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K. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
1. LIMBONA V MANGELIN GR No. 80391 28February 1989
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona,was elected Speaker of the Regional LegislativeAssembly or Batasang Pampook of CentralMindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairmanof the Committee on Muslim Affairs of theHouse of Representatives, invited petitioner inhis capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with localgovernment officials. Petitioner accepted theinvitation and informed the Assembly membersthrough the Assembly Secretary that there shallbe no session in November as his presence wasneeded in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, theAssembly held a session in defiance of theLimbona's advice, where he was unseated from
his position. Petitioner prays that the session'sproceedings be declared null and void and be itdeclared that he was still the Speaker of theAssembly. Pending further proceedings of thecase, the SC received a resolution from theAssembly expressly expelling petitioner'smembership therefrom. Respondents argue thatpetitioner had "filed a case before the SupremeCourt against some members of the Assemblyon a question which should have been resolvedwithin the confines of the Assembly," for whichthe respondents now submit that the petitionhad become "moot and academic" because itsresolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governmentsor regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomousgovernments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration whenthe central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisionsin order to broaden the base of governmentpower and in the process to make localgovernments "more responsive andaccountable". At the same time, it relieves thecentral government of the burden of managinglocal affairs and enables it to concentrate onnational concerns. The President exercises"general supervision" over them, but only to"ensure that local affairs are administeredaccording to law." He has no control over theiracts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves anabdication of political power in the favor of localgovernments units declared to be autonomous.In that case, the autonomous government isfree to chart its own destiny and shape itsfuture with minimum intervention from central
authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoysautonomy of the latter category [CONST.(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to thedecree of the organic act creating it andaccepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomousgovernment of the former class is, as we noted,
under the supervision of the nationalgovernment acting through the President (andthe Department of Local Government). If theSangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, isautonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,debatably beyond the domain of this Court inperhaps the same way that the internal acts,say, of the Congress of the Philippines arebeyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomousin the former category only, it comesunarguably under our jurisdiction. Anexamination of the very Presidential Decreecreating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were nevermeant to exercise autonomy in the secondsense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,in the first place, mandates that "[t]he Presidentshall have the power of general supervision andcontrol over Autonomous Regions." Hence, weassume jurisdiction. And if we can make aninquiry in the validity of the expulsion inquestion, with more reason can we review thepetitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle,that of local autonomy. We have to obey theclear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations,one in favor of centralized power in Malacañangand the other beneficial to local autonomy, thescales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that theNovember 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid.It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not besuspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while thisopinion is in accord with the respondents' own,we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,since at the time the petitioner called the"recess," it was not a settled matter whether ornot he could do so. In the second place, theinvitation tendered by the Committee onMuslim Affairs of the House of Representativesprovided a plausible reason for the intermissionsought. Also, assuming that a valid recess couldnot be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake.What appears is that instead, they opened thesessions themselves behind his back in anapparent act of mutiny. Under thecircumstances, we find equity on his side. For
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this reason, we uphold the "recess" called onthe ground of good faith.
2. QUEZON CITY VS BAYANTEL G.R. No.162015
Res po nden t Ba ya n T e leco mmun i ca t i o
ns , I nc . (Bayantel) is a legislative franchiseholder under RA 3259toe s t a b l i s h a n d o p e r a t e r a d i o s t a t io n s f o r d o m e s t i c t e l ec o mm u ni c at i ons , radiophone, broadcast ing andte lecasting. A tax provision in its charter exemptedBayantel from payment of realty taxes actually,directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of itsfranchise. On January 1, 2002, the LGCtook ef fect wh ich grants LGUs the power tolevy tax on real properties. On July20, 1992,Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633,amending Bayantel’s original franchise which
contained once again the exemption of Bayantel from payment of realty taxes actually,directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of itsfranchise. In1993, the government of Quezon City
enacted the Quezon City Revenue Code
(QCRC), imposing a real property tax on al l
real properties in Quezon City which inc
luded som eproperties of Bayantel. Bayantel
did not pay the realty taxes prompting
t h e Q C T r e a s u r e r t o i s s u e w a r r a n t s
o f levy against thepropert ies.
Threatened, Bayantel filed with the RTC a
petitionfor prohibition with an urgent app
licatio n for a tempora ryrestraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Should Bayantel be granted tax
exemption?
RULING: Yes. The power to tax is
pr ima ri ly ves ted in the Congress; however,
in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local
legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a
va l idde legat ion as before , but pursua
nt to d i r ect auth or i tyconferred
by Section 5, Article X of the
Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise
of the power may be subject to such
guidelines and l imitations as the Congre
ss may provide which, however, must be
consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Section 5 does not change the
doctrine that municipal corporations do notpossess inherent powers of taxation. What
it does is to confer municipal corporations
a general power to levy taxes and otherwise
create sources of revenue. They no longer have
to wait for a statutory grant of these powers.
The power of the legislative authority relative to
the fiscal powers of local governments has been
reduced to the authority to impose limitations
on municipal powers. There can really be no
dispute that the power of the Quezon City
Government to tax is limited by Section
232 of the LGC. Under this law, the Legislature
highlighted its power to thereafter exemptcertain realties from the taxing power of local
government units.
A d m i t t e d l y , R e p . A c t N o . 7 6 3 3 w a s
en a c t e d subsequent to the LGC. The
Court v iews this subsequent piece of
legislation as an express and real intention
on the part of Congress to
once again remove from the L GC s
delegated taxing power, all of Bayantel’s
properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of i tsfranchise
3. ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
Subject: Public CorporationDoctrine: Automatic release of IRAFacts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VIImandating the Pres to submit to Congress abudget of expenditures within 30 days beforethe opening of every regular session, submittedthe National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “ANACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THEOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARYONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO
THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” alsoknown as General Appropriations Act (GAA) forthe Year 2000. It provides under the heading“ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS”that the IRA for local government units shallamount to P111,778,000,000”.In another part of the GAA, under the heading“UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that anamount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apartfrom the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above,shall be used to fund the IRA, which amountshall be released only when the original
revenue targets submitted by the President toCongress can be realized based on a quarterlyassessment to be conducted by certaincommittees which the GAA specifies, namely,the Development Budget Coordinating
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Committee, the Committee on Finance of theSenate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Thus, while the GAA appropriatesP111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund,it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billionof IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be
released only upon the occurrence of thecondition stated in the GAA.On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs andPOs, along with 3 barangay officials filed withthis Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, againstrespondents then Executive Secretary RonaldoZamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno,then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit,
challenging the constitutionality of provisionXXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTUNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1,XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND)Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAAprovisions)Petitioners contend that the said provisionsviolates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfullyreducing the IRA allotted by 10B and bywithholding its release by placing the sameunder “Unprogrammed funds”. Although the
effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased,this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolvethe issues raised in the present case, it beingimpressed with public interest. Petitioners arguethat the GAA violated the constitutionalmandate of automatically releasing the IRAswhen it made its release contingent on whetherrevenue collections could meet the revenuetargets originally submitted by the President,rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUsfiscal autonomy by not automatically releasingthe whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the nationaltaxes which shall be automatically released tothem.Petitioners argue that the GAA violated thisconstitutional mandate when it made the
release of IRA contingent on whether revenuecollections could meet the revenue targetsoriginally submitted by the President, ratherthan making the release automatic.Respondents counter argue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to thelegislature but to the executive, hence, thesame does not prevent the legislature fromimposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.Respondents thus infer that the subjectconstitutional provision merely prevents theexecutive branch of the government from“unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the
legislature from authorizing the executivebranch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that thePresident or any member of the ExecutiveDepartment cannot unilaterally, i.e., without thebacking of statute, withhold the release of theIRA.”As the Constitution lays upon the executive theduty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so itenjoins the legislature not to pass laws thatmight prevent the executive from performing
this duty. To hold that the executive branchmay disregard constitutional provisions whichdefine its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitutionamendable by statute – a proposition which ispatently absurd. If indeed the framers intendedto allow the enactment of statutes making therelease of IRA conditional instead of automatic,then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitutionwould have been worded differently.Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the
Constitution, only the just share of localgovernments is qualified by the words “asdetermined by law,” and not the releasethereof, the plain implication is that Congress isnot authorized by the Constitution to hinder orimpede the automatic release of the IRA.In another case, the Court held that the onlypossible exception to mandatory automaticrelease of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:…if the national internal revenue collections forthe current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year,
in which case what should be automaticallyreleased shall be a proportionate amount of thecollections for the current fiscal year. Theadjustment may even be made on a quarterlybasis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarterof the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of theGAA provisions by Congress was motivated bythe laudable intent to “lower the budget deficitin line with prudent fiscal management.” The
pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must beechoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that eventhe best intentions must be carried out withinthe parameters of the Constitution and the law.Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out
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by legal methods.”WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVIIand LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutionalinsofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, inthe amount of P10 Billion, as part of theUNPROGRAMMED FUND.
4. LTO V CITY OF BUTUAN
G. R. No. 131512. January 20,2000
Facts:Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to
LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government Code, the SangguniangPanglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an
ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for theissuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit,and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinanceprovided for, among other things, the paymentof franchise fees for the grant of the franchiseof tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of apermit for the driving thereof.
Petitioner LTO explains that one of thefunctions of the national government that,
indeed, has been transferred to localgovernment units is the franchising authorityover tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and RegulatoryBoard ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, theauthority of LTO to register all motor vehiclesand to issue to qualified persons of licenses todrive such vehicles.
The RTC and CA ruled that the power to giveregistration and license for driving tricycles hasbeen devolved to LGU's.Issue:
Whether or not, the registration of tricycleswas given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is avalid exercise of police power.
Ruling:No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement
the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code"- the newly delegated powers to LGU'spertain to the franchising and regulatory powersexercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions
of the LTO relative to the registration of motorvehicles and issuance of licenses for the drivingthereof. Corollarily, the exercised of a policepower must be through a valid delegation. Inthis case the police power of registeringtricycles was not delegated to the LGU’s, but
remained in the LTO.
Clearly unaffected by the Local GovernmentCode are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136requiring the registration of all kinds of motorvehicles "used or operated on or upon anypublic highway" in the country.
The Commissioner of Land Transportation
and his deputies are empowered at anytime toexamine and inspect such motor vehicles todetermine whether said vehicles are registered,or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked orequipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated onbecause of possible excessive damage tohighways, bridges and other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with being thecentral repository and custodian of all recordsof all motor vehicles.
Adds the Court, the reliance made byrespondents on the broad taxing power of localgovernment units, specifically under Section
133 of the Local Government Code, istangential.
Police power and taxation, along witheminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share withlocal government units by delegation givenunder a constitutional or a statutory fiat. Allthese inherent powers are for a public purposeand legislative in nature but the similarities justabout end there. The basic aim of police poweris public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case,focuses on the power of government to raiserevenue in order to support its existence andcarry out its legitimate objectives. Althoughcorrelative to each other in many respects, thegrant of one does not necessarily carry with itthe grant of the other. The two powers are, bytradition and jurisprudence, separate anddistinct powers, varying in their respectiveconcepts, character, scopes and limitations.
To construe the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the LGC indistinctively would result in therepeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power
which evidently has not been intended. If itwere otherwise, the law could have just said soin Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the LocalGovernment Code in the same manner that thespecific devolution of LTFRB's power onfranchising of tricycles has been provided.Repeal by implication is not favored.
The power over tricycles granted underSection 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local GovernmentCode to LGUs is the power to regulate theiroperation and to grant franchises for theoperation thereof. The exclusionary clause
contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government Code must not beheld to have had the effect of withdrawing theexpress power of LTO to cause the registrationof all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions
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of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature,exercised pursuant to the police power of theState, whose basic objectives are to achieveroad safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Notinsignificant is the rule that a statute must notbe construed in isolation but must be taken inharmony with the extant body of laws.
LGUs indubitably now have the power toregulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire andto grant franchises for the operation thereof,and not to issue registration.
Ergo, the ordinance being repugnant to astatute is void and ultra vires.
5. BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURTOF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSODand BATANGASCITY MAYOR [G.R. No.138810. September 29, 2004]
FACTS:On July 28, 1986, respondentSangguniang Panlungsod enacted ResolutionNo. 210 granting petitioner a permit toconstruct, install, and operate a CATV systemin Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolutionprovides that petitioner is authorized to chargeits subscribers the maximum rates specifiedtherein, “provided, however, that any increaseof rates shall be subject to the approval of theSangguniang Panlungsod.Sometime in November 1993, petitionerincreased its subscriber rates from P88.00 toP180.00 per month. As a result, respondentMayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening tocancel its permit unless it secures the approvalof respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod,pursuant to Resolution No. 210.Petitioner thenfiled with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, apetition for injunction alleging that respondentsSangguniang Panlungsod has no authority toregulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators because under Executive Order No.205, the National TelecommunicationsCommission (NTC) has the sole authority toregulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.ISSUE :may a local government unit (LGU)regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATVoperators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.x x xThe logical conclusion, therefore,is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No.436, the NTC exercises regulatory power overCATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.x x xLike any other enterprise, CATV operation
maybe regulated by LGUs under the generalwelfare clause. This is primarily because theCATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses publicproperties in order to reach subscribers.) Thephysical realities of constructing CATV system
–the use of public streets, rights of ways, thefounding of structures, and the parceling of large regions–allow an LGU a certain degree of regulationover CATV operators.x x xBut, while we recognize the LGUs’ power underthe general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. Weare convinced that respondents strayed fromthe well recognized limits of its power. Theflaws in Resolution No. 210are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing lawsand (2) it violates the State’s deregulationpolicy over the CATV industry.LGUs must recognize that technical mattersconcerning CATV operation are within theexclusive regulatory power of the NTC
6. MAYOR MAGTAJAS & CITY OF CAGAYAN v.PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCORFacts:PAGCOR decided to expand its operationsto Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, itleased a portion of a building belonging toPryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovatedand equipped the same, and prepared toinaugurate its casino there during the Christmasseason.. Civic organizations angrily denouncedthe project. The religious elements echoed theobjection and so did the women's groupsand the youth. Demonstrations were ledby the mayor and the city legislators. Themedia trumpeted the protest, describing thecasino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it isviolative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353prohibit ing the use of bui ldings for theoperation of a casino and Ordinance No.3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.
On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D.1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralizeand regulate all games of chance, includingcasinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents.Hence, the petition for review.
Issue:Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 andOrdinance No. 3375-93 are valid
Held:NoRatio:Cagayan de Oro City, like other local politicalsubdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinancesfor the purposes indicated in the Local
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Government Code. It is expressly vested withthe police power under what is known as theGeneral Welfare Clause now embodied inSection 16 asfollows:***S ec. 16. — Genera l We lfar e. —Every local government unit shall exercise the powersexpress ly granted, those neces s a r i l y imp l i ed t he re f ro m, a swell as powers necessary,appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effectivegovernance, and those which are essentialto the promotion of the general welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensureand support, among other things, thepreservation and enrichment of culture,promote health and safety, enhance theright of the people to a balancedecology,encour age and supp ort the deve lo pment o f a pp ro p r i a t e a nd s e l f -reliant scientific andtechnologicalcapabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice,promote ful l employment among theirresidents, maintain peace and order, andpreserve the comfort and convenience of theirinhabitants. The re i s a requ i rement t ha t t he o rd ina nces s ho u ld no t co n t ra vene a s t a tute. Munic ipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Localcouncil s exerc ise only dele gatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as thenational lawmaking body. The delegate cannotbe superior to the principal or exercise powershigher than those of the latter. It is a heresy tosuggest that the local government units canundo the acts of Congress, from which theyhave derived their power in the first place, andnegate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized byP.D. 1869. This decree has the status of astatute that cannot be amended or nullified bya mereordinance.Therefor e, the peti tion is DENIED and the challenged decision of theCourt of Appeals is AFFIRMED
Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local
Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had,
on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code,
null and void for non-compliance with theprescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of
Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
revoked the Secretary’s resolution and
sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that
the procedural requirements had been
observed. More importantly, it declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control overlocal governments in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution
and of the specific provision therein conferring
on the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local governments.
The court cited the familiar distinction between
control and supervision, the first being “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter,” while thesecond is “the power of a superior officer to see
to it that lower officers perform their functions
is accordance with law.”
ISSUES:
The issues in this case are
(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local
Government Code is unconstitutional; and
(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can
exercise control, rather than supervision, overthe local government
HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in
so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the
Local Government Code is unconstitutional but
affirmed the said lower court’s finding that the
procedural requirements in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justiceto review only the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it
on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,
he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act. It they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even
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decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. In the opinion of the
Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and
no more nor less than this, and so performed an
act not of control but of mere supervision.
Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully
examined every exhibit and agree with the trial
court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. The only exceptions are
the posting of the ordinance as approved but
this omission does not affect its validity,
considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of generalcirculation will satisfy due process.
Miranda vs. Aguirre
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing
the constitu-tionality of Republic Act No. 8528,
converting the City of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to merely a
component city.
On May 5, 1994, RA No. 7720 was signed
into a law, which converted the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city.
on July 4, 1994, RA No. 7720 was approved
by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.
On February 14, 1998, RA No. 8528 was
enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that
practically downgraded the City of Santiagofrom an independent component city to a
merely component city.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit
the law for the approval of the people of
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the
said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago
from an independent component city into acomponent city. It allegedly did not involve any
“creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the
people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the
petition and argued that the petition raises a
political question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT RA NO. 8528 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ITS FAILURE TO
SUBMIT IT TO PROPER PLEBISCITE.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS LACKS
STANDING OR PERSONALITY IN FILING THIS
PETITION.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION AT BAR ON
THE GROUND THAT IT INVOLVES A POLITICAL
QUESTION.
DECISION:
Petition was GRANTED. RA No. 8528 is
declared unconstitutional and the writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to desist from implementing the
said law.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional
because Sec. 10 of Art. X of the 1987Constitution clearly states that: No province,
city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
That when an amendment of the law
involves creation, merger, division, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the
imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Petitioner
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado
was the President of the Sangguniang Liga,
together with 3 other petitioners were all
residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is
their right to be heard in the conversion of their
city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by theCOMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike down
the law as unconstitutional.
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Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states
that: the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instru-mentality of the Government.
That the Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it
involves not a political question but a justiciable
issue, and of which only the court could decide
whether or not a law passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional.
PUBLIC CORP DIGEST FOR Miranda v
Aguirre (1999)
FACTS: 5 May 1994: RA 7720 converted the
municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an
independent component city. 14 Feb 1998: RA
8528 was enacted, amending RA 7720. It
changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component
city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
this RA since it lacked a provision submitting
the law for ratification by the people of Santiago
City in a plebiscite. The respondents raised thedefense of standing and the political question
doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA
merely reclassified Santiago City from an
independent component city to a component
city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units.”
ISSUE: WON a reclassification of a city from an
independent component city to a component
city requires a plebiscite. YES.
RATIO: The wording of the constitution has a
common denominator: the material change in
the political and economic rights of the LGU
directly affected. The consent of the people is
required to serve as a checking mechanism to
any exercise of legislative power. The changes
are substantial. The city mayor will be placed
under the administrative supervision of the
provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council will have to be
reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have
to be shared with the province. There would be
a reduction in their IRA.
When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago
City from a municipality to an independent
component city, it required the approval of its
people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose.
There is no reason why the same should not be
done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of
their city. The rules cover all conversions,
whether upward or downward so long as they
result in a material change in the LGU directlyaffected.
NAVARRO v ERMITA
Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a
province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of
Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for
constitutionality for not being in compliance
with the population or the land area
requirements of the Local Government Code
under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to
this case declared the creation of the province
as unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a
separate province constitutional?
Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy
considerations in the creation of provinces.
They compared the LGC provisions on the
creation of municipalities and cities and how
they allow an exception to the land area
requirement in cases of non-contiguity asprovided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the
LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the
intent of the legislators to extend such
exception to provinces especially considering
the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was
absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision
relating to creation of provinces), such was
incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting
the congressional oversight in said provision
and reflecting the true legislative intent.Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very
restrictive construction which could trench on
the equal protection clause, as it actually
defeats the purpose of local autonomy and
decentralization as enshrined in the
Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement
should be read together with territorial
contiguity.
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals
(161 SCRA 646)
Facts: Gelacio Tumambing contracted the
services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of
scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of
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Manila on board the lighter LCT "Batman."
Pursuant to this agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon
sent his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where it
docked in 3 feet of water. Then, Gelacio
Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to
Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading
which was actually begun on the same date by
the crew of the lighter under the captain's
supervision. When about half of the scrap ironwas already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of
Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded
P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter
resisted the shakedown and after a heated
argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula
drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing.
The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had
to be taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for
treatment. After sometime, the loading of the
scrap iron was resumed. But on 4 December
1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompaniedby 3 policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza
and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the
lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the
compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor
Rub issued a receipt stating that the
Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of
the scrap iron.
Tumambing instituted with CFI Manila an action
against Ganzon for damages based on culpa
contractual. The trial court rendered a decision
absolving Ganzon from liability. On appeal,
however, the appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision appealed. Hence, the petition
for review on certiorari.
Held: Now the petitioner is changing his theory
to caso fortuito. Such a change of theory on
appeal we cannot, however, allow. In any case,
the intervention of the municipal officials was
not In any case, of a character that would
render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier
of its obligation. The petitioner was not dutybound to obey the illegal order to dump into the
sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence
of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same
order was attended with such force or
intimidation as to completely overpower the will
of the petitioner's employees. The mere
difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is
not considered force majeure. We agree with
the private respondent that the scraps could
have been properly unloaded at the shore or at
the NASSCO compound, so that after thedispute with the local officials concerned was
settled, the scraps could then be delivered in
accordance with the contract of carriage.
Pablico v. Villapando
J. Ynares-Santiago, G.R. No. 147870. July 31,
2002
FACTS: Solomon Maagad and Renato
Fernandez, members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of San Vicente, Palawan filed an administrative
complaint against Alejandro A. Villapando, the
mayor of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of
authority and culpable violation of the
Constitution for entering into a consultancy
agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated
mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections
where Villapando was elected. They allege that
the consultancy agreement amounted to an
appointment to a government position within
the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-
B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
Villapando, on the other hand, argues that he
did not hire Tiape, but appointed him and
invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the
Department of Justice which states that the
appointment of a defeated candidate as a
consultant does not constitute an appointment
to a government office or position as prohibited
by the Constitution. The Sangguniang
Panalalawigan of Palawan found Villapando
guilty of the administrative charge and
dismissed him from service which was affirmed
by the Office of the President. Meanwhile, Ramir
Pablico, the vice-mayor of San Vicente,Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal
Mayor afterwhich, Villapando filed with the RTC
of Palawan for a temporary restraining order
which was first granted, then denied by the
RTC. So Villapando now goes to Court seeking
to annul the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan and the affirmation of
the Office of the President, and the denial of the
temporary restraining order by the RTC. He
argues that under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160, an
elective local office may be removed from officeon the grounds enumerated under Sec. 60 by
order of the proper court. Without such order of
the court, he cannot be dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not local legislative bodies
and/or the Office of the President, on appeal,
may validly impose the penalty of dismissal
from service on erring elective local officials?
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that it is
clear under Sec. 60 of R.A. 7160 that the
penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring
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elective local official may be decreed only by a
court of law. In Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et
al., it was held that “[t]he Office of the
President is without any power to remove
elected officials, since such power is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly
provided for in the last paragraph of Section
60.” Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LocalGovernment Code, however, adds that – “(b) An
elective local official may be removed from
office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph
(a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in
Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by
order of the proper court or the disciplining
authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining
authority referred to pertains to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan
and the Office of the President. As held inSalalima, this grant to the “disciplining
authority” of the power to remove elective local
officials is clearly beyond the authority of the
Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules
and Regulations. No rule or regulation may
alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law,
such as the Local Government Code.
Implementing rules should conform, not clash,
with the law that they implement, for a
regulation which operates to create a rule out of
harmony with the statute is a nullity. It isbeyond cavil, therefore, that the power to
remove erring elective local officials from
service is lodged exclusively with the courts.
Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, insofar as it vests power on
the “disciplining authority” to remove from
office erring elective local officials, is void for
being repugnant to the last paragraph of
Section 60 of the Local Government Code of
1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly
construed and applied, and the authority in
whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith,
for what is involved is not just an ordinary
public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right
of suffrage. Their will must not be put to
naught by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority. Where the disciplining
authority is given only the power to suspend
and not the power to remove, it should not be
permitted to manipulate the law by usurping
the power to remove.
K.13. ATIENZA V. VILLAROSA
RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of OccidentalMindoro, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. VILLAROSA, inhis capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Atienza and respondentVillarosa were the Vice-Governor and Governor,respectively, of the Province of Occidental
Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor received the Memorandum dated June25, 2002 issued by the respondent Governorconcerning the “AUTHORITY TO SIGNPURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES,MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL,REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THESANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.” (JUNE 25,2002)Such purchase orders shall be approved by thegovernor in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province. In reply to thememorandum, the petitioner governor stated
that such purchase orders are included underthose as authorized for signature by the Vice-Chief executive of the Sanggunian on the basisof the DILG Opinion No. 96-1995 as affirmed bythe COA Opinions, and coursing it to theGovernor for his approval is no longernecessary, the fact that [Secs.] 466 and 468, RA7160 already provides for the separation of powers between the executive and legislative.Such authority even includes everythingnecessary for the legislative research programof the Sanggunian.
Unimpressed, the respondent Governor issuedthe Memorandum relating to the “TERMINATIONOF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOBORDER EMPLOYEES AND REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES.” Itterminates all existing contract of employment– casual/job order basis and reappointment of the recommendees – entered into by Vice-Gov.Atienza, it for being unauthirized. (JULY 1,2002). The respondent Governor issued anotherMemorandum regarding the “ENFORCIBILITY(sic) OF PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ISSUED ON
JUNE 20, 26 AND JULY 1, 2002.”
In his letter, the petitioner Vice-Gov. Invokedthe principle of separation of powers as appliedto LGUs. The petitioner Vice-Gov. reiterated hisrequest for the respondent to make a “deepstudy” on the matter before implementing hismemoranda. However, the respondent governorinsisted on obliging the department heads of the provincial government to comply with thememoranda.
Petitioner Vice-Gov. filed a petition with CA for
prohibition assailing the Governor’s Memorandadated June 25 and July 1, 2002, claiming thatsuch memoranda excluded him from the useand enjoyment of his office in violation of RA 7160 or the LGC 1991, and itsimplementing rules and regulations. It prayed
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that the respondent governor be enjoined fromimplementing the assailed memoranda.PETITION FOR PROHIBITION – DISMISSED, theCourt citing Sec. 344 of RA 7160.
The CA explained that Section 466(a)(1)[7]of the same Code, relied upon by thepetitioner Vice-Governor, speaks of theauthority of the Vice-Governor to sign
“all warrants drawn on the public treasury forall expenditures appropriated for the operationof the sangguniang panlalawigan.” In declaringthis provision inapplicable, the CA reasonedthat the approval of purchase orders is differentfrom the power of the Vice-Governor to signwarrants drawn against the public treasury.
Anent the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002, theCA ruled that the issue on whether it could beenjoined had already been rendered moot andacademic. The CA pointed out that the subjectof the said memorandum could no longer be
enjoined or restrained as the termination of theemployees had already been effected. It opinedthat where the act sought to be enjoined in theprohibition proceedings had already beenperformed and there is nothing more torestrain, the case is already moot andacademic.
Hence, the instant petition for review oncertiorari was filed, seeking to reverse and setaside the CA’s decision – dismissing his petitionfor prohibition.
ISSUE: Who between the petitioner and therespondent is authorized to approve purchaseorders issued in connection with theprocurement of supplies, materials, equipment,including fuel, repairs and maintenance of theSangguniang Panlalawigan?
RULING: The court held that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority.
Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislativepower for the province is exercised by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan[13] and the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer. Being vestedwith legislative powers, the SangguniangPanlalawiganenacts ordinances, resolutionsand appropriates funds for the general welfareof the province in accordance with theprovisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. The samestatute vests upon the Vice-Governor the powerto:
(1) Be the presiding officer of thesangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrantsdrawn on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.
Since it is the Vice-Governor who approvesdisbursement vouchers and approves thepayment for the procurement of the
supplies, materials and equipment neededfor the operation of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, then he also has the authority toapprove the purchase orders to cause thedelivery of the said supplies, materials orequipment.
Indeed, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the
provincial treasury for all expendituresappropriated for the operation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan as well as toapprove disbursement vouchers relating theretois greater and includes the authority toapprove purchase orders for theprocurement of the supplies, materials andequipment necessary for the operation of theSangguniang Panlalawigan.
The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160,therefore, is to vest on theSangguniangPanlalawigan independence in the exercise of
its legislative functions vis-a-vis the dischargeby the Governor of the executive functions. TheMemoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1,2002 of the respondent Governor, whicheffectively excluded the petitioner Vice-Governor, the presiding officer of theSangguniang Panlalawigan, from signing thepurchase orders for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment needed for theoperation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan aswell as from appointing its casual and job orderemployees, constituted undue interference withthe latter’s functions. The assailed memorandaare clearly not in keeping with the intent of Rep.Act No. 7160 and their implementation shouldthus be permanently enjoined. The petition is GRANTED. The Memorandadated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 issued byrespondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULLAND VOID.
K.14. LATASA V. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS Latasa vs. ComelecFACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected Mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur to 3 three consecutive
terms (1992, 1995, 1998). During his third term,a plebiscite was held to convert Digos into acomponent city (2000). The ratification of theCharter of the City of Digos ended the tenure of Latasa as Mayor. However, he was stillmandated as hold-over mayor of the city untilthe next election.
For the election of 2001, Latasa filed his COC forhis first term as mayor of the city. Heacknowledges that he served as mayor of Digoswhen it was still a municipality. Sunga, also acandidate for mayor, filed a petition to
disqualify Latasa as he already had served asmayor for three consecutive terms in violationof the Local Government Code and theConstitution. Comelec issued a resolution infavor of Sunga and disqualified Latasa. Latasasubmitted a motion for reconsideration which
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was not acted upon by the Comelec until theend of the May 14 elections. As a result, Latasawas still able to continue his campaign andeventually won the election. Sunga now alsosought to annul Latasa’s proclamation. Comeleconly rendered its decision denying Latasa’smotion for reconsideration in 2002. Sungaclaims that he should be proclaimed mayor ashe holds the second most number of votes in
2001
ISSUE: WON Latasa is eligible to run ascandidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after heserved for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
HELD: Latasa cannot serve as Mayor of the newcity of Digos. Latasa having been elected asmayor in 1998, the conversion of Digos from amunicipality to a city in 2000 falls within histerm. As Digos acquired a new corporate
existence, qualifications for its elective positionsalso change. As a result, the Office of theMunicipal Mayor was abolished to make way forthe creation of the Office of the City Mayor.However, under the Charter of the City of Digos,the elective officials of the Municipality of Digosshall have hold-over power until a new electionand the duly elected officials have assumedtheir office. Latasa never ceased to dischargehis duties as Mayor during the conversion of Digos. Also, although Digos was converted intoa city, Digos never redefined its territory, theinhabitants are the same group of voters whoelected petitioner Latasa to be their municipalmayor for three consecutive terms. These arealso the same inhabitants over whom he heldpower and authority as their chief executive fornine years. Sunga’s cannot claim that he beproclaimed as mayor after the disqualificationof Latasa, the SC already ruled that thedisqualification of the winning candidate doesnot entitle the second highest vote earner theposition of mayor. Vacancy be filled bysuccession.
K.15. LACEDA, SR. V. LIMENA
K.16 RIVERA III VS COMMISSION ONELECTIONSFACTS: The case is a resolution of twoconsolidated petitions – one filed by Attys.Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick deGuzman against Marino “Boking Morales, andthe other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, thecandidate who obtained the second highestvote after Morales.
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking"Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Petitioners filedwith the COMELEC a petition to cancelrespondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that he was elected and had servedthree previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacyviolated Section 8, Article X of the Constitutionand Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he waselected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (firstterm) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (thirdterm), but he served the second term from July1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since hisproclamation as mayor was declared void bythe Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was alsopreventively suspended by the Ombudsman inan anti-graft case from January to July 1999.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated thethree-‐term limit rule when he ran for re-‐election as mayor in the 2004 elections.
HELD: For the three-term limit for elective localgovernment officials to apply, two conditions orrequisites must concur, to wit: (1) that theofficial concerned has been elected for threeconsecutive terms in the same localgovernment post, and (2) that he has fullyserved three consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed theposition. He served as mayor until June 30,2001. He was mayor for the entire periodnotwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in theelectoral protest case filed by petitioner Deeousting him (respondent) as mayor. RespondentMorales is now serving his fourth term. He hasbeen mayor of Mabalacat continuously withoutany break since July 1, 1995. In just over amonth, by June 30, 2007, he will have beenmayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuousyears. His assumption of office for the secondterm constituted “service for the full term” andshould be counted as a full term served incontemplation of the three-term limit prescribed
by the constitutional and statutory provisionsbarring local elective officials from beingelected and serving for more than threeconsecutive terms for the same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by includingthis exception, wanted to establish somesafeguards against the excessive accumulationof power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Moralesineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy datedDecember 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Notbeing a candidate, the votes cast for him
SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must beconsidered stray votes.
K.17. DIZON V. COMELEC Case DigestFACTS: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident andtaxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case
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with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P.Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat onthe ground that the latter was elected and hadfully served three previous consecutive terms inviolation of Section 43 of the Local GovernmentCode. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipalmayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus,Morales should not have been allowed to havefiled his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007
for the same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that heis still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for thesaid position in the 1998 elections. He averredthat the COMELEC en banc affirmed thedecision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee asthe duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998elections. Thus, he was not elected for the saidposition in the 1998 elections. His term shouldbe reckoned from 2001. He added that hiselection in 2004 is only for his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicialnotice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera casepromulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was heldthat Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacatin 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding theRTC Decision in an electoral protest case thatthe then proclamation of Morales was void). TheSC ruled in that case that Morales violated thethree-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC.Hence, Morales was considered not a candidatein the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualifyfor the 2004 elections is a gap and allows himto run again for the same position in 2007elections.
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration beforethe COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc:affirmed. The three-term limit is not applicablehere for: 1) Morales was not the duly -electedmayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June30, 2007 term primordially because he was noteven considered a candidate thereat; and 2)Morales has failed to serve the entire duration
of the term of office because he has alreadyrelinquished the disputed office on May 16,2007 which is more than a month prior to theend of his supposed term.
ISSUES: WON the period served by Morales inthe 2004-2007 term (although he was oustedfrom his office as Mayor on May16, 2007)should be considered his fourth term
HELD: NO. In our decision promulgated on 9May 2007, this Court unseated Morales duringhis fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of
Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. Thiscancellation disqualified Morales from being acandidate in the May 2004 elections. The votescast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution andSection 43(b) of the Local Government Codestate that the term of office of elective localofficials, except barangay officials, shall bethree years, andno such official shall serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he waselected.
There should be a concurrence of twoconditions for the application of thedisqualification: (1) that the official concernedhas been elected for three consecutive terms inthe same local government post and (2) that hehas fully served three consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales waselected as mayor of Mabalacat for fourconsecutive terms:
1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualifiedMorales from his candidacy in the May 2004elections because of the three-term limit.Although the trial court previously ruled thatMorales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 termwas void, there was no interruption of thecontinuity of Morales’ service with respect tothe 1998 - 2001 term because the trial court’sruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, orafter the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’involuntary severance from office with respectto the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severancefrom office for any length of time short of thefull term provided by law amounts to aninterruption of continuity of service. Ourdecision in the Rivera case was promulgated on9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. Thenext day, Morales notified the vice mayor’soffice of our decision. The vice mayor assumedthe office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice
mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter howshort itmay seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not holdoffice for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June2007. (4th term)
K.18. MONTEBON V. COMELEC MontebonVs Comelec FACTS: Petitioners Montebon and Ondoy andrespondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates formunicipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections.
On April 30, 2007, petitioners and othercandidates for municipal councilor filed apetition for disqualification against respondentwith the COMELEC alleging that respondenthad been elected and served three consecutive
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terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001,2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he isproscribed from running for the same positionin the 2007 elections as it would be his fourthconsecutive term.
In his answer, respondent argues that he cannotbe disqualified on the ground of the 3 term limitrule because his second term was interrupted
when he assumed the position of vice-mayordue to the retirement of elected vice-mayorPetronilo Mendoza.
Petitioners maintain that respondent'sassumption of office as vice-mayor in January2004 should not be considered an interruptionin the service of his second term since it was avoluntary renunciation of his office as municipalcouncilor. They argued that, according to thelaw (constitution and LGC), voluntaryrenunciation of the office for any length of timeshall not be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for whichthe official concerned was elected.
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Divisiondenied the petition for disqualification rulingthat respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an interruption inthe continuity of his service. His second termhaving been involuntarily interrupted,respondent should thus not be disqualified toseek reelection as municipal councilor.
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld theruling of the First Division. Petitioners filed theinstant petition for certiorari on the ground thatthe COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent'sassumption of office as vice-mayor in January2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term asmunicipal councilor.
ISSUE: WON the private respondents’assumption of the vice-mayor office, by virtueof succession, can be considered as an effective
disruption in his full service of his second termas councilor.
HELD: YES. In Lonzanida v. Commission onElections, the Court held that the two conditionsfor the application of the disqualificationmust concur: 1) that the officialconcerned has been elected for threeconsecutive terms in the same localgovernment post; and 2) that he has FULLYserved three consecutive terms.
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the
Court emphasized that the term limit forelective officials must be taken to refer to theright to be elected as well as the right to servein the same elective position. Thus, for thedisqualification to apply, it is not enough thatthe official has been elected three consecutive
times; he must also have served threeconsecutive terms inthe same position.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, theCourt explained the concept of voluntaryrenunciation as follows:
The second sentence of theconstitutional provision under scrutiny
states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of officefor any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in thecontinuity of service for the full term forwhich he was elected.’ The clear intentof the framers of the constitution tobar any attempt to circumvent thethree-term limit by a voluntaryrenunciation of office and at the sametime respect the people’s choice andgrant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in thecomputation of the three term limit;conversely, involuntary severance fromoffice for any length of time short of thefull term provided by law amounts to aninterruption of continuity of service.
While it is undisputed that respondent waselected municipal councilor for threeconsecutive terms, the issue lies on whether heis deemed to have fully served his second termin view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is byoperation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No.7160, provides that if a permanent vacancyoccurs in the office of the vice mayor, thehighest ranking sanggunian member shallbecome vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancyoccurred in the office of the vice mayordue to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.Respondent, being the highest rankingmunicipal councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law. Thus, respondent'sassumption of office as vice-mayor in January2004 was an involuntary severance from hisoffice as municipal councilor, resulting in aninterruption in the service of his 2001-2004term. It cannot be deemed to have been byreason of voluntary renunciation because it wasby operation of law.
We quote with approval the ruling of theCOMELEC that –
The legal successor is not given anyoption under the law on whether to
accept the vacated post or not. Section44 of the Local Government Code makesno exception. Only if the highest--‐ranking councilor is permanentlyunable to succeed to the post doesthe law speak of alternate succession.
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Under no circumstances can simplerefusal of the official concerned beconsidered as permanent inability withinthe contemplation of law.
Thus, succession by law to a vacated
government office is characteristically not
voluntary since it involves the performance of a
public duty by a government official, the non-
performance of which exposes said official to
possible administrative and criminal charges of
dereliction of duty and neglect in the
performance of public functions. It is therefore
more compulsory and obligatory rather than
voluntary.
BOLOS V COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong
Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3
consecutive terms (1994,1997, 2002).
In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for
Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He
assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving his post as
Punong Barangay.
After serving his term as a councilor he filed his
candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in
the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. Cinconiegue, then incumbent
Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the
same office, filed a petition for disqualification on
the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the
maximum limit of three term hence no longereligible to run and hold the position in
accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’
relinquishment of the position of Punong
Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part,
as it could be presumed that it was his personal
decision to run as municipal councilor in the May14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added
that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed
the position, there would be a voluntary
renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he
assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by
operation of law; hence, it must be considered as
an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his
last term of service.
Pending the resolution of the case before the
COMELEC, Bolos Jr. won in the election.
The COMELEC resolved the petition in favor of
Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already
served the maximum three consecutive term for
an office and thus disqualified to run for the same
office. It further ordered that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be
succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a voluntaryrenunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by
Bolos Jr. when he assumed the post of Municipal
Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for
three consecutive terms.
Held:
YES. The three-term limit for elective official is
contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution
states:
“Section 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.”
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The Local Government Code provides for the
term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local
elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was
elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and
members of the sangguniangkabataan shall be for five (5) years, which
shall begin after the regular election of
barangay officials on the second Monday of
May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang
kabataan members who were elected in the
May 1996 elections shall serve until the
next regular election of barangay officials.
Socrates v. Comelec held that the rule on the
three-term limit, embodied in the Constitutionand the Local Government Code, has two parts: x
x x The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance
from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the servicebefore and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate reelection for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office following
the end of the third consecutive term.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court stated that
the second part of the rule on the three-term
limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the people’s
choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term. The Court held that two conditions for
the application of the disqualification must
concur: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the samegovernment post; and (2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was
elected as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition
for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner is
deemed to have voluntarily renounced his
position as Punong Barangay during his third
term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang
Bayan member and assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that
petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of
Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a
consequence of his assumption to office asSangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on
July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy
for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not
deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts
attending his pursuit of his election as municipal
councilor point out to an intent and readiness to
give up his post as Punong Barangay onceelected to the higher elective office, for it was
very unlikely that respondent had filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang
Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the
municipal electorate to vote for him as such and
then after being elected and proclaimed, return
to his former position. He knew that his election
as municipal councilor would entail abandonment
of the position he held, and he intended to forego
of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
Petitioner erroneously argues that when he
assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by
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operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his
third term as Punong Barangay.
The term "operation of law" is defined by the
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term
describing the fact that rights may be acquired or
lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of
the person affected." Black's Law Dictionary also
defines it as a term that "expresses the manner
in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve
upon a person by the mere application to the
particular transaction of the established rules of
law, without the act or cooperation of the party
himself.
An interruption in the service of a term of office,
by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v.Comelec and Borja vs. Comelec. In this case,
petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by
operation of law. He instead relinquished his
office as Punong Barangay during his third term
when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang
Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed
a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong
Barangay. (Bolos v. Comelec, G.R. No.
184082, March 17, 2009)
Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
Facts:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was
elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In
September 2005, during his third term of office,the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day
preventive suspension against him in relation to
a criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo
resumed the performance of the functions of his
office.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to
deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of
candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three terms;
his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated
the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article
X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA
7160
Issue:
Whether Asilo’s preventive suspension
constituted an interruption that allowed him to
run for a 4th term?
Held:
The “interruption” of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is
one that involves no less than the involuntary
loss of title to office. The elective official must
have involuntarily left his office for a length of
time, however short, for an effective interruption
to occur.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by
operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a
term. On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title tooffice or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office for a reason provided by law.
Preventive suspension – whether under the Local
Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act – is
an interim remedial measure to address the
situation of an official who have been charged
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administratively or criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of
or potential for eventual guilt or liability. Notably
in all cases of preventive suspension, the
suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary
in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and losetitle to his office; loss of office is a consequence
that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt
or liability. This was what exactly happened to
Asilo.
Hence, the preventive suspension of public
officials (Asilo) does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA
7160).
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195229 October 9, 2012
EFREN RACEL ARA TEA, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D.
ANTlPOLO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking
to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2
February 2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January
2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D.
Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The
petition asserts that the COMELEC issued the
Resolution and Order with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D.
Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National
and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate
of candidacy on 1 December 2009.4 On 8
December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo)
filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny
due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida waselected, and had served, as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms
immediately prior to the term for the May 2010
elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made
a false material representation in his certificate
of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath
that he was eligible for the office he sought
election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective
official from being elected and serving for morethan three consecutive terms for the same
position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a
Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Pertinent
portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read:
Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held
the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than nine consecutive years. Instead heraised arguments to forestall or dismiss the
petition on the grounds other than the main issue
itself. We find such arguments as wanting.
Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of
mayor for more than three consecutive terms,
went against the three-term limit rule; therefore,
he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010
elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the
political arena of San Antonio.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instantpetition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of
Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida
for the position of mayor in the municipality of
San Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His
name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of
Official Candidates for the position of Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010
elections.
SO ORDERED.8
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the
May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel
Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of
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votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor
and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor
before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond
C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July
2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the
Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether,as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume
the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s
disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S.
201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to
hold office by reason of his criminal conviction.
As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification,
the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently
vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of
the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice
to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s
motion for reconsideration. In another letterdated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG
to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24
August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo
allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the
permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales without prejudice however to the
outcome of the cases pending before the
[COMELEC]."11
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issueda Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from
running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The
COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two
grounds: first , Lonzanida had been elected and
had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and
second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final
judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was
sentenced for each count of falsification to
imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as
maximum. The judgment of conviction became
final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this
Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before Lonzanida
filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
2009. Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010
Resolution read:
Prescinding from the foregoing premises,
Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of SanAntonio, Zambales for more than three (3)
consecutive terms and for having been convicted
by a final judgment of a crime punishable by
more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is
clearly disqualified to run for the same position in
the May 2010 Elections.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion
for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.14
On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion forLeave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Petition-in-Intervention.15 She claimed her right to
be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a
candidate when the COMELEC Second Division,
through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
and the striking out of his name from the list of
official candidates for the position of Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010
elections.
In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea
asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who
received the second highest number of votes,
could not be proclaimed as the winning
candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was
not yet final during election day, the votes cast in
his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s
subsequent disqualification resulted in a
permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and
Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, wasmandated by Section 4416 of the Local
Government Code to succeed as Mayor.
The COMELEC’s Rulings
The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12
January 2011, stating:
Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed
by Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant tothe power of this Commission to suspend its
Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of
justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:
1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;
2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by
Antipolo;
3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO
LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL ARATEA,proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales,
to file their respective Comments on the Petition-
in- Intervention within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from receipt thereof;
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4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-
Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at
10:00 a.m. COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor,
Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila.
WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for
their information and compliance.
SO ORDERED.17
In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the
COMELEC En Banc no longer considered
Lonzanida’s qualification as an issue: "It is
beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold
and discharge the functions of the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue
to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the
vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s
disqualification."18 The Resolution further stated:
We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor
Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo
[sic] for being a second placer in the elections.
The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De
Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC,
et al., while they remain sound jurisprudence find
no application in the case at bar. What sets this
case apart from the cited jurisprudence is that
the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and
ineligibility to hold public office is establishedboth in fact and in law on election day itself.
Hence, Lonzanida’s name, as already ordered by
the Commission on February 18, 2010 should
have been stricken off from the list of official
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Commission hereby:
1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of
respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA;
2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela
D. Antipolo;
3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a
Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to
PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the
duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;
4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease
and desist from discharging the functions of theOffice of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-
over of the said office to Antipolo upon her
proclamation; and
5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as
well as the Regional Election Director of Region III
to cause the implementation of this Resolution
and disseminate it to the Department of Interior
and Local Government.
SO ORDERED.19
Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February2011.
The Issues
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy
in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales is dependent upon the determination
of Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was
disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the sameCode that resulted in his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, is
determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is
the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales.
The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2
February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011
Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected
Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be
declared Mayor pursuant to the LocalGovernment Code’s rule on succession.
The dissenting opinions make three grave errors:
first , they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a
false representation in the certificate of
candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms
elected and served is a material fact that is a
ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78; second, they ignore
that a false representation as to eligibility to run
for public office due to the fact that the candidatesuffers from perpetual special disqualification is a
material fact that is a ground for a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section
78; and third, they resort to a strained statutory
construction to conclude that the violation of the
three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78, even when it is clear and plain that
violation of the three-term limit rule is an
ineligibility affecting the qualification of a
candidate to elective office.
The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous
ground when they assert that a candidate’s
eligibility to the office he seeks election must be
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strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e.,
age, citizenship, or residency, among others,
which the law requires him to state in his COC,
and which he must swear under oath to possess.
The dissenting opinions choose to view a false
certification of a candidate’s eligibility on the
three-term limit rule not as a ground for false
material representation under Section 78 but as a
ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to well-
established jurisprudence.
The Court’s Ruling
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second
placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab
initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate
at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes.
Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate,actually garnered the highest number of votes for
the position of Mayor.
Qualifications and Disqualifications
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points
to the Local Government Code for the
qualifications of elective local officials.
Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section
40 of the Local Government Code provide in
pertinent part:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city or province x x x; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election; and able to read and write Filipino
or any other local language or dialect.
x x x x
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-
mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.
x x x x
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasissupplied)
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has
been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion
or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more thaneighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein
provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from
his service of sentence, unless within the sameperiod he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis
supplied)
The grounds for disqualification for a petition
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
are specifically enumerated:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who,
in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having(a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b)
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committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received
or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as acandidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of
a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Emphasis supplied)
A petition for disqualification under Section 68clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited
acts and possession of a permanent resident
status in a foreign country."20 All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to election
offenses under the Omnibus Election Code,
not to violations of other penal laws. There
is absolutely nothing in the language of Section
68 that would justify including violation of the
three-term limit rule, or conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds oroffenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr.
v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled:
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify
candidates is limited to those enumerated in
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All
other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. x x x
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground
for a petition under Section 68.
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states
that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or
cancelled when there is false material
representation of the contents of thecertificate of candidacy:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not laterthan fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details
the contents of the certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒
The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of theBatasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district
or sector which he seeks to represent; the
political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession
or occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed
by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections
was thus required to provide 12 items of information in the certificate of candidacy:22
name; nickname or stage name; gender; age;
place of birth; political party that nominated the
candidate; civil status; residence/address;
profession or occupation; post office address for
election purposes; locality of which the candidate
is a registered voter; and period of residence in
the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The
candidate also certifies four statements: a
statement that the candidate is a natural born or
naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that thecandidate is not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement
that the candidate is eligible for the office
he seeks election; and a statement of the
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candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines.23 The certificate of
candidacy should also be under oath, and filed
within the period prescribed by law.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment,
with the penalty of prisión mayor , disqualifies
him perpetually from holding any public
office, or from being elected to any publicoffice. This perpetual disqualification took
effect upon the finality of the judgment of
conviction, before Lonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy. The pertinent
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. —
The duration of the penalties of prisiónmayor and temporary disqualification shall
be from six years and one day to twelve
years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, it shall be that of
the principal penalty.
x x x x
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification. — Thepenalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification for public office shall produce
the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and
employments which the offender may have
held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to
be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or
public employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such
disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2
and 3 of this article shall last during the term of
the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or otherpension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification. — The
penalties of perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for public office, profession
or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment,
profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices
or employments either perpetually or during theterm of the sentence, according to the extent of
such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. — The
perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right
of suffrage shall deprive the offender
perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of saidpenalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to
such office. Moreover, the offender shall
not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties.
— The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it
that of temporary absolute disqualification
and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage which the offender shallsuffer although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis
supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically
carries with it, by operation of law,24 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised
Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualificationproduces the effect of "deprivation of the right to
vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office.” The
duration of temporary absolute disqualification is
the same as that of the principal penalty of
prisión mayor . On the other hand, under Article
32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual
special disqualification means that "the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his
disqualification,” which is perpetually. Bothtemporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is
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ineligible to run for elective public office,
and commits a false material
representation if he states in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import
of the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes,
it must be remembered that appellee’s
conviction of a crime penalized with prision
mayor which carried the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and
Section 99 of the Revised Election Code
disqualifies a person from voting if he had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year ormore of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute
disqualification disqualifies the convict for public
office and for the right to vote, such
disqualification to last only during the term of the
sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30,
Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes,
would have expired on 13 October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to theother accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually , as distinguished
from temporary special disqualification, which
lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32,
Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for theexercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual
or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the
offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of said penalty,
of the right to vote in any popular election for any
public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to
hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during
the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents;
thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the
perpetual kind of special disqualification, while
the phrase "during the term of the sentence"
refers to the temporary special disqualification.
The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different
because the provision, instead of merging their
durations into one period, states that such
duration is "according to the nature of said
penalty" — which means according to whetherthe penalty is the perpetual or the temporary
special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or
to be elected to or hold public office
perpetually.”
The accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification takes effect immediatelyonce the judgment of conviction becomes
final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty
does not depend on the duration of the principal
penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail
sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32
states that "the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his
[perpetual special] disqualification." Once the
judgment of conviction becomes final, it is
immediately executory. Any public office that the
convict may be holding at the time of hisconviction becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible
to run for any elective public office
perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he
became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to
run for, any elective public office from the
time the judgment of conviction against
him became final. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009
and became final on 23 October 2009,
before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground
for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is
an ineligibility, which means that the convict is
not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Section 74 requires him to state
under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this
Court held in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections,
27
the false material representation mayrefer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who
suffers from perpetual special disqualification is
ineligible to run for public office. If a person
suffering from perpetual special disqualification
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files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath
that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section 74, then he
clearly makes a false material representation
that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
As this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due
course to or the cancellation of the CoC is notbased on the lack of qualifications but on a
finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is running for. It is noted that
the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is
to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications
or eligibility for public office. If thecandidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered
to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already
likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo
warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the
OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is
filed before proclamation, while a petition for quowarranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Latasa, Rivera and Ong:
The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for
Ineligibility
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that
he is eligible for the public office he seeks
election. Thus, Section 74 states that "thecertificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing x x x is eligible for said office.”
The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties and to
enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice,29 is
found both in the Constitution30 and the law.31
After being elected and serving for three
consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for the same
office in the next regular election32 because he is
ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run forelective public office is not "eligible for [the]
office." As used in Section 74, the word
"eligible"33 means having the right to run for
elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run
for the public office.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner
Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the
Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992,
1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was
converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s
third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections.
Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before
the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course,
cancel certificate of candidacy and/or
disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground
that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of
Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make
any false representation. In his certificate of
candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the
phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*
Havingserved three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and
now running for the first time as city mayor." The
COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasa’s
certificate of candidacy for violation of the three-
term limit rule but not for false material
representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC
En Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for
reconsideration.
We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of
candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission onElections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales
exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having
been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat
for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998
to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We
declared him ineligible as a candidate for the
same position for the 2007 to 2010 term.
Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’
violation of the three-term limit rule constituted
false material representation, we nonetheless
granted the petition to cancel Morales’ certificateof candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed
the cancellation of Francis Ong’s certificate of
candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition
to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ong’s
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was
predicated on the violation of the three-term limit
rule.
Loong, Fermin and Munder:
When Possession of a Disqualifying ConditionisNot a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and
jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the
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grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis
qualifications and disqualifications. For example,
a candidate may represent that he is a resident
of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is
actually a permanent resident of another
country.38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner
should not be constrained in his choice of remedy
when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes
available multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allowsthe filing of a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy before the
election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a
petition for quo warranto after the election.
Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should
not confuse a petition for disqualification using
grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.
The distinction between a petition under Section68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed
in Loong v. Commission on Elections40 with
respect to the applicable prescriptive period.
Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition
under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner
Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-
Governor of the Autonomous Government of
Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to
his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the
election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25
day period from the last day of filing certificatesof candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum’s
petition was one based on false representation
under Section 78, and not for disqualification
under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive
period provided in Section 78 should be strictly
applied. We recognized the possible gap in the
law:
It is true that the discovery of false
representation as to material facts required to be
stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse
of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of
the Code, through no fault of the person who
discovers such misrepresentations and who
would want the disqualification of the candidate
committing the misrepresentations. It would
seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a
gap between the time of the discovery of the
misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made
after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code
has lapsed) and the time when the proclamationof the results of the election is made. During this
so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who
would seek the disqualification of the candidate)
is left with nothing to do except to wait for the
proclamation of the results, so that he could avail
of a remedy against the misrepresenting
candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo
warranto against him. Respondent Commission
sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap
which, according to it, is unnecessary and should
be remedied.
At the same time, it can not be denied that it isthe purpose and intent of the legislative branch
of the government to fix a definite time within
which petitions of protests related to eligibility of
candidates for elective offices must be filed, as
seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code.
Respondent Commission may have seen the
need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap",
but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does
not provide, its function not being legislative. The
question of whether the time to file these
petitions or protests is too short or ineffective isone for the Legislature to decide and remedy.41
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue
of a candidate’s possession of the required one-
year residency requirement was raised in a
petition for disqualification under Section 68
instead of a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section
78. Despite the question of the one-year
residency being a proper ground under Section
78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before theCOMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and
5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 780043
and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin,
we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution
cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments
that distinguish the grounds for
disqualification from those of ineligibility,
and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said
grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only
be premised on a ground specified in Section 12
or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition
questioning a candidate’s possession of the
required one-year residency requirement, as
distinguished from permanent residency or
immigrant status in a foreign country, should be
filed under Section 78, and a petition under
Section 68 is the wrong remedy.
In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45
petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of
candidacy for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip
filed a petition for Munder’s disqualification on 13
April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder
misrepresented that he was a registered voter of
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Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible
to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was
not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s
registration. Moreover, Munder’s certificate of
candidacy was not accomplished in full as he
failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his
thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division
dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that his
grounds are not grounds for disqualificationunder Section 68 but for denial or cancellation of
Munder’s certificate of candidacy under Section
78. Sarip’s petition was filed out of time as he
had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s
certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December
2009, within which to file his petition.
The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified
Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second
Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on
the propriety of Sarip’s remedy but focused onthe question of whether Munder was a registered
voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court
reinstated the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution. This Court ruled that the ground
raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter
in the locality where he was running as a
candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for
disqualification. We further declared that with our
ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the
claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a
candidate is a ground for a petition fordisqualification under Section 68. The only
substantive qualification the absence of which is
a ground for a petition under Section 68 is the
candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant
status in a foreign country.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the
three-term limit rule as a disqualification under
Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status,
circumstance or condition which bars him from
running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the
[Local Government Code]." In so holding the
dissenting opinions write in the law what is not
found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the
proper grounds for disqualification under said
Section. The grounds for filing a petition for
disqualification under Section 68 are specifically
enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to
the specific enumeration in Section 68 and
contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the
dissenting opinions add to the enumeratedgrounds the violation of the three-term limit rule
and falsification under the Revised Penal Code,
which are obviously not found in the enumeration
in Section 68.
The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s
possession of a disqualifying condition (violation
of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for
disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is
explicit as to the proper grounds for
disqualification: the commission of specific
prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code
and possession of a permanent residency or
immigrant status in a foreign country. Any otherfalse representation regarding a material fact
should be filed under Section 78, specifically
under the candidate’s certification of his
eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-
term limit as a condition for eligibility, the
dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation,
ignoring the verba legis doctrine and well-
established jurisprudence on this very issue.
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is
asked to certify under oath his eligibility, andthus qualification, to the office he seeks election.
Even though the certificate of candidacy does not
specifically ask the candidate for the number of
terms elected and served in an elective position,
such fact is material in determining a candidate’s
eligibility, and thus qualification for the office.
Election to and service of the same local elective
position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same
position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida
misrepresented his eligibility because he knewfull well that he had been elected, and had
served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than three consecutive terms yet he still
certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for
the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s
representation that he was eligible for the office
that he sought election constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility
for the office.
Legal Duty of COMELECto Enforce PerpetualSpecial Disqualification
Even without a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a
legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of anyone suffering from perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of
a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of
the disqualification of the convict from running
for public office. The law itself bars the convictfrom running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but
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also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly
mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of
the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the
COMELEC because under the Constitution theCOMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election."46 The disqualification
of a convict to run for elective public office under
the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final
judgment of a competent court, is part of the
enforcement and administration of "all the
laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes.47 We quote from the
COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution with
approval:
As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission
speaking through the Second Division had
already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his
name in the list of official candidates for themayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales.
Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its
resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously
affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida.
Our findings were likewise sustained by the
Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of
Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground.
On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En
Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification
is two-pronged: first, he violated the
constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; andsecond, as early as December 1, 2009, he is
known to have been convicted by final judgment
for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on
election day, respondent Lonzanida’s
disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in
law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was
never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of]
San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray votes. Consequently,
Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the solequalified candidate for the mayoralty post and
obtained the highest number of votes, should
now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales.48 (Boldfacing and
underscoring in the original; italicization
supplied)
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was
cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1 Whether his
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial because the
cancellation on such ground means he was nevera candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor
in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who
therefore received the highest number of votes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order
dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane
in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The
COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute aSpecial Municipal Board of Canvassers to
proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren
Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist
from discharging the functions of the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA,
Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 197015
PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA
RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions
are the disqualification of a substitute who was
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proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election;
and the ascertainment of who should assume the
office following the substitute’s disqualification.
The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to
annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution
issued on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January
11, 2011 Resolution of the Second Division;
2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of
Roderick A. Alcala;
3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of
respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;
4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to
cease and desist from discharging the functions
of the Office of the Mayor;
5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office
of the Mayor of Lucena City, the proclaimed Vice-
Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as
provided under Section 44 of the LocalGovernment Code;
6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the
Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to
the Office of the President of the Philippines, the
Department of Interior and Local Government,
the Department of Finance and the Secretary of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City.
Let the Department of Interior and Local
Government and the Regional Election Director of Region IV of COMELEC implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.1
Antecedents
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009,
Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo
(Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of
candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May10, 2010 national and local elections.2
Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-
CMD,3 declared in his CoC that he was eligible for
the office he was seeking to be elected to.
Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo
filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated
as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already
Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City
Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC).4 He alleged
therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had
been elected and had served three consecutive
terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC
for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010
national and local elections.
The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, anda resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing, Lucena
City but may be served with summons and other
processes of this Commission at the address of
his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City
4301;
2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of
legal age, married, and a resident of Barangay
Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal
address at the Office of the City Mayor, City Hall,
Lucena City, where he may be served withsummons and other processes of this
Commission;
3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of
Lucena having been elected during the 2007
local elections, is running for city mayor of
Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10
May 2010 local elections and has filed his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;
4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local
elections based on the records of the Commission
on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served
the aforesaid three (3) terms without any
voluntary and involuntary interruption;
5. Except the preventive suspension imposed
upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14 November
2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October
2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan 4th Division
Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3October 2005, the public service as city mayor of
the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted
under the existing laws and jurisprudence;
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6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the
filing of the certificate of candidacy of the
respondent, hence, such act is outrightly
unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;
7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected
for and had fully served three (3) consecutive
terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucenafor this coming 10 May 2010 national and local
elections;
8. Under the Constitution and existing Election
Laws, New Local Government Code of the
Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is
no longer entitled and is already disqualified to
be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term;
9. The filing of the respondent for the position of
city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and ispotentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers
of the City of Lucena; and
10. It is most respectfully prayed by the
petitioner that the respondent be declared
disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public
office as city mayor of Lucena City based on the
existing law and jurisprudence.5
The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed that the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due
course to or cancel the same and that he be
declared as a disqualified candidate under the
existing Election Laws and by the provisions of
the New Local Government Code.6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayanhad preventively suspended him from office
during his second and third terms; and that the
three-term limit rule did not then apply to him
pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence7 to the
effect that an involuntary separation from office
amounted to an interruption of continuity of
service for purposes of the application of the
three-term limit rule.
In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the
Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.Commission on Elections,8 holding that
preventive suspension, being a mere temporary
incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding
the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on
December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC
a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking
into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino.
Relevant portions of his Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve are quoted herein, viz:
4. When respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City, the rule that ‘where the separation fromoffice is caused by reasons beyond the control of
the officer – i.e. involuntary – the service of term
is deemed interrupted’ has not yet been
overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme
Court. As a matter of fact, the prevailing rule
then of the Honorable Commission in [sic]
respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its
decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo
where it stated:
"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the2004 elections, which was supposedly his third
and final term as city councilor, the same cannot
be treated as a complete service or full term in
office since the same was interrupted when he
was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division. And the respondent actually heeded the
suspension order since he did not receive his
salary during the period October 16-31 and
November 1-15 by reason of his actual
suspension from office. And this was further
bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a
Memorandum directing him, among others, to
reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.)
5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the
part of respondent as would constitute a ground
for the denial of due course to and/or the
cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
candidacy at the time he filed the same.
Petitioner’s ground for the denial of due course to
and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificateof candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law,
as there is no ground to warrant such relief under
the Omnibus Election Code and/or its
implementing laws.
6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the
Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the
three (3)-term limitation, respondent
acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to
run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City
having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) termsas Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections.
7. In view of the foregoing premises and new
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jurisprudence on the matter, respondent
respectfully submits the present case for decision
declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City.9
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his
disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections,
Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.
Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution on April 19, 2010,10 disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to
run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for
Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.11 Later
on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010
an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the
Pending Motion for Reconsideration.12 At 4:30
p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her
own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitutionof Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by
Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated
Ramon.13
On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on
Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal,
declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution
dated April 19, 2010 final and executory.14
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the
votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of
Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate,
resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately
credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s
39,615 votes.15
Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board
of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of
Barbara Ruby’s proclamation.16
It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC
En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law
Department,17 gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s
CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917,
thereby including her in the certified list of
candidates.18 Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed
Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of
Lucena City.19
On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for
Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC,20
docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara
Ruby could not substitute Ramon because hisCoC had been cancelled and denied due course;
and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a
candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had
approved her substitution three days after the
elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should
be considered stray.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of
Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby maintained the
validity of her substitution. She countered that
the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course toor cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of
his disqualification, because there was no finding
that he had committed misrepresentation, the
ground for the denial of due course to or
cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her
valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No.
900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for
Ramon were properly counted in her favor.
On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the
duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought tointervene,23 positing that he should assume the
post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s
substitution had been invalid and Castillo had
clearly lost the elections.
On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second
Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s
petition-in-intervention,24 holding:
In the present case, Castillo was notified of
Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was thebasis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date.
He, however, failed to file any action within the
prescribed period either in the Commission or the
Supreme Court assailing the said resolution.
Thus, the said resolution has become final and
executory. It cannot anymore be altered or
reversed.
x x x x
x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed byCastillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was
actually for the disqualification of Ramon for
having served three consecutive terms, which is
a ground for his disqualification under the
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Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of
Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein
that Ramon has committed material
representation that would be a ground for the
cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of
Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the
petition as one for disqualification as gleaned
from the body of the resolution and its dispositiveportion quoted above. This treatment of the First
Division of the petition as one for disqualification
only is affirmed by the fact that its members
signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly
stated that the First Division only disqualified
Ramon.
Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid
down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable.
Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such,
the votes for Ramon cannot be considered asstray votes but should be counted in favor of
Ruby since the substituted and the substitute
carry the same surname – Talaga, as provided in
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.
x x x x
Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus
Election Code or any election laws for that matter
which requires that the substitution and the
Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute shouldbe approved and given due course first by the
Commission or the Law Department before it can
be considered as effective. All that Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by
Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that
it should be filed with the proper office. The
respondent is correct when she argued that in
fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a
substitute candidate in case the cause for the
substitution happened between the day before
the election and mid-day of election day. Thus,even if the approval of the substitution was made
after the election, the substitution became
effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with
the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance.
There being no irregularity in the substitution by
Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena
City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor
of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of
Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order.
Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul theproclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C.
Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of
Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10,
2010.25
Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions
for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc issued
the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011
reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s
ruling.26
Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not
attain finality for being issued without a hearing
as a mere incident of the COMELEC’s ministerialduty to receive the COCs of substitute
candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based
on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s
disqualification was resolved with finality only on
May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded
that Barbara Ruby could not have properly
substituted Ramon but had simply become an
additional candidate who had filed her COC out of
time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should
succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of
the Local Government Code (LGC).27
Issues
The core issue involves the validity of the
substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon,
her husband.
Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of
who among the contending parties should
assume the contested elective position.
Ruling
The petitions lack merit.
1.
Existence of a valid CoC is a conditionsine qua
non for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided bylaw is a mandatory requirement for any person to
be considered a candidate in a national or local
election. This is clear from Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person
shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy
within the period fixed herein.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Codespecifies the contents of a COC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—
The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
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person filing it is announcing his candidacy for
the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that hewill support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by his oath
is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge. x x x
The evident purposes of the requirement for the
filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing
them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to
know, at least 60 days prior to the regular
election, the candidates from among whom they
are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid
confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of
the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the
duly-registered candidates the choice by the
voters, there may be as many persons voted foras there are voters, and votes may be cast even
for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to
identify the votes in favor of a candidate for
another office in the same election.28 Moreover,
according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is:
x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to
the whole world of the candidate’s political creed
or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a
person seeking to run for a public office certifying
that he announces his candidacy for the officementioned and that he is eligible for the office,
the name of the political party to which he
belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office
address for all election purposes being as well
stated.
Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his
intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for
the position he seeks to assume, followed by the
timely filing of such declaration, constitute a validCoC that render the person making the
declaration a valid or official candidate.
There are two remedies available to prevent a
candidate from running in an electoral race. One
is through a petition for disqualification and the
other through a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court
differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections,30 thuswise:
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one
hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of theOmnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. On the other hand, a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only
be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31
Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
(i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact
of a candidate’s permanent residency in another
country when that fact affects the residency
requirement of a candidate) are separate and
distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of
or denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance
candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code; and material misrepresentationunder Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code),
the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya32
that the following circumstances may result from
the granting of the petitions, to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for
election but may have filed a valid CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the
same time may not have filed a valid CoC; and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may
be denied due course or cancelled.
In the event that a candidate is disqualified to
run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his
CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides the option of
substitution, to wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the lastday for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
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certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political
party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance
with the preceding sections not later than mid-
day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occurbetween the day before the election and mid-day
of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution
is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code unequivocally states that only an officialcandidate of a registered or accredited party may
be substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give
rise to a valid candidacy,33 there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear,
too, that a candidate who does not file a valid
CoC may not be validly substituted, because a
person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any personwho has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.34
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his
CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A
withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a
substitution if the substitute candidate submits
prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.35
2.
Declaration of Ramon’s disqualificationrendered
his CoC invalid; hence, he was nota valid
candidate to be properly substituted
In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the
Court concurs with the conclusion of the
COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in
SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition,
the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections:36
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due
course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a
finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to
the qualifications required of the public office
he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is
eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since
they both deal with the eligibility or qualificationof a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the
fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is
filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations
pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a)
Ramon made a false representation in his CoC;
(b) the false representation referred to a material
matter that would affect the substantive right of
Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run forthe election for which he filed his certificate); and
(c) Ramon made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his
qualification for public office or deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render him ineligible.37 The
petition expressly challenged Ramon’s eligibility
for public office based on the prohibition stated in
the Constitution and the Local Government Code
against any person serving three consecutive
terms, and specifically prayed that "theCertificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent
Ramon be denied due course to or cancel the
same and that he be declared as a disqualified
candidate."38
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of
the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not
only that a person lacks a qualification but also
that he made a material representation that is
false.39 A petition for the denial of due course to
or cancellation of CoC that is short of therequirements will not be granted. In Mitra v.
Commission on Elections,40 the Court stressed
that there must also be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, thus:
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The false representation under Section 78 must
likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose
of the requirement, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidate’s qualifications for public
office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section
78 addresses cannot be the result of a mereinnocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a
situation where the intent to deceive is patently
absent, or where no deception on the electorate
results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a
material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can
be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
It is underscored, however, that a Section 78
petition should not be interchanged or confused
with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under
the two sections are different, for they are based
on different grounds, and can result in different
eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a
candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled
or denied due course under Section 78 is not
considered as a candidate at all because his
status is that of a person who has not filed aCoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a
candidate who is disqualified under Section 68
can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77
because he remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate.1âwphi1
To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e.,
the three-term limit) is enforced both by theConstitution and statutory law. Article X, Section
8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he waselected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code
reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for
all elective local officials, to wit:
Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for thefull term for which the elective official concerned
was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
The objective of imposing the three-term limit
rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged
stay in the same office." The Court underscored
this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,44 stating:
x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the people’s freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for
the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor
would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception. Shouldhe be allowed another three consecutive terms
as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would
then be possibly holding office as chief executive
over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive
years. This is the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory
proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded
from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term.
Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual
ab initio for containing the incurable defect
consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility
to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC
made his situation even worse than that of a
nuisance candidate because the nuisance
candidate may remain eligible despite
cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of
due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.45
Ramon himself specifically admitted his
ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the
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COMELEC.46 That sufficed to render his CoC
invalid, considering that for all intents and
purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his
disqualification had the effect of announcing that
he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had
no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda
v. Abaya aptly put it:
Even on the most basic and fundamental
principles, it is readily understood that the
concept of a substitute presupposes the
existence of the person to be substituted, for how
can a person take the place of somebody who
does not exist or who never was. The Court has
no other choice but to rule that in all the
instances enumerated in Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid
certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is arequisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be
substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the
disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is
and was not a candidate at all. If a person was
not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under
Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to
allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new"and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the
period for the filing thereof, it would be a
crystalline case of unequal protection of the law,
an act abhorred by our Constitution.47 (Emphasis
supplied)
3.
Granting without any qualification of petition in
SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s
intention todeclare Ramon disqualified and tocancel his CoC
That the COMELEC made no express finding that
Ramon committed any deliberate
misrepresentation in his CoC was of little
consequence in the determination of whether his
CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.
In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the
petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not
given due course and/or cancelled." TheCOMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and
then pronounced — in apparent contradiction —
that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The
Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the
petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel
Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled
Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained:
The question to settle next is whether or not
aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being
disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998
resolution, his certificate of candidacy hadlikewise been denied due course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019
specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the
Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for
the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be
not given due course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises
are likewise prayed for.
(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)
In resolving the petition filed by private
respondent specifying a very particular relief, the
Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, theCommission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the
Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is
hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the
position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the
May 11, 1998 national and local elections.
SO ORDERED.
(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No.
98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer
specifically and particularly sought in the petition
was GRANTED, there being no qualification on
the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was
simply ruled over and above the granting of the
specific prayer for denial of due course and
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x
x.49
x x x x
x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or
petition filed by private respondent in SPA No.
98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel
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the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe"
Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no
question that the said petition was GRANTED
without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather
clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec
granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by
disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that
the said petition was granted and that the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Mirandawas denied due course and cancelled. x x x.50
The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that
the COMELEC actually granted the particular
relief of cancelling or denying due course to the
CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting
that relief to any qualification.
Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although
Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC)
specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or
cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC
categorically stated in the Resolution dated April
19, 2010 that it was granting the petition.
Despite the COMELEC making no finding of
material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon,
its granting of Castillo’s petition without express
qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had
cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent
ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010
became final and executory because Castillo didnot move for its reconsideration, and because
Ramon later withdrew his motion for
reconsideration filed in relation to it.
4.
Elected Vice Mayor must succeedand assume the
position of Mayordue to a permanent vacancy in
the office
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the
doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer
espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections51 should not apply to him because
Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the
elections.52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission
on Elections,53 where the Court said:
x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of
disqualification before the elections. The doctrine
on the rejection of the second placer was appliedin Labo and a host of other cases because the
judgment declaring the candidate’s
disqualification in Labo and the other cases had
not become final before the elections. To repeat,
Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine
on the rejection of the second placer have one
common essential condition — the
disqualification of the candidate had not become
final before the elections. This essential condition
does not exist in the present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became
final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself,
Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present
case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23
days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On
election day, Cayat was no longer legally a
candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy
for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-
existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an electioncannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of
law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is notdeclared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the
elections, which is the situation covered in the
first sentence of Section 6. The second is when
the disqualification becomes final after the
elections, which is the situation covered in the
second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governingthe first situation is categorical: a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall
not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying
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Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before
the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the
8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat
was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper
because he was the sole and only candidate,
second to none.54
Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castilloasserts that he was entitled to assume the
position of Mayor of Lucena City for having
obtained the highest number of votes among the
remaining qualified candidates.
It would seem, then, that the date of the finality
of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon
disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10,
Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804, 55
a decision or resolution of a Division becomes
final and executory after the lapse of five daysfollowing its promulgation unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section
8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of
the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and
executory five days after its promulgation and
receipt of notice by the parties.
The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon
disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19,
2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the
same date.56
Ramon filed a motion forreconsideration on April 21, 201057 in accordance
with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58
but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,59
ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara
Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion
for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated
that there was no more pending matter that
could have effectively suspended the finality of
the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution
dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have
attained finality upon the lapse of five days fromits promulgation and receipt of it by the parties.
This happened probably on April 24, 2010.
Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc
continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of
his motion for reconsideration through the May 5,
2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final
and executory.
Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion
that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming finalprior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in
Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s
filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon
significantly differentiated this case from the
factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr.
Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was
disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his
disqualification became final before the May 10,
2004 elections. Considering that no substitution
of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his
rival, remained the only candidate for the
mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast,
after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being
regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a
bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she
became a contender for the same position vied
for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same
footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate
negated Castillo’s claim of being the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes, and
of being consequently entitled to assume the
office of Mayor.
Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for
he was only a second placer.1âwphi1 Labo, Jr.
should be applied. There, the Court emphasized
that the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes for the contested office could
not assume the office despite the disqualification
of the first placer because the second placer was
"not the choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely,
the Court explained, a minority or defeated
candidate could not be deemed elected to the
office.61
There was to be no question that thesecond placer lost in the election, was repudiated
by the electorate, and could not assume the
vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and
compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a
loser to be their political leader or their
representative.63
The only time that a second placer is allowed to
take the place of a disqualified winning candidate
is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was
fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within
the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast
the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the
electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case the eligible candidate
with the second highest number of votes may bedeemed elected.65 But the exception did not
apply in favor of Castillo simply because the
second element was absent. The electorate of
Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact
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of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In
fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution
finding her substitution invalid only on May 20,
2011, or a full year after the decisions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc
properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from
assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To
begin with, there was no valid candidate for herto substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also,
Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC
before the elections in accordance with Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was
not an additional candidate for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her
CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed
by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a
candidate.66
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy
should be filled pursuant to the law on succession
defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of
the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become
the governor or mayor. x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions
in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the
Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the
COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails
and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012
Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-
2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the
COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s
disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn,
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated
August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55 declaring
Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit
rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position
of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely,
the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national andlocal elections, Abundo vied for the position of
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both
the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate
and accordingly served the corresponding terms
as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however,
the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres),
who, in due time, performed the functions of the
office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’
election and proclamation. Abundo waseventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for
his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006
until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30,
2007, or for a period of a little over one year and
one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where
Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy 3
for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoralcontest, Torres lost no time in seeking the
former’s disqualification to run, the
corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case
No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-
consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the
COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5
finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested
Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly
proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga,
Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the
COMELEC could resolve the adverted
disqualification case Torres initiated against
Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R.
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Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action
before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes,
docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat
Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres
raised in his petition to disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election CaseNo. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to
serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered
GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo
Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v.COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already
served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit,
2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and,
hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth,
consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had
been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004
elections consequent to his protest and occupied
the position of and actually served as Viga mayor
for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from
May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the
RTC, the year and a month service constitutes acomplete and full service of Abundo’s second
term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC,
his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-
2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010,
the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the firstassailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73,
Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Divisionruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino,
Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion
of a term by a protestant who is declared winner
in an election protest is considered as service for
one full term within the contemplation of the
three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied
reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its
equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The
fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion
for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division,
the COMELEC en banc held in essence the
following: first, there was no involuntary
interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term servicewhich would be an exception to the three-term
limit rule as he is considered never to have lost
title to the disputed office after he won in his
election protest; and second, what the
Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to
be in office for the same position for more than
three consecutive terms and not to the service of
the term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)and/or preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the
COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying
Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the
following events transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an
Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolutionfinal and executory. The following day, June 21,
2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of
Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for
Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac,
Catanduanes.
3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on
Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day earlier,
issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD(COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire
records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff
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personally delivered the entire records of the
instant case to, and were duly received by, the
clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its
receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for
Execution through an Order18 of even date. And a
Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received
the Writ of Execution and served the same at the
office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via
substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20
enjoining the enforcement of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the TRO. On
the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and
First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga,
Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor
and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,
respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of
Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent
Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or statusquo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor
Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office
the day before—assumed the posts of mayor and
vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To
Admit Attached Manifestation)25 and
Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5,
2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by the
Court has become functus officio owing to theexecution of the RTC’s Decision in Election Case
No. 55.
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his
Comment/Opposition with Leave to the
Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status
Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that
since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First
Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed
the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Orderwould serve no purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most
Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the
July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In
View of the Unreasonable and Inappropriate
Progression of Events).28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that
Abundo was dislodged from his post as
incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be
sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s
ouster despite the supervening issuance by theCourt of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the
Court. While it is not clear whether Vice-Mayor
Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or
put on notice about the TRO either before they
took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before
assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on
July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following
the issuance of the assailed COMELEC en banc
irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as
it were to maintain the status quo, thus averting
the premature ouster of Abundo pending thisCourt’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have
been trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment
on Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by
public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated
Comment.29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for theallowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in
Abundo’s motion for reconsideration as mere
rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised
prior to the promulgation of the Resolution.
6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has
consecutively served for three terms despite the
fact that he only served the remaining one year
and one month of the second term as a result of
an election protest.30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not
Mere Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion
for reconsideration on the basis that his
arguments in said motion are mere reiterations of
what he already brought up in his appeal Brief
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before the COMELEC Second Division. In this
petition, petitioner claims otherwise.
Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the
latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments
in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First, in his
Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC to consider the quo
warranto case since the alleged violation of the
three-term limit has already been rejected by the
COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128
(DC), while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar
ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s
finding on the issue of his qualification to run for
the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo
assailed RTC’s reliance on Aldovino, Jr., while inhis MR, he argued that the Court’s
pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with
preventive suspension, is not applicable to the
instant case as it involves only a partial service of
the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his
situation cannot be equated with the case of
preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr.,
while in his MR, he argued before that the almost
two years which he did not sit as mayor during
the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the
issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the
Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served
three consecutive terms
The pivotal determinative issue then is whetherthe service of a term less than the full three
years by an elected official arising from his being
declared as the duly elected official upon an
election protest is considered as full service of
the term for purposes of the application of the
three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition
meritorious. The consecutiveness of what
otherwise would have been Abundo’s threesuccessive, continuous mayorship was effectively
broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to
which he, after due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local
officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section
8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No.(RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
x x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more
than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an
elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same localgovernment post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-
term limit rule, as applied to the different factual
milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit
and analyze the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the
Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the
incumbent elective local official for any length of
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time shall NOT, in determining service for three
consecutive terms, be considered an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the
observation that the law "does not textually state
that voluntary renunciation is the only actual
interruption of service that does not affect
‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposesof the three-term limit rule."32
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on
Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term
limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that
what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive
fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local
official cannot, following his third consecutive
term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term
for the same position after the election where hecould have sought his fourth term but prevented
to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in
the successive terms of the official after his or
her third term. An interruption usually occurs
when the official does not seek a fourth term,
immediately following the third. Of course, the
basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall NOT be considered an interruption in thecontinuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected." This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an
elective local official intending to skirt the three-
term limit rule by merely resigning before his or
her third term ends. This is a voluntary
interruption as distinguished from involuntary
interruption which may be brought about by
certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, thethree-term limit rule has engendered a host of
disputes resulting from the varying
interpretations applied on local officials who were
elected and served for three terms or more, but
whose terms or service was punctuated by what
they view as involuntary interruptions, thus
entitling them to a, but what their opponents
perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary
interruption is claimed to result from any of these
events or causes: succession or assumption of
office by operation of law, preventive suspension,declaration of the defeated candidate as the
winner in an election contest, declaration of the
proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an
election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate
as the winner in a recall election, removal of the
official by operation of law, and other analogous
causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and
jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms
were considered or not considered as having
been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose
T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v.
Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court
delved on the effects of "assumption to office by
operation of law" on the three-term limit rule.
This contemplates a situation wherein an elective
local official fills by succession a higher local
government post permanently left vacant due to
any of the following contingencies, i.e., when thesupposed incumbent refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected
vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2,
1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent mayor, CesarBorja. Capco was then elected and served as
mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
When Capco expressed his intention to run again
for the mayoralty position during the 1998
elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then
also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification for violation of the three-term
limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the
disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enoughthat an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification
can apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no
violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was
not elected to the office of the mayor in the first
term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law"39 when a permanent vacancy
occurred in that office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the
case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been
elected for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-
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2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004,
or during his second term, Montebon succeeded
and assumed the position of vice-mayor of
Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired.
When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy
again as municipal councilor, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him based on
the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that
Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity
of service as councilor. The Court emphasized
that succession in local government office is by
operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary
severance from office. Since the law no less
allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor
in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his
occupation of the higher office cannot, without
more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of
his position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on
the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission
on Elections40 (2002) and the aforementioned
case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was
elected and served as mayor of Lucena City
during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During
the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001
term ended, a recall election was conducted in
May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When
Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was
challenged on the ground he had already served
as mayor for three consecutive terms for
violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court
held therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s
term after the recall election during which Talaga
served as mayor should not be considered forpurposes of applying the three-term limit rule.
The Court emphasized that the continuity of
Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat
during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in
Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the
COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward
Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall
election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been
elected and served as mayor of Puerto PrincesaCity for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995,
1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of
the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted
not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the
2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and
eventually won. However, midway into his term,
Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the
recall election held, Hagedorn run for the
former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates
sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the
three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in therecall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June
30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he
won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on
September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period,Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity
of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of
his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition.41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that
"an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the
same office following the end of the thirdconsecutive term and, hence, any subsequent
election, like recall election, is no longer covered
x x x."42
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a
municipality into a city does not constitute an
interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity
of service. The Court said so in Latasa v.
Commission on Elections43
(2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop:
Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001.
During his third term, Digos was converted into a
component city, with the corresponding cityhood
law providing the holdover of elective officials.
When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as
mayor for the 2001 elections, the Court declared
Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of DigosCity for violation of the three-term limit rule on
the basis of the following ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily
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relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he vacated
his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed
office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of
time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa
never ceased from acting as chief executive of
the local government unit. He never ceased fromdischarging his duties and responsibilities as
chief executive of Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court
espoused the doctrine that the period during
which a local elected official is under preventive
suspension cannot be considered as aninterruption of the continuity of his service. The
Court explained why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term
limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that
allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond
three terms. A preventive suspension cannot
simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office
although he is barred from exercising thefunctions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the
suspended official’s continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement and the
lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest
vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudencepresents a more differing picture. The Court’s
pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera
III v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon
v. Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest
cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and
had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative tothe 1995 election was protested and was
eventually declared by the RTC and then by
COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of
elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three
months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC
order and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s
opponent assumed office for the remainder of the
term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again
filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,
Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on
the ground that Lonzanida had already served
three consecutive terms in the same post. TheCourt, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2)
conditions which must concur for the three-term
limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms."49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the
foregoing requisites were absent in the case of
Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot
be considered as having been duly elected to thepost in the May 1995 elections since his
assumption of office as mayor "cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation."
And as a corollary point, the Court stated that
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term, a situation
which amounts to an involuntary relinquishment
of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in
Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50
owing to a variancein the factual situations attendant.
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and
served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004.
During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during
his supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified
Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong
lost during the 1998 elections. However, the
COMELEC’s decision became final and executory
on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact
already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as
mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In
2004, Ong filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position as mayor, which his opponent
opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued
that he could not be considered as having served
as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not
duly elected to the post and merely assumedoffice as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing
Ong’s argument, the Court held that his
assumption of office as mayor for the term 1998-
2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and
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hence, should be counted for purposes of the
three-term limit rule. The Court modified the
conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that
Ong’s service was deemed and counted as
service for a full term because Ong’s
proclamation was voided only after the expiry of
the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC
decision which declared Ong as not having won
the 1998 elections was "without practical andlegal use and value" promulgated as it was after
the contested term has expired. The Court
further reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was
only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as his proclamation was under protest did
not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exerciseof the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a
contrary view is not hard to discern. Such
contrary view would mean that Alegre would –
under the three-term rule - be considered as
having served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to aproclamation made in due course after an
election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida
and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to
wit:
The difference between the case at bench and
Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election
was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence
thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-
elect was nullified, followed by an order for him
to vacate the office of mayor. For another,
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term, there being an involuntary
severance from office as a result of legal
processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.52
(Emphasis supplied.)
Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would
later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases
of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee
v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor
of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following
consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and
2001-2004. In relation to the 2004 elections,
Morales again ran as mayor of the same town,
emerged as garnering the majority votes and was
proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing
July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo
warranto was later filed against Morales
predicated on the ground that he is ineligible torun for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor
for three consecutive terms. In his answer,
Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001
term cannot be considered against him, for,
although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat
board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis
the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of
mayor until June 30, 2001, his proclamation was
later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his
closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly
elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Moralesparlayed the idea that he only served as a mere
caretaker.
The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and
held that the case of Morales presents a factual
milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For
ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis
Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like
Morales, had served the three-year term from the
start to the end of the term. Hence, the Court
concluded that Morales exceeded the three-termlimit rule, to wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the
term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed
the position. He served as mayor until June 30,
2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee
ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate,
as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does
not constitute an interruption in serving the fullterm.
x x x x
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth
term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat
continuously without any break since July 1,
1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he
will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being
belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the
term, cannot constitute an interruption in
Morales’ service of the full term; neither can
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Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a
"caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto
officer" for purposes of applying the three-term
limit rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on
Elections,56 the Court would again find the same
Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification
proceeding when he ran again as a mayoraltycandidate during the 2007 elections for a term
ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated
from his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in
Rivera, Morales would argue this time around
that the three-term limit rule was no longer
applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This
time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for
purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term
limit rule was no longer a disqualifying factor as
against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’
involuntary severance from office with respect to
the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from
office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera
case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales
notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision.
The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor
from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. Theassumption by the vice mayor of the office of the
mayor, no matter how short it may seem to
Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service.
Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term
of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis
supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing
jurisprudence on issues affecting
consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary
interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an
elective position and the official merely assumed
the position pursuant to the rules on succession
under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official cannot
be treated as one full term as contemplated
under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the
official runs again for the same position he heldprior to his assumption of the higher office, then
his succession to said position is by operation of
law and is considered an involuntary severance
or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s
service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall
election, a private citizen (Adormeo and
Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to
the conversion of a municipality to a city does
not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent
official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-
interrupting event as the elective officer’s
continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercisingthe functions of his office during this period
(Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for
an elective position and assumes office, his term
is interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would
otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida
and Dizon). The break or interruption need not befor a full term of three years or for the major part
of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length
of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is
sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election
protest and said decision becomes final after said
official had served the full term for said office,
then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managedto serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in
the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC
erred in uniformly ruling that he had already
served three consecutive terms and is, thus,barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule
to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist,
Abundo arguments run thusly:
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1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present
case as the former dealt with preventive
suspension which does not interrupt the
continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an
elected official can be interrupted so as to
remove him from the reach of the constitutional
three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of
"term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a mere
portion of the Decision and not on the unified
logic in the disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the
holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruledthat there was no interruption in the service of
Abundo since what he considered as an
"interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred
before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres)
whose proclamation was adjudged invalid was
interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo)
who was eventually proclaimed winner was not
so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC
counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr.
finds application in the instant case. The
COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to
the office as his victory in the protest case
confirmed his entitlement to said office and he
was only unable to temporarily discharge the
functions of the office during the pendency of the
election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo dealswith the effects of an election protest, for which
the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon
appear to be more attuned than the case of
Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the
imposition of a preventive suspension being the
very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the
same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a
different factual backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest
cases wherein the individuals subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the
election protest and each declared loser during
the elections, Abundo was the winner during the
election protest and was declared the rightful
holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor
Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both
unseated toward the end of their respective
terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his
opponent and had assumed the remainder of the
term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s
pronouncements in the past as instructive, andconsider several doctrines established from the
1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case
of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving
at this Court’s conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule
was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of
political power" and prevent elected officials from
breeding "proprietary interest in their position"60
but also to "enhance the people’s freedom of
choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V.Mendoza, "while people should be protected from
the evils that a monopoly of power may bring
about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not unduly curtailed."62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s
case meritorious and declares that the two-year
period during which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s
case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for
the 2004 election for the term starting July 1,
2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected
mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his
election protest against Torres and his
consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor.
Accordingly, the first requisite for the application
of the disqualification rule based on the three-
term limit that the official has been elected is
satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of
whether or not Abundo had served for "three
consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically
understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
immediately before the 2010 national and local
elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the
question of whether or not there was an effective
involuntary interruption during the three three-
year periods, resulting in the disruption of the
continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an
involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June
2007 term.
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There can be no quibbling that, during the term
2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the
decision of the election protest in his favor,
Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May
9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007
or for a period of a little over one year and one
month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong
and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said
that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully theentire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise
entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of
Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and
definite period of time which the law describes
that an officer may hold an office."64 It also
means the "time during which the officer may
claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another."65
It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title
to and can serve the functions of an elective
office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160, 66
the term for local elected officials is three (3)
years starting from noon of June 30 of the first
year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year
and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May
8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if
he wanted to, that he could hold office of themayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert
title to the same nor serve the functions of the
said elective office. The reason is simple: during
that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as
proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo
actually held the office and exercised the
functions as mayor only upon his declaration,
following the resolution of the protest, as duly
elected candidate in the May 2004 elections orfor only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full
term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it
cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term
2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that
Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period
during which Abundo’s opponent actually served
as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot,
in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting
the three-term threshold.67
The notion of full service of three consecutive
terms is related to the concepts of interruption of
service and voluntary renunciation of service.
The word interruption means temporary
cessation, intermission or suspension.68 To
interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When
the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of
interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to
the continuance of the service by the concernedelected official by effectively cutting short the
service of a term or giving a hiatus in the
occupation of the elective office. On the other
hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea
of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or
resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by
an elective local official would thus mean to give
up or abandon the title to the office and to cut
short the service of the term the concerned
elected official is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc,
applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption
of service which jurisprudence deems an
exception to the three-term limit rule, implies
that the service of the term has begun before it
was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not
lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution
states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to
have lost his title to the office. On the contrary,
he actively sought entitlement to the office when
he lodged the election protest case. And
respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is
a final confirmation that he was validly elected
for the mayoralty post of Viga, Catanduanes in
2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was
only unable to temporarily discharge the
functions of the office to which he was validlyelected during the pendency of the election
protest, but he never lost title to the said office.72
(Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other
hand, pronounced that the actual length of
service by the public official in a given term is
immaterial by reckoning said service for the term
in the application of the three-term limit rule,
thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this
formulation—no more than three consecutive
terms—is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we
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cannot subscribe to the argument that since
respondent Abundo served only a portion of the
term, his 2004-2007 "term" should not be
considered for purposes of the application of the
three term limit rule. When the framers of the
Constitution drafted and incorporated the three
term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the
term, not the actual length of the service the
public official may render. Therefore, one’s actualservice of term no matter how long or how short
is immaterial.73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on
the theory that the length of the actual service of
the term is immaterial in his case as he was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as
mayor.
The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy
reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commendthemselves for concurrence. The Court cannot
simply find its way clear to understand the poll
body’s determination that Abundo was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as
mayor during the pendency of the election
protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the
winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired
portion of the term. Verily, while he was declaredwinner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for
the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service
rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there
was actual involuntary interruption in the term of
Abundo and he cannot be considered to have
served the full 2004-2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It
cannot be overemphasized that pending the
favorable resolution of his election protest,Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary
constituent since his opponent, as presumptive
victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two
years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term
—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent
actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo
was a private citizen warming his heels while
awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even
if declared later as having the right to serve the
elective position from July 1, 2004, suchdeclaration would not erase the fact that prior to
the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not
serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no
legal right to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to
respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s
resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the
Court succinctly defines what temporary inability
or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of anelective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title to
office or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office for a reason provided by law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on
preventive suspension does not apply to the
instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say thatAbundo merely was temporarily unable or
disqualified to exercise the functions of an
elective post. For one, during the intervening
period of almost two years, reckoned from the
start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be
said to have retained title to the mayoralty office
as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed
winner who would have the legal right to assume
and serve such elective office. For another, not
having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot
be said to have lost title to the office since onecannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first
place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, even if the belated declaration in the
election protest accords him title to the elective
office from the start of the term, Abundo was not
entitled to the elective office until the election
protest was finally resolved in his favor.1âwphi1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two
years, consisting of a break and effective
interruption of his service, until he assumed theoffice and served barely over a year of the
remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the
apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with
the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor
Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and
Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since
they were non-candidates in the regularelections.
They were proclaimed winners during the recall
elections and clearly were not able to fully serve
the terms of the deposed incumbent officials.
Similar to their cases where the Court deemedtheir terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo
also became or was a private citizen during the
period over which his opponent was serving as
mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there
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was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because
of his subsequent defeat in the election protest,
then with more reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-
2007 should be declared interrupted since he
was not proclaimed winner after the 2004
elections and was able to assume the office and
serve only for a little more than a year after
winning the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as
interruption of service, the "law contemplates a
rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit."75 Applying the said principle in
the present case, there is no question that during
the pendency of the election protest, Abundo
ceased from exercising power or authority over
the good people of Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo
was not serving as mayor should be considered
as a rest period or break in his service because,
as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the
election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent,
Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue
of the still then valid proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case
differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in
the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he
was the one deprived of his right and opportunity
to serve his constituents. To a certain extent,
Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election
system. While admittedly the Court does not
possess the mandate to remedy such
imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with
enough authority to establish a fortress against
the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling
would work damage and cause grave injustice to
Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly
declared as the winner and assumed office for
only a short period of the term. If in the cases of
Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of
a losing candidate––or the person who was
adjudged not legally entitled to hold the
contested public office but held it anyway––We
find more reason to rule in favor of a winning
candidate-protestant who, by popular vote,deserves title to the public office but whose
opportunity to hold the same was halted by an
invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be
committed against Abundo is the injustice that
may likewise be committed against the people of
Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their
right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of
the Constitution, We bear in mind that We
"cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to
decide what the people want"76 and hence,
should, as much as possible, "allow the people toexercise their own sense of proportion and rely
on their own strength to curtail the power when it
overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws
strength from the choice the people make which
is the same choice We are likewise bound to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8,
2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE)
No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch
43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No.
55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED
ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the
May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes
are ordered to immediately vacate the positions
of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,
respectively, and shall revert to their original
positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor,
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is
hereby LIFTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
GARCIA V. COMELECSept. 30, 1994
FACTS:On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a
petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong
as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in
accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the
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petition within 30 days after its submission; so,
they resorted to their power of initiative under
the Local Government Code of 1991. They
solicited the required number of signatures to
repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon,
and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang
Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June 11,1993 to deny the petition for local initiative
and/or referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition
for local initiative because its subject is “merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.”
ISSUE:w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to
deny the petition be set aside?
HELD:The petition is granted and the decision of
the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set
aside.
RULING:The 1987 Constitution installed back the
power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986. The new
Constitution became “less trusting of public
officials.”
Through initiative, the people were given the
power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2
Art. 17 which provides “amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered
voter therein.”
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No.
6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor.”
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress
shall provide for a system of initiative andreferendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly proposeand
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3
systems of initiative, namely:1. Initiative on the
Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to
enact a national legislation3. Initiative on local
legislation – petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangaylaw, resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on
local initiatives, which is “the power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a
year.”
Adormeo vs COMELEC [76 SCRA 90; GR 147927;February 4, 2002]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation: Interruption, Recall –Exception to the 3 term limit)Facts: Petitioner and private respondentincumbent mayor were the only candidates whofiled their COC for mayor of Lucena City in theMay 2001 elections.Private respondent was elected mayor in May1992, where he served the full term. Again, hewas re-elected in May 1995, where he againserved the full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won and served only theunexpired term of Tagarao after having lost tothe latter in the 1998 election.
Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/ordisqualification of the respondent in the groundthat the latter was elected and had served ascity mayor for 3 consecutive terms contendingthat serving the unexpired term of office isconsidered as 1 term.
Private respondent maintains that his service ascity mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He losthis bid for a second re-election in 1998 andduring Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a privatecitizen, thus he had not been a mayor for 3
consecutive terms.Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitutionprovides that the term of office of electiveofficials, except barangay officials, which shallbe determined by law, shall be 3 years and nosuch official shall serve for more than 3consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuityof service for the full term for which the electiveofficial concerned was elected.
Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government
Code) provides that “no local elective officialshall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms inthe same position. Voluntary renunciation of theoffice for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuity
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of service for the full term for which the electiveofficial concerned was elected.”
Issue: WON private respondent had alreadyserved 3 consecutive term for mayor of LucenaCity.Held: No. Private respondent was not electedfor 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, hewas a private citizen. The continuity of his termas mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the1998 elections.Neither can respondent’s victory in the recallelection be deemed a voluntary renunciation forclearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of aterm does not cancel the renounced term in thecomputation of the three term limit; conversely,involuntary severance from office for any lengthof time short of the full term provided by lawamounts to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).Hence, being elected in a recall electioninterrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.
Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove anofficial from office by reason of lack of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.
Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No.154512, November 12, 2002
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Local Government, Recall Election: Exceptionto the 3 term limit)Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall
Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recallelection on September 7, 2002.On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC formayor in the recall election.
Different petitioners filed their respectivepetitions, which were consolidated seeking thedisqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recallelection and the cancellation of his COC on theground that the latter is disqualified fromrunning for a fourth consecutive term, havingbeen elected and having served as mayor of the
city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992,1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instantrecall election for the same post.
COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in aresolution the petitioner for lack of merit. AndCOMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run inthe recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected andserved for 3 consecutive full terms is qualifiedto run for mayor in the recall election.Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for electivelocal officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which states:“Section 8. The term of office of elective localofficials, except barangay officials, which shallbe determined by law, shall be three years andno such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not beconsidered as an interruption in the continuityof his service for the full term for which he waselected.”
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as theLocal Government Code, which provides:
“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for morethan three (3) consecutive terms in the sameposition. Voluntary renunciation of the office forany length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of service for thefull term for which the elective official waselected.”
The first part provides that an elective localofficial cannot serve for more than threeconsecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determiningthe three-term limit rule. The second partstates that voluntary renunciation of office forany length of time does not interrupt thecontinuity of service. The clear intent isthat involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before andafter the interruption from being joined togetherto form a continuous service or consecutiveterms.After three consecutive terms, an elective localofficial cannot seek immediate re-election for
a fourth term. The prohibited election refers tothe next regular election for the same officefollowing the end of the third consecutiveterm. Any subsequent election, like a recallelection, is no longer covered by the prohibitionfor two reasons. First, a subsequent electionlike a recall election is no longer an immediatere-election after three consecutiveterms. Second, the intervening periodconstitutes an involuntary interruption in thecontinuity of service.Based from the deliberations of a ConstitutionalCommission, what the Constitution prohibits isan immediate re-election for a fourth termfollowing three consecutive terms. TheConstitution, however, does not prohibit asubsequent re-election for a fourth term as longas the re-election is not immediately after theend of the third consecutive term. A recallelection mid-way in the term following the thirdconsecutive term is a subsequent election butnot an immediate re-election after the thirdterm.Neither does the Constitution prohibit onebarred from seeking immediate re-election to
run in any other subsequent election involvingthe same term of office. What the Constitutionprohibits is a consecutive fourth term.In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in therecall election on September 24, 2002 is not animmediate re-election after his third
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consecutive term which ended on June 30,2001. The immediate re-election that theConstitution barred Hagedorn from seekingreferred to the regular elections in 2001.
MMDA vs. GarinG.R. No. 130230 April 15, 2005Chico – Nazario, J.:
FACTS:Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violationreceipt and his driver’s license was confiscatedfor parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDAChairman Prospero Oreta requesting the returnof his license and expressed his preference forcase to be filed in Court. Without an immediatereply from the reply from the Chairman, Garinfiled a complaint for preliminary injunctionassailing among other that Sec 5(+) of RA 7942violates the constitutional prohibition againstundue delegation of legislative authority,
allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecifiedand unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rules inhis favor directing MMDA to return Garin’sdriver’s license and for MMDA to desist fromconfiscating driver’s license without first givingthe driver to opportunity to be heard in anappropriate proceeding.
ISSUE:Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 whichauthorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend orrevoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic constitutional.
RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. Itwas concluded that MMDA is not a localgovernment unit or a public corporationendowed with legislative power and it has nopower to enact ordinances for the welfare of thecommunity.
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in thelegislative to make, ordain and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,statutes and ordinances either with penalties orwithout, not repugnant to the constitution, asthey shall judge to be for the good and welfareof the commonwealth, and for subjects of thesame. There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowersMMDA or its council to “enact ordinances,approve resolutions and appropriate funds forthe general welfare of the inhabitants of MetroManila. All its functions are administrative innature. It is an agency created for the purposeof laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, P.O.,NGO’s and private sector for the efficient andexpeditious delivery of services.”
MMDA vs VIRON TRANSPORTATION Case
Digest
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al. v. VIRON
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al.
530 SCRA 341 (2007), EN BANC, (CARPIO
MORALES, J.)
It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which
is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the mass transport
system.
FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic
congestions problem in Metro Manila the
President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179,
―Providing for the Establishment of Greater
Manila Mass Transportation System. As
determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of
traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been thenumerous buses plying the streets that impede
the flow of vehicles and commuters and the
inefficient connectivity of the different transport
modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) came up with a recommendation,
proposing the elimination of bus terminals
located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares, and the construction of mass
transport terminal facilties to provide a more
convenient access to mass transport system tothe commuting public.
The project provided for under this E.O. was
called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖
(Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as
the implementing agency. Accordingly, the
Metro Manila Council the governing board of the
MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full
support of the project.
The respondents, which are engaged in the
business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co.,
Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc.,
assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged
that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure
of existing bus terminal, constituted a
deprivation of property without due process;
that it contravened the Public Service Act which
mandates public utilities to provide and
maintain their own terminals as a requisite for
the privilege of operating as common carriers;and that Republic Act 7924, which created
MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the
closure of bus terminals. The trial court
declared the E.O. unconstitutional.
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The MMDA argued before the Court that there
was no justiciable controversy in the case for
declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that
E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the
MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons;
that the President has the authority to
implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125;
and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of policepower.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is
constitutional
HELD: By designating the MMDA as
implementing agency of the “Greater Manila
Transport System,” the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires
Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA,was issued by former President Aquino in her
exercise of legislative powers. This executive
order reorganized the Ministry (now
Department) of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), and defined its
powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to
be the primary policy, planning, programming,
coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and
regulate networks of transportation and
communications.
The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the
power to establish and administer
comprehensive and integrated programs for
transportation and communications.
Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is
authorized to issue such orders, rules,
regulations and other issuances as may be
necessary to ensure the effective
implementation of the law. The President may
also exercise the same power and authority toorder the implementation of the mass transport
system project, which admittedly is one for
transportation. Such authority springs from the
President‘s power of control over all executive
departments as well as for the faithful
execution of the laws under the Constitution.
Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the
Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is
the primary implementing and administrativeentity in the promotion, development and
regulation of networks of transportation. It is
the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the mass transport system. By
designating the MMDA as implementing agency
of the Project, the President clearly overstepped
the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires.
In the absence of a specific grant of authority to
it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for
the closure of existing bus terminals RepublicAct (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform
planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercises
regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services, including
transport and traffic management. While traffic
decongestion has been recognized as a valid
ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is
not granted police power, let alone legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R.A.7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro
Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila.
In light of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Greater Manila
Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179;
hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake theproject. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly
order the elimination of respondents‘ terminals.
Even assuming arguendo that police power was
delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such
power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid
police power measure: (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from that of a
particular class, requires its exercise; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and notunduly oppressive upon individuals.
In various cases, the Court has recognized that
traffic congestion is a public, not merely a
private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued
due to the felt need to address the worsening
traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the
MMDA so determined, is caused by the
increasing volume of buses plying the major
thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of
existing transport system.
With the avowed objective of decongesting
traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to
eliminate the bus terminals now located along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide
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more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the
provision of mass transport terminal facilities.
Common carriers with terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be
compelled to close down their existing bus
terminals and use the MMDA-designated
common parking areas. The Court fails to see
how the prohibition against respondents‘terminals can be considered a reasonable
necessity to ease traffic congestion in the
metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of
respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the
distinct possibility and the equally harrowing
reality of traffic congestion in the common
parking areas, a case of transference from one
site to another.
Moreover, an order for the closure of bus
terminals is not in line with the provisions of thePublic Service Act. The establishment, as well
as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or
passenger terminals, is generally considered a
necessary service by provincial bus operators,
hence, the investments they have poured into
the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal
sites.
Abbas vs. COMELECG.R. No. 89651November 10, 1989Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA6734Facts:A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine(9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,wasscheduled for November 19, 1989, inimplementation of RA 6734, entitled "An ActProviding for an Organic Act for theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao"(Organic Act). These consolidated petitions praythat the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC fromconductingthe plebiscite; and (2) declare RA
6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. Theargumentsagainst R.A. 6734 raised bypetitioners may generally be categorizedinto either of thefollowing: (a) that R.A. 6734,or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and(b) that certainprovisions of R.A. No. 6734conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.Issue:Whether or not certain provisions of the OrganicAct are unconstitutional.Held: The petition has no merit and the law isconstitutional.1. Petitioner contends that thetenor of a provision in the Organic Act makesthe creationof an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only twoprovinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be createdcomposed of the two provinceswhere thefavorable votes wereobtained. there is a specific provision in the
Transitory Prov isions (A rticle XIX)of the Organic Act, which incorporates s
ubstantially the samerequirementsembodied in the Constitution and fills in thedetails, thus:
“SEC. 13. The creation of the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao shalltake effectwhen approved by a majority of the votes castby the constituentunits provided in paragraph(2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in aplebiscitewhich shall be held not earlier thanninety (90) days or later than onehundredtwenty (120) days after theapproval of this Act:Provided, That only theprovinces and citiesvoting favorably in such plebiscite shall beincluded in theAutonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities whichinthe plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in theAutonomous Region shall remainthe existingadministrative determination, mergethe existing regions. “
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734,the creation of the autonomous region shalltakeeffect only when approved by a majority of thevotes cast by the constituent units inaplebiscite, and only those provinces and citieswhere a majority vote in favor of the OrganicActshall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein suchamajority is not attained shall not be included inthe autonomous region. It may be that evenif an autonomous region is created, not all of thethirteen (13) provinces and nine (9)citiesmentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A.No. 6734 shall be included therein. The singleplebisc i te contemplated by the
Const i tut ionand R.A. No. 6734 wi l l therefore bedet
erminative of (1) whether there shall be anautonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and(2)
which provinces and cities, amongthose enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shallcompromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what thismajority means. Does it refer to a majorityof the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all theconstituent units, or a majority in each of theconstituent units, or both? The1987 Constitution provides: Thecreation of theautonomous region shall be effectivewhenapproved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite calledfor thepurpose, provided that only provinces, citiesand geographic areas voting favorably in suchplebiscite shall be included in the autonomousregion. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It willreadily beseen that the creation of the autonomous
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region is made to depend, not on thetotalmajority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituentunits andthe proviso underscores this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen(13) provinces and nine (9) cities included intheOrganic Act, possess such concurrence inhistorical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characterist ics. By includingareas, which do not strictlyshare the samecharacteristic as the others,
petitioner claims that Congress has expandedthe scope of theautonomous region which theconstitution itself has prescribed to be limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. TheConstitution lays down the standards bywhichCongress shall determine which areasshould constitute the autonomous region.Guided bythese constitutional criteria, theascertainment by Congress of the areas thatshare commonattributes is within the
exclusive realm of the legislature'sdiscretion. Any review of thisascertainmentwould have to go into the wisdom of the law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violatestheconstitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centersona provision in the Organic Act whichmandates that should there be any conflictbetween theMuslim Code and the Tribal Codeon the one had, and the national law on theother hand, the Shari'ah courts createdunder the same Act should applynational law. Petiti onersmaintain that the
islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from theKoran, which makes i t part of divine law. Thusit may not be subjected to any "man-made"national law. Petitioner Abbassupports thisobjection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Codeand national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim'sreligious convictions.In the present case, no actual controvers
y between real litigants exists. There arenoconflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violationof religious freedom. This being so, the Courtin this case may not be called upon toresolvewhat is merely a perceived potentialconflict between the provisions the Muslim Codeandnational law.
5. According to petitioners, said provisiongrants the President the power to mergeregions, a power which is not conferred by theConstitution upon the
President.While the power to merge administrative regions is not expresslyprovided for in theConstitution, it is a powerwhich has traditionally been lodged withthe President to facilitatethe exercise of thepower of general supervision over local
governments. There is no conflictbetween thepower of the President to merge administrativeregions with the constitutional provis ionrequiring a plebiscite in themerger
of local government units because therequirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
6. Every law has in its favorthe presumption of constitutionality. Basedon the groundsraised by petitioners tochallenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734,the Court finds that petitioners have failed toovercome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
Ordillo v. Comelec
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the
provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of
Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a
majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao
Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by
148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and
city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14,
1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been
approved and/or ratified by majority of the
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to
declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act
for the Region. The petitioners maintain that
there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous
Region in only one province as the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said
Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is
whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the
only province which voted favorably for the
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
can, alone, legally and validly constitute such
Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
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Constitution. The keywords — provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that “region” is to be made
up of more than one constituent unit. The
term “region” used in its ordinary sense
means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen
(13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are
groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao
is a province by itself. To become part of a
region, it must join other provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas. It
joins other units because of their common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures and other
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No.
6766 provide that the Cordillera AutonomousRegion is to be administered by the Cordillera
government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It
further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall
exercise powers and functions necessary for
the proper governance and development of all
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay
or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that
Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous
region. Otherwise, we would be faced with
the absurd situation of having two sets of
officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising
their executive and legislative powers
over exactly the same small area
Cordillera Broad Coalitionvs.Commission
on AuditFacts:Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed onSeptember 13, 1986, the Cordillera PeoplesLiberationArmy (CPLA) and the CordilleraBodong Administration agreed that theCordillera people shall notundertake theirdemands through armed and violent strugglebut by peaceful means, such aspoliticalnegotiations.A subsequent jointagreement was then arrived at by the twoparties. Such agreement states that theyareto:Par. 2. Work together in drafting anExecutive Order to create a preparatory body
that couldperform policy-making andadministrative functions and undertakeconsultations and studiesleading to a draftorganic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Haverepresentatives from the Cordillera panel jointhe study group of the R.P. Panel indrafting the
Executive Order.Pursuant to the above jointagreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of therepresentatives of the Cordillera people. Thiswas then signed into law by PresidentCorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislativepowers, creating the Cordillera AdministrativeRegion [CAR],which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province and theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuingthe said order,the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-emptedCongress from itsmandated task of enacting anorganic act and created an autonomous regionin the Cordilleras.
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COADate:
January 29, 1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad
Coalition Respondent: COA, et alPonente:
CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the President in
the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR.
It was created to accelerate economic and
social growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate
the planning and implementation of programs
and services in the region, particularly, to
coordinate with the local government units as
well as with the executive departments of the
National Government in the supervision of field
offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring,and accepting projects and activities in the
region. It shall also monitor the implementation
of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region. The CAR shall have a
Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-
formulating body and a Cordillera Executive
Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and
the Assembly and Executive Board shalle xist
until such time as the autonomous regional
government is established and organized. In
these cases, petitioners principally argue thatby issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, inthe
exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the
1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
organicact and created an autonomous region
in the Cordilleras.
Issue:WON EO 220 is valid
RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily
reveal that what it actually envisions is theconsolidation and coordination of the delivery of
services of line departments and agencies
of the National Government in the areas
covered by the administrative region as a step
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preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act
and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This
does not necessarily conflict with the provisions
of the Constitution on autonomous regions, aswe shall show later. Moreover, the transitory
nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean
that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition
asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the
Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a
basic structure of government in the
autonomous region composed of an elective
executive and legislature and special courts
with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that
E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomousregional government. It created a region,
covering a specified area, for administrative
purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation
of programs and services. To determine policy,
it created a representative assembly, to
convene yearly only for a five-day regular
session, tasked with, among others, identifying
priority projects and development programs. To
serve as an implementing body, it created the
Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies createdby E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing
local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella"
that brings together the existing local
governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or
tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.
Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political
subdivision.
Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is
not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now
address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No.
220contravenes the Constitution by creating a
new territorial and political subdivision. After
carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No.
220, we find that it did not create a new
territorial and political subdivision or mergeexisting ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly,
the CAR is not a public corporation or a
territorial and political subdivision. It does not
have a separate juridical personality, unlike
provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations, e.g. the power
to sue and be sued, the power to own and
dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the
CAR was created primarily to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of
expediting the delivery of services is nothing
new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of
1972, which was made as part of the law of the
land by virtue of PD 1, established 11regions,
later increased to 12, with definite regional
centers and required departments and agencies
of the Executive Branch of the National
Government to set up field offices therein. The
functions of the regional offices to be
established pursuant to the Reorganization Planare: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules and regulations of the
department or agency in the regional areas; (2)
to provide economical, efficient and effective
service to the people in the area; (3) to
coordinate with regional offices of other
departments, bureaus and agencies in the area;
(4) to coordinate with local government units in
the area; and (5) to perform such other
functions as may be provided by law.CAR is in
the same genre as the administrative regionscreated under the Reorganization Plan, albeit
under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR
requires the participation not only of the line
departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments,
ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental
organizations in bringing about the desired
objectives and the appropriation of funds solely
for that purpose.
Issue: WON the creation of the CARcontravened the constitutional guarantee of the
local autonomy for the provinces (Abra,
Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose
the CAR.
Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the
constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in
the Constitution refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in
more technical language, the decentralizationof government authority. Local autonomy is not
unique to the1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution.
And while there was no express guarantee
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under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress
enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264)
and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185),
which ushered the irreversible march towards
further enlargement of local autonomy in the
country. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of politicalautonomy and not just administrative autonomy
to these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of
ane xecutive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction in each of
the autonomous regions. As we have said
earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory
coordinating agency that would prepare the
stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras.It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous
region vested with political autonomy.
Disomangcop v. Datumanong (Tinga,
2004)
Facts:
− On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed(Organic Act of ARMM). Four provincesvoted for inclusion in ARMM, namely:Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
− In accordance with it, EO 426 was issuedby Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The same devolved to the ARMM thepower of the DPWH.
− On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued byDPWH Sec. Vigilar. It created a DPWHMarawi Sub-District Engineering Office
which shall have jurisdiction over allnational infrastructure projects andfacilities under the DPWH within MarawiCity and Lanao del Sur.
− On Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which createda new Engineering District in the firstdistrict of Lanao del Sur was passed byPres. Estrada.
− On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 whichamended RA 6734 was passed. Theprovince of Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said
law.− Petitioners Disomangcop and
Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC andEnginer II respectively of the FirstEngineering District of DPWH-ARMM inLanao del Sur filed a petition questioning
the constitutionality and validity of DO119 and RA 8999 on the ground thatthey contravene the constitution and theorganic acts of the ARMM.
Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both
invalid and constitutionally infirm.
Held and Ratio:
On RA 8999
− RA 8999 never became operative andwas superseded or repealed by a RA9054. By creating an office withpreviously devolved functions, RA 8999,in essence sought to amend RA 6074,which is an organic act which enjoysaffirmation through a plebiscite. Hence,the provisions thereof cannot beamended by an ordinary statute such asRA 8999. The amendatory law needs tobe submitted also to a plebiscite which islacking in the case of RA 8999. RA 6734devolved the functions of the DPWH toARMM which includes Lanao del Sur.
− Moreover, RA 8999 is patentlyinconsistent with RA 9054 which is alater law. RA 9054, which is anchored onthe 1987 Constitution advances theconstitutional grant of autonomy bydetailing the powers of the ARMM whichcovers among others Lanao del Sur.However, RA 8999 ventures toreestablisht he National Government's
jurisdiction over the infrastructureprograms in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 ispatently inconsistent with RA 9054, andit destroys the latter law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH inline with the policy of the Constitution togrant LGUs meaningful and authenticregional autonomy.
On DO 119
- DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and
Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO
426 which implements the transfer of control
and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in
line with RA 6734. The office created under DO
119 having essentially the same powers with
the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur
as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The
DO in effect takes back powers which have
been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA
9054 however has repealed DO 119 because
the former seeks to transfer control and
supervision of DPWH offices to ARMM.
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Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by
Autonomous Regions (ARMM) – Population
Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM.
Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM
because Cotabato City voted against its
inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.
Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The
1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City
and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s
Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays.
Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised
of the municipalities of the 1st district of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato
City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections,
COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is
now only made of Cotabato City (because of
MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained however just for
the purposes of the elections, the first districtshould be called Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a
decisive declaration from Congress as to
Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or
part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the
legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with
Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was
contending that Cotabato City should be a
separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting
(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from
there and D was winning – in fact he won). She
contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that
province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan
excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is
being deprived of a representative in the HOR.COMELEC maintained that the legislative district
is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district
is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is
unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can
create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The
creation of local government units is governed
by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local
government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions.
First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must
not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in
the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an
express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary
legislative powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards,
and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
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Note that in order to create a city there must be
at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least
one representative in the HOR. Note further
that in order to have a legislative district, there
must at least be 250k (population) in said
district. Cotabato City did not meet the
population requirement so Sema’s contention is
untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot
validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But
this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are
barangays not cities and provinces.
Kida v. SenateI. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic
Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM
Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset
the first regular elections to November 26,
2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3
years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
resetting the next ARMM regular elections to
May 2013 to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed
directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the
synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the
three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution?3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to
appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the
petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not
expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent
to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of
the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The Constitutional
Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of
the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following
elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections,
although called “regional” elections, should be
included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a “local” election based on
the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that
the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the
ARMM elections.
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2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES
NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed
by either the House or the Senate can become
laws they must pass through three readings onseparate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION
when the President certifies to the necessity of
the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court,
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained
the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase"except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form
and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the
power to appoint OICs in the ARMM isconstitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified
the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow
the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM
to remain in office in a hold over capacity until
those elected in the synchronized electionsassume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the [2013] synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint OICs, [their respective
terms to last also until those elected in the
2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional
since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it
violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials,
they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is
effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant
for the new term. This view – like the extension
of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly,then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot
also create a new term and effectively appoint
the occupant of the position for the new term.
This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is
viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally
permissible, and there had been statutory basis
for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
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9054) in the past, we have to remember
that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it
explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that
is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, except where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is
unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is
essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections
may be held on any other date for the positionsof President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so
provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress
may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMMelections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date – May
13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized
with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has
made a policy decision in the exercise of its
legislative wisdom that it shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the
Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at
the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests
on very narrow ground and is merely to annul acontravening act of Congress; it is not to
supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done
in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective
ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
putting an expiration date earlier than the three
(3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen – a term of
less than two years – if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the
cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the
power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim isvalid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’
chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern
the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as
the only measure that Congress can make. This
choice itself, however, should be examined for
any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of
this power should be strictly construed; these
limitations or qualifications must be clearly
stated in order to be recognized. The appointing
power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on
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Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whomhe may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the
officers that the President can appoint. These
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments;
ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs
emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
express limitation whose non-observance in the
assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this
alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only
if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA
No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA
No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only
does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.” This
power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not
amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of electionsand for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No.
10153 should be read – in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization,
it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
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