intelligibility all the way down : nagel on mind and...
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This is a repository copy of Intelligibility All the Way Down : Nagel on Mind and Cosmos.
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Thomas, Alan Price orcid.org/0000-0002-8053-7195 (2018) Intelligibility All the Way Down : Nagel on Mind and Cosmos. Klesis Revue philosophique. 1–29. ISSN 1954-3050
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IntelligibilityAlltheWayDown:InterpretingNagel’sMindandCosmos.
Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos is, to date, his most recent philosophical
monograph.1IthasalsoprovedtobehismostcontroversialasNagelwasdragged
intoAmerica’sculturewarsovertherespectiverolestobeplayedinintellectual
life between the claims of scientific belief and of religious faith. Yet, as I will
demonstrateinthispaper,thisbookissimplythelatestdevelopmentofananti-
reductionismthathasbeenpresent,asaleitmotif,inNagel’soeuvreoveraforty-
yearperiod.Sothosescandalizedbythebookarealittlelatetotheparty.Iwill
outlinethemainclaimsofthebookandtracetheircontinuitywithearlierthemes
inNagel’sworkbeforeassessingtheirphilosophicalmerits.
TheContinuityofNagel’sArguments
The arguments ofMind and Cosmos are clearly a continuation of some of the
central themes of Nagel’s earlier work, particularly as expressed in the most
comprehensive presentation of his philosophical outlook in The View from
Nowhere2.InMindandCosmosNagel’sargumentopenswiththeclaimthatthere
is an ineradicable tension between two forms of our self-understanding that
appearsmostvividlyintherestrictedcaseofthemental/physicalproblem(this
claimisalsomadeinTheViewfromNowhere).Butwhilethisparticularexample
of«placing»mentalityinthephysicalworldiswherethetensionappearsmost
strikingly, the ramifications of the problem are farwider. Solving the problem
involvesaradicalchangeinourself-understanding.Sothelaterbookrepresents
adevelopmentinNagel’sthoughtasheworksthroughwhatthischangeinvolves:
«[A] true appreciation of the difficulty of the problem must eventually
changeourconceptionoftheplaceofthephysicalsciencesindescribingthe
naturalorder3.»
WhatdoImeanherewhenIreferto«twoformsofself-understanding»?First,
thatwethinkofourselvesasconscioussubjectswhohavearationalnatureand
whoengagewithvalue;second,wealsothinkofourselvesaspartofthenatural
1T.Nagel,MindandCosmos:WhytheMaterialistNeo-DarwinianConceptionofNatureIsAlmost
CertainlyFalse,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012.2T.Nagel,TheViewfromNowhere,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1986.3T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.3.
order.By«thenaturalorder»ismeant,inturn,aconceptionofnature–viewedas
atotality–whoseexistenceisindependentofusandwhichweclaimtoknowvia
differentformsofunderstandingincludingthatexemplifiedbythesciences.
Nagelbelievesthatatensionarisesbecause,atthelevelofreflection,we
havetwosetsofirreconcilablecommitments:thattowhichweseemcommitted
whenweexplainmentalityseemstoberuledoutbyaconceptionofourselvesas
partofthenaturalorderas that latter ideahasbeendevelopedbythephysical
sciences.(Thatis,giventhecontingenthistoricalpathwayoftheirdevelopment–
thispointwillproveimportanttowhatfollows.)Nagel’simplicationseemstobe
thatsciencehasbeensetonthewrongpathbyphilosophers’commentaryonits
contentandimplications.EarlyinthebookNagelidentifieshistargetasacertain
philosophicalviewandnotascientificone:
«[A] comprehensive, speculative world picture that is reached by
extrapolationfromsomeofthediscoveriesofbiology,chemistryandphysics
– a particular naturalistic Weltanschaaung that postulates a hierarchical
relation among the subjects of those sciences, and the completeness in
principle of an explanation of everything in the universe through their
unification4.»
SoNagelisnotdescribingcurrentphysics.Itis–notoriously–noteveninternally
unified. Nor is he simply defining «science » by iterating a list of disciplines
whereby physical science is conjoined to all the other non-special and special
sciences (however the line is drawnbetween those two classes).He is, rather,
describing a philosophical view – hence the word «speculative» – that
«extrapolates» from the success of the core sciences to a comprehensive
philosophical naturalism that is also committed to the positivist project of
explanatorycompletenessandunificationbyexplanatoryreduction.
ItisimportanttowhatfollowsthatNagel’sownviewisalso,ultimately,a
formofphilosophicalnaturalism;unfortunately,«naturalism»isoneofthemost
protean terms in recent philosophy. It is also true that the view that Nagel
describesasreductionistnaturalismdoesnotunderstanditselftobereductionist
–itsproponentstakeittobetheonetruenaturalism.However,Nagelisnotalone
inidentifyingaviewofthiskind–inMindandWorld,JohnMcDowellcallstheview
4T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.4.
thatNageltargetsbythenameof«baldnaturalism»5.So,forconvenience,Iwill
refer toNagel’sviewas«naturalism» andaview thathe rejects«reductionist
naturalism» even if its proponents would reject that characterization of their
view.
Nagel further conjoins reductionist naturalism to an epistemological
project envisioned by the Vienna Circle in the guise of the International
EncyclopediaofUnifiedScience.Thatprojectistheunificationofallthesciences
via reductive bridging laws. So, once again, Nagel is not critiquing any of the
resultsofthephysicalsciences,butaphilosophicalviewthatisextrapolatedfrom
them:
«[S]uchaworldviewisnotanecessaryconditionofthepracticeofanyof
thosesciences…mostpracticingscientistsmayhavenoopinionaboutthe
overarchingcosmologicalquestions towhich thismaterialist reductionism
providesananswer6.»
ThisechoesNagel’searliercritiqueofaviewthathecalled«physicalism»inThe
ViewfromNowhere:acritiquegroundedonhisradicalrealism.Radicalrealismis
the view that not only is our current understanding of the world fallible –
somethingmostphilosopherswouldadmit–but that futureconceptionsof the
world might have the feature that we could not, now, understand them. To
understandthemnow,wewouldhavetohavecompletedaniteratedsequenceof
understandingsoftheworld–from«hereandnow»to«thenandthere».Nagel
isscepticalthatthisambitioncouldberealized.
He believes that our current form of scientific understanding, then, is
inherentlylimited.Nageldoesnotmeanbythisthat,givenourcurrentmethods,
there are things we do not know – that is platitudinous. Rather, our current
methodshavenecessary,not contingent, limitations: thereare some thingswe
cannotknowrelativetoourcurrentunderstanding.Thatis,however,noreasonto
cut reality down to our size by drawing a principled connection between the
knowableandtherealthatensuresthatthelattercannotoutstriptheformer.In
The View from Nowhere, the physicalist, like the idealist, is accused of cutting
reality down to size: of privileging one form of description of the world that
5J.McDowell,MindandWorld,Cambridge,MA,HarvardUniversityPress,1994,p.xvii,ff.6T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.4.
aspirestobebothcomprehensiveandcomplete.Nagelthinks,onceagain,thatthis
ambitioncannotberealized.Hisradicalrealismisthetrueformofrealismand
onethatrunsagainstacounter-currentofidealismthatNageldetectsinthework
ofWittgensteinandDavidson–aswellasthemisguidedviewofthephysicalist.7
In order to begin to make the case for an alternative to reductionist
naturalism, Nagel proposes a transcendental argument that begins from an
assumption shared with the scientific enterprise: that the world is rationally
intelligible–allthewaydown.ThisplacesNagel,asheconfesses,inthetradition
ofthe«objectiveidealism»ofPlato,SchellingandHegel:anunderlyingorderto
experienceispostulatedtomakeasuperficialphenomenonintelligible.Toadmit
that our explanations havehit bedrock is, forNagel, a failure andought to re-
interpretedasa counsel todigdeeper8.There isalwaysadeeper intelligibility
conferring explanation to be found; ifwe cannot find one, that is a contingent
limitationonour(current)abilities.Weareinaworldnotofourownmakingthat
existsanyway; ifwe fail tomakesenseofpartof it, that reflects thenecessary
limitationsofthecurrentstateofourunderstanding.
From Nagel’s rationalist perspective, as expressed inMind and Cosmos,
merelyidentifyingthecauseofaphenomenonisnotenough;norarecorrelations
between distinct phenomena. We seek explanations and to explain is to bring
events under some description or other. Those descriptions introduces an
elementofgeneralitythatis,forNagel,partandparcelofanyexplanation9.Thisis
thebasisofhisclaimthattherewouldbea«doubleinvolvement»ofmindinthe
naturalorderintherenovatedworldviewthatitisthetaskofMindandCosmosto
makeplausibletous:
«Theintelligibilityoftheworldisnoaccident.Mind,inthisview,isdoubly
relatedtothenaturalorder.Natureissuchastogiverisetoconsciousbeings
withminds;anditissuchastobecomprehensibletosuchbeings.Ultimately,
therefore,suchbeingsshouldbecomprehensible to themselves.Andthese
are fundamental features of the universe, not byproducts of contingent
developments whose true explanation is given in terms that do not make
referencetomind10.»
7T.Nagel,ViewfromNowhere,pp.97,pp.105–109.8Whileacceptingthat,metaphysically,“allexplanationscometoanendsomewhere”.T.Nagel,
MindandCosmos,p.22.9T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.47.10T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.17.
ForNagel,thehybrisofthereductionististheclaimthatthereductivenaturalist
worldpicture,whichexcludesthementalabinitio,sufficesreflexivelytoexplain
its own generation and acceptance by conscious subjects with reason. The
reductivenaturalistcangiveusnoreasontobelieveherownviewsincethevery
ideaof«reasonsforbelief»doesnotfeatureinheraustereontology.11
Forthereductionistnaturalist,herpositionsuffersmerelyfromthedefect
ofincompleteness:wearealreadyinapositiontostate,now,that«mentalistic,
teleological, or evaluative intelligibility … have been left behind for good as
fundamental formsofunderstanding12».Bycontrast,Nagelasksus toenvisage
whataconceptionofexplanationmightlooklikethatkeptthesealternativeforms
ofintelligibilityinplay–thatmake«mind,meaning,andvalueasfundamentalas
matterandspace-time inanaccountofwhatthere is13». Inenvisagingsuchan
alternativeNagelarguesthatweneedtore-conceiveofthesciencesoflifeinsuch
awaythattheycanbeintegratedintoareflectiveaccountoftheworldandour
place in it as conscious, rational, persons such that it is highlyprobable that a
temporalprocesscouldhaveledtotheevolutionofmindslikeours.
NowtheconstraintsofNagel’scommitmenttopanpsychismintrudeonthe
argumentinawayIwillexplainbelow:becauseheisapanpsychist,Nagelbelieves
thatwecannotunderstandmentalityashavingemergedfromthefundamentally
non-mental.Itcanhavearisenasadevelopmentonlyfromthatwhichwas«proto-
mental»–aNageliantermofartthatIwillexplainbelow.(Healsousesthephrase
«proto-psychic»torefertothesameproperties.)Havinggivengroundsforrejecting
theisticandmaterialisticexplanationsofthisdevelopment,Nagelfeelscompelled
togivenanexplanationbasedinthecomplexityofthenaturalorderitself.
Soinhisnon-reductionistnaturalism,wehavetoassumethatsomeofthe
basiclawsofworkingoftheuniverseareteleologicalinformanddonotalltake
the formofmechanistic causal laws.Thatwhich theDutchhistorianof science
EduardJanDijksterhuiscalledthe«mechanizationoftheworldpicture »hasbeen
mistakenly over-generalised: some causal processes may only be constitutively
11ForanargumentthatparallelsNagel’sseeL.RudderBaker,SavingBelief:ACritiqueof
Physicalism,PrincetonUniversityPress1989.12T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.20.13T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.20.
understoodintermsoftheendstatethattheyseek(metaphorically)torealise»14.
Mentality, or proto-mentality, must be built into our understanding of the
universe and its workings at the ground floor: its most fundamental laws of
workingmustincludethecapacitytoexplainhowproto-mentalityledtomentality
intheguiseinwhichitisexemplifiedinus.AsNagelputsitinastrikingmetaphor,
atsomepointthenon-mentaluniverse«wokeup».Heseeksanon-reductionist,
non-materialist, explanation of how that could be possible that makes it
intelligible that such an occurrence would be a probable development in the
workings of nature. He thinks the only way in which that is possible is by
postulatingsomefundamentallawsofnaturethatareteleologicalinform.
SavingtheData
Atsomepointinthehistoryoftheuniversesentientandconsciousbeingscame
intoexistence;fromourvantagepointinhistorywearewitnesstotheevolution
of a species in which we instantiate a capacity for reason that is reflectively
appliedtounderstandingthatevolutionitself.ForarationalistlikeNagel,reason
gives us privileged insight into the truths of reason, and given his other
philosophicalcommitmentshehasalwaysbelievedthatethicsandmathematics
areparadigmsofobjectiveknowledgethatalsohavearationalistbasis.Reason
also,ashearguesinbothTheLastWordandMindandCosmos,givesusadirect
and unmediated access to certain truth of reason that are plausibly to be
interpretedasapriori15.
Furthermore,wecanreflectontheoperationsofourminditselfandsee
that we face, to borrow David Chalmer’s expression, a «hard» problem of
consciousness that suffices to showthe falsityofpsycho-physical reductionism
aboutthemental16.Suchreductionismneithertherapeuticallydissolvesthehard
problem; nor does it explain it away. Hence the persistent sense that the
reductionist has redefined the problem of placing mental properties in the
physical world to make it “easy” – that means, in effect, soluble to her own
14E.J.Dijksterhuis,TheMechanisationoftheWorldPicture,PrincetonUniversityPress,1961.15T.Nagel,TheLastWord,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1997.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.
79–81.16D.Chalmers,TheConsciousMind:InSearchofaFundamentalTheory,Oxford,OxfordUniversity
Press,1996.
satisfaction,buttono-oneelse’s.AsalwaysinNagel’sphilosophy,webeginfrom
formsofobjectiveknowledge,andcapacitiesthatfindtheirexpressioninthem,
and seek a reflective account of ourplace in theworld that is non-revisionary
towards both. In that loose sense, of beginning from a minimally theorised
conceptionoftheworldandourplaceinit,Nagelisaphenomenologist17.
Mind and Cosmos is replete with subtle discussions of the
phenomenological data to be derived from experience of consciousness,
rationalityandengagementwithvalue.EachofNagel’sseparatediscussionsisof
interest in its own right. Individual chapters of the book are devoted to
consciousness, cognition and value, interwoven with the exposition of Nagel’s
centralargument.Ineachcase,Nagelrejectsareductionistaccountoftheformof
knowledgeinquestion.
Inthesecharacterisationsofthedataofourexperienceitistheproblemof
consciousnessthatplaysthemostimportantroleinNagel’soverallconception.He
is,afterall,seekingaspeculativemetaphysicalfoundationforthesciencesoflife
in thisbook.The inadequacyof theviews thathecriticises seems tohimmost
evident in the case of the mental/physical relation. It is his solution to that
problem–thecaseofneutralmonism–thatexplainsagreatdealelseaboutthe
argumentsofMindandCosmos.
Nevertheless,Nageldoesdistinguishthechallengesthateachofthethree
problemsposesforthereductionistasthatcarriesovertotheproblemfacingthe
anti-reductionistnaturalistassheconstructsheralternativeexplanations.Nagel
seeksexplanationsthataddresstwokindsofquestions:oneconstitutiveandone
historicalthathedistinguishesasfollows:
«An ahistorical constitutive account of how certain complex physical
systemsarealsomental,andahistoricalaccountofhowsuchsystemsarose
intheuniversefromitsbeginnings18.»
Nagel is sensitive to how these two different problems may place different
constraintsontheirsolution.Takethecaseofconsciousness:givenhisrepeated
rejectionofemergentistexplanations,hisexplanationwillbe«reductive»inhis
17M.Ratcliffe,«HusserlandNagelonSubjectivityandtheLimitsofPhysicalObjectivity»
ContinentalPhilosophyReview,vol.35,no.4,pp.353–377,2002.18T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.54.
ownsenseofthatterm.Thatiswhatdriveshimtowardspanpsychism;butifthat
adequately answers the constitutive problem, Nagel doubts that it can be an
answertothesecond,historical,question.
«[I]tisnotclearthatthiskindofreductiveexplanationcouldreallyrender
the result intelligible … The protopsychic properties of all matter, on this
view, are postulated solely because they are needed to explain the
appearanceofconsciousnessathighlevelsoforganiccomplexity.Apartfrom
that, nothing is knownabout them: theyare completely indescribable and
have no predictable local effects, in contrast to the physical properties of
electronsandprotons,whichallowthemtobedetectedindividually.19»
Nagel isalsotroubledbyhowweareeventounderstandhow«proto-mental»
propertiescanbespatiallylocatable.Butthatisnottherealproblem,asfrankly
acknowledgedinthisparagraph:giventhatweknownothingabouttheintrinsic
nature of protopsychic properties it is difficult to envisage the historical
counterparttotheconstitutiveexplanationofconsciousmentality.
Furthersensitivitytothedifferencebetweentheproblemsemergeswhen
Nagelturnstothenatureofrationalcognition.Here,somekindofholismseems
to him inescapable, and any constitutive account given in terms ofmore basic
elementsdoesnotcomeclosetoofferingasatisfactoryexplanationofrationality:
ashenotes«justasconsciousnesscannotbeexplainedasamereextensionor
complication of physical evolution, so reason cannot be explained as a mere
extensionorcomplicationofconsciousness20.»
Nagelbelievesthatthesametwoquestions–constitutiveandhistorical–
emergeinconnectionwithvalues21.Theanswertotheconstitutivequestion, in
this case, involves the phenomenon of reason responsiveness: Nagel claims of
evaluative facts that «it is through being recognized as reasons by a value-
sensitive agent that they affect behavior 22 ». This is an avowedly anti-
psychologisticconceptionofexplanation;again,alegacyofNagel’smuchearlier
workinThePossibilityofAltruismwherepsychologicalexplanationisconstrained
by some identifiable a priori principles of practical reason.23As in the case of
19T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.62.20T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.81.21T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.112–114.22T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.113.23T.Nagel,ThePossibilityofAltruism,OxfordUniversityPress,1970.Foranassessmentofthis
radicalanti-psychologismseeA.Thomas,ValueandContext:theNatureofMoralandPolitical
rationality,Nageldoesnotthinkthatareductiveexplanationwillbeplausiblein
thiscase.
Whenitcomestothehistoricalquestionaboutvalue,Nagelarguesthatthe
answeris«muchmoreobscure24».Conscious,rationalbeingscometofindvalue,
notonlyinthemselvesbutalsointheworld:
«Accordingtothehypothesisofnaturalteleology,thenaturalworldwould
haveapropensitytogiverisetobeingsofthekindthathaveagood–beings
forwhichthingscanbegoodorbad25.»
ThismeetsNagelscriterionforanacceptableexplanationas«valueisnotjust
an accidental side effect of life; rather, there is life because life is a necessary
conditionofvalue26.»This«predisposition»onthepartofthecosmosis,Nagel
admits,aspeculationthatisunlikelytofindfavor;butheendorsesitonlybecause
hethinksnootherexplanationisplausible:itisan«admissibleconjecturegiven
theavailableevidence27.»
BeforeIturntothealternativeconceptionofthesciencesoflifethatNagel
develops,andanassociatedcritiqueofthecurrentformofevolutionarytheory,
moreneedstobesaidabouthisneutralmonism.Thisisthecrucialmetaphysical
breakthroughthathasledNageltothislarge-scalecritiqueofthesciencesoflife
eventhough,asIhavejustnoted,Nagelisworriedaboutwhethertheviewcanbe
a comprehensive answer to both of the questions that he tries to answer,
constitutiveandhistorical,foreachofthethreedomainsofmentality,rationality
and evaluation. Nagel believes that a relatively local philosophical problem –
explainingtherelationbetweenthementalandthephysical–hasthisdramatic
consequence.Thatisbecauseinunderstandingthisrelationbetweenthemental
and the physical we are given insight into the fundamental nature of the real,
namely,thatitcorrectlydescribedbyneutralmonism.Iwillnowexplainwhatthat
Knowledge,Oxford,theClarendonPress,2006,chapterfour;A.Thomas,ThomasNagel,London,
Routledge,2008,chapterfour.24T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.117.25T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.121.26T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.123.27T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.124.
viewissupposedtobeandhowitrelatestoNagel’sindependentcommitmentto
panpsychism28.
TheCentralRoleofNeutralMonism
AversionofneutralmonismfirstemergedinNagel’spaper«ThePsychophysical
Nexus»,wherehe first speculated thatwe areon the vergeof discovering the
natureofasubstancewhosenaturenecessitates that ismanifests itself inboth
physicalandmentalproperties29.Nagelrecapitulatessomeofthemainclaimsof
thatpaperinMindandCosmos:
«[T]heappearanceofcontingencyintherelationbetweenmindandbrain
is probably an illusion … it is in fact a necessary but nonconceptual
connection,concealedfromusbytheinadequacyofourpresentconcepts
…weshouldexpecttheoreticalprogress inthisareatorequireamajor
conceptualrevolution…Weourselvesarelarge-scale,complexinstances
of something both objectively physical from outside and subjectively
mental from inside. Perhaps the basis for this identity pervades the
world30.»
This«perhaps» formsthebasisof theargumentsofMindandCosmos:as«the
Psychophysical Nexus» made clear, uncovering this substrate that upwardly
necessitatesbothitsmentalandphysicalaspectswouldbeanempiricaldiscovery
by the sciences of the mind; but there is philosophical insight in coming to
understand the form that an intelligibility conferring explanation of the
mental/physicalrelationhastotake.Sowhilethereisonesenseinwhichitisup
to science to discover the substrate, there is another sense in which we have
solvedthephilosophicalproblemofthemental/physicalrelationinthatwehave
identifiedtheformthatanysuccessfulexplanationwouldhavetotake.
Thisunderlyingsubstrate,then,isneithermentalnorphysicalinitsown
right:hencetheword«neutral».Theremaywellbeapluralityofsuchsubstances,
but each of them is of the same fundamental type, hence themonism. Yet, for
reasonsIwillshortlyexplain,Nagelseemstohavecometoacceptthatthisviewis
28ThiscommitmentgoesbacktooneofNagel’searliestpapers:T.Nagel«Panpsychism»in
MortalQuestions,pp.181–195.29T.Nagel,«ThePsychophysicalNexus»inConcealmentandExposure,Oxford,OxfordUniversity
Press,2002,pp.194–236.30T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.41–2,emphasisadded.
more accurately classified as a version of dual aspect theory and inMind and
Cosmositisrevisedtomakeitapurerexemplarofneutralmonism.
ThekeycomponentsofNagel’sversionofneutralmonism–aviewwitha
longhistoryinphilosophy–isthatit«accountsfortherelationbetweenmindand
brainintermsofsomethingmorebasicaboutthenaturalorder»31.This«more
basic”thingisunitaryas«theconstituentsoftheuniversehavepropertiesthat
explainnotonlyitsphysicalbutitsmentalcharacter».InMindandCosmosNagel
quotesThomasSorrell’sviewthat thesebasicelementsare«transphysicaland
transmental32.»This,then,capturesboththeneutralityoftheelements–theyare
neitherphysicalnormental–andtheirunitarynatureastheyformonekind.Any
basicconstituent,evenifisnotpartofaperson,couldbeapartofsomethingwith
mentalfeatures.Therefore,itmustformpartofanexplanationofwhyamental
subjecthasanunderlyingnaturethatis,initself,neitherdistinctivelymentalnor
physical.
However, Leopold Stubenberg has noted an important shift between
Nagel’s position in «ThePsychophysicalNexus» to the view later defended in
MindandCosmos33.Theformerexplainsthe«neutrality»ofmentalandphysical
aspectsviawhatStubenbergcallsthe«neither»view:anaspectofasubstrateis
«neutraljustincaseitisintrinsicallyneithermentalnorphysical»Hecitesthis
passageasevidenceofNagel’searlierviewofneutrality:
«[T]hisviewwouldimplythatthefundamentalconstituentsoftheworld,outof
whicheverythingiscomposed,areneitherphysicalnormentalbutsomethingmore
basic. This position is not equivalent to panpsychism. Panpsychism is, in effect,
dualismallthewaydown.Thisismonismallthewaydown34».
StubenbergcontraststhisparagraphwiththelaterpositioninMindandCosmos:
«Everything,livingornot,isconstitutedfromelementshavinganaturethatisboth
physicalandnonphysical—thatis,capableofcombiningintomentalwholes.Sothis
reductiveaccountcanalsobedescribedasaformofpanpsychism:alltheelements
ofthephysicalworldarealsomental35».
31T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.56.32T.Sorrell,DescartesReinvented,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2005,p.95.Quotedin
T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.57.33L.Stubenberg,«NeutralMonism»inTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy2016.34T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.231.35T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,2012,p.57.
Stubenberg’sworryisthatthisisanequivocation–orshift–inwhatNagelmeans
by«neutral».
Intheearlierpaper,NagelholdswhatStubenbergcallsthe«neither»view
of the neutrality component of neutral monism: the aspects are neither
intrinsicallymentalnorintrinsicallyphysical.However,bythelaterbookNagel
holdsthe«both»viewofneutralitywhereaspectsarebothphysicalandmental.
Thesearetwodifferentsensesof«neutrality».Seekingclarification,Stubenberg
receivedthefollowingexplanationinpersonalcorrespondencefromNagel:
«[T]hefundamentalelementswouldbeneithermerelyphysicalnormerelymental,
butsomethingthatwasnecessarilybothphysicalandmental,(orprotomental);but
since thisnecessaryconnectioncan’tholddirectlybetween thephysicaland the
mental as we conceive them, it would require that the real character of these
fundamental constituentsbesomethingmorebasic thataccounts for theirbeing
bothphysicaland(proto)mental36».
SoStubenbergisright:thereisanimportantchangehere.
The view in «ThePsychophysicalNexus» ought – in retrospect – to be
interpretedasa formofdualaspecttheorywithacleardistinctionbetweenan
underlyingsubstanceandtheupwardsentailmentoftwokindsofaspect–mental
orphysical.ByMindandCosmosthatviewhasbeensupersededbypansychismin
awaydrivenbythecommitmenttomonism.Nagelhasalwaysbeenapanpsychist,
so in theperiodbetween thepublicationof these twoworksheseems tohave
revisedhisdualaspecttheorytomakeitconsistentwithhispanpsychism:onthe
«both» view of neutrality in the later work «the fundamental elements [are]
necessarilybothphysicalandmental».
Yet,aswehaveseen,MindandCosmoscombinesare-affirmtionofNagel’s
commitmenttopanpsychismwiththefrankexpressionofaproblemforthatview:
Nagel is concerned that panpsychism may do better as an explanation of the
constitutivenatureofconsciousnessthanasanaccountofitshistoricalevolution.
Iwouldsurmisethatthepostulationof teleological laws inMindandCosmos is
developedpreciselytoaddressthissubsidiaryproblem.Panpsychismremainsas
an answer to the constitutive question, but fundamental teleological laws are
36T.Nagel,T.personalcorrespondence,notdated,citedinL.Stubenberg,«NeutralMonism»in
TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy2016.
necessarypostulatesifonewantstoanswerthehistoricalquestion.Theymight
alsothenplayaroleinanyholisticaccountofthenatureofrationalityorinan
explanatoryaccountoftheoriginofvalue–Nagelisclearthathisaimisnothing
lessthana«theoryofeverything».
SowhatmotivatedNagel’smovefromdualaspecttheorytopanpsychism
asananswertotheconstitutivequestion?Isurmisethatthecrucialargumentfor
thechange is this:mentalitydoesnotmanifest itselfeverywhere.Personshave
mental attributes; pet rocks do not – not really. However, in any case where
mentalitydoesnotmanifestitself,thesameunderlyingsubstratemustbeinvolved
(becauseofthecommitmenttomonism).Thatsubstrate, then,eithermanifests
physicality and mentality (where mentality is instantiated) or physicality and
proto-mentality (where mentality is not instantiated). To preserve the unified
natureoftheunderlyingsubstance–thisis,afterall,aformofmonism–itisalways
eitheroneortheother:hencethepanpsychism(inits«both»versionwherethe
fundamentalelementsare«transphysicalandtransmental»).
Thisisnot,then,theclaimthateverythingismental,butthateverythingis
eithermentalor«proto-mental».Thisistheview,then,whose«appearance…
castsitsshadowbackovertheentireprocess»–theprocess,thatis,describedby
thesciencesoflife37.Nagelpresentshisbasicargumentformonismasfollows38:
«[S]inceconsciousorganismsarenotcomposedofaspecialkindofstuff,
butcanbeconstructed,apparently,fromanyofthematteroftheuniverse
suitably arranged it follows that this monism will be universal.
Everything,livingornot,isconstitutedfromelementshavinganaturethat
isbothphysicalandnonphysical–thatiscapableofbeingcombinedinto
mental wholes. So this reductive account can also be described as
panpsychism;alltheelementsofthephysicalworldarealsomental39».
Nagel franklyadmitsthathisoutlineofhowwemightchangeourfoundational
assumptionsinthelifesciencesisspeculative,butitisreasonedspeculationthat
appealsnot to theism,but to«complications to the immanentcharacterof the
naturalorder40».Itwouldnotonlybeaunifyingexplanation,butamoreunifying
37T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.8.38Nagelexplainshisdistinctionbetween“reductive”and“reductionist”:T.Nagel,Mindand
Cosmos,p.44,fn.14.39T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.57.40T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.12.
explanationthatitstheisticrivalsgiventhatthoseviews,too,assumethattheonly
naturalistic option is a reductive naturalism. Reductive naturalism shapes the
formtakenbythetheistic«intelligentdesign»alternative;absentthepresumed
sexism,we can use J. L. Austin’s phrase that these twopositions “take in each
other’swashing”41.Nagel’spositionis,inthatsense,evenmoreradicalthanthat
envisaged by proponents of intelligent design: his view is that «materialist
naturalism,isfalse,andnotjustaroundtheedges»42.Oneimmediatepayoff,as
thebookmakesclear,isthatweneedtotakeanotherlook–amorescepticaland
challenginglook–atthereductionist,materialist,understandingofthetheoryof
evolution.
Nagel’sCritiqueofEvolutionaryTheory
Nagel’scritiqueofthetheoryofevolutionisattheheartofhisbookandexplains
agreatdealofthecontroversythatithasgenerated.Thisisnotleastbecausein
developingthiscritiqueNagelishappy,indevelopingascepticalaccountofthe
theory of evolution in its current guise, to borrow arguments from religiously
motivated proponents of intelligent design – even while he rejects their
alternativetheisticexplanationfortheappearanceofdesign.(Intheircase,that
the appearance ought to be accepted at face value.) We need to explain how
mentality could have evolved, given the truth of Nagel’s neutral monism, as
opposedtosimplyacceptingexistingconceptionsofevolutiontoocloselytied,he
implies,topsychophysicalreductionism.
As Nagel notes – anticipating the controversy his book would cause –
criticizingthetheoryofevolutionisviewedasboth«politicallyincorrect»aswell
as scientifically incorrect. But Nagel believes that standard conceptions of
evolutionarytheory–hecallsthemvariously«materialist»or«neo-Darwinian»
–fallwiththepsycho-physicalreductionismtheyseektovindicate.Hearguesthat,
tothispoint,wehaveunderstoodthe«BookofNature»inphysico-mathematical
terms that have omitted the mind’s place in nature. Concomitantly, biological
41«[T]hesetwoterms,‘sensedata’and‘materialthings’,livebytakingineachother’swashing–
what is spurious is not one term of the pair, but the antithesis itself. » J. L. Austin, Sense and
Sensibilia,OxfordUniversityPress,p.4.(IthinkwemaysafelypresumethatAustindidnottakein
hisownwashing.)42T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.15.
theoryhasrestricted itself tomechanisticexplanationsaspartof thisunhappy
alliance with psycho-physical reductionism. Neutral monism opens up the
prospectofareorientationofthesciencesoflifearoundprinciplesthat«arein
theirlogicalformteleologicalandnotmechanistic43».
«Mind,asadevelopmentoflife,mustbeincludedasthemostrecentstageofthis
long cosmological history, and its appearance … casts its shadow back over the
entire process and the constituents and principles on which the process
depends44.»
Can we infer, then, from this foundational error in the assumptions of
evolutionarytheory,thatitisintellectuallyunsatisfactoryinitscurrentform?
Nagelthinksthatweareentitledtodrawthisconclusion.Inparticular,he
claimsthatevolutionarytheory,understoodinareductiveandmechanisticway,
cannotanswertwoquestions:
«[W]hat is the likelihoodthatself-reproducing life formsshouldhavecome into
existencespontaneouslyontheearlyearth,solelythroughtheoperationofthelaws
ofphysicsandchemistry?
Intheavailablegeologicaltimesincethefirstlifeformsappearedonearth,whatis
the likelihood that, as a result of physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic
mutationsshouldhaveoccurredthatwassufficienttopermitnaturalselectionto
producetheorganismsthatactuallyexist?45»
Nageladdsfurtherclaimstohiscritique:thatevolutionarytheoryisincomplete
(merelyanexplanationsketchor«schema»);itlackssufficientevidentialsupport
and must rest on «general assumptions »; that it runs contrary to common
sense46.
Criticsaresurelyrighttofindthisconjunctionofclaimsaboutthecurrent
understanding of evolutionary theory unconvincing. To take them in reverse
order:being«contrarytocommonsense»isaweakargumentgiventhatmany
well-establishedscientificclaimsseemcontrarytocommonsense.Anhistorical
perspectiveonhowscientifictheoriesofthepastwerereceivedbytheaudiences
43T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.7.44T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.8.45T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.6.46T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.6–7.
contemporaneoustothemwouldseemtostrengthenthispoint–particularlyso
inthecaseofthetheoryofevolutionwhenfirstputforwardbyDarwin.
OnNagel’ssecondobjection:wholebooksarewrittenonwhysuperstring
theoryisasociologicallywell-entrenchedpositioninphysicspoorlysupportedby
evidence.Onanyrealisticconceptionofhowscienceactuallyoperatessometimes
«generalassumptions»doplayanimportantroleintheacceptanceofscientific
theories.Clearly,theremaybesomethingintellectuallyunsatisfactoryaboutthis
stateofaffairsifitpersists–orthecritiquesofsuperstringtheorywouldnotbe
written–butmypointisthatitisnotunusualfor«generalassumptions»tocarry
aburdenofproof, at leastprovisionally.Theanswer toNagel’s concernwould
seem to be: more and better science (of the same general type) in the field
concernedthatwillseeusdobetter«overthelongrun».
Finally,onthethirdpoint, ifwehaveonlyexplanationsketches inthese
cases,thentheanswer,onceagain,isthatscientistsworkinginthefieldfacethe
taskofcomingupwithbetter,moredetailed,moreconvincingexplanations–a
taskthatdoesnotrequirecommentfromthesidelinesfromthosenotexpertin
thefield.
IfNagel’schallengetothecurrentunderstandingofevolutionarytheoryis
tobestrongerthanthis,then,heneedstodomorethanraisescepticalquestions
aboutit;thesearewhatPeircecalled«paperdoubts».Heneedstosubstantiate
theclaimthatthetransitionfrompsycho-physicalreductionisminthephilosophy
ofmindtoneutralmonismpayssubstantialphilosophicaldividends.Itisbecause
we have been successfully convinced that we need a new paradigm for the
explanationofmindandvaluethatweareforcedtoreviseourassumptionsabout
evolutionarytheoryandtolookatitsfoundationalcommitmentsinanewlight.
Nagel may reasonably respond that it is not his job to re-write the life
sciences; it is simply to draw attention to some of their deepest foundational
commitmentsinordertoholdopenintellectualpossibilitiesthatseemdefinitively
closedformistakenreasons.Butifweseekmorethanthat,theremustatleastbe
anoutlineofanargumentthattakesusfromNagel’sfoundationalre-orientation
tobetteranswerstothetwo,fundamental,probabilisticquestionswithwhichhe
begins: first,howdoestherecoveryofnatural teleologyallowustogivebetter
answers to the questions of the origin of life? Second, is a single mechanism
adequatetoexplainallthecurrentformsthatlifetakes?
Nagelbelievesthatwearejustifiedinbeginningfromourwell-grounded
experiences that we use our ordinary capacities for knowledge – perception,
reasonandconsciousawareness–andtoconcludeonthatbasisthatthisisdata
thatnointellectuallysatisfyingexplanationcanoverturn.Re-capitaluatingsome
ofthecentralclaimsofhisbookTheLastWord,theexerciseofourbasiccapacities
forknowledgegivesusreasonswithgreaterintellectualauthoritythanthatofany
scepticalchallengetothosecapacitiesandreasons.47Onthecontrary,thisbasic
pointguidesustowardsaconstraintonasolutiontotheproblemtohand:
«[T]he appearance of living organisms has eventually given rise to
consciousnesss,perception,desire,actionandtheformationofbothbeliefs
andintentionsonthebasisofreasons.Ifallthishasanaturalexplanation,the
possibilities were inherent in the universe long before there was life, and
inherent in early life long before the appearance of animals. A satisfying
explanationwould show that the realization of these possibilitieswas not
vanishinglyimprobablebutasignificantlikelihoodgiventhelawsofnature
andthecompositionoftheuniverse.Itwouldrevealmindandreasonasbasic
aspectsofanonmaterialisticnaturalorder48.»
Itisworthrecallingthatby«nomaterialistic»Nagelisherereferringbackto
hisneutralmonisminwhichthebasicelementsofrealityaretrans-mentaland
trans-physical alike. What conception of law would make it intelligible how
elements like these developed over time to compose conscious, rational,
valuingcreatureslikeus?
Nagelistransferringtheburdenofproof:givenotherthingsweknow,
ofatleastasmuchcertaintyasthetheoryofevolution,thenthattheorymust
meetthestandardofrationalistintelligibilityinexplaininghowcreatureswith
ourcapacitiescameintoexistence–orwemustrejectthatstandard.Severalof
Nagel’s criticshavewillinglyembraced the latteroption;now theburdenof
proofisonthemtoofferindividualexplanationsofhowwedonotseemtoknow
whatNagelthinkswecandemonstratethatwedoknow.Weknow,inaway
immunetoscepticalchallengetoourbasiccapacitiesforknowledge,thatwe
47T.Nagel,TheLastWord,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1997.48T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.32.
areconsciousbeingswithdirectknowledgeofthetruthsofreason.Givenhis
wider philosophical rationalism, Nagel extends this defense to the truths of
mathematicsandethics,too.If,however,weacceptthestandard,andaccept
the validity of the knowledge claims, then we need to look again at the
foundationalassumptionsofthesciencesoflifeasNagelrecommendsandasI
shallnowexposit.
Nagel’sRenovatedConceptionoftheSciencesofLife
GiventheboldnessofNagel’sclaims,onemighthaveexpectedinMindandCosmos
a detailed working out of the new form that the sciences of life must take.
However,Nagelbelieves–correctlyinmyview–thatthisisnottheroleofthe
philosopher.Thetaskshefacesistoarticulatetherelationbetweenhighleveland
abstractconceptionsofhowtheworldworkstothemoredetailedspecificationof
those conceptions exemplified by the sciences themselves. Philosophy and the
sciencesmaywellhavepartedcompany forgood in theseventeenthcentury–
thosewhocomplainthatphilosophymakesnointellectualprogressforgetthatit
spinsoffsuccessfulsciencesthatbecomeautonomousfromit–butphilosophical
presuppositionsmaycontinuetoplaceempiricalenquiryonthewrongpathby
falselyconstrainingtheavailableoptions.ThatseemstobeNagel’sview:empirical
scientistsgoabouttheirbusinesswithnoregardforphilosophy,butheimplies
that high level philosophical misconceptions may play a role in prematurely
shutting down paths of enquiry that should have remained open. The
mechanisation of the world-picture was undoubtedly a significant intellectual
achievement,butifphilosophersareguiltyofover-generalisingitssuccess,then
they areprematurely foreclosingon explanatoryoptions in the sciences of life
withoutsufficientgroundsfordoingso.
Thebasicidea,then,isthatweneedageneralconceptionofthesciencesof
life that does not reflect the false philosophical outlook of the reductionist
materialist.Nagel’sspecificproposal,asIhavenoted,dependsontheconstraints
placedonthesesciencesbyhispanpsychism.
The panpsychist has to deny that the mental emerges from the
fundamentallynon-mental,whetherinthedevelopmentofeachindividualorat
thelevelofthewholespecies.Theobviousopponenthereistheemergentist,who
arguesthatthefundamentallynon-mentalcandevelopinitscomplexityuntilwe
reach the point at which sophisticated biological organisms start to exhibit
cognitive states – at some particular time in their evolutionary history. As a
further,complexdevelopmentwithincognition–anddifferentaccountsexplain
this complexity indifferentways– cognitiondevelops intoconsciousness49. So
consciousmentalityisanemergentfeatureofsophisticatedorganismsthatalso
havea«baselevel»descriptionthat iswhollyphysical.This istheemergentist
explanationofmentalitythatisarivaltoNagel’spanpsychism.
Nagel recapitulates, and endorses, his earlier critiques of emergentism
interpretedasaconstitutiveaccountofwhatmakesagivenorganismconscious;
«it still seems likemagic»50. Emergence, forNagel, canplaya limitedpart in
derivative explanations; his critique applies only its deployment in basic
explanations.However,hethinksthateveninderivativeexplanationstheideaof
emergencemustalwaysbe«cashedout».However,whenwedocashitoutwe
see that it is «analysed through the character and interactions of … more
elementary components51» and can see its inadequacy. Any such explanation
rulesoutthe«completelynew»;butthisiswhytheemergentistcannotexplain
consciousness 52 . Nagel can accept the uncontroversial claim of epistemic
emergencewherewecanbesurprisedbyadiscoveryofaconsequenceofwhat
weknow.Metaphysicalemergenceiscategoricaldifferent.Thepanpsychistdenies
that the mental could ever emerge from the non-mental even if we add in
complexity.Ifyoumakeacomplexphysicalsystemevenmorecomplex,well,that
iswhatyouendupwith–adifferenceofdegree,notoneofkind.ForNagel,even
themostcomplexphysicalsystemsstillfallthewrongsideofthemental/physical
divide:
49J.Jaynes,TheOriginofConsciousnessintheBreakdownoftheBicameralMind,HoughtonMifflin,
1990.D.Dennett«JulianJaynessSoftwareArchaeology»inCanadianPsychology,vol.27,no.2,
pp.149–54,1986.50T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.55–6.51T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.56.52This objection is repeated in connection with a suggestion of Sharon Street’s proposal of a
psychophysical, historical, theory of the emergence of conscious organisms: a “brute fact of
emergence…thereforeessentiallymysterious”.YetNagelconcedesthatthisview“[requires]the
smallestalterationtotheprevailingphysicalformofnaturalism”.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.61.
[huh?Thisisobscure.]
«If evolutionary theory is a purely physical theory, then it might in
principle provide the framework for a physical explanation of the
appearance of behaviorally complex animal organisms with central
nervous systems. But subjective consciousness, if it is not reducible to
something physical, would not be part of this story; it would be left
completely unexplained by physical evolution – even if the physical
evolutionofsuchorganismsisinfactacausallynecessaryandsufficient
conditionforconsciousness53.»
FortherationalistsuchasNagel,itisnotsufficienttoassertabrutecorrelation
betweensophisticatedphysical thingsandmental features: theirco-occurrence
must be intelligible, hence necessitated. (Needless to say, those not equally
committedtophilosophicalrationalismdenythisconnection:forthem,perhaps
necessitiesareintelligible,buttheconversedoesnothold.54)
FromNagel’sperspectiveitisnon-accidentalthatsomephysicalthingsare
conscious, soareductionistnaturalismthatseesaworldwhollydescribable in
termsofbasicphysicalcausallawsisfailingeventoexplaintheactualworld.That
is because it is failing to explain part of it – its conscious, mental, part. If the
implication of reductionist naturalism is that the fundamentalworkings of the
worldcanstaythesamewhetherpartsofitareconsciousornot–modulosome
magicalmindstuffaddedtoittoexplainwhypartsofitareconsciouswhenthey
are–thenthisisaflawedbasicconception55.Thisisthefundamentalthoughtthat
motivatesNagel’spanpsychism:wehavetobuildintoourbasicconceptionofthe
worldthatpartoftheworldmanifestsmentalproperties.Thispotentiality,then,
mustbeanaspectofeventhemostfundamentalproperties:hencetheconception
ofthemastrans-physicalandtrans-mental56.
AnimportantintermediateassumptioninNagel’sargumentisthatwhathe
callsa«nonhistorical»theoryofconsciousness,whichexplainedofanyparticular
organismwhyitwasorwasnotconscious,cannotbeindependentofatheoryof
howconsciousorganismsaroseinthefirstplace.Asingleprocesswouldhaveto
explain both the evolution of consciousmentality and supply the basis for the
53T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.44.54Iamgratefultoananonymousrefereeforthisjournalforremindingmeofthisanti-rationalist
positionby,asitwere,holdingit.55“Onapurelymaterialistunderstandingofbiology,consciousnesswouldhavetoberegardedas
atremendousandinexplicableextrabrutefactabouttheworld”.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.45.56T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.45.
«nonhistorical»productofthatprocess.Thatiswhyhispanspychismevolvesin
Mind and Cosmos to include a novel conception of scientific law that could
accommodatethatexplanatorydemand.
Nagel thinks thata reconsiderationof thesciencesof lifewouldhave to
include«a teleologicalaccount» thatpostulatestheexistenceof«principlesof
self-organisationorofthedevelopmentofcomplexityovertime»57thatarenot
solelygroundedoncasuallawasconceivedofinanorthodoxway:
«Naturalteleologywouldmeanthattheuniverseisgovernedrationally
inmorethanoneway–notonlythroughthequantitativelawsofphysics
thatunderlieefficientcausation,butalsothroughprincipleswhichimply
that thingshappenbecausetheyareonapaththat leadtowardcertain
outcomes–notably, theexistenceof living, andultimatelyof conscious
organisms58.»[Nagel,2012,p.67]
Tothispointpanpsychismhasnottakenthisextrastep;fromNagel’sperspective,
thepanpsychistisbeingundulyconservativeaboutthekindsoflawsthatthere
are. If they can appeal only in their reductive, historicist, explanation of the
emergence of conscious life to orthodox causal law their account will be
unconvincing.Itisforcedtotaketheformofa“mentalisticreductionism”thatsees
mentalityasapropensitybuilt intothenatureofmatter.Nagel isscepticalthat
thisgeneralformanexplanationdoesconferanyintelligibility:
«The protopsychic properties of all matter … are postulated solely
because theyareneeded toexplain theappearanceof consciousnessat
highlevelsoforganiccomplexity.Apartfromthatnothingisknownabout
them: they are completely indescribable and have no predictable local
effects59.»[Nagel,2012,pp.61-62]
SoasananswertoNagel’stwoquestions,then,heseemstohavecometobelieve
that panpsychism can really only answer his constitutive question about
conscious mentality. Explanations of its historical emergence or parallel
explanations of cognition or value are going to need to appeal to his novel
postulation of basic, teleological laws in the life sciences. As always, this need
arisesbecauseNagelcanseenootherwayofdoingjusticetothatwhichneedsto
beexplained.
57T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.459.58T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.67.59T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,pp.61–2.
IsthisaVindicationofTheism?
In thedevelopmentofhisproject,Nagelunfoldsadialectical contrastbetween
theism and materialism; predictably enough, both postulate «explanation
stoppers» that fail to meet the requirement posed by Nagel’s «form of the
principle of sufficient reason 60 ». Theism ends the regress of justification in
mentality,admittedlythementalityofanagentofanunusualkind(asitalsohas
thefeatureofexistingnecessarily):
«Theismoffersavicariousunderstanding,byassigningittoatranscendentmind
whosepurposesandunderstandingoftheworldwecannotourselvesfullyshare,
butwhichmakesitpossibletobelievethattheworldisintelligible,evenifnotto
us61.»
Asacounter-reactiontoreductionistnaturalism,theviewiswell-motivated.But,
for Nagel, theism is finally unacceptable because it «pushes the quest for
intelligibilityoutsidetheworld62».
Materialismisfundamentallygroundedonacompactsetofphysicallaws
thatare,conceivably,aselectionfromalternativepossiblesets.Theexplanations
it offers of our human capacities is insufficiently reassuring: «evolutionary
naturalismprovidesanaccountofourcapacitiesthatunderminestheirreliability,
andindoingsounderminesitself63.»
Neither theism nor reductive naturalism (materialism) can, then, be
anything other than a temporary stopping point for Nagel’s kind of objective
idealist. The key elements Nagel isolates in both views is that they seek
comprehensiveness, and must therefore include their own generation and
acceptance.Theymustbe«reflexive»bywhichImeanthatbothviewshaveto
give an account of the social practices, norms and values in which the very
enterpriseoffindingoutthefundamentaltruthaboutrealitythateachprojectis
embedded. Eachplaces a constraint on the vocabularywe canuse to give this
60T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.17.61T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.23.62T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.26.63T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.27.
account:theaustereresourcesofreductionistnaturalismseemsunabletoexplain
theveryideaofareasonforbelief.Thelimitedresourcesoftheismpostulatean
agent in some ways like us, but in a fundamental way not – an agent whose
motivations must be opaque to us. Nagel’s aspiration is for something less
ambitious:areflective«placing»ofourhumanpointofviewthatisa«plausible
pictureofhowwefitintotheworld64.»
Ratherthanallowingevolutionarynaturalismtoundermineourmostbasic
capacitiesofknowledge–giventhatsuchanambitiouwouldbeinternallyself-
undermining–Nagel claims that theargumentought tobe reversed:ourmost
«basic forms of thought» are not candidates for being undermined by
evolutionaryunderstanding:
«[I]t seems reasonable to run the test equally in the opposite direction:
namely,toevaluatehypothesesabouttheuniverseandhowwehavecome
intoexistencebyreference toordinary judgements inwhichwehavevery
highconfidence65.»
Again,consistentlywithNagel’spreviousexpressionsofhisphilosophicaloutlook,
we should not resile to quietism where that would mean delineating our
conceptual scheme «from within» and noting differences between different
forms of representation without investigating issues of explanatory priority66 .
Because reality is unitary, all our representations – of different degrees of
«perspectivalness»–havetobemutuallyadjustedandreconciledtobeplacedin
some intelligible relation to it: quietismdoes not face up to the fact that «the
questionisthere,whetherweansweritornot67.»
Thefailureoftheismandreductivenaturalism,then,leavesthatwhichis
tobeexplainedintact:theexerciseofbasiccapacitiesofknowledge.
«Theexistenceofconsciousmindsandtheiraccesstotheevidenttruthsof
ethicsandmathematicsareamongthedatathatatheoryoftheworldandour
placeinithasyettoexplain.Theyareclearlypartofwhatisthecase,justas
muchasthedataaboutthephysicalworldprovidedbyperceptionandthe
64T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.25.65T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.29.66T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.31.67T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.30.
conclusionsofscientificreasoningaboutwhatwouldbestexplainthatdata.
Wecannotjustassumethatthelattercategoryofthoughthaspriorityover
theothers,sothatwhatitcannotexplainisnotreal68.»
These facts are as they are; Nagel is convinced that neither reductionist
materialism,northeism,offeranycredibleexplanationforthem.LikeRyle,inhis
rejectionof the ghost in themachine,Nagel is awareof how these two flawed
conceptions–oneofmentalityandtheotherofmatter–workintandemtomake
both equally unacceptable.69The picture of a mechanised nature into which a
divineagentintrudesisamacro-levelequivalentofthemicro-levelaccountofthe
mental-physicalrelationtowhichRyleandNagelareequallyopposed.
HowPlausiblearetheseArguments?
Iturnnowfromexpositiontocriticism.Nagel’sbookhasmetwithagreatdealof
criticism,muchofitsevere,butnotalwayscharitable.Iwillbeginwiththesimpler
caseswhereexegeticalcharitymighthaveledtoamorereasonableunderstanding
ofNagel’spositionthatmighthaveforestalledsomeofthiscriticism(oratleast
muteditstone).
First, Nagel’s defense of «common sense». Peter Godfrey-Smith’s
response,inafair-mindedreview,isthemostforthright:«thisisoneareainwhich
intuitionsareworthnothing70». I thinkthat iscorrect: itwouldbeunfortunate
indeedifadevelopedscientifictheorywerebeingrejectedonthebasisofcommon
sense.However,thatwouldbeaveryuncharitablereadingofNagel’sargument.
Byvindicating«commonsense»Nagelisnotsettingthetruthofanyspecificclaim
of common sense against the truth of a theory; he is, rather, vindicating the
underlying capacities for knowledge manifested in such claims. The only
exceptiontothisclaimarethetruthsofreasonthatNagelclaimsareself-evident,
butifheisright,thentheinteresthereisintheclaimofself-evidenceandnotin
theobservationthatsuchtruthsformpartofcommonsense(iftheydo).Ifthere
areaprioritruths–andplausiblythereare–everyviewneedsanexplanationof
theirspecialepistemicstatus.
68T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.31.69G.Ryle,TheConceptofMind,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,2000.70P.Godfrey-Smith, «Not SufficientlyReassuring: reviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»London
ReviewofBooks,vol.35,no.2,pp.20–21.
Nagel is avowedly a rationalist and has been since The Possibility of
Altruism:wehavea capacity for reason that is expressedbyour capacities for
knowingspecifictruthsofmathematicsandethics(totaketwoofNagel’sfavourite
examples)71.Whenthatcapacityseekstofindahomeforitselfintheworld,and
doesnotfindaconvincingexplanationofthisintheworld-viewofthereductionist
naturalist,Nagelaskswhetheranotherviewispossible.
Asecondobjectionrunsasfollows:oughtthephilosopherbelecturingto
the scientist? Again, that is not Nagel’s view: reductionist naturalism is
extrapolated fromtheactual resultsof thesciencesand isnot itselfascientific
view. Conversely, the philosophical question of whether there are irreducibly
teleological forms of causation has not been answered solely by the rise of a
mechanistic world-picture in the seventeenth century as John Hawthorne and
DanielNolanpointoutinapapertowhichNagelrefersapprovingly72.
Ifthequestionhadbeensettledinthisway,thenatleastweareowedan
accountof theempiricalcontentof thetheoryandtheprocessbywhich itwas
refuted.Yet,HawthorneandNolannotethat«therelationof thehypothesisof
final causation to evidence is much more of a philosophical puzzle » than
workadaycasesofexplaining,say,howphlogistontheorywasoverturnedbythe
evidence.Intheirpaper,HawthorneandNolanconstructamodelteleologicallaw,
wherelaw-likenessisexplainedinDavidLewis’swayascombiningsimplicityand
informativeness.Theythenask,rhetorically,whytherecouldnotbelawsofthis
kind?(Theystrengthentheirargumentbynotingthatteleologicallawsmightbe
found in the special sciences and thereby restricted to particular domains.) If
HawthorneandNolanhavepresented,asitwere,a«proofofconcept»thenwe
canconclude,atleast,thatNagel’sproposednaturalteleologyisnotapriorifalse
norinternallyinconsistent.Ifhecanmakeaprimafaciecasethatteleologyofthis
kindisnecessarytoexplainthesciencesoflife,thenthereis,asitwere,acaseto
answer–evenifthefinaldeterminationishandedovertotheempiricalsciences
andnotlefttophilosophers.
71T.Nagel,ThePossibilityofAltruism,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1970.72JHawthorne&D.Nolan,Daniel«WhatWouldTeleologicalCausationBe?»reprintedinJ.
Hawthorne,MetaphysicalEssays,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,pp.265–284.
Athirdobjectioncouldbeviewedasmeta-philosophical:Nagelisbundling
togethernon-reductionistsolutionstotheexplanationofhowwehaveknowledge
acrossseveraldomainssuchasthemoral,themathematical,andaprioritruths
about the structure of reason itself. Neutral monism is an overarching
metaphysicaltheorythatexplainsthefundamentalnatureoftherealitythatcan
accommodatesuchtruthsandthecapacitiesofreasonthatunderliethem:sowe
needanaccountofthesciencesoflifeconsistent–strictly,moreconsistent–with
the truth of neutralmonismor panpsychism. (Wehave seenNagel canvas the
advantagesordisadvantagesofbothviews.)
IfthishishowwearebesttounderstandNagel’sproject,thenitlookslike
aparticularambitiousversionofaninferencetothebestexplanation.Mindand
Cosmosisthesearchforanoverallpackageofcommitmentsthatisstrengthened
by its comprehensiveness. The critic may urge that we ought, case by case, to
explain specific problems in specific ways and that inferences to the best
explanationarenotmeta-philosophicallydefensible.Butifheismistakenonthis
point,thenNagelisatleastingoodcompany:forexample,DavidLewis’sOnthe
PluralityofWorldsdefendsmodalrealismpreciselybysuchaninferencetothe
bestexplanationthatspanssolutionstoseveraldistinctphilosophicalproblems73.
Lewis seems also to believe that his overall view – whatever its intrinsic
plausibility – gains credibility from its comprehensive coverage of disparate
problems.
Mostcharitably,Nagelisnottellingthescientistinthelifescienceswhatto
do in the practice of her discipline, simply freeing up that practice from false
assumptionsimposedbyotherphilosophers–notscientists:
«Philosophycannotgeneratesuchexplanations;itcanonlypointoutthe
gaping lack of them, and the obstacles to constructing them out of
presentlyavailablematerials74.»
Reductionistmaterialismistheprematureclosingdownofoptionsthatneedto
be kept open. This is a claim at a high level of generality; I have heard the
distinguished philosopher of science Hilary Putnam remark thatKarl Popper’s
73D.Lewis,OnthePluralityofWorlds,Oxford,Wiley-Blackwell,2001.
74T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.68.
criterionoffalsifiabilitycouldnotbeamarkofagenuinetheorybecausemany
theoriesaresocrazythatthereisnopointtestingtheminthefirstplace.ButNagel
isnotaddinganothercrazytheorytothislist;simplyissuingareminderthatthe
caseagainstbasicteleologicallawsinthelifescienceshasnotconclusivelybeen
made–aclaimatahighlevelofgenerality.Sothereisatleastaprimafaciecase
for considering whether teleological laws are admissible candidates for a
renovationofthelifesciences.ThetaskofproducingsuchtheoriesisnotNagel’s;
butthattaskcanbepursuedfreedfromafalsephilosophicalpreconceptionthat
lawsofacertaincharacterarenotevencandidatesforreasonableconsideration.
Afifthobjectionseemtometocarrymoreweight:itisraisedbyJohnDupré
in his insightful review of the book. Nagel postulates irreducibly teleological
developmentallawstoexplainwhyconsciousmentality(andrationality,andan
innernisustowardsvalue)historicallydevelopedinawaythatmakesthemmore
probable than they would be on a purely mechanistic understanding of their
development.AsDuprénotes, itmaycertainlybedesirablethatanexplanation
makeaneventveryprobablerelativetothesetupinwhichitdevelops.However,
healsonotesnotallexplanationsworklikethis:
«Nagelconstantlyassertsthattoexplaintheexistenceofconsciousness,etc.,
evolutionmustnot justshowthat theyarepossible,butalso that theyare
likely,ortobeexpected…[this]seemstomepoorlymotivated.Atthetimeof
mybirthitwasveryunlikelythatIwouldseveraldecadeslaterbereviewing
abookbyafamousphilosopher;butitisnotmysteriousthatthiseventually
came about. The improbability has been declining rapidly for the last few
decades. Just sowith evolution.The evolutionof reasonmaywell be very
unlikelyindeedonayoung,hotplanet.It'sagreatdealmorelikelybythetime
therearehighlysocial,ifnotyetrational,multicellularorganismswithvery
complexnervoussystems75.»
Perhaps we should view the developmental process as involving a series of
discontinuous breaks that, in each case, fundamentally re-set the baseline
probabilitiesrelativetoeachnewsetup.
ThatmayinvitearesponsefromNagelthatwewouldliketodobetter:his
rationalist,teleologicallygroundedexplanationoftheemergenceofconsciousand
rational subjects ismore intellectually satisfying than itsmaterialist rival. (We
75J.Dupré,«ReviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»NotreDamePhilosophicalReviews,29thOctober
2012.
haveseenthathiscritiqueofemergentisminvolvesdenyingDupré’slastquoted
point:forNagel,noamountofbiologicalcomplexitycanexplaintheemergenceof
consciousmentality.)Butthepointisthatthereisagapbetweentheclaimthat
onestyleofexplanationcandobetterthananotherwhenitcomestomakingthe
developmentofaneventmoreprobable,andtheclaimthatdoesbetterinmaking
theoccurrenceoftheeventmore«intelligible».
ItakeDupré’sdeeperpointtobethatintelligibilityis,inthatsense,quitea
weakconstraintandbothkindsoflaws–causal–mechanicalandteleological–can
meetit.Itmaybelessintellectuallysatisfyingtopostulatealow-probabilityevent
thatthenmakessubsequenteventsmoreprobablerelativetothenewsetupthat
it establishes; but it meets Nagel’s constraint of being intelligible. Perhaps we
simplycannotdoanybetterinthiscase.
Thesixth,andfinal,objectionisthatNagelistoolooseinhisdefinitionsand
attacksastrawman–orasuccessionofthem.Anexamplethatacriticmightcite
isDanielStoljar’spaperinwhichhearguesthatneutralmonismisactuallyaform
ofphysicalismandnotanalternativetoit.76Ithinkthebestresponsehereisto
saythatofcourseabooklikeMindandCosmosisaninvitationtofurtherworkand
to further arguments – such as formulations of non-standard versions of
physicalism of the kind Stoljar develops. If no one remains committed to the
epistemological project of unity represented by the Encyclopedia of Unified
Science,or topsycho-physical reductionism, then fromNagel’sperspective that
canonlybegoodnews.Infact, itseemstomethatheisrighttoidentify«bald
naturalism » as a strong undercurrent in recent philosophy in the analytic
tradition.
Conclusion
I think it is reasonable to describe the critical reception of Nagel’s book as
unfortunate. It should be clear from all of the foregoing that Nagel is simply
workingthroughtheimplicationsofphilosophicalcommitmentsthathehasheld
fordecades.«ThePsychophysicalNexus»isonlyacomparativelyrecentpaper;
76D.Stoljar«TwoConceptionsofthePhysical»,PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearchvol.
62,no.2,pp.253–281.
hiscommitmenttopanpsychismpre-datesitbydecades.Thecentralpartofthe
argumentofMindandCosmosisdrivenbyNagel’sattempttospecifytheimpactof
absorbing the claims of the later paper into the framework of the earlier and
envisioningtheconsequencesforthesciencesoflife77.Thatweoughtnotsimply
toassumethattheideaofateleologicallawisanobsoleterelicisanoptionworth
pursuing,particularlygivenHawthorneandNolan’sclearexplanationofhowa
lawcouldtakethis form.Theyexplainhowsuch lawsarepossible;Nagelgives
grounds for takingsomeof these lawstobeactual. It isnothis jobtodiscover
them,buttoenrichtheintellectualpossibilitiesofthoseworkinginthesciences
of life given that we can all agree that the problem of explaining mentality,
rationalityandvaluearehardproblems.
Onspecificissues,Nagelisnotaloneinholdingtheviewshedoes:heshares
hisconceptionoftheproblemofconsciousnesswithDavidChalmers;heshares
his«reasonsrealism»withCharlesLarmoreandThomasScanlon;heshareshis
panpsychismwithGalenStrawson78.Neutralmonism, in itsRussellianguise, is
currently undergoing a resurgence79 . Nagel’s sin, it seems, was to attempt to
weave these views together in a single synthesis and then derive implications
fromthemforthelifesciencesthatledtohiscritiqueofthetheoryofevolution.It
isthelatterthathasearnedhimthehostilityofseveralofhisreviewers.
Nagel explicitly states that he has been influenced by the critique of
evolutionarytheorydevelopedbyproponentsoftheintelligentdesignhypothesis,
butheisequallyexplicitthatherejectsboththathypothesisofintelligentdesign
andthetheismthatgroundsit.Itseemsodd,then,forhiscriticstoaccusehimof
supernaturalism when Nagel explicitly states that specific explanations in the
naturalsciencescannotbegroundedonfactsaboutdivineagency–theconception
77Asheremarks,thosewhoremaincommittedtopsycho-physicalreductionism“canregardthe
argumentthatfollowsasahypotheticalone”.Headds“Iassumethishypotheticalpositionwillbe
welcome to reductionists, since it shows just how extravagant and costly a position
antireductionisminthephilosophyofmindis”.T.Nagel,MindandCosmos,p.43.78D.Chalmers,TheConsciousMind;C.Larmore,TheAutonomyofMorality,Cambridge,Cambridge
UniversityPress,2008;T.Scanlon,BeingRealisticAboutReasons,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,
2014;G.Strawson,etalConsciousnessandItsPlaceinNature:DoesPhysicalismEntailPanpsychism?
Exeter,ExeterAcademic,2013.79 B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London, Kegan Paul, 1927; G. Rosenberg, A Place for
Consciousness:ProbingtheDeepStructureofthePhysicalWorld,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,
2005;P.GoffConsciousnessandFundamentalReality,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2017.
ofGodassomekindofpartymagician.80ThegeneralchargeseemstobethatNagel
is keeping bad company. 81 But it can hardly be a constraint on a work of
speculativemetaphysics that itoughtnot tobepublishedbecausesome things
oughtnottobesaid,asitwere,«infrontofthechildren».Nagel’ssympathiesare
withintelligentdesign’scritiqueofreductionistnaturalism–notwithintelligent
designitself,thathemakesclearisanexplanatorynon-starter.
Moregenerally,therearecomplaintsthatNagelbegsthequestionwhenit
comestoassumingthetruthofmoralormathematicalrealism,ortotherebeing
truthsofreason,ortotherebeingahardproblemofconsciousness.82Thesereally
areinstanceswhereonephilosopherannouncesassumptionsanddrawsacertain
conclusiononlyforcriticstorespondthat,giventheconclusion,theassumptions
areunacceptable–itisnotasifNagelhasnotalreadydischargedhisintellectual
responsibilitiesinmakingargumentsforeachoftheseclaimsinwhatisnowan
extensivebodyofwork.Eachis,undoubtedly,adisputableclaim;buttherearenot
manyindisputableclaimsinphilosophy.IfNagel’sinventoryofhisowncandidates
forindisputabletruthsisfaringaspoorlyaseveryoneelse’ssimilarlistthensobe
it.However,giventhatNagelhasmadethecaseforthesetheseselsewhereishe
not entitled to draw out what would be, for him, the inference to the best
explanationthatmakesthembothprobableandcredible?
Perhapsweshouldconcludethatphilosophersdostandtolearnat least
thismuchfromthesciences:HelenLonginohasconvincinglymadethecasefor
whatshecallstheoreticalorexplanatorypluralism.83Weneedtokeepasmany
theoreticaloptionsopeninthesciencesaspossible,becausethatwhichweseek
toexplainisverycomplex.Sheconcludesthatwemayneedmanyintellectualtools
inourtoolkit.HasokChanghasaddedtheclaimthatweneedalotoftheoretical
optionsinthescienceseventoexplainverysimplethings,forwhichwedoknow
80Leiter,B.,&Weisberg,M.,«DoYouOnlyHaveaBrain?:OnThomasNagel»TheNation,October
12,2012.81Leiter,B.,&Weisberg,M.,«DoYouOnlyHaveaBrain?:OnThomasNagel»TheNation,October
12,2012;J.Dupré,«ReviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»NotreDamePhilosophicalReviews,29th
October2012.82S.Blackburn,«ThomasNagel:APhilosopherwhoconfessestofindingthingsbewildering»The
NewStatesman,8thNovember,2012;J.Dupré,«ReviewofNagel’sMindandCosmos»NotreDame
PhilosophicalReviews,29thOctober2012.83H.Longino,TheFateofKnowledge,Princeton,NJ,PrincetonUniversityPress,2001.
thatweneedalotofintellectualtoolsinourtoolkit.84Forasubjectonalesssecure
epistemic basis than the sciences, namely philosophy, this would seem to be
methodologically sound advice pertinent to the present case. Speculative
rationalism isnotwell represented in the toolkitof recentphilosophers,but it
wouldbeunfortunateifphilosophydecideditcoulddispensewithitaltogether.
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