American Demographics

is always a danger when making long-range projections thatthe world as we know it may be turned upside down and remade inways that no linear forecast can capture. Consider predictions in themid-l*>th century that New York City would be buried in severalfeet of horse manure a century later. That thought was based on esti-mated population ijrowth, transportation demand, and equine fecesproduction. The invention of internal combustion spared the cityfrom mountains of manure, but in tbe process polluted its air andhelped alter the world's climate. Exit one anticipated problem, enteranother unpredictable one.

In a similar vein, estimating how many people will inhabit theU.S. in 3109 is partly folly. Cenuiry-forward population predictionshave been tried in the past, and most of them have been spectacu-larly off the mark.

imagine trying to project the U.S. population in 2009 from thevantage point of f 909. The waves of immigrants coming to the U.S.in the early 1900s and the sky-high birth rate at the dme would sig-nal robust growth over the next century, but n 1924 law severely

niting immigration and a big drop in fertilitj- due to depressiond war dampened these numbers.

nversely, a post-World War II baby bt)om (1948-1964) and aw expanding immigration added millions to tbe nation andl ihc U.S. growth rate backup. In the end, the nation's popu-

lation m.m.iged to more than triple—growing from about 92 millionin 1909 to ;ibout 306 million today. Most turn-of-the-20th-centuryt'^lini-ites liad the nation at 300 million by the middle of the 20thcentury, whereas that number was reached only in 2006.

So what is the official U.S. projection for the next 100 years? In000, as part of the worldwide millennium celebration, the Censusureau projected U.S. population to the year 2100. Following itssual method, the agency developed three scenarios—low, medium,d high growtb.

The lowest estimate predicted almost no population growth frome year 2000, with a starting population of 275 million and a popu-tion of perhaps 300 million by 2100 (whereas, again, the nationached that level only a few years after this estimate was made).js scenario assumed a below-repíacement-level fertility rate of 1.6

ren per woman and sharp limits on immigration,he middle scenario assumed fertility at slightly above replace-

mi,'i'1rli'\ci and just fewer than one million immigrants per year. Theresult is ,1 doubling of tbe 2000 population—or 571 million Ameri-

10 I Planning May 2009

Ci rea 2109

People, places, and

densities a century

from now.

By Robert E. Lang,

Mariela Alfonzo,

and Casey Dawkins

The high-growth scenario assumes that ininiigration will keepincreasing and that high fertihty among immigrants will lift the rateto 2.7 births per woman. Under this scenario, the U.S. populationin 2100 clocks in at 1.2 bilhon—slightly larger than India's currentnumber and just hehind the figure in today's China.

Cornucopians versus doomsters

Is there a China-sized population in our future? That depends onwhom you ask. .^t the 2008 American Planning Association Confer-ence in Las V'egas, our colleague Arthur C. Nelson, YMCP (now at theUniversity of Utah), presented the case that we are on track to hit thecensus's high projection. He based his prediction in part on immedi-ate past performance. Since 2000—the starting point for the CensusBureau's century-long projection—the U.S. has gained people onthe high side of the range. It could even reach 311 million residentshy 2010, which is the upper bencliinark for the decade (although it ismore likely to fall a few million people shy ofthe mark).

As with the census's high estimate, Nelson assumes continued im-migration and high fertility, but he also adds much longer life expec-tancy. He argues, too, that the U.S. can sustain many more peoplethan it does now in part because Americans can build much denserurban environments than we have currently. Nelson even speculatesthat all additional population growth to 2100 can fit onto the na-tion's existing surface parking lots.

The Census Bureau and Nelson assume that the world's resourc-es will be used in a way that adequately supports or even greatly ex-pands America's population. The view can be seen as "comucopian"because its advocates assert that improving technology will allowhumans to use natural resources in a way that does not limit popula-tion growth. It should be noted that so far the cornucopian view hasbeen correct.

Not everyone shares Nelson's rosy vision of the nation's future.An entire neo-Malthusian school has emerged that sees the nationshrinking back to its 19th century population size. We call thesefolks the "Doomsters." Perhaps the best known Doomstcr is JamesHoward Künstler, familiar to many planners for his influential 1993book, The Geography of Nowhere.

In the book, Kunstler offers a harsh critique of suburbia, mostly indesign terms (i.e., it is ugly and alienating). But in Kunstler's recentworks, The Long Emci-gemy and the fictional IVorld Made Iry Hand, agrimmer assessment of the suburban future emerges. Kunstler nowargues that the suburbs—and America overall—are doomed because

American Planning Association 11

of resource depletion and global climatechange.

This is not a new idea. Thomas Mal-thus proposed it at the start of the Indus-trial Revolution. The idea's most recentprevious incarnation was the Club ofRome's 1972 report, The Limits to Growth,which argued the world's population wasabout to overshoot the planet's carryingcapacity.

In the modem version of this view, themost important single force leading toAmerica's inevitable population decline is"peak oil," the notion that we have nowextracted half the petroleum the worldwill ever produce and that it is all down-hill from here. (See "Post Carhon Cities,"December 2008.) While the idea that theworld is nearing peak oil is an increasinglycommon view, it is Kunstler's interpreta-tion of this event that makes him a doom-ster. He sees no possible substitution foroil. He argues that all alternative formsof carbon-based energy, such as coal, sand

How many will die off? Kunstler is abit vague on the number, but he is cer-tain that the sustainable population of theU.S. will be similar to that of the late 19thcentury, before oil became widely used.Thus, in his view, the U.S. could shrink to75 or even 50 million hy 2100. The worldpopulation may fall to just a billion, andthe most pessimistic doonisters—who seeagriculture as a multimillennium failedexperiment—caution that the worldcould be down to tens of millions.

Our best guessWe see U.S. population growth reach-ing about the mid range of the censusestimates at the start of the next century.That means there should be nearly 600million Americans in 2109, or just underdouble our current population.

The estimate is based on several as-sumptions—first, that there will not beanother world war or devastating globalpandemic or that our current recession

While whites in 2109 may netleek'* like whites teday, whites

as defined hy the Census willstill he the majerity.

tar, and shale oil, are severely limited andimpractical alternatives at best.

Künstler also believes the U.S. is nearpeak natural gas, despite recent break-tlirough technology that has substantiallyincreased U.S. gas reserves and produc-tion. (See "Fort Worth's Bonanza," July2008.) As for other alternatives, includinggreen technologies such as wind and solarenergy. Kunstler says they can only helpmarginally at best.

The bottom line for Kunstler and hisfellow doomsters is that the planet nowhas way too many people and that lotsof them will die premature deaths be-cause their food supply and basic needsare heavily energy dependent and we arerunning out of oil. There is even a termfor this process—the "die off (not tomention a website, www.dieoff.org, andwell over a million Google citations forthe term).

becomes a depression like the GreatDepression of the 1930s. Further, we as-sume the Mad Max scenarios laid out bythe doomsters do not come to pass, butenvironmental stress and resource limitspresent enough of a technological chal-lenge to at least slow world populationgrowth.

Also, we assume that the U.S. re-mains attractive to immigrants but thatthe numbers decline in a few decadesas world population growth slows. And,while some of us may want to live for-ever, humans will live only a bit longerthroughout the 21st century. Finally, weassume fertility will remain stähle, andperhaps more importantly the high fertil-ity rates among immigrants should dropsubstantially after one generation here inthe U.S.

A major factor in population growthis choice. As a nation, we make the pub-

lic policy that can alter the course of how-many people live here. For example, adramatic shift in opinion can produce anew politics of immigration. Just a yearago it seemed like the Republican Partywas becoming anti immigration. But thepresidential candidate who emerged—Sen. John McCain—held the most openview on immigration (which he alteredsomewhat during the campaign).

The diverse coalition that helpedelect President Barack Obama signaleda new demographic reality that eventhe Republicans are now starting to em-brace. The GOP recently elected formerMaryland Lt. Gov. Michael Steele, anAfrican American, as its party chairman,and many see Indian American LouisianaGov, Bobby Jindal as a rising star.

Yet there is no guarantee that the cur-rent open-door policy on immigrationwill last for decades. It could even fall vic-tim to a prolonged economic downturn,like the one we may now be entering. Im-migrants and the children born to immi-grants make up such a large share of theprojected population growth that evenslight changes to the numbers enter-ing the U.S. over the next decade coulddramatically alter the final estimate ofhow many people will live here 100 yearshence.

Predicting population growth is alsolike forecasting the weather—the fur-ther into the future one estimates, theless accurate the forecast. In predictingthe weather, one can rely on a high sta-tistical probability that the forecast willbe accurate a few days out but that therewill be a dramatic fall-off in predictabil-ity with each additional day. Population ismuch more stable than the weather, andthe time horizon for prediction is longer.Days become years and decades, and inthe end both meteorology and demogra-phy often miss the mark.

Thus population projections to mid-century are more likely to be accuratethan those extended out 100 years. Evenso, adjustments to population projectionsare common. For example, when theU.S. population reached 300 million in3006, the Census Bureau forecast that wewould add another 100 million residentsby 2043. In August 2008, however, theCensus adjusted this estimate to reflecta faster-than-expected growth rate. Now,the Census predicts that the U.S. will get

1? Planning May 2009

Nevertheless, despite the small fluc-tuations in this projection, it is very likelythat the U.S. population will he at 400million by midcentury. iVfter that point,the projections become fuzzier. If we hadto guess, it may be the final jump from,say, 500 to 600 million that is die leastcertain. However, the probability reinainshigh that the U.S. can reach at least a halfbillion people by 2109.

How will the U.S. stack up?

VMiere does this put the U.S. in theglobal context? This nation is the onlydeveloped country that is on track toadd substantial population. Other G7nations such as (¡ermany and Japan willlikely ct)ntinue to contract, while theU.K. and France will grow slowly. Ifthe U.S. jumps to 400 million by 2039,it will probably have added 100 millionrcsitlents faster than all other nationsexeept India and Pakistan, and will evenoutpace China.

Again, forces within our control willpartly determine the rate of growth. Ifthe U.S. lacks the will or the resources tosubstantially upgrade its crumbling infra-structure, its economic growdi may slowand that may diminish its attraction toimmigrants. But if the U.S. remains opento inunigration and its economy booms,we could see the next 100 million peopleat an even earlier date.

There are also external forces drivingimmigration, including such push factorsas how attractive the U.S. is compared toother nations. Conti'ary to all the hype,the baby boomers can retire with somereasonable certaint)' that they will receivemost of what they were promised fromSocial Security. Barring some break-through medical technology that curesold age, all it would take to secure thesebenefits is a year or two added to the So-cial Security minimum retirement ageand a bit more income subject to payrolltaxes (say a jump from $ 100,000 per yearto $125,01)1) and then indexed thereaf-ter).

Why the ros)' forecast on Social Se-curity? You can thank the 1965 immigra-tion reform for that outlook. Just as thebaby boom ended, the U.S. reopened toimmigrants. T'he numbers were small atfirst, but in the last 20 years they equaledthe immigrant boom of the late 19th andearly 20th centuries. The result is that

How America Finally Solved its Race ProblemIn 2110 the U.S., changing a few words in what was original!)' a I9()l gospelsong, adopted a national anthem that was more uplifting than its original one.The new song was "We Have Overcome."

In its second centur\', the .American pianning field saw extraordinary events:the shrinkage of Philadelphia and lampa to village size; the ensuing GreatScale-Up that created serious national and regional planning; the parallel emer-gence of the land consumer movement; the revival of Ohio; the triumph of theBuffalo Commons in the Great Plains.

No story was more remarkable than the one that led to the new anthem. Itopened in the second decade of the 21st century in the Lower Mississippi RiverDelta. In 1986, the rock poet Paul Simon sang in "Graceland" that "the Deltashines like a national guitar." In 1948 Mississippi s David (]ohn said that theDelta's core goes from the lobby of Memphis's Peabody Hotel to Catfish Row inVicksburg, Mississippi—still true more than a centur\' and a half later.

The Delta runs cast and west along the Mississippi liiver, stretehing acrossparts of seven states, from Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri in the north 750miles through Arkansas and Tennessee to Louisiana and Mississippi in the south.Many Delta counties had black majorities or near-majorities deep into the 21stcentury. 7 he mainly rural and small-town Delta—^and its attendant racism,violence, and poverty—vividly formed coundess artists, writers, and musicians,both black and white.

The Endless Flood and its aftermath

In the Delta the river always has the last word. That was certainly true duringits legendary floods of 1861,1927, and 1973. The performance of the Delta'sdams, canals, locks, and levees determined its prospects, as if in F,g\iit. All failedin 2O19's Endless Flood, so ealied because it never seemed to ebb. It destroyedevery major Delta city along the Mississippi, from Memphis to New Orleans,and much of the region's agriculture.

The rebuilding of the Delta gripped the nation.'! he Delta Planning Boardwas formed immediately after the 2019 flood and by midcentury it had becomethe nation's most powerñil regional planning agency.

The board's new emphasis on land use, ecological restoration, and innova-tive laser work approaches to the river averted destruction from major floods,particularly after the agency took control of the Delta operations of the now-defunct Army Corps of Engineers. At the turn of die 22nd century, it was clearthat the Grand Reconciliation—as the rebuilding movement was called—hadmade the Delta's recoveiy the most successful large redevelopment project inAmerican history.

The Grand Reconciliation created a vast new interracial Great ReverseMigration that stemmed the Delta's population outflow, inspiring the babyboomers' children and later generations to spend their years of national servicein the Delta, invest in it, and retire there. The rebuilt cities of Memphis and there-sited New Orleans flourished as gateways to the region, with Baton Rouge,Natchez, and Vicksburg as its nodes.

Tbe Grand Reconciliation enlarged many kinds of Delta tourism: musical,literary, antebellum, slaver)'. Civil War, civil rights, great house. Native Ameri-can, food, farming, and environmental. It fostered culture, including schools ofcomputer art, kudzu-based architecture, and the newly influential social scienceof improving race relations.

Because of the Grand Reconciliation the Delta bloomed in ways die nationhad never seen. Americans responded to the flood with a will to overcome thehorrors they bad allowed to occur after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. If they againhad not prevented a flood, at least they could improve on the aftertnatb.

The Delta showed the country and the world how racial integration reallyworked. By 2065, the widely celebrated bicentennial of Appomattox, it had

American Planning A55Odation 13

assimilated its fast-growing Latino popula-tion, then a third of the region. The lessonst<tok elsew here in the country. They arrivedslowly, well after the nation's 2076 tricen-tennial, in tbe urban North and Midwest.But in tbe end the Delta set an effectivenational e.xampte for decency, goodwill, op-timism, and bard work. It became a secular(and also highly religious) version of PaulSimon's Ciraccland, a place where a!I suffer-ers went to be received and redeemed.

Free at last

I be ccreniun)' atloj>tmg "We Have Over-come" as the national anthem took place onthe National .Mall amid the cherr\' blos-soms. The president was an Austrian-Co-ma nche-American, a self-made trillionairessfrom Delta Tennessee and a founder of tbedominant New Lincoln Part}'. From thesteps of the King Memorial, she addresseda spillover crowd estimated at five million.Allsensovision carried her speech to a globalaudience more than 1,000 times as large,nearly haH the world's population.

Presitient Alta Koch spoke in her softDelta drawl; "Welcome v bienvenido, lôdaywe renew our vast national journey: epluri-hns tiniim—Out of Many, One. I want tomention some of our compatriots on wbatDr. King called the long walk ro freedom.We must never fitrget tbe millions wholived and died in the Delta and elsewhere tomake this day possible.

"Cond(tlceza Rice—do any of youremember who she was?-—regarded slaveryas America's original sin, its moral birthdefect. To the inemor\' ofW.E.B. Du Bois,we say with assurance that today Americano longer has the color line you rigbtly sawas the 20th CLMitury's worldwide curse. Inour countrj' it lasted much too long intothe 21 St. Please join me and tbe Marian An-tierson Choir in singing the first verse andchorus of our new national antbem." t\ná agreat roar went up:

We have oi'erarme,

We have overcmne.

We have overcome today.

Oh. deep in 7//y heart.

1 do believe,

We have overeóme today.

I Deborah E. Popper teaches geography at the Collegeof Staten Island/City University of New York andPrinceton University, Frank J, Popper teaches land-useplanning at Rutgers and Princeton universities. ThePoppers originated the Buffalo Commons idea. Theyare at work on a book on six American regions, includ-ing the Delta and the Plains.

there will be more workers per retireethan anyone expected a generation ago,when Social Security taxes were raisedsubstantially.

While the U.S. has legions of newworkers who are rapidly moving into tbeAmerican tnainstream, Europe appears tobe on a different track: lots of retirees andfew workers. Further, many immigrantsin Europe remain unassimilated even af-ter a multigetieration tenure in an E.U.country.

We can envision a Europe that soontakes on tbe character of an enormousassisted living facility where the elderlyare tended to by a resentful and alien-ated foreign-born work force. Despite allof America's unsolved problems, one ofthe great forces adding to its populationis tliat it remains an immigrant nation,whereas most of Europe retains too manysociocultural barriers to belp foreign-born residents quickly assimilate.

Who will be white?

Many believe that by the mid 21st cen-tury, tbe U.S. population will have amajority of nonwhite residents. It is un-likely, however, that tbis will ever cometo pass. It is more prol)able that currentracial categories will be redefined—-inparticular, that the definition of "white"will change.

Because the vast majority of Hispanicsare already categorized as a subcthnicityunder "white," an overwhelmingly largeproportion of the country is now "white."Tbe term minorit\^ majoritj' currently re-fers mostly to Hispanic whites. While itis true that Hispanic whites are tbe fast-est growing etbnic group, many are in-termarrying with non-Hispanic whites.In fact, both Hispanic whites and Asians,which are the fastest growing popula-tions, are now often intennarrying withnon-Hispanic whites.

When including Hispanic whites,whites are indeed the majority of tbeU.S. population. By midcentury, it ismore likely that the Hispanic ethnic bar-rier will tade. So while whites in 2109may not "look" tike whites today, whitesas defined by the Census will still be tbemajority. A 2005 repon on intermarriageput out by the Population Reference Bu-reau concluded that "most intennarriagestill involves a white person married to aminority spouse. In this sense, intermar-

riage is 'whitening' U.S. minority popula-tions."

"Whiteness" has been redefined be-fore. Early in the 20tb centurj; there wasa considerable social distance betweenEastern and Southern Europeans (Ital-ians, Russians, and Poles) and Americansdescended from Northwestern Europeanimmigrants wbo had arrived earlier. Thenewer groups were "byi>hcnated whites"or simply "white ethnics." Think of asolidly middle-class, old-stock EuropeanAmerican living in 1909 and that person'sattitude toward the so-called "new immi-grants" from Southern and Eastern Eu-rope. We know tbe opinion was not highbecause in 1924 the older, establishedgroups called for strict immigration lawsto keep out other Europeans.

People from one part of Europefought to keep out immigrants from an-other part of Europe. In todays contexttbat seems almost quaint.

A century ago, it was difficult to imag-ine that Northwestern Europeans wouldroutinely intcrmarr)' with white ethnicsand that their children and grandchildrenwould form a composite of pan-Europe-anisni that is now the non-Hispanic white-population of tbe L'.S.

Neighborhoods that had previouslybeen defined as Italian ncigbborhoods orJewish neighborhoods came to be knownsolely as white neighborhoods. By thelate 20th century. New York's Little Italywas more of a novelty, a remtvant ratherthan an actual Italian neighborhood.

Ibday, many .'\mcricans arc productsof pan-European marriages. I1i i s trend islikely to continue—or rather, accelerate.

The U.S. may emerge from pan-Eu-ropean to pan-Asian or more likely PanWorld. President Obama personifies theracial evolution of the U.S. In tbe end,while a residual black-white divide maystill remain, the U.S. will never technical-ly have a minority-majority population.

Where will Americans live?

At the turn of the 19th centurj; the U.S.was primarily a coastal country, with themajority of the U.S. population residingeast of tbe Appalacbian Mountains. Buttbe 19tb century was a time of westernsettlement. Until the 20th century, infact, much of the nation's growth tooktbe form of frontier expansion. By 1909,the U.S. had settled vast stretches of the

Planning May 2009

continent, and the C^ensus had declaredthe frontier closed nearly rwo decadesearlier.

Every one of today's top 50 metro-politan areas was already established 100years ago—the last one being Las Vegasin 1905. The subsequent 100 years ofgrowth, during the 20th and early 21stcenturies, involved tremendous popula-tion growth within and extension of theseurban areas, including the emergence ofthe metropolitan Sunbelt in the Southand West.

A simple indicator—the center pointpopulation estimate—<lesigned by Fran-cis W^alker of The Massachusetts Insti-tute ot 'Ièchnology, the census directorin 1870 and 1880, vividly showed west-ern movement. This measure, which hasbeen in use by the Census Bureau since1870 (but projected back to 1790, tbefirst census), is described as "the point atwhich an imaginary, fiat, weightless, andrigid map of the United States would bal-ance perfectly if weights of identical valuewere placed on it so that each weight rep-resented the location of one person onthe date of the census."

In 1790, this point was 23 miles eastof Baltimore in Kent County, Maryland.By 1800 it had jumped the ChesapeakeBay to a spot west of Baltimore, and it hascontinued to head west ever since. From1800 to 1940, the center moved prettymuch due west from the Mid Atlantic re-gion, varying just a degree or two northand south every census.

Beginning in 1950, the center of pop-uladon took a distinctly southern turnand has headed in a southwest directionhenceforth. The turn corresponds withthe rise of the Sunbelt, where states suchas California, Texas, and Florida emergedas major population centers that draggedthe center soutbward. In 2000, the centerstood in south central Missouri—ahout120 miles southwest of the symbolicGateway Arcb in St Louis.

If the current rate of growth and ex-pansion in the West and the South con-tinues, the center of population in theyear 2109 is likely to be somewhere inOklahoma, along the Turner Turnpikebetween Tulsa and Oklahoma City, per-haps in Lincoln County or Creek Coun-ty. This projection is based on the num-ber of decades that the mean center ofpopulation has been calculated, projected

populatiun growth, and current settle-ment patterns. It also assumes a relativelystable worid climate tbat does not causerising sea levels to flood major coastalcities of tbe South and does not damp-en mountain snowpacks and monsoonalflows in the West. These are, of course,real possibilities.

What a country!We estimate that by 2109, nearly 600million people will call ¿Vinerica home.This is almost double our current popu-lation. Our cities will expand to accom-modate this additional growth, while theresource base fueling tbis expansion be-comes stressed but should not snap.

Our ethnic identity' will become morecomplex, and traditional racial and etbniccategories such as '"white" and "Hispanic"will lose meaning. Intermarriage betweenwbites and minorities will dramaticall)'shift the social definition of racial andethnic identities. Likewise, our neighbor-hoods will also become more diverse, asethnic and racial minorities move to sub-urbs in record numbers, black-white resi-dential segregation continues to decline,and high-income households continuerepopulating our cities.

Our plans and policies will shape thisfuture. The ongoing debate over immi-gration reform may impact the pace andcharacter of future immigration flows.The future of fair-housing policy willshape the diversity of our cities and sub-urbs. Energ)' and environsnentLiI policieswill determine the size of the future pop-ulation's environmental footprint. Andtransportation policies will influence theeconomic and social interactions withinand among metropolitan areas. Localplans will also continue to play an impor-tant role in altering the character and lo-cation of where new growth occurs.

These forces will ultimately determinewhether we can accommodate 300 mil-lion additionai people within our existingparking lots, as Chris Nelson argues, or ifour desire for suburban lifest\'les fuels a300-million-acre expansion of our urban-ized space.

Robert Lang and Casey Dawkins are codirector^of the Mettopolitdn Institute arVtrginiaTech inAlexandria. Mariela Alfonzo is a postdoctoralfellow at the institute.