based on cshapes (weidmann, kuse , gleditzsch 2010)

10 Years after the ‘Big Bang’ EU Enlargement – An assessment of the causes and consequences of Eastern enlargement and an outlook during times of multiple crises

Baltisch-Deutsches HochschulkontorUniversity of Latvia, Faculty of Economics and Management, Room 504

31/03/2014

Dirk Leuffen (Dirk.Leuffen@uni-konstanz.de)

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9Based on CShapes (Weidmann, Kuse, Gleditzsch 2010).

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Traditionalist Scientistic Rationalist Constructivist

Causes

DemandNugent (2004)…

Mattli & Plümper (2002)Moravcsik (1998)…

Gstöhl (2002)Sundlisaeter Skinner (2012)Friis (1998a)…

Supply Moravcsik (1998)Schneider (2009)…

Tewes (1998)Sedelmeier (2002)Friis (1998b)Schimmelfennig (2003)…

Consequences

EUZielonka (2006)…

Thomson (2011)Hertz & Leuffen (2011)Naurin & Lindahl (2008)…

Bailer et al. (2009)Thomas (2006)…

Candidates/MS

Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2004)Trauner (2009)…

Grabbe (2001)Freyburg & Richter (2010)…

DEEPENING VS. WIDENING…?

EU Enlargement Research (selection)

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Group Size (Public Choice)

THEORY MECHANISM EXPECTATION

Club Theory

Collective action

Non-cooperative game theoryTransaction cost approaches

Spatial Models

A-priori Voting Power Theory

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Group Size (Public Choice)

THEORY MECHANISM EXPECTATION

Club Theory Crowding costs Fewer public goods produced (-)

Collective action Freeriding Fewer public goods produced (-)

Non-cooperative game theory

Informational deficits Less cooperative behavior (-)

Transaction cost approaches Growing complexity Loss of efficiency; slowing down of decision-making (-)

Spatial Models Growing heterogeneity Increase of policy stability (-)

A-priori Voting Power Theory

Reduction of passage probability

Status quo bias (-)

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Club Theory (Buchanan 1965)

Increase of group size-> Crowding costs

-> Fewer incentives to contribute to production of public goods

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Collective Action (Olson 1965)

Increase of group size-> More incentives for freeriding

-> Fewer incentives to contribute to production of public goods

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Non-cooperative Game Theory

(cf. z.B. Hardin 1971; Bonacich et al. 1976)

Increase of group size-> Less information about other players

-> Less cooperative behavior

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Transaction Cost Approaches(cf. Buchanon & Tullock 1962)

Source: Jensen, Hertz & Leuffen (2009)

Increase of group size-> Growing complexity

-> Growing transaction costs-> Efficiency is diminished

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Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002)

SQ

Increase of group size-> Growing heterogeneity (per assumption)

-> Increase of polciy stability

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Group Size (Public Choice)

THEORY MECHANISM EXPECTATION

Club Theory Crowding costs Fewer public goods produced (-)

Collective action Freeriding Fewer public goods produced (-)

Non-cooperative game theory

Informational deficits Less cooperative behavior (-)

Transaction cost approaches Growing complexity Loss of efficiency; slowing down of decision-making (-)

Spatial Models Growing heterogeneity Increase of policy stability (-)

A-priori Voting Power Theory

Reduction of passage probability

Status quo bias (-)

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Expectations Eastern Enlargement• Kerremans (1998)/Dobbins et al. (2004): SQ-bias due to growing

heterogeneity at least in specific policy areas• Zimmer et al. (2005): Growing conflict between net contributors

and net receivers• König & Bräuninger (2000): reduced decision-making capacities,

depending on MS preferences• König & Bräuninger (2004): Growing cores in the agricultural sector• Tsebelis & Yatanagas (2000): Increase of policy-stability• König & Schulz (2000): Rise of transaction costs leads to slowing

down of decision-making• Scharpf (2006): More of the joint-decision-trap• Exception Steunenberg (2002): Enlargement resistant property

under QMV

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Generel Expectation

More Gridlock:Growing policy-stability after enlargement!

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Empirical Findings

Results on the policy-making process• No more negative votes (cf. Mattila 2009;

Hagemann 2008)• Only partial re-ordering of actor constellations

(cf. Thomson 2009, 2011; Veen 2011; Naurin & Lindahl 2008; Plechanovova 2011)

• Slowing down effects (cf. König & Schulz 2000; Hertz & Leuffen 2011; ≠ Golub 2007)

• Continuity in EP and Commission (cf. Hix & Noury 2009; Peterson & Birdsall 2009)

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System Production (Hertz & Leuffen)

• Analysis of EU legislative output (count models)• PreLex 1976-2009 (EUR-Lex; Council summaries) • No general reduction of legislative output after

enlargement rounds (not even in CAP and CFP)• But: slight reduction of directives!

OVERALL: WHY SO MUCH CONTINUITY?

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Group Size in Sociology

THEORY MECHANISM RESULTOligarchization

Formalization

Adaptation

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Group Size in Sociology

THEORY MECHANISM RESULTOligarchization Growing difference

between actors; more hierarachy

Concentration of power

Formalization Inefficiency leads actors to reform institutions

Institutional response

Adaptation Social mechanism of influence (Johnston 2001); Contract by convention (Hardin 1982)

Cooperative behavior is continued after enlargement

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Oligarchization

• Network analyses show slight increase in concentration

• Link to outputs, however, rather unclear• Models show that the influence of big states is

rather limited

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Formalization

• No strong evidence for formalization; e.g. increasing use of „trilogues“

• But: institutional response; e.g. reform treaties & reform of Council Rules of Procedure (abolishment of tour de table)

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Adaptation

• Newcomers adopt existing decision-making behavior

• Mechanisms of social influence (Johnston 2001)?

• Consensual decision-making is still the rule after enlargement

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Heterogeneity

• Assumption of growing heterogeneity of MS preferences after enlargement…

• Structural-variables (GDP, occupational structure, history…) suggest more tensions…

Preferences in the enlarged EU

„DEU II“ (with R. Thomson & J. Arregui)

• Expert interviews to measure preferences and saliences of EU member states

• 152 controversial issues / 56 legislative proposals after enlargement

• „low politics“• Scale ranging from 0 to 100

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Counterfactual Analysis

What if…?How would the EU have decided in the

„good old days“?

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Model

• Model as approximation of reality in order to „rerun history“

• Compromise-model (van den Bos 1991; Achen 2006)

(= inst. Realism; approximation of Nash bargaining solution)

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Example

0 50 100

COM (2006) 373 (2006/0132/COD)

ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)

Issue 11. Areal spraying of crops (cf. art. 9 of COM-proposal)

Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive

Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions

Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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AUT BEL BUL CYP CZ

DK EE FI FR DE

EL ES HU IE IT

LT LU LV MT NL

PL POR RO SI SK

SE UK

Compromise-ModelISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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AUT0

BEL50

BUL0

CYP100

CZ100

DK100

EE100

FI100

FR50

DE50

EL50

ES100

HU0

IE50

IT0

LT100

LU50

LV100

MT50

NL100

PL100

POR50

RO0

SI50

SK50

SE100

UK50

Compromise-ModelISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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AUT0

BEL50

DK100

FI100

FR50

DE50

EL50

ES100

IE50

IT0

LU50

NL100

POR50

SE100

UK50

Counterfactual EU 15 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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BEL50

DK100

FR50

DE50

EL50

ES100

IE50

IT0

LU50

NL100

POR50

UK50

Counterfactual EU 12 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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BEL50

DK100

FR50

DE50

EL50

IE50

IT0

LU50

NL100

UK50

Counterfactual EU 10 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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BEL50

DK100

FR50

DE50

IE50

IT0

LU50

NL100

UK50

Counterfactual EU 9 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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BEL50

FR50

DE50

IT0

LU50

NL100

Counterfactual EU 6 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

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Procedure counterfactual analysis1. Per issue: 6 predictions generated (EU27 to EU6)

2. Comparison of prediction and actual measured outcome

3. Average difference for EU6 to EU27 over ALL issues

3b. Disaggregation into policy areas (Harm., Reg., Redistr.)

4. Comparison of distance between model predictions and reference point (mostly SQ) over different group sizes

QUESTION: Do enlargement rounds lead to SQ-bias?

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All acts Fin. Sub. Reg. Harmon.

EU25/27

EU15

EU12

EU10

EU9

EU6

N 152

Mean Absolute Errors (=average errors of model predictions to measured output)

Performance

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All acts Fin. Sub. Reg. Harmon.

EU25/27 24.22

EU15 25.03

EU12 25.25

EU10 25.33

EU9 25.39

EU6 26.89

N 152

Performance

Mean Absolute Errors (=mean errors of model predictions to measured output)

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All acts Fin. Sub. Reg. Harmon.

EU25/27 24.22 24.65 23.13 28.01

EU15 25.03 25.59 23.17 29.40

EU12 25.25 26.37 23.93 29.25

EU10 25.33 25.18 23.59 29.27

EU9 25.39 25.74 23.11 29.01

EU6 26.89 27.56 25.31 30.78

N 152 18 69 52

Performance

Mean Absolute Errors (=average errors of model predictions to measured output)

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SQ Bias?

Average distance of model prediction to reference point;N = 152.

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SQ Bias?

Average distance of model prediction to reference point

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SQ Bias?

Average distance of model prediction to reference point

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Boxplots: distance to RP0

2040

6080

100

Dis

tanc

e to

Ref

eren

ce P

oint

EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome

All Issues

020

4060

8010

0D

ista

nce

to R

efer

ence

Poi

nt

EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome

Financial Subsidies Issues

020

4060

8010

0D

ista

nce

to R

efer

ence

Poi

nt

EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome

Harmonization Issues

020

4060

8010

0D

ista

nce

to R

efer

ence

Poi

nt

EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome

Regulation Issues

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Caveats

• Measurement of ideal points?• Anticipation of Commission? Enlarged

orchestra plays a different tune…• Validity of compromise model: is predictive

capacity sufficiently strong?

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Administrative capacity?

Overall salience means and predicted values for each country based on DEU II (source Leuffen, Malang & Woerle 2014).

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Current Challenges

• Compliance• Euro Crisis• EU – Russia Relations• Public Opinion – Support for EU – Legitimacy• …

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Conclusion

• Eastern enlargment no watershed!• Institutional response + preference structure

can explain the high degree of continuity• Eastern enlargement overall a success story