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ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITASAJONAS,petitioners, vs. THE COURT OFAPPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFFROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY andREGISTER OF DEEDS OFMARIKINA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, JR.,J.:
A word or group of words conveys intentions. Whenused truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breedsconflict. Thus, it is written - By thy words shalt thou be
justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned.(Matthew, 12:37)
Construing the new words of a statute separately isthe raison detre of this appeal.
Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation ofthe inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from acertificate of Title covering a parcel of realproperty. The inscription was caused to be made by theprivate respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued inthe name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde andLucita Jarin, and was later carried over to and annotatedon Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of thesame registry, issued in the name of the spousesAlfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, whopurchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, andare now the petitioners in this case.
The facts are not disputed, and are herebyreproduced as follows:
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto
Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of
residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spousesAlfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installmentbasis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell datedSeptember 22, 1983. The property was registered inthe names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. OnAugust 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the
annotation of an adverse claim based on the saidContract to Sell on the title of the subject property,which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon fullpayment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executeda Deed of Sale involving the property in question infavor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. Thedeed of absolute sale was registered almost a yearafter, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-
appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection ofsum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25,1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into bythe parties in the said case under which ErnestoUychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation toDomingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed topay the same in two years from June 25, 1980. WhenUychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in thecompromise agreement, defendant-appellant Pilaresmoved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce
the decision based on the compromise agreement,which the court granted in its order dated August 3,1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued onAugust 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City where thecivil case was pending. Pursuant to the order ofexecution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of levy onexecution was issued on February 12, 1985. OnFebruary 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia ofQuezon City presented said notice of levy on executionbefore the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same
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was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as EntryNo. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 41984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was ssued in the name of the Sajonas
couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated bydefendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. OnOctober 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third PartyClaim with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auctionsale of the subject property did not push through asscheduled.
On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demandedthe cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upondefendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their
lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand,defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause thecancellation of said annotation. In view thereof,plaintiffs-appellees filed this complaint dated January11, 1986 on February 5, 1986.[1]
The Sajonases filed their complaint[2] in the RegionalTrial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares,the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevantportion of the complaint alleges:
7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated bythe defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of thedefendant, have already transferred, conveyed andassigned all their title, rights and interests to theplaintiffs and there was no more title, rights or intereststherein which the defendant could levy upon;
8. That the annotation of the levy on execution whichwas carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegaland invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of
the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by theplaintiffs on the corresponding title of the Uychocdespouses;
9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon thedefendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellationof the said notice of levy but the latter, without
justifiable reason and with the sole purpose of harassingand embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refusedplaintiffs demand;
10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of thedefendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levyon execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigateand engage the services of the undersigned counsel, toprotect their rights and interests, for which they agreedto pay attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000 and
appearance fees of P500 per day in court.[3]
Pilares filed his answer with compulsorycounterclaim[4] on March 8, 1986, raising special andaffirmative defenses, the relevant portions of which areas follows:
10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against hereindefendants;
11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filedan adverse claim against the property covered by TCTNo. 79073 registered under the name of spousesErnesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceasesto have any legal force and effect (30) days thereafterpursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;
12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No.79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Executiondated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (nowRTC) of Quezon City proceeding from a decision
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rendered in Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of hereindefendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedlyproper and appropriate because the property isregistered in the name of the judgment debtor and isnot among those exempted from execution;
13. Assuming without admitting that the property
subject matter of this case was in fact sold by theregistered owner in favor of the herein plaintiffs, thesale is the null and void (sic) and without any legal forceand effect because it was done in fraud of a judgmentcreditor, the defendant Pilares.[5]
Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplarydamages in a counterclaim against the Sajonasspouses. The parties appeared at pre-trial proceedingson January 21, 1987,[6] after which, trial on the merits
ensued.
The trial court rendered its decision on February 15,1989.[7] It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, andordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
The court a quo stated, thus:
After going over the evidence presented by the parties,the court finds that although the title of the subject
matter of the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in thename of the Spouses Uychocde when the same wasannotated on the said title, an earlier Affidavit ofAdverse Claim was annotated on the same title by theplaintiffs who earlier bought said property from theUychocdes.
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs.Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverseclaim is equivalent to registration and the subsequentregistration of the Notice of Levy could not have any
legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscriptionof the adverse claim annotated on the title of theUychocdes.
xxx xxx xxx
On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in
good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocdeeven notwithstanding the claim of the defendant thatsaid sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud ofcreditors, the Court finds that the evidence in thisinstance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs aspurchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of thedefendant over said property or that the same isinvolved in a litigation between said spouses and thedefendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and badfaith, and the existence of any bad faith must be
established by competent proof.[8] (Cai vs. Henson, 51Phil 606)
xxx xxxxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment infavor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares,as follows:
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy onExecution annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No.N-109417.
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000as attorneys fees.
3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by saiddefendant.
Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.
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claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of aperson over a piece of real property, and serves as anotice and warning to third parties dealing with saidproperty that someone is claiming an interest on thesame or has a better right than the registered ownerthereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over theadverse claim which was previously annotated in the
certificate of title over the property.[24]
The question may be posed, was the adverse claiminscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in force when private respondent causedthe notice of levy on execution to be registered andannotated in the said title, considering that more thanthirty days had already lapsed since it wasannotated? This is a decisive factor in the resolution ofthis instant case.
If the adverse claim was still in effect, thenrespondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existinginterest over the subject property, and thus, petitionersare entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levyattached to the certificate of title.
For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to thelaw itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the LandRegistration Act reads:
Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest inregistered lands adverse to the registered owner,arising subsequent to the date of the originalregistration, may, if no other provision is made in thisAct for registering the same, make a statement inwriting setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,and how or under whom acquired, and a reference tothe volume and page of the certificate of title of theregistered owner, and a description of the land in whichthe right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shallstate the adverse claimants residence, and designate aplace at which all notices may be served upon him. Thestatement shall be entitled to registration as an adverseclaim, and the court, upon a petition of any party ininterest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the questionof the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter
such decree therein as justice and equity mayrequire. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, theregistration shall be cancelled. If in any case, the courtafter notice and hearing shall find that a claim thusregistered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax theadverse claimant double or treble the costs in itsdiscretion.
The validity of the above-mentioned rules onadverse claims has to be reexamined in the light of the
changes introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part orinterest in registered land adverse to the registeredowner, arising subsequent to the date of the originalregistration, may, if no other provision is made in thisdecree for registering the same, make a statement inwriting setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,and how or under whom acquired, a reference to thenumber of certificate of title of the registered owner, the
name of the registered owner, and a description of theland in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shallstate the adverse claimants residence, and a place atwhich all notices may be served upon him. Thisstatement shall be entitled to registration as an adverseclaim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shallbe effective for a period of thirty days from the date ofregistration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
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meaning to be attached to any word or phrase usuallyto be ascertained from the context.[28]
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcilethe apparent inconsistency between the portions of thelaw such that the provision on cancellation of adverseclaim by verified petition would serve to qualify the
provision on the effectivity period. The law, takentogether, simply means that the cancellation of theadverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective,otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated andshall continue as a lien upon the property. For if theadverse claim has already ceased to be effective uponthe lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longernecessary and the process of cancellation would be auseless ceremony.[29]
It should be noted that the law employs the phrasemay be cancelled, which obviously indicates, asinherent in its decision making power, that the courtmay or may not order the cancellation of an adverseclaim, notwithstanding such provision limiting theeffectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from thedate of registration. The court cannot be bound by suchperiod as it would be inconsistent with the veryauthority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on theperiod of effectivity is immaterial in determining the
validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is theprincipal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It willtherefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearingfor the court to determine whether it will order thecancellation of the adverse claim or not.[30]
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverseclaim as absolute and without qualification limited tothirty days defeats the very purpose for which thestatute provides for the remedy of an inscription ofadverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is
a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property where the registration ofsuch interest or right is not otherwise provided for bythe Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 orthe Property Registration Decree), and serves as awarning to third parties dealing with said property thatsomeone is claiming an interest or the same or a betterright than the registered owner thereof.[31]
The reason why the law provides for a hearingwhere the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshedout is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity tobe heard, providing a venue where the propriety of hisclaimed interest can be established or revoked, all forthe purpose of determining at last the existence of anyencumbrance on the title arising from such adverseclaim. This is in line with the provision immediatelyfollowing:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no secondadverse claim shall be registered by the sameclaimant.
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain hisinterest in the property, the adverse claimant will beprecluded from registering a second adverse claimbased on the same ground.
It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the
claim may only be determined by the Court uponpetition by an interested party, in which event, theCourt shall order the immediate hearing thereof andmake the proper adjudication as justice and equity maywarrant. And it is only when such claim is foundunmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claimmay be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of theadverse claimant and giving notice and warning to thirdparties.[32]
In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim onthe Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in
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effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City SheriffRoberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy onexecution thereto. Consequently, he is charged withknowledge that the property sought to be levied uponon execution was encumbered by an interest the sameas or better than that of the registered ownerthereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the
existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate oftitle in favor of the petitioners. This can be deducedfrom the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, towit:
Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to thirdpersons- The levy on execution shall create a lien infavor of the judgment creditor over the right, title andinterest of the judgment debtor in such property at thetime of the levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then
existing. (Italics supplied)
To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners oftheir property, who waited a long time to completepayments on their property, convinced that theirinterest was amply protected by the inscribed adverseclaim.
As lucidly observed by the trial court in thechallenged decision:
True, the foregoing section provides that an adverseclaim shall be effective for a period of thirty days fromthe date of registration. Does this mean however, thatthe plaintiffs thereby lost their right over the property inquestion? Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirtyday period automatically nullify the contract to sellbetween the plaintiffs and the Uychocdes therebydepriving the former of their vested right over theproperty?
It is respectfully submitted that it did not.[33]
As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers ingood faith of the subject property, the same should bemade to rest on the findings of the trial court. Aspointedly observed by the appellate court, there is noquestion that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of thepending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at thetime of the sale of the property by the latter in their
favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony ofConchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination on April 21, 1988.[34]
ATTY. REYES
Q - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde andhis wife offered to you and your husband theproperty subject matter of this case, theyshowed you the owners transfer certificate,is it not?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - That was shown to you the very first timethat this lot was offered to you for sale?
A - Yes.
Q - After you were shown a copy of the title andafter you were informed that they aredesirous in selling the same, did you andyour husband decide to buy the same?
A - No, we did not decide right after seeing thetitle. Of course, we visited...
Q - No, you just answer my question. You didnot immediately decide?
A - Yes.
Q - When did you finally decide to buy thesame?
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inscribed at the back of the certificate of title as Entry
No. 3439.[4]
On June 1, 1992, respondent Ma. Angelica Paez-
Barrameda wrote HMDF, Mortgage and Loans Division
informing the office that they have purchased the
subject property from the Calingo spouses and that they
filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of
Deeds of Paraaque. They also sought assistance from
said office as regards the procedure for the full
settlement of the loan arrearages and the transfer of
the property in their names.[5]
Respondents Barrameda moved into the property
on June 2, 1992.
On July 13, 1992, a notice of levy with attachment
on real property by virtue of a writ of execution was
annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the
property in question. The writ of execution was issued
by Judge Salvador Abad Santos, Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 65 in connection with Civil Case No. 88-
2159 involving a claim by herein petitioners, Spouses
Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, against
respondents Calingo. Judge Abad Santos issued the writ
in favor of petitioners Rodriguez.[6]
On July 21, 1992, petitioners counsel, Atty.
Nelson A. Loyola, sent a letter to respondents
Barrameda inquiring about the basis of their occupation
of the property in question.
On August 21, 1992, respondents Barrameda
remitted to respondents Calingo the amount
of P364,992.07 to complete the payment of the agreed
purchase price. Respondents Calingo acknowledgedreceipt of said amount and waived all their rights to the
property in favor of the Barrameda spouses. They also
guaranteed that the property was clear and free from
any liens and encumbrances, except the real estate
mortgage assumed by respondents Barrameda.[7]
On October 7, 1992, respondents Barrameda
executed a joint affidavit stating that they are the
owners of the property in question by virtue of a deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage; that they registered
an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds
of Paraaque; that the Sheriff of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 65, Makati, Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, levied
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said property despite their adverse claim; and that they
have acquired the property long before the levy was
made, and therefore, said levy was illegal. They served
a copy of the affidavit on petitioners counsel, Atty.
Loyola, who made a reply thereto on October 15, 1992.
In his letter to Christopher Barrameda dated
October 15, 1992, Atty. Loyola pointed out that the
alleged deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was
not registered with the Register of Deeds and that the
records of the HMDF show that the property is owned by
the Calingo spouses. He urged the Barrameda spousesto confer with the petitioners to amicably settle the
controversy.[8]
On November 9, 1992, respondents Barrameda
found a Notice of Sheriffs Sale posted on their front
gate, announcing the auction sale of their house and lot
on December 3, 1992 at 10:00 in the morning.[9]
On November 20, 1992, pursuant to Rule 39,
Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, respondents
Barrameda served a Notice of Third Party Claim upon
Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, accompanied by their affidavit
of title.
On December 2, 1992, respondents Barrameda
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition
for quieting of title with prayer for preliminary
injunction. The petition prayed, among others, that the
execution sale of the property be enjoined, the notice of
levy and attachment inscribed on the certificate of title
be cancelled, and that respondents Barrameda be
declared the lawful and sole owners of the property in
question.[10]
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitionersand dismissed respondents Barramedas petition for
quieting of title. It ruled that the annotation of
respondents Barramedas adverse claim at the back of
the certificate of title was insufficient to establish their
claim over the property. It said that respondents
Barrameda, as buyers of the property, should have
registered the title in their names. Furthermore,
respondents Barramedas adverse claim had lost its
efficacy after the lapse of thirty days in accordance with
the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The trial
court also found that there was collusion between
respondents Barrameda and respondents Calingo to
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Decree[13] requires that such document be registered
with the Register of Deeds in order to be binding on
third persons. The law provides:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and otherdealings by registered owner. An owner
of registered land may convey, mortgage,lease, charge or otherwise deal with thesame in accordance with existing laws. Hemay use such forms of deeds, mortgages,leases or other voluntary instruments as aresufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage,lease, or other voluntary instrument,except a will purporting to convey oraffect registered land shall take effectas a conveyance or bind the land, butshall operate only as a contractbetween the parties and as evidence ofauthority to the Register of Deeds tomake registration.
The act of registration shall be theoperative act to convey or affect the landinsofar as third persons are concerned, andin all cases under this Decree, theregistration shall be made in the office ofthe Register of Deeds for the province orcity where the land lies. (emphasissupplied)
It is admitted in this case that the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage was not registered, but
instead, respondents Barrameda filed an affidavit of
adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. The question
now is whether the adverse claim is sufficient to bind
third parties such as herein petitioners.
In L.P. Leviste and Company, Inc. v.
Noblejas,[14] we explained when an inscription of an
adverse claim is sufficient to affect third parties, thus:
The basis of respondent Villanuevasadverse claim was an agreement to sellexecuted in her favor by Garcia Realty. Anagreement to sell is a voluntary instrumentas it is a wilful act of the registeredowner. As such voluntary instrument,Section 50 of Act No. 496 [now Presidential
Decree No. 1529] expressly provides thatthe act of registration shall be the operativeact to convey and affect the land. AndSection 55 of the same Act requires thepresentation of the owners duplicatecertificate of title for the registration of anydeed or voluntary instrument. As theagreement to sell involves an interest lessthan an estate in fee simple, the sameshould have been registered by filing it with
the Register of Deeds who, in turn, makes abrief memorandum thereof upon the originaland owners duplicate certificate oftitle. The reason for requiring theproduction of the owners duplicatecertificate in the registration of a voluntaryinstrument is that, being a wilful act of theregistered owner, it is to be presumed thathe is interested in registering theinstrument and would willingly surrender,
present or produce his duplicate certificate
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of title to the Register of Deeds in order toaccomplish such registration. However,where the owner refuses to surrenderthe duplicate certificate for theannotation of the voluntaryinstrument, the grantee may file withthe Register of Deeds a statement
setting forth his adverse claim, asprovided for in Section 110 of Act No.496. In such a case, the annotation of theinstrument upon the entry book is sufficientto affect the real estate to which it relates,although Section 72 of Act No. 496 imposesupon the Register of Deeds the duty torequire the production by the [r]egisteredowner of his duplicate certificate for theinscription of the adverse claim. The
annotation of an adverse claim is ameasure designed to protect theinterest of a person over a pieceof real property where the registrationof such interest or right is nototherwise provided for by the LandRegistration Act, and serves as anotice and warning to third partiesdealing with said property thatsomeone is claiming an interest on the
same or a better right than theregistered owner thereof. (emphasessupplied)
In the case at bar, the reason given for the non-
registration of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage was that the owners duplicate copy of the
certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF. It was
not shown, however, that either respondents Barrameda
or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to retrieve
the owners duplicate copy from the HMDF for the
purpose of registering the deed of sale with assumption
of mortgage. In fact, the parties did not even seek to
obtain the consent of, much less inform, the HMDF of
the sale of the property. This, despite the provision in
the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor
(respondents Calingo) from selling or disposing the
property without the written consent of the
mortgagee.[15] Respondents Calingo, as party to the
contract of mortgage, are charged with the knowledgeof such provision and are bound to comply
therewith. Apparently, there was haste in disposing the
property that respondents Calingo informed HMDF of
the sale only on October 2, 1992 when they served a
copy of their letter to said office regarding the transfer
of the property to respondents Barrameda. There was
no reason for the parties failure to seek the approval of
the HMDF to the sale as it appears from the letter of
respondent Angelica Paez-Barrameda to HMDF that they
were ready to pay in full the balance of the loan plus
interest. What is more suspect is that the judgment
against respondents Calingo ordering them to pay the
petitioners the sum of P1,159,355.90 was rendered on
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SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA
and ERNESTO S. DE MESA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and
MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,
SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE
and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS,
G.R. No. 185064
Present:
CARPIO,J.,
Chairperson,
PEREZ,
SERENO,
REYES, and
BERNABE,JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondents. January 16, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------x
DECISION
REYES,J.:
Nature of the Petition
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the SpousesAraceli Oliva-De Mesa (Araceli) and Ernesto S. De Mesa
(Ernesto), assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated June 6, 2008 and Resolution2 dated
October 23, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391
entitled Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De
Mesa v. Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al.
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Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment
case is not a bar to action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building. Neither shall it
be conclusive as to the facts therein. This issue is far
from being novel and there is no reason to depart from
this Courts previous pronouncements. In Malabanan v.
Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.,18this Court had previously
clarified that a decision in an ejectment case is not res
judicata in an annulment of title case and vice-versa
given the provisional and inconclusive nature of the
determination of the issue of ownership in the former.
Forum-shopping exists where theelements oflitis pendentia are present,namely: (a) identity of parties or at leastsuch as representing the same interests inboth actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief beingfounded on the same facts; and (c) theidentity in the two cases should be such thatthe judgment that may be rendered in onewould, regardless of which party issuccessful, amounts to res judicata in theother.
Petitioner and respondent are thesame parties in the annulment andejectment cases. The issue of ownershipwas likewise being contended, with sameset of evidence being presented in bothcases. However, it cannot be inferred that a
judgment in the ejectment case would
amount to res judicata in the annulmentcase, and vice-versa.
This issue is hardly a novel one. It hasbeen laid to rest by heaps of cases iteratingthe principle that a judgment rendered in anejectment case shall not bar an actionbetween the same parties respecting title to
the land or building nor shall it beconclusive as to the facts therein found in acase between the same parties upon adifferent cause of action involvingpossession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectmentsuits, the only issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of theproperty involved, independent of any claimof ownership by any of the party litigants.However, the issue of ownership may beprovisionally ruled upon for the sole purposeof determining who is entitled topossession de facto. Therefore, theprovisional determination of ownership inthe ejectment case cannot be clothed withfinality.
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one of these two modes of constitution willbar a judgment debtor from availing of theprivilege.
On the other hand, for family homes
constructed afterthe effectivity of theFamily Code on August 3, 1988, there is noneed to constitute extrajudicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effectivefrom the time it was constituted and lasts aslong as any of its beneficiaries under Art.154 actually resides therein. Moreover, thefamily home should belong to the absolutecommunity or conjugal partnership, or ifexclusively by one spouse, its constitution
must have been with consent of the other,and its value must not exceed certainamounts depending upon the area where itis located. Further, the debts incurred forwhich the exemption does not apply asprovided under Art. 155 for which the familyhome is made answerable must have beenincurred after August 3, 1988.21 (citationsomitted)
In the earlier case ofKelley, Jr. v. Planters
Products, Inc.,22 we stressed that:
Under the Family Code, there is noneed to constitute the family home judiciallyor extrajudicially. All family homesconstructed after the effectivity of theFamily Code (August 3, 1988) areconstituted as such by operation of law. Allexisting family residences as of August
3, 1988 are considered family homesand are prospectively entitled to thebenefits accorded to a family homeunder the Family Code.23(emphasissupplied and citation omitted)
The foregoing rules on constitution of family
homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could
be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
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Second, family residences constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus
exempt from execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially
or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation
of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family
residence sometime in January 1987. There was noshowing, however, that the same was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still,
when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,
the subject property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt
from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in
asserting that the subject property was a family home.
The family homes
exemption fromexecution must beset up and provedto the Sheriffbefore the sale ofthe property atpublic auction.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a
family home and, thus, should have been exempt from
execution, we nevertheless rule that the CA did not err
in dismissing the petitioners complaint for nullification
of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the
petitioners should have asserted the subject property
being a family home and its being exempted from
execution at the time it was levied or within a
reasonable time thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out:
In the light of the facts abovesummarized, it is evident that appellants did
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not assert their claim of exemption within areasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time,for purposes of the law on exemption, doesnot mean a time after the expiration of theone-year period provided for in Section 30of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for
judgment debtors to redeem the property
sold on execution, otherwise it would rendernugatory final bills of sale on execution anddefeat the very purpose of execution toput an end to litigation. x x x.24
The foregoing disposition is in accord with the
Courts November 25, 2005 Decision in Honrado v.
Court of Appeals,25 where it was categorically stated
that at no other time can the status of a residential
house as a family home can be set up and proved and
its exemption from execution be claimed but before the
sale thereof at public auction:
While it is true that the family home isconstituted on a house and lot from the timeit is occupied as a family residence and isexempt from execution or forced sale underArticle 153 of the Family Code, such claimfor exemption should be set up and provedto the Sheriff before the sale of the property
at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming theexemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v.Gealone:
Although the Rules of
Court does not prescribe theperiod within which to claim theexemption, the rule is,nevertheless, well-settled thatthe right of exemption is apersonal privilege granted tothe judgment debtor and assuch, it must be claimed not bythe sheriff, but by the debtorhimself at the time of the levy or
within a reasonable periodthereafter;
In theabsence of expressprovision it hasvariously held thatclaim (for
exemption) must bemade at the time ofthe levy if thedebtor is present,that it must bemade within areasonable time, orpromptly, or beforethe creditor hastaken any step
involving further
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For all intents and purposes, the petitioners
negligence or omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they
have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since
the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to
invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period
and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the
status of the subject property as a family home.
The petitioners negligence or omission renders
their present assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a
mere afterthought and artifice that cannot be
countenanced without doing the respondents injustice
and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their
favor. Simple justice and fairness and equitable
considerations demand that Claudios title to the
property be respected. Equity dictates that the
petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of their
unexplained negligence.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22,
in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755
(M) and other documents, and the October 23, 2008
Resolution denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE TEOFILO MERCADO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 141019
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- versus -
VALLEY MOUNTAIN
MINES EXPLORATION, INC.,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- x
HEIRS OF JUAN OLIMPIADAAND HEIRS OF SERGIO OLIMPIADA,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ALFONSO GARCIA, Judge, RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City,
VALLEY MOUNTAIN MINES
EXPLORATION, INC., represented
G.R. No. 164281
by its President, JOAQUIN
RODRIGUEZ, AND CITY
GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- x
HEIRS OF JUAN AND SERGIO
OLIMPIADA, represented by
Fernando Olimpiada as Attorney-
in-Fact,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. GREGORIO M. MONREAL,
CITY ASSESSOR, TAGAYTAY CITY,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 185781
Present:
CORONA,C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CAST
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
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For failure to pay the real property taxes for
several years, the subject lots were sold by the City
Government of Tagaytay in a public auction held on
November 28, 1983, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser issued in favor
of Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc. (VMMEI). Said
certificate of sale was registered on December 9,
1983.
To save their property, the heirs of Narciso
Olimpiada,[4] through their attorney-in-fact, Rosa
Cabrera Mendoza, executed a Deed of Sale of an
Unregistered Parcel of Land With Assignment of Rights
and Assumption of Obligations in favor of Jose Teofilo
T. Mercado (Mercado).[5] The heirs of Juan
Desengao[6] through their attorney-in-fact Primitivo
Mendoza likewise executed a similar deed in favor of
Mercado.[7]
On December 7, 1984, Mercado paid the sums
of P58,327.82 and P33,841.49 for the five parcels of
land. Consequently, a Certificate of Redemption
covering the subject properties was issued by the Office
of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City.[8] Said office also
returned the purchase price plus interest thereon to
VMMEI on December 11, 1984.[9] However, the checks
issued by Mercado in payment of the aforesaid sums
when presented for payment to the bank, were
dishonored for the reason Refer to Drawer. Under
letters dated April 16, 1985 and October 8, 1985, the
Office of the City Treasurer advised Mercado to replace
the bounced checks.[10]
On April 14, 1986, VMMEI through its counsel
wrote then City Treasurer Concepcion C. Daplas
asserting its right to be reinstated as the highest bidder
during the public auction sale considering that no
effective redemption was made by the delinquent
owners, and expressed willingness to return the total
amount of P111,222.07 refunded to it and also to pay
additional sums to update the taxes due on the subject
properties.[11] Thereupon, under letter dated April 22,
1986, Daplas sought the advice/ruling of the Minister of
Finance on whether she can accept VMMEIs repayment
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for the total amount of tax delinquency of the auctioned
properties and costs without going through the process
of another public auction, and issue the corresponding
final bill of sale in its favor. [12] No written reply was
received from the Ministry of Finance regarding Daplas
query.
On August 7, 1986, Daplas accepted the amount
of P46,400.00 from Mercado as partial cash payment,
particularly for replacement of check covering payment
of tax receipts # 7495076, 7495036 & 7495075 as
evidenced by a handwritten temporary receipt she
issued to Mercado.[13] Said amount was immediately
deposited with PNB Cavite Branch under SJV No. 86-09-
21 dated September 5, 1986. On October 7, 1986, a
certain Mr. Francisco Zarate informed the City Treasurer
that he is withdrawing the payment he made in behalf
of Mercado because he realized that the transaction was
irregular since the 365 days redemption period allowed
by law had already expired when they paid the cash
replacement of the bounced check of Mercado.
[14] However, such money paid by Zarate was never
returned by the City Treasurers Office.
The repayment made by VMMEI was eventually
accepted and then OIC/City Treasurer Pio Baybay
executed the Final Bills of Sale [15] covering the subject
lots. Consequently, the previous tax declarations of the
Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and Heirs of Desengao were
cancelled and new tax declarations for the year 1988
were issued in the name of VMMEI which likewise paid
the real property taxes due on the five parcels of land.
On May 15, 1988, the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada
and Juan Desengao sought reconsideration of the
cancellation of their respective tax declarations on the
ground that it was illegal considering that the auctioned
properties have been timely redeemed. In his letter-
reply, then City Assessor Josefina De Castro informed
that their properties have already been sold at public
auction for non-payment of real property taxes in
accordance with existing regulations and procedure.
[16] Still, the said heirs reiterated their request for the
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revival or restoration of their tax declarations on
September 7, 1989.[17]
On September 26, 1989, Mercado filed separate
petitions for judicial confirmation of title over the
subject lots in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagaytay City (Branch 18), docketed as LRC Case Nos.
TG-354 (Lot 4867 - Olimpiada Property), TG-355 (Lots
7539, 7540 and 7541 - Desengao Properties) and TG-
356 (Lot 4831-B - Desengao Property).
The Republic of the Philippines through the
Solicitor General entered appearance and filed its
Opposition to the petitions filed in LRC Case Nos. TG-
355 and TG-356.[18] The Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada
represented by Atty. Dante A. Carandang (Carandang
Group) filed their Opposition in LRC Case No. TG-354,
having earlier filed on April 11, 1990 before the same
court Civil Case No. TG-1124 for the annulment of
public auction sale. The Heirs of Juan Desengao filed
their Opposition in LRC Case Nos. TG-355 and TG-356.
[19] VMMEI, on the other hand, filed its Opposition to all
three petitions filed by Mercado.[20] VMMEI likewise filed
a separate application for registration of the same
parcels of land before the same court, docketed as LRC
Case No. TG-383.
On April 23, 1991, the trial court issued a general
order of default with the exception of private oppositors
VMMEI and the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada (Carandang
Group).[21] Civil Case No. TG-1124 was dismissed on
joint motion of the parties as the Heirs of Narciso
Olimpiada pursued their opposition in the consolidated
cases of LRC Case Nos. TG-354, TG-355 and TG-356.[22]
Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada[23] (Carandang Group)
These oppositors led by Teresa Olimpiada and
counsel Atty. Dante A. Carandang, claimed to be the
lawful owners of Lot No. 4867 as legal heirs of Narciso
Olimpiada who died intestate sometime in 1926. They
alleged that they were not notified of the public auction
sale conducted on November 28, 1983 wherein their
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(Soledad Umali Mendoza) of another heir, Marcelino
Mendoza, signed the document for herself and allegedly
in behalf of her children with Marcelino.[27]
Rosa and Primitivo presented the respective
receipts for the amounts (P200,000.00 for the heirs of
Olimpiada and P400,000.00 for the heirs of Juan
Desengao)[28]representing the purchase price they
received from Mercado, which were all deposited with
Mercados sister, Paulita Mercado Araas, for
safekeeping until the titles to the land are issued.[29]
Atty. Augusto Del Rosario testified that the
subject deeds were executed in his presence. He relied
on the representation of the heirs-signatories that they
are the only heirs of the declared landowners and it
being the custom in the rural areas to trust the word of
the eldest in the family. He also admitted there were
tenants on the subject properties but these tenants
already executed waivers in favor of Mercado.[30]
Loreta Luring Mendoza testified that it was not
her signature which appeared above the name Lorenza
Mendoza, which was not her true name, in the Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Primitivo Mendoza.
[31] Another witness, Cornelia Mendoza, likewise denied
it was her signature appearing above the name Aba
Mendoza and she always signed using the name
Cornelia Mendoza her full name. [32]
Macario Olimpiada testified that he is a great
grandson of Narciso Olimpiada, his father Dominador
Olimpiada being the son of Victor Olimpiada. He denied
the signature appearing above his name in the Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Rosa Cabrera
Mendoza. He does not know anything about the
execution of said document nor the sale in favor of
Mercado made by his co-heirs. He also did not make
any contribution for the payment of real property taxes
because it was only through Rosa Cabrera that he came
to know that they have a property in Tagaytay. Neither
is he aware that the subject land was sold in a public
auction nor of its redemption by Mercado. In fact, he
does not know anything of what was happening
regarding the property.
[33]
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VMMEI presented as its witnesses its Treasurer
Grace Ramos Abesamis, former City Treasurer of
Tagaytay Concepcion Daplas and Local Training
Operations Officer of the City Treasurers Office
Domingo Bayas.
Abesamis testified that the refund of the purchase
money paid by VMMEI at the public auction was
deposited in the companys account but on September
30, 1997, they paid it back to the City Government of
Tagaytay by issuing two checks duly receipted by the
City Treasurers Office. While the said payment
consisted of personal checks of Joaquin Rodriguez,
VMMEIs President, she explained that stockholders and
officers can make advances in behalf of the company.[34]
Treasurer Daplas testified that the payment
tendered by Mercado as redemption price was only
partial and she issued a temporary receipt
for P46,400.00 received only on August 7, 1986. They
earlier refunded the purchase price to VMMEI on
December 11, 1984 before they learned that the checks
issued by Mercado bounced. The Ministry of Finance
sent a telegram dated December 11, 1985 directing
then OIC/City Treasurer of Tagaytay Pio Baybay to
appear at said office in connection with the subject
properties. The Final Bills of Sale were executed by
Baybay in favor of VMMEI in Manila and she signed the
documents as witness. This was upon the verbal
instruction given by the officials of the now Department
of Finance (DOF) when on the same date she and
Baybay were called to a conference before said
officials. The return of the refunded purchase price was
made by Joaquin Rodriguez through checks.[35] She also
identified the signatures of Baybay and the other
witness in the Final Bills of Sale.[36]
GaudiosoPlatero,
Bonifacia
Platero,
Herminia
Platero-
Castro and
Elizabeth
Platero-
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In upholding the claim of VMMEI, the trial court
ruled that VMMEI acquired ownership rights over the
subject properties when it returned the refunded
purchase price to the City Treasurer. As confirmation of
such rights, the City Treasurer executed Final Bills of
Sale in favor of VMMEI which was attested to by witness
Daplas.
Heirs
of Juan
and
Sergio
Olimpia
da[42] (F
abella
Group)
On February 16, 1993, the heirs of Juan and
Sergio Olimpiada who are allegedly full-blood brothers
of Narciso Olimpiada, represented by their attorney-in-
fact Fernando Olimpiada and their counsel Atty. Gilbert
M. Fabella (Fabella Group), filed an Urgent Motion for
Reopening[43] of LRC Case No. TG-354. They pointed out
that in the approved plan of Lot 4867, Ap-04-
000778[44] dated April 29, 1976, it was clearly indicated
that the land described therein was surveyed for the
Hrs. of Narciso Olimpiada, et al. and that the words
et al. refer to the Heirs of Juan and Sergio Olimpiada,
the co-owners of Narciso Olimpiada.
In a Joint Order[45] dated April 20, 1993, the trial
court denied the said Urgent Motion as well as the
petition for relief from judgment and motion for
reconsideration filed by the Plateros. The trial court
said it no longer had jurisdiction to act on the pending
motions since it already approved the notice of appeal
filed by applicant Mercado.
On May 20, 1998, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella
Group[46] instituted before the same court (RTC of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18) Civil Case No. TG-1800 for
Annulment of Auction Sale. However, the named
attorney-in-fact was Macario Olimpiada. They prayed
that the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City
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Tagaytay and Hon. Alfonso Garcia, Judge, RTC Branch
18, Tagaytay City.[51]
CA-G.R.
CV No.
41164
and CA-
G.R. SP
No.
32309
Applicant Mercado filed a notice of appeal from
the adverse decision of the RTC in LRC Case Nos. TG-
354, TG-355 and TG-356, the appeal docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 41164.Before the CA, VMMEI filed a
motion for the issuance of writ of possession, which was
granted under its Resolution dated October 20, 1993.[52] In the same resolution, the motion for elevation of
the court records in LRC Case Nos. TG-354 and TG-383
and/or remand of the case to the trial court, filed by the
Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group (who represented
themselves as Heirs of Narciso, Juan and Sergio
Olimpiada, et al. was also denied. The CA noted that
LRC Case No. TG-354 was already decided while the
motion for consolidation was filed before the trial court
by the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group only on February
5, 1993. As per the report submitted by the Sheriff, the
writ of possession was returned unserved for lack of
specification of the address of appellees.[53]
Meanwhile, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group
filed in this Court G.R. No. 110005, Appeal by
Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction seeking to re-open
the proceedings in LRC Case No. TG-354. Citing the
pendency of said G.R. No. 110005, they filed an Urgent
Motion before the CA to hold in abeyance resolution of
the appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 41164).[54]
VMMEI filed a motion to strike out the pleadings
filed by the Plateros (who filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution granting the motion for
issuance of writ of possession) and Olimpiada Heirs-
Fabella Group (who filed their opposition to the motion
for issuance of writ of possession and motion to hold in
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32309. Petitioners therein specifically prayed that said
case be consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41164
pending with the appellate court.[59] In an obvious
attempt to evade the charge of forum shopping, Atty.
Fabella appended a Certification to said petition
attesting that they have withdrawn [their] action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Honorable
Supreme Court in the case entitled, Heirs of Narciso
Olimpiada, et al., represented by Fernando Olimpiada,
in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, petitioners versus
The Hon. Judge, Eleuterio O. Guerrero, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court Branch 18, Tagaytay City, Jose
Teofilo T. Mercado and Valley Mountain Mines
Exploration, Inc., represented by the President, Jack
Rodriguez, under CA-G.R. No. 110005. and even
attached the purported Motion to Withdraw signed by
Atty. Fabella filed before the Supreme Court on October
12, 1993.[60] As earlier mentioned, G.R. No. 110005 was
denied with finality by this Court on September 3, 1993.
On December 29, 1993, the CAs Thirteenth
Division ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No.
32309 with CA-G.R. CV No. 41164.[61]
On November 12, 1997, the CAs Special Seventh
Division issued the following Resolution[62]:
An examination of the rollo of SC
G[.]R. No. 119059 revealed that the heirs of
Narciso Olimpiada, et al., petitioners
therein, filed a Manifestation with the
Supreme Court on September 13, 1995 to
inform the said court that they sought the
assistance of the DENR to investigate the
identity and registrability of the subject
land. A certification marked as annex B (p.
260, Rollo) issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources was
subsequently presented to show that the
land subject of this controversy falls within
the Unclassified Public Forest of Tagaytay
City per LC-CM 10 control map ofCavite. The petitioners argue that if the
land subject of this appeal is indeed forest
land and is thus, inalienable, the tax sale
conducted by the City of Tagaytay is void
and the said land cannot be the subject of
an application for registration. However,
when the DENR failed to submit a full report
on the matter on time, the Supreme Court
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made on December 12, 1997. VMMEI filed in said case
the following motions: (1) Motion To Recall Entry of
Judgment; (2) Motion To Resolve Petition, both dated
September 6, 1998; and (3) Motion to Clarify dated
October 6, 1998. In a Resolution[64] dated November
23, 1998, this Court said:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
aforesaid Motions are all NOTED WITHOUT
ACTION and the Court of Appeals may now
judiciously proceed with the resolution of
CA-GR No. SP 32309 and CA-GR CV No.
41164, inasmuch as this present case isnow deemed finally resolved and
terminated. No further pleadings will be
entertained.
On May 31, 1999, the CAs Fourteenth Division
rendered its Decision[65] dismissing the appeal of
Mercado in CA-G.R. CV No. 41164 and sustaining the
trial courts findings and conclusions as to the defective
redemption made by Mercado, the validity of VMMEIs
acquisition of the subject lands by repaying the
purchase price to the City Treasurer, and the
undisputed open, exclusive and notorious possession of
the former owners of the lands since time
immemorial. The appellate court also dismissed CA-
G.R. SP No. 32309, noting that in dismissing without
prejudice G.R. No. 119059, this Court did not reverse or
modify the October 14, 1994 Resolution excluding the
Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group and the Plateros in CA-
G.R. CV No. 41164. Further, it was mentioned that
since G.R. No. 110005 also filed by the same Olimpiada
Heirs-Fabella Group was already denied with finality, the
CA can no longer entertain the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32309 which questioned the RTCs order denying
their motion to re-open proceedings in LRC Case Nos.
TG-354, the same issues raised by said petitioners
cannot be litigated anew. Lastly, the CA held that even
if said petitioners were allowed to intervene in CA-G.R.
CV No. 41164, still their alleged rights are foreclosed by
the fact that VMMEIs mode of acquisition was not by
sale made by the Olimpiada heirs but by purchase in a
tax delinquency sale pursuant to P.D. No. 464. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the
Court a quo dated November 26, 1992 is
affirmed in toto. Likewise, the petition
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docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32309 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against applicant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[66]
On October 12, 1999, Mercado filed a Motion for
New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
consisting of the following: (1) the Notarial Report of
Notary Public Crisostomo G. Valle showing that
Document Nos. 809 to 987 appears on pages 67-101 of
Book XXI for the month of September 1987 whereas theFinal Bills of Sale indicated Document Nos. 977, 978 and
980, Book XXIII, pages 99 and 100, Book XVIII covers
only pages Nos. 73-101, series of 1987; Documents 978
and 980 are recorded not as the final bills of sale; (2)
Certification from the Clerk of Court, Notarial Section,
RTC of Manila which proves the spurious nature of the
Final Bills of Sale; and (3) Letter dated October 5, 1999
from Angelina M. Magsino, Deputy Executive Director
and OIC of the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
Department of Finance, in response to Mercados letter-
query if it is the practice of said office to give verbal
instruction to then Tagaytay City Treasurer Daplas
regarding the auction sale of the property redeemed by
him, and which states that as a matter of public policy,
all job-related instructions to local treasury officials are
usually made in writing and that whether somebody
might have given [Daplas] such verbal instructions, the
Bureau is not at all aware of the same.[67]
In its Resolution dated November 15, 1999, the
CA granted Mercados motion for new
trial. Subsequently, however, in its Resolution dated
December 1, 1999, the appellate court granted VMMEIs
motion for reconsideration and set aside its November
15, 1999 resolution.[68]
On February 4, 2000, Mercado filed a petition for
review before this Court to reverse the CA Decision
dated May 31, 1999 and Resolution dated December 1,
1999, docketed as G.R. No. 141019.
CA-G.R.
SP No.
74454
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While their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 74454 was
still pending, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group filed a
petition for mandamus before the RTC of Tagaytay City
(Branch 23), docketed as Civil Case No. TG-2406.
[69]Impleaded as defendant therein was City Assessor
Gregorio M. Monreal. It was prayed that said defendant
be directed to correct the error committed in the
issuance of tax declaration as New in 1974 containing
the name Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada only instead of
the Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, et al. as reflected in
the approved survey plan (Ap-04-000778).
On August 15, 2003, the Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella
Group filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings in
CA-G.R. SP No. 74454 to await the final resolution of the
mandamus case (Civil Case No. TG-2406).[70] In its
Opposition, VMMEI contended that the petition in Civil
Case No. TG-2406 is defective as it did not also implead
the City Government of Tagaytay. Such non-inclusion of
the city government was deliberate and made to
conceal the forum shopping committed by the
Olimpiada Heirs-Fabella Group who had earlier filed Civil
Case No. TG-1800, in which the reliefs are similar to
those sought in Civil Case No. TG-2406. It was further
argued that the filing of Civil Case No. TG-1800 was
itself an act of forum shopping because the Olimpiada
Heirs-Fabella Group had previously filed an urgent
motion for reopening of Civil Case No. TG-354 before
the RTC. In view of this clear and blatant forum
shopping, the filing of the mandamus case could not be
invoked as legal basis for suspension of the proceedings
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74454.[71]
On March 31, 2004, the CAs Eighth Division
rendered its Decision[72] dismissing the petition for
certiorari finding no grave of abuse of discretion
committed by the respondent judge in dismissing Civil
Case No. TG-1800. It noted that petitioners failed to
offer satisfactory explanation for not complying with
Section 83 of P.D. No. 464, failing to appeal the final
orders of the respondent court, and resort to petition for
relief from judgment and other motions without
complying with procedural requirements. Additionally,
the court found that the alleged extrinsic fraud was not
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land is concerned; (2) declaring the Decision in LRC
Case No. TG-354 with respect to Lot 4867 confirming
ownership in favor of VMMEI as null and void at least to
the extent of 2/3 thereof; (3) declaring the order of
respondent judge dated January 14, 2000 as null and
void for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion and with gross misrepresentation for
excluding petitioners as co-owners of Lot 4867; and (4)
declaring the March 31, 2004 CA Decision as null and
void for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion as it did not await the final resolution of the
mandamus case.[85]
G.R. No. 185781
Petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision
dated December 27, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89657,
setting forth the following arguments: (1) lands which
have not been issued patent and certificate of title
cannot be the object of an auction sale, and if sold by
the non-grantee is a violation of the law; (2) the only
bidder VMMEI is a mining corporation not allowed to
acquire agricultural land, besides being a dummy
corporation, its claim of ownership over the subject
land is a violation of the Corporation Code; (3) the
correction of a typographical or clerical error committed
by a City Assessor is a ministerial function and is purely
ministerial in character; (4) petitioners did not receive
any notice declaring them as delinquent taxpayers and
of the conduct of auction sale, and neither were
they parties to the land registration case; and (5)
under the Civil Code, VMMEI is only a trustee of the
petitioners when it bought at the auction sale the lot
owned in common. Petitioners thus prayed that the CA
decision be set aside and judgment be rendered
ordering the City Assessor to correct the erroneous
1974 Tax Declaration No. 09959-B.[86]
Ruling of the Court
The present controversy generated a prolonged
litigation on the issue of ownership. On the one hand is
the dispute between Mercado and VMMEI as to who had
validly acquired rights over Lot 4867 in the tax
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WHEREFORE the foregoing are 3 The Regional Technical Director
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WHEREFORE, the foregoing are
initially submitted to the Honorable Court
for its information, with the
recommendation that the rendition of
the decision be held in abeyance until
after the discrepancies are corrected
and the requested informations are
received. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, the trial court rendered its Decision
dated November 26, 1992 without waiting for the
receipt by the LRA of the abovementioned verification
reports on the correctness of the plan and status of the
land applied for registration.
On January 5, 1993, the LRA submitted to the trial
court a Supplementary Report,[89] as follows:
x x x x
2. LMB & CENRO informed that theparcel of land situated in Iruhin, Tagaytay
City, described in plan Ap-04-000778, Lot
4867, Cad-355 is not covered by any public
land application/land patent per its
1st Indorsement dated September 28, 1990
& letter dated September 6, 1990, copies
are attached hereto as Annexes A & B;
3. The Regional Technical Director,
Region IV, in its letter dated June 26, 1992,
in LRC Record No. N-51844, a copy is
attached hereto as Annex C, informed
that the correct tie line of Lot 4867 from
BLLM #1, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre
should be N. 70 deg. 54E., 6543.57 m.;
4. When the furnished corrected tie
line was applied in the replotting of Ap-04-
000778, Lot 4867, Cad-355, in our Municipal
Index Sheet, it was found that Lot A, plan
Vs-04-000318, a portion of Psu-179428,
applied in LRC Case No. Tg-301, LRC
Record No. N-51844 by Primitiva
Landicho-Tenido, et. al., & decided on
October 21, 1988, is a portion of Lot
4867, Tagaytay Cadastre, applied in
the case at bar. Copy of plan Vs-04-
000318 is attached hereto as Annex D;
and
5. LRA letter dated July 24, 1990
addressed to the FMB remains unanswered
as of this date.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing report is
respectfully submitted to the Honorable
Court for its information & guidance with
the recommendation that (1) the
applicant be required to submit a
subdivision plan in tracing cloth of Lot
4867, Tagaytay Cadastre, Ap-04-
000478 together with the
corresponding technical descriptions resolution or order if any of the Honorable
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corresponding technical descriptions
duly verified & approved by the
Regional Technical Director, Region IV,
by excluding therefrom as a separate
lot the portion covered by plan Vs-04-
000318, Lot A, a portion of Psu-
179428, applied & decided in LR Case
No. Tg-301, LRC Record No. N-51844 &
the Forest Management Bureau to
submit a report to the Court on the
status of the land applied for, to
determine whether said land or any
portion thereof, is within the forest
zone.[90] (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, the LRA was not notified that a
decision had already been rendered as evident from its
letter[91] dated January 19, 1993 to the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Branch 18, requesting for confirmation of the
genuineness and regular issuance of said
decision. Concerned about the matters earlier
conveyed to the court and whether these have been
properly addressed, the LRA again wrote the Clerk of
Court, stating that
In connection with the examination of
the above-noted case/record, please furnish
this Authority with a certified copy of the
resolution or order if any, of the Honorable
Court relative to our Supplementary Report
dated January 05, 1993, for our record as
required by existing regulations.
In the negative, please include said
report in the calendar of cases for
consideration of the Honorable Court.[92]
By that time, however, the RTC had already given
due course to the appeal of Mercado, and hence the
records were being forwarded to the appellate court.
As to the other lots applied for in LRC Case Nos.
TG-355 and TG-356, though not subject of the petition
before this Court, we note that the LRA Report dated
August 10, 1990 submitted to th
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