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PEACEMAKING CONCEPTS OF NEGOTIATION

Successful mediation leads to peace agreement

Peace agreements are key instruments for lasting peace

Lasting peace requires peacebuilding to resolve underlying conflicts

Therefore:

Mediators are early Peacebuilders

They put in place political processes for continued dialogue

“The end of conflict does not necessarily mean the arrival of

peace” Ban Ki-moon

WAR

Violence

Polarization

Contradiction

Difference

Ceasefire

Agreement

Normalization

Reconciliation

Conflict Transformation

Conflict Settlement

Conflict Containment

Conflict Settlement

Conflict Transformation

Cultural Peacebuilding

Cultural Peacebuilding

War Limitation

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping

Peacemaking

Peacemaking

Structural Peacebuilding

Structural Peacebuilding

Narrowing of political space

Widening of political space

5 Transformations

Context transformation

Structural transformation

Actor transformation

Issue transformation

Personal transformation

Global, regional, state level

Conflict level

Individual level

Third-party intervention

Party A Party B

Third Party Arbitration

Facilitation

Third Party Engagement

Coercive Enforcement Non-forcible coercion “Carrots & Sticks” mediation

Non-coercive Mediation

Good offices Peacebuilding/reconciliation

Insider Mediators

Individuals or institutions with credibility, influence, and trust within the society in conflict, who are able to play a role,

often behind the scenes, that can influence the conflict in a constructive way

Examples of Insider Mediation

Ø  Uwiano Platform in Kenya: joint initiative of Government and civic groups in Kenya, local monitors to identify and provide early warning on emerging hotspots through SMS messaging system. It supported the resolution of tensions through local peace committees during the constitutional referendum in 2010 and national elections in 2013.

Ø  Lebanese National Dialogue: integral part of the complex system of Government in Lebanon, wherein recurring political disputes can be mediated with the support of the members of the platform (i.e., decentralization)

Ø  Tunisia’s National Dialogue Quartet: ad-hoc national dialogue that created a road map for the establishment of an independent caretaker government, the crafting of a new constitution, and the adoption of a new electoral law, all by consensus. It includes the Labor Union, the Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, the Human Rights League, and the Order of Lawyers.

Tensions

Ø  Peacemakers work with elites

Ø  Peacemakers focus on short and medium-term tactical decisions

•  How to bring the parties to the table •  What issue to discuss •  How to break deadlocks

Ø  Peacemakers focus on security and stopping the violence

Ø  Peacemakers might use brinkmanship to achieve most advantageous outcome

•  It is a risky tactic •  It can generate future resentments and tensions

KEY CONCEPTS

Ripeness

When parties are willing to entertain their negotiated options and a political ‘‘solution’’ to the conflict, because that promises

lower costs than continuing the conflict

Ø  Mutually hurting stalemate: when sides realize that costs of continuing the struggle exceed the benefits to be gained

Ripeness

Ripeness for negotiation to start

and

Ripeness for negotiation to succeed

Costs of negotiation Ø  Military deadlock Ø  Conflict too long Ø  Running out of resources Ø  Possible positive outcomes

Costs of conflict

Vs.

Ø  Sanctions Ø  Blockades Ø  Arming one side (altering

balance of power)

Intractable Conflicts

Ø  When conflict is stuck in the middle range of escalation

Ø  Violence is episodic

Ø  There is no pressure for a solution

Ø  No options to change incentive structure

Ø  Hurting stalemate: when neither side can win, but neither side wants to back down

Asymmetric Conflicts

Ø  Roots of the conflict lie not in particular issue or interest that may divide the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them

Ø  Is there an interest in the “top dog” to change the structure of the conflict? •  There are costs in sustaining power and keeping the

“underdog” down

Ø  Tactics to transform asymmetric conflicts (can lead to more violence): •  Mobilizing popular movements (internal) •  Non-violent resistance •  Raising awareness (external) •  Strengthen the underdog

Turning vs Sticky Points

Ø  Turning Points: when parties see a way forward through negotiations

•  Capitalize on the momentum and the changed relationship

to move forward

Ø  Sticky Points: when political space is closed

•  Work around the obstacle •  Look for internal or external support

Skeptics vs Spoilers

Ø  Skeptics: reject the proposed agreement but are not against negotiation

•  Provide incentives to join

Ø  Spoilers: oppose any compromise and agreement

•  Coercion •  Marginalization •  Bring them into the negotiation process with clear ground

rules that include penalties for intransigent behavior and rewards for cooperation

Spoilers

Ø  Moral hazard: the risk that a party has not entered into negotiations in good faith

Ø  Especially acute in civil conflicts with extremists who are not interested in compromise

Ø  Spoiler management:

•  Coercion •  Bring them into the negotiation process with clear ground

rules that include penalties for intransigent behavior and rewards for cooperation

Step-by-step vs One-off

Focus on the peripheral issues first in the hope of making early agreement on what is easier

Vs

Aim to a comprehensive agreement that includes the core issues

OSLO PROCESS

The Beginning

The Facilitators

“If you two are going to manage to live together, you’ve got to solve this problem between you. You own the problem.

If you need some help from us, please ask for it. We can provide money, houses, services, and we can be intermediaries on the phone. After

lunch, you should go into the meeting room and I will wait for you outside, unless you get into fisticuffs!”

Terje Rod-Larsen

The Parties

“We are not here to make a peace accord, but an agreement on how to

reach agreement.”

The Transformations

Context transformation

Structural transformation

Actor transformation

Issue transformation

Personal transformation

???

Empowered Palestinians with PA

More empowered negotiators (Abu Mazen + Uri Savir, DG of

Israel MFO)

“Gaza First”

Group dynamics among the parties (“seven against the

outside world”) “Do it for me” – Terje Rod-Larsen

Final Agreement

Ø  Military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho begins by December 1993

Ø  Palestinian Council elected by mid-July 1994

Ø  Transfer of authority to the Palestinian Council on education, culture, health, social welfare, taxation and tourism

Ø  Israeli military would then deploy outside populated areas in West Bank

Ø  By December 1995 negotiation begins on the permanent status of the Occupied Territories, and by end-1998 the final settlement would take effect

Flaws

Ø  No contextual transformation: “Spirit of Oslo remains in Oslo”

Ø  No engagement on the ground: only a few politicians from Israeli Labor Party and the PLO

Ø  Hard issues were avoided (“right of return,” Jerusalem, …)

Ø  Incremental process in the hands of Israel

Ø  Loose language in the agreement

Ø  Regional context

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