800xa high integrity fgs and bms applications - abb … · 800xa high integrity fgs and bms...
Post on 15-Apr-2018
221 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
© ABB© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 1
800xA High IntegrityFGS and BMS Applications
Luis M. Duran, Prodict Marketing Manager Safety Systems, February 2013
© ABB
§ Safety Systems
§ Safety Standards and Application-Specific Standards
§ Changes to Functional Safety Standards
§ ABB Offering
§ 800xA High Integrity Overview
§ What’s New?
§ Services Overview/SEC and FSMS
§ Fire & Gas Systems
§ Burner Management Systems
§ Conclusions
Content
© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 2
© ABB
What is Safety? What is Risk ?
§ Safety§ Freedom from
unacceptable Risk
§ Risk§ Combination of:
§ probability ofoccurrence of harm
and
§ the severity of the harm
© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 3
© ABB
Risk Reduction
Residualrisk
Processrisk
RiskTarget
Increasingrisk
Necessary risk reductionActual risk reduction
Risk reductionleft to be
handled by theSafety
InstrumentedSystems
SIS
Risk reductiondue to othertechnology:-fire pumps,-foam systems,-water curtains,-deluge systems(hydraulic, pneumatic )
Calculated Process RiskAcceptable Level of Risk(Defined by user per application)
Risk reductiondue to mechanicalequipment like:- relief valve,- non return valve,- dyke…
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 4
© ABB
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
§ SIS reduce risk andconsequently protect
• People,• Environment• Equipment and• Business
• SIS performance is measureby Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
• SIL 1 (Lower)• SIL 4 (Higher)
© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 5
© ABB
Independent Protection Layers (IPL) to reduce Risk
§ Each IPL mustindependently protectagainst the hazard theyare designed tosafeguard
§ Hazard occurs when alayer fails to respond tothe process demand
§ Objective of SIS IPLmust be maintained
OperatorIntervention
Automatic SIS
Safety relief valveRupture disk, etc
ContainmentDyke, Bunker, etc
Plant responseCommunity response
Process variable BPCS
ALARMS
SIS
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 6
© ABB© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 7
Safety Standards Timeline
USA
Inte
rnat
iona
lG
erm
any
UK
1995
IEC SC 65 IEC 61508
ISO 10418
DIN VDE 0801
DINVDE 19250
HSE PES
OHSA CFR1910.119
ISA dS84.01
API RP14C
1995Draft
1995Draft
1993
1991
1989
1987
1974
ANSI/ISAS84.01
1999
2005
IEC 61511 2003
1996
1992
1974
,Flix
boro
ugh
1976
,Sev
eso
1984
,Bho
pal
1986
,Che
rnob
le
1988
,Pip
erA
lpha
1989
,Pas
aden
a
PRESCRIPTIVE STANDARDS
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
ANSI/ISAS84.00.01 (IEC 61511 Mod)
2004
1st Generation Systems
© ABB
§ © ABB Group
§ May 31, 2013 | Slide 8
Certificates800xA High Integrity – ABB Safety Certificates
§ TÜV Product Service, the foremost independentcertification agency in the business, has certified allproduct components on the 800xA Safety offering
Product SafetyCertificate
Development DepartmentSafety Certificate
Safety Manual
© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 8
© ABB
§ © ABB Group
§ May 31, 2013 | Slide 9
800xA High Integrity – SIL3 CertifiedCertificate
Also NFPA certified forF&G and BMS
SIL3 Certified
© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 9
© ABB
§ Functional Safety
§ IEC 61508
§ IEC 61511/ISA 84
§ UL1998
§ Basic Safety
§ IEC61131
§ EN50178
§ UL508
CertificatesIndustry Standards
§ Application Standards
§ NFPA72/EN54
§ NFPA85/FM 7605
§ IEC62061
§ NFPA79
© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 10
© ABB
Nationally Recognized Testing Lab (NRTL)
§ TÜV SÜD Product ServicesGmbH (TUVPSG)§ 49-89-5008-4335
§ Ridlerstrasse 65, D-80339
§ Munich, Germany
§ List includes:§ CSA International
§ FM Approvals LLC (FM)(formerly Factory Mutual ResearchCorporation)
§ Underwriters Laboratories Inc.(UL)
§ For additional informationplease visit§ http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/nr
tllist.html© ABB GroupMay 31, 2013 | Slide 11
© ABB
Changes to Functional Safety Standards
§ Functional safety: Safety instrumented systems for theprocess industry sector
§ Consistency between IEC61511 and ISA 84
§ Performance Based Functional Safety Standards areapplicable to Fire and Gas Systems (NFPA 72),Burner/Boiler Management Systems (NFPA 85) andOven/Furnaces (NFPA 86)
§ Fire and Gas Systems
§ Check: ISA-TR-84.00.07-2010
§ Burner Management Systems
§ Check: ISA-TR84.00.05-2009
§ IEC61508 Edition 2 (2010)
§ IEC 61511 under revision© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 12
© ABB
Access to information…Seamlessly and in contextIntegrated Control and Safety Systems
“Integrated but separate” architectures continue to gain traction… ARC© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 13
© ABB
Thanks to a Common Operation Environment……Operator can take timely action
Monitor the Process and respond to Abnormal Conditions
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 14
© ABB
System 800xA HI – Integrated SafetyCustomer value of integration – available today
Plant-wideSequenceof Events
Same operationsinterface andengineering
CentralizedHistorian andData Archiving
CentralizedHistorian andData Archiving
Common, integratedasset management
strategy
Common systemtherefore reduced
spare parts, trainingetc…
CentralizedHistorian andData Archiving
Process control andsafety running in
separate controllers
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 15
© ABB
800xA High IntegrityDiverse Architecture, Diverse Implementation
§ The SIL 3 800xA High Integrity controllerhas parallel processing paths based ondiverse technology
§ Integrity voting between pathscompliments the built in activediagnostics
§ Controller and Supervision Moduledeveloped by diverse (different) teams(Vasteras and Malmo, Sweden) andtested by a third team (Oslo, Norway) bypeople with different backgrounds
§ The two channel architecture meets SIL3requirements for hardware fault detectionand reaction
1oo1D 1oo2D
90 - 9960 - 90< 60
0SFF (%)
SIL 3SIL 2SIL 1
1SIL 1SIL 2SIL 3SIL 4
HFT
> 99
IEC61508-2 Table 3
PM
SM Safety I/O SIL3
CBSIL3
AC800M HISIL3
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 16
© ABB
What do you mean Diversity?Example of Embedded Diversity
§ Software diversity inlogic solver§ PM865 & SM811
§ Different operating systems
§ Different base softwarelayers
§ Different un-packingprocedures
§ Different development andtesting teams with differentbackground in severallocations
§ Etc…
§ Embedded Diversity offersa significant contribution tooverall system integrity.
§ i.e. to execute the samelogic on / in diverse ways /software,
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 17
© ABB
What do you mean Diversity?More on Embedded Diversity
§ Hardware diversity in S800 High Integrity I/O modules
§ Each IO module has two diverse execution pathsbased on different hardware technology
§ MCU and FPGA respectively
§ Each individual single IO module has an internal 1oo2architecture
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 18
© ABB
§ © ABB Group
§ May 31, 2013 | Slide 19
AC800M High IntegrityRedundant Controller Configuration
SM811 BC810 PM865
Optical Modulebus
RCU LinkCEX bus
Redundant I/OTB 840
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 19
© ABB
§ © ABB Group
§ May 31, 2013 | Slide 20
SecuritySystem Security And Embedded Firewalls
§ Provides functions for protection of SILclassified applications in AC800M HIControllers
§ SIL Access Control andAuthorization
§ Force Control / Override Control /Bypass Management
§ Confirmed Online Write / ConfirmedOperation
§ Embedded firewalls and confirmationprocedures protect the SIL applicationfrom inadvertent / accidental controlactions
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 20
© ABB
SecurityRoles & Responsibilities
§ Users can be assigned with differentpermissions according to theirresponsibilities
§ Restriction of access to the SIS(operation and engineering)
§ High flexibility
Proc
ess
Ope
rato
r
Safe
tyO
pera
tor
Proc
ess
Engi
neer
Safe
tyEn
gine
erOperate BPCS X X
Operate SIS X
Engineer BPCS X X
Engineer SIS X
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 21
© ABB
More Efficient and Effective TroubleshootingSafety relevant information is readily available
§ Alarms, Events, Audit Trail, andSOE displays for root causeanalysis
§ Real-time information
§ Standard functionality forinhibiting of specific safetyfunctions
§ Status supervision of SafetySystem Elements
§ Flexible Report Creation andScheduling
§ Valve Leak Test, Verification,Automatic ShutdownReporting, SIL status
§ © ABB Group
§ May 31, 2013 | Slide 22
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 22
© ABB
Installed BaseInstallations Across The Globe
§ ABB’s intimate knowledge of and experiencefrom all conceivable locations, environmentsand applications directly benefits end-users
§ With more 30 years on the market theinstalled base is spread across
§ …more than 55 countries…
§ …on all continents and across allregions…
§ …and all traditional safety systemsindustry segments such as oil & gas,petrochemical and chemical industries…
§ …as well as more non-traditional safetysystems industry segments such as pulp& paper, semiconductor and minerals &mining facilities.
“Reducing risk where it isneeded…”
More than 4,600 controllerssold since initial release inJanuary 2005
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 23
© ABB
Fast Adoption on a Conservative Market Space
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 24
© ABB
Small Independent HI system with engineering and DCS
§ HI Hardware§ TUV certified SIL 3
controller (single)§ 24 VDC DC I/O and 4-20
ma Analog inputs§ Control Builder Safety
§ IEC1131 languages§ Access control and
override control§ Certified Libraries
§ Safety and Supervision§ Application (F&G, BMS)
§ Connectivity and Interfacing§ ABB Control systems§ 3rd party software and
control systems§ Diagnostics
Independent High IntegrityScope of supply
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 25
© ABB
Automation can’t check for human intervention
§ Industrial plants are designed withthe highest accuracy in mind, withseveral separate safety loops oftenchecking the integrity of processsystems.
§ Can this apparatus check for humanintervention?
§ No, they can’t!
§ A small human error could cause anenormous catastrophe.
§ Bear in mind that 70% of reportedincidents in the oil and gas industryworldwide are attributable to humanerror and account for in excess of90% of the financial loss to theindustry.
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 26
© ABB
Primary Cause of SIS System Failure
43
15
15
6
21
Specification
Design and Implementation
Operation and Maintenance
Installation and Commisioning
Changes after operation
Source: Out of control: Why control systems go wrong and how to prevent failureHSE Books ISBN 0-7176-2192-8
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 27
© ABB
Functional Safety Management SystemOrganisational Structure
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 28
© ABB
ABB’s Safety Execution CentersOver 24 locations globally
Safety Execution Center (SEC)TUV Certified SEC
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 29
© ABB
§ Organizations shall appoint one or more persons withresponsibility for one or more phases…..
§ All persons, departments or organizations shall beidentified, responsibilities clearly defined andcommunicated
§ Activities related to management of functional safety shallbe applied at the relevant phases
§ All persons undertaking specific activities shall have theappropriate competence
§ The competence shall be documented
Source: IEC 61508
Management of Functional SafetyCompetency now normative
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 30
© ABB
Fire & Gas System – F&GSystem Configuration Example
Living Quarters
Addressable Firedetection loop
ControlRoom
GasProcessing
Local FireAlarm System
Sprinkler
SerialCommunication link
HVAC
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 31
© ABB
§ Usually divided into fire areas by geographical location
§ Hierarchical structure
§ Overview display
§ Detailed presentation of each detector with detailed status information
§ All alarms and overrides presented in one display
§ Inhibits and override functionality
§ Specific detectors or a group
§ Manual activation from call points in the field or by operator releasecommands from the control room
§ Voting mechanisms used on input channels to avoid spurious trips
§ 1oo2, 2oo3, 2ooN
§ Communication possibilities with addressable F&G stations
§ Safety Integrity Level
§ Typically SIL2
Fire & Gas System – F>ypical Functional Requirements
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 32
© ABB
Fire & Gas System800xA HI – Safety Certified Libraries
§ Supervision Library
§ Detector input
§ System control andmonitoring
§ Output handling
§ Overview presentation
§ Libraries enable significantsavings during engineering
Fire & Gas LibraryModules for monitoring and control
of protection systemsCO2DelugeSprinkler
Override functionality built into the modules tosupervise the use of Force, Inhibit, Disable,and Manual Mode
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 33
© ABB
§ © ABB Group
§ May 31, 2013 | Slide 34
Fire & Gas System – F&G800xA HI – Operator Display
L11
L12
L13
M21
M10
M22
M11
M23
M12
D11
PlatformOverview
§ Displays organized in a hierarchy levels
1. Site overview display (the top level display)
2. At least one level of group of areas
3. Area detail displays (the bottom level)
Not only the condition ofthe detectors but also thephysical location
FIRE
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 34
© ABB
Group overviewGroup overview
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Site overview
SiteOverview
GroupOverview
AreaOvreview
DetectorFaceplate
Fire & Gas System – F&G800xA HI – Display Structure
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 35
© ABB
§ Enable quick response to operational conditions througheasy access to information during all sequence steps
§ Enable maintenance and test procedures withoutcompromising process safety
§ Bypass management
§ Controlled access to bypasses, normally prohibited
§ Monitoring and Proof Testing
§ Valve Stroke Test
§ Verification of integrity of instrumented functions
§ Safety Integrity Level
§ SIL2 or SIL3
§ Have you performed a Safety Assessment?
Burner Management System – BMSTypical Functional Requirements
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 36
© ABB
DCSController
Emergency OffPushbutton
OperatorWorkplace
BMSController
OperatorWorkplace
AC800M HI AC800M
Burner Management System – BMS800xA HI - Example System Configuration
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 37
© ABB
Boiler Management System – BMS800xA HI – More Key Benefits
§ Easy Implementation
§ IEC 6-1131-3 supportedlanguages
§ SupervisionBasicLib
§ Display Structure
§ Shutdown System Overview through standard graphic elements
§ Flexible display design to reduce time to decision and action
§ Bypass management and Forced Control
§ Sequence of Events
§ Information Management for safety
§ Shutdown reports
§ Valve operation reports
§ Asset Optimization for monitoring
3
Supported Languages SIL2 SIL3
Function Block Yes Yes
Structured Text Yes Yes
Sequential Function Chart Yes No
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 38
© ABB
Process Safety SystemsARC Strategies for Success
§ Ignore the Dual(Duplex), TMR, QMR Arguments
§ Look for Industry Expertise and Project ExecutionExperience
§ Offer Certified Safe Sensors
§ Integrate Security with Safety
§ Get Your System Security Certified
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 39
© ABB
Conclusion
§ Best in Class companies link safety to their success andinvest in programs and systems to reduce their risk
§ Engineers have attempted to reduce risk by minimizing thepotential for common cause failures
§ Common cause failures can occur in products (hardware orsoftware) or the implementation of the application
§ The industry have conceived best practices (FSMS) tominimize the impact of human error
§ Human factors can’t be ignored in the design, particularly inthe project design
§ Enforcement of these best practices (FSMS) is a way toreduce the risk introduced by engineers… is vital!
© ABB Control SystemsMay 31, 2013 | Slide 40
© ABB
Questions
31 May 2013 | Slide 41
top related