research direction introduction adviser: frank, yeong-sung lin present by sean chou 1

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Research Direction Introduction

Adviser: Frank, Yeong-Sung Lin

Present by Sean Chou

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Maximization of Network Survivability with Secret Sharing and Defense

Resource Allocation Against Intelligent Attacks and Nature

Disasters

考量智慧攻擊與天然災害下透過機密共享與防禦資源分配以最大化網路存活度之研究

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Agenda Introduction Problem Description Attack-defense Scenario Mathematical Formulation

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Agenda Introduction Problem Description Attack-defense Scenario Mathematical Formulation

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Introduction With the development of the Internet and

information technologies, more and more transactions happened on the Internet.

There are also many enterprises do their business as well as provide services for their consumers on the Internet.

Therefore, continuity service provided and reliably data storage are very important to companies and costumers.

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Introduction Their most serious fears relate to cyber-security.

The statistic result of most significant risk in companies is showed in Figure 1.1.

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Introduction Since 1997, IBM X-Force has been tracking public

disclosures of vulnerabilities in software products. According to IBM X-Force®2012 Mid-year Trend and Risk Report [2], Figure 1.3 shows that it just over 4,400 new security vulnerabilities in the first half of 2012.

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Introduction According to the International Disaster Database (EM-

DAT), between 1980-1989 and 1999-2009, the number of disaster events reported globally increased from 1,690 to 3,886. Here is the statistical data of reported disasters from 1980 to 2009 in Figure 1.7.

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Introduction There are many serious disasters happened and

cause a great deal of destroyed. For example, the 921 earthquake on September 21, 1999 in Taiwan or the serious disaster was the earthquake on March 11, 2011 in Japan, which was followed by a large tsunami.

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Introduction There are many impacts on the network

when natural disasters happened. For instance, the system components would

destroyed by earthquake like hard disk damaged because of strong vibration.

Also, earthquake may cause electrical fire so that interrupt services.

What’s more, tsunami may cause coastal areas to floods and destruction of power support system or service system.

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Introduction Therefore, we want to find how to use

protections to protect network which affect by internal failures and external impact in order to ensure system survivability and information confidentiality.

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Agenda Introduction Problem Description Attack-defense Scenario Mathematical Formulation

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Problem Description Internal failures External impact System survivability Information confidentiality

Problem Description Internal failures A network may have some internal

failures which can be from component degradation or wear out.

Therefore, we will consider component failures in the network.

In our study, we use “Poisson Arrival Process” to describe component failures.

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Problem Description External impact

Naturel disaster Malicious attack

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Naturel disaster Naturel disaster

Earthquake Compute the probability of different

magnitude earthquake happened Impact range Damage ratio

Tsunami Tsunami happen probability and location The height of tsunami Impact range

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Earthquake Compute the probability of

different magnitude earthquake happened

The occurrence process of earthquake is generally assumed to follow Poisson distribution.

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Earthquake Gutenberg–Richter law

Where: is the number of events having a

magnitude ≧ M a and b are constants different from

locations. Gutenberg, R., and C.F. Richter, (1944). “Frequency of earthquakes in California”,

Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 34, 185-188.

10log m a bM

m

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Earthquake According to estimated parameters of Gutenberg-Richter

equation, we can calculate the mean annual rate of specific magnitude earthquake by following equation :

Where:

Yin Myo Min Htwe, Shen WenBin, “Gutenberg-Richter Recurrence Law to Seismicity Analysis of Southern Segment of the Sagaing Fault and Its Associate Components”, World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 26 2009

0 max 0

max 01

m m m m

m m

e em v

e

0

0 max,mv e m m m

2.303 , 2.303a b

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Earthquake Impact range & Damage ratio We use peak ground acceleration to decide the

impact range and damage ratio According to the research, we can compute the

peak ground acceleration Y by following equation:

Where Y is peak ground acceleration M is earthquake magnitude R is the distance between node and earthquake center

2.30271.5873 0.61650.0253 0.3155M MY e R e

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Earthquake According to Central Weather

Bureau, we transfer use peak ground acceleration to earthquake intensity.

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Tsunami According to the geographical research, over

magnitude 6.5 earthquake which happened under the sea may cause tsunami.

The height of tsunami can compute by following equation :

We can use the height of tsunami into our research to compute the tsunami impact range.

log logwH M a D

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Malicious attack Malicious attack

Commander’s purposes : Compromise the target network by

destroying core nodes to make the service operation lower than the QoS threshold.

Intrude the system components to steal important information.

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Malicious attack In the real world, cyber-attack on the Internet

always launch by a hacker or a group of hackers. Accordingly, in our scenario, the network is

attacked by attackers which are led by many commanders. Each commander would lead only one attack group.

Furthermore, attackers will launch a single attack or collaborative attack and use of his limited resources to achieve the maximization attacks.

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Malicious attack In 1996, S. Skaperdas proposed an

economic theory called “Contest Success Function”

We use contest success function to compute the winning probabilities of two competing parties.

m

m m

TvT t

S. Skaperdas, “Contest success functions”, Economic Theory, vol. 7, pp. 283-290, 1996.

System survivability System survivability Because of enterprises facing a lot of risks, they need a

metric to measure the system state. Survivability is a metric that measures the performance

of a system or a network when it suffers intended attacks, natural disaster or component failure.

Here is a clear definition of survivability in : “We define survivability as a capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents. We use the term system in the broadest possible sense, including networks and large-scale systems of systems.”

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R.J. Ellison, D.A. Fisher, R.C. Linger, H.F. Lipson, T. Longstaff, and N.R. Mead, “Survivable Network Systems: An Emerging Discipline,” Technical Report CMU/SEI-97-TR-013, November 1997 (Revised: May 1999).

System survivability Defender wants to maintain the network service

operation in finite resource. Because the limitation of budget, defender will

find the high risk nodes by detecting system and using reactive protection strategies in order to decrease impact on the network by attackers.

Reactive protection strategy example: Virtual Machine Defense Strategy The third party’s defense center signature Dynamic Topology Reconfiguration

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Problem Description Information confidentiality We want to use the method called “Secret

sharing” to improve the security of data. Secret sharing is a method for distributing a

secret to a group of participants, each of which allocates a share of the secret.

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Agenda Introduction Problem Description Attack-defense Scenario Mathematical Formulation

Attack-defense Scenario For the commander, the goal of the commander

is to compromise several core nodes, which causes the defender’s service disruption or steal important information.

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Attack-defense Scenario

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Agenda Introduction Problem Description Attack-defense Scenario Mathematical Formulation

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Mathematical Formulation Given Parameters Decision Variables Verbal Notation Objective Function Constraint Verbal Constraints

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Given Parameters

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Given Parameters

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Given Parameters

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Given Parameters

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Given Parameters

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Decision Variables

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Decision Variables

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Decision Variables

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Verbal Notation

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Verbal Notation

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Objective Function

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Constraint

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Constraint

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Verbal Constraints

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Thanks for your listening.