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Preliminary Hazards Analysis
for the
Emergency Operations Center
Project
Los Alamos National Laboratory
June 12, 2001
Prepared by
Jerry C. Bueck
ESH-3, Integrated Risk Analysis, Communication and Management Group
Document Control No. CGRP-0012-009, R0
Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................1 2. Introduction .......................................................................................................2 3. Site Description...................................................................................................2 4. Facility Description ..............................................................................................6 5. Evaluation Of Past Safety Experience and Documentation.....................................7 6. Hazards Identification.........................................................................................7 7. Hazards Assessment.........................................................................................10 8. Hazard Classification ........................................................................................11 9. Natural Hazards Performance Category .............................................................11 10. Accident Analysis .............................................................................................11 11. Identification Of Required Safety Functions........................................................12 12. Identification Of Proposed Safety Controls .........................................................14 Attachment A Hazard Analysis Tables ....................................................................A-1 Attachment B HVAC Safe Operational Concept .......................................................B-1
1. Executive Summary
This analysis supports the conceptual development phase for the low hazard Emergency
Operations Center facility. This new facility consolidates a number of emergency functions
performed by the Laboratory and Los Alamos County into one facility equipped with adequate
space (about 33,000 sq. ft.) and systems to accommodate most emergency response activities
and the hazardous environments that might accompany the emergencies. The facility will be
able to operate up to 14 days without external utility support while housing up to 100 workers. A
ventilation system that provides protection to occupants from hazardous particulate releases
(such as most radioactive materials) and some toxic gases will be provided. Three tiers of back-
up emergency response management complement the EOC. These include a facility at TA-49,
one in White Rock, and a mobile command center.
The proposed EOC is located on the western edge of the Laboratory just off State Road 501 and
Anchor Ranch Road in TA-69. This location provides several escape routes and is outside most
hazard circles that represent the limits of severe hazard to EOC workers.
The EOC is a low hazard facility based on the operations that will be conducted within the facility.
However, the operational requirement to operable during most potential emergency situations
requires a level of safety consideration for both operational concepts and facility systems. Safety
functions and the systems that will perform the functions based on the CDR are identified.
Important administrative controls, such as monitoring the interior environment during an
emergency to ensure it remains safe, are identified. This PHA further looks at the impacts on the
ability to operate for the desired 14 days without external utility support and the hazards that
may threaten that objective.
External hazards due to site emergency conditions are assessed, as are requirements associated
with natural phenomena such as seismic activity or wildfires. The facility structure is designated
PC-2 based on its importance. Other systems are assigned a PC rating based on their importance
to the safety of workers or their importance to meeting the safety function of the EOC.
Protective systems and administrative controls are developed along with a HVAC operational
concept to help ensure EOC workers are protected from life-threatening situations associated
with potential emergency conditions.
1
2. Introduction
3.
This analysis is in support of the conceptual phase of the proposed Los Alamos National
Laboratory Emergency Operations Center (EOC) project. This PHA is to be used in conjunction
with programmatic documentation that details the objectives and scope of this project.
Summaries of the project to the level that makes the safety arguments sensible are provided in
the text that follows.
The EOC project results from post Cerro Grande Fire assessments that demonstrated that the
current EOC facility is inadequate to provide for the needs of a major emergency for both the
Laboratory and the surrounding community. The new LANL/LAC EOC is to be a permanently
manned facility providing Los Alamos County, Police, Fire and 911dispatch and administrative
offices for the LANL Emergency Management Support Staff. During emergency conditions, the
facility will be able to house LANL, county, state, and federal emergency staff on a 24 hours a
day basis for up to 14 days without external utilities support.
The facility will be approximately 33,000 sq. ft and include the Emergency Operations Response
Center, emergency technical support areas, a secure vault, with administrative support areas
consisting of staff offices, meeting rooms, and multi agency offices. Auxiliary support areas
including locker rooms, kitchen, copier/reproduction/plotting areas, and training rooms and the
like will be provided to allow the EOC to function during protracted emergency conditions.
Additional features will include a garage area for emergency response vehicle storage, dedicated
potable water storage, motor powered electrical generator with fuel supply, and parking and fire
standoff paved areas.
Site Description
The site chosen for this facility is at the intersection of State Road 501 and Anchor Ranch Road at
TA-69. TA-69 is shown within LANL in Figure A-1 while the proposed location within TA-69 is
shown in Figure A-2. This site was chosen for several reasons. Egress is possible in one of four
directions allowing evacuation away from most threatening hazardous conditions that may be
encountered, located on the edge of LANL property and therefore fairly far from LANL facilities
that might produce hazardous materials releases, and separated from an existing alternate EOC
such that it is unlikely that both centers would be unusable except for extremely widespread
disasters. The site is outside most emergency hazard planning zones for radioactive materials
release from any LANL facility. The site also lies outside explosive exclusion zones. The only
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facility whose hazard planning zone will encompasses the EOC is the TA-3 Beryllium Technology
Facility when it becomes operational. Radiation emergency planning zones are shown in Figure
A-3 (except that the TA-8-23 radiography facility, a Category 2 nuclear facility, is not shown
although the potential impact of that facility is defined).
Figure A-1: LANL Technical Areas
3
Figure A-2: EOC Site Location
4
Figure A-3: Radiation Emergency Planning Zones
The site has been assessed for local seismic faulting which is described in a seismic report
prepared by the Laboratory. An independent seismic criteria review was also conducted by
Dr. Loring Wyllie, Degenkolb Engineering.
Nearby facilities and features with the potential to impact EOC activities include those nuclear
facilities listed in Table A-1 (radiation dose is calculated based on unprotected exposure with a
worst-case release from the nuclear facility), TA-3 Beryllium Technology Facility, TA-3 Gas Plant,
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and the TA-3 Warehouse and Chemical Warehouse (these facilities are also listed in Table A-1).
State Road 501 is a major throughway on the western part of the laboratory with a variety of
hazardous traffic including inter-laboratory transport and commercial hazardous material
transport vehicles.
Table A-1: Facilities that Could Impact the EOC
Facility Approximate Distance and Direction from EOC Hazard(s) of Concern
CMR (TA-3-29) 2450 m (ENE) Radioactive particulates – 14 rem
Radiography (TA-8-23) 1400 m (S) Radioactive particulates - <2 rem (estimate based on preliminary analysis)
WETF (TA-16-205) 3350 m (S) Radioactive gas (tritium) – 3.2 rem
TSF (TA-21-209) 7070 m (ENE) Radioactive gas (tritium) – 1.2 rem
TA-55 (TA-55-4) 4250 m (E) Radioactive particulates – 2.7 rem
Gas Plant (TA-3) 2975 m (ENE) Hazardous gases and vapors Beryllium Technology Facility (TA-3-141)
2975 m (ENE) Beryllium particulates
Chemical Warehouse (TA-3) 2000 m ENE) Chemical vapors
Natural phenomena hazards associated with this site are identified in section 6.
4. Facility Description
The facility will consist of a major structure of approximately 33,000 sq. ft that will comprise the
EOC. A garage will be constructed to house emergency response vehicles. Potable water
storage and an electrical power generator with its associated fuel storage will be located near the
EOC. Parking for approximately 100 cars and trucks as well as a paved area to provide access
around the site will be included. A sanitary sewer holding tank to accommodate 14 days
discharge based on 100 people is provided with a lift-station for normal operation. Fire
protection water is provided by an elevated fire water tank located near the facility.
Facility features include an EOC structure designed to maintain a positive internal pressure, air-
lock type primary entrances, an HVAC system described in greater detail below, work and office
areas, training areas, locker rooms, kitchen, storage and technical equipment support rooms, and
utility support areas such as mechanical, telecommunications, and electrical distribution rooms.
Natural gas is provided for normal hot water and boiler operations. Back-up electrical hot water
heating is provided.
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The EOC HVAC will provide the maintenance of positive pressure under most conditions. The
HVAC will have the capability to provide HEPA like filtering (these will not be nuclear grade HEPAs
but will be sized to filter harmful particlates that might result from a variety of credible accident
scenarios associated with external events). Charcoal filtering will also be available to remove
some toxic vapors that could be expected under selected credible accident scenarios. The
ventilation system can be operated in a recirculation mode with or without external make-up air.
A non-pressurized mode will be available where the ventilation system is sealed form the external
environment and air is circulated inside the building. The operational concept for the EOC HVAC
is shown in Attachment B.
5.
6.
Evaluation Of Past Safety Experience and Documentation
The existing LANL EOC is treated as a low hazard facility so there is no substantial safety
documentation except for the LANL required Facility Safety Plan that outlines general safety
requirements typical of all LANL office-type environments. Recent experience resulting from the
Cerro Grande Fire provide the basis for the construction of this new facility primarily in provision
of adequate space for the increased staff required during an emergency and the post emergency
recovery period.
Hazards Identification
Hazards associated with the proposed EOC project are listed in Table A-2 (construction hazards
are not included and no site hazards that would impact the construction or normal operational
activity have been identified). External hazards possible to be encountered during a laboratory or
area wide emergency are listed in Table A-3. These hazards are identified based on a review of
Laboratory facilities and operations that could provide the most significant impact to the EOC.
They include the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Facility (CMR), the TA-8-32 Radiography
Facility, and the TA-16 Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF), all Category 2 nuclear
facilities, the Sigma Complex which includes the Beryllium Technology Facility, the Laboratory
warehouse and chemical warehouse (SM 30 and 31), the gas plant, the steam plant, and a
variety of low hazard laboratories. The hazards of these facilities provide the information needed
to assess the external hazards likely to be encountered during LANL emergency situations.
Hazardous material transport activities in support of Laboratory functions as well as commercial
transport offer the potential for transportation accidents with associated hazardous material
releases. Hazardous materials under the control of Los Alamos County, particularly chlorine gas
used in water and sewage treatment activities is also considered.
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NPH hazards that are considered as threats or significant potential impacts to the EOC are listed
in Table A-4.
Table A-2: EOC Facility Hazard List
Hazard Measure Comment
Electricity 220 and 110 Volts Utility systems and office use.
Some higher voltage (440 V)
may be needed for increased
efficiency of utility systems.
Solvents and cleaning
Materials
Janitorial and light
maintenance quantities
Required for maintenance of
the facility – toxicity,
flammability, or combustibility
concerns.
Combustible materials Office type quantities typical
of all LANL office areas
Typical needs for office
operations. See also solvents
and cleaning materials.
Electromagnetic Force (EMF) No levels determined Computer use and power
distribution.
Radio frequency (RF)
electromagnetic fields
About 500 w VHF transmitted
About 800 w UHF transmitted
VHF and UHF radios and
antenna systems for wireless
communication.
Natural gas LANL natural gas distribution. Located in separate attached
mechanical equipment room.
Distribution to have seismic
shut-off capability.
Fuel 14 day supply for generator to
produce facility electrical
power and fuel delivery truck
Buried diesel fuel tank located
outside but near facility. Day
tank for operation of
generator. Drive-through
provided for fuel delivery
Fueled vehicles
(Flammables and combustibles
hazard)
Up to 7 fully fueled truck type
vehicles with associated
emergency response
equipment.
Emergency vehicles are
housed in a proposed garage
adjacent to the EOC.
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Hazard Measure Comment
Hydrogen gas
(associated with
uninterruptible power
supplies)
Dependent upon battery type
and quantity selected.
Potential fire or explosion
source if release of hydrogen
gas is not adequately
ventilated.
Common hazard with
established standards based
control methodologies
Table A-3: External Hazards List
External Hazard Hazard Concern Comments
Forest or Wild Fire Smoke, toxic or hazardous
smoke-borne particles, fire,
high temperatures, firebrands
and toxic gases. Secondary
effects such as loss of off-site
power and other distributed
utilities.
Threatens EOC workers and
possibly EOC structure.
Significant fires requiring EOC
operation have occurred
several times over the last fifty
years.
Tritium gas release Radioactive gas is EOC worker
hazard
Accident analysis indicates
that tritium concentrations
would be relatively low
however accumulation of
tritium in the EOC could
increase dose
Radioactive particulate
material
Radioactive materials release
from a nuclear facility poses a
potential worker hazard
Accident analysis indicates the
hazard level in the dispersed
cloud would much lower than
that experienced in the facility
where the release could occur.
Beryllium powder Beryllium powder poses an
EOC worker hazard
A worst case release could
produce dispersion cloud
concentrations above the
ERPG-3 level
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External Hazard Hazard Concern Comments
Hazardous chemicals transport Chemical release of a variety
of chemicals can create
hazardous conditions for EOC
workers from exposure to
vapors or gases of –
• HCl
• HNO3
• Cl2
• Fl2
These chemicals are routinely
delivered to and within the
Laboratory and transport
vehicles containing these and
other hazard chemicals can
transit the Laboratory in
quantities limited only by DOT
guidelines.
Explosion/fire Explosions from explosives
laden vehicles, flammable
gases, fuels, and other
sources can produce shrapnel,
cause secondary fires, and
burn producing toxic fumes
that can be harmful to EOC
workers.
Explosives and explosive
potential gases are
transported and routinely used
in a variety of locations at the
Laboratory and on roads
transiting the Laboratory in
quantities limited only by DOT
guidelines.
Table A-4: Natural Phenomena Hazards Considered
Natural Phenomena
Hazard
Concern
Seismic activity EOC and external event initiator
High winds EOC and external event initiator
Floods Minor EOC concern, potential external event initiator
Snow loads EOC
Heavy rain EOC and possible external event initiator
Volcanism Area wide threat
7. Hazards Assessment
The hazards identified in Table A-2, Table A-3, and Table A-4 are evaluated in this section.
Hazards are evaluated with respect to the primary operational objective of the EOC, which is to
operate safely through emergency events and to support post-emergency recovery. Therefore,
the consequences of concern are not only significant injury to the workers or public, but
conditions that would prevent the operation of the EOC under the desired operational conditions.
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EOC workers may expect an elevated hazard level to be acceptable under emergency conditions,
as such is clearly not a condition of “normal operations.” Internal environmental monitoring,
provided by laboratory support groups on an as needed basis, is used to determine whether
hazardous conditions associated with external emergency events are unacceptable and EOC
evacuation would be required. This administrative process forms the framework for hazard
assessment for the EOC.
Although it is clearly possible to evaluate each hazard in Table A-3 these hazards can be grouped
into five areas, which exhibit some overlap. These areas are:
• Forest and/or wild fire (includes smoke, high temperatures, and firebrands)
• Hazardous particulate release (radioactive material, beryllium, smoke borne hazardous
particles)
• Tritium and other hazardous gases
• Chemical vapors
• Explosion generated missiles
The above hazards are evaluated in Table A-2.
Natural phenomena hazards impacts on the EOC are considered in Table A-3 along with design
considerations and the external hazards or hazardous conditions that might be associated with
the NPH.
In general, hazards of concern are those that threaten the EOC workers or prevent the EOC from
being occupied and performing its safety function.
8.
9.
10.
Hazard Classification
This is a low hazard facility based on the facility hazards, which include primarily standard
industrial hazards routinely encountered and accepted by the public (LANL LIR 200-00-05.1)
Natural Hazards Performance Category
This is an emergency facility and is classified as PC-2. Specific EOC design considerations are
identified in Table A-3.
Accident Analysis
No accidents are considered for this low hazard facility. Accidents that occur in other facilities
are captured as external events.
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11.
Identification Of Required Safety Functions
Safety functions of proposed safety systems are identified in Table A-2 and Table A-3 as a
function of hazard. As many design related safety function serve to prevent or mitigate more
than one hazard a cross walk of safety function and hazard is prepared (a safety function view
instead of a hazard view). In this way, the safety function is fully described and all its drivers are
identified in one place instead of being spread among many entries in several tables. The
required safety function, the CDR SSC(s) that satisfy this function, and the hazard(s) that
requires the safety function are identified in Table A-5.
In Table A-5 the terms “air-tight” and “air-lock” are used to describe the facility feature that helps
minimize hazardous gases or vapors that may not be filtered effectively from entering the EOC
during emergency events and causing a dangerous environment for EOC workers. These
features are also credited in helping to keep particulate hazards from entering the EOC. An
engineering evaluation1 has defined “air-tight” to include a specific allowable leakage rate that is
demonstrated by a post-construction test. The study additionally identified the “air-lock” as an
administratively controlled entryway with two sets of doors with a zoned ventilation capability to
help keep hazardous materials located outside the facility from coming inside when the facility is
entered.
The fundamental operational feature leading to the “air-tight” and “air-lock” requirements is the
need to be able to isolate the facility and maintain a reasonable expectation for a safe work
environment for about an hour’s duration. The hour is the time estimated to position support at
the EOC to establish monitoring of the particular hazards threatening the EOC.
1 Bridgers and Paxton Memo, Dorsey to Roberts, HNR, “Emergency Operations Center, PHA,” May 22, 2001.
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Table A-5: Safety Function Requirements
Required Safety Function CDR SSCs that satisfy function Hazard(s) that drive function
Minimize hazardous particulates from entering the EOC to protect workers from harm
• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC particulate filter • HVAC particulate filter with
provision for adequate loading for smoke and smoke borne particles
• HVAC filtered recirculation • HVAC operational monitoring • Secondary entryways alert lights
to prevent opening during hazardous mode operations.
Radioactive particles Beryllium particles (powder) Smoke particles and smoke born hazardous particles Combustion particulates
Prevent or reduce hazardous gases from entering EOC to protect workers from harm
• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC isolation function • HVAC charcoal filter removes or
reduces some hazardous gases • HVAC operational monitoring • Secondary entryways alert lights
to prevent opening during hazardous mode operations.
Tritium Forest or wildfire produced toxic gases Combustion products Hazardous chemical gases
Prevent or reduce hazardous vapor from entering to protect workers from harm
• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC isolation function • HVAC charcoal filter removes or
reduces some hazardous vapors (likely more effective on vapors than gases)
• HVAC operational monitoring • Secondary entryways alert lights
to prevent opening during hazardous mode operations.
Hazardous chemical vapors
Prevent EOC structure from catching fire during fire related emergencies (loss of EOC function, workers subject to harm from fire)
• EOC fire resistant structure and fire suppression system
• Fuel storage designed to pose no fire threat
• Garage structure designed so as not to pose a fire threat if it catches fire
• Paved firebreak to reduce radiant heat load
• HVAC intake and filter system fire resistant.
• EOC fire detection • Natural gas source isolation
capability to reduce fire load
Forest or wildfire (heat and firebrands)
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Required Safety Function CDR SSCs that satisfy function Hazard(s) that drive function
Isolate EOC from external environment if external airborne hazard is unknown or hazard cannot be managed before external air enters EOC (2-hour isolation capability –nominal lab emergency hazard cloud passage time)
• HVAC isolation even under no-power condition
• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC operational monitoring • Natural gas line with seismic
shut-off capability
All external hazards NPH caused external hazards
EOC to operate during and after most emergency conditions (14 day stand alone operation)
• Standby electrical power • Fuel for standby electrical power
for 14 days • Potable water for 14 days
operation • Sanitary waste storage for 14
days • Robust seismic design of EOC
and essential support structures (PC-2)
• SSCs (above) able to perform function given a PC-2 level flood, winds, wind driven missile, snow loads, and heavy rain conditions.
• EOC structure to remains “air-tight” after PC-2 level seismic event
• External EOC structure easy to decontaminate
Forest and wildfires NPH events Hazardous particulate releases that may contaminate structure Hazardous gases or vapors that may contaminate structure
12. Identification Of Proposed Safety Controls
Engineered safety controls are identified as being associated with their required safety functions
in Table A-5. Additional non-engineered or non-facility controls that are proposed in support of
the CDR concept and their functional requirements are listed in Table A-6.
Table A-6: Non-facility Engineered and Administrative Controls
Safety Function Safety Control Determine whether EOC remains safe to occupy during emergency events
Environmental monitoring performed by properly equipped support personnel
Safe evacuation of EOC residents under emergency conditions when required
Emergency evacuation plans Site location
Manage small local fires that might occur at the EOC during emergency conditions, particularly forest or wildfires.
Fire-fighting plans Hand-held fire suppression equipment appropriate for type of fire
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Attachment A Hazard Analysis Tables The hazard analysis format is taken from a draft FWO-OAB Hazards Analysis Technical Methodology Handbook (1/16/2001). The changes and the reasons for change from the handbook are listed in Table A-1.
Table A-1: Changes and Modifications to Recommended Methodology
Change BasisFacility hazards (Table A-2) are not evaluated This is a low hazard facility and all internal hazards are managed
adequately by codes and standards associated with Standard Industrial Hazards. Safety design drivers are external and natural phenomena hazard events.
Hazards are not evaluated one-by-one but grouped into logical classes The controls associated with the class of hazard are far more important than the individual hazards that comprise the group. This allows a greater focus on the design objectives rather than simply repeating the same controls for each hazard in the group.
Prevention controls do not apply to the hazard but to prevention of the outcome.
The EOC cannot function to prevent the occurrence of external events, however some design features can help prevent the consequences of concern.
Mitigation includes both administrative and design considerations The EOC cannot be made impermeable to all hazards with engineered systems. The effectiveness of the engineered systems must be considered in light of proposed administrative controls in order to judge the adequacy of the approach.
Loss of EOC function is considered as a safety consequence as the EOC serves a safety function when an emergency occurs. The existence of three alternative capabilities are in descending order of priority: the secondary EOC located at TA-49, the tertiary EOC located at the Community Building in White Rock, and the mobile command center.
The hazard classification approach used at the Laboratory considers impact from the facility to workers and the public. However, the EOC clearly is an important element in providing the coordination of emergency response and accident/emergency recovery functions relied upon by the laboratory in general and many hazardous facilities in particular.
A-1
Table A-2: Hazard Analysis Table – External Hazards
Hazard What-if Question Unmitigatedconsequences
Preventative feature Mitigative feature Comments or Action Items
Forest or wildfire (smoke and toxic combustion gases)
Smoke from forest or wildfire threatens Laboratory or LA community
Potential significant impact to EOC workers due to smoke or toxic gases
Design issues: HVAC filtering for smoke
particulates (smoke loading of filters to be accommodated);
HVAC charcoal filtering to remove some toxic gases;
HVAC to maintain internal positive pressure to minimize seepage of smoke and toxic gases into EOC;
EOC structure to be “air-tight” to reduce smoke and toxic gases entry into building;
EOC primary entryway to be “air-lock” to reduce smoke and toxic gas entry into EOC when personnel enter or leave;
Design issues: HVAC isolation if
HVAC ineffective; HVAC status
monitor and alarm to indicate loss or reduction of HVAC function;
HVAC filtered recirculation to
reduce effects of smoke or toxic gas leakage;
CO Monitor Administrative measures: Air quality
monitoring; Emergency
evacuation;
Forest or wildfire (heat or firebrands)
Heat or firebrands from forest or wildfire cause EOC or EOC support structures to catch fire
Potential significant impact to EOC workers due to direct fire exposure, loss of EOC, loss of EOC support functions
Design issues: Garage and fuel storage
to be located or protected such that they do not present fire hazard to main EOC building;
EOC main structure to be of fire resistant construction to prevent
Design issues: Fire detection in
EOC and support structures to alert EOC workers of facility fire;
Fire suppression systems to limit spread of fire or
A-2
Hazard What-if Question Unmitigated consequences
Preventative feature Mitigative feature Comments or Action Items
firebrands or nearby burning trees or structures from igniting EOC;
Area around EOC to be paved to provide adequate stand-off distance to prevent EOC from catching fire from radiant heat of burning trees and such;
Standby electrical power fuel source and motor generator protected from potential fire sources;
Natural gas supply isolation or shutdown capability;
HVAC inlet and exhaust fire resistant structure
extinguish small fires;
Administrative measures: Fire fighting plan; Emergency
evacuation;
Forest or wildfire (loss of support utilities)
Forest of wildfire causes loss of off-site electrical power and other externally supplied utilities
EOC operations cannot be conducted due to no electrical power, EOC cannot be effectively operated due to inadequate life support systems
Design issues; None (no prevention for these events occurring)
Design issue: Electrical power
supplied by local motor generator;
Fuel for local motor generator for up to 14 days with specified additional margin located at EOC site;
Potable water supply for 100 personnel to last up
A-3
Hazard What-if Question Unmitigated consequences
Preventative feature Mitigative feature Comments or Action Items
to 14 days; Sanitary sewer
holding tank for up to 14 days discharge
Hazardous particulates (Radioactive materials, beryllium)
Hazardous particulates enter EOC environment
Potential significant worker impact, EOC cannot be occupied
Design issues: HVAC filtering of particulates; EOC structure is “air-tight” EOC primary entrance uses “air lock” EOC exterior surface is cleanable (reduce internal contamination during accident recovery phase); Alternative electrical power source for HVAC and associated loads (for loss of off-site power)
Design issues: Isolation of
building if HVAC fails;
HVAC status alarm
Tritium and other hazardous gases
Hazardous gases enter EOC environment
Potential significant worker impact, EOC cannot be occupied
Design issues: HVAC isolation; HVAC hazardous gas
removal (limited effectiveness of charcoal filter);
EOC structure is “air-tight”
EOC primary entrance uses “air lock”
Design issues: HVAC isolation; EOC structure is
“air-tight”; EOC primary
entrance uses “air lock”;
HVAC recirculation (provides dilution)
The mitigative features are the same as some of the preventative features as a realistic measure of potential effectiveness. Positive pressure is not included for this class of hazards as the positive pressure
A-4
Hazard What-if Question Unmitigated consequences
Preventative feature Mitigative feature Comments or Action Items
Administrative measures: Air quality
monitoring; Emergency
evacuation;
is supported by make-up air from the environment. The assumptions of less than full effectiveness to total ineffectiveness of charcoal filtering.
Chemical vapors
Hazardous chemical vapors enter the EOC environment
Potential significant worker impact, EOC cannot be occupied
Design issues: HVAC isolation; HVAC hazardous gas
removal (limited effectiveness of charcoal filter);
EOC structure is “air-tight”
EOC primary entrance uses “air lock”
EOC exterior surfaces are cleanable to allow decontamination that prevents reintroduction of hazard into EOC
Design issues: HVAC isolation; EOC structure is
“air-tight”; EOC primary
entrance uses “air lock”;
HVAC recirculation (provides dilution)
Administrative measures: Air quality
monitoring; Emergency
evacuation
See previous comments on hazardous gas releases. The charcoal filter may more effectively filter vapors.
Explosives driven missiles
Missile caused by an explosion impacts the EOC
Penetration of structure with injury to EOC workers or damage of standby electrical motor generator
Design issue: Outside Laboratory
explosion hazard zones (siting)
Robust design of standby electrical motor generator assembly and associated fuel storage tank
None Explosions associatedwith transportation accidents are unlikely to occur near enough to the EOC to be a significant design concern
A-5
Natural phenomena hazards (NPH) assessment: This section tabulates the assessment of NPH identified in Table A-4. The NPH is identified and failure under the impact of the NPH is assumed. The consequence of failure is assessed and the desired functional response based on the guidelines in DOE-STD-1021 (Natural Phenomena Hazards Performance Category Determination) is defined. Additional design considerations supporting the continued operation of the EOC given the NPH has occurred are identified. Hazards from external events that might be expected given some level of NPH are identified.
Table A-3: NPH Assessment
NPH EOC NPH caused failure conditions
PC indicated Design considerations External hazards that may be initiated
Seismic activity • EOC structural damage • EOC standby electrical
motor generator fuel leakage
• EOC natural gas line rupture
• Loss of off-site power • Loss of telephonic and
other land-line communications
PC-2 (emergency facility)
EOC must maintain “air tight” structure and doors under PC-2 conditions;
EOC fuel storage must withstand PC-2 level event without loss of function or leakage;
EOC standby motor generator must be operational under PC-2 level event;
EOC natural gas line must be safe in excess of PC-2 level event
Facility fires, forest or wild fires, hazardous material releases, loss of off-site power, loss of utility natural gas distribution, loss of water distribution, road and bridge loss, vehicle accidents
High winds • EOC structural damage • Loss of off-site power • Loss of EOC external
features (generator and fuel source, VHF antenna, HVAC filter house)
• Loss of telephonic and other land-line communications
• Miss operation of HVAC positive pressure function
PC-2 EOC must maintain “air-tight” structure and doors under PC-2 conditions;
HVAC “positive pressure” requirement must be defined under high wind conditions to determine proper functioning;
HVAC external structures and filters must withstand PC-2 level winds. EOC fuel storage and standby
Facility, forest and wild fires due to downed power lines or falling trees, transportation accidents due to wind generated missiles, falling trees, or downed power lines.
A-6
NPH EOC NPH caused failure conditions
PC indicated Design considerations External hazards that may be initiated
generator must withstand PC-2 level winds without failure and motor must be able to operate under PC-2 level winds.
Floods • Water damage to internal EOC systems
• Water infiltration in fuel for standby motor generator
• Washout/damage of roads or EOC site
• Loss of off-site power and distributed utilities
• Loss of telephonic and other land-line communications
PC-2 EOC not in flood plane (siting) EOC flood water flow design Standby electrical motor
generator fuel protected from flood conditions to PC-2 level.
Facility damage related hazardous materials release Transportation accidents
Snow loads • Structural damage of EOC (roof)
• Inaccessibility of standby electrical motor generator system and fuel system
• Loss of off-site power and distributed utilities
• Loss of telephonic and other land-line communications
• Unpassable roadways
PC-2 EOC structure (roof) to carry PC-2 level snow load Standby electrical motor generator and fuel supply accessible and operable with PC-2 level load.
Facility damage related hazardous materials release Transportation accidents
Heavy rain • Same as flood PC-2 Same as flood Same as flood
Volcanism • Ash load prevents operation of HVAC
• Loss of telephonic and
N/A HVAC filter loading capability from ash
Standby electrical motor
Many – unique type events not considered, as EOC and lab would be evacuated in the event of severe
A-7
NPH EOC NPH caused failure conditions
PC indicated Design considerations External hazards that may be initiated
other land-line communications
• Loss of off-site power and distributed utilities
• Loss of roadways due to lava flows
• Severe EOC structural damage due to lava flows
generator and fuel ash tolerant (Note: EOC and rest of lab would be evacuated if volcanic activity became severe.)
volcanic activity.
A-8
Attachment B HVAC Safe Operational Concept
Emergency eventoccurs and EOC
notified
EOCthreatened?
Hazards toEOC known?
Normal operation
ParticulateHazard only?
Filter forparticulates
Isolate EOCHVAC
Determine natureof hazard to EOC
EOC internalenvironment
OK?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Evacuate EOC
No
No
No
Monitor internalEOC envornment
Yes
HVAC filteringeffective?
No
Filter using HVACYesIsolate EOCHVAC
Monitor internalEOC environemnt
No
Figure B-1
B-1
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