoZarqawiin2005,remindinghimofalQaeda’slong-termgoalsandaskinghimtoworktowardsfosteringsympatheticrelationshipswithallIraqis.15

Iraq’snationalelectionsin2005andthecreationoftheconstitutionwereseenasfailuresforAQIandotherjihadigroups,whichresultedinanincreaseinsuicideattacksandviolencethroughouttheyear.ManyoftheseattackswereaimedatShiitesandoccupyingcollaborators.SupportforZarqawiwaswaningbecauseoftheindiscriminate,brutaltacticsandtheinfluxofforeignfighters,includingZarqawihimself.AlQaedawarnedZarqawiabouttargetingShiitesandrecommendedminimizingthecollateraldamage.IgnoringalQaeda’sadvicetotonedowntheviolence,AQIorganizedthebombingsofthreehotelsinAmman,JordaninNovember.Jordanian’sprotestedandthebacklashfromthose

8Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,”1-2.9Chambers,Peters.2012."AbuMusabAlZarqawi:TheMakingandUnmakingofanAmericanMonster(inBaghdad)."Alternatives37,no.1:30-51.SocialSciencesCitationIndex,EBSCOhost(accessedNovember11,2016).10Weaver,MaryAnne."InventingAl-Zarqawi,”88.11StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”12Gambill,Gary.“AbuMusabal-Zarqawi:ABiographicalSketch.”13Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,"2-3.14StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”15Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,"3.

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attacksdiminishedZarqawi’ssignificance.16

MajlisShuraal-MujahedinInearly2006,ZarqawibroughttogetheranumberofIraqijihadfactionsunderAQI

administrationandrenamedthecoalitionMajlisShuraal-Mujahedin(MSM),hislastditchefforttoredeemhisstature.However,ZarqawiwaskilledinadroneattackinJune2006,andMSMendedwithZarqawi’sdeath.17AlQaedaimmediatelyreplacedZarqawiwithAbuAyubalMasri(akaAbuHamzaalMuhajir),anEgyptianbombmakerwithtrainingexperienceinAfghanistan.OnOctober15,astatementwasreleasedannouncingtheestablishmentoftheIslamicStateofIraq(ISI),arebrandingafterZarqawi’sfallfromgraceandthegroup’sdecliningfavor.AbuOmaralBaghadiwasnamedthenewleader.

IslamicStateofIraq TherebrandingandrenamingofAQItoISIafterZarqawi’sdeathwasintendedtogathermoresupport,locallyandregionally.Instead,itcreatedsignificantconfusionnotonlyforitsfighters,butintelligenceanalyststrackingthegroup.18LocalIraqiSunniswereincreasinglydissatisfiedwiththesignificantpresenceofforeignfightersandleadership,theorganization’sinsistenceofenforcingtheirownbrandofIslam,anduseofextremeviolence,whichalsoaffectedinnocentcivilians.ByplacinganIraqiintopower,AbuOmaralBaghdadi,Masrihopedtoregainstrengthinnumbers.MasrishiftedtothepositionofISIwarminister,althoughitisbelievedheretainedasignificantamountofcontrolovertheorganization.19 TherebrandingeffortswereineffectiveasISIlostmajorsupportandthegroupbecamerelativelyinoperativefrom2006to2010.Earlyin2007,jihadifighterswereabandoningISIandjoiningforceswithlocaltribestocombatISIintheSahwaorAwakeningMovement.FrustratedbyISIseekingtogoverntheirterritoryandforcingISIrulesuponthem,theAwakeningMovementcoordinatedwithU.S.andcoalitionforcestoconsiderablyreduceISIfightersinthewesternIraq.20“Byearly2008,coalitionandlocalsecurityforceshadkilled2,400AQImembers[AQIandISIwereusedinterchangeablyduetotherebrandingconfusion]andtaken8,800prisoners.Byspring2009,theU.S.wasfundingaround100,000localSunnistofightAQI.”21

BetweenJune2009andAugust2010,themajorityoftheU.S.militarywithdrewfromIraq.22ISIappearedtohavebeendefeatedandIraqwasonitswaytobeingstableandsecure.TheIraqimilitarybegantakingoverandmaintainingsecurityinIraq.IraqiSecurityForces,trainedbyU.S.forces,haddevelopedsignificantly.BetweenAugustandOctober2009,ISIhadregroupedandattackedgovernmentinfrastructures,killinghundredsofcivilians.InApril2010,bothMasriandAbuOmaralBaghdadiwerekilledinanIraqicounterterroroperationandbyJune80percentofISI’s42leaderswerekilledorcaptured.16Kirdar,M.J.“AlQaedainIraq,”3-4.17Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,"3.18Kirdar,M.J.“AlQaedainIraq,”5.19StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”20Kirdar,M.J.“AlQaedainIraq,”5.21StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”22Shamieh,Luna,andZoltánSzenes.2015."TheRiseofIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS)."AARMS:Academic&AppliedResearchInMilitary&PublicManagementScience14,no.4:363-378.InternationalSecurity&CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedOctober8,2016),367.

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AbuBakralBaghdadipromptlyassumedcontroloftheweakISI,apositionhewassuitedtohandleasco-founderofJayshAhlal-Sunnahwa-l-Jamah,ajihadistgroupthatoperatedinIraqaftertheU.S.invasionofIraqandmergedwithAQIin2004.Asasub-commanderwithintheranksofISIsince2004,BaghdadiwasperfectlyabletotakechargeofISI.Baghdadi’sfirststepsweretoreiteratethegroup’sgoals,focusingonweakeninganddestroyingtheIraqigovernment,andcreatinganIslamiccaliphate. BaghdadithensetouttorestructureISI.Heenvisionedadisciplined,hierarchicalstructure;Baghdadiformedgoverningandpolicymakingbodies,removedforeignersfromleadershippositionsandplacedthemintocombatroles,manyfulfillingoutreach,propaganda,recruitment,anddonationcollectionfunctions.BaghdadisoughtoutmembersofSaddamHussein’sformerBaathistregimetofillISI’smilitaryorsecurityleadershippositions.23U.S.forceslocatedandkilledbinLadeninPakistaninMay2011puttingbinLaden’ssecondincommand,AymanalZawahiri,incontrolofalQaedaanditsaffiliates,whichincludedISI.24

TheoutbreakoftheSyriancivilwaropenedadoorforISImovement.BaghdadisentISIoperativestoSyriatogathersupportandprepareforISIadvancement.ISIwascommittingtofightagainsttheBasharalAssadregime,anAlawite(aShiasect)dominatedgovernmentthatISIviewedasnon-MusliminfidelstryingtosuppressMuslims.25Duringthisexpansiontime,byDecember2011,U.S.andcoalitionforcesweregone,andwithlesspressureandsecurity,ISIattacksincreased,targetingtheIraqigovernmentandIraqiSecurityForces.TheSunniandShiadividedeepenedastheIraqigovernmentmarginalizedtheminoritySunnigroup.26ThegroupofISIoperativesBaghdadisenttoSyriaemergedasJabhatalNusrain2012,effectivelyfightingagainsttheAssadgovernment.ThegroupwasgrowinginpopularityandsupportinSyria,duetothedistributionoffoodandmedicinetowar-tornareas,whichotherSyrianopponentsoftheregimedidnotaccomplish.27

IslamicStateofIraqandSyriaInApril2013,BaghdadiannouncedtheexpansionofISIoperationsinSyriaandthe

mergerofISIwithJabhatalNusra(JN),28analQaedaaffiliateinSyria.29Torecognizetheirexpandedvision,ISIchangedtheirnametoIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS).JNandalQaedaleadershipdisputedtheunificationandZawahiridictatedthatISIS’sinfluenceshouldremaininIraq.RejectingZawahiri’smandate,ISIScontinuedtooperateinSyria,sometimesclashingwithotherIslamistgroups.JNwasandhadbeenwillingtoworktowardsacommongoalandfoughtagainsttheSyriangovernmentwithotherjihadistgroups.ISISleadershipdidnotsharetheirenthusiasmandpreferredtoestablishcontrolofmoreterritory.30

InOctober2013,ZawahiridemandedthatISISdisband,returnoperationstoIraq

23Hashim,AhmedS.2014."TheIslamicState:Fromal-QaedaAffiliatetoCaliphate."MiddleEastPolicy21,no.4:69-83.AcademicSearchPremier,EBSCOhost(accessedOctober17,2016),72-74.24Humud,CarlaE.2016. "AlQaedaandU.S.Policy:MiddleEastandAfrica."CongressionalResearchService:Report1-22. InternationalSecurity&CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedSeptember25,2016),1.25Hashim,AhmedS."TheIslamicState:Fromal-QaedaAffiliatetoCaliphate,”77.26StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”27Hashim,AhmedS."TheIslamicState:Fromal-QaedaAffiliatetoCaliphate,”77.28StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”29Holbrook, Donald. 2015. "Al-Qaeda and the Rise of ISIS." Survival (00396338) 57, no. 2: 93-104. International Security & CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedSeptember25,2016),97.30StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”

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onlyandleaveJNtocommandtheSyrianjihadis.BaghdadiargueditwouldbeasintodissolvetheuniononthebasisofIslamiclawandwasnotwithinthebestinterestsofISIS.HealsorefusedtoaccepttheSykes-PicotboundariescreatedbytheFrenchandBritishafterWorldWarI.31Aftermonthsoffighting,alQaedadisownedISISandofficiallyseveredallconnectionsinFebruary2014.32ISIShaddisobeyedalQaedaleadershiptoomuchandtoooften.ISISwasoperatingunderitsownconditions.33

ComparisonofalQaedaandISIS BinLadenandZarqawicameintotheirrolesduringthewarwiththeSovietsinAfghanistaninthelate1980s,binLadeninhisroleasalQaedaleaderandZarqawi,ajihadifighter,dedicatedtoattackingallinfidelsandnonbelievers,andfutureAQIleader.34AfterthedeathofZarqawi,Masri,andAbuOmaralBaghdadi,AbuBakralBaghdadipickedupwhereZarqawihadleftoffideologically.ThesebeliefsremainedinlinewithalQaedaideology,bothorganizationswishingtospreadIslamoveraslargeofageographicalareaaspossible,removingsecularstateinstitutions.35BothgroupsalsosoughttoestablishacentralIslamicgovernment,theCaliphate,enforcedbySharialawwiththeCaliphgivingordersandleadingthefollowerspoliticallyandreligiously.36However,theirdifferencesweredrastic. AlQaedapioneeredtheglobaljihad,advocatingattacksonallinfidels,particularlyAmericansathomeandabroad.37AlQaedasoughtoutAmericanandEuropeantargetsasthegroup’simmediatepriority.38AlQaedahasclaimedresponsibilityformultipleattacksagainsttheU.S.anditsalliedforcesincluding1998bombingofU.S.embassiesinKenyaandTanzania,theattackontheU.S.S.ColeinYemenin2000,andthemostinfamousattacks,theSeptember11,2001attacksinNewYork,WashingtonD.C.,andPennsylvania.39Byfocusingontargetsoutsideoftheregion,theSeptember11attacksandtheLondonbombingsforexample,alQaedawasabletobringthefightandinflicttheirideologyonpeopleofothercountries,outsidethereimmediatesphereofinfluence.40

ISISontheotherhand,iswagingjihadathome,mostISISattackshaveoccurredinSyria,andIraq.41In2014,ISISaddedapartnerorganizationinLebanon,42andnowisaffiliatedwithmorethan40groupsin16countrieslikeLibya,Nigeria,Egypt,SaudiArabia,Yemen,andAfghanistan.43ISIShastightcentralleadershipanddoesnotcoexistwellwithintheirseizedcommunities,asmostarefearfulofISISmembersandareagainsttheirextremetacticsandviolence.44ISIShasbeenmostlyconcernedwithlocalsectarian

31Hashim,AhmedS."TheIslamicState:Fromal-QaedaAffiliatetoCaliphate,”77-78.32Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,”3and5.33Hashim,AhmedS."TheIslamicState:Fromal-QaedaAffiliatetoCaliphate,”77-78.34Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,"1.35Brown,CodyMcClain.2015."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria."PolitickaMisao:CroatianPoliticalScienceReview52,no.4/5:203-214.AcademicSearchPremier,EBSCOhost(accessedOctober17,2016),204-205.36Shamieh,Luna,andZoltánSzenes."TheRiseofIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS),"368-369.37Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”205.38Ibid.,206.39Humud,CarlaE."AlQaedaandU.S.Policy:MiddleEastandAfrica,"1.40Shamieh,Luna,andZoltánSzenes."TheRiseofIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS),"369.41Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”206.42Gulmohamad,ZanaKhasraw.2014."TheRiseandFalloftheIslamicStateofIraqandAl-Sham(Levant)ISIS."GlobalSecurityStudies5,no.2:1-11.InternationalSecurity&CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedOctober8,2016),2.43Boghani,Priyanka."WheretheBlackFlagofISISFlies."WheretheBlackFlagofISISFlies.May13,2016.AccessedNovember15,2016.http://apps.frontline.org/isis-affiliates/.44Shamieh,Luna,andZoltánSzenes."TheRiseofIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS),"369.

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fighting.ISISdoesnotseemtohaveplacedparticularemphasisontheglobaljihadinthesamewayalQaedahas.45

UnlikealQaeda,ISISwelcomesforeignfighterstoincreasenumbersinrankandhelpgovernoccupiedterritory.46ISISnowheavilyrecruitsforeignfightersfromaroundtheworldtoestablishthecaliphateastheirreligiousduty.Foreigners,inthethousands,havetraveledtoSyriatotrainandfightwiththeexpectationtheywillreturntotheirrespectivehomelandsandcarryoutjihad.ThishasbeenespeciallyrelevantinEuropewiththeattacksinFranceandBelgium.47MultipleattacksinGermany,theUnitedKingdom,andSpainhavebeenthwarted.48ISIShasalsocapitalizedoninspiringattacksaroundtheworld,callingon“true”Muslimstojointhecaliphateandcarryouthomegrownattacks.ManyMuslimshaveradicalizedthroughpropagandaontheInternet,whichismeanttoinspireindividuals,whocannottraveltoSyriatofight,butwanttodosointhenameofISISandtheCaliphate.TheSanBernardinoandtheOrlandonightclubattacksareexamplesofthis.49

ISISdesirestocreateapureSunnistateandthusmuchoftheirviolencehasbeensectarianinnature,againstprivatepropertyinShiapopulatedareasorreligiouscenters.ZarqawibelievedinordertosavetheIslamiccommunityitwouldneedtobepurged.AlQaedadoesnotsupporttheopinionthatMuslimsaretheproblem,butrecognizetheinstitutionsarewhatneedtobechanged.AlQaedahasmaintainedthatbyalieningthosewhosupportthem,theSunnisonly,thelong-termgoalofglobaljihadwouldbehurt.50

AlQaedahasneverpossessedorattemptedtocreateitsownstateandtheyhavenotcommittedtheorganizationtoadomesticinsurgency,insteadchoosingtorespecttheregimeofthecountrywheretheyarelocated.51InJune2014,BaghdadibeganreferringtoISISastheIslamicState,declaringtheterritoryoccupiedbytheorganizationastheircaliphate.AbuBakralBaghdadiwasnamedthecaliphorrulerandcalledforMuslimsaroundtheworldtojointhecaliphate.AlQaedawasunimpressedwithBaghdadi’sannouncement,assertinghenotonlydidnothavetherighttodeclareacaliphate,butthatthetimingwasnotappropriate.52ISIShasfulfilledZarqawi’sdream,tocreateandgovernastate.ThebiggestdifferencebetweenalQaedaandISISisthis:alQaedahasanetworkapproach,buildingsupportandforcesthroughcommunicativeoutreachversusISIS’sthugtactics,forcingindividualstojointheirranksorbekilled.ThesedifferencesultimatelyledtoalQaedaseveringtieswithISIS.

ExpertViews TherearemanyopinionsbehindthecomebackandexpansionofISIS.Explainedbelow,thislistisbynomeanscomprehensive.Itisnottheintentionofthispapertoclaimtheseperspectivesarerightorwrong,andthattheydidnotcontributetotheriseofISIS,45Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”206.46Mueller,John,andMarkG.Stewart.2016."MisoverestimatingISIS:ComparisonswithAl-Qaeda."PerspectivesOnTerrorism10,no.4:30-39.InternationalSecurity&CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedSeptember25,2016),32.47StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”48Pavlik,Melissa."ISIS'SCampaigninEurope:July16-August18,2016."InstitutefortheStudyofWar.September2,2016.AccessedNovember15,2016.http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isiss-campaign-europe-july-16-august-18-2016.49StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”50Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,"3.51Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”206.52Hashim,AhmedS."TheIslamicState:Fromal-QaedaAffiliatetoCaliphate,”79.

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butIbelievethreespecificconditions,thesectariandivide,politicalinstabilityinIraqandlaterSyria,aswellasthewithdrawalofU.S.militaryandcoalitionforcesfromIraq,togethercreatedtheidealenvironmentforISIStoflourish.

Globalization Inthearticle“RegionalizationofPoliticalViolence:ArabLevantandRiseofIslamicState”bySaima,A.KayaniRajaQaiserAhmed,andMuhammadShoaib,theauthorsalludetoglobalizationastheconditiongrowingterrorismintheformofnon-stateactorsintheMiddleEast,usingISISastheirexample.Alreadyplaguedwithregionalissues,suchassectariandivisions,authoritarianregimes,poorgovernance,andreligiousextremism,ISIShasbeenabletoriseduetoregionalpolitical,social,andeconomicsituationsinthecontextofglobalization.ByexploitingthesituationsinIraqandSyria,ISISwasabletofillthepowervacuumsandattractingforeignfighterswithdreamsofuninhibitedfreedomandwealth.53

IncomeinequalityAccordingtoanarticlepostedbytheWashingtonPost,ThomasPiketty,authorand

professorattheSchoolforAdvancedStudiesintheSocialSciencesandattheParisSchoolofEconomicsbelievesinequality,specificallyincomeinequality,isthedriverbehindterrorismintheMiddleEast.Intheoriginalarticle,publishedintheFrenchnewspaperLeMonde,PikettystatesWesternnationsaretoblameandtheregionalpoliticalandsocialsystemsarefracturedduetoahighconcentrationofoilwealthwithrelativelysmallpopulations.Theoilwealthissharedwithasmallportionofthepopulationandisalsocontrolledbyfew,askingthedistributionunequal.Pikettycriticizestheunequaldistributioncreatesadistressingeconomicconditions,providingjustificationforjihadifighters.TheregionalwarsperpetratedbytheWesternnationsarealsomentionedasvalidationforjihadistactionsasthesenationssupportthegovernmentscontrollingtheoilwealth.54

SectarianDivideTheSunniandShiadivideisnothingnew.Islamhasbeendividedforfourteen

centuries,SunnisandShiascoexistingpeacefullytogether,forthemostpart.WhiletheirritualsandinterpretationsofIslamiclawmaydiffer,theystillreadfromtheQuranandfollowtheteachingsoftheProphetMohammed.Moderndaysectarianismintheregioncanbepartiallylinkedtothe1979IranianRevolution,whereShiacleric,AyatollahRuhollahKhomeini,implementedanIslamicruledgovernment.KhomeiniencouragedMuslimunitybetweenthesects,butmanycountriesintheregionregardedIran’sShiaruledgovernmentasanopportunitytopushaShiaagenda,especiallySaudiArabia,whobeganassertingWahhabism,apuritanicalbrandofSunniIslamintotheregion.Shiaaretheminority,roughlyfifteenpercentoftheworldsalmosttwobillionMuslims,however,theyarethemajorityinIran.Itisbelievedthatmanyofthegroupsresponsibleforsectarianviolencein

53Kayani,SaimaA.,RajaQaiserAhmed,andMuhammadShoaib.2015."RegionalizationofPoliticalViolence:ArabLevantandRiseofIslamicState."Dialogue(Pakistan)10,no.1:1-21.InternationalSecurity&CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedOctober8,2016).54https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/30/why-inequality-is-to-blame-for-the-rise-of-the-islamic-state/

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theregionarelinkedtoSaudiandArabiantensions.TheIraq-IranWaroccurredfrom1980-1988.SaudiArabiabackedIraqwithmilitants,whoalsowenttoAfghanistantohelpfightagainsttheinvadingSovietUnion,weresuppressingShiamovementsbackedbyIran.TheseactionsvalidatedSunnisuspicionsofShiaantagonismtowardsthem.55 SaddamHusseinandhisBaathistpartyweremainlySunnis,theminorityinIraq.WiththeoverthrowofSaddamin2003andtheplacementofamajorityShialedgovernmentin2004,theformerlyoppressiveminoritySunnisbecametheoppressed.ThenewIraqiconstitutionprovidedforreligiousfreedom.ThebombingoftheShiiteshrine,AlAskariMosque,inFebruary2006,escalatedthepreviouslypoliticallychargedattacksintosectarianviolence.56Thesectarianconflictbetween2006and2008waspartiallyfueledbyShiitemilitantsrespondingtoSunniattacks.57

AftertheU.S.withdrawalattheendof2011,sectarianviolenceincreasedexponentially.December2011,theIraqigovernmentannouncedanarrestwarrantwasissuedforSunniVicePresidentTariqalHashimiandhissecurityteamamidallegationsofplanstoassassinateMaliki.ThiswasperceivedasamovetoconcentrateallofthepowerwithMaliki.U.S.officialsintervenedwithpoliticalfactionsandaconferencetoreachapoliticalagreementbetweenallfactionswasscheduledforMarch2012.Itneverhappened.InDecember2012,MalikiarrestedthebodyguardsoftheFinanceMinister,RafialIssawi,alsoaSunni.Sunnitriballeadersheldanti-MalikidemonstrationsinSunnicitiesdemandingthereleaseofprisonersarrestedunderantiterrorismandde-BaathificationlawsaswellasimprovedgovernmentservicesinSunnimajorityareas.

ByJanuary2013,smallamountsofforcewerebeingusedagainstSunnidemonstrators.Thisworsenedthediscontent.IraqiSecurityForceskillednineSunniprotestorsonJanuary25th,whichledtoanincreaseofISIattacksonsecurityforces.OnApril23,IraqiSecurityForcesattackedaSunniprotestcamp.Thistime,about40peoplehadbeenkilled.TheIraqigovernmentdidnotrespondpropellingSunnidemonstratorsandtriballeaderstotakeuparms,overthrowingregionalgovernmentbuildings.Sunniparliamentarian,Ahmadal-Alwani,wasorderedtobearrestedbyMaliki,andbytheendof2013,Sunniunresthadsharplyescalated.MoreattacksbyISIfollowed,whichkilled17IraqiSecurityForces.58UnderMaliki’sorder,IraqiSecurityForcesbeganinvadingSunniprotestcampsandwhenIraqiSecurityForcesattemptedtoclearaprotestcampinRamadiattheendof2013,Protestorsrebelled,drivingoutsecurityfromtheregion,providingISItheperfectlocationtotakeoverandgainterritory.ISIfighterswerejoinedbysomeSunniprotesters,59SunniattacksagainstShiitetargetsincreased,doublingtheciviliandeathtollin2013fromwhatitwasin2012.60

“…ThisconflictislessaboutIslamandIslamismthanitisaboutsectariandivisionsbetweenSunniandShiainIraqandSyria.”61TheSyriancivilwartransitionedtoamore

55"TheSunni-ShiaDivide."CouncilonForeignRelations.February2016.AccessedOctober16,2016.http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/.56Katzman,Kenneth,andCarlaE.Humud."Iraq:PoliticsandGovernance."CongressionalResearchService:Report(March9,2016):1-40.InternationalSecurity&CounterTerrorismReferenceCenter,EBSCOhost(accessedNovember14,2016),3-4;Kuoti,Yasir."ExclusionandViolenceinPost-2003Iraq,"7-9.57Kuoti,Yasir.2016."ExclusionandViolenceinPost-2003Iraq."JournalOfInternationalAffairs69,no.2:19-28.BusinessSourcePremier,EBSCOhost(accessedNovember1,2016),16.58Ibid.,22-24.59Ibid.,24.60StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”61Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”204.

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sectarianbattleasISIbeganfightingwithotherSunnisupportsagainstBasharalAssad,aAlawaiteShia.62SectariantensionsshapedbyMaliki’smarginalizationofSunnileadersandcitizens,andtheconflictwithISIShascausedlimitationsinreligiousfreedomandfueleddiscriminationinIraq.Iraq’sdomesticpoliticalsituationsawsupportforISIScontributingtoitsgrowthinIraqfrom2012-2014.TheSunni-ShiastrifeinIraqaddsfurtherweighttotheargumentthattheongoingconflictcanbedescribedas“sectariancivilwar.”63

U.S.MilitaryWithdrawalTheinterventionandinvasionofIraqin2003steeredZarqawitowardanalliance

withalQaeda.ManyreligiousandtriballeadersplayedouttheinvasionasanunprovokedattackfromtheWestandanaggressiveattemptagainstallMuslims.ThecalltodefendIraqwassentouttoallmembersoftheMuslimcommunity,encouragingfighterstotravelanddefendtheresistance.ManyoftheseforeignfighterswereabsorbedintoAQIandfellinstepwithZarqawi’sorganizationalgoals. ThedisbandingandbarringofformerSaddamregimemembersfromholdingofficeorgovernmentpositionsencouragedthemtoassistandhouseforeignfighters.However,astheAQIgoalstransitionedtooccupyingterritoryversusfreeingitfromoccupyingforces,localtribesbeganfightingagainstAQI.Zarqawi’sdeathin2006incombinationwiththeAwakeningMovementcollaborationandthesurgeinU.S.troopsinearly2007sawasignificationreductioninISIfighters.64ISI’scapabilitiesdeclined,however,theorganizationwasneverdefeated.65U.S.officialsandpublicsupportforthewarwaswaningandwithIraqiSecurityForcesappearingtoberelativelywelltrainedanddisciplined,andanti-governmentgroups,ISIinparticular,showinglowlevelsofactivitywithsectarianviolencereasonablyundercontrol,althoughslightlyincreased,itwastimetowithdrawandallowIraqtocomeintoitsown.Bytheendof2011,U.S.andcoalitionforcesweregone.66 PrimeMinisterNuriAl-Maliki’sperceivedtargetingofSunnisholdingpositionswithinIraq’sgovernmentwithchargesofassassinationplansorterrorismoffensescausedSunniuprisingsagainstthegovernmentalloverIraq.In2013,theprotestmovementcampnearRamadistimulatedarebellionthatspreadthroughouttheAnbarProvinceinwesternIraqleadingMalikitoremovearmedforcesfromthearea.ThissecurityvacuumpavedthewayforISItoholdterritoryandorganizemajorjihadieffortsallovertheprovince.67

PoliticalInstability ISISholdsthemostterritoryinIraqandSyria,twocountriesplaguedwithinternalconflict.InstabilityevolvedfirstinIraq.SincethecreationofthenewIraqigovernmentafterthe2003invasion,thegovernmenthasexperienceddifficultyinsupportingandprotectingitspeople.ManysecurityforcespersonnelwereeitherpaidverylittleornotatallandsubsequentlysomeofthemleftgovernmentservicestosupportISIS.ThevolatilityinSyriaoriginatedinearly2011fromprotestsandhassinceevolvedintoacivilwar,killing

62Rodgers,Lucy,DavidGritten,JamesOffer,andPatrickAsare."Syria:TheStoryoftheConflict."BBCNews.March11,2016.AccessedNovember15,2016.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.63Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”208.64Kirdar,M.J.“AlQaedainIraq,”5-9.65Celso,AnthonyN.2015."Zarqawi'sLegacy:AlQaeda'sISIS‘Renegade’."MediterraneanQuarterly26,no.2:21-41.AcademicSearchPremier,EBSCOhost(accessedNovember12,2016),26.66Katzman,Kenneth,andCarlaE.Humud."Iraq:PoliticsandGovernance,”12.67Celso,AnthonyN.2015."Zarqawi'sLegacy:AlQaeda'sISIS‘Renegade’,”26-28.

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and/ordisplacinghundredsofthousandsofpeople,torefugeecampsinLebanon,Turkey,andJordanaswellasseekingasyluminEurope.

IraqiGovernment In1988,Iraq’sleader,SaddamHussein,usedchemicalweaponsontheKurdishpeopleofnorthernIraq,killingtensofthousandsforaccesstotheoilrichregion,creatingconflictandresentment.HisauthoritarianregimefavoredtheSunniminorityingovernmentappointments,employmentopportunities,andmilitarypositionsoverIraq’sShiamajorityaswellastheKurds.68Insignificantdebtfromtheeight-yearlongIraq-IranWar,SaddaminvadedKuwaitinAugust1990overoildisputes.69TheinvasionledtoU.S.andUnitedNations(UN)imposedsanctions.IraqitroopswereforciblyremovedfromKuwaitbyU.S.militaryforce.ThesanctionswereneverremovedandIraq’sfailuretocomplywithUNenforcedmeasuresaddedtothelaundryoflistofreasonsfortheU.S.invasionofIraqin2003. SaddamandtheSunni-ledgovernmentlostpowerinApril2003.ByMay2003,AmbassadorL.PaulBremerwasappointedbytheBushadministrationastheleaderoftheCoalitionProvisionalAuthority,overseeingIraq’sinternalaffairsuntilanewgovernmentwasappointed.MembersofSaddam’sBaathpartywerebannedfromeverservinginagovernmentpositionandallofthedefenseandinteriorministriesweredisbanded.InJune2004,aninterimgovernmentwithamoderateShiiteleaderwasappointed.70BasedontheagreementbyallIraqifactions,theupcomingelectionswoulddeterminefuturepoliticaloutcomes,endingtheoccupation.ElectionswereheldonJanuary30,2005,whichproduceda275-seattransitionalparliamentandgovernmentmeanttowriteanewconstitutiontobepublicallyvotedonbeforethefull-termelectionswereheld.Withaproportionalelectionsystem,theSunnisboycottedandonlywon17seats.71 Thecommitteeformedtowritetheconstitutionconsistedof55members,themajorityofthembeingShiiteandoneofwhichwasSunni.AftercallsformoreSunniinclusion,fourSunniswereassassinateddaysintothewritingprocess.TheSunnisprotestedtonoavail.ByOctober15,2005,theconstitutionwasapproved72andnationalelectionswereheldonDecember15,2005.Again,theShiitesandKurdswerethemajorityleadersplacingaShiite,NurialMalikiasPrimeMinister.73Withthelossofpowerpolitically,theSunnissoughtauthorityelsewhere,rationalizingtheirviolence,carbombs,politicalassassinations,andelectionviolenceforexample,asawaytodisruptthenewIraqigovernment,whichtheysawasillegitimatesincetheywereunderrepresented.74 InFebruary2006,intheSunni-dominatedcityofSamarra,thebombingoftheShiiteshrine,AlAskariMosque,setoffmajorSunni-Shiiteviolenceaboveandbeyondpoliticalgrievances.Fast-forwardtothenationalelectionsonMarch7,2010.AseriesofappealswerefiledaftertheJusticeandAccountabilityCommissioninvalidatedalmost500candidates.Ultimately,MalikiandtheShiitepartywoneventhoughMaliki’simageasthe

68Shamieh,Luna,andZoltánSzenes."TheRiseofIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS),"364-365.69Kuoti,Yasir."ExclusionandViolenceinPost-2003Iraq,"20-21.70Ibid.,21.71Katzman,Kenneth,andCarlaE.Humud."Iraq:PoliticsandGovernance,”3-4.72Kuoti,Yasir."ExclusionandViolenceinPost-2003Iraq,"22.73Katzman,Kenneth,andCarlaE.Humud."Iraq:PoliticsandGovernance,”7.74Kuoti,Yasir."ExclusionandViolenceinPost-2003Iraq,"22-23.

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protectorofIraqwassmearedwithseveralprominentattacksandbombingsin2009.Withthesecondfull-termIraqigovernmentinplace,theU.S.begantowithdrawitstroops.75

Afterthewithdrawal,however,thesegroupsbeganincreasingattacksinoppositionoftheMalikigovernment,resentmentofShiitedominatedgovernment.76The100,000IraqiSunnisfighterswhohadcooperatedwithU.S.andIraqiforcesagainstISIduring2006-2011aspartoftheAwakeningMovementwerepromisedintegrationintotheIraqiSecurityForcesorgovernmentjobsbytheIraqigovernment.Onlyabouttwo-thirdsreceivedthesebenefitsandtherestretainedtheirpositionsatcheckpointsinSunniareas,neverformallybeingindoctrinatedintoIraqiSecurityForcesbythetimeU.S.forceshadleft.ThisallegedlyresultedinsomejoiningtheIslamicStateoffensivesin2014.77

Iraqiswerelosingtrustintheirgovernment,asMalikiappearedtocontinuetobeself-serving,makingfalsepromises.ThevicepresidentandhissecurityteamwereeitherarrestedorhadarrestwarrantsissuedforallegationsofplanstoassassinateMaliki.ThiswasaperceivedpowerplaytoconcentrateallofthepowerwithMaliki.U.S.officialsintervenedwithpoliticalfactionsandaconferencetoreachapoliticalagreement.Theconferencedidnotoccur.LaterinDecember,Malikiarrestedthebodyguardsofthefinanceministercontinuinghissensedbidfordominance.78

FormerPrimeMinisterNurialMaliki’sregimeengagedincampaignsofviolenceandharassmenttowardsIraqiSunnis.Extrajudicialkillings,airstrikes,andtorturehavebeendocumented.79U.S.officialsblamedhimformarginalizingSunnileadersandcitizens,creatingfurthertensionsthroughoutIraqwhilehewasservinginpublicoffice.TheISISoffensiveinMosul,inJune2014,leadingtothecity’scaptureduetoIraqiSecurityForceseithersurrenderingordesertingthecityresultedinMalikilosinghisthirdtermasprimeministertoHaydaral-Abbadi.80

SyrianCivilWar ThecivilwarandoverallpoliticalsituationinSyriahasallowedforISIStoexpandthere.LikeIraq,Syriaisfacingsignificantinternalconflict.81Whatstartedoutasprotestsfollowingthearrestandtortureofteenagersforwritingpoliticalgraffitionaschoolwall,inMarch2011,promptedproteststoeruptinthesoutherncityofDaraa.Whensecurityforcesopenedfireonandkilleddemonstrators,moreprotestorstooktothestreets.DemandingPresidentBasharalAssadstepdown,campaignsagainsttheSyriangovernmentbrokeoutnationally.ByJuly2011,theoppositionsupportershadtakenuparms,escalatingtheviolence,throwingSyriaintocivilwarasbattlesforcontrolofcitiesensuedaroundthecountry.Thefightingreachedthecapital,Damascus,andAleppoby2012.

TheAssadregimehasbeencriticizedharshlyfortheiruseofforce.TheUNhasdocumentedevidenceofwarcrimes,suchasmurder,torture,rapeandenforceddisappearances,beingcommittedbyothersides.Thegovernmentisbeingaccusedofblockingaccesstofood,waterandhealthservicesasamethodofwar.Capitalizingonthe75Katzman,Kenneth,andCarlaE.Humud."Iraq:PoliticsandGovernance,”7-9.76Ibid.,12.77Ibid.,16.78Ibid.,22-23.79Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”208.80Katzman,Kenneth,andCarlaE.Humud."Iraq:PoliticsandGovernance,”24-25.81Shamieh,Luna,andZoltánSzenes."TheRiseofIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS),"364-365.

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chaosinSyria,ISIShastakencontroloflargeportionsofthecountryaspartoftheirdeclarationofacaliphateinJune2014,namingtheSyriancityofRaqqaasitscapital.82Underthispretext,ISIShasbeeninflictingseverepunishmentsonthosewhorefusetoacceptitsrules,includinghundredsofpublicexecutionsandamputations.ISISfightershavealsocarriedoutmasskillingsofrivalarmedgroups,membersofthesecurityforcesandreligiousminorities,andbeheadedhostages.83

TheSyriancivilwarhastakenonsectarianovertonesalthoughitstartedasapoliticaluprising.SyriahasaSunnimajoritywithaShiapresident,fromtheAlawitesect,andtheriseoftheSunnijihadistgroup,ISIS,hasshiftedtheemphasisofthefighting.84ISIShasgrowninsizeandpowerwithitsmilitaryoffensivesinSyriaandIraq.ISISisnotonlyfightingagainstbothgovernments,butwithvariousrebelgroupsinSyriaaswell.85ISIShasfoundasafehavenandaccesstoweaponsinSyria.WhiletheSyriangovernmentisworkingtopushbackandextinguishrebelforcesspecificallyfightingagainstthem,ISIShasbeenfocusingitseffortsonclaimingadditionalterritory,distributingoffoodandmedicineinwartornareasinanefforttogatheradditionalsupport.86

TippingPointTheoryMalcolmGladwellfirstintroducestheideaofthe“tippingpoint”ina1996articlein

theNewYorkermagazine.Inthearticle,Gladwellsuggeststhetippingpointis“thepointatwhichanordinaryandstablephenomenon…canturnintoa…crisis.”87Hearguesthateveryepidemichasatippingpointandtofightit,thatpointneedstobeunderstood.Gladwellstatesthatepidemicsdon’tbehavethewaywethinktheywillandsocialscientistshavebegunrelatingthetheoryofepidemicstohumanbehavior.88Gladwellalsousesthe“brokenwindow”hypothesistoimplythatdisorderinvitesmoredisorderandinthecontextofvandalismorcriminalactivity,abrokenwindowcanbethetippingpoint.Theauthorfinalizeshissuppositionbyindicatingthatitisthe“natureofnonlinearphenomenathatsometimesthemostmodestofchangescanbringaboutenormouseffects”89andintheframeworkofinfectiousdiseaseepidemics,onesmallchangecancausetheepidemicdecreasesignificantly.90

Inhisbook,publishedin2000,hefurtherdevelopstheTippingPointtheorybydescribingitas“momentofcriticalmass,thethreshold,theboilingpoint.”91Gladwellcontinuestousethespreadofinfectiousdiseasestoillustratehistheoryandascertainsanepidemicistippedbecauseofachangeormultiplechanges.WhatGladwellcalls“agentsof

82Rodgers,Lucy,DavidGritten,JamesOffer,andPatrickAsare."Syria:TheStoryoftheConflict.";"SyrianCivilWarFastFacts."CNN.September26,2016.AccessedNovember15,2016.http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/index.html.83"IslamicStateandtheCrisisinIraqandSyriainMaps."BBCNews.November2,2016.AccessedNovember15,2016.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.84Rodgers,Lucy,DavidGritten,JamesOffer,andPatrickAsare."Syria:TheStoryoftheConflict."85StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”86"IslamicStateandtheCrisisinIraqandSyriainMaps."BBCNews.87Gladwell,Malcolm."Thetippingpoint."NewYorker72,no.14(June3,1996):32-38.AcademicSearchPremier,EBSCOhost(accessedNovember8,2016),34.88Ibid.,35-36.89Ibid.,38.90Ibid.,34.91Gladwell,Malcolm.TheTippingPoint:HowLittleThingsCanMakeaBigDifference.NewYork,NY:Little,BrownandCompany,2002.Electronic,11.

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change,”aredefinedasLawoftheFew,theStickinessFactor,andthePowerofContext.92TheseRulesofEpidemicsprovidethebasisforhowtheTippingPointofallepidemicsisreached.93

LawoftheFew TheLawoftheFewrulesuggests“thesuccessofanykindofsocialepidemicisheavilydependentontheinvolvementofpeoplewithaparticularandraresetofsocialgifts.”94Italsosignifiesthattherearecertainpeoplewhoareperfectlypositionedtostartanepidemic:Mavens,Connectors,andSalesmen.95GladwelldescribesConnectorsasthosewhobringtheworldtogetherandlinkustooursocialcircles.96Mavenshavetheabilitytoconnectuswithnewinformation,typicallythroughword-of-mouthinepidemics.97Salesmenarecharismaticallyirresistibleandbydrawingpeoplein,theyascertaingroupagreementwiththetoneoftheconversationbasedupontheircadenceandmood.98

StickinessFactor Gladwellproposesacriticalfactorforthespreadofasocialepidemicisnotthemessengers,butthenatureofthemessageitself.Tobesuccessful,themessageneedstobeofcertainqualitytostick.99TheStickinessFactorsuggeststherearespecificwaysofmakingamessagememorable.Thesimplestchangesinthestructuringandpresentationoftheinformationcanmakeahugedifferenceandimpact.Amemorablemessagewillthenlikelybemorecontagiousandinvokeaction.100

PowerofContext Forepidemics,theconditions,timing,andplacewheretheyoccurmustbeprecise,whichallowsforanepidemictobetransmitted.101“ThePowerofContextsaysthathumanbeingsarealotmoresensitivetotheirenvironmentthantheymayseem.”102Wearealso“powerfullyinfluencedbyoursurroundings,ourimmediatecontext,andthepersonalitiesofthosearoundus.”103Gladwelldetailsthatsizeandcompositionofthegrouporgroupsofpeoplearoundusmatter.UsingtheRuleof150,belowthisnumberpeoplemingleandmeldtogethereasily.Toomanypeopleandpersonalitiestomanageandpeoplebecomealienated,splittingthegroupup.104

Gladwellsaysthe“BrokenWindowstheoryandthePowerofContextareoneandthesame.Theyarebothbasedonthepremisethatanepidemiccanbereversed,canbetipped,bytinkeringwiththesmallestdetailsoftheimmediateenvironment.”105“The

92Ibid.,18.93Ibid.,11.94Ibid.,33.95Ibid.,13.96Ibid.,37.97Ibid.,58-60.98Ibid.,83.99Ibid.,91-92.100Ibid.,25.101Ibid.,138.102Ibid.,28.103Ibid.,258.104Ibid.,181-186.105Ibid.,144.

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paradoxoftheepidemic:thatinordertocreateoncontagiousmovement,youoftenhavetocreatemanysmallmovementsfirst.”106

Analysis:ElementsofthePerfectStormandTheTippingPoint“In2008,it[ISI]wasdescribingitselfasbeinginastateof‘extraordinarycrisis’.”107

Asstatedpreviously,between2006and2010,ISIwasrelativelyinoperative.In2007,theAwakeningMovement,anallianceofapproximately100,000formerISIfightersandlocaltribes,werefightingagainstISI,reducingtheirareaofoperationasseeninFigure1below.

Figure1:AQI/ISIOperatingAreaComparison

http://understandingwar.org/press-media/graphsandstat/al-qaeda-iraq-and-sunni-insurgents-dec-2006-mar-2008

ISIwasbeaten,butnotdefeated.TheUnitedStatesbeganreducingitsforcesin2009,leavingIraqiSecurityForcesinchargeofsecurity,butbytheendoftheyear,ISIwasslowlyreemergingwithattacksagainstthegovernment,meanttoundermineitsinfrastructure

106Ibid.,191.107Hashim,AhmedS."TheIslamicState:Fromal-QaedaAffiliatetoCaliphate,”72.

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andstrength.108Early2010,MasriandAbuOmaralBaghdadiwerekilled,leadingtoafurtherreductioninforces.AbuBakralBaghdaditookcontrolofISIandbeganreorganizingthegroup,creatingadisciplined,hierarchicalstructurewithmultiplegoverningbodies.Iraqiswereskepticalofandupsetbythenumberofforeignfighterswithintheorganization,andtocombatthishesitation,Baghdadiremovedforeignfightersfromleadershippositions. OsamabinLadenwaskilledinMay2011,usheringAymanalZawahiriinasalQaedaandit’saffiliates,ISIincluded,newleader.AfterthewithdrawalofU.S.andcoalitionforcesinDecember2011,ISIbeganagradualcomebackwithcalculatedstepstakentoreturntotheirformerglory.SectarianviolencebegantoincreaseinIraqasIraqiPrimeMinisterNurialMaliki,aShiite,startedtargetingandarrestingSunnileadersinhigh-levelpositionsinIraq’sgovernmentdaysafterU.S.andcoalitionforceswereoutofIraq.ThiscreatedapowervacuuminIraq. InMarch2011,justbeforebinLaden’sdeath,protestseruptedinSyria.Theresponseofsecurityforces,killingdemonstratorsprovokedthenationtoorderPresidentBasharalAssadtostepdownfromhispositionaspresident.HisrefusaltoleaveofficeandtheescalationofviolencethrewSyriaintoacivilwar.ThesituationinSyriaalsocreatedapowervacuum.From2012toearly2014,theareaISIScontrolledisfairlyunknown.Inanefforttoremainrelevant,ISISleadershipappearstohaveinflatedthenumberofsupportersandorganizationalgrowth,bothinfightersandterritorycontrolled.

InApril2013,ISIoperationsexpandedintoSyria,capitalizingonthecrisisandchaosthere.ThetransitionintoSyriapromptedthegroupchangedtheirnametoISIS.BytakingcontrolofcitiesinbothnorthernSyriaandwesternIraq,ISIShasbeenabletomaintainofficialbordercrossingsbetweenIraqandSyriaandtheonlybordercrossingbetweenIraqandJordan.109AsanaffiliateofalQaeda,ZawahiriimploredISIStooperateonlyinIraqasotheralQaedaaffiliates,JN,werefunctioningwithinSyria.Disagreementsensued,andintheend,thedifferencesintacticsandapproachledalQaedatodissolvetheirrelationshipwithISISinFebruary2014.

TheShiadominatedIraqigovernmentcontinuedtofuelthesectariandivisionbytargetingmoreSunnileadersandattackingSunniprotestcamps.InJune2014,ISISpushedtheirforcesintoMosul,Iraq.Theywereabletocapturethecityeasilyassecurityforcesquicklysurrenderedordesertedtheirposts.Laterthatmonth,BaghdadibeganreferringtoISISastheIslamicState(seeAppendix1forfurthernameinformation),declaringaCaliphateandalloccupiedterritoryastheirs.110 ISISleadershipdeservescreditfortheiractionsaswell,intheproliferationofthegroup.AfterbeingpushedtoohardbyalQaeda,ISISwasabletocuttieswiththemandreemergeundertheAbuBakralBaghdadiandhisreorganization.ISISwasabletobecomeself-fundingastheycapturedterritoryinoilrichareas.ThereorganizationofISISalsoputtheappropriateindividualsincontrolofrecruitmentandpropagandaviasocialmedia.ThisattentionbroughtadditionalforeignfightersfromallovertheglobetobetrainedandfightwithISISaswellasreturnhometocarryoutattacksinthenameofthegroup.

108Ibid.,72-73.109StanfordUniversity.“TheIslamicState.”110Katzman,Kenneth,andCarlaE.Humud."Iraq:PoliticsandGovernance,”24.

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TheTippingPoint Gladwell’sTippingPointtheoryassertsthattheculminationofwhatIdeemthe“PerfectStorm,”orthe“momentofcriticalmass”hadtocometogetherinorderforISIStobesupportedinIraqandSyria,andgainthenotorietyandterritoryitdid.IbelievethetippingpointforISISwasinFebruary2014whenalQaedaseveredtieswithISIS.OnceISISwasoperatingontheirownaccord,theywereabletoflourishandexpandinwaysneverthoughtpossible.TheTippingPointTheorybestexpressesmyopinionthatatthepointthetwogroupsseparated,theelementsinvolvingISISbecamesosaturated,thesituation“tipped”toconditionsfavoringISISproliferationwithinIraqandSyria.ZarqawiandAbuBakralBaghdadifallundertheLawoftheFewasthe“epidemic”ofISISwasencouragedbytheiruniquesocialskillspositioningZarqawitocommunicatetheideologyofthegroupandlaterBaghdadi’sabilitytoorganizeandregrowit.

TheStickinessFactor,emphasizingamemorablemessagethatisstructuredandpresentedinawaythatcreatesalastingimpact,wasISIS’slanguageandactionsofradicalization,anduseofviolenceagainstShiaandothernonbelievers.ISISpioneeredtheuseofsocialmediatowidelydisseminatethesemessages,includingcherrypickedpartsoftheQurantosupportandsubstantiateISIS’sactions.

ThePowerofContext,theperfectenvironmentregardingconditions,timing,andlocationforan“epidemic”tospread,wasthemarginalizationandrepressionoftheSunnisinIraqafterPrimeMinisterMaliki’sreelection,thewithdrawalofU.S.militaryforcesandthepowervacuumthisleftafterMalikiprovedhewasnotabletoprotectallofthepeopleofIraq,andtheSyriancivilwar,whichattractedthousandsoffighterstocombattheattacksoftheAssadregime.

SectarianissuesarenotuniquetoonlyIraqandSyria.Itisaregionalconcern.ExploitingthepowervacuumandIraqigovernment’streatmentofSunnis,ISISwasabletotipthescalesintheirfavor,andthriveafterthecaptureofthekeycityofMosulinnorthernIraqin2014.Thesearenottheonlyconditionsthatmattered.Withoutoneoftheminthecombination,ISISwouldnothavebeenabletoproliferateasquicklyandwidelyastheydid.

Conclusion Inmypaper,IhavearguedthatthewithdrawalofU.S.troopsandcoalitionforcesfromIraq,thepoliticalinstabilityinIraqandSyria,andthesectariandivideincombinationhaveallowedforthejihadistorganization,theIslamicStateoftheIraqinSyriatoescalate.Withoutoneoftheconditionsinthecombination,ISISwouldnothavebeenabletoproliferateasquicklyandwidelyastheydid.AsISISlosesterritory,asithasbeensince2015,thegroupanditssupporterswillbacklashandincreasesinattackscanbeexpected. ItisimportanttorecognizewhyunderstandingtheriseofISISisimportant.Ibelieveitisessentialtounderstandthebackgroundofthegrouptodeterminethebestwaystodefeatthembecauseatsomepoint,theyareboundtomakemistakes.Sectarianpartitioninghasresultedinfurtherconflictsandbloodshedlocallyandregionally.GeopoliticaldivisionshavemadethesituationslightlyworseinSyriaasRussiahassidedwithIranandtheAssadregime,whomtheUnitedStatesopposesandinsteadsupportsSunniGulfstatesandTurkey.WithinternationalcollaborationandbyfosteringthecreationofpowersharinginstitutionswithinIraqandSyria,thesectariantensionscouldbe

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diminishedtopre-Iraqinvasionlevels.111CollaborationonagloballevelcouldalsoreducetheterritorymaintainedbyISISandultimatelyeliminatethegroupbyworkingtowardscombatingacommonenemy,ISIS.ISIShasbecomeaninternationalproblemandwillrequireinternationalcoordination,includinghelpingSyriaresolvetheirinternalconflictandassistingtheIraqigovernmentinovercomingtheirweakenedgovernment.AsIresearchedandwrotemyresearchpaper,Ibegantoaskmyselfifthetimingofallaspectsofthe“perfectstorm”andsequenceofspecificeventsplayedaroleinriseofISIS.Thiswouldbeaninterestingtopicforfutureresearch.

111Brown,CodyMcClain."MobilizingtheCaliphate:ISISandtheConflictinIraqandSyria,”213.

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Appendix1

DefinitionsThefollowingtermshavebeenusedtodescribeISISasanorganization,sometimesinterchangeably,inmuchoftheresearchIhaveread.Throughoutmypaper,IattempttousebroadtermstodescribeandexplainISIS,unlesspertinenttoexpressingaspecificpoint.Ibelieveitisimportanttounderstandthetermsbeingused

Insurgency• DepartmentofDefense-inreferencetoaninsurgentgroup:“theorganizeduseof

subversionandviolencetoseize,nullify,orchallengepoliticalcontrolofaregion.Insurgencycanalsorefertothegroupitself.”112

• “Havingamassbaseofsupportandsomanyfightersthattheycanoperateindaylightandcaptureterritorywiththeintentionofholdingandgoverningit.”113

o “Functionsasaquasimilitaryforcethatisabletomusterrecruitsanddeployinformationnotjusttoattack,buttoexerciselastingcontrolovertheterritoryitcaptures.”114

Terrorism• DepartmentofDefense-inreferencetoaterroristgroupororganization:“the

unlawfuluseofviolenceorthreatofviolence,oftenmotivatedbyreligious,political,orotherideologicalbeliefs,toinstillfearandcoercegovernmentsorsocietiesinpursuitofgoalsthatareusuallypolitical.”115

• “Arebynaturemuchsmaller,withoutamassbaseofsupportsuchthattheymustthereforeoperatecovertly,andtheydonotattempttogovernthepeopletheyterrorize.”116

o “Theyhideinsafehouseswheninactiveorplotting,thenrapidlyexecuteanattackonlytoreturnimmediatelybacktotheircovertlocations.”117

• UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil:“Criminalacts,includingagainstcivilians,committedwiththeintenttocausedeathorseriousbodilyinjury,ortakingofhostages,withthepurposetoprovokeastateofterrorinthegeneralpublicorinagroupofpersonsorparticularpersons,intimidateapopulationorcompelagovernmentoraninternationalorganizationtodoortoabstainfromdoinganyact,whichconstituteoffenceswithinthescopeofandasdefinedintheinternationalconventionsandprotocolsrelatingtoterrorism,areundernocircumstancesjustifiablebyconsiderationsofapolitical,philosophical,ideological,racial,ethnic,religiousorothersimilarnature,andcallsuponallStatestopreventsuchactsand,if

112"DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms."DepartmentofDefense.November8,2010.AccessedNovember15,2016.http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.113Gorka,Sebastian.2016."HowAmericaWillBeAttacked."MilitaryReview96,no.5:30-40.AcademicSearchPremier,EBSCOhost(accessedOctober8,2016),33.114Ibid.115"DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms."116Gorka,Sebastian."HowAmericaWillBeAttacked,"33.117Ibid.

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notprevented,toensurethatsuchactsarepunishedbypenaltiesconsistentwiththeirgravenature.”118

PerfectStorm• “Adetrimentalorcalamitoussituationoreventarisingfromthepowerfulcombined

effectofauniquesetofcircumstances.”119• “Acombinationofeventswhicharenotindividuallydangerous,butoccurring

togetherproduceadisastrousoutcome.”120

CurrentISISDesignationsISISusesandisrecognizedbyavarietyofnames.ThefollowingisalistofcurrentISISnames,whousesthem,andthecontextinwhichtheyareused.121• ISIS:acronymstandsforIslamicStateofIraqandSyria.Theorganizationfirst

announcedthemergerofJabhatalNusraandISIunderthisname,andthemediaandpublicarecurrentlyusingit.

• ISIL:acronymstandsforIslamicStateinLeveant(oralSham).ThenameimpliestheinclusionoftheentiregeographiclocationoftheLevantorJordan,Lebanon,andPalestine.TheObamaAdministrationusesthisname.

• Daesh:ArabicacronymstandsforalDawlaalIslamiyafialIraqwaalShamortheIslamicStateofIraqandSham.ThisnameisusedbyArabStates.

• IslamicState:Thisisthenamethegroupcallsthemselves.ItechoestheirambitionsofanIslamicStatewithoutbordersandinclusionofallMuslims.

TABLE1.HistoryofISISNames122GROUPNAME ACRONYM YEARSINUSEJamaatal-Tawhidwa-l-Jihad JTWJ 1999–2004al-QaedaintheLandofTwoRivers(morecommonlyknownasal-QaedainIraq) AQI 2004–2006MajlisShuraal-Mujahedin MSM 2006IslamicStateofIraq ISI 2006–2013IslamicStateofIraqandal-Sham(TheLevant)(alsoknownasIslamicStateofIraqandSyria) ISIS/ISIL 2013–present

118"Resolution1566(2004)."UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.October8,2004.AccessedNovember20,2016.http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1566(2004).119"DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms."120Ibid.121Shamieh,Luna,andZoltánSzenes."TheRiseofIslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS),"367-68.122Zelin,AaronY."TheWarBetweenISISandal-QaedaforSupremacyoftheGlobalJihadistMovement,"1.

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