American Collegeof

Trial Lawyers

THE LAW OF EVIDENCEIN FEDERAL SENTENCING

PROCEEDINGS

Approved by the Board of RegentsMarch 19,1997

Copyright 1997American College of Trial Lawyers

All Rights Reserved

American College Of Trial Lawyers

The American College of Trial Lawyers, founded in 1950, isone of the premier professional organizations in America. It iscomposed of the best of the trial bar from the United States andCanada. Fellowship in the College is extended by invitation only,after careful investigation, to those experienced trial lawyerswho have demonstrated exceptional skill as advocates andwhose professional careers have been marked by the higheststandards of ethical conduct, professionalism and civility.Although there are currently more than 5,000 Fellows acrossthe United States and Canada, membership can never be morethan 1% of the total lawyer population of any State or Province.Qualified lawyers are called to Fellowship in the College from allbranches of trial practice. Fellows are carefully selected fromamong those who represent plaintiffs and those who representdefendants in civil cases; those who prosecute and those whodefend persons accused of crime. The College is thus able tospeak with a balanced voice on important issues affecting theadministration of justice.

The College is dedicated to maintaining and improving thestandards of trial practice, the administration of justice and theethics of the profession. It brings together members of theprofession who are qualified and who, by reason of probity andability, will contribute to the accomplishments and goodfellowship of the College.

American College of Trial LawyersCHANCELLOR-FOUNDER

HON. EMIL GUMPERT1895-1982

OFFICERS

ANDREW M. COATS, PresidentEDWARD BRODSKY, President-ElectE. OSBORNE AYSCUE, JR., Secretary

EARL J. SILBERT, TreasurerCHARLES B. RENFREW, Immediate Past President

BOARD OF REGENTS

E. OSBORNE AYSCUE, JR. JOHN S. MARTELCharlotte, North Carolina San Francisco, California

EDWARD BRODSKY MICHAEL E. MONENew York, New York Boston, Massachusetts

SPENCER J. BROWN ANTHONY MURRAYKansas City, Missouri Los Angeles, California

ROBERT R. CAMPBELL CHARLES B. RENFREWKnoxville, Tennessee San Francisco, California

ANDREW M. COATS EDWARD J. RICE, JR.Oklahoma City, Oklahoma New Orleans, Louisiana

JEROME J. GRAHAM, JR. DAVID W. SCOTT, Q.C.Morristown, New Jersey Ottawa, Ontario

Wm. BRUCE HOFF, JR. STUART D. SHANORChicago, Illinois Roswell, New Mexico

GARR M. KING EARL J. SILBERTPortland, Oregon Washington, District of Columbia

WARREN B. LIGHTFOOT JAMES F. STAPLETONBirmingham, Alabama Stamford, Connecticut

American College of Trial Lawyers

PAST PRESIDENTS

1973-74 ROBERT L. CLARE, JR.1950-51 EMIL GUMPERT* New York, New York

Los Angeles, California 1974 AUSTIN W. LEWIS*1951-52 C. RAY ROBINSON* New Orleans, Louisiana

Merced, California 1975-76 THOMAS E. DEACY, JR.1952-53 CODY FOWLER* Kansas City, Missouri

Tampa, Florida 1976-77 SIMON H. RIFKIND*1953-54 E. D. BRONSON* New York, New York

San Francisco, California 1977-78 KRAFT W. El DMAN*1954-55 CODY FOWLER* Houston, Texas

Tampa, Florida 1978-79 MARCUS MATTSON*1955-56 WAYNE E. STICHTER* Los Angeles, California

Toledo, Ohio 1979-80 JAMES E. S. BAKER1956-57 JESSE E. NICHOLS* Chicago, Illinois

Oakland, California 1980-81 JOHN C. ELAM1957-58 LEWIS C. RYAN* Columbus, Ohio

Syracuse, New York 1981-82 ALSTON JENNINGS1958-59 ALBERT E. JENNER, JR.* Little Rock, Arkansas

Chicago, Illinois 1982-83 LEON SILVERMAN1959-60 SAMUEL P. SEARS* New York, New York

Boston, Massachusetts 1983-84 GAEL MAHONY1960-61 LON HOCKER Boston, Massachusetts

Woods Hole, Massachusetts 1984-85 GENE W. LAFITTE1961-62 LEON JAWORSKI* New Orleans, Louisiana

Houston, Texas 1985-86 GRIFFIN B. BELL1962-63 GRANT B. COOPER* Atlanta, Georgia

Los Angeles, California 1986-87 R. HARVEY CHAPPELL, JR.1963-64 WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR* Richmond, Virginia

New York, New York 1987-88 MORRIS HARREL1964-65 BERNARD G. SEGAL Dallas, Texas

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1988-89 PHILIP W. TONE1965-66 EDWARD L. WRIGHT* Chicago, Illinois

Little Rock, Arkansas 1989-90 RALPH I. LANCASTER, JR.1966-67 FRANK G. RAICHLE* Portland, Maine

Buffalo, New York 1990-91 CHARLES E. HANGER*1967-68 JOSEPH A. BALL San Francisco, California

Los Angeles, California 1991-92 ROBERT B. FISKE, JR.1968-69 ROBERT W. MESERVE* New York, New York

Boston, Massachusetts 1992-93 FULTON HAIGHT1969-70 LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. Santa Monica, California

Washington, D.C. 1993-94 FRANK C. JONES1970-71 BARNABAS F. SEARS* Atlanta, Georgia

Chicago, Illinois 1994-95 LIVELY M. WILSON1971-72 HICKS EPTON* Louisville, Kentucky

Wewoka, Oklahoma 1995-96 CHARLES B. RENFREW1972-73 WILLIAM H. MORRISON* San Francisco, California

Portland, Oregon*Deceased

COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

CHAIR

MICHAEL A. COOPERNew York, New York

MEMBERS

ELKAN ABRAMOWITZNew York, New York

STANLEY S. ARKINNew York, New York

JOHN M. BICKELCedar Rapids, Iowa

GEORGE W. BRAMBLETT, JR.Dallas, Texas

JOHN M. BRAYWashington, District of Columbia

MERLYN W. CLARKBoise, Idaho

J. DONALD COWAN, JR.Greensboro, North Carolina

GEORGE A. CUMMING, JR.San Francisco, California

ALAN J. DAVISPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

JAMES R. DeGIACOMOBoston, Massachusetts

ALAN G. GREERMiami, Florida

JOSEPH L. HARDIG, JR.Bloomfield Hills, Michigan

LYMAN G. HUGHESDallas, Texas

PATRICIA M. HYNESNew York, New York

JOHN M. IMELTulsa, Oklahoma

GREGORY P. JOSEPHNew York, New York

PAUL E, KOVACSSt. Louis, Missouri

BARBARA W. MATHERPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. McCLEARDetroit, Michigan

LAWRENCE L. McNAMARANew Orleans, Louisiana

HON. JAMES R. MUIRHEADNew Orleans, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEIRYNCKBloomington, Illinois

JOHN D. NELLIndianapolis, Indiana

MICHAEL D. O'KEEFESt. Louis, Missouri

JOE C. SAVAGELexington, Kentucky

JOHN H. SHARERLos Angeles, Calif ornia

FLETCHER L. YARBROUGHDallas, Texas

JAMES F. STAPLETONStamford, Connecticut

Regent Liaison

THE LAW OF EVIDENCEIN FEDERAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS

I.Introduction

As its name suggests, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”)1 contains“sweeping reforms”2 that “revolutionized”3 the way in which federal defendants aresentenced. The SRA ended nearly a century of indeterminate sentencing in responseto the perceived “dishonesty” of the extant regime in which, as a result of parole,defendants rarely served their full sentence.4 More radical was elimination of thevirtually unfettered discretion a sentencing judge had in choosing a sentence fromwithin a broad statutory range, a response to criticisms of wide sentencing disparity.Instead, the judge is now generally required to sentence a convicted defendant to aspecific sentence from within a narrow range set forth in the Federal SentencingGuidelines (“Guidelines”) written by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.

Fact-finding assumes a central, critical role under Guidelines sentencing. Thecrime of conviction is merely the starting point (“base offense level”) to be adjustedafter a series of factual determinations—each having a direct and identifiable impacton the ultimate sentence—regarding offense characteristics (e.g., amount of drugs ormoney involved), defendant's role in the offense, harm to the victim, and other factors.A controversial feature of the Guidelines requires aggregation for sentencing purposesof all “relevant conduct”—even if the defendant has been acquitted of, or was never

* This report was prepared by the Federal Rules of Evidence Committee of theAmerican College of Trial Lawyers. The Executive Committee and Board of Regents ofthe College have approved the report. Inasmuch as this Report addresses only theevidentiary and procedural aspects of sentencing, it should not be read as approval ordisapproval by the College of the substantive aspects of federal guidelines sentencing,e.g., the "relevant conduct" provisions.

1 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988, codified at 18U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988).

2 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).

3 Bums v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991).

4 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines And The Key CompromisesUpon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 4 (1988) (citation omitted).

1

even charged with, committing that conduct.5 The level calculated after theseadjustments marks the point on the vertical axis of a grid (the “Sentencing Table”),while defendant’s criminal history (also requiring fact-finding) is measured along thehorizontal axis. The point at which the two lines intersect yields the permissible rangeof sentence from which (absent an authorized departure) the judge must select.6

Manifestly, the procedures for determining facts material to the Guidelines calculationmay have a profound impact on a defendant’s sentence.

Though the Commission’s daunting task of writing guidelines for 681 criminalstatutes took more than two years,7 little attention was paid to the procedural aspectsof fact-finding under this new and vastly different sentencing scheme. Since neitherCongress (in the SRA) nor the Commission (in the Guidelines) addressed in any detailcritical evidentiary issues such as burdens of proof, admissibility of evidence,confrontation rights and hearing procedures, by default the courts have had to step into shape and resolve these matters. In so doing, courts have been greatly influencedby pre-Guidelines law on evidentiary issues, which freely permitted judges to considerall sorts of information and “evidence” at sentencing. The resulting state of affairs hasprompted one circuit judge to remark that “[w]hen it comes to proof of facts undergird-ing guideline sentences, the principle courts often apply is that ‘Anything Goes.’”8

Because evidentiary issues relating to Guidelines sentencing have been greatlyinfluenced by pre-Guidelines law, this Report first gives a brief historical sketch ofsentencing in this country and the law of evidence that evolved alongside. The Report

5 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). See United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 638 (1997) (a juryverdict of acquittal “does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conductunderlying the acquitted charge”); United States v. Edwards, 105 F.3d 1179, 1180 (7thCir. 1997) (“The 'Relevant Conduct’ rule requires the judge to consider drugs that werepart of the same plan or course of conduct, whether or not they were specified in theindictment.”); United States v. Ritsema, 31 F.3d 559, 564-65 (7th Cir, 1994) (the goal ofthe relevant conduct provision “is to allow a court to reflect in its sentence the actualseriousness of an offense, instead of strictly limiting it to the charge the prosecutornames in the indictment”); United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1993)(trial court properly considered conduct not resulting in conviction where the presen-tence investigative report indicated it was relevant), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1042 (1994).

6 Departures are permitted where a court finds “an aggravating or mitigatingcircumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by theSentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentencedifferent from that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). See also U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b)(“When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguisticallyapplies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may considerwhether a departure is warranted.”) Departures are also permitted in other circum-stances, for example, when the government makes a departure motion in recognitionof a defendant's substantial assistance. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.

7 Breyer, supra note 4, at 3.

8 United States v. Smiley, 997 F.2d 475, 483 (8th Cir. 1993) (Bright, J., dissenting).

2

n e xt e xa mi n e s t h e Gu i deli n e s a n d sh o w s t h at p re -Gu i deli n e s la w o n e vi d e nti a ry i ssu e sh a s e sse n ti all y p e rsi st e d , d e sp it e ch a n g e s u n d e r t h e Gu i d eli n e s w h i ch su g g e st t h atp ri o r l a w m i g ht n o t b e a p p ro p ria t e w h e n a p pli e d i n t hi s di ff e re nt co n t e xt. Th e R e p o rtco n clu d e s b y e xa mi ni n g va ri o u s p ro p o sal s fo r ref o rm . Th e p rop o sa l s di scu s se d b el o wa re n o t li m it e d t o di vi ni n g m i ni m u m co n sti t uti o n al st a n d a rd s a n d u rgi n g t h a t se n t e n c-ing co u rt s a d h e re t o su ch mi ni m u m re q uire m e nt s. R a th e r, t h e f o cu s i s o n w a ys i n w hi cht h e se n t e n ci n g p ro ce s s ca n b e m a d e m o r e f ai r a n d a p p ro p r i at e . Th u s, w h il e d u ep ro ce ss sh o ul d i nf o rm t h e e vi de n ti a ry sch e m e a t se nt e n ci n g b y e st a bli shi n g m i ni m u mst a n da rd s, it sh o ul d n ot b e vi e w e d a s o t h erw i se re st ri cti n g th e b o un d s o f g o o d p u bli cp oli cy. “ Th at a p ra cti ce i s co n stit u tio n al d o e s no t m a ke it wi se.” 9

II.Historical Overview of Evidence at Sentencing

A. Background

S e nt e n ci n g in t hi s co u n try h a s co m e f ull ci rcl e f ro m de t e rmi n at e , n o n di scre ti o na ryse n t e n ci n g st a r ti n g i n co l o ni al ti m e s, t o i n d e t e rm i n at e , d i scre t i o n a ry se n t e n ci n g(st re ssi n g “ re h a bilit a ti o n” )10 i n l at e r ye a rs, a n d n o w fi n all y b a ck t o w a rd de t e rmi n a t ese n t en ci n g u n d e r th e Gu id eli n e s. Th e cu rre nt l a w o f e vi d e n ce at se nt e n cin g i s be tt e ru n d e rst o o d in li g ht o f t hi s hi st o ry.

In col o ni al ti m e s, p ro n ou n ce m e n t of se nt e n ce w a s p u rel y m i ni st e ri al: co n vi cti o n o fa f el o n y l e d i n e xo ra bl y t o a d e fi nit e p u ni sh m e n t , o f t e n d e a t h, u nl e ss t h e d e f e n d a n tco u l d o f f e r a l e g a l r e a s o n , s u ch a s i n s a n i t y o r p r e g n a n c y, t o e xc u se t h a tp e n alt y.1 1 C o u r t s t h e re f o re di d n o t h a ve m e a ni n g f ul di scre t io n o n ce a d e f e nd a n t w a sco n vi ct e d,12 a n d el a b o rat e f a ct - fin di n g p ro ce d u re s w e re u n n e ce ssa ry.

I m p ri so n m e nt l at e r b e ca m e t h e d o mi n a nt m e a n s of p u ni sh m e n t f o r o ff e n d e rs. A sin m at e p o pul ati o n g re w, h o w e ve r , va ri ou s m et h o d s w ere u se d t o re du ce o ve rcro w din g,su ch a s p a rd o n s, g o o d ti m e , p ro b a t i o n a n d p a ro l e , co n t r i b u t i n g t o a n i n cre a si n gind e te rmi n a cy of se n te n ce s.13 At t h e sa m e ti m e, t he re h a bilit ati ve m o d el of p u ni sh m e ntg ai n ed wi d e a cce p t a n ce . U n d e r t h a t m o d el , co n vi ct s n e e d e d "t rea t m e n t " t o b e "cu re d "

9 U ni t ed St at e s v. L o m b a rd, 1 0 2 F . 3 d 1, 5 (1 st Ci r. 19 9 6 ).

10 D e b o rah Y o u ng , Fa ct -F i n din g at Fe d e ral S e nt e n ci n g: Wh y t h e Gui d eli n e s S ho ul dM e e t t h e R ul e s, 7 9 C o rn ell L. R e v. 2 9 9, 3 07 (1 9 94 ) .

11 Willi a m s v. N e w Y o r k, 3 3 7 U . S . 2 4 1 , 2 4 7 (1 9 4 9 ) ( "t h e d e a t h se n t e n ce w a s a na ut o m a ti c a n d co m m o n p l a ce re su lt of co n vi ctio n s— e ve n f o r off e n se s t o d a y d e e m e dtri vi al "); Y ou n g, su p ra n ot e 7 , at 30 6 .

12 Y ou n g, sup ra n ot e 10 , at 3 0 6.

13 Willi a m J. P o w e ll a n d Mi ch a e l T . Ci m i n o , P ro se cu t o r / a / D i scre ti o n u n d e r t h eFe d eral S en te n ci n g Gui d elin e s: I s t he Fo x Gu a rdi ng t he H en H o u se? , 97 W. V a. L . R e v.373,374-77(1995).

3

of their criminal tendencies, and the primary goal of imprisonment was to rehabilitatethe offender. Sentencing was viewed, therefore, as much as a treatment as it waspunishment.14

The length of time necessary for rehabilitation could not, of course, be predictedin advance. Accordingly, the sentencing judge imposed an initial indeterminatesentence—for instance, “10 years to life”—but the precise time served was left to aboard of “experts” (the parole board) which, after ongoing monitoring of the prisoner'sprogress, made the ultimate decision as to defendant's release.15 The court's sentencingdecision was a critical component of defendant's overall treatment, and had to bebased not only on the nature of the crime but on the nature of the defendant. Courtswere therefore encouraged to consider a broad variety of information before imposingsentence—without regard to rules of evidence—such as defendant's background,educational and employment history, family situation, criminal record, and allegationsof uncharged criminal conduct.16 In making its sentencing determination, the court hadvast discretion, and was not obliged to explain why the particular sentence waschosen or to justify the exercise of discretion.

B. Rules of Evidence Did Not Apply at Sentencing

Because courts were not required to find facts, rules of evidence typically did notapply at sentencing. Williams v. New York,17 a Supreme Court decision renderednearly a half-century ago, exemplifies the then-prevailing view that sentencing courtscould consider any information regardless of its admissibility under evidentiary rules.

After convicting Williams of murder, the jury made a non-binding recommendationof life imprisonment. But pursuant to a New York statute that permitted the sentencingjudge to consider the defendant's criminal record, reports of mental, psychiatric andphysical examinations, and “any information that will aid the court in determining theproper treatment of such defendant,” the court relied in part on a pre-sentence investi-gation report and instead imposed a death sentence. The court acknowledged that thereport contained many material facts about defendant relevant to sentencing that werenot admissible before a jury. Such information included defendant's alleged commission

14 See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Code § 482 (repealed) (in sentencing defendant, court mayseek any information that will aid "in determining the proper treatment of such defen-dant") (emphasis added). See also Young, supra note 10, at 308; Kristen D. Sauer,Informed Conviction; Instructing the Jury about Mandatory Sentencing Consequences,95 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1234 (1995); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Lawand the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 679, 701(1994).

15 See U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt, A(3) (the pre-Guidelines sentencing regime "empoweredthe parole commission to determine how much of the sentence an offender actuallywould serve in prison").

16 Young, supra note 10, at 308.

17 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

4

of thirty burglaries in the vicinity of the murder,18 and “certain activities” (not describedin the Supreme Court opinion) indicating that defendant had a “morbid sexuality” andwas a “menace to society.”19

Although Williams did not dispute the accuracy of any of the information or ask forcross-examination, on appeal he asserted that the statutory scheme deprived him ofdue process because he had no opportunity to confront or cross-examine thewitnesses supplying the information in the report. As framed by the Supreme Court,the case presented a “serious and difficult” question relating to “the rules of evidenceapplicable to the manner in which a judge may obtain information” for sentencingpurposes.20

The Supreme Court rejected defendant’s challenge for a combination of historical,practical and penological reasons. The Court first noted that, historically, tribunalspassing on the guilt of a defendant had been limited by strict evidentiary rules, but theopposite had been true of sentencing proceedings: judges had traditionally beenaccorded wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist in deter-mining the appropriate sentence.21 The Court also noted that practical reasonssupported the distinction. When the “narrow” issue of guilt was at stake, rules ofevidence served to confine the trial to information strictly relevant to the offensecharged, and rested in part on a need to prevent a time-consuming and confusing trialof collateral issues. The task of the sentencing judge, however, was broader, and tomake an appropriate determination the court needed “the fullest information possibleconcerning the defendant's life and characteristics.”22

That need, explained the Court, was impelled by the modern penologicalapproach to punishment, whereby reformation and rehabilitation—not retribution—hadbecome the dominant objectives. The function of probation officers’ reports was to “aidoffenders,”23 and to deny sentencing judges the kind of information contained thereinwould undermine contemporary penological policies. Indeed, said the Court, it wouldbe totally impractical, if not impossible, to present open court testimony with cross-examination in connection with the type of information contained in presentencereports, and such a procedure could impose an administrative burden and delay.24

Congress codified the Williams holding in 1970, enacting the following statutoryprovision: “No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,

18 Defendant had not been convicted of any of those burglaries, but the judge hadinformation that defendant had confessed to some and had been identified as theperpetrator of others. Id. at 244.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 246.

22 Id. at 247.

23 Id. at 249.

24 Id. at 250.

5

character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the UnitedStates may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriatesentence.”25 That policy of liberally receiving all sorts of information and “evidence” atsentencing was consistent with the way most courts actually conducted their business.The significance of the statutory imprimatur, however, is that while Williams was aconstitutional decision, establishing what could be done, the statute sets forthCongressional policy, prescribing what must be done.

Not surprisingly, when the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975,sentencing proceedings were expressly exempted from those rules.26 With respect tohearsay, however, some courts fashioned a requirement, in recognition of defendants’due process rights, mandating that the hearsay meet a “minimal indicium of reliability”standard.27

C. Pre-Guidelines Burden of Proof

The question of applicable burdens of proof at sentencing did not frequently arisebefore the Guidelines. There were, however, some occasions when fact-finding underindeterminate sentencing schemes was required—for example, when mandatoryminimum sentences were at issue. It was in that context that the Supreme Courtconsidered burdens of proof at sentencing.

In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,28 defendants challenged a Pennsylvania statute treat-ing gun possession as a sentencing factor, rather than as an element of the offense.Under the statute, if the defendant was convicted of certain felonies and the courtfound at sentencing that defendant “visibly possessed a firearm” during the crime, aminimum five-year sentence had to be imposed.29 The finding could be based onevidence introduced at trial and any additional evidence offered by either side at thesentencing hearing, and the prosecution's burden of proof was the low preponderanceof the evidence standard. By contrast, defendants argued, due process required that

25 18 U.S.C. § 3577. This provision was renumbered 18 U.S.C. § 3661 by the SRA.The holding in Williams has been repeatedly confirmed by the Supreme Court. See,e.g., United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 635 (1997); Witte v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2205(1995).

26 Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3). Privileges, however, may be invoked even at sentencing.Fed. R.Evid. 1101 (c).

27 See UnitedStates v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156,1167 (11th Cir.), cert, denied sub nom.Pierrot v. United States, 471 U.S. 1104 (1985); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030,1040 (3d Cir. 1982).

28 477 U.S. 79 (1986).

29 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9712 (1982).

6

el e m e nt s o f t h e off e n se b e e st a bli sh e d b y t h e f a r m o re st ri n ge n t "b e yo n d a re a so n a bl edo u bt " st a nd a rd.30

Th e C o u rt , i n a 5 -4 d e ci si o n , u p h el d t h e st a t ut e . A lt h o u g h a ckn o w l e d gi n g t h atth e re w e re co n stit u ti o n al li m it s t o a st a t e's a bili t y t o d e fi n e f a ct s a s se nt e n ci n g co n si d -e ra ti o n s a s o p p o se d t o e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n se , t h e m a j o ri t y— w h il e d e cli ni n g t oe xpli ca t e t ho se li mi t s— co n cl ud e d t h at t h e y w e re n o t t ra n sg re sse d in t h a t ca se .31 Th eC o u rt re a so n e d t h a t t h e st a t u t e o p e ra t e d s o l e l y t o li m i t t h e se n t e n ci n g c o u r t ' sdi scre ti o n i n se l e cti n g a p e n alt y f ro m wi t hin a ra n g e th a t w a s al re a d y a vail a ble t o it, b utdi d n ot i n cre a se de f e n d an t s' p u ni sh m e n t. 32 Th e m aj o rit y a d diti o n all y o pi n e d t h at t h est at u te h a d n ot b ee n t ail o re d to "p e rmit t h e vi si bl e p o sse s si o n fi n di n g t o b e a t ail w h i chw a g s t h e d o g o f t h e su b st a n t i ve of f e n se . "33 H e n ce , t h e b e yo n d a re a so n a bl e d o u btst a n d a rd w a s n o t co n st it u ti o n all y m a n d a t e d .

Th e C o u rt li ke w i se rej e ct e d t he cl ai m t h at t h e in t e rm e di a t e "cl e a r a n d co n vi n ci n ge vi d e n ce " st a n d a rd w a s re q ui re d. Ci tin g Willi a m s, th e m aj o ri t y n ot e d t h at se n t e n ci n gco u r t s h a ve t ra d iti o n a ll y h e a rd e vi d e n ce a n d f o u n d f a ct s " w it h o u t a n y p re s cr i b e db u rd en of p ro o f a t all, "34 a n d d e cli n e d t o d ra w a di sti n cti o n b e t w e e n b a ckg ro u n d a n dch a ra ct e r e vi d e n ce a n d e vi d e n ce rel a ti n g t o t h e ch a rg e d cr i m e . I n d e e d , w h il e t h eP e n n s yl va n i a st at u t e o rd a i n e d a p re p o n d e ra n ce st a n d a rd , t h e C o u r t se e m e d t osu g g e st e ve n t h a t w a s n ot co n stit u tio n all y re q ui re d .35

* * *

In su m , u n d e r i n d et e rm in a t e se n t e n ci n g sch e m e s st re ssi n g reh a bili ta ti o n, rul e s ofe vi d e n ce d i d n o t a p p l y (al t h o u g h a f e w co u r t s re q u i re d t h a t h e a rs a y b e a t l e a stmi ni m a ll y reli abl e ) ; i n d e e d , co u r t s co n si d e re d a n d se n t e n ce d d ef e n d a n t s b a se d o n allso r t s o f i n fo rm a ti o n, e ve n o f d u bi o u s reli a bilit y. M o re o ve r , w h e n fin di n g s of f a ct h a d t ob e m a d e , t h e pre p o n d e ra n ce o f t h e e vi d e n ce st a n d a rd p a sse d co n st it u ti o n al m u st e r .

30 4 7 7 U .S . at 8 3.

31 I d . at 8 6 .

32 Id , at 8 8 .

33 Id . at 9 1 .

34 " We se e n ot hi n g i n P e n n syl va ni a 's sch e m e t h at w o ul d w a rra nt co n sti t uti o n ali zi n gb u rd en s o f p ro of at se n t e n ci n g. " I d .

7

III.

Fact-finding Under The Federal Sentencing Guidelines

A. The Importance of Fact-finding

U n li ke t h e p re vi o u s d i scre ti o n a ry se n t e n ci n g re gi m e , f a ct - fi n di n g u n d e r t h eGui d eli ne s i m p a ct s u po n t h e de f en d a nt 's se n te n ce in an e a sil y i de n tifia bl e m a n n er. Th edif f e re n ce i n a co n vi ct 's se n t e n ce re sulti n g f ro m a fi n di n g t h at h e di st ri b ut e d , sa y, o n eg ra m a s o p p o se d t o o n e kil o o f co ca i n e i s m e a su re d m a t h e m a ti ca ll y u n d e r t h eGu id eli n e s.

Th e i m p o rt a n ce o f f a ct u al fi n din g s a t se n t e n ci ng i s u n d e rsco re d b y t h e t h e o ryu n d e rl yi n g t h e Gu i d eli n e s. Th e C o m m i ssi o n co m p ro m i se d b et w e e n a p u re "ch a rg eof f e n se " sy st e m a n d a p u re "re al off e n se " syst e m . C h a rg e se n t e n ci n g ti e s t h e p u ni sh -m e n t di re ctl y t o th e el e m e nt s of t h e cr i m e f o r w hi ch d ef e n d a nt w a s co n vi ct e d , wi t h o utco n si d e ri n g a g g ra va ti n g o r mi tig a ti n g f a ct o rs, su ch a s t h e m a n n e r i n w h i ch t h e cr i m ew a s co m m it t ed . A re al o ff e n se syst e m b a se s t h e se n t e n ce o n "t h e a ct u al co n d u ct i nw hi ch t h e d e f e nd a n t e n g a g e d reg a rdl e ss o f t h e ch a rg e s f o r w hi ch h e w a s i n di ct e d o rco n vi ct e d. "36 Th e m e t ho d ol o g y settl e d u p o n co n t ain s el e m e nt s of e a ch : th e off e n se f o rw hi ch de f e nd a nt w a s co n vi ct e d e sta bli sh e s t h e b a se off e n se le ve l, w hi ch i s a dj u st e d i nlig ht of se ve ra l "re al " a g g ra vati n g o r m iti g a tin g f a ct o rs p a r ti cul a r t o t h e t yp e o f cr i m e(e. g ., q u a n tit y of d ru g s f o r n arco ti cs cr i m e s, o r d oll a r a m o u n t o f l o ss f or f ra u d ), se ve ral"re al " g e n e ral f a ct o rs (e . g. , l e a d e rshi p rol e i n t h e o ff e n se o r h a rm t o t h e vi cti m ) a n dd ef en d a nt's cri mi nal hi st o ry.37

A s a n e xa m pl e , su p p o se a fi rst- ti m e o ff e n d e r, w o rki n g sol o, i s co n vi ct e d of bil ki n ga n el d e rl y wi d o w ou t o f h e r li fe sa vin g s o f $ 3 0 0, 0 0 0 i n a n ela b o ra te sch e m e u sin g t h em ail s. Th e b a se off e n se l e vel f o r m ail f ra u d i s si x. A n a d diti o nal eig h t p oin t s a re t a cke do n f o r th e "spe cifi c o ff e n se ch a ra ct e ri sti c" rel ati n g to t h e a m o un t of t h e l o ss, an d a n ot h e rt w o f or m o re -t h a n -mi ni m al pl an ni n g . Th e su m i s 1 6 , t o w hi ch a n ot h e r t w o i s a d d e d f o rt h e vu l n e ra bl e vi cti m a dj u st m e n t . A ssu m i n g d e f e n d a nt i s re ca l ci t ra nt a n d re f u se s t oa cce p t re sp o n sibili t y f o r hi s w ro n g d oi n g (a n d , th e re f o re, i s n ot e n titl e d t o a re d u cti o nfo r "a cce p t a n ce o f re sp o n si bilit y") , t h e a p pli ca bl e g ui d eli n e ra n g e i s 2 7 -3 3 m o n t h s f o rthi s d ef e n d a nt , w h o se C ri m i n al Hi st o ry C at e g o ry i s I .38

In a cco rd wit h t h e "re al off e n se " ch a ra ct e r o f th e Gu id eli n e s, t h e co u r t i s re qui re dt o co n si d e r all o f t h e d e f e n d a n t's "re l e va n t co n d u ct , " e ve n i f t h at co n d u ct w a s n o tch a rg e d o r did n ot re su lt i n a co n vi cti o n .39 Th u s, i n m a ki ng t h e Gui d eli n e s cal cul ati o n ,a ct s a n d o mi ssi o n s t h at w e re p a r t of t h e "sa m e co u rse o f co n d u ct "40 a s t h e o ff e n se ofco n vi ct i o n a re a g g re g a t e d . I n t h e m a il f ra u d h yp o t h e ti cal , if at t h e se n t e n ci n g st a g e

36 U . S. S . G. ch . 1, p t. A (4 )(a ).

37 B re ye r, su p ra n o t e 4, at 1 1 -1 2.

38 See U.S.S.G. §§ 2F1.1, 3A1.1, 3E1.1; U.S.S.G. ch. 4, pt. A; U.S.S.G. ch. 5 pt. A.Sentencing Table.

39 U . S. S. G. § 1 B 1. 3 ; se e su p ra n ot e 5 a n d a cco m p a n yi n g t e xt.

40 U . S. S. G. § 1 B 1. 3 (a)(2 ).

8

inf o rm a ti o n w a s p re se n t e d t o t h e co u r t sh o w i n g t h a t d e f e n d a nt h a d d e f ra u d e d o t h e rvi cti m s in t h e sa m e sch e m e f o r a n a d diti o n al l o ss o f $ 4 5 0 ,0 0 0 , 1 0 p oin t s w o ul d h a veb e e n a d d e d f or t h e d oll a r l o ss ch a ra ct e ri sti c, i n st e a d o f ei g h t, yi el di n g a n i n cre a se dse n t e n ci n g ra n g e o f 3 3 t o 4 1 m o n t h s. Or f o r a m o re e xt re m e e xa m p l e, t h e d ef e n d a n tin U nit e d S t at e s v. E b b ol e41 pl e a d e d g uilt y t o di st ri b uti n g a g ra m o f co cai n e to an u nd e r-co ve r a g e nt , w h i ch o rdi n a ril y w o ul d h a ve re su lt e d i n a 2 7 -3 3 m o n t h se nt e n ce . B u t t h ese n t e n ci n g co u r t f o u n d b y a p re p o n d e ra n c e o f t h e e vi d e n ce t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a dp o sse sse d 1 . 2 kil o g ra m s a s p a r t o f t h e sa m e co u rse o f co n d u ct , w h i ch m o re t h a ntri pl ed t h e ra n ge t o 9 2 t o 1 15 m o nt h s.42

It i s cl e a r , t h e re f o re , t h a t e a c h f a ct m a t e r i a l t o t h e Gu i d e li n e s ca l cu l a ti o n ca ndi re ctl y i m p a ct u p o n d e f e n d a nt 's se nt e n ce .

B. How Facts Are Dete rmine d

I n m a ki n g t h e n e ce s sa ry f a ct u al fi n di n g s, t h e j u d g e 's p ri n ci p al so u rce o f i n f o rm a ti o na b o u t t h e d e f e n d a nt , t h e o ff e n se a n d t h e a p pli ca b l e g ui d eli n e s— p a rti cu l a rl y i n pl e aca se s (w h i ch co n stit u t e t h e va st m aj o rit y o f cr i mi n al co n vi cti o n s)— is t h e p re se nt e n cein ve st i g a ti ve re p o r t (“ P S I” ) .4 3 Th e P S I h a s t h e re f o re b e e n ca ll e d “ t h e si n gl e m o stim p o rt a nt d o cu m e n t i n t h e g ui d eli n e se n t e n ci n g pro ce s s.” 4 4 P re p a re d u n d e r st at u t o rydi re cti o n b y a pro b ati o n of fi ce r o p era tin g a s a n "a rm o f t h e co u r t,” 45 t h e P SI i s in t e nd e dto be a “ si n gl e re n diti o n o f t h e off e n se " b a se d o n t h e of fi ce r 's i n d e p e n de n t a sse s sm e n tof t he rel e va nt fa ct s.” 46 I n p ra cti ce, h o w e ve r , pro b ati on offi ce rs rel y al m o st e xcl u si vel y o n

41 917 F.2d 1495, 1495-1496 (7th Cir. 1990).

42 Id. at 1496.

43 1 ABA Section of Criminal Justice, Practice Under the New Federal SentencingGuidelines ch. 8[C], at 8-25 (Robert D. Richman, ed. Supp. 1995) (here inaf ter"Practice").

44 I d , S e e a l so E d w a r d R . B e ck e r , I n su r i n g R e li a b l e Fa ct F i n d i n g i n Gu i d e li n e sS e nt e n ci n g: M u st t h e Gu a ra n t e e s o f t h e C o n f ro nt a ti o n a n d D u e P ro ce s s C l a u se s B eA p pli ed ? , 1 5 1 F . R . D . 1 5 3, 1 5 8 (1 9 9 3 ); N o t e, A n A rg u m e nt f o r C o nf ro nt a ti on u n d er t h eFe d e ral S e nt e n ci ng Gu i deli n e s , 1 0 5 H a rv. L. R e v. 1 8 8 0 , 1 8 8 2 (1 9 9 2 ).

45 S e e, e. g ., U n it e d St at e s v. Bel g a rd , 8 9 4 F . 2 d 1 0 92 , 1 0 9 7 (9 t h C i r. ) , ce r t, d e nie d ,4 9 8 U . S. 8 6 0 (1 9 9 0 ) .

46 A d m i n i st ra ti ve Of f i ce o f t h e U n i t e d S t at e s C o u r t s, P re s e n t e n ce I n ve st i g a ti o nR e p o rt s U n d e r t h e S e nt e n ci n g R e f o rm A ct of 1 9 8 4, at 7 (1 9 8 7 ) ; P ra cti ce , su p ra n ot e4 3, a t 8 -2 5.

9

g o ve rn m e nt -p ro vi d ed i nf o rm ati o n, a n d co u rt s t e n d t o p re su m e t h e P S I t o b e reli a bl e.47

Th e ne t re sul t i s t h a t i nf o rm a ti o n su p pli e d b y t he g o ve rn m e nt f re q u e ntl y b e co m e s t h eb a si s f o r a se n te n ce t h at e xce e d s t h e g ui d eli n e s ra n g e f o r t h e of f e n se of co n vi cti o n .

Th e P S I m u st b e di scl o se d t o t h e p a r ti e s at l e a st 3 5 d a ys b e f o re se n t e n ce i sim p o se d , a n d th e p a rti e s a re req ui re d t o co m m u n i ca t e t h ei r o bj e cti o n s t o e a ch o t h e ra n d t he p ro ba ti o n of fi ce r w it hi n t w o w e e ks t h e re af t e r. Th e p ro b ati o n o ffi ce r m a y m e e tw i t h t h e p a r ti e s t o t ry t o re so l ve t h e o b j e ct i o n s, a n d a n y u n r e so l ve d d i sp u t e s a reid en tifi e d i n a se p a ra te ad d e n d u m gi ve n t o t he co u rt al o n g wi t h t h e P S I. A t se nt e n ci n g ,t h e co u r t i s re q ui re d ei t h e r t o m a ke fi n di n g s o n e a ch co n t ro ve r t e d m a t t e r o r t o st a t eth a t su ch a fi n din g i s u n n e ce ssa ry b e ca u se t h e di sp u t e d i ssu e w ill n o t b e co n si d e re din, o r will n ot a ff e ct, se nt e n ci n g.48 U nd e r di scre tio n a ry se n te n ci n g, a ju d g e co ul d e a sil ya voi d re sol vi n g f a ct u al di sp u t e s b y si m pl y sa yi n g t h at t h e co n tro ve rs y w a s i m m a t e ri alto t h e ch o se n se n t e n ce . U n d e r t h e Gu i d eli ne s, h o w e ve r , gi ve n t h e n at u re a n d co n se -q u en ce of m o st f a ct u al di sp ut e s, th e co u rt w ill l i kel y b e o bli g ed t o re sol ve t h e di sp u te .49

I n f a ct , w h il e l a ck o f e vi d e n ti a ry st a n d a rd s a n d b ro a d j u di ci al d i scre t i o n u n d e rp re -Gui d eli n e s se nt e n ci ng h a ve b e e n criti ci ze d , o n e stre n g t h of t h at st ru ct u re w a s t h eco rre l a ti ve d i scre t i o n j u d g e s h a d t o di sre g a rd o r d i sc o u n t e vi d e n ce t h e y d e e m e du nreli a ble .50 Fo r e xa m pl e, i f t h e P SI sai d t ha t t h e p ro b atio n o ffi ce r i nt e rvi e w e d t h e ca sea g e nt w h o rel at e d t h at an u ni de n tifi e d j ail h o u se in f o rm a nt h ad i m pli ca t e d d ef e n d a nt inot h e r cri m e s, t h e j u d ge w a s n ot o bli ge d t o rat ch e t u p t he se nt e n ce ba se d o n t h at m ulti -le vel h e a rsa y. A n e cd o t al e vi d e n ce su p p o r t s t h e n o ti o n t h at j u d ge s o p e ra t e d i n t h atfa shi o n. Ci rcuit Ju d g e E d w a rd R . B e cke r (a f o rm e r di st ri ct ju d g e f o r t w el ve ye a rs un d e rth e ol d se nt e n ci n g re gi me ) a sse r t s t h at j u d ge s t ypi call y di sco u n t ed u n relia bl e e vi d e n ce,a n d a t l e a st o n e o t h e r f e d e ra l j u d g e h a s w r i tt e n t h a t di sp u t e d f a ct s a t s e n t e n ci n gw e re ro u ti n el y di sre g a rd e d i n i m p o si n g p u ni sh m e n t.5 1

Ju d g e s h a ve l o st t h at fl e xi bilit y u n d e r t h e Gu i d elin e s. Th e y a re n o l o n g er i m b u e dwi t h t h e f re e d o m si m pl y t o i g n o re di sp u t e d f a ct s a n d gi ve t h e d ef e n d a n t t h e b e n efi t o f

47 Ge ral d W. H e a n y, Th e R e ali t y o f Gu i d eli n e s S e nt e n ci n g: N o En d t o Di sp a r it y, 2 8A m . Gr i m. L . R e v. 1 6 1 , 1 73 (19 9 1 ); U nit e d S ta t e s v. S h e rb a k, 9 50 F .2 d 10 9 5, 1 1 0 0 (5t hCi r . 1 9 9 2 ) ( "A p re se n t e n ce re p o rt g e ne rall y b e a rs su ffi ci e nt i n di ci a of reli a bili t y t o b eco n si d e re d a s e vi de n ce b y t h e t ri al j u d g e i n m a kin g t h e fa ct u al d et e rmi n ati o n s re q ui re db y t h e S e n t en ci n g Gu i d elin e s") .

48 S ee Fed . R. Gri m. P. 3 2.

49 P ra cti ce , su p ra n ot e 3 8, at 8 -33 .

50 U nit e d St at e s v. Gi g a nt e, 9 4 F. 3 d 5 3 , 5 6 (2 d Ci r. 1 99 6 ) (i n p re -Gu id eli n e s e ra , "aco u r t h a d di scre ti o n t o di sre g a rd [ u n ch a rg e d o r a cq u it t e d co n d u ct ] e n ti rel y, e ve n ifp ro ve n. ") S e e al so Yo u n g, su p ra n ot e 7 , at 3 1 5 ( "On e o f t h e g e n e rall y u n a ckn o wl e d g e dm e r it s o f di scre t i o n a ry se n t e n ci n g w a s t h a t i t p e rm it t e d j u d g e s t o w ei g h t e vi d e n ceb a se d o n i t s relia bili t y") .

51 Be cke r, sup ra n ote 44 , at 15 4. Jud ge Ei sele , in Unit ed St ate s v. Clark, 7 92 R Su p p. 6 37 ,6 4 9 (E. D . A rk. 1 9 9 2 ), n ot e d, "[i ]f a f a ct o r i m p o r t a nt t o se n t e n ci n g w a s, af t er di scu ssi o n,stil l d e ni e d , i t si m p l y w a s o m itt e d f ro m co n si d e rati o n . " I d. (e m p h a si s a d d e d ) .

10

t h e d o u b t i n cl o se ca se s. I n st e a d, co u r t s a re co m p e ll e d t o re so l ve all di sp u t e d f a ct sm at e rial to t h e se nt en ce .52

C o u rt s, h o w e ve r , h a ve n o t b e en gi ve n m u ch sta t ut o ry g ui d a n ce i n u n d e rt a ki n g t h atta sk. Th e onl y all u si o n t o e vid e n ti a ry st a n d a rd s in t h e S R A i s 1 8 U . S. C . § 3 6 6 1, w h i chis m e rel y a re n u m b e ri n g wi t h ou t su b st a n ti ve ch a n g e of 1 8 U .S . C . § 3 5 5 7 (t h e co di fi ca -tio n o f Willi a m s), 53

Th e Gui d eli n e s' co n si d e rati o n o f e vi d e nti a ry i ssu e s i s o nl y sli g htl y m o re ela b o ra te .I n a P ol i cy S t a t e m e n t , t h e C o m m i ssi o n d e cl a re d t h a t t h e se n t e n ci n g j u d g e m a yco n si d e r rel e va n t i n f o rm a ti o n wi t h o ut re g a rd t o t h e rul e s of e vi d e n ce , so l o n g a s t h einf o rm ati on ha s "su ffi ci en t i n di cia of relia bilit y t o su p p or t it s p ro b a ble a ccu ra cy. "54 On it sfa ce , t h at st a n d a rd i s se e m i n gl y m o re st rin g e n t t h a n t h e "m i ni m al i n di ci a of reli a bilit y"d u e p ro ce ss sta n d a rd co u r t s h a d a p plie d be f o re t h e Gu i d elin e s, a n d so m e co u rt s h a vee xp re ssl y sai d so.55 B u t m a n y co u rt s co nti n u e to rel y o n t he "mi ni m al i n di ci a " f orm ul a -tio n .56 I n t h e C o m m e n t a ry, t h e C o m m i ssi o n e xp re ssl y st at e d t h a t "[ reli a bl e h e a rsa y"m a y b e co n si d e re d b ut t h at "[ u n reli a bl e all e ga ti o n s" sh all n ot .57

Wi t h re sp e ct t o f a ct - fi n di n g p ro ce d u re s, t h e C o m m i ssi o n co m m e n t a ry n o t e d t h atu n d e r p re -Gu i d eli n e s p ra cti ce , se n t e n ci n g f a ct o rs w e re of t e n d et e rm i n e d i n f o rm all y,p a rti all y e xpl ai n a ble be ca u se p a rti cul a r of f en se a n d of f en d e r ch a ra ct e ri sti cs "ra rel y h a da hi g h l y sp e ci fi c o r re q u i re d se n t e n ci n g co n se q u e n ce . "5 8 Th a t sit u a t i o n , t h eC o m m i ssi o n a ckn o w l e d g e d, n o l o n g e r e xi st s u n d e r t h e Gu i d eli n e s; t o t h e co n t ra ry,re sol uti o n of di sp ut e d f a ct s w o ul d, i n d e ed , "h a ve a m e a su ra ble eff e ct o n t h e a p pli cabl ep uni sh m e n t. "59 C o n se q u e ntl y, said t h e C o m m i ssi o n, "[ m] o re f o rm alit y" i s u n a void a bl e ifse nt e n ci n g i s t o b e a ccu rat e a n d f ai r.60

52 S e e U nit e d St at e s v. L o m b a rd , 1 0 2 F . 3 d 1 , 4 (1 st Ci r. 19 9 6 ) ; Gi g a nt e, 9 4 F . 3 d a t56 .

53 Y o u n g, su pra no t e 1 0, a t 3 2 2 & n .1 4 1 .

54 U . S. S . G. § 6 A 1. 3 . P oli cy st a t e m e n t s a re g e n e rall y bi n di n g o n co u rt s. Willi a m s v.U ni t ed St a te s, 5 0 3 U . S. 1 9 3 , 2 0 0 -0 1 (1 9 9 2 ) .

55 U nit e d St at e s v. Ml ele , 9 8 9 F .2 d 6 5 9, 6 6 3 -66 4 (3 d C ir . 1 99 3 ) (ci tin g U . S. S. G. § 6A 1.3 (a ); U nit e d S t at e s v. To rre s, 9 2 6 F. 2 d 3 21 , 3 2 4 (3 d Ci r. 1 9 91 )) .

56 Se e. e. g., U nite d St at e s v. Bro w nin g, 6 1 F .3 d 75 2, 7 5 6 (1 Ot h Ci r. 1 9 95 ); U nit e d St at e sv. H u ckin s, 5 3 F3 d 2 7 6, 2 7 9 (9t h C ir . 1 9 94 ); U nit e d St at e s v. Sil ve rm a n, 97 6 F. 2 d 1 50 2 ,1 5 0 6 (6t h Ci r. 1 9 92 ) (e n b a n e ), ce r t, d e ni ed , 1 1 3 S . C t. 1 5 9 5 (1 9 9 3) .

57 U . S . S . G. § 6 A 1 . 3 , co m m e n t . Th e C o m m i ssi o n ' s Of f i ci al C o m m e n t a ry t o t h eGu i d e l i n e s i s b i n di n g o n co u r t s u n l e ss i n co n si st e n t w i t h t h e C o n st i t u ti o n , f e d e ra lst at u te , o r a g ui deli n e it sel f. S ti n so n v. U nit e d S t at e s, 1 1 3 S . C t . 1 9 1 3, 1 9 1 5 (1 9 9 3 ).

58 U .S . S. G. § 6A 1 .3 , co m m e n t.

59 Id,

60 Id.

11

The additional “formality” in sentencing hearings contemplated by the Commissiondoes not include a right to confront adverse witnesses or even an absolute right to callone’s own witnesses.61 Moreover, as for burdens of proof, the Commission, in a 1991commentary amendment, stated its belief that the preponderance standard meets dueprocess requirements and “policy concerns” in resolving disputed factual issues.62

IV.Proposals for Reform

The pervasive use of hearsay at sentencing, lack of confrontation rights, and lightburdens of proof have spawned arguments and proposals for change. Critics of theexisting system are of one mind that pre-Guidelines law, which is the foundation forcurrent doctrine, has been inappropriately extended to the Guidelines.

First, critics point out that rehabilitation as the paramount goal of sentencing hasnow been expressly repudiated.63 The primary rationale of pre-Guidelines cases suchas Williams v. New York was that courts needed access to as much information aspossible about the offender to arrive at the most appropriate sentence in aid of his orher rehabilitation. Such wide-ranging inquiries are no longer necessary under, and infact are severely circumscribed by, Guidelines sentencing.64

Indeed, under discretionary sentencing the information presented to the judge wasgenerally not subject to scrutiny through adversarial procedures. By contrast, Rule 32of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now “contemplates full adversarial testingof the issues relevant to a Guidelines sentence.”65 Because the focus under Guidelines

61 United States v. Little, 61 F.3d 450, 454 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 116 S. Ct.954 (1996); Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1511; United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 400 (8thCir. 1992) (en bane), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 1592 (1993); United States v. Tardiff, 969F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir, 1992).

62 U.S .S .G. § 6A1.3, comment.

63 The SRA lists punishment, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation (in thatorder) as factors the court should consider in imposing sentence. 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D), U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(3), notes Congress’ “basic objective” withregard to sentencing when it enacted the SRA: honesty, uniformity, and proportionality.Id. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) instructs the Sentencing Commission to "insure that the guide-lines reflect the /^appropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonmentfor the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with neededvocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment." Id. (emphasisadded).

64 See generally U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H.

65 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 135 (1991).

12

se n t e n ci n g i s on t h e of f e n se of co n vi cti o n a n d rel at e d cri m e s, rat h e r t h a n t h e off e n d -e r , "t h e f a ct s t h a t a re n o w re l e va n t t o se n t e n ci n g a re m o re su s ce p ti bl e t o t ri al - t yp ep ro o f t h a n t h o se f a ct s re l e va n t u n d e r t h e re h a bili t a ti ve sch e m e . ..” 66

Ju d g e s a n d sch ol a rs h a ve p ro p o u n d e d a rg u m e n t s t o i n cre a se th e reli a bilit y o ffa ct - fi n di n g a t se n t e n ci n g . S o m e a re e xa m i n e d b el o w . I n a d diti o n, so m e o f o u r o w nid e a s t o re m e d y p ro bl e m s t h at h a ve b e co m e p re va l e nt u n d e r Gu i d eli n e s se n t en ci n ga re o ff e re d . S p e ci fi call y, w e a dd re ss ( i ) t h e f req u e n t u se o f h e a rsa y all e g a ti o n s t oin cre a se a d ef e n d a nt 's se n t e n ce ; a n d (ii) p ro se cu t o rs' u se of "rel e va nt co n d u ct " t ole n g t h e n a d e f e n d a n t 's se n t e n ce , e ve n t h o u g h t h at co n d u ct m a y n o t h a ve b e e nch a rg e d o r re sul t e d i n a co n vi cti o n.

A. Confrontation Clause Rights

Th e S u p re m e C o u rt h a s n o t ye t d e ci d e d w h e t h e r t h e Si xt h A m e n d m e n t 'sC o n f ro nt a ti o n Cl a u se a p pli e s to se n t e n ci n g p ro ce e di n g s. Th e co u r t s of a p p e al s—so m e t i m e s o ve r st ro n g di sse n t s6 7— h a ve g e n e ra ll y a g re e d t h at t h e Gu i d el i n e sse n t e n ci n g re gi m e d o e s n o t co m p e l re co g n iti o n of co n f ro nt a ti o n ri g ht s. Di sse n t i n gju dg e s a n d sch ol a rs, h o w e ve r , h a ve a rg u e d t h at de f e nd a n t s sh o ul d h a ve su ch ri g ht s. Itm a y w ell b e t h a t th e S up re m e C o u rt, w h e n it ulti m a t el y co n f ro nt s th e i ssu e , w ill d e ci d ea g ain st co n f ro nt ati o n ri g ht s a s a co n sti t uti on al i m p era ti ve. We n e ve rt h el e ss b elie ve t h ate vi d e nti a ry rul e s g ro u n d e d i n t h e p oli ci e s u n d e rl yi n g th e C o nf ro n t ati o n Cl a u se sh o ul db e a d o p t e d f o r u se at se n t e n ci n g.

Th e a rg u m e nt in f a vo r o f co n f ro n ta ti on sta r t s w it h t he t e xt of t h e Si xt h A m e n d m e nt ,w hi ch co n f ers su ch ri g h t s i n "all cri m in al p ro se cu ti o n s. " I t w o ul d se e m se lf -e vi d e n t t h a ta se n t e n ci n g h e a ri n g i s a n i n te g ral pa r t o f a cr i mi n al p ro se cu ti o n, p a r ti cul a rl y i n li gh t o fth e f a ct t h at a t t he ti m e t h e Si xt h A m e n d m e nt w a s a d op t e d, t ri al a n d se n t e n ci n g w e rep ar t of a si ngl e p ro ce e din g.68

Th e co n f ro nt a tio n a rg u m e n t i s st re n gt h e n e d w h e n o n e co n si d e rs t h e a p p a re n tp u rp o se o f th e Cl a u se . Alt h o u g h t h e p re ci se i nt e nt of t h e f ra m e rs i s u n kn o w n ,69 t h eSi xt h A m e nd m e n t o p e rat e s t o af f o rd cri mi n al d ef e n d a nt s a f ai r o p p o rt u nit y t o ch all e n g ea n d e xp o se w e a kn e sse s i n t h e p ro se cu ti o n 's e vi d e n ce a t t r i al, p ri n ci p a ll y t h ro u g h

66 N o t e, su p ra n ot e 4 4 , a t 1 8 8 6 .

67 S e e Wi se , 97 6 F . 2d at 40 6 -4 1 0 (A rn ol d, C . J. , co n cu rr i ng i n p a rt a nd di sse n ti n g i np a rt ) ; Sil ve rm a n , 9 7 6 F . 2 d a t 1 5 2 4 -27 (M e rri K, C. J. , di sse n ti n g ).

68 "If 'pl ai n m e a n i n g ' i s t h e cr it e ri o n , t hi s i s a n e a sy ca se [i n f a vo r o f co n f ro nt a ti o nri gh t s]. " Wi se, 9 7 6 F. 2 d a t 4 0 7 (A rn ol d, C . J. , co n cu rri n g i n p a rt a n d di sse n ti n g i n p a rt ).B ut se e U n it e d S ta t e s v. Ki ku m u ra , 9 1 8 F . 2 d 1 0 8 4, 1 1 02 (3 d Ci r . 1 9 9 0 ) ( "A s a t e xtu alm a ke r , t h e si xt h a m e n d m e nt , w hi ch ref e rs t o 'cr i mi n al p ro se cu ti o n s,' a rg u a bl y a p pli e so nl y a t t ri al. ") .

69 S e e, e. g ., Wh i te v. Ill i n oi s, 1 1 2 S . C t . 7 3 6 (1 99 2 ) (Th o m a s, J., co n cu rr i n g i n p a r ta n d co n cu rr in g i n t h e j ud g m e n t ); C alif o rni a v. Gre e n , 3 9 9 U . S. 1 4 9 (1 9 7 0) (H a rl a n, J.,co n cu rri n g ) .

13

face-to-face cross-examination,70 Under the Guidelines, where factual findings ondisputed issues may be as consequential to defendants as the conviction itself, it maybe cogently argued that defendants should be afforded similar rights.

Specht v. Patterson, 71 a Supreme Court case decided on due process grounds,also suggests that a defendant may be entitled to confront adverse witnesses atsentencing. Under the statutory scheme in that case, if a defendant was convicted ofcertain sex offenses, he was subject to an indeterminate sentence of one day to lifeupon a finding, in a separate proceeding, that he posed a threat of bodily harm to thepublic, or was a mentally ill . habitual offender. The Supreme Court held that thatrequisite finding was a “new finding of fact... that was not an ingredient of the offensecharged” and defendant was therefore entitled, among other things, to be ‘confrontedwith witnesses against him” and “the right to cross-examine.”72 Under the Guidelines,courts frequently make new factual findings that are not elements of the chargedoffenses. 73

When a defendant is at risk of an increased sentence based on hearsayallegations, he should have a right to confront and cross-examine his accuser underoath to expose bias, lack of perception, memory defects, motive to lie and other factorsbearing on the reliability of the proffered testimony. In the typical case, where at bestdefendant is given the opportunity to cross-examine a law enforcement officer relayingthe accusations, the defendant does not have a realistic chance to undermine thecharges, even though the informant may be mistaken or—worse—lying.

We recognize, however, that in exceptional circumstances the government mayhave a compelling need to avoid face-to-face examination of the declarant. For exam-ple, an informant's life may be endangered or the integrity of an ongoing investigationmay be compromised if the informant were forced to testify. Where the governmentshows that compelling interests are at stake, the court should have discretion to mod-ify the right of confrontation to balance defendant's rights and the government'slegitimate interests. The court may consider conducting an in-camera examinationof the informant based on written questions submitted by the defendant, maydemand affidavits and strict corroboration of the informant's accusations, or maydevise other means to adequately balance the parties' respective interests.

In deciding the appropriate procedure, the court's discretion to depart from anabsolute right of confrontation should be exercised in inverse proportion to the amountby which defendant's sentence would be increased were the accusations credited, inother words, if defendant's sentence would be significantly increased based on thehearsay, the court should be hesitant to entertain anything less than full confrontation;in these circumstances, the government may choose to forego an enhanced sentencealtogether. But where the sentence would be lengthened by only a few months and the

70 See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (placing screen betweendefendant and witnesses at trial violates Confrontation Clause).

71 386 U.S. 605(1967).

72 Id. at 610.

73 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

14

g o ve rn m e n t ca n sh o w a co m p e lli n g n e e d n o t t o p ro d u ce t h e wi t n e ss, t h e co u r t m a ywi sh t o f a shi o n a n alt e rn a t e p ro ce d u re .

R e co g ni zi n g co n f ron t ati o n ri g ht s at se n t en ci ng , al b eit i n m o di fie d f o rm , w o ul d h el pa ssu re t h at se nt e n ce s a re b a se d o n reli a bl e e vi d e n ce . Th e p ro se cu ti o n w o ul d no t, ofco u rse , b e re q ui re d t o p ro d u ce t h e so u rce o f i nf o rm a ti o n f o r cro ss-e xa m i n ati o n i f t h ee vi de n ce fall s wit hin a firml y ro ot e d h e arsa y e xce ptio n o r b e ars pa r ti cul a ri ze d g u a ra nt e e sof t ru st w o r thi n e ss. 74 B u t th e co m m o n si t u ati o n o f a l a w e nf o rce m e n t o ffi ce r rel a yi n gall e g ati o n s m a d e b y a n u ni d e n tifi e d "co n fi d e n ti al i n f o rm a nt " w o ul d b e o b vi at e d.

B. Burdens of P roof

W h il e re ce n t l y re a ffi rm i n g t h a t "a p p li ca t i o n of t h e p re p o n d e r a n ce st a n d a rd a tse n t e n ci n g g e ne rall y sa ti sfi e s d u e p ro ce s s, " t h e S u p re m e C o u rt d e cli n e d t o a d d re sst h e q u e st i o n , o n w hi ch it n o t e d "a di ve rg e n ce o f o pi n i o n a m o n g t h e ci rcu i t s, " o f"w h e th e r, i n e xtre m e ci rcu m st a n ce s, rel e va nt co n d u ct t h at w o ul d dra m a ti call y i n cre a seth e se n t e n ce m u st b e ba se d o n cl e a r a n d co n vin cin g e vi d en ce . "75

Th e a rg u m e nt s i n fa vo r of a hig h e r b u rd e n of p ro of , su ch a s t h e i nt e rm e di at e "cl ea ra n d co n vi n ci n g " st a n d a r d , di sti n g u i sh t h e p re -Gu i d e li n e s ca se o f M c M ill a n v.P e n n syl va ni a on t h e g ro u n d t h at t h e d e f e n d a nt s t h e re w e re n ot e xp o se d t o a g re at e rp u ni sh m e nt ra n g e th a n al re a d y a vail a bl e to t h e se n t en ci ng j ud g e . I n d e e d, t he S up re m eC o u rt a ckn o wl e d g e d t h at d ef e nd a n t's a rgu m e n t w o ul d h a ve be e n st ro n g er h ad t h at no tb e en t h e ca se .76 B y co n t ra st, u nd e r t h e Gu i deli n e s, d ef e n d an t s a re e xp o se d t o g re at e rp u ni sh m e nt w h en criti cal di sp ut e d f a ct s are f o u n d a gai n st t he m . Th at p ot e n tial milit at e sin f a vo r o f a hi g h e r b u rd e n o f p ro of .

Ju d g e s a n d co m m e n ta t ors h a ve al so a rgu e d t h at t he M at t he w s v. Eld ri d g e77 d u ep ro ce s s t e st re q ui re s a hi g h e r e vi d e n ti a ry b u rd e n. 78 U n d e r t h at t e st, t h e co u r t m u stco n sid e r (i ) t h e pri va t e in t e re st at st a ke ; (ii ) t h e ri sk o f a n e rro n e o u s de p ri va ti o n of t h a tint e re st a n d t h e val u e of a d diti o n al p ro ce d u ra l sa f e g u a rd s; a n d (ii i ) t h e g o ve rn m e n t 'sin t e re st, i n cl u di n g co st a n d a d mi ni st ra ti ve co n ce rn s. 79 P ro p o n e n t s a rg u e t h at t h eb al a n ce o f th e se fa ct o rs m a n d at e s a b u rd e n o f p ro of g re a t e r th a n t h e p re p o n d e ran cest an d a rd.

Th e Thi rd Ci rcu it , i n U ni t e d St a t e s v. Ki ku m u ra ,80 w a s t h e fi rst co u rt t o i m p o se ah i g h e r st a n d a r d o f p ro o f i n se n t e n ci n g t h a n t h e p re p o n d e ra n ce o f t h e e vi d e n ce

74 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).

75 Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 637 (1997).

76 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).

77 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

78 S e e, e. g ., N o t e, su p ra n o t e 4 4 , at 1 8 9 5 -9 6.

79 M a tt h e w s, 4 2 4 U . S. a t 3 3 5.

80 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).

15

standard. In rare cases, the Kikumura court explained, due process requires disputedfacts at sentencing to be decided on the basis of a clear and convincing standard ofproof. 81 In Kikumura, the trial court had departed upwards from a sentencing rangeof 27 to 33 months and imposed a 30 year sentence, based in part on allegationsthat defendant was a terrorist affiliated with the Japanese Red Army who was on amajor terrorist bombing mission in this country. Citing McMillan, the Third Circuitobserved that the case was a dramatic example of a sentencing hearing functioningas a “’tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.’”82 The court concluded that itcould not reflexively apply the same procedures that are adequate for “moremundane, familiar sentencing determinations”83 and held that a clear and convincingevidence burden of proof was mandated (and satisfied) in that case.84

Several other courts have expressed a willingness to adopt Kikumura's clear andconvincing standard in certain, extreme circumstances, or at least require a findingbeyond a preponderance of the evidence.85 Commentators have welcomed Kikumura'swillingness to impose a higher burden of proof, but have questioned whether there isa principled basis for not imposing that higher burden when any increased sentencewill result from fact-finding at sentencing.86 We believe that the clear and convincingburden of proof is more appropriate than the low preponderance standard in at leasttwo circumstances: (i) when the government seeks to increase defendant's sentenceby any amount using uncharged “relevant conduct”; and (ii) when defendant'ssentence, regardless of the circumstances, would be substantially increased based onevidence presented at sentencing.

At sentencing, defendants are stripped of important trial protections such as jurydetermination of facts, the reasonable doubt standard and confrontation rights.Presently, prosecutors have a tremendous incentive to charge a defendant with asingle, easily provable count and then to seek additional punishment at the sentencingstage by establishing other "relevant conduct" by the relatively light preponderancestandard. The manifest unfairness of such a practice would be mitigated by holding thegovernment to a higher burden of proof when it seeks to add to defendant’s sentencebased on uncharged conduct. Although in recognition of the differences between trialand sentencing we do not advocate that the reasonable doubt standard apply, we thinkthat in these circumstances the familiar, intermediate clear and convincing standardshould be used instead of the preponderance standard.

81 Id. at 1101.

82 Id. at 1100-01.

83 Id. at 1101.84 Id.

85 See United States v. Gigante, 94 F,3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Corbin, 998 F.2d 1377,1387 (7th Cir. 1993); United Staies v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 656, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1991)(en bane), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 961 (1992); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966F.2d 682, 688 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 901 (1992).

86 E.g., Young, supra note 7, at 339.

16

Similarly, whenever a significant increase in punishment would result fromevidence presented at the sentencing stage, the clear and convincing standard shouldapply. That is in accord with the Kikumura court’s holding. When the consequences toa defendant are as profound as the loss of liberty for an extensive period, we shouldnot be satisfied with having the relevant facts determined by the same standard thatgoverns civil disputes.

C. Rules of Evidence

Although we do not think that it is necessary to adopt the Federal Rules ofEvidence in their entirety for use in sentencing proceedings, we believe that the rulesrelating to hearsay should be recognized when defendant's sentence would bematerially affected. Similarly, certain other evidentiary rules, enumerated below, mayappropriately be applied in the sentencing context.

The Rules define hearsay87 and set forth the appropriate exceptions to the generalprinciple that hearsay is inadmissible.88 By definition, the Rules filter out only unreliableallegations, for if there are “guarantees of trustworthiness” equivalent to the otherexceptions, the hearsay is admissible under the catchall exception.89

All this is closely related to confrontation rights, as the Supreme Court hasrecognized that defendants have no right of confrontation if a firmly-rooted hearsayexception applies or if the out-of-court statements bear particularized guarantees oftrustworthiness.90 Thus, if the hearsay meets an exception, there is likely no constitu-tional right of confrontation. Conversely, if the hearsay cannot meet an applicableexception, it is presumably the sort that requires probing by defendant to assure thecourt of its suitability for increasing a defendant's sentence. Adoption of the hearsayrules would therefore help identify when our proposed modified right of confrontationwould be triggered and in any event would serve an independent value of helping toassure that sentences are based on reliable evidence.

Certain other rules of evidence can readily be applied at sentencing to enhancereliability of factfinding. For example: Rule 106, the "complete writing" rule;91 Rule 602,requiring a witness to testify based on personal knowledge; article VII, relating toopinion and expert testimony; article IX, governing authentication; and article X, the

87 Fed. R. Evid, 801 (C)

88 See Fed. R. Evid. 803-804.

89 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24).

90 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-815 (1990). See also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.346, 356-357 (1992) (hearsay falling within an established exception per se notviolative of Confrontation Clause).

91 Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides: “When a writing or recorded statement orpart thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction atthat time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought infairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”

17

rules relating to admissibility of duplicate documents and summaries of voluminouswritings.

D. Other Proposals

A variety of other proposals for reform have been made. Judge Becker (the authorof Kikumura), targeting hearsay that would elevate the sentencing range, proposesdevelopment of an “unfairness index” that would evaluate the government's evidenceto determine which hearsay is so unreliable that the government must either producethe witness or do without the evidence. As part of his methodology, he proposes thatcertain devices, such as affidavits and discovery, may in some cases alleviateproblems underlying hearsay.92

Professor Deborah Young argues that the best way to achieve needed, compre-hensive reform is to adopt an amended version of the Federal Rules of Evidence forsentencing purposes. She notes that the Rules are generally neutral to both govern-ment and the defendant, are designed to insure reliable fact-finding, and are familiar topractitioners and judges. Moreover, since the Rules are not of constitutional magnitude,refinements can be made through amendments.93

Less ambitious in her proposed reforms is Professor Margaret Berger, whosuggests that certain specialized rules be adopted responding to some of the moretroubling problems.94 For example, she submits that hearsay statements made byindividuals in custody, engaged in plea bargaining, or awaiting sentence may not beused to prove relevant conduct. As for other hearsay, it should not be used atsentencing unless corroborated by trial testimony, tangible evidence, or defendant'sallocution.

We believe that, in general, evidentiary reforms in sentencing should beparty-neutral, as are the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves. Thus, defendantsseeking downward departures should be subject to the same evidentiary strictures andburdens as the government in seeking an upward modification. Implementation ofreforms, however, may require reconsideration of the inherent presumptions in theGuidelines, for they affect who bears the burden of proving disputed facts.

92 Becker, supra note 44, at 170-71.

93 Young, supra note 10, at 371-72.

94 Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking the Applicabil ity of Evidentiary Rules atSentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need for an Infield Fly Rule,5 Fed. Sent. R. 96 (1992).

18

Conclusion

Although some may argue that more formalized evidentiary rules will make thesentencing process less streamlined and will consume precious judicial and prosecu-torial resources, the reality is that in a criminal justice system where the overwhelmingmajority of prosecutions are resolved by guilty plea prior to trial, sentencing hasbecome the critical stage of the proceeding. It seems to us, therefore, that the need foruniform, appropriate rules that courts are to follow at a proceeding in which decisionsare made concerning whether and, if so, for how long, a person will be incarceratedoutweighs any incremental societal cost of implementing such rules.

The legacy of the bygone era where courts sentenced to “rehabilitate” is anevidentiary scheme that in many instances does not afford Guidelines defendantsadequate protection against enhanced punishment based on unreliable evidence. ThisReport has examined the past, the present, and proposals for the future. It seems clearthat the unfairness inhering in the present system should be remedied, and that avariety of tools are at the disposal of conscientious courts, legislators andcommissioners.

April 1997

19