policy devolution and the racial politics of poverty governance joe soss humphrey school of public...

Policy Devolution and the Racial Politics of Poverty Governance

Joe SossHumphrey School of Public Affairs

Departments of Political Science & SociologyUniversity of Minnesota

Presentation based on Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram. 2011. Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race. University of Chicago Press.

The Transformation of Poverty Governance

Neoliberalism

• Agenda: contrast with laissez-faire

• Operations: devolution, privatization, performance

Paternalism

• Agenda: set and enforce behavioral expectations, promote social order and individual self-discipline

• Operations: directive and supervisory admin, penal and custodial logics focused on noncompliance

PG: more muscular in its normative enforcement, more dispersed and diverse in its organization

Continuity and Change in Poverty Governance

• Principle of Less Eligibility (PLE): a default logic disrupted by episodic political pressures.

• Double Regulation of the Poor: rising correctional dimensions of the PLE, convergence as a single system, extension of penal logic/language to welfare

• Blurring of State/Market Boundary: PG as a site of profitable investment and labor market activity

• Disciplinary Goals, Diverse Tools: goal of producing compliant (self-disciplining) worker-citizens, attractive and available to employers

Mainsprings of National Change

Conservative Mobilization• Business, Racial, Neo-, Religious/Social• Investments: think tanks, electoral/lobbying• Racialized “wedge issues” targeting fractures in

the Democratic coalition

Socio-economic Change• Decline of markets/wages for low-skilled labor• Compounding of social problems in racially

segregated areas of concentrated poverty• The Underclass as a repository for diverse

anxieties, growing push to enforce social order and discipline work/social behavior

Today’s Focus: Federalism & Devolution(Structuring the Politics of Poverty Governance)

Horizontal: choice and variation across state and local jurisdictions

Vertical: structured relations across federal, state, and local levels

Federalism: the timing and patterning of change

Devolution : In PG, a racialized policy choice that facilitates racial influences and inequalities.

• Racial effects depend on political and economic conditions across jurisdictions.

Poverty Governance, 1940s-1960s

Incarceration: modest, stable rates (~.1%)

Welfare: patchwork of state and local provision

• Barriers to access, excluded populations• Intrusive, restrictive rules and admin. • Low benefit levels• Calibration to local needs – e.g., seasonal

closures in the South

Disruption in the 1960s:

Political insurgency and welfare rights litigation reshape the welfare settlement:

• Political pressures drive state benefit and caseload increases, moving them away from the PLE

• Expanded federal role in AFDC, constrains admin tactics for excluding/purging in the states

• Incarceration rates respond to insurgency, but criminal justice remains mostly state/local

Federal Role Explains the Timing and Focus of Shifts in Poverty Governance, 1970-1995

Criminal Justice: States are less constrained• Earlier shift to more muscular approach• Steep rise in incarceration across the states

Welfare: States are more constrained• Limits on rule and admin strategies• Benefits become the focus of efforts to restore

the PLE• Real value of AFDC drops by roughly 50%, but

caseloads fail to recede

Disruption and Limited Restoration of the PLE:The Benefit-Wage Ratio over Time

• Declining Wages

• Food Stamps (1964)

.97

.6

.42

.91

.54

.86

0.2

.4.6

.81

1961 1976 1995

State Calibration:Benefit - Retail Wage

State Average:Benefit-Wage Ratio

Multivariate Models of State Welfare Change:The Patterning of Decline, 1970-1995

Rates of AFDC Benefit Decline• Republican Control of Govt. • Higher BWR (benefits encroaching on wages)• Higher black % of AFDC caseload• Interaction of BWR and Black %

GA Termination: Republican control, low-skilled wage levels, black % of recipients

AFDC Waiver Adoption: same predictors as benefit decline

State-Level Patterns in Criminal Justice: Key Predictors of State Increases in Black and

White Imprisonment Rates, 1976-1995

Republican Control

Low-skill Wage

Drug Arrest Rate

Crime Rate

-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Predicted Change in Imprisonment Rate, by Race(based on 1976-1995 change in independent variable)

Black

White

Federal Welfare Reform (PRWORA):A New Devolution Settlement

• Block grants, expansion of state rule discretion• Federal mandates, asymmetric state choices• Backed up by federal benchmarks, monitoring,

incentives, penalties• Not a handoff, a shift in the federal role. State

discretion over means for achieving federally mandated, disciplinary ends.

• Work enforcement: now a national, bipartisan, implicitly racialized political project

State Choices Regarding TANF Programs

Disappearance of predictors: partisan control, benefit-wage ratio (PLE), fiscal capacities, objective indicators of social problems

Racial Composition strongly predicts… • Time limits• Family Caps• Full-Family Sanctions• Work Requirement Rigidity• Eligibility Restrictions• Second-Order Devolution

The Accumulation of Racial Bias:National Exposure to TANF Policy Regimes (2001)

63

11

31

37

26 26

4143

26

54

29

63

02

04

06

0P

erc

en

t of T

AN

F F

am

ilies

TANF Neoliberal Paternalism Scale

0 1 2 5 4 5

White Percent Black Percent

Convergent Systems of Social ControlTANF Regimes, Correctional Control, and Black Pop. (2001)

R-Squared = .76

2.6

2.8

33.

23.

43.

6P

erce

nt in

Cor

rect

iona

l Con

trol

05

1015

20B

lack

Per

cent

of S

tate

Pop

ulat

ion

0 1 2 3 4 5TANF Regime: Neoliberal Paternalism

Average Black Percent of State PopulationAverage Correctional ControlQuadratic Slope: Correctional Control by TANF Regime

Sanction Implementation: Conservatism, Race, and Devolution

Florida WT Program• Higher rates in more conservative counties: half

as likely to survive 12 months without a sanction• Strong interaction with client race: no effect

among white clients.

National Analysis• Interaction of local conservatism and client race

observed in SOD states only

Black-White Sanction Disparities, Black Arrest Rates, and Benefit-Wage Ratios in Black HH Incomes (FL Counties)

02

46

Pre

dict

ed

WT

Sa

nctio

n D

ispa

rity

0 .1 .2 .3Ratio of Black Arrests to Black Population

Low Ratio ofWelfare to Earnings

Average Ratio ofWelfare to Earnings

High Ratio ofWelfare to Earnings

Convergence: Policing and Welfare Sanctioning

Sanctioning and Labor Market Needs:Statewide Seasonal Calibration

Sanction Hazard Ratios and Tourism Revenues: r = .95

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Month of Year

Hazard

Rati

o

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

To

uri

sm

Tax C

oll

ect

ion

s (

in B

illi

on

s)

Hazard Ratio

Tourism Taxes

Sanctions and Local Labor Market Seasonality by Client Race (County-Months)

68% Black

43% Black

28% Black

510

15

20

Pre

dic

ted

Mo

nth

ly S

anct

ion R

ate

10 20 30 40 50 60Percentage of Sales Taxes from Tourism-related Businesses

Concluding Remarks

• Contemporary poverty governance as a coherent disciplinary project. A shared logic of… • Criminal justice and welfare• Policy design and implementation

• Neoliberal paternalism as a racial project

• Federalism as a mechanism for calibrating PG and state/local political economies

• Federalism as a mechanism of racial inequality, • Facilitating racial biases in policy choice • Converting them into racial inequalities vis-à-

vis state and market institutions

Policy Devolution and the Racial Politics of Poverty Governance

Joe SossHumphrey School of Public Affairs

Departments of Political Science & SociologyUniversity of Minnesota

Presentation based on Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram. 2011. Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race. University of Chicago Press.

Extra Slides

State Choices Regarding TANFFamily Cap, Time Limit, Full-Family Sanction

0.2

.4.6

.81

Pre

dict

ed P

roba

bilit

y of

TA

NF

Pol

icy

Cho

ice

0 20 40 60 80Black Percent of AFDC Recipients

Family Cap Time LimitFull-Family Sanction

State Choices Regarding TANFWork Requirement Rigidity, Eligibility Restrictions

0.2

.4.6

.81

Pre

dict

ed

Val

ue o

f TA

NF

Re

stri

ctio

n

0 20 40 60 80Black Percent of AFDC Recipients

Work Req. Rigidity Eligibility Stringency

0.2

.4.6

.81

Pre

dict

ed

Pro

bab

ility

of D

evo

lutio

n

0 5 10 15 20Average Black Percent of State's County Populations

Less HeterogeneousDispersion

AverageDispersion

More HeterogeneousDispersion

State-to-Local Devolution in TANF Programs:Size & Distribution of Black Populations