The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 40 | Number 3 | Article ID 3421 | Oct 04, 2010

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American Base Town in Northern Japan. US and Japanese AirForces at Misawa Target North Korea

Mitsumasa Saito

American Base Town in NorthernJapan. US and Japanese Air Forces atMisawa Target North Korea

Saito Mitsumasa

Translated by John Junkerman

A Base-Dependent Town

Everyone sat, eating cheese rolls in silence.Cheese wrapped in gyoza skins and deep-fried,cheese rolls are a local “B-class gourmet” food.The piping hot rolls seemed to warm thechilled, rain-drenched bodies of the customers.

The shop was the Noodle House, on the mainstreet of the city of Misawa, Aomori Prefecturein northern Japan. As the name suggests, onecan get all kinds of Japanese noodles at therestaurant. But it is not noodles but thesecheese rolls that are hot sellers. They’re afavorite among the airmen from Misawa AirBase and their families, who make up some 90percent of the customers.

“Coming here to Misawa, what I’ve been mostsurprised to see is how totally different theatmosphere is from Okinawa. Why is there noanti-American, anti-base sentiment here?”

Filling his mouth with a ketchup-coveredcheese roll, the man shook his head in wonder.Those around him nodded in confirmation. Itwas May 24, and some 70 legal activists fromaround Japan had descended upon the NoodleHouse en masse.

The group was part of a Misawa baseobservation tour that was organized by theTokyo-based Japan Lawyers Association forFreedom. For the group of lawyers working forpeace and human rights, the American bases inJapan are a critical issue.

At the time of their visit, the tidal wave of anti-base sentiment generated by the controversyover the relocation of the Futenma Marine airbase in Okinawa was surging from thesouthernmost region of Japan toward themainland, so there was interest in knowing thesituation around the base in Misawa, at thenorthern tip of Honshu.

But the Misawa they observed was the verypicture of tranquility. The roar of jet fightersshook the air just as it does in Okinawa, buteverywhere they went, the citizens they methad only positive things to say about the base.

Hearing these restrained, pro-base commentswas something of a culture shock to themembers of the group, who had previously only

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encountered the negative image that equatesbases with sound pollution and crime.

Why were the citizens of Misawa so tolerant ofthe base? Didn’t it represent a burden? Queriedby a succession of people from the lawyers’group, Noodle House owner Sato Kazuoresponded as follows:

“It’s important to understand that the origin ofthe base in Misawa is totally different fromthose in Okinawa. As I understand it, land inOkinawa was forcibly confiscated fromresidents by the American military, and thebases were built there. And that resulted inanti-base sentiments. But Misawa is theopposite. There was a base here that drewpeople to it, and that’s how the town formed.The base came first.”

Therefore…, he paused for a breath andseemed to firm his resolve: “We don’t say soopenly, but I’d guess more than 90 percent ofthe citizens favor the status quo, they supportthe continued presence of the base.”

The reluctance to speak openly is due to therecent flood of reports on television and innewspapers of opposition to American bases,sparked by the Futenma controversy. In thatcontext, the people of Misawa don’t want to bemisunderstood as “base-lovers.”

The base is a sensitive issue to the localcitizens. This is partly a consequence of howdeeply and complexly the base is intertwinedwith the local economy. Of course, Sato hatesthe noise and the crimes of the Americanforces. But this is not enough to push him intoopposing the base. The issue is not so black-and-white.

In fiscal 2008, the city of Misawa received ¥6.2billion (then, approx. $60 million) in defense-related subsidies and grants. Leaving asidecomplicating factors, this amount representedabout one third of the city’s annual budget. Inaddition, there’s the money that 10,000 militarypersonnel and dependents spend in variousways. This is not an insignificant sum in a cityof 40,000 people.

For this reason, Sato distrusts the DemocraticParty of Japan (DPJ)-led government. Coming topower in the fall of 2009, the administrationboasted it would move the Futenma baseoutside of Okinawa, but ended up accepting thestatus quo. This only served to agitateOkinawa, pouring oil on the flames of anti-basesentiment, Sato says.

This opinion is shared by a 47-year old manwho l ives in Misawa and works on theAmerican base. The wages of base workers arecovered by the “sympathy budget” that theJapanese government provides in support ofAmerican bases. As such they were a target ofthe DPJ administration’s budget-trimmingcampaign, the worker notes, because thewages are higher than prevailing rates in thearea.

“Budget-cutting? That’s just grandstanding, toplease the people. Aren’t there morefundamental things the government should bepaying attention to?” the worker remarks,without concealing his displeasure. “There are1,400 base workers in Misawa. Isn’t the DPJignoring the fact that cutting all of their wagesis going to depress the local economy?”

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A fellow worker continues, “What we saw withFutenma is that, when it comes to the baseissue, there’s no difference between the DPJand the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party).They’re both beholden to the US military,they’re both hopeless.”

One who has been observing the people ofMisawa with interest through American eyes isthe Tokyo-based poet and essayist ArthurBinard. Raised in Detroit near a base of theMichigan National Guard, Binard has long beenconcerned about the economic impact of bases.That interest deepened after he began makingregular monthly appearances for a radio stationin Aomori, and he has taken up the issue in hisprogram.

“I certainly understand thethinking of people in Misawa,” hesays. “It was the same in the area Igrew up in. But here’s what Ithink. At the same time you obtaineconomic stabi l i ty throughdependence on a base, it becomesa limitation, and it preventseconomic growth in other areas.The existence of the base restrictsthe character of Misawa, and iteliminates other possibilities.”

Today, a vague anxiety hangs over many peoplein Misawa. This is the fear that some dayAmerican planes might disappear from thescene. There are 40 F-16 jet fighters assignedto Misawa, but around 10 of them have beendispatched to Iraq, and 15 others weretemporarily dispatched to South Korea in May.Fewer than half of the planes remain inMisawa. Of course, this reduction has had animpact on the local economy.

USAF F-16 Fighting Falcons over Iraq onFeb 17, 2009 (US Air Force photo by Staff

Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

Sato notes, “A reduction of one F-16 means areduction of 20 to 30 troops, including the pilotof course and all the maintenance personneland support staff. So the absence of more thanhalf of the planes is a big blow.”

As if in response to these words, a city hallofficial sighs, “If the F-16s continue todisappear… The thought puts me in a coldsweat. If the base is eliminated, Misawa will fallinto ruin. I wonder if the central governmentunderstands this.”

The Plan to Withdraw the F-16s

In fact, there’s a reason people raise thisconcern. It stems from September 2009, whenreports appeared in some of the Japanesemedia of plans to withdraw the F-16s fromMisawa as early as the end of the year. Itturned out that this was simply one scenariounder consideration by the Americangovernment, but the reports sent shockwavesthrough the base-centered town.

Is it really possible that the F-16s, whichrepresent the sole aerial attack force of the USAir Force in Japan, would soon vanish from thescene? Seeking an answer, I queried sources inthe US departments of state and defense, the

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US military in Japan, the Japanese ministries ofdefense and foreign affairs… everyone I knowwho was connected with US-Japan relations.

But the answer was “No.” One personconnected to the US base in Misawa stated histotal denial in the following terms:

“At present, we have heardabsolutely nothing about such aplan. There is a standing plan toupgrade the aging F-15s at Kadenawith cutting-edge F-22 Raptors,but the F-16s are not going to bewithdrawn.”

Still, news of the plan to withdraw the F-16scaused a sensation. At the Misawa city hall,which is committed to coexistence and co-prosperity with the base, city officials raisedwhat amounted to screams: “Withdrawal of theF-16s will impact base subsidies and throw thecity’s fiscal planning into disarray.” “We’ll endup in fiscal ruin, like the city of Yubari inHokkaido.”

The ministries of foreign affairs and defensetried to quell these fears over the futureviability of the city by denying the plan towithdraw the F-16s. But the news reports leftlingering, deep-seated suspicions such as thosementioned above.

Then, why did news of such a plan emerge, allof a sudden? One military affairs expertexplains the context this way:

“I’ve been told that this withdrawalplan was one of numerous optionsthat were prepared as draftproposals. It was prepared by agovernment-contracted think tank.It’s probable that a preliminaryproposal like this got into thehands of one sector of the media as

a result of a deliberate leak by theprevious rul ing party—theLDP—and people associated withthe US government who had casttheir lot with the LDP over thereorganization of American forcesin Japan. The purpose, of course,was to cause a political shock tothe DPJ-led government.”

At the root of this maneuver was the disputeover the relocation of the Futenma Marine airbase, which had become a political problembetween the US and the former Hatoyamagovernment and remains pending. “The reala im of the leak was l ike ly to get thegovernment to comply with the existingagreement to move the base to the shore alongCamp Schwab (in the waters off Henoko inNago City).”

In other words, do as the US wishes orAmerican forces will pull out of Japan, leavingthe country to face North Korea and its ballisticmissiles on its own. The LDP camp and the USwere posing this forceful challenge: IsJapan—the DPJ—prepared to do this?

The F-16s were stationed at Misawa in 1985 asa forward presence in the strategy ofcontaining the Soviet Far East military. In theevent of a conflict, their mission was to destroySoviet air bases on Sakhalin and Etorofu Islandto facilitate US Navy and Japanese MaritimeSelf Defense Force patrols for nuclearsubmarines.

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US Air Force in Japan: F-16s at Misawa(North) C-130s at Yokota (Central),

Kadena and F-15s at Futenma (Okinawa)

After the end of the Cold War, North Koreabecame the hypothetical enemy. The F-16s arepoised to deliver the first wave of surgicalstrikes, targeted at strategic installations suchas anti-aircraft systems, missile-launchingbases, and nuclear facilities. From the NorthKorean perspective, they are knives pointed atthe country’s throat.

For this reason, the impact on North Korea ofthe plan to withdraw the F-16s from Misawacannot be overlooked. Senior Fellow John Parkof the government-funded US Institute forPeace offered an analysis along the followinglines: The withdrawal plan could send anerroneous message to North Korea, since theNorth Koreans watch every move the Americanmake. If the F-16s are withdrawn, North Koreacould mistake this for a signal from the US andsee it as a chance to drive a wedge between

Japan and the US.

Over the past quarter century, the US militaryhas transformed Misawa into a permanentstronghold for launching attacks against theSoviet Union and North Korea. The militaryaffairs analyst Ogawa Kazuhisa has described itas the “Misawa fortress.”

Is the Misawa fortress actually changing itsmake-up? One intriguing response to thisquestion was provided by the base commander,Colonel David Stilwell, in a comment in theFebruary 2010 edition of the magazine KōkūFan (Aviation Fan):

“Under present conditions, I knowof no concrete plan to withdrawthe F-16s from Misawa. … Closinga base or moving a unit requires agreat deal of work and takes a lotof time.”

The comment can be read as a denial of thewithdrawal plan. In fact, “the American militarycan move planes or ships surprisingly easily, asstrategy shifts or to meet their own needs. Inthe space of a month, they can move a unit ofjet fighters,” according to the military affairsjournalist Maeda Tetsuo.

In this fashion, the F-16s in Misawa were linkedinto the debate over the Futenma problem. Is itpossible that the F-16s, the most potent aerialattack force in Northeast Asia, will somedayleave Misawa? The answer lies behind thecurtain of military secrecy.

The Much-Delayed Advanced Fighter

While the American F-16s garner strategic andsometimes political attention, one must notoverlook the Japanese Air Self Defense Force(ASDF) that shares residence on the base withthe F-16s.

“There are 80 Japanese and American fighters

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concentrated on one base? That’s incredible.”This comment from a university student eliciteda collective sigh from the packed classroom. Itwas a day in June, when I had been invited tolecture to a journalism class at WasedaUniversity.

I had explained that the Misawa airfield is theonly one in Japan that is used jointly by the USand Japanese militaries, as well as civilianaircraft. And that the 40 F-16s of the US AirForce 35th Fighter Wing were stationedalongside about 40 F-2s in the ASDF 3rd AirWing.

The SDF’s Mitsubishi F-2

After the lecture, most of the students I spokewith expressed bewilderment that Misawa wassuch an enormous base. They couldn’t concealtheir astonishment that, with a combinedattack force of 80 fighters, Misawa hosts one ofthe most powerful strike forces of any base inthe world.

A written comment from a senior in thedepartment of law expressed these sentimentsquite frankly: “Your lecture was shocking. Iknew that the Misawa base was there inAomori Prefecture, but I had never heard thatit has one of the most powerful attack forces inthe world. I am appalled at myself for living insuch ignorance.”

Tokyo Woman’s Christian University ProfessorKurokawa Shuji, a specialist in US-Japanrelations, assesses this type of response fromstudents in the following way:

“This reflects the average level ofawareness of the military basesamong the Japanese people. It’snot necessarily a lack of concern,but they carry on without knowing.Not knowing presents no obstaclein their daily lives. And when theylearn the facts for the first time,they ’ re bewi ldered by thecomplexity and importance of thebases.”

The base may bewilder the Japanese, but on thefar side of the ocean, there are others who havefocused an intense gaze on Misawa, especiallyon the advanced F-2 fighter stationed at theASDF base.

On July 23, 2007, the New York Times ran afront-page story on the participation ofJapanese F-2s from Misawa in Cope NorthGuam, a joint training exercise with US forces,in which the fighters engaged in live-bombingdrills for the first time. The headline read,“Bomb by Bomb, Japan Sheds MilitaryRestraints.”

A B-52 Stratofortress leads a formation of twoF-16 Fighting Falcons; two Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-2 attack fighters and two USNavy EA-6B Prowlers Feb. 15, 2010 near Guamduring Exercise Cope North. (US Air Forcephoto/Staff Sgt. Jacob N. Bailey)

The ASDF is constrained from conducting live-bombing exercises within Japan itself, so itregularly dispatches aircraft to Guam fortraining. The newspaper described the trainingexercise, and noted especially the capacity ofthe F-2s to fly the 3,000 kilometers to Guamwithout refueling. F-2s began to be stationed at

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Misawa in 2000. The 3rd Fighter Squadron waslater joined by the 8th Fighter Squadron tocomprise the 3rd Air Wing, which reached atotal complement of some 40 F-2s in March2010.

As can be seen in its appearance, the F-2 isbased on the design of the F-16. It was jointlydeveloped by Japan and the US, with muchanticipation as the “Heisei-period ZeroFighter.” However, its development wassubstantially delayed by Japan’s decision toload the plane with high technology, and thecost of each plane rose dramatically.

At an average unit cost of ¥12.3 billion (about$145 million), it costs four times as much as anF-16. It is one of the most expensive jet fightersin the world. Because of its high cost, theoriginal production run was reduced by a third,to a total of 94 units.

“It is a multi-role fighter, capable of performingcounter-air, -ground, and -ship missions,” apilot in the 3rd Fighter Squadron explainsproudly. However, the F-2 was developed toprevent the landing of enemy ships on theJapanese coast, so it is heavily weighted towardanti-ship attack functions. It is a product of theSoviet threat doctrine of the Cold War-era.

“But, since the end of the Cold War, it has beendifficult to imagine a situation like that,” says ahigh official in the Ministry of Defense,implicitly acknowledging that the F-2 is out-of-date. Among military affairs analysts, it is oftensaid that the F-2 was already obsolete andlacking in capacity at the moment it appeared.

A spotlight was cast on the capacity of the F-2when the doctrine of preemptive attack onenemy bases was proposed in response tomissile launches by North Korea. Then-DefenseMinister Ishiba Shigeru of the former LDP-ledgovernment stated the doctrine as follows: “Ifan announcement is made that a missile is tobe launched and the fueling of the missilebegins, it is legally permissible to strike enemy

territory.”

Ishiba’s statement is no more than oneinterpretation of the constitution. But if in factthe situation developed where a missile basehad to be attacked, how would it be done? Mostmilitary analysts respond that there is no otheroption than employing the F-2.

This is why the New York Times focused itsattention on the live-bombing drills of the F-2,because they demonstrated that Japan has thecapacity to attack North Korea. A high-rankingpilot in the 3rd Fighter Squadron described a“new weapon” that has recently been acquiredby the F-2s. “These are JDAM (joint directattack munitions). They enable pinpoint attacksregardless of weather conditions.”

JDAMs are precision guided weapons thatutilize GPS signals to achieve a target accuracyof several meters. But the military affairsjournalist Maeda dismisses the doctrine: “Itwould mean dispensing with the exclusive self-defense doctrine, which is a pillar of theconstitution.”

An officer in the ASDF explains why preemptiveattacks on enemy bases are unrealistic.

“The missiles that North Koreatargets at Japan are Rodongmissiles (estimated range: 1,300ki lometers) . The Rodong ismounted on a launcher and istherefore mobile, and the missilesare hidden in secret tunnels inmountainous areas. There aremore than 100 of them. If youwanted to attack them, the onlyway would be to detect the missileswith a surveillance satellite theinstant they emerged from thetunnels, and to pick them off one ata time, like playing whac-a-mole.Would that be possible?

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Above all, to ensure that the attackplanes were not shot down, theenemy’s radar and antiaircraftm i ss i l e s wou ld have to bedestroyed first. The ASDF doesn’thave the armaments or skills to dothis.”

According to the Ministry of Defense, first-linearmaments are now under a process of review,in light of the end of the Cold War. As the SDFis reorganized, the F-2 is seen as too expensivefor the capacities it delivers. Having arrivedlate on the scene, where is this advancedfighter headed?

The ¥200 Billion “Sympathy Budget”

Neatly trimmed lawns, shining green in thesun. The expansive gardens are equipped withbarbecue sets for the residents’ days off.

“This is just like a pocket of America itself.”This is how the scene struck Iijima Shigeaki,associate professor at Nagoya GakuinUniversity, when he visited Misawa to surveythe American military housing that lines thestreets outside of the base. What surprisedIijima was the deeply discomforting view ofwhat appeared to be an American town

transplanted intact into Japan, as well as thegap between that scene and the ramshackle,tin-roofed Japanese homes that stood nearby.The size of the homes and their luxuriousnesswere worlds apart.

Japanese housing in Misawa

Iijima, a specialist in constitutional and peacestudies, has been conducting fixed-pointobservation in Okinawa and Aomori, at thenorthern and southern extremes of theJapanese archipelago, as a way of examiningthe continued presence of the Americanmilitary in Japan. One aspect of his study is the“sympathy budget” that the Japanesegovernment pays to support the base presence.The American military housing before his eyeswas a product of that very sympathy budget.

“The taxes used to pay for the sympathy budgetare, of course, paid by Japanese citizens. ThatAmerican soldiers live in better houses than theJapanese taxpayers is head over heels.”

Through the sympathy budget, the Japanesegovernment bears the cost of stationingAmerican troops in Japan. This includeshousing outside of the base, as well as the costsof the buildings and utilities on the base, andthe wages of Japanese base workers. Thesystem began in 1978, after Defense Agency

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Director-General Kanemaru Shin declared “Wewant to deal with the US military from astandpoint of sympathy.”

At the beginning, the Japanese share of costsamounted to only ¥6.2 billion (approx. $27million at then current exchange rates). Inresponse to repeated requests from the USmilitary, the budget grew by leaps and boundsuntil it reached ¥275.6 billion (approx. $2.5billion) in 1999. Fiscal constraints have led tosome reduction in the budget, but it stillamounted to ¥192.8 billion (approx. $2.1billion) during the last fiscal year. [1]

Iijima comments,

“Last year, the tremendous sum ofnearly ¥200 billion was used forthe maintenance of anothercountry’s military. Even moreproblematic is the content. Off-base hous ing tha t i s moreluxurious than the Japanese enjoyis part of it, but the wages of cakedecorators , bowl ing a l leymanagers, and the maintenanceworkers at golf courses are alsoincluded. The taxes paid byJapanese people cover the costs ofoff-duty leisure activities ofAmerican soldiers. It is a trulyremarkable phenomenon.”

If you liken the American bases to a house, inthis peculiar arrangement the Japanesegovernment is lending out a mansion completewith maid service at no cost, not even chargingfor water and electricity. The Americans fullyunderstand how comfortable this arrangementis. For example, Rep. Stephen Solarz, thenchairman of the Asian subcommittee of theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee, told theJapan National Press Club in 1991 that the US“should be grateful” to Japan for welcomingAmerican troops on its soil and bearing more of

the costs than any other ally, despite the factthat the US military’s primary mission was aregional one, to deter aggression againstcountries in the region other than Japan.

While some countries charge the Americanmilitary fees for hosting US bases, very fewhave agreed to share the costs of those bases.Japan and Germany are among them. Manymilitary affairs analysts point to this as onereason the US has been reluctant to reduce itspresence in Japan.

Another reason is Japan’s strategic location. Itwas positioned to block expansion into thePacific by America’s hypothetical enemies afterWorld War II: the Soviet Union, China, andNorth Korea.

Former Deputy Secretary of State RichardArmitage was once asked about the importanceof Okinawa, and he nearly shouted his reply:“Location, location, location!” These words canbe applied to the entire Japanese archipelago.In the words of military analyst Ogawa, “As a

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strategic base, the Japanese islands buttresshalf of the globe, from Hawaii to the Cape ofGood Hope. If the US were to lose Japan, itcould no longer remain a superpower with aleadership position in the world.”

An interesting document provides support forthis perspective. It is the US Department ofDefense Base Structure Report, which lists theproperty value of the American military’sforeign bases. The value is calculated as thecost of building the same base from scratch,which is termed “plant replacement value.”

Large US Military Bases Overseas

(Department of Defense Base StructureReport, 2006)

(PRV=Plant Replacement Value, in billionUS$)

According to the 2006 report, 14 of the 38 most

valuable large bases in the world areconcentrated in Japan. This includes the topthree: the Navy base at Yokosuka, home portfor a nuclear aircraft carrier ($3.88 billion); theAir Force base at Kadena, the largest airterminal in Asia ($3.82 billion); and the airbaseat Misawa ($3.71 billion).

There is little difference in the value of thesethree bases, so it can be said that Misawa isone the most valuable American bases in theworld. It goes without saying that this value issupported by the sympathy budget.

Analyzing this document, US-Japan relationsexpert Niihara Shoji comments, “The abnormalprominence of the American bases in Japan andJapan’s status as an American base state arevividly in evidence.” Niihara goes so far as tosay, “Without Japan, there is no Americanmilitary.”

Facing this massive base presence, AssociateProfessor Iijima poses the following question:“As we can see in the incidents and accidentsthat occur in Okinawa, even in peacetime theAmerican military gives priority to its owninterests, and conducts a whole range ofexercises without regard for any harm done tothe Japanese. Under emergency conditions in aconflict, would such an organization defend theJapanese people?”

One response was provided by Gregory Clark,president emeritus of Tama University and acommentator on international and economicaffairs:

“Many Japanese consider theAmerican bases indispensable forthe defense of Japan, but the USgives little thought to defendingJapan. The US government signedthe security treaty with Japanbecause it needed to have bases inthe security stronghold of theJapanese islands. It is no more

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than an extension of post-WorldWar I I occupa t i on po l i cy .Unfortunately, if the US is going toprotect anything it is the Americanbases in Japan, not Japan itself.”

The Transformation of the US-JapanAlliance

“We completed our mission without having anycontact with the pirates. I am proud that wewere able to contribute to the national interestand to respond to the expectations ofinternational society.” Captain NakahataYasuki, commander of the 4th Escort Divisionof the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF),proudly delivered these remarks on March 20,2010, on a wharf crowded with welcomingfamilies and fellow seamen at Ominato base inthe city of Mutsu, Aomori Prefecture.

The 3,550-ton destroyer Hamagiri, with a crewof 150, had just returned to its homeport aftera 5-month absence, having been deployed tothe sea off of Somalia and the Gulf of Adenunder the Anti-Piracy Measures Law. Therewas excitement in the air at the return of theship, carrying the aura of the distant ArabianSea.

Hamagiri

The Hamagiri had been paired with theYokosuka-based 4,650-ton destroyer Takanamito form the third surface force dispatched tothe region, where it provided escorts forcommercial shipping for three and a halfmonths from November 2009. The shipsperformed 34 escorts, protecting a total of 283ships, including those of foreign countries.

On February 3, more than a month before theHamagiri returned, two P3C patrol planes leftthe MSDF Hachinohe airbase (also in Aomori),headed for the same region. They were thethird aerial force to be dispatched under thesame law, for a four-month tour of duty. Basedat the Djibouti International Airport, the planesconducted observation and informationgathering, providing intelligence about thepirates to the destroyers guarding thecommercial ships.

Strangely, these ships and planes based inAomori were, in quick succession, performingduties off of Africa and the Middle East. Torepeat, the main mission of the MSDF’sOminato naval base and Hachinohe airbasewas, along side the US military, to contain theSoviet Union during the Cold War. But the ColdWar has been over for 20 years. These forcesnow headed, not to the northern seas coveredwith snow-white ice floes, but to the MiddleEast and Africa, where yellow clouds of sanddance across the land. Why? The answer issimple. Because the status of US-Japan alliancehas been broadened in its interpretation.

Prime Minister Sato Eisaku (in office, 1964–72)once said, “With our constitution, Japan willabsolutely never go outside the country.” Hemade that statement before the Lower Housebudget committee in 1969, and at the time itwas thought that the peace constitutionprohibited the Self Defense Force from goingoverseas. Now, 40 years later, escort ships andsurveillance planes from the SDF have unfurledthe rising sun flag in the Middle East—theworld’s powder keg—and in the chaos of Africa.

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The two eras are worlds apart. But some haveraised objections to these activities.

Nagoya Gakuin’s Iijima: “Under the Anti-PiracyMeasures Law, the SDF can be sent anywherein the world in the name of ‘anti-piracymeasures.’ Moreover, these can be placeswhere conflict could occur, and the SDF is ableto attack first in some cases.” Iijima points outthat the 2001 law that enabled the SDF toprovided refueling services in the Indian Oceanin support of the war in Afghanistan and the2003 law that authorized the dispatch of theSDF to Iraq were both time-limited andspecified the period of the troop dispatch, “butunder the Anti-Piracy Measures Law, the SDFcan be sent anywhere, anytime [2], at the solediscretion of the government. It has to be saidthat this is a very serious violation of theconstitution.”

The US-Japan security treaty is an agreementthat requires the US to defend Japan in theevent of an enemy attack. Japan is underabsolutely no obligation to defend the US.However, the world situation after the end ofthe Cold War—or more to the point, theUS—would not allow Japan to remain withinthe narrow confines of East Asia.

A succession of laws have expanded the role ofthe SDF: the 1999 law on emergency situationsnear Japan, the 2001 anti-terrorism law, the2003 Iraq War law, and now the anti-piracylaw. As Iijima says, “Japan has become acountry that can dispatch the SDF anywhere,anytime.” Each step in this process has beentaken under intense pressure from the US.

One military affairs expert raises the followingquestion, regarding this rapid change in thecharacter of the US-Japan alliance: “Thepresent security treaty framework has becomeglobalized, far surpassing the two-countryagreement on defense cooperation that it wasa t t h e s t a r t . I t i s s t i l l u n d e r g o i n gtransformation at the present, and I wonderhow many Japanese citizens really grasp the

status of the security treaty/US-Japanalliance?”

As the Futenma controversy has made clear,the Japanese government will, under pressurefrom the US, muzzle the people’s voice. This isbecause it has no options other than the US-Japan alliance to ensure the security that willdetermine the fate of the country. At the mercyof successive governments with no vision, it isalways the Japanese people who get the shortend of the stick.

Notes

[1] Editor’s note: The sympathy budget is onlypart of the total cost to Japan of hostingAmerican bases. When indirect costs (such asland rental fees), special assessments forOkinawa, and costs of the base realignmentplan are included, the total came to ¥469.6billion (approx. $5.5 billion) for the 2010 fiscalyear. These figures are from the Ministry ofDefense. Thanks to Norimatsu Satoko for thisinformation.

[2] Editor’s note: The Anti-Piracy MeasuresLaw went into effect in July 2009 and wasextended for another year in July 2010. It doesnot specify when or where forces will bedispatched for anti-piracy operations, whichcan be ordered without prior approval of theDiet.

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This report appeared in the October 2010 issueof Sekai, as the final installment of an 8-partseries, “Shimokita Nuclear Peninsula.” Theseries was written jointly by Saito and theveteran journalist Kamata Satoshi.

Saito Mitsumasa is a journalist and an editor ofTo-o Nippo in Aomori. His books include Beigun“Himitsu” Kichi Misawa (Misawa, the “Secret”American Base). He is a winner of the Ishibashi

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Tanzan Memorial Journalism Award fromWaseda University.

John Junkerman is an American documentaryfilmmaker and Japan Focus associate living inTokyo. His most recent film, “Japan’s PeaceConstitution” (2005), won the Kinema Jumpoand Japan PEN Club best documentary awards.It is available in North America from Icarus

Films. He co-produced and edited “Outside theGreat Wall,” a film on Chinese writers andartists in exile that will be released in Japanand abroad later this year.

Recommended citation: Saito Mitsumasa,"American Base Town in Northern Japan. USand Japanese Air Forces at Misawa TargetNorth Korea," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 40-3-10,October 4, 2010.