prevention and control of cross country natural gas pipeline emergencies 04 th december’2009
Post on 02-Apr-2015
219 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
Prevention and Control of
Cross Country Natural Gas
pipeline Emergencies
04th December’2009
2
Pipeline Transportation
The increasing demand of Natural Gas and the distance between the source and the consumers point necessitated the transportation of NG through Pipelines.
Pipelines specially underground are the Safest and Most Reliable, Economical and Eco -friendly Mode of Product Transportation.
Unlike Other Business/ Industrial activities, Pipeline Transpiration also has Risk.
Pipeline Incidents are Low Frequency and High Consequence in Terms of Cost.
3
Hazards of Natural Gas
Fire Hazards
– Jet Fire
– Flash Fire
– Pool Fire
Explosion
– Vapor Cloud Explosion / Delayed explosion
Toxicity
– Comparatively less toxic
4
Transco Pipeline Incident 14th Sept’08
At 7.44 am on 14th September’ 2008 TPL line-B failed at MP -1459.73 near town of Appomattox, Virginia State and was reported to National Response Centre.
5
Transco Pipeline failure Sept, 2008
Gas cloud ignited producing a large fireball and resulting in a 37’ wide, 15’ deep crater and a burn zone of 1125 ‘ in diameter.
30’ section of pipe was blown out. No damage to adjacent lines.
6
Transco Pipeline failure Sept, 2008
Appomattox Fire Dept, Virginia State Police responded
7
Transco Pipeline failure Sept, 2008
8
Transco Pipeline failure Sept, 2008
23 family evacuated, 5 injured, 2 houses burnt.
9
Transco Pipeline Incident 14th Sept, 08
TPL is a n interstate gas P/L system that extends from Gulf of Mexico to New York and it passes through Verginia having two compressor stations (Reidville Cs at MP 1369 & Ellicott at MP 1628.
Three lines, A,B & C, laid parallel to each other with 20’ distance apart.
– Line A: 30” dia, Grade-X52, Coal tar enamel coated, 1950
– Line B: 30” dia, X52 Grade, Asphalt enamel coated, 1955
– Line C: 36” dia, X52 Grade, Asphalt enamel coated, 1962
– MAOP : 800 psi, Actual pressure: 799 psi
10
Hazards of Natural Gas
All lines had a common corrosion system with rectifier connected to all three lines. Explosion
Close internal electrical survey was performed in 2003. Action taken were unknown.
Line B & C were internally inspected in 2008 with a high resolution magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) tool and deformation tool. This led to replacement of 200 ft section of Line C.
PSP at blast location was low. Readings taken in 2006 indicated PSP remained low.
11
DIAMANT BOART
DIAMANT BOART
Pipeline involved:Ø 1000 MM
Pipeline Ø 900 MMCRATER
Belgium Pipeline Incident 30th July’04 (Gellingen location)
12
Details of the Pipeline
Pipeline : Natural Gas Pipeline
Number :2
Owner : Fluxys (network manager)
Route : Zeebrugge - Blaregnies
Diameter : 39” (1000 mm)
Pressure in the pipeline: 80 bar Size of the opening: Guillotine break
13
What went wrong?
Pipeline undergoing maintenance (pressure from 80 to 50 bar);
Work on site (levelling the ground using excavator/ spreder);
Reduced cover above the pipe;
Pipe damaged during work (75% reduced wall thickness);
30 July 2004 pipe back in use. (pressure from 50 to 80 bar);
At 8:45 smell of gas reported;
9:00 fire on site and pipe splits open;
9:01 Explosion!!!!
14
Victims
24 dead including 5 firemen and 1 policeman.
132 injured of which 25 with life-threatening burns
Chief inspector Stéphane Delfosse of Ath police force was the only person to survive the zero perimeter. He was standing 15 metres from the leak when the pipeline failed under the high pressure.
Why were there so many victims?
No central direction!
15
Victims
People ran towards the leaking pipe instead of keeping a safe distance.
He owes his life to a driver who took him to the hospital in Ath, and the doctor at the hospital who immediately transferred him to Neder-Over-Heembeek.
He was in a coma for 4 months, and suffered 3rd degree burns over 50% of his body. He has already undergone 25 operations …
16
A cloud of gas
9:00 AM
9:01AM
Photo taken
approx. 15 km
from Gellingen
Photos taken
from a distance of approx. 9 km
At approx. 1 min
intervals
17
Max. height 450m Av. height 250m
Other observations - a sea of flames
18
Details of the action plan
The action plan indicates that if there is a fire as a consequence of a guillotine break in a gas pipeline with a diameter of 1000 mm, the following zones are assigned:
Zone 1 (10 kW/m2 after 30 secs): 210 m
Zone 2 ( 3 kW/m2 after 30 secs): 710 m
Zone 3: 1000 m
20
CraterCrater
190 m
240 m
210 m
210 m
Zone heavily affected by the heat = House burning distanceZone heavily affected by the heat = House burning distance
Verification
2121
approx. 160 m from craterapprox. 160 m from crater
Observations: Damage from heat radiation
22
Along the road Along the road
Approx. 210 m from craterApprox. 210 m from crater
Dried leavesDried leaves
Observations: Damage from heat radiation
2323
CraterCrater
Wood ignited Wood ignited approx. 130 m from craterapprox. 130 m from crater
Following slide : inside the Following slide : inside the buildingbuilding
Observations: Damage from heat radiation
2424
Details of the action plan
The action plan indicates that if there is a fire as a consequence of a guillotine break in a gas pipeline with a diameter of 1000 mm, a sound level of 90 dbA will extend 250 metres.
Observation: the sound exceeded the pain threshold!
2525
View of the crater.
app. 14 mapp. 14 m
app. 14 m
app. 14 m
app
. 4 m
app
. 4 m
The explosion
26
The section of pipeline was found approx. 155 m from the crater.
The explosion
2712-11-2008 27
Damage caused by the explosion
28
Causes of Pipeline Incidents
Third Party (Instantaneous, Previously Damaged Pipe & Vandalism)
Corrosion (External & Internal)
Incorrect Operations
Material and Construction Defects
Weather (Heavy Rain/ Flood and Lightning)
Weld/ Fabrication (Defective Pipe Girt & Fabrication Weld)
Natural Calamities (Earthquakes)
Environment (Stress Corrosion Cracking)
29
Hazardous Liquid & Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines Incidents (1984-2004)
NG Pipelines Incidents:1367 nos.
Liquid Pipelines Incidents: 2054 nos.
Microsoft Excel Worksheet
Microsoft Excel Worksheet
Source:http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipelineIA98.htm. www.pstrust.org/resources/stats/accident.htm
30
Pipeline Integrity Management Program
Detection and Prevention of Threats to Enhance Pipeline Integrity:
Third Party Damage– One Call System– Increased Cover Depth– Increased Line Markers– Hazard Protection– Marker Tape at Top of Pipe– Increased Patrol Frequency (Line Walk & Aerial)– Public Awareness / Education– Reward for Report of Encroachment– Liaison with Local Development Authorities– Leak and Soil survey
31
Pipeline Integrity Management Program
Corrosion - External– In-Line Inspection (ILI) and Rehabilitation Program*– Direct Current Voltage Gradient (DCVG) Survey– CP Coverage & Reading Analysis– Bell Hole / Visual Inspection– Soil Corrosivity Inspection– Buried Coupon Monitoring
Corrosion - Internal– In-line Inspection– Impurities /Moisture Reduction– Biocide Inspection– Inhibitor Injection– Internal Coupon Monitoring– Cleaning Pig Run
32
Pipeline Integrity Management Program
Construction and Material Failure
– Pipe Manufacturing Inspection– Pipe Loading and Transportation Inspection– Construction Activity Inspection
Incorrect Operations
– Pressure Relief Design– SOP for Normal, Abnormal and Emergency – Operators Qualification Test
Fatigue Analysis and Monitoring program Management of Change Process Periodic Pipeline Integrity and Safety Audits Incident Investigation & Corrective Action
Tracking Risk Assessment based on Population Density
Index
33
Categorization of Emergencies
Emergency Organization
Emergency Notification Matrix
Emergency Response Support System (ERSS)
First Responders Kit
Liaison with Local Fire Services, Hospitals, Police etc
Emergency Drills Training and Rehearsal
Dealing with Press/Media
Siren Code
Evacuation Plan
Assembly Points & Emergency Control Centre.
EWPL ERDM Preparedness
34
EWPL Level of Emergencies
35
First Person at site Notification of incident
Pipeline Operation Centre (POC) in Command
Emergency under control
POC to initiate Level-1 Notification by informing Level-1 team members
Emergency Under control
No
POC to intimate to all concerned
Emergency Escalates to Level - 2
Emergency Terminated
Yes
EMT Leader activates ECC at RCP, Mumbai
Yes
No
Emergency Response Team (ERT) to site
Incident leading to emergency
Emergency Escalates to Level - 3
EMT Leader informs CMT Leader Mumbai and POC
CMT Activated
Incident handling at site by ERT & ERT Leader
ERT Leader informs POC/ EMT Leader
POC initiates Level-2
Emergency Notification
Emergency Escalation
36
EWPL Emergency Notification/Communication Matrix
Input from emergency site through F & G, SCADA, Manual Call Point, One-call number, Telephone, Public, Reliance Mitra etc
Pipeline Operation Centre Shift Engg.
ERT Leader & Lead
Operations
Head- Field O&M
Head- HSEF
OT Control Room
Head- POC
Security Operation
Centre
Emergency Response Team
State Security Manager
Sec. Guard & Reliance Mitra
Head- ROU
Land Owners/ Stake holders
District Authorities
Mutual Aid Industries
POC
Emergency Mgmt Team Members
Crisis Mgmt Team (PMSP/RKD/JSY)
Informed by EMT Leader
LEVEL-1
EMT Leader Fire / Police /
Hospitals
LEVE
L-2
LEV
EL-3
37
EWPL Emergency Organization
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM
LEADER (Area / RHQ Manager)
Security Staff on duty
Lead- Ops Lead-Elec Lead- Inst
IT Lead Gate Security
Lead- MechanicalExec. Inst.
Medical Services & Ambulance
Fire Brigade Services
Police Services
Affected Stake Holders (land Owners) and
Govt. Authorities
Off-Site Incident
Commander (District
Magistrate)
First Responder/
Reliance Mitra
Rescue & First Aid Team
Auxiliary Fire Team
Operations Team
Communication Team
Contract Workers
Emergency Mgmt Team
Crisis Mgmt Team
State Security Manager
Head-ROU
Note: Level I Level II Level III
38
Organizational Focus - Standards and Code of Practices
Statutory and Regulatory Compliances
Surveillance (Aerial and Line Walk Patrolling)
Integrity and Reliability of Pipeline
Compliance to HSE Requirements
Periodic Audits
Emergency Response & Disaster Management Readiness.
Monitoring Process
Summary
39
top related