amendments 1 - 313 - european parliament · amendment 18 miguel urbán crespo, miguel viegas, fabio...

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EN United in diversity EN

European Parliament2014-2019

Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in theapplication of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion

2017/2013(INI)

7.9.2017

AMENDMENTS1 - 313

Draft reportPetr Ježek, Jeppe Kofod(PE604.514v01-00)

Report on the inquiry into Money Laundering, Tax Avoidance and TaxEvasion(2017/2013(INI))

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AM_Com_NonLegReport

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Amendment 1Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, HeidiHautala, Michel Reimon, Jordi Soléon behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolutionCitation 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment

- having regard to Article 116 of theTreaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union (TFEU),

Or. en

Amendment 2Miguel Urbán Crespo, Miguel Viegas, Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Marina AlbiolGuzmán, Stelios Kouloglou, Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese



- having regard to the revelations ofthe International Consortium ofInvestigative Journalists (ICIJ), on theuse of offshore companies, which havebecome known as the ‘Panama Papers’,

Or. en

Amendment 3Miguel Viegas, Miguel Urbán Crespo, Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Marina AlbiolGuzmán, Stelios Kouloglou, Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese

Motion for a resolutionCitation 3 b (new)


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- having regard to the resolutionadopted by the United Nations GeneralAssembly on 27 July 2015 on the AddisAbaba Action Agenda,

Or. en

Amendment 4Monica Macovei, Traian Ungureanu, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite PagazaurtundúaRuiz, Sven Giegold



- having regard the EuropeanAgenda on Security of April 2015

Or. en




- having regard the Commission´sAction Plan to strengthen the fightagainst terrorist financing of February2016

Or. en

Amendment 6Pervenche Berès, Emmanuel Maurel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Tibor Szanyi, HuguesBayet, Evelyn Regner, Peter Simon

Motion for a resolution

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Citation 15 a (new)


- having regard to the EuropeanParliament resolutions 2015/2066(INI) of25 November 2015 and 2016/2038(INI) of6 July 2016 on tax rulings and othermeasures similar in nature or effect,

Or. en

Amendment 7Petras Auštrevičius



- having regard to the EuropeanParliament`s recommendation to theCouncil of 2 April 2014 on establishingcommon visa restrictions for Russianofficials involved in the SergeyMagnitsky’s case.

Or. en




- having regard to the EU FIUPlatform mapping exercise and gapanalysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation (15 December 2016),

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Or. en




- having regard to the EuropeanParliament reports of the SpecialCommittees TAXE1 and TAXE2 on “Taxrulings and other measures similar innature or effect”

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 15 c (new)


- having regard to the EuropeanParliament report on “Bringingtransparency, coordination andconvergence to corporate tax policies inthe Union”

Or. en


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Motion for a resolutionCitation 15 d (new)


- Having regard to the Council ofEurope Warsaw Convention (16 May2005);

Or. en




- having regarded to the Report (A8-0056/2017) of 7 March 2017 on theproposal for a directive of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council amendingDirective (EU) 2015/849 on theprevention of the use of the financialsystem for the purposes of moneylaundering or terrorist financing andamending Directive 2009/101/EC(COM(2016)0450 – C8 0265/2016 –2016/0208(COD)) of the Committee onEconomic and Monetary Affairs, and theCommittee on Civil Liberties, Justice andHome Affairs;

Or. en

Amendment 13Miguel Urbán Crespo, Miguel Viegas, Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Stelios Kouloglou,Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese, Marina Albiol Guzmán


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- having regarded to the Report (A8-0004/2017) on the role of whistle-blowersin the protection of EU’s financialinterests (2016/2055(INI)) by theCommittee on Budgetary Control;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 c (new)


- having regarded to the Mappingexercise and gap analysis on FIUs’powers and obstacles for obtaining andexchanging information Report adoptedby the EU FIUs’ Platform on 15December 2016;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 d (new)


- having regarded to the OECDreport “Improving Co-operation betweenTax and Anti-Money LaunderingAuthorities: Access by tax administrationsto information held by financialintelligence units for criminal and civilpurposes” published on 18 September

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2015;

Or. en

Amendment 16Miguel Urbán Crespo, Miguel Viegas, Fabio De Masi, Marina Albiol Guzmán, MattCarthy, Stelios Kouloglou, Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese

Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 e (new)


- having regarded to the ‘ECOLEF’Project on The Economic and LegalEffectiveness of Anti-Money Launderingand Combating Terrorist Financing,funded by the European Commission DGAffairs JLS/2009/ISEC/087 of February2013;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 f (new)


- having regarded to Directive2013/34/EU of the European Parliamentand of the Council of26 June 2013 ‘onthe annual financial statements,consolidated financial statements andrelated reports of certain types ofundertakings, amending Directive2006/43/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council and repealing CouncilDirectives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC’(CbCR proposal),

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Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 g (new)


- having regarded to the EuropeanCommission proposal for a CouncilDirective amending Directive 2011/16/EUas regards mandatory automaticexchange of information in the field oftaxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements COM(2017) 335,

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 h (new)


- having regarded to the EuropeanCommission proposal for a CouncilDirective on a Common Corporate TaxBase COM(2016) 685,

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 i (new)

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- having regarded to the EuropeanCommission proposal for a CouncilDirective on a Common ConsolidatedCorporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 2016/0336(CNS),

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 j (new)


- having regarded to the OECD’s‘Multilateral Convention to ImplementTax Treaty Related Measures to PreventBEPS’ of June 2017;

Or. en

Amendment 22Marina Albiol Guzmán, Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Stelios Kouloglou, TakisHadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese, Miguel Urbán Crespo, MiguelViegas

Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 k (new)


- having regarded to the UN 'Finalstudy on illicit financial flows, humanrights and the 2030 Agenda forSustainable Development' of theIndependent Expert on the effects offoreign debt and other relatedinternational financial obligations ofStates on the full enjoyment of all human

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rights, particularly economic, social andcultural rights, of 15 January 2015;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionCitation 16 l (new)


- having regarded to the UN 'Reportof the Special Rapporteur on extremepoverty and human rights, MagdalenaSepúlveda Carmona', of 22 May 2014.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital C


C. whereas maladministration meanspoor or failed administration that occurs,for instance, if an institution fails to respectthe principles of good administration, andwhereas examples of maladministrationinclude administrative irregularities andomissions, abuse of power, unfairness,malfunction or incompetence,discrimination, avoidable delays, refusal ofinformation, negligence, and othershortcomings that reflect a malfunctioningin the application of Union law in any area

C. whereas maladministration meanspoor or failed administration that occurs,for instance, if an institution fails to respectthe principles of good administration, andwhereas examples of maladministrationinclude administrative irregularities andomissions, abuse of power, unfairness,unlawful procedures, malfunction orincompetence, discrimination, avoidabledelays, lack or refusal of information,negligence, and other shortcomings thatreflect a malfunctioning in the application

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covered by this law; of Union law in any area covered by thislaw;

Or. en

Amendment 25Emilian Pavel, Emmanuel Maurel, Ana Gomes, Peter Simon

Motion for a resolutionRecital C


C. whereas maladministration meanspoor or failed administration that occurs,for instance, if an institution fails to respectthe principles of good administration, andwhereas examples of maladministrationinclude administrative irregularities andomissions, abuse of power, unfairness,malfunction or incompetence,discrimination, avoidable delays, refusal ofinformation, negligence, and othershortcomings that reflect a malfunctioningin the application of Union law in any areacovered by this law;

C. whereas maladministration meanspoor or failed administration that occurs,for instance, if an institution fails to respectthe principles of good administration, andwhereas examples of maladministrationinclude administrative irregularities andomissions, abuse of power, giving andreceiving bribe, unfairness, malfunction orincompetence, discrimination, avoidabledelays, refusal of information, negligence,and other shortcomings that reflect amalfunctioning in the application of Unionlaw in any area covered by this law;

Or. en

Amendment 26Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Peter Simon

Motion for a resolutionRecital C a (new)


Ca. Whereas it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice of theEuropean Union that the principle of"sincere cooperation" enshrined inArticle 4.3 of the TEU imposes anobligation on the Member States toachieve results, as well as an obligation of

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means ;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D


D. whereas money laundering involvesconcealing illicit money to disguise theidentity of illegally obtained proceeds sothat they appear to have originated fromlegitimate sources; whereas such offencesare known as predicate offences, and,under the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) 2012 Recommendations and the4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive(AMLD), applicable as of 26 June 2017,include tax crime;

D. whereas money laundering involvesconcealing illicit money to disguise theidentity of illegally obtained proceeds sothat they appear to have originated fromlegitimate sources and re-enter the legaleconomy; whereas such offences areknown as predicate offences, and, underthe Financial Action Task Force (FATF)2012 Recommendations and the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD),applicable as of 26 June 2017, include taxcrime, and the proposal for a directive ofthe European Parliament and of theCouncil amending the 4th AMLD resultedin tax offences being considered predicateoffences for money laundering under allcircumstances, independently of howheavily they are punished at MemberState level;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D

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D. whereas money laundering involvesconcealing illicit money to disguise theidentity of illegally obtained proceeds sothat they appear to have originated fromlegitimate sources; whereas such offencesare known as predicate offences, and,under the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) 2012 Recommendations and the4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive(AMLD), applicable as of 26 June 2017,include tax crime;

D. whereas money laundering involvesconcealing illicit money to disguise theidentity of illegally obtained proceeds sothat they appear to have originated fromlegitimate sources; whereas such offencesare known as predicate offences, and,under the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) 2012 Recommendations and the4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive(AMLD), applicable as of 26 June 2017,include tax crimes;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D a (new)


Da. whereas international criminalnetworks use legal business structures toconceal the source of their profits, soaction is required in order to address theproblems this creates in the licit economy;

Or. en




Da. whereas money laundering isconnected to corruption and abuse ofhuman rights, people who report and

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investigate money laundering perform apublic service, however, are at risk to getretaliated against.

Or. en

Amendment 31Monica Macovei, Traian Ungureanu, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite PagazaurtundúaRuiz



Da. whereas international criminalnetworks use legal business structures toconceal the source of their profits, soaction needs to address the infiltration ofthe licit economy by organised crime;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D b (new)


Db. whereas tax avoidance is the legalact – unless deemed illegal by the taxauthorities or, ultimately, by the courts –of using tax regimes to one's ownadvantage to reduce one's tax burden;and tax evasion is defined as the illegalact of evading taxes by concealingincome, earned either legally or illegally,from detection and collection by the taxauthorities1a;

_________________

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1a ‘Member States' capacity to fight taxcrimes, Ex-post impact assessment’,Elodie Thirion and Amandine Scherrer,European Parliamentary ResearchService, July2017.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D b (new)


Db. whereas the European Agenda onSecurity of April 2015 highlighted theneed to tackle the nexus betweenterrorism and organized crime,underlining that organised crime feedsterrorism through different channels,inter alia the supply of weapons,financing through drug smuggling, andthe infiltration of financial markets;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D c (new)


Dc. whereas the EU economicarchitecture enhances tax competition, asan investment attraction formula, erodingtax resources; whereas factorscontributing to internal EU taxcompetition include free movement of

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capital, an EU budget incapable ofoffsetting the growing economicdivergences between Member States, anda growing pressure on Member States tocompete through wage moderation andtax collection restrictions, all of whichbenefit those who gain their incomes fromprofits and wealth, and puts the pressureon workers and the majority of citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 35Luděk Niedermayer, Dariusz Rosati

Motion for a resolutionRecital E


E. whereas this Committee was set upafter the publication of the Panama Papers;whereas the revelations were the result ofthorough investigative work by journalistsfrom 107 media organisations in 80countries, united in the InternationalConsortium of Investigative Journalists(ICIJ), who analysed documents detailingthe operations of Mossack Fonseca usingstate-of-the-art software to process thehuge amount of leaked data;

E. whereas this Committee was set upafter the publication of the so-called‘Panama Papers’, whereas the PanamaPapers constitute the biggest leak ofinformation thus far; whereas the 2.6terabytes of confidential informationleaked from the law firm and licensedtrust company Mossack Fonsecacontained 11.5 million documents andrepresent more data than Wikileaks(2010), Offshore Leaks (2013), Luxleaks(2014) and Swissleaks (2015)combined;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital E a (new)


Ea. [new recital following recital E]

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whereas the publication was the result ofthorough investigative work by journalistsfrom 107 media organisations in 80countries, united in the InternationalConsortium of Investigative Journalists(ICIJ), who analysed documents detailingthe operations of Mossack Fonseca usingstate-of-the-art software to process thelarge amount of leaked data;

Or. en

Amendment 37Dariusz Rosati

Motion for a resolutionRecital E a (new)


Ea. Whereas the Panama Papers haveuncovered various cases of using offshoreentities with an aim to purposefully avoidor evade tax or launder money;

Or. en

Amendment 38Enrique Calvet Chambon

Motion for a resolutionRecital F


F. whereas the Panama Papersillustrate the importance of free media andinvestigative journalism, which Parliamentwholeheartedly embraces as anindispensable factor in functioningdemocracies;

F. whereas the Panama Papersillustrate the importance of free media andinvestigative journalism, which Parliamentwholeheartedly embraces as anindispensable factor in functioningdemocracies alongside impartial andeffective action by the Stateadministration to investigate the facts thatmay constitute a crime or administrative

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offence;

Or. es

Amendment 39Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Ana Gomes, Evelyn Regner, Emmanuel Maurel, MarjuLauristin, Elly Schlein, Tibor Szanyi, Hugues Bayet, Virginie Rozière, Peter Simon,Nessa Childers




F. whereas the Panama Papersillustrate the importance of free media,investigative journalism and theimportant work of whistle-blowers inshedding light on hidden malpracticesand illegal behaviours, which theEuropean Parliament wholeheartedlyembraces as an indispensable factor infunctioning democracies;

Or. en

Amendment 40Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Miguel Viegas, Matt Carthy, Fabio De Masi, Marina AlbiolGuzmán, Stelios Kouloglou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese, Miguel Urbán Crespo




F. whereas the Panama Papersillustrate the catalytic role of free mediaand investigative journalism, whichParliament whole heartedly embraces as aprerequisite and an indispensable factor inthe development of democracies, inpromoting transparency, and instrengthening existing functioningdemocracies;

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Or. en

Amendment 41Stelios Kouloglou, Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Marina Albiol Guzmán, TakisHadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese, Miguel Urbán Crespo, MiguelViegas

Motion for a resolutionRecital F a (new)


Fa. Whereas whistle-blowing is linkedto freedom of the press and is essential inbringing to light illegal activities oractivities which evidently harm orthreaten the public interest; whereas theprotection of whistle-blowers has beenrecognised by all major internationalinstruments concerning corruption andwhistleblowing standards have been setout by the UN Convention againstCorruption (UNCAC),Council of EuropeRecommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 and the2009 OECD Anti-BriberyRecommendation; whereas most EUMember States have ratified the UNConvention against Corruption, whichmakes it obligatory to provide appropriateand effective protection to whistle-blowers;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital F b (new)


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Fb. Whereas whistle-blowing relatingto financial interests of the Union is thedisclosure or reporting of wrongdoing,including, but not limited to, corruption,fraud, conflicts of interest, tax evasionand tax avoidance, money laundering,infiltration by organised crime and acts tocover up any of these;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital F c (new)


Fc. Whereas reporting by whistle-blowers of information on practises thatcould threaten or harm the publicinterests is conducted on the basis of theirfreedom of expression and information,both enshrined in the EU Charter ofFundamental Rights, and with a strongsense of responsibility and civic morality;whereas whistle-blowers often risk theirpersonal safety which is protected underArticle 6 of the Charter of FundamentalRights

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital F d (new)

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Fd. whereas it is vital for a horizontallegal framework to be established as amatter of urgency, which by laying downrights and obligations, protects whistle-blowers throughout the EU, as well as inthe EU institutions

Or. en

Amendment 45Stelios Kouloglou, Fabio De Masi, Miguel Viegas, Miguel Urbán Crespo, Marina AlbiolGuzmán, Patrick Le Hyaric, Matt Carthy, Curzio Maltese, Takis Hadjigeorgiou

Motion for a resolutionRecital F e (new)


Fe. whereas it is essential to ensurethat any kind of retaliation againstwhistle-blowers will be suitably punished,as according to the OECD more than onethird of organisations with reportingmechanism do not have or do not knowof, a written policy on protecting thosewho report from reprisals;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital F f (new)


Ff. whereas the Commission stated,for instance, in its communication of 5July 2016, that the protection of whistle-

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blowers, in both the public and privatesectors, helps to address mismanagementand irregularities, including cross-bordercorruption, which deprives European taxauthorities of legitimate tax revenue;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital G


G. whereas the Panama Papersconstitute the biggest leak of informationthus far; whereas the 2.6 terabytes ofconfidential information leaked from thelaw firm and licensed trust companyMossack Fonseca contained 11.5 milliondocuments and represent more data thanWikileaks (2010), Offshore Leaks (2013),Luxleaks (2014) and Swissleaks (2015)combined;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 48Luis de Grandes Pascual, Gabriel Mato

Motion for a resolutionRecital G


G. whereas the Panama Papersconstitute the biggest leak of informationthus far; whereas the 2.6 terabytes ofconfidential information leaked from thelaw firm and licensed trust companyMossack Fonseca contained 11.5 milliondocuments and represent more data than

G. whereas the Panama Papersconstitute the biggest leak of informationon money laundering and tax avoidanceand evasion thus far; whereas the 2.6terabytes of confidential informationleaked from the law firm and licensed trustcompany Mossack Fonseca contained 11.5

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Wikileaks (2010), Offshore Leaks (2013),Luxleaks (2014) and Swissleaks (2015)combined;

million documents and represent more datathan Wikileaks (2010), Offshore Leaks(2013), Luxleaks (2014) and Swissleaks(2015) combined;

Or. es


Motion for a resolutionRecital G a (new)


Ga. [recital G(new)]

Whereas the Panama Papers cover a vastamount of data since the 1970s, withoutproviding an overview of the number ofcases from different years; whereas it istherefore difficult to draw extensiveconclusions on to what extent currentEU-legislation have been breached;

Or. en

Amendment 50Monica Macovei, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Miguel UrbánCrespo

Motion for a resolutionRecital G a (new)


Ga. Whereas investigative journalismand whistle-blowing proved to be to ahighly valuable source of information inthe fight against money launderingthrough which illicit money from taxevasion and tax avoidance, organizedcrime or corruption are laundered;

Or. en

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Amendment 51Monica Macovei, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Fabio DeMasi, Ana Gomes, Miguel Urbán Crespo

Motion for a resolutionRecital G b (new)


Gb. Whereas no horizontal EUlegislation on the protection ofinvestigative journalists and whistle-blowers is in place to protect them againstdifferent forms of reprisals, inter alia,dismissal, criminal or civil proceedingsagainst them, threats to their physicalintegrity, boycotts and even detention insome countries

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital G b (new)


Gb. [new recital following previousnew recital]

whereas many of the cases in the PanamaPapers reveal old practices, whereas theEU legislation has been considerablyimproved during the last years, butdeficiencies in the implementation of thelegislation and loopholes remains.

Or. en


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Motion for a resolutionRecital G c (new)


Gc. [new recital following previousnew recitals]

Whereas it is important to underline thatmost companies and private persons abideby the law; whereas it is therefore crucialthat illegal activities are revealed andloopholes closed without creatingunnecessary burden for the law abidingtaxpayers;

Or. en

Amendment 54Enrique Calvet Chambon, Petras Auštrevičius

Motion for a resolutionRecital H a (new)


Ha. whereas one fourth of the world’sFDI stocks in two Member States, theNetherlands and Luxembourg1a; whereas,according to the available statistics, theNetherlands is the Member State with thehighest number of letterbox companies inthe EU;

_________________1a Eurodad; Fifty shades of tax dogging,p.19; October 2015

Or. en

Amendment 55Marco Valli


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Recital I


I. whereas Mossack Fonseca is notthe largest firm in the offshore secrecybusiness, which indicates that the PanamaPapers can be construed as only the tip ofan iceberg; whereas the company had ashare of approximately 5 % to 10 % of thismarket and incorporated entities across 21jurisdictions15;

I. whereas Mossack Fonseca is notthe largest firm in the offshore secrecybusiness, which indicates that the PanamaPapers can be construed as only the tip ofan iceberg; whereas the company had ashare of approximately 5 % to 10 % of thismarket and incorporated entities across 21jurisdictions15; whereas Europol estimatesthat the Panama Papers account for only0.6% of the total number of moneylaundering cases recorded annually;

_________________ _________________15‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

15‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

Or. it


Motion for a resolutionRecital I


I. whereas Mossack Fonseca is notthe largest firm in the offshore secrecybusiness, which indicates that the PanamaPapers can be construed as only the tip ofan iceberg; whereas the company had ashare of approximately 5 % to 10 % ofthis market and incorporated entitiesacross 21 jurisdictions15 ;

I. whereas with a share ofapproximately 5 % to 10 % of the offshoresecrecy market and incorporated entitiesacross 21 jurisdictions15 Mossack Fonsecais not the largest firm in the offshoresecrecy business, which indicates that thePanama Papers can be construed as onlythe tip of an iceberg;

_________________ _________________15 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

15 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

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Or. en

Amendment 57Ana Gomes

Motion for a resolutionRecital J


J. whereas PANA convened meetings,conducted fact-finding missions andcommissioned studies in order to furtherinvestigate beyond the practicesdocumented in the Panama Papers – for acomplete list of activities, including thenames of speakers, see part II of thisreport;

J. whereas PANA convened meetings,conducted fact-finding missions andcommissioned studies in order to furtherinvestigate beyond the practicesdocumented in the Panama Papers – for acomplete list of activities, including thenames of speakers, see part II of thisreport, which includes reports of thedelegations sent to Cyprus, Portugal,Malta, the United States, the UnitedKingdom, Luxembourg and Switzerland;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital K


K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose of

K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax avoidance consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability; whereas the Panama

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reducing tax liability; papers demonstrated that the scope ofoffshore companies registered by MossackFonseca exceeded privacy concerns andtax fraud attempts to also include cases ofVAT carousel fraud, drug trafficking,illegal immigration, cybercrimes orterrorism financing;

Or. en

Amendment 59Werner Langen, Sven Schulze



K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability;

K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, ‘tax avoidance’ is the legalutilisation of the tax regime to reduce oravoid tax liabilities;

Or. de

Amendment 60Evelyn Regner, Emmanuel Maurel, Tibor Szanyi, Hugues Bayet, Ana Gomes, PeterSimon



K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the other

K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the other

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hand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability;

hand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability; whereas there is agrey zone between illegal tax evasion andlegal tax avoidance which is beingexploited by tax evaders;

Or. en

Amendment 61Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Monica Macovei




K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the improperutilisation of the tax regime to reduce oravoid tax liabilities while often violatingat least the intent of the law it purports tofollow 1a and aggressive tax planningconsists in taking advantage of thetechnicalities of a tax system, or ofmismatches between two or more taxsystems, for the purpose of reducing taxliability;

_________________1a OECD (2017). Glossary of Tax Terms.Paris: OECD

Or. en


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K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the not illegal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability;

Or. en





K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the legal butquestionable utilisation of the tax regimeto reduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability;

Or. en


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K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of tax regimes toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability;

Or. en





K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the utilisation of thetax regime to reduce or avoid tax liabilities,and aggressive tax planning consists inillicitly taking advantage of thetechnicalities of a tax system, or ofmismatches between two or more taxsystems, for the purpose of reducing taxliability;

Or. en

Amendment 66

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Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Monica Macovei

Motion for a resolutionRecital K a (new)


Ka. Whereas in practice, there is aconsiderable grey area between taxavoidance and tax evasion, not leastbecause tax avoidance cases rarely end upin courts, and even when they do, manycountries do not disclose the names of theinvolved companies in the courtresolutions

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital L


L. whereas as a result of data leaks inrecent years the awareness of moneylaundering, tax evasion, tax fraud schemesand corruption has increased considerablyand these issues have become a majorfocus of international political concern;

L. whereas as a result of data leaks inrecent years the awareness of moneylaundering, tax evasion, tax fraud schemesand corruption has increased considerablyand these issues have become a majorfocus of international political concern aswell as raised concern of EU citizens;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital L a (new)

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La. whereas efficient resolution ofthese problems requires more policycoherence between tax policies and otherforms of economic governance, such astrade policies and investment arbitrationtreaties;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital M


M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion;

M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16; whereas revenue lossdue to tax avoidance schemes deprives thecommunity of the resources needed forinvestment and public services such ashealth, education and income andemployment support measures; whereas itis therefore one of the main causes ofeconomic and social inequalities; whereasit also creates an unacceptable form ofunfair competition by multinationalcompanies to the detriment of smallentrepreneurs and their businesses whoare forced to pay ever higher taxes;whereas money laundering, tax avoidanceand tax evasion undermine the fairdistribution of tax contributions in the EUMember States; whereas massive taxavoidance by high net worth individualsand enterprises not only penalises ordinarytaxpayers, public finances and socialspending, but also threatens goodgovernance, macroeconomic stability andsocial cohesion;

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_________________ _________________16ECB hearing. 16ECB hearing.

Or. it




M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16 ; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion;

M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16 ; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion; whereas as tax evasion risessharply with wealth, it increasesinequality16a; whereas tax evasion, andtax avoidance impact on gender inequalityby limiting the available resources forpolicies aimed at reducing the gender gapand increasing equality at the nationaland international level1c ; whereas moneylaundering impacts on gender inequalityby concealing the origin of assetsobtained from human trafficking16b;

_________________ _________________16 ECB hearing. 16 ECB hearing.

16a Annette Alstadster, Niels Johannesen,Gabriel Zucman, ‘Tax Evasion andInequality’, 2017.

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16b Veronica Grondona, Nicole BidegainPonte, Corina Rodriguez Enriquez, 'IllicitFinancial Flows Undermining GenderJustice', 2016.1c UN 'Final study on illicit financialflows, human rights and the 2030 Agendafor Sustainable Development' of theIndependent Expert on the effects offoreign debt and other relatedinternational financial obligations ofStates on the full enjoyment of all humanrights, particularly economic, social andcultural rights, of 15 January 2015.

Or. en

Amendment 71Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Emmanuel Maurel, HuguesBayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes




M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16; whereas weakregulation in tax havens has contributedto the development and worldwidedispersion of opaque and risky financialproducts (derivatives, hedge funds,swaps...) and made it more difficult toassess the healthiness of financialinstitutions with activities and assets inthis offshore centres; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and social

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cohesion;


Or. en

Amendment 72Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Juan Fernando López Aguilar




M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16; whereas weakregulation in tax havens has contributedto the development and worldwidedispersion of opaque and risky financialproducts (derivatives, hedge funds,swaps...)and made it more difficult toassess the healthiness of financialinstitutions with activities and assets inthis offshore centres whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion;


Or. en

Amendment 73

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Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, HeidiHautala, Michel Reimon, Jordi Soléon behalf of the Verts/ALE Group




M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16 ; whereas tax evasionand tax avoidance creates unfaircompetition, especially towards small andmedium enterprises and large companiesnot using complex structures to go againstthe spirit or letter of the law; whereasmoney laundering, tax avoidance and taxevasion undermine the fair distribution oftax contributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and security,social cohesion and public trust in theinstitutions;

_________________ _________________16 ECB hearing. 16 See for example Anna Meyendorff -

Designing financial systems in transitioneconomies : strategies for reform inCentral and Eastern Europe, S. 102"giving an example for Russia; or "Taxevasion, the underground economy andfinancial development":http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811200128X

Or. en


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M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16 ; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States,fuel tax dumping and therefore distortcompetition in the internal market;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion by aggravating inequalities andthus dangerously underminingdemocracy;


Or. en

Amendment 75Raymond Finch



M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16 ; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not only

M. whereas money laundering, taxavoidance and tax evasion undermine theability of the Member States to tax andspend in a proportional manner; whereasmassive tax avoidance by high net worthindividuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,

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penalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion;

macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion;

_________________16 ECB hearing.

Or. en





M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas tax avoidance by individuals andenterprises not only penalises ordinarytaxpayers, public finances and socialspending, but may also threaten goodgovernance, macroeconomic stability andsocial cohesion;

_________________ _________________16ECB hearing. 16ECB hearing.

Or. de


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Motion for a resolutionRecital M a (new)


Ma. whereas when a state´s ability tocollect revenues and control illicitfinancial flows is more restricted, revenueloss tends to be compensated throughhigher taxes on compliant taxpayers, suchas small and medium-sized companiesand individuals or by relying more heavilyon indirect taxation; whereas women areoverrepresented in small and mediumenterprises and lie at the bottom of theincome ladder, a state's ability to collectrevenues and control illicit financial flowsimpacts more heavily on women1a;

_________________1a UN 'Report of the Special Rapporteuron extreme poverty and human rights,Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona', of 22May 2014.

Or. en

Amendment 78Paul Tang, Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Tibor Szanyi,Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes, Peter Simon



Ma. Whereas the creation of speciallydesigned preferential tax systemsthreatens the solidarity between MemberStates and reduces the aggregate taxrevenues of all Member States as a resultof the competition between the nationaltax regulations and arrangements withinthe Union.

Or. en

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Amendment 79Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Petras Auštrevičius



Ma. Whereas the Value Added Tax(VAT)is one of the main sources ofrevenues in the Member States andaccording to the available data the overalldifference between the estimated VATrevenue and the amount actuallycollected, the 'VAT gap', amounts to EUR159.5 billion.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital M b (new)


Mb. Whereas 1.5 million jobs couldhave been supported across Europe withthe money that was lost to nationalauthorities because of the tax lossassociated to the Panama Papers1a.

_________________1a Study for the PANA committee "TheImpact of Schemes revealed by thePanama Papers on the Economy andFinances of a Sample of Member States".

Or. en


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Motion for a resolutionRecital N


N. whereas public authorities areresponsible for the regulatory andsupervisory framework, as well as fortaxation; whereas public authorities, viaregulation, company registers, tax law andsupervision, play an important role in theexistence of tax havens and offshorefinancial centres; whereas, in fact, thesecentres can only exist when governmentscreate the necessary conditions;

N. whereas public authorities areresponsible for the regulatory andsupervisory framework, as well as fortaxation; whereas public authorities, viaregulation, company registers, tax law andsupervision, play an important role in theexistence of tax havens and offshorefinancial centres;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital N


N. whereas public authorities areresponsible for the regulatory andsupervisory framework, as well as fortaxation; whereas public authorities, viaregulation, company registers, tax law andsupervision, play an important role in theexistence of tax havens and offshorefinancial centres; whereas, in fact, thesecentres can only exist when governmentscreate the necessary conditions;

N. whereas public authorities areresponsible for the regulatory andsupervisory framework, as well as fortaxation; whereas public authorities, viaregulation, company registers, tax law andsupervision, play an important role in theexistence of tax havens and offshorefinancial centres; whereas, in fact, thesecentres can only operate whengovernments create the necessaryconditions;

Or. en

Amendment 83Miguel Viegas, Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Marina Albiol Guzmán, Stelios Kouloglou,Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese, Miguel Urbán Crespo

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Motion for a resolutionRecital N a (new)


Na. whereas auditors play a crucialrole regarding the creation of aframework of public confidence,providing credibility to corporate incomestatements and balance sheets, and bear aresponsibility as providers of consultancyservices concerning tax optimizationplans; whereas the large auditing andaccounting firms act as globallyintegrated firms but present themselves asnumerous separate legal entities that arenot under common ownership but whichare bound by contractual arrangements tooperate common standards under acommon name, in order to diluteresponsibility, reduce their regulatory costand risk, ring-fence their legal risk, andprotect their clients from regulatoryenquiries; whereas the context of thisproblem is the absence of harmonizedglobal regulations and in conflicts ofinterests between the audit companies andtheir clients;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital O


O. whereas offshore structures offeringpreferential regimes could not exist withoutthe intervention of enablers andintermediaries such as banks, accountingfirms, tax advisers, wealth managers andlawyers;

O. whereas offshore structures offeringpreferential regimes could not exist withoutthe intervention of enablers andintermediaries such as banks, accountingfirms, tax advisers, wealth managers andlawyers; whereas governments and

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parliaments, when creating andperpetuating such preferential taxregimes, are actually fostering unfaircompetition within the EU and seriouslyundermining the single market;

Or. en




O. whereas offshore structures offeringpreferential regimes could not exist withoutthe intervention of enablers andintermediaries such as banks, accountingfirms, tax advisers, wealth managers andlawyers;

O. whereas offshore structures offeringpreferential regimes could not exist withoutthe intervention of enablers andintermediaries such as banks, accountingfirms, tax advisers, wealth managers andlawyers, both in tax havens and in otherjurisdictions;

Or. en




O. whereas offshore structures offeringpreferential regimes could not existwithout the intervention of enablers andintermediaries such as banks, accountingfirms, tax advisers, wealth managers andlawyers;

O. whereas offshore structures offeringlegal preferential regimes could not berealised without intermediaries such asbanks, accounting firms, tax advisers,wealth managers and lawyers;

Or. de

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Motion for a resolutionRecital P


P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions have specialised in creatingextremely preferential tax regimes to thebenefit of multinational companies andhigh net worth individuals, who do not infact have a real presence within thesejurisdictions but are merely represented byshell companies;

P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions, including Member States,have specialised in creating extremelypreferential tax regimes to the benefit ofmultinational companies and high networth individuals, who do not in fact havea real economic activity within thesejurisdictions but are merely represented byshell companies; whereas shell companies,trusts, foundations, “freeports”, bearershares, among others, are useful tools forall sorts of criminals to park and launderthe proceeds of crime;

Or. en





P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions, even in the European Union,have specialised in creating extremelypreferential tax regimes to the benefit ofmultinational companies and high networth individuals, who do not in fact havea real presence within these jurisdictionsbut are merely represented by shellcompanies;

Or. it

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Amendment 89Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Ana Gomes, Emmanuel Maurel, Juan Fernando LópezAguilar, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Paul Tang, Peter Simon, Nessa Childers




P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions, including in the EuropeanUnion Member States, have specialised orengaged in creating extremely preferentialtax regimes to the benefit of multinationalcompanies and high net worth individuals,who do not in fact have a real presencewithin these jurisdictions but are merelyrepresented by shell companies;

Or. en

Amendment 90Brian Hayes, Seán Kelly




P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions outside the EU havespecialised in creating extremelypreferential tax regimes to the benefit ofmultinational companies and high networth individuals, who do not in fact havea real presence within these jurisdictionsbut are merely represented by shellcompanies;

Or. en


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P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions have specialised in creatingpreferential tax regimes which distortcompetition to the benefit of multinationalcompanies and individuals, who do not infact have a real presence within thesejurisdictions but are merely represented byshell companies;

Or. de





P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions have specialised in creatingextremely preferential tax regimes to thebenefit of multinational companies andrich individuals, who do not in fact haveeconomic substance within thesejurisdictions but are merely represented byshell companies;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital P a (new)


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Pa. [new recital following recital P]

whereas unlike in case of LuxLeaks, thealleged involvement of Politically ExposedPersons in possibly illegal activitiesuncovered in Panama Papers may lead tosituation where some governments are notwilling to properly investigate suchcases. Whereas in some non-EU countriesthat tolerate low level of transparency andwhere suspicion about corruption ofgovernment officials exist, there is nointerest in taking any measures inresponse to information uncovered inPanama papers;

Or. en

Amendment 94Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes, SergioGaetano Cofferati, Peter Simon

Motion for a resolutionRecital P a (new)


Pa. Whereas the downward trend incorporate tax rates, in almost all EUMember States, whether legal rates oreffective rates, installs in the long run aworrying taxation race-to-the-bottom;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital Q


Q. whereas the EuropeanCommission has cited previous estimates

deleted

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according to which the annual revenuelosses owing to tax evasion and tax fraudamount to at least EUR 1 trillion withinthe European Union alone;

Or. en




Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone;

Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone; whereas a study produced by theEuropean Parliament estimates that theloss of revenue due solely to the taxschemes revealed by the Panama Papersamounts to up to EUR 237 billion for the28 Member States;

Or. it





Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone; whereas tax competition among EUMember States makes some of them

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become, in practice, tax havens forholdings of companies of other MemberStates;

Or. en

Amendment 98Pervenche Berès, Emmanuel Maurel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Tibor Szanyi, HuguesBayet, Virginie Rozière, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes, Paul Tang, Peter Simon




Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone; whereas it directly affects nationaland EU budgets;

Or. en

Amendment 99Evelyn Regner, Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Tibor Szanyi, Hugues Bayet, PeterSimon



Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to atleast EUR 1 trillion within the EuropeanUnion alone;

Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion, tax fraud, tax avoidance andaggressive tax planning amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone;

Or. en

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Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone 1a;

_________________1a

https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-evasion/a-huge-problem_en

Or. en





Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited estimates according to which theannual revenue losses owing to tax evasionand tax fraud amount to at least EUR 1trillion within the European Union alone;

Or. de

Amendment 102

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Elly Schlein, Emmanuel Maurel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Hugues Bayet, EvelynRegner, Ana Gomes, Peter Simon, Linda McAvan

Motion for a resolutionRecital Q a (new)


Qa. whereas the Panama Papersclearly displayed the disastrousconsequences of tax avoidance andevasion on developing countries, showinghow multinational companies createcomplex financial structures eroding therevenue base of these countries anddepriving them of essential resources tofund the most basic services, putting atrisk the achievement of the 2030 Agendafor Sustainable Development;

Or. en

Amendment 103Enrico Gasbarra

Motion for a resolutionRecital Q a (new)


Qa. whereas the total ‘developmentfinance loss’ in developing countries (i.e.the lost tax revenues and the reinvestedearnings that are lost as profits) amountsto around 250 billion euros per year1a

http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1245

_________________1a

http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1245

Or. en

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Amendment 104Enrico Gasbarra, Emmanuel Maurel, Tibor Szanyi, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner,Peter Simon

Motion for a resolutionRecital Q b (new)


Qb. whereas the total ‘developmentfinance loss’ in developing countries (i.e.the lost tax revenues and the reinvestedearnings that are lost as profits) amountsto around 250 billion euros per year

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital R


R. whereas as of 2014, at least 7.6trillion of the world’s total financialprivate wealth of USD 95.5 trillion wasunaccounted for; whereas worldwide, 8 %of financial private wealth is held offshore,leading to global tax revenue losses ofUSD 190 billion; whereas an estimatedUSD 2.6 trillion of financial private wealthin Europe is held offshore, leading to taxrevenue losses of USD 78 billionannually17;

R. whereas worldwide, 8 % offinancial private wealth is held offshore,leading to global tax revenue losses ofUSD 190 billion; whereas an estimatedUSD 2.6 trillion of financial private wealthin Europe is held offshore, leading to taxrevenue losses of USD 78 billionannually17;

_________________ _________________17 Gabriel Zucman, ‘The Hidden Wealth ofNations – The Scourge of Tax Havens’,University of California, 2015.

17 Gabriel Zucman, ‘The Hidden Wealth ofNations – The Scourge of Tax Havens’,University of California, 2015.

Or. de

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Motion for a resolutionRecital R


R. whereas as of 2014, at least 7.6trillion of the world’s total financial privatewealth of USD 95.5 trillion wasunaccounted for; whereas worldwide, 8 %of financial private wealth is held offshore,leading to global tax revenue losses ofUSD 190 billion; whereas an estimatedUSD 2.6 trillion of financial private wealthin Europe is held offshore, leading to taxrevenue losses of USD 78 billionannually17 ;

R. whereas as of 2014, at least USD7.6 trillion of the world’s total financialprivate wealth of USD 95.5 trillion wasunaccounted for; whereas worldwide, 8 %of financial private wealth is held offshore,leading to global tax revenue losses ofUSD 190 billion; whereas an estimatedUSD 2.6 trillion of financial private wealthin Europe is held offshore, leading to taxrevenue losses of USD 78 billionannually17 ;

_________________ _________________17 Gabriel Zucman, ‘The Hidden Wealth ofNations – The Scourge of Tax Havens’,University of California, 2015.

17 Gabriel Zucman, ‘The Hidden Wealth ofNations – The Scourge of Tax Havens’,University of California, 2015.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital S


S. whereas in 2011 an estimated USD3.1 trillion globally were lost each year viatax evasion and tax avoidance of largecompanies owing to secrecy18 ;

deleted

_________________18 Tax Justice Network, November 2011.

Or. en

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S. whereas in 2011 an estimated USD3.1 trillion globally were lost each year viatax evasion and tax avoidance of largecompanies owing to secrecy18;

S. whereas in 2011 an estimated USD3.1 trillion globally were lost each year viaillegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidanceof large international companies owing tosecrecy18 ;

_________________ _________________18 Tax Justice Network, November 2011. 18 Tax Justice Network, November 2011.

Or. de




S. whereas in 2011 an estimated USD3.1 trillion globally were lost each year viatax evasion and tax avoidance of largecompanies owing to secrecy18 ;

S. whereas in 2011 an estimated USD3.1 trillion globally were lost each year viatax evasion and tax avoidance of largecompanies 18 ;

_________________ _________________18 Tax Justice Network, November 2011. 18 Tax Justice Network, November 2011.

Or. en



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Recital S a (new)


Sa. whereas a high profile case oftransnational money laundering linked toPanama Papers was exposed by theRussian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, andhas been the subject of money launderinginvestigations in EU member states andaround the world.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital S b (new)


Sb. whereas the ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe calledfor improving international cooperationin investigating the “money trail” of thefunds originating in the fraudulent taxreimbursements denounced by MrMagnitsky; while the perpetrators andbeneficiaries both of the crime committedagainst Sergei Magnitsky and thatexposed by him have not been brought tojustice.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital T


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T. whereas money launderingamounts to an estimated 2 %-5 % of GDPworldwide;

deleted

Or. en




T. whereas money launderingamounts to an estimated 2 %-5 % of GDPworldwide;

T. whereas the United Nationsestimated the total amount of criminalproceeds in 2009 at approximately USD2.1 trillion, equivalent to 3.6% of globalGDP 1a;whereas money laundering casesare increasing according to Eurojuststatistics 1b and necessitates a coordinatedresponse across multiple jurisdictions tofight such transnational offences;

_________________1a http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4452_en.htm1b 148money laundering cases in 2012,202 cases in 2013, 221 cases in 2014, and285cases in 2015

Or. en




T. whereas money laundering amounts T. whereas money laundering amounts

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to an estimated 2 %-5 % of GDPworldwide;

to an estimated 2 %-5 % of GDPworldwide; whereas, by failing to properlylegislate and enforce anti-moneylaundering controls, EU Member Statesand the Commission maybe allowingorganised crime, including terrorism, toexplore loopholes within the EU andglobally;

Or. en




T. whereas money laundering amountsto an estimated 2 %-5 % of GDPworldwide;

T. whereas the scale of internationalmoney laundering amounts to an estimatedshare of 2 %-5 % of GDP worldwide;

Or. de

Amendment 116Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Juan Fernando LópezAguilar, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes, Paul Tang, Peter Simon, NessaChilders

Motion for a resolutionRecital U


U. whereas several EU Member Statesand overseas countries and territories(OCTs) feature in the top 100 mostsecretive countries19 ;

U. whereas several EU Member Statesand overseas countries and territories(OCTs) feature in the top 100 mostsecretive countries, whereas Germany,Luxembourg and the United Kingdomfeature in the top 15 and if UK wereassessed together with its overseasterritories and crown dependencies itwould be at the top of such list19; whereas

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several Member States, i.e. Netherlands,Ireland, Luxembourg and Cyprus, andEuropean OCTs, i.e. Bermuda, CaymanIslands, Curacao, Jersey and the BritishVirgin Islands, feature in the top 15corporate tax havens according toOxfam19a;

_________________ _________________19 Financial Secrecy Index 2015, TaxJustice Network.

19 Financial Secrecy Index 2015, TaxJustice Network.19a Tax Battles, 2016, Oxfam.

Or. en




U. whereas several EU Member Statesand overseas countries and territories(OCTs) feature in the top 100 mostsecretive countries19;

U. whereas several EU Member Statesand overseas countries and territories(OCTs) feature in the top 100 mostsecretive countries19; whereasLuxembourg and Germany are ranked6th and 8th, respectively;

_________________ _________________19 Financial Secrecy Index 2015, TaxJustice Network

19 Financial Secrecy Index 2015, TaxJustice Network

Or. it




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U. whereas several EU Member Statesand overseas countries and territories(OCTs) feature in the top 100 mostsecretive countries19;

U. whereas several EU Member Statesand overseas countries and territories(OCTs) so far feature in the top 100 mostsecretive countries19;

_________________ _________________19 Financial Secrecy Index 2015, TaxJustice Network.

19 Financial Secrecy Index 2015, TaxJustice Network.

Or. de

Amendment 119Paul Tang, Emmanuel Maurel, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes, Peter Simon

Motion for a resolutionRecital V


V. whereas the Panama Papersdocumented a systematic use of illegalpractices such as backdating documentsand revealed a blatant disregard of basicdue diligence on the part of lawyers,wealth managers and other intermediaries,as documented by, for example,maintaining business relations withcompanies whose nominee director hadbeen dead for several years;

V. whereas the Panama Papersdocumented a systematic use of illegalpractices such as backdating documentsand revealed a blatant disregard of basicdue diligence on the part of lawyers,wealth managers and other intermediaries,as documented by, for example,maintaining business relations withcompanies whose nominee director hadbeen dead for several years, often causedby the passing on or out-sourcing of thedue diligence obligation to another entityin the chain of the tax scheme ;

Or. en




V. whereas the Panama Papers V. whereas the Panama Papers made

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documented a systematic use of illegalpractices such as backdating documentsand revealed a blatant disregard of basicdue diligence on the part of lawyers,wealth managers and other intermediaries,as documented by, for example,maintaining business relations withcompanies whose nominee director hadbeen dead for several years;

public a systematic use of illegal practicessuch as backdating documents and revealeda blatant disregard of basic due diligenceon the part of the lawyers, wealthmanagers and other intermediariesconcerned, as documented by, forexample, maintaining business relationswith companies whose nominee directorsrepresented up to 1 000 letterboxcompanies or had been dead for severalyears;

Or. de




V. whereas the Panama Papersdocumented a systematic use of illegalpractices such as backdating documentsand revealed a blatant disregard of basicdue diligence on the part of lawyers,wealth managers and other intermediaries,as documented by, for example,maintaining business relations withcompanies whose nominee director hadbeen dead for several years;

V. whereas the Panama Papersdocumented a systematic use of illegalpractices and revealed a blatant disregardof basic due diligence on the part oflawyers, wealth managers and otherintermediaries, as documented by, forexample, maintaining business relationswith companies whose nominee directorhad been dead for several years;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital V a (new)


Va. whereas the Panama Papers also

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reveal a glaring disregard bygovernments, parliaments and nationaland European authorities for legislatingand enforcing anti-money laundering andtax controls, thereby facilitating financialcrimes;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital W


W. whereas 79 countries so far, or one-third of all nations, have announced a totalof 150 inquiries, audits or investigations bypolice, customs, financial crime and mafiaprosecutors, judges and courts, taxauthorities and parliaments, and by meansof corporate reviews, according to globalmedia reports and official statements;whereas thousands of taxpayers andcompanies are under investigation;whereas over the past eight months this hasled to national authorities having alreadyrecovered tens of millions of dollars intaxes on previously undeclared funds20 ;

W. whereas 79 countries so far, or one-third of all nations, have announced a totalof 150 inquiries, audits or investigations bypolice, customs, financial crime and mafiaprosecutors, judges and courts, taxauthorities and parliaments, and by meansof corporate reviews, according to globalmedia reports and official statements;whereas Member States identified morethan 3000 EU-based taxpayers andcompanies linked to the Panama papers;whereas Member States have collectivelylaunched at least 1300 inquiries, auditsand investigations into Panama Papersrevelations; whereas over the past eightmonths this has led to national authoritieshaving already recovered tens of millionsof dollars in taxes on previouslyundeclared funds20 ;

_________________ _________________20 ICIJ 2017, ‘Where Are They Now? AYear Later, Mixed Fortunes For PanamaPapers Line-Up’.

20 ICIJ 2017, ‘Where Are They Now? AYear Later, Mixed Fortunes For PanamaPapers Line-Up’.

Or. en

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Motion for a resolutionRecital W


W. whereas 79 countries so far, or one-third of all nations, have announced a totalof 150 inquiries, audits or investigations bypolice, customs, financial crime and mafiaprosecutors, judges and courts, taxauthorities and parliaments, and by meansof corporate reviews, according to globalmedia reports and official statements;whereas thousands of taxpayers andcompanies are under investigation;whereas over the past eight months this hasled to national authorities having alreadyrecovered tens of millions of dollars intaxes on previously undeclared funds20;

W. whereas 79 countries so far, or one-third of all nations, have announced a totalof 150 inquiries, audits or investigations bypolice, customs, financial crime and mafiaprosecutors, judges and courts, taxauthorities and parliaments, and by meansof corporate reviews, according to mediareports and official statements; whereasthousands of taxpayers and companies areunder investigation; whereas over the pasttwelve months this has led to nationalauthorities having already recovered manymillions of dollars or euros in taxes onpreviously undeclared funds20;

_________________ _________________20 ICIJ 2017, ‘Where Are They Now? AYear Later, Mixed Fortunes For PanamaPapers Line-Up’.

20 ICIJ 2017, ‘Where Are They Now? AYear Later, Mixed Fortunes For PanamaPapers Line-Up’.

Or. de

Amendment 125Monica Macovei, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Fabio DeMasi, Miguel Urbán Crespo, Sven Giegold

Motion for a resolutionRecital W a (new)


Wa. Whereas the InternationalConsortium of Investigative Journalists(ICIJ) included a reference in its PanamaPapers report to bearer shares, describingthem as one way to protect the anonymityof companies' owners, making it harder to

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ascertain the ultimate ownership of thecompanies; whereas the real and ultimateownership can be transferred from oneparty to another in full anonymity,without any trace and furtherdocumentation; whereas through bearershares an individual or an entity cancontrol a public or private companyconducting in the same time businesseswith public money;

Or. en

Amendment 126Marina Albiol Guzmán, Stelios Kouloglou, Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric,Miguel Viegas, Miguel Urbán Crespo, Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Curzio Maltese



Wa. Whereas the InternationalConsortium of Investigative Journalists(ICIJ) included a reference in its PanamaPapers report to bearer shares, describingthem as one way to protect the anonymityof companies' owners, making it harder toascertain the ultimate ownership of thecompanies; whereas the real and ultimateownership can be transferred from oneparty to another in full anonymity,without any trace and furtherdocumentation; whereas through bearershares an individual or an entity cancontrol a public or private companyconducting in the same time businesseswith public money;

Or. en

Amendment 127Markus Ferber

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Wa. whereas the work of theCommittee of Inquiry has made it clearthat there are also tax havens within theEuropean Union; whereas theCommissioner responsible for taxation ispublicly denying this;

Or. de

Amendment 128Pervenche Berès, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Paul Tang, Emmanuel Maurel, TiborSzanyi, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Peter Simon



Wa. whereas the EU is the globalleader in the fight against moneylaundering, tax fraud, tax evasion and taxavoidance; whereas it must remain so bygoing further than the internationalstandards and recommendations in thesefields in order to raise the global level;

Or. en

Amendment 129Monica Macovei, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Sven Giegold

Motion for a resolutionRecital W b (new)


Wb. Whereas many EU public orprivate companies have issued suchbearer shares, and many have obtainedpublic contracts of hundreds of millions

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of euros; Whereas these companies useEU public funds for infrastructureprojects or are involved in large energybusinesses, metallurgical, or other kind ofindustries;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionSubheading 1


Tax evasion and tax avoidance Illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance

Or. de


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1


1. Notes that various definitions existas to what constitutes an offshore financialcentre (OFC), a tax haven, a secrecy haven,a non-cooperative tax jurisdiction or ahigh-risk country in terms of moneylaundering;

1. Notes that various definitions existas to what constitutes an offshore financialcentre (OFC), a tax haven, a secrecy haven,a non-cooperative tax jurisdiction or ahigh-risk country in terms of moneylaundering; notes that “freeports” alsoconstitute offshore storage facilities,enabling money laundering and theuntaxed trade of other values, includingjewellery, art, antiques and other itemsproceeding from organised crime, fraud,corruption and other crimes;

Or. en

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1. Notes that various definitions existas to what constitutes an offshore financialcentre (OFC), a tax haven, a secrecy haven,a non-cooperative tax jurisdiction or ahigh-risk country in terms of moneylaundering; notes that the very absence ofa single definition constitutes one of themain factors preventing the adoption ofadequate and effective legislation tocounteract tax avoidance, tax evasion andmoney laundering;

Or. it





1. Notes that various definitions existas to what constitutes an offshore financialcentre (OFC), a tax haven, a secrecy haven,a non-cooperative tax jurisdiction or ahigh-risk country in terms of moneylaundering; notes the difficulties toidentify and define shell companies andtheir link to offshore structures due to thelack of available information and themany kind of entities depending on thepurpose of its economic activity;

Or. en

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1. Notes that various definitions existas to what constitutes an offshore financialcentre (OFC), a tax haven, a secrecy haven,a non-cooperative tax jurisdiction or ahigh-risk country in terms of moneylaundering; calls on the Commission toestablish a common definition atEuropean level;

Or. es


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 1 a (new)


1a. Recalls that depending on thedefinition of offshore financial centrechosen the number of volume of offshorefinance vary between 1 and 21 trilliondollars 1a.

_________________1a Study for the PANA committee"Offshore activities and moneylaundering: recent findings andchallenges" by Prof. Dr. Brigitte UNGER,Utrecht University School of Economics,the Netherlands.

Or. en

Amendment 136

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2. Recognises that offshore financialcentres generally present the followingfeatures: 1) a primary orientation ofbusiness toward non-residents; 2) afavourable regulatory environment (lowsupervisory requirements and minimalinformation disclosure); 3) the existence oflow (unspecified) or zero taxationschemes21 ;

2. Recognises that offshore financialcentres generally present the followingfeatures: 1) a primary orientation ofbusiness toward non-residents; 2) low ormoderate supervisory and financialrequirements and/or minimal informationdisclosure; 3) the existence of low(unspecified) or zero taxation schemes21 ;4) Financial systems with external assetsand liabilities out of proportion todomestic financial intermediation; 5) theexistence of very specific and restrictedtax advantages or certain administrativepractices that provide selective advantagesfor tax planners;

_________________ _________________21 ‘Offshore activities and moneylaundering: recent findings andchallenges’, Prof. Dr. Brigitte Unger,Utrecht University School of Economics,The Netherlands, February 2017.

21 ‘Offshore activities and moneylaundering: recent findings andchallenges’, Prof. Dr. Brigitte Unger,Utrecht University School of Economics,The Netherlands, February 2017.

Or. en




2. Recognises that offshore financialcentres generally present the followingfeatures: 1) a primary orientation of

2. Recognises that offshore financialcentres generally present the followingfeatures: 1) a primary orientation of

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business toward non-residents; 2) afavourable regulatory environment (lowsupervisory requirements and minimalinformation disclosure); 3) the existenceof low (unspecified) or zero taxationschemes21 ;

business toward non-residents; 2) afavourable regulatory environment (lowsupervisory requirements and secrecy andconfidentiality); 3) the existence of low(unspecified) or zero taxation schemes21 ;

_________________ _________________21 ‘Offshore activities and moneylaundering: recent findings andchallenges’, Prof. Dr. Brigitte Unger,Utrecht University School of Economics,The Netherlands, February 2017.

21 ‘Offshore activities and moneylaundering: recent findings andchallenges’, Prof. Dr. Brigitte Unger,Utrecht University School of Economics,The Netherlands, February 2017.

Or. en




2a. Notes that academic literaturedistinguishes between sink-OFCs - whichattract and retain foreign capital - andconduit-OFCs- which are attractiveintermediate destinations in the routing ofinternational investments and enable thetransfer of capital without taxation;Underlines that five countries – theNetherlands, the United Kingdom,Ireland, Singapore and Switzerland –canalize the majority of corporateoffshore investment as conduit-OFCs,specialising either by geographical areaor industrial sector 1a

_________________1a University of Amsterdam, “UncoveringOffshore Financial Centers: Conduitsand Sinks in the Global CorporateOwnership Network” 24 July2017

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http://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-06322-9

Or. en

Amendment 139Evelyn Regner, Peter Simon, Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati,Hugues Bayet, Ana Gomes



2a. Notes with great concern thenumerous tax havens located in theEuropean Union; stresses that the OECDtook a critical view on freeports, namelythat storage facilities of this type could beused to launder money, as theycircumvent international transparencyrules and that media reports suggest thatfreeports are being used as hiding placesfor looted art and antiques – includingobjects looted by IS;

Or. en




2a. Notes that while traditional taxhavens that aim to attractdisproportionate amounts of privatewealth typically rely on high levels ofsecrecy, corporate tax havens may bemore transparent but still very harmful inpoaching the tax bases of other countries;

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Or. en




3. Welcomes the fact that theCommission is in the process of drawingup two different lists, namely a ‘commonEU tax list of uncooperative taxjurisdictions’ and an ‘EU anti-moneylaundering list of high-risk third countries’;

3. Highlights the risk that theCommission's insufficiently ambitiousand neutral approach in the process ofdrawing up two different lists, namely a‘common EU tax list of uncooperative taxjurisdictions’ and an ‘EU anti-moneylaundering list of high-risk third countries’,may frustrate efforts to identify thejurisdictions and countries that pose areal threat in terms of money launderingand tax avoidance and tax evasion and totake the necessary defensivecountermeasures;

Or. it

Amendment 142Evelyn Regner, Peter Simon, Emmanuel Maurel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, TiborSzanyi, Hugues Bayet




3. Welcomes the fact that theCommission is in the process of drawingup two different lists, namely a ‘commonEU tax list of uncooperative taxjurisdictions’ and an ‘EU anti-moneylaundering list of high-risk third countries’;urges the European Commission and theEU Member States to agree on strictercriteria making the lists an effective toolto fight tax avoidance, tax evasion and

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money laundering within the EU andglobally;

Or. en




3. Welcomes the fact that theCommission is in the process of drawingup two different lists, namely a ‘commonEU tax list of uncooperative taxjurisdictions’ and an ‘EU anti-moneylaundering list of high-risk thirdcountries’;

3. Welcomes the fact that theCommission and the Code of ConductGroup are in the process of drawing upthe Common EU list of non-cooperativetax jurisdictions (the Moscovici list), andthe Commission has drawn up and isregularly updating the EU list of high riskthird-countries with strategic deficienciesin their AML/CFT regimes posing risk tothe financial system of the Union (theJourova list) ;

Or. en





3. Welcomes the fact that theCommission is in the process of drawingup two different lists, namely a ‘commonEU tax list of uncooperative taxjurisdictions’ and an ‘EU anti-moneylaundering list of high-risk third countries’;regrets however that the Commission has,so far, failed to counter EU jurisdictionsthat function as tax havens and

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“freeports”;

Or. en

Amendment 145Sajjad Karim




3. Notes the fact that the Commissionis in the process of drawing up twodifferent lists, namely a ‘common EU taxlist of uncooperative tax jurisdictions’ andan ‘EU anti-money laundering list of high-risk third countries’;

Or. en

Amendment 146Angel Dzhambazki, Bernd Lucke




3. Notes the fact that the Commissionis in the process of drawing up twodifferent lists, namely a ‘common EU taxlist of uncooperative tax jurisdictions’ andan ‘EU anti-money laundering list of high-risk third countries’;

Or. en

Amendment 147Thierry Cornillet


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Paragraph 3



3. Welcomes the fact that the Union isin the process of drawing up two differentlists, namely a ‘common EU tax list ofuncooperative tax jurisdictions’ and an ‘EUanti-money laundering list of high-riskthird countries’;

Or. fr

Amendment 148Pervenche Berès, Emmanuel Maurel, Hugues Bayet, Peter Simon



4. Acknowledges that the two listsmay overlap in terms of some of thecountries they feature, although they havedifferent objectives, different criteria, adifferent compilation process and differentconsequences; believes, nonetheless, thatthe two lists should complement eachother in ensuring double protection for EUMember States’ tax bases and the properfunctioning of the Single Market;

4. Adds that the two lists havedifferent objectives, different criteria, adifferent compilation process and differentconsequences and that together they willensure a double protection for EU MemberStates’ tax bases and the properfunctioning of the Single Market;

Or. en




4. Acknowledges that the two listsmay overlap in terms of some of thecountries they feature, although they have

4. Acknowledges that the two listsmay overlap in terms of some of thecountries they feature, although they have

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different objectives, different criteria, adifferent compilation process and differentconsequences; believes, nonetheless, thatthe two lists should complement each otherin ensuring double protection for EUMember States’ tax bases and the properfunctioning of the Single Market;

different objectives, different criteria, adifferent compilation process and differentconsequences; believes, nonetheless, thatthe two lists should complement each otherin ensuring high protection for EUMember States’ tax bases, integrity of theEU financial system and the properfunctioning of the Single Market;

Or. en

Amendment 150Romana Tomc



4. Acknowledges that the two listsmay overlap in terms of some of thecountries they feature, although they havedifferent objectives, different criteria, adifferent compilation process and differentconsequences; believes, nonetheless, thatthe two lists should complement each otherin ensuring double protection for EUMember States’ tax bases and the properfunctioning of the Single Market;

4. Acknowledges that the two listsmay overlap in terms of some of thecountries they feature, although they havedifferent objectives, different criteria, adifferent compilation process and differentconsequences; believes, nonetheless, thatthe two lists should complement each otherin ensuring full protection for EU MemberStates’ tax bases and the properfunctioning of the Single Market;

Or. en




4a. Notes that projects managed by theEuropean Investment Bank involved

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Mossack Fonseca and that the EuropeanCommission blocked 18 projects in 2016,preventing €1billion to end up in taxhavens;

Or. en




4a. Regrets the fact that theCommission and Council have, so far,never inserted a “fair taxation chapter” inany trade, investment or partnershipagreement between the EU and thirdcountries;

Or. en




4a. Notes with concern the highcorrelation between the number of shellcompanies and tax rulings and certain taxjurisdictions and EU Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 154Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, HeidiHautala, Michel Reimon, Jordi Solé

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on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 4 b (new)


4b. Notes the jurisprudence of theCourt of Justice of the European Unionregarding the principle of abuse of law inrelation to taxation, ruling that nationalsof a Member States cannot attemptimproperly or fraudulently to takeadvantage of provisions of EU law; Addsthat several Member States apply theconcept of abuse of law to taxation issues1a;

_________________1a For example: France, Italy, Poland andthe Netherlands

Or. en




5. Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 156

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Marco Valli




5. Notes that the Council is aiming toestablish by the end of 2017 a ‘CommonEU List of Non-Cooperative TaxJurisdictions’, with the aim of addressingexternal risks to Member States’ tax basesposed by third countries that refuse toadhere to international tax goodgovernance standards; stresses that thisinitiative will succeed only if it is basedon solid and objective criteria andincludes all countries and jurisdictionsthat effectively operate as tax havens,regardless of any political commitmentsor agreements or the formal transpositionof international tax standards; regrets inthis regard that there is a clear politicalwill to exclude EU Member States fromthe list, thus refusing to address theinternal problem of the erosion of the taxbases of the Member States caused by EUcountries systematically pursuing harmfultax practices at the heart of Europe;

Or. it




5. Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim of

5. Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim of

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addressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards;

addressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards; deplores,however, that only third countries outsidethe EU will be scrutinized and that theEuropean Parliament is not involved inthe screening process, which is carriedout by the Council Code of ConductGroup on Business Taxation sufferingfrom opaque proceedings and inefficientdecision rules; Stresses that the above-mentioned list should be realistic andobjective in order to be credible and torestore confidence in EU actions to fighttax havens;

Or. en

Amendment 158Monica Macovei, Traian Ungureanu, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Fabio De Masi




5. Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards; calls upon theCouncil to establish by the end of 2017 asimilar list with the EU Member Stateswhere Non-Cooperative Tax Jurisdictionsexist even if in regions or in otheradministrative structures of those MemberStates

Or. en

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5. Notes the fact that the Council isaiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards, regrets thefact that this list is likely to be noticeablyincomplete in terms of criteria andcountries to be included;

Or. en




(5) Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards;

(5) Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesand jurisdictions close to the EU thatrefuse to adhere to international tax goodgovernance standards;

Or. de

Amendment 161

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Beatrix von Storch




5. Notes the fact that the Council isaiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards;

Or. en

Amendment 162Pervenche Berès, Emilian Pavel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Evelyn Regner, EmmanuelMaurel, Elly Schlein, Virginie Rozière, Ana Gomes, Paul Tang, Peter Simon



6. Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country taxjurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and evasion22 ;

6. Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country taxjurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and tax evasion22 ; calls on theCouncil not to dilute the ambition of thecriteria of said list; regrets that the Codeof Conduct Group (Business Taxation)has withdrawn the clear mention of zerocorporate tax rate as a criteria to definetax haven and be identified on such a list;

_________________ _________________22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of a

22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of a

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jurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdictionposes, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zerocorporate income tax rates.

jurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdictionposes, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zerocorporate income tax rates.

Or. en




6. Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country taxjurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and evasion22;

6. Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country taxjurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and evasion22; recalls in thisrespect that the Panama Papers haverevealed the central role played by variousMember States in terms of tax avoidanceand evasion; insists, therefore, on theneed to extend this process to countrieswithin the Union;

_________________ _________________22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of ajurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdictionposes, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zerocorporate income tax rates.

22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of ajurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdictionposes, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zero orclose-to-zero corporate income tax rates.

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Or. it




(6) Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country taxjurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and evasion22;

(6) Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing EU and third-countrytax jurisdictions, allowing Member Statesto identify jurisdictions playing a role intax avoidance and evasion22;


22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of ajurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdictionposes, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zerocorporate income tax rates.

Or. de




6. Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country tax

6. Notes that the Moscovici list aimsto provide a common EU methodology forassessing, screening and listing third-

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jurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and evasion22 ;

country tax jurisdictions, allowing MemberStates to identify jurisdictions playing arole in tax avoidance and evasion22 ;


22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of ajurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdictionposes, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zerocorporate income tax rates.

Or. en

Amendment 166Emilian Pavel



6. Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country taxjurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and evasion22 ;

6. Notes that this list aims to provide acommon EU methodology for assessing,screening and listing third-country taxjurisdictions, allowing Member States toidentify jurisdictions playing a role in taxavoidance and tax evasion22 ;

_________________ _________________22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of ajurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdiction

22 A provisional scoreboard of third-country jurisdictions was published inSeptember 2016 and comprises two sets ofindicators for determining risks to EUMember States: 1) assessments of ajurisdiction’s economic ties with the EU,the magnitude of financial services activityand financial stability factors; 2)assessment of the risk the jurisdiction

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poses, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zerocorporate income tax rates.

poses, identifying whether jurisdictions aresufficiently transparent, have favourablecorporate income tax regimes or zerocorporate income tax rates.

Or. en




7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready in 2017;

7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready in 2017; Regrets however thatdespite support from the EuropeanParliament and the EuropeanCommission, Member States did not agreethat low or no taxation rates should beconsidered as a specific criterion to assessunfair tax competition when screeningthird country jurisdictions 1a

_________________1a See Written answers by CommissionerJourova, November 2016

Or. en




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7. Notes that in May 2016, theCouncil endorsed the proposed listingprocess and called for an EU list to beready in 2017; deplores that the Councildecided against a zero or close to zerocorporate tax rate as a listing criterion;regrets that EU Member States fulfillingthe criteria of a non-cooperative taxjurisdiction will not be listed;

Or. en

Amendment 169Evelyn Regner, Peter Simon, Emmanuel Maurel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, HuguesBayet




7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready in 2017; underlines that theassessments of individual countriesshould be carried out in a transparentmanner;

Or. en

Amendment 170Ramón Jáuregui Atondo




7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready in 2017; calls for a universaldefinition of tax havens agreed by the EU,

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the OECD, the IMF and the UN.

Or. en




(7) Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready in 2017;

(7) Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list,including EU tax havens, to be ready in2017;

Or. de

Amendment 172Romana Tomc




7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready by the end of 2017;

Or. en



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7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for this list to beready by the end of 2017;

Or. en

Amendment 174Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Marina Albiol Guzmán, Stelios Kouloglou, TakisHadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Curzio Maltese, Miguel Urbán Crespo, MiguelViegas



7a. Notes that a list of non-cooperativetax jurisdictions will only proof useful ifaccompanied by meaningful sanctionsthat will bring about the necessarychanges in the legislation of theconcerned jurisdictions; such sanctionscan include, but are not limited to, theapplication of withholding taxes to fundsflowing to listed jurisdictions and thecancelation of double taxationagreements;

Or. en

Amendment 175Pervenche Berès, Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, TiborSzanyi, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes, Paul Tang, Peter Simon



7a. Regrets that the Code of ConductGroup (Business Taxation) is handling

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the process without any transparency;

Or. en




8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that this has been implementedrecently only by a small number ofjurisdictions; recalls that on 15 February2011 the Economic and Financial AffairsCouncil (ECOFIN) adopted CouncilDirective 2011/16/EU on administrativecooperation in the field of taxation andrepealing Directive 77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that this Directive makes itmandatory for national taxadministrations to supply informationconcerning a taxpayer of another MemberState on request, even if this informationis held only by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS)requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that only less than a half ofcommitted jurisdictions will haveimplemented the CRS in 2017;

_________________23 Income from employment, directors’fees, dividends, capital gains, royalties,certain life insurance products, pensions,and ownership of and income from

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immovable property.

Or. en




8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that this has been implementedrecently only by a small number ofjurisdictions; recalls that on 15 February2011 the Economic and Financial AffairsCouncil (ECOFIN) adopted CouncilDirective 2011/16/EU on administrativecooperation in the field of taxation andrepealing Directive 77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that this Directive makes itmandatory for national tax administrationsto supply information concerning ataxpayer of another Member State onrequest, even if this information is heldonly by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that this has been implementedrecently only by a small number ofjurisdictions; July 2005 the Saving TaxDirective (EUSTD) enter into effect(reviewed in March2014) and contained,for the first time, an AEOI system; recallsthat on March 2010the US Foreignaccount Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)went into effect; stresses that both ruleswere the grounds on which the OECDCRS built on; recalls that on recalls thaton 15 February 2011 the Economic andFinancial Affairs Council (ECOFIN)adopted Council Directive 2011/16/EU onadministrative cooperation in the field oftaxation and repealing Directive77/799/EEC (DAC 1); recalls that thisDirective makes it mandatory for nationaltax administrations to supply informationconcerning a taxpayer of another MemberState on request, even if this information isheld only by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information for

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certain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

_________________ _________________23 Income from employment, directors’fees, dividends, capital gains, royalties,certain life insurance products, pensions,and ownership of and income fromimmovable property.

23 Income from employment, directors’fees, dividends, capital gains, royalties,certain life insurance products, pensions,and ownership of and income fromimmovable property.

Or. en

Amendment 178Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Emmanuel Maurel, HuguesBayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes



8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that this has been implementedrecently only by a small number ofjurisdictions; recalls that on 15 February2011 the Economic and Financial AffairsCouncil (ECOFIN) adopted CouncilDirective 2011/16/EU on administrativecooperation in the field of taxation andrepealing Directive 77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that this Directive makes itmandatory for national tax administrationsto supply information concerning ataxpayer of another Member State onrequest, even if this information is heldonly by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating to

8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that this has been implementedrecently only by a small number ofjurisdictions; July 2005 the Saving TaxDirective (EUSTD) enter into effect(reviewed in March 2014) and contained,for the first time, an AEOI system; recallsthat on March 2010 the US Foreignaccount Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)went into effect; stresses that both ruleswere the grounds on which the OECDCRS built on; recalls that on 15 February2011 the Economic and Financial AffairsCouncil (ECOFIN) adopted CouncilDirective 2011/16/EU on administrativecooperation in the field of taxation andrepealing Directive 77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that this Directive makes itmandatory for national tax administrationsto supply information concerning a

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automatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

taxpayer of another Member State onrequest, even if this information is heldonly by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;



Or. en




8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that this has been implementedrecently only by a small number ofjurisdictions; recalls that on 15 February2011 the Economic and Financial AffairsCouncil (ECOFIN) adopted CouncilDirective 2011/16/EU on administrativecooperation in the field of taxation andrepealing Directive 77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that this Directive makes it

8. Welcomes that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that the United States are notcommitted to this new internationalstandard; points out that also the CRS hasweaknesses and welcomes that the OECDis working on refining the standard tomake it more effective; recalls that on 15February 2011 the Economic and FinancialAffairs Council (ECOFIN) adoptedCouncil Directive 2011/16/EU on

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mandatory for national tax administrationsto supply information concerning ataxpayer of another Member State onrequest, even if this information is heldonly by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

administrative cooperation in the field oftaxation and repealing Directive77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that thisDirective makes it mandatory for nationaltax administrations to supply informationconcerning a taxpayer of another MemberState on request, even if this information isheld only by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;



Or. en




a. [new para following para 8]

recalls that on 15 February 2011 theEconomic and Financial Affairs Council(ECOFIN)adopted Council Directive2011/16/EU on administrativecooperation in the field of taxation andrepealing Directive 77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that this Directive makes itmandatory for national taxadministrations to supply informationconcerning a taxpayer of another MemberState on request, even if this information

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is held only by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories[1],which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

[1] Income from employment, directors’fees, dividends, capital gains, royalties,certain life insurance products, pensions,and ownership of and income fromimmovable property.

Or. en




8a. Takes note that the OECD’s‘Multilateral Convention to ImplementTax Treaty Related Measures to PreventBEPS’ of June 2017 gives countries thechoice of selecting partners, imposing inpractice a bilateralism;

Or. en

Amendment 182Thierry Cornillet



9. Recalls that DAC 2 was adopted in 9. Recalls that on 9 December 2014,

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December 2014, extending the scope ofthe directive to include automaticexchange of tax information;

the ECOFIN Council adopted DAC2,under which the scope of the automaticand mandatory exchange of informationhas been extended to include financialaccounts;

Or. fr




9. Recalls that DAC 2 was adopted inDecember 2014, extending the scope ofthe directive to include automaticexchange of tax information;

9. Recalls that DAC 1 wassuccessfully extended by several recasts tocover automatic exchange of taxinformation, automatic exchange ofinformation to tax rulings and advancepricing agreements, mandatory exchangeof tax information on country-by-countrybasis and exchange of anti-moneylaundering information, in particularbeneficial ownership and due diligenceinformation;

Or. en




10. Recalls that on 8 December 2015ECOFIN adopted DAC 3, which extendedthe scope of the mandatory automaticexchange of information to tax rulingsand advance pricing agreements;

deleted

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Or. en




11. Recalls that on 25 May 2016ECOFIN formally adopted DAC 4, whichtranslates Action 13 of the OECD’s BaseErosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)project into EU law, and makes itmandatory for tax authorities to collectand automatically exchange country-by-country information;

deleted

Or. en




11a. Regrets that the directiveamending ‘Directive 2013/34/EU asregards disclosure of income taxinformation by certain undertakings andbranches’, was approved by the EuropeanParliament with the inclusion of a “getout” clause allowing big companies toretain information if they declare thepublication damaging for their ownbusiness;

Or. en

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12. Recalls that on 6 December 2016ECOFIN formally adopted DAC 5, due toenter into force on 1 January 2018,extending the scope of the informationexchange to national anti-moneylaundering information, in particularbeneficial ownership and due diligenceinformation;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 188Emmanuel Maurel, Marju Lauristin, Emilian Pavel, Ana Gomes, Hugues Bayet, PeterSimon



12. Recalls that on 6 December 2016ECOFIN formally adopted DAC 5, due toenter into force on 1 January 2018,extending the scope of the informationexchange to national anti-moneylaundering information, in particularbeneficial ownership and due diligenceinformation;

12. Recalls that on 6 December 2016ECOFIN formally adopted DAC 5, due toenter into force on 1 January 2018, bywhich national tax administrations ofMember States will have access to thecentral registers of the beneficial ownersheld by the financial intelligence units;

Or. en

Amendment 189Emmanuel Maurel, Marju Lauristin, Emilian Pavel, Hugues Bayet, Ana Gomes, EvelynRegner, Elly Schlein, Peter Simon


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Paragraph 12 a (new)


12a. Recalls that the EuropeanParliament, in its opinion on DAC 5, wasin favour of a genuine and compulsoryAEOI (automatic exchange ofinformation) between the Member Statestax administrations concerning thebeneficial owners of companies andtrusts, considering that the AEOI is thebest tool available to push taxtransparency and to ease cross-borderinquiries;

Or. en




13. Welcomes the Commissionproposal on DAC 6 for mandatoryautomatic exchange of information in thefield of taxation in relation to reportablecross-border arrangements;

13. Welcomes the Commissionproposal on Council Directive amendingDirective 2011/16/EU as regardsmandatory automatic exchange ofinformation in the field of taxation inrelation to reportable cross-borderarrangements (DAC 6);

Or. en



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13. Welcomes the Commissionproposal on DAC 6 for mandatoryautomatic exchange of information in thefield of taxation in relation to reportablecross-border arrangements;

13. Welcomes the Commissionproposal of 21 June 2017 on DAC 6 formandatory automatic exchange ofinformation by intermediaries and taxadvisors in the field of taxation in relationto reportable cross-border arrangements;

Or. en




14. Observes that offshore entities areoften set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying economic rationale orsubstance within the country ofestablishment;

14. Notes that companies, foundationsand trusts are the main tools used bymoney launderers and tax evaders,according to Panama papers data andthat these structures are often used incombination to obfuscate ownership ofassets; Stresses the risks of increased useof trusts for money laundering purposes,as these instruments do not have legalpersonality and are not subject toreporting and disclosure requirements;Observes that offshore entities are often setup as shell companies24 , which do nothave to have real economic substancewithin the country of establishment;Deplores that there is no European orinternational minimum standardsregarding the definition of corporatesubstance or aggressive tax planning;notes that in July 2017, a French courtruled that Google had no permanentestablishment in France despiteemploying more than 700 persons in a10000 square meters office located on“Rue de Londres” leading to no taxable

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presence in France while there is noEuropean binding definition of apermanent establishment;

_________________ _________________24 As the OECD defines it, a shell companyis a company that is formally registered,incorporated or otherwise legally organisedin an economy but which does not conductany operations in that economy other thanin pass-through capacity.

24 As the OECD defines it, a shell companyis a company that is formally registered,incorporated or otherwise legally organisedin an economy but which does not conductany operations in that economy other thanin pass-through capacity.

Or. en




14. Observes that offshore entities areoften set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying economic rationale or substancewithin the country of establishment;

14. Observes that offshore entities maybe set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying economic rationale or substancewithin the country of establishment;



Or. en




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14. Observes that offshore entities areoften set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying economic rationale or substancewithin the country of establishment;

14. Observes that offshore entities maybe set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying economic rationale or substancewithin the country of establishment;



Or. en




14. Observes that offshore entities areoften set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying economic rationale orsubstance within the country ofestablishment;

14. Observes that offshore entities areoften set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying substance within the country ofestablishment;



Or. en



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Paragraph 15


15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activityand money laundering, or transferringassets from an individual or company to anew company without incurring theliabilities of the former;

15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, or transferring assets from anindividual or company to a new companywithout incurring the liabilities of theformer, masking criminal activity,concealing the illegal origin of the assets(drug trafficking, human trafficking,illicit wildlife trade, illicit trade of humanorgans, illicit trade of small arms andweapons, illicit trade of diamonds andcoloured gemstones, illicit oil trade, illicittimber trade, illicit fish trade, illicit tradeof art and cultural property, illicit goldtrade, and fake goods) and launderingthem in order to re-enter them in the legaleconomy, evading and avoiding corporateincome tax, evading value added tax(VAT);

_________________ _________________25 The ultimate beneficial owner is thenatural person who is ultimatelyresponsible for the entity.

25 The ultimate beneficial owner is thenatural person who is ultimatelyresponsible for the entity.

26 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Operational Risk andMannheimer Swartling Advokatbyra.


Or. en


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15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former; or to leave the assetstransferred to a trust untaxed, as neitherthe settlor nor the trustee (legal owner) orthe beneficiary (until the funds aredistributed) are liable for the taxes on thatfund;





Or. en

Amendment 198Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Emmanuel Maurel, HuguesBayet, Ana Gomes


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15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former; or to leave the assetstransferred to a trust untaxed, as neitherthe settlor nor the trustee (legal owner) orthe beneficiary (until the funds aredistributed) are liable for the taxes on thatfund;





Or. en




15. Underlines that motivations for the 15. Underlines that motivations for the

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establishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

establishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or income or capital gains taxin the countries where the UBOs areresidents26 , shielding assets from creditorsor heirs, the evasion of sanctions, maskingcriminal activity and money laundering, ortransferring assets from an individual orcompany to a new company withoutincurring the liabilities of the former;Notes that several documents from thePanama papers demonstrated theknowledge by intermediaries and MossackMonseca of these motivations;





Or. en




15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countries

15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities and theuse of “freeports” and bearer shares mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion of

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where the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

inheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;





Or. en




(15) Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25, the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26, shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

(15) Underlines that one of the clearestmotivations for the establishment ofoffshore entities is obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25, the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26, shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

_________________ _________________

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Or. de




15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25, the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26, shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

15. Underlines that the mainmotivations for the establishment ofoffshore entities include obscuring theorigins of money and assets and concealingthe identity of the ultimate beneficialowner (UBO)25, the avoidance or evasionof inheritance or savings tax in thecountries where the UBOs are residents26,shielding assets from creditors or heirs, theevasion of sanctions, masking criminalactivity and money laundering, ortransferring assets from an individual orcompany to a new company withoutincurring the liabilities of the former;





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Or. es

Amendment 203Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Hugues Bayet, EvelynRegner, Ana Gomes, Peter Simon, Nessa Childers



15a. Stresses the role played by bearershares in the mechanisms revealed in thePanama Papers to conceal the identity ofthe UBOs and to provide “a deep level ofsecrecy" 26a.

_________________26a Panama Papers, 2016, Obermayer andObermaier.

Or. en




16. Adds that in the case ofmultinational corporations, shell andletterbox companies are also used as part ofcorporate tax optimising strategies, tofacilitate transfer pricing;

16. Adds that in the case ofmultinational corporations, shell andletterbox companies are also used as part ofcorporate tax optimising strategies, tofacilitate transfer pricing; Notes thataggressive tax planning is not compatiblewith Corporate Social Responsibilityprinciples and recalls its request toCommission to include this element in anupdated Corporate Social ResponsibilityEU strategy;

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Or. en





16. Adds that in the case ofmultinational enterprises(MNEs), shelland letterbox companies or holdingcompanies with the minimum number ofpersonnel required to escape anti-taxavoidance clauses are also used as part ofcorporate tax optimising strategies, tofacilitate transfer pricing;

Or. en

Amendment 206Evelyn Regner, Peter Simon, Emmanuel Maurel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, TiborSzanyi, Hugues Bayet, Ana Gomes




16. Adds that in the case ofmultinational corporations, shell- andletterbox companies are also used as part ofaggressive tax planning schemes, tofacilitate transfer pricing as well as tocircumvent social and legal standards;

Or. en


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16. Adds that in the case ofmultinational corporations, shell andletterbox companies are also used as part ofcorporate tax optimising strategies, toevade and avoid taxes through transferpricing mechanisms;

Or. en

Amendment 208Brian Hayes, Seán Kelly



17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had thelargest number of offshore entitiesrevealed in the Panama Papers (17 973entities), followed by Luxembourg (10 877entities) and Cyprus (6 374 entities), aswell as Latvia, Ireland, Spain, Estoniaand Malta27 ;

deleted

_________________27 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

Or. en


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17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities), as well as Latvia,Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Malta27 ;

17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities), as well as Latvia,Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Malta27 ;Stresses that out of the 21 countries usedmost by Mossack Fonseca to set up shellcompanies or other complex structures,12 countries, in addition to the UK areBritish Overseas Territories, BritishCrown Dependencies or members of theCommonwealth;


27 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

Or. en

Amendment 210Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Emmanuel Maurel, Elly Schlein, Hugues Bayet, EvelynRegner, Ana Gomes, Peter Simon, Nessa Childers



17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities), as well as Latvia,Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Malta27 ;

17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities), as well as Latvia,Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Malta27; pointsout, for example, that at a certain pointMossack Fonseca created 115 companies

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in Luxembourg in just one week27a;


27 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.27a Intervention by Jan Lukas Strozyk,Norddeutsche Rundfunk, in PANACommittee hearing on 27 September 2016

Or. en




17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities), as well as Latvia,Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Malta27;

17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities);

_________________27 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries inthe schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

Or. es

Amendment 212Paul Tang


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17a. Notes that not only the amount offiscal entities established in countries orwhat countries these entities areestablished from are relevant to evaluatethe role of countries in offshore structuresbut that also the role of countries asfinancial hubs should be taken intoconsideration, as was shown that 23% ofall corporate investments that ended in atax haven was channelled through theNetherlands, followed by the UnitedKingdom (14%), Switzerland (6%),Singapore (2%) and Ireland (1%)27a

_________________27a http://corpnet.uva.nl/ofcs/

Or. en




17a. Notes with concern that theFootball Leaks revelations and the severalindividual cases of tax evasion in theworld of football recently discovered haveshown that many loopholes andmismatches still exist in nationallegislation regarding the taxation ofimage rights and the taxation offootballers’ international transfers;

Or. en

Amendment 214

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17b. Recommends that while exercisingtheir tax sovereignty, countries shouldtake into account the impact of theiractions more globally, especially in so faras they restrict the exercise of taxsovereignty of other countries; Notes thatsuch ‘spillover’ analyses are not oftendone by European Member States forexample;

Or. en

Amendment 215Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Emmanuel Maurel, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, AnaGomes, Peter Simon, Nessa Childers



19. Underlines that at the time the datawere leaked, 55 728 entities were stillactive and approximately 90 % were basedin the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Panamaand the Seychelles;

19. Underlines that at the time the datawere leaked, 55 728 entities were stillactive and approximately 90 % were basedin the British Virgin Islands (BVI), whichis a overseas territory of the UnitedKingdom, Panama and the Seychelles;

Or. en


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19. Underlines that at the time the datawere leaked, 55 728 entities were stillactive and approximately 90 % were basedin the British Virgin Islands (BVI),Panama and the Seychelles;

19. Underlines that the British VirginIslands (BVI), Panama and the Seychellesconstituted the top three countries were90% of entities were created;

Or. en




19a. Observes that in the cases whereentities were found to be inactive it wasbecause they had been found to be used toregister accounts with banks in order tostore assets, wealth and money, and thatin most cases the underlying reason forthe creation of such entities has been taxevasion1a;

_________________1a PANA Committee written answercontributions by Norbert Naulin, PANAhearing, 14 November 2016.

Or. en



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Paragraph 20


20. Notes that in offshore jurisdictionscompany registers and authorities often donot require the information necessary toidentify beneficial owners, or do not shareit; notes that the identification of UBOs insome countries relies only on self-declaration of beneficial ownershipinformation, without any furtherverification29 ;

20. Notes that in offshore jurisdictionsand in some EU Member States companyregisters and authorities often do notrequire or do not share the informationnecessary to identify beneficial owners,qualified shareholders, supervisory boardmembers, management board membersand general managers nor information onbalance sheet as well as profit and lossstatement; notes that the identification ofUBOs in some countries relies only onself-declaration of beneficial ownershipinformation, without anyfurtherverification29 ;

_________________ _________________29 Intervention by Daniel Thelesklaf,Chairman of the Committee of Experts onthe Evaluation of Anti-Money LaunderingMeasures and the Financing of Terrorism(MONEYVAL) in PANA Committeehearing on 13 October 2016.

29 Intervention by Daniel Thelesklaf,Chairman of the Committee of Experts onthe Evaluation of Anti-Money LaunderingMeasures and the Financing of Terrorism(MONEYVAL) in PANA Committeehearing on 13 October 2016.

Or. en




21. Notes that in most offshoredestinations tax and reporting obligationsare non-existent;

21. Notes that in most offshoredestinations tax and reporting obligationsare non-existent 1a; Is concerned thatseveral of these jurisdictions include intheir national legislation or administrativepractice obstacles to exchangeinformation with foreign competent

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authorities;

_________________1a OECD SECRETARY-GENERALREPORT TO G20 FINANCEMINISTERS, Baden-Baden, Germany,March 2017:http://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-g20-finance-ministers-march-2017.pdf

Or. en




22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between2000 and 2002 after having made formalcommitments to implement the OECD’sglobal standards of transparency andexchange of information;

22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between2000 and 2002 after having made onlyformal commitments to implement theOECD’s global standards of transparencyand exchange of information, without,however, the effective implementation ofthese standards having been establishedand although these countries continue tooperate as tax havens in all respects;stresses that the systematic exclusion ofmany countries and jurisdictionsinternationally known as aggressive taxhavens is due to the fact that the criteriaused to compile the list are limited to theformal observance of internationaltransparency standards and do not takeaccount of the existence of harmful taxpractices, including tax rates equal to orclose to zero;

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Or. it




22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between2000 and 2002 after having made formalcommitments to implement the OECD’sglobal standards of transparency andexchange of information;

22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between2000 and 2002 after having made formalcommitments to implement the OECD’sglobal standards of transparency andexchange of information; and notes thatonly one jurisdiction is currently listed asan ‘uncooperative tax haven’ by theOECD, namely, Trinidad & Tobago;

Or. en




22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between

22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between

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2000 and 2002 after having made formalcommitments to implement the OECD’sglobal standards of transparency andexchange of information;

2000 and 2002 after having made formalcommitments to implement the OECD’sglobal standards of transparency andexchange of information; Deplores that theOECD list of tax havens contains onlyone country since July 2017;

Or. en




23. Underlines that some jurisdictionsoffer the possibility of being resident inmultiple jurisdictions using doublepassports or investor visa programmes thatallow a residence permit to be obtained inexchange for an investment in thesejurisdictions30 ;

23. Underlines that some jurisdictionsoffer the possibility of being resident inmultiple jurisdictions using doublepassports or investor visa programmes thatallow a residence permit to be obtained inexchange for an investment in thesejurisdictions30 ; notes the pervasiveness ofthese investor visa programmes inMember States, competing with eachother, whereby third country nationals aregranted residence rights/freedom ofmovement or citizenship in the MemberState in exchange of capital transfers,purchase of property or governmentbonds, or investment in corporate entities;observes that these schemes perverselyelicit corruption, money laundering andillicit flows of capitals from thirdcountries into the EU and highlightsinstances and concrete cases in whichsuch investor visa programmes have beenmisused for money launderingpurposes31a;

_________________ _________________30 Brooke Harrington, ‘Capital withoutborders, wealth managers and the onepercent’, Harvard University Press, 2016.

30 Brooke Harrington, ‘Capital withoutborders, wealth managers and the onepercent’, Harvard University Press, 2016.

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31a https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/04/golden-visa-immigration-deal-british-citizenship-home-office

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23. Underlines that some jurisdictionsoffer the possibility of being resident inmultiple jurisdictions using doublepassports or investor visa programmes thatallow a residence permit to be obtained inexchange for an investment in thesejurisdictions30 ;

23. Underlines that some jurisdictionsoffer the possibility of being resident inmultiple jurisdictions using doublepassports or investor visa programmes thatallow a residence permit to be obtained inexchange for an investment in thesejurisdictions30; highlights instances andconcrete cases in which such investor visaprogrammes have been misused formoney laundering purposes30a;

_________________ _________________30 Brooke Harrington, ‘Capital withoutborders, wealth managers and the onepercent’, Harvard University Press, 2016.

30 Brooke Harrington, ‘Capital withoutborders, wealth managers and the onepercent’, Harvard University Press, 2016.30a https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/04/golden-visa-immigration-deal-british-citizenship-home-office?

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24. Stresses that each offshorejurisdiction provides services to individualsand companies which are tailored to theirbusiness model;

24. Stresses that each offshorejurisdiction provides services to individualsand companies which are tailored to theirbusiness model; highlights that offshoreservice providers take advantage of thetax benefits and special regimes offeredby some jurisdictions to provide structuresthat hide the identity of the beneficialowner and can relocate within minutes inanother jurisdiction these structures , ifrequired (when tax authorities start aninvestigation in the former jurisdiction,for instance);

Or. en

Amendment 226Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Emmanuel Maurel, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, HuguesBayet, Evelyn Regner, Ana Gomes, Elly Schlein, Emilian Pavel



24. Stresses that each offshorejurisdiction provides services to individualsand companies which are tailored to theirbusiness model;

24. Stresses that each offshorejurisdiction provides services to individualsand companies which are tailored to theirbusiness model; highlights that offshoreservice providers take advantage of thetax benefits and special regimes offeredby some jurisdictions to provide structuresthat hide the identity of the beneficialowner and can relocate within minutes inanother jurisdiction these structures, ifrequired (when tax authorities start aninvestigation in the former jurisdiction,for instance);

Or. en

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24a. Notes that tax competition, with itsdetrimental effects, is not only allowed butencouraged by the EuropeanCommission, in an attempt to attractforeign investment even when theeffectiveness of this strategy has beengreatly questioned1a;

_________________1a See, for example, ICRICT, 'Four waysto tackle international tax competition',December 2016; and Joseph Stiglitz'intervention in PANA Committee hearingon 16 November 2016.

Or. en




25. Notes that most of the offshoreconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers were set up from Luxembourg, theUnited Kingdom and Cyprus and that thesecountries could have suspected that thisimplied a loss of the tax base of otherMember States where the UBOs wereresident – in Luxembourg, for example,many offshore companies were set uppurely to circumvent the withholding tax31

(which only applied to natural persons, notto offshore companies), and some of those


(which only applied to natural persons, notto offshore companies), and some of those

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were still active after the entry into force ofDAC 1;

were still active after the entry into force ofDAC 1; notes that greater transparencyover the identity of UBOs through theestablishment of public registers wouldhelp detect anomalies and suspicions ofwrongdoings as well as act as a deterrentto misconduct;

_________________ _________________31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

Or. en





(which only applied to natural persons, notto offshore companies), and some of thosewere still active after the entry into force ofDAC 1;


(which only applied to natural persons, notto offshore companies), and some of thosewere still active after the entry into force ofDAC 1; notes that greater transparencyover the identity of UBOs through the

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establishment of public registers wouldhelp detect anomalies and suspicions ofwrongdoings as well as act as a deterrentto misconduct;

_________________ _________________31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

Or. en




(25) Notes that most of the offshoreconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers were set up from Luxembourg, theUnited Kingdom and Cyprus and that thesecountries could have suspected that thisimplied a loss of the tax base of otherMember States where the UBOs wereresident – in Luxembourg, for example,many offshore companies were set uppurely to circumvent the withholding tax31

(which only applied to natural persons,not to offshore companies), and some ofthose were still active after the entry intoforce of DAC 1;

(25) Notes that most of the offshoreconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers were set up from Luxembourg, theUnited Kingdom and Cyprus and that thesecountries should have suspected that thisimplied a loss of the tax base of otherMember States where the UBOs wereresident – in Luxembourg, for example,many offshore companies were set uppurely to circumvent the withholding tax31, some of those were still active after theentry into force of DAC 1;

_________________ _________________31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea Group

31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea Group

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Compliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

Compliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

Or. de





(which only applied to natural persons,not to offshore companies), and some ofthose were still active after the entry intoforce of DAC 1;

25. Notes that most of the offshoreconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers were set up from the UnitedKingdom, Luxembourg and Cyprus andthat these countries could have suspectedthat this implied a loss of the tax base ofother Member States where the UBOs wereresident; Notes that due to the ‘ne bis inidem’ principle, legal action cannotalways be started in a Member Statebecause of the dual system ofadministrative and criminal sanctionsexisting in many countries;

_________________31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

Or. en

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25a. Notes that in Luxembourg, forexample, many offshore companies wereset up purely to circumvent thewithholding tax 1a (which only applied tonatural persons, not to offshorecompanies), and some of those were stillactive after the entry into force of DAC 1;recalls that Luxembourg, thanks tointensive blocking and lobbying in theCouncil of Member States, obtained aconcession in the EU Savings TaxDirective (EUSTD) to not automaticallyexchange information allowing taxevaders to hide their money from the taxauthorities of their residence; deploresthat Luxembourg tolerated the creation ofa tax avoidance business on its territoryhelping wealthy individuals to formallymove the ownership of their funds intooffshore companies located in tax havensand thus escaping the scope of theEUSTD; is concerned that until todayLuxembourg does not cooperateeffectively in order to help its partnercountries to bring their tax evaders tojustice; Notes that the Commissionreviews of the Savings Directive, carriedout in 2008 and 2011, identified the use oflegal entities and arrangements and theexposure of European financialinstitutions towards such structures inoffshore centres as an issue; Recalls thatthe Commission made an updatedproposal in 2009 which did not receivepolitical support by Member States;

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_________________1a See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of NordeaPrivate Banking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee ofInquiry in a meeting with a PANAdelegation.

Or. en

Amendment 233Fabio De Masi, Matt Carthy, Marina Albiol Guzmán, Stelios Kouloglou, TakisHadjigeorgiou, Patrick Le Hyaric, Miguel Viegas, Miguel Urbán Crespo, CurzioMaltese



25a. Notes that a particularly pressingproblem arises through the outright lackof any harmonised approach amongMember States on the issue of outboundpayments; notes that in this current,uncoordinated framework, thecombination of a removal of sourcetaxation under the Interest and Royaltiesand Parent-Subsidiary Directives, with alack of withholding taxes on dividend,licence and royalty fees and interestoutbound payments in some MemberStates, creates loopholes whereby profitscan effectively flow from any MemberState out of the Union without beingsubject to tax at least once;

Or. en

Amendment 234

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Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Juan Fernando López Aguilar



25a. Notes that Gibraltar has asignificant ‘offshore’ sector with almostas many companies as inhabitants (over20 000, as stated by its tax authorities tothe PANA Committee), which do notconduct economic activities and whichcan be used by fraudsters to conceal theiridentity from the tax authorities of thecountries in which their financial andproperty assets are located.

Or. es




25b. Notes that little progress has beenachieved on the revision of the mandateand transparency of the Code of ConductGroup on Business Taxation since theParliament’s reports on the Luxleaksrevelations; recalls its requests to makemandatory to the Code of Conduct Groupthe approval of new tax measure adoptedby the Member States; points out that dueto a lack of political will, Member Stateshave been unable to agree on abolishing anumber of harmful tax measures whichare under discussion in the Code ofConduct Group on Business Taxation forseveral years; notes that French andItalian patent box regimes are still not

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compliant with the Code of ConductGroup criteria and no action has beentaken by the Council nor the Commission;notes that the Code of Conduct Group’sAnti-abuse Subgroup started its work oninbound profit transfers in 2009 buthasn’t agreed yet on a switch-over clausefor foreign untaxed income entering theEU; notes that the Code of ConductSubgroup on outbound profit transfersstarted to work at least since 2010 on theproblem of untaxed profit distributionsfrom the EU to a third country but noagreement has yet been reached; notesthat, as regards taxation applicable tointerest and royalty payments madebetween associated companies of differentMember States, despite a Commissionproposal presented in November 2011 torecast Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3June 2003, Member States haven’t beenable to agree on solving shortcomingsresulting from the limited scope of theDirective by including a MinimumEffective Taxation (MET)clause in theDirective; notes that, as regardsinvestment funds, Member States deniedin September 2011 to continue thediscussion about these schemes’ allegedand potential harmfulness;

Or. en




25b. Notes that in the UK, more than75% of corruption cases involvingproperty investigated by the authorities

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involved anonymous companies registeredin secrecy jurisdictions; Adds that ofthese,78% of the companies involved wereregistered in either the UK’s overseasterritories or crown dependencies; Notesthat the United Kingdom government caninvoke special prerogatives that wouldforce British overseas territories andcrown dependencies to introduce centralpublic registers of company ownershipand end their tax secrecy;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 25 c (new)


25c. Points out that within theEuropean Union, special economic zoneslike Madeira are abused by largecompanies and wealthy individuals tostash profits without paying taxes; Sees,therefore, a need for the EuropeanCommission to review the status of theseschemes if the initial objectives haven’tbeen met and also to review the guidelinesfor EU regional aid with stricter taxconditions;

Or. en



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Paragraph 25 d (new)


25d. Notes that little progress has beenachieved on the revision of the mandateand transparency of the Code of ConductGroup on Business Taxation since theParliament’s reports on the Luxleaksrevelations; Recalls its requests to makemandatory to the Code of Conduct Groupthe approval of new tax measure adoptedby the Member States; Points out that dueto a lack of political will, Member Stateshave been unable to agree on abolishing anumber of harmful tax measures whichare under discussion in the Code ofConduct Group on Business Taxation forseveral years; notes that French andItalian patent box regimes are still notcompliant with the Code of ConductGroup criteria and no action has beentaken by the Council nor the Commission;notes that the Code of Conduct Group’sAnti-abuse Subgroup started its work oninbound profit transfers in 2009 buthasn’t agreed yet on a switchover clausefor foreign untaxed income entering theEU; notes that the Code of ConductSubgroup on outbound profit transfersstarted to work at least since 2010 on theproblem of untaxed profit distributionsfrom the EU to a third country but noagreement has yet been reached; notesthat, as regards taxation applicable tointerest and royalty payments madebetween associated companies of differentMember States, despite a Commissionproposal presented in November 2011 torecast Council Directive 2003/49/EC of3June 2003, Member States haven’t beenable to agree on solving shortcomingsresulting from the limited scope of theDirective by including a MinimumEffective Taxation (MET) clause in theDirective; notes that, as regardsinvestment funds, Member States deniedin September 2011 to continue the

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discussion about these schemes’ allegedand potential harmfulness;

Or. en




26. Notes the lack of adequate humanand financial resources available toregulators, supervisors and applicable taxlaw enforcement bodies;

26. Notes the lack of adequate humanand financial resources available toregulators, supervisors and applicable taxlaw enforcement bodies; Notes forexample that only the EBA is allocatingresources to ensure ALM coordinationwith other EU financial authorities butonly have0.8 person in charge of thisissue; Regrets the lack of commonEuropean definitions for tax evasion andtax avoidance, which would easecooperation between Member States;Points out that administrative cooperationand legal assistance in criminal mattersbetween two or more Member States withregard to tax evasion, tax fraud andmoney laundering are hampered bymismatched national legislation; regretsthat in some Member States, like inLuxembourg for example, simple taxevasion was or still is not treated as anaggravated crime and therefore preventscross-border administrative cooperationand legal assistance in criminal matters;regrets that in some Member States, likein Luxembourg for example, the time ofthe commitment of the crime was or still isconsidered as the starting point forcalculating the limitation periodpotentially preventing cross-borderadministrative cooperation and legal

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assistance in criminal matters; welcomesthat some Member States, for exampleLuxembourg, already have or plan tomodify their national law in order toremove obstacles to cross-borderadministrative cooperation and legalassistance in criminal matters;

Or. en





26. Notes the lack of adequate humanand financial resources available toregulators, supervisors and applicable taxlaw enforcement bodies, due to theapplication of austerity policies that haveresulted in several Member Statesreducing significant jobs in the TaxAdministration since 2008 to the presentdate;

Or. en

Amendment 241Ana Gomes, Emmanuel Maurel, Sergio Gaetano Cofferati, Hugues Bayet, EvelynRegner, Peter Simon




26. Notes the lack of adequate human,technological and financial resourcesavailable to regulators, supervisors andapplicable tax law enforcement bodies in

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EU Member States, along the lack ofproper backing, independence andpolitical support of their work;

Or. en





26. Notes the lack of capacityincluding qualified human and financialresources available to regulators,supervisors and applicable tax lawenforcement bodies;

Or. en

Amendment 243Emilian Pavel, Emmanuel Maurel, Peter Simon




26. Notes the lack of adequate humanand financial resources available toregulators, supervisors and applicable taxlaw enforcement authorities and bodies;

Or. en



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(26) Notes the lack of adequate humanand financial resources available toregulators, supervisors and applicable taxlaw enforcement bodies;

(26) Deplores the lack of adequatehuman and financial resources available tothe regulators, supervisors and applicabletax law enforcement bodies;

Or. de




26a. Notes that 18 infringement caseswere open by the Commission againstMember States regarding the lack oftransposition of DAC1 1a, 13 casesregarding the implementation ofDAC2 1b

and 8 cases regarding the implementationof DAC3; Recalls that the Directive onadministrative cooperation 4 on country-by-country reporting between taxadministration had to be implemented innational law by Member States by 4 June2017; Notes that actions with regard to 11Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus,Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary,Malta, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic,Slovakia) are still pending 1c;

_________________1a 14 actions were initiated for non-communication of domestic provisions byMember States (not meeting the 01January 2013 deadline fortransposition).Another infringement casewas initiated for non-transposition(including the spontaneous exchange ofinformation) and six actions were

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initiated for possible incorrecttransposition of DAC1. Out of these sixactions, three cases are still ongoing.1b Deadline for transposition was 01January 20161c Cases for Greece and Portugal shouldbe closed soon

Or. en




27. Stresses that this lack of resourcesin tax administrations impedes the capacityto effectively comply with the spontaneousexchange of information under DAC, andthat this is a systemic problem in the EU;

27. Stresses that this lack of resourcesin tax administrations impedes the capacityto effectively comply with the spontaneousexchange of information under DAC, andthat this is a systemic problem in the EU;Notes that the distinction betweenadministrative tax offences and criminaltax offences is often blurred at memberStates level, creating sometimes obstaclesto good cooperation between memberStates; Recalls its proposal to amend DACin order to improve Member States’coordination on tax audits;

Or. en



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28. Concludes that the DAC provisions,especially Articles 1, 2 and 8(1) – onspontaneous information exchange – werenot implemented effectively; highlights thatMember States had grounds for supposingthat there had been a loss of tax in otherMember States owing to offshoreconstructions, but did not report this taxinformation to those other Member States;

28. Concludes that the DAC provisions,especially Articles 1, 2 and 8(1) – onspontaneous information exchange – werenot implemented constituting cases ofmaladministration by negligence oromission; highlights that Member Stateshad grounds for supposing that there hadbeen a loss of tax in other Member Statesowing to offshore constructions, but didnot report this tax information to thoseother Member States; points out thatalready in 2012, the Council Code ofConduct Group on Business Taxationacknowledged the lack of exchange ofinformation on rulings on a spontaneousbasis 1a; Concludes that the Commissionfailed to enforce DAC provisionseffectively;

_________________1a Council Code of Conduct on BusinessTaxation, Background document from10September 2012: “The monitoringexercise discussed at the 17 April 2012Code meeting showed that in practice noinformation on rulings was exchanged ona spontaneous basis”

Or. en




29. Recalls that the FATF set the globalstandards for Anti-Money Laundering andCountering Financing of Terrorism

29. Recalls that the FATF set the globalstandards for Anti-Money Laundering andCountering Financing of Terrorism

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(AML/CFT), and that all its members,including the main offshore financialcentres cited in the Panama Papers (BVI,Panama and the Seychelles), committed toimplementing these standards;

(AML/CFT), and that all its members,including the main offshore financialcentres cited in the Panama Papers (BVI,Panama and the Seychelles),committed toimplementing these standards; recalls thatFATF recommendations were latestamended in 2012 and should be revised assoon as possible according to new risks ofmoney laundering or money launderingpractices highlighted in the PanamaPapers;

Or. en




29a. Notes that the Council of EuropeWarsaw Convention constitutes the mostcomprehensive international conventionon money laundering, asking parties toadopt legislative measures to facilitate theprevention, investigation and prosecutionof money laundering as well as theeffective freezing and confiscation ofproceeds and instrumentalities of crime;Regrets that the Warsaw Convention hasbeen ratified by only 18 Member States sofar; 1a

_________________1a Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,Malta, The Netherlands, Poland,Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,Spain, and the United Kingdom.

Or. en

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30. Acknowledges that the EUframework for AML is the Anti-MoneyLaundering Directive (AMLD), whichidentifies the money laundering risks atthree levels, namely supranational level,Member State level and the level of thereporting entities as part of their customerdue diligence (CDD);

30. Acknowledges that the EUframework for AML is the Directive (EU)2015/849 of the European Parliament andof the Council of 20 May 2015 on theprevention of the use of the financialsystem for the purposes of moneylaundering or terrorist financing (AMLDIV), which identifies the money launderingrisks at three levels, namely supranationallevel, Member State level and the level ofthe reporting entities as part of theircustomer due diligence (CDD);

Or. en




30. Acknowledges that the EUframework for AML is the Anti-MoneyLaundering Directive (AMLD), whichidentifies the money laundering risks atthree levels, namely supranational level,Member State level and the level of thereporting entities as part of their customerdue diligence (CDD);

30. Acknowledges that the EUframework for AML is the Anti-MoneyLaundering Directive (AMLD),whichidentifies the money laundering risks atthree levels, namely supranational level,Member State level and the level of theobliged entities as part of their customerdue diligence (CDD); Regrets however thelack of greater harmonisation in MemberStates’ approaches to fighting financialcrimes;

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Or. en

Amendment 252Markus Ferber



(32) Notes that AMLD IV improves thescope of enhanced CDD for undertakingbusiness with high-risk countries and thedefinitions and obligations concerningpolitically exposed persons and UBOs,lowers the cash payment threshold fromEUR 15 000 to EUR 10 000 and extendsthe scope of reporting entities to includethe entire gambling sector, and not justcasinos; recalls that the threshold foridentifying beneficial owners of corporateentities is a shareholding of 25 % plus oneshare or an ownership interest of more than25 %; recalls that AMLD IV entered intoforce on 26 June 2017;

(32) Notes that AMLD IV improves thescope of enhanced CDD for undertakingbusiness with high-risk countries and thedefinitions and obligations concerningpolitically exposed persons and UBOs,lowers the cash payment threshold fromEUR 15 000 to EUR 10 000 and extendsthe scope of reporting entities to includethe entire gambling sector, and not justcasinos; recalls that the threshold foridentifying beneficial owners of corporateentities is a shareholding of 25 % plus oneshare or an ownership interest of more than25 %; recalls that AMLD IV entered intoforce on 26 June 2017; regrets that AMLDIV has not, or has only partially, beentransposed into national law by 17Member States at the expiry of theimplementation period; calls on therelevant Member States to implementAMLD IV as a matter of urgency;

Or. de




32. Notes that AMLD IV improves the 32. Notes that AMLD IV improves the

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scope of enhanced CDD for undertakingbusiness with high-risk countries and thedefinitions and obligations concerningpolitically exposed persons and UBOs,lowers the cash payment threshold fromEUR 15 000 to EUR 10 000 and extendsthe scope of reporting entities to includethe entire gambling sector, and not justcasinos; recalls that the threshold foridentifying beneficial owners of corporateentities is a shareholding of 25 % plus oneshare or an ownership interest of more than25 %; recalls that AMLD IV entered intoforce on 26 June 2017;

scope of enhanced CDD for undertakingbusiness with high-risk countries and thedefinitions and obligations concerningpolitically exposed persons and UBOs,lowers the cash payment threshold fromEUR 15 000 to EUR 10 000 and extendsthe scope of obliged entities to include theentire gambling sector, and not justcasinos; recalls that one criterion foridentifying beneficial owners of corporateentities is a shareholding of 25 % plus oneshare or an ownership interest of more than25 %; recalls that AMLD IV entered intoforce on 26June 2017 but only sixMember States have notified fullimplementation into national legislationin due time to the European Commission1a;

_________________1a The six countries are: Czech Republic,Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Sweden and theUK. Austria, France, Hungary, Ireland,Latvia, Slovakia and Spain have notifiedpartial implementation only.

Or. en




32a. Notes that on 28 February 2017Parliament voted on the revision of the4th AMLD; underlines that Parliamentvoted in favour of an ambitious proposalthat will close many loopholes andconsiderably strengthen existing anti-money laundering legislation; highlightsthat under Parliament's proposal: all tax

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offences will be considered as predicateoffences for money laundering,independently of how heavily they arepunished on Member State level; allproviders of tax advice as well as arttraders, auction houses and freeports areadded to the list of obliged entities; thethreshold for identifying beneficialowners (BOs) of corporate entities islowered from 25% of shareholding plusone share (or more than 25% ofownership interest) to 10% ofshareholding plus one share (or morethan 10% of ownership interest) and theBO definition for trusts is broadened toinclude all trust parties; no seniormanagers, nominee directors and otherproxy agents can be identified as BOsunless they fulfil the criteria of a BO; fullpublic access is granted to trust andcompany BO registers; centralised assetregisters including land and real estatewill be put in place on Member State leveland connected on EU level; sanctions areput in place for any breach of the AMLDand strong sanctions such as thewithdrawal of the business licence forserious, repeated and systematic breaches;

Or. en

Amendment 255Cora van Nieuwenhuizen, Enrique Calvet Chambon



32a. Notes that according to Europolcrypto currencies pose a moneylaundering threat and notes that moneylaundering is subject to change and thattherefore anti-money launderingstrategies should not only be focused onthe past, but also on new money

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laundering techniques;

Or. en




32a. Welcomes the EuropeanCommission proposal on controls on cashentering or leaving the Union and callsfor greater harmonisation of cashrestrictions at the European level;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionSubheading 2.2


An EU anti-money laundering list of high-risk third countries

An EU anti-money laundering list of high-risk countries

Or. en



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33. Recalls that on 14 July 2016 theCommission adopted, by delegated act, alist of eleven third countries havingstrategic deficiencies in their regimes onAnti-Money Laundering (AML) andCountering Financing of Terrorism(CFT), namely Afghanistan, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Guyana, Iraq, the LaoPeople’s Democratic Republic, Syria,Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Iran and theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK);

33. Recalls that on 14 July 2016 theCommission adopted DelegatedRegulation (EU) 2016/1675supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 ofthe European Parliament and of theCouncil a list of eleven high-risk thirdcountries with strategic deficiencies intheir AML/CFT regimes, namelyAfghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,Guyana, Iraq, the Lao People’s DemocraticRepublic, Syria, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen,Iran and the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea (DPRK);

Or. en




33a. Notes that third countries wheremoney laundering is done are just onestep used by big corporations and wealthyindividuals around the world in themoney-laundering cycle; these include inparticular the richest countries, includingEU ones. The process of moneylaundering and tax evasion requiresconcrete players and necessary steps:from a real beneficiary, a bank that opensan account, tax and legal advisors, off-shore entities and possible nominee-directors, and, ultimately, a taxjurisdiction.

Or. en

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Amendment 260Monica Macovei, Traian Ungureanu, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite PagazaurtundúaRuiz, Bernd Lucke, Fabio De Masi



33a. Stresses that the implementation ofvery strict rules for those identified ashigh risk third countries is necessary, inorder to avoid the migration to anyjurisdiction with a more favourablepolitical and financial environment formoney laundering activities.

Or. en




34. Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATF;

34. Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATF;Questions why Panama was taken out ofthe FATF list of non-cooperationjurisdictions in 2016 before GALIFAThas conducted its peer-review evaluationon Panama and analysed the properenforcement of FATF standards; Notesthat Panama was rated as ‘non-compliant’ by the Global Forum at theend of 2016;

Or. en

Amendment 262

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Marco Valli




34. Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATFand does not include any of the countriesmentioned in the Panama Papers;

Or. it





34. Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATF,of which the Commission is an activemember;

Or. en




(34) Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATF;

(34) Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATFand the 34 EU jurisdictions are totallyabsent;

Or. de


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34. Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATF,of which the Commission is an activemember;

Or. en




35. Recalls that the Commissionproposed to amend the list by removingGuyana and adding Ethiopia; reiteratesParliament’s objections to these delegatedacts, of 19 January and 17 May 2017;

35. Recalls that the Commissionproposed to amend the list by removingGuyana and adding Ethiopia; reiteratesParliament’s objections to these delegatedacts, of 19 January and 17 May 2017, dueto dissatisfaction with the list notcontaining any single important offshorefinancial centre and with the aim to urgethe Commission to allocate more staff tocombat money laundering and terroristfinancing allowing for an own andindependent EU assessment of thirdcountries;

Or. en



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Paragraph 35 a (new)


35a. Regrets that the EuropeanCommission so far has not managed tocomply with the Delegated Act under the4th AMLD in order to produce anindependently assessed list of countriesbased on objective criteria, which wouldnot put the European institutions in aposition of indirectly endorsing thoseregimes that would not be in line with itsown assessment criteria;

Or. en




35b. Regrets that the Commission statesit is not able to conduct its own properassessment of money laundering high-riskthird countries as it does not havesufficient qualified staff to fulfil thisobligation under the AMLD;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 35 c (new)


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35c. Regrets that an independentassessment has not been made by theEuropean Commission to considerwhether EU Member States should beincluded in the list;

Or. en




36. Notes that the FATF has reviewedmore than 80 countries since 2007 in termsof their compliance and deficiencies andthat 59 countries have been put on thepublic list; reiterates the FATF’s claimsthat since then, 49 countries have madesignificant progress in terms of putting inplace legal and regulatory frameworks andreforms, committing themselves toupholding international tax standards suchas the OECD’s common reportingstandards, so as to be taken off the list;

36. Notes that the FATF has reviewedmore than 80 countries since 2007 in termsof their compliance and deficiencies andthat 61 countries have been put on thepublic list identifying countries withstrategic AML/CFT deficiencies ;reiterates the FATF’s claims that sincethen, 51countries have since made thenecessary reforms to address them, suchas putting in place legal and regulatoryframeworks and reforms, committingthemselves to upholding international taxstandards such as the OECD’s commonreporting standards, and to be taken off thelist; highlights that being delisted from thepublic list should not take place only aftercommitments to reforms but after athorough FATF evaluation ensuringchanges in practice;

Or. en


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36a. Regrets that the process of FATFassessment and peer review have resultedin a list which is not useful for tacklingmoney laundering.;

Or. en




37. Recalls that under AMLD III eachMember State is obliged to establish anFIU in order to combat money launderingand terrorist financing, that each nationalFIU must be given adequate resources tofulfil its tasks, and that the FIUs have to beequipped to ensure timely access to thefinancial, administrative and lawenforcement information they require toproperly carry out their tasks;

37. Recalls that under AMLD III eachMember State is obliged to establish anFIU in order to combat money launderingand terrorist financing, that each nationalFIU must be given adequate resources tofulfil its tasks, taking into account factorssuch as the exposure to money launderingrisks, the number of corporateheadquarters located in the country, thepossession of offshore territories, thevolume of tax collection of the jurisdictionas well as the number of offshore entitiesidentified in the Panama papers or otherleaked information and that the FIUs haveto be equipped to ensure timely access tothe financial, administrative and lawenforcement information they require toproperly carry out their tasks;

Or. en

Amendment 273

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Monica Macovei, Traian Ungureanu, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite PagazaurtundúaRuiz, Miguel Urbán Crespo



37. Recalls that under AMLD III eachMember State is obliged to establish anFIU in order to combat money launderingand terrorist financing, that each nationalFIU must be given adequate resources tofulfil its tasks, and that the FIUs have to beequipped to ensure timely access to thefinancial, administrative and lawenforcement information they require toproperly carry out their tasks;

37. Recalls that under AMLD III eachMember State is obliged to establish anFIU in order to share information betweenthe different intelligence services of theMember States, to combat moneylaundering and terrorist financing, thateach national FIU must be given adequateresources to fulfil its tasks, and that theFIUs have to be equipped to ensureefficient and timely access to the financial,administrative and law enforcementinformation they require to properly carryout their tasks, including interoperabilitybetween databases of the relevantauthorities

Or. en

Amendment 274Paul Tang, Emmanuel Maurel, Emilian Pavel, Hugues Bayet, Evelyn Regner, PeterSimon



38a. Notes that a uniform definition ofa suspicious transaction lacks, or that thedefinition is deemed inadequate in someindividual cases.

Or. en

Amendment 275

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40. Notes and welcomes theestablishment of the FIU.net cooperation inthe framework of Europol; recalls that theEgmont Group, an international body forthe cooperation of FIUs, is composed of154 FIUs worldwide;

40. Notes and welcomes theestablishment of the FIU.net cooperation inthe framework of Europol but is concernedby still existing legal and technicalbarriers preventing or/and significantlydelaying cooperation between EU FIUs;Regrets that several FIUs in Europe arestill not allowed according to theirnational legal framework to exchangedata directly with foreign lawenforcement; regrets that Europol islacking investigation powers to prosecutetax evasion and money laundering; recallsthat the Egmont Group, an internationalbody for the cooperation of FIUs, iscomposed of 154 FIUs worldwide;

Or. en

Amendment 276Petras Auštrevičius, Enrique Calvet Chambon

Motion for a resolutionParagraph 40 – subparagraph 1 (new)


Notes that a major issue in anti-moneylaundering investigations in the EU is thelengthy and inefficient mechanism ofexchanging official requests between anti-money authorities in the EU. The drasticdiscrepancy between the moneylaundering tools and the mechanism ofcombating money laundering coupledwith lax anti-money laundering regimesin certain jurisdictions, and in some

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cases, like in the Magnitsky case, theexistence of state sponsored moneylaundering, has led to the infiltration ofEU financial system with billions of eurosof laundered funds, as demonstrated byPanama Papers, Magnitsky case, RussianLaundromat and others.

Or. en




40a. Observes that because of theinternational scope of money launderingschemes, better international cooperationat the level of FIUs and Eurojust isnecessary, so that resources can bestreamlined and saved in moneylaundering investigations conducted bymultiple EU states, like in the Magnitskycase, and to enable investigations to bepromptly commenced and effectivelyconducted so that perpetrators can beidentified at early stages, and subsequentmoney laundering deterred.

Or. en




41. Observes that a number of 41. Observes that a number of

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intermediaries did not adequately carry outthe mandatory enhanced CDD measures,whether upon the establishment of thebusiness relationship with their clients orduring that business relationship, evenwhen there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackof reporting by obliged entities ofsuspicions of money laundering to thecompetent FIUs33 ;

intermediaries, namely enablers andpromoters of tax evasion, tax avoidanceand money laundering, did not adequatelycarry out the mandatory enhanced CDDmeasures, whether upon the establishmentof the business relationship with theirclients or during that business relationship,even when there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackof reporting by obliged entities ofsuspicions of money laundering to thecompetent FIUs33 ;

_________________ _________________33 The investigation into the privatebanking activities of Nordea showed thatthe bank did not comply with internalguidelines or regulatory requirements inLuxembourg. More specifically, it did notclassify customers in the appropriate high-risk category, and the subsequent enhanceddue diligence (EDD) reporting wasincomplete. The EDD requirementsinclude, for instance, collectinginformation on the source of the funds andthe purpose of the accounts. Moreover, duediligence needs to be repeated regularlyand reassessed. This so-called ‘ongoingdue diligence’ (ODD) was, however, notsystematically conducted. The informationwas in many cases not up to date accordingto the internal investigation of the bank(Nordea, 2016). Similar implementationand enforcement problems were indicatedby a former compliance officer of theGerman Berenberg Bank that testified forthe PANA Committee.

33 The investigation into the privatebanking activities of Nordea showed thatthe bank did not comply with internalguidelines or regulatory requirements inLuxembourg. More specifically, it did notclassify customers in the appropriate high-risk category, and the subsequent enhanceddue diligence (EDD) reporting wasincomplete. The EDD requirementsinclude, for instance, collectinginformation on the source of the funds andthe purpose of the accounts. Moreover, duediligence needs to be repeated regularlyand reassessed. This so-called ‘ongoingdue diligence’ (ODD) was, however, notsystematically conducted. The informationwas in many cases not up to date accordingto the internal investigation of the bank(Nordea, 2016). Similar implementationand enforcement problems were indicatedby a former compliance officer of theGerman Berenberg Bank that testified forthe PANA Committee.

Or. en



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Paragraph 41


41. Observes that a number ofintermediaries did not adequately carry outthe mandatory enhanced CDD measures,whether upon the establishment of thebusiness relationship with their clients orduring that business relationship, evenwhen there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackof reporting by obliged entities ofsuspicions of money laundering to thecompetent FIUs33 ;

41. Observes that a number ofintermediaries , such as the Berenbergbank in Germany or the Pilatus bank inMalta, did not adequately carry out themandatory enhanced CDD measures,whether upon the establishment of thebusiness relationship with their clients orduring that business relationship, evenwhen there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackof reporting by obliged entities ofsuspicions of money laundering to thecompetentFIUs33 ;



Or. en

Amendment 280

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Pervenche Berès, Emmanuel Maurel, Hugues Bayet, Peter Simon




41. Observes that a number ofintermediaries did not adequately carry outthe mandatory enhanced CDD measures,whether upon the establishment of thebusiness relationship with their clients orduring that business relationship, evenwhen there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackand unequal level of reporting by obligedentities of suspicions of money launderingto the competent FIUs33 ;



Or. en

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41. Observes that a number ofintermediaries did not adequately carry outthe mandatory enhanced CDD measures,whether upon the establishment of thebusiness relationship with their clients orduring that business relationship, evenwhen there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackof reporting by obliged entities ofsuspicions of money laundering to thecompetent FIUs;

_________________33 The investigation into the privatebanking activities of Nordea showed thatthe bank did not comply with internalguidelines or regulatory requirements inLuxembourg. More specifically, it did notclassify customers in the appropriatehigh-risk category, and the subsequentenhanced due diligence (EDD) reportingwas incomplete. The EDD requirementsinclude, for instance, collectinginformation on the source of the fundsand the purpose of the accounts.Moreover, due diligence needs to berepeated regularly and reassessed. Thisso-called ‘ongoing due diligence’ (ODD)was, however, not systematicallyconducted. The information was in manycases not up to date according to theinternal investigation of the bank(Nordea, 2016). Similar implementationand enforcement problems were indicatedby a former compliance officer of theGerman Berenberg Bank that testified forthe PANA Committee.

Or. en

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42. Finds that in many cases no, orinsufficient, inquiries were carried out toidentify the UBOs of offshore entities;highlights the consequential failure todefine the ownership and control structureof the entity and/or to obtain informationon the purpose and intended nature of thebusiness relationship34 ;

42. Finds that in many cases no, orinsufficient, inquiries were carried out toidentify the UBOs of offshore entities;highlights the consequential failure todefine the ownership and control structureof the entity and/or to obtain informationon the purpose and intended nature of thebusiness relationship34 ; Stresses thatpublic documents from the PanamaPapers show that Mossack Fonseca wasaware that customer due diligence wasnot always properly done by some of itsclients or subsidiaries 1a;Highlights thatMossack Fonseca admitted that in somecases, they did not know who thebeneficial owners of the registered entitieswere; 1b

_________________ _________________1a In an email from 24 September 2010,Jürgen Mossack wrote ‘it would appearthat Mossfon UK are not doing their duediligence thoroughly (or maybe none atall) and maybe from now on we ourselveswill have to do the DD on all clients thatMossfon UK have with us, present andfuture!”1b In an email relating an exchangebetween Mossack Fonseca and UBS, therepresentative from Mossack Fonsecasaid: “He explained that UBS had neverbeen a contracting partner of ours. Idisagreed at this issue and added that insome cases we even don’t know who theBO is. (...) I answered that in the past, wespecifically, on demand of UBS and other

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banks, were not supplied with the identityof the BO”.

34 For 25 % of the MosFon entities thatwere still active in 2015, the UBO wasunknown or anonymous.

34 For 25 % of the MosFon entities thatwere still active in 2015, the UBO wasunknown or anonymous.

Or. en




42a. Condemns the fact that in order toaccommodate the special uses of theirclients, Mossack Fonseca charged moreexpensive services with no proper duediligence checks while deliberatelyknowing these services entailed a higherrisk of money laundering; 1a

_________________1a In an email from 05 May 2009, arepresentative from Mossack Fonsecaexplained that the price for creating twofoundations “is higher basically for thespecial use the client will make with theFoundation and the special flexibleservice that we are providing (withoutmuch due diligence) as definitively entaila higher risk.”

Or. en


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43. Underlines that as a result,insufficient documentation is available tonational FIUs or other competentauthorities to conduct the appropriateinvestigations and analysis in accordancewith national law;

43. Underlines that insufficientdocumentation is available to national FIUsor other competent authorities to conductthe appropriate investigations and analysisin accordance with national law, especiallyregarding the identification of theultimate beneficial owners; Regrets thatcertain European FIUs did not receiveSuspicious Transaction Reports related tothe Panama Papers before the scandalwas made public by ICIJ journalists,showing the under-reporting of moneylaundering risks by certain obligedentities; Regrets that the requirement ofdual criminality provisions (both in thecountry requesting information and in thecountry receiving the request forcooperation) has preventing goodcooperation among Member States tofight tax evasion and money laundering;

Or. en




44. Notes that the lack ofdocumentation and inquiry also applies tocertain life insurance policies granted byinsurance companies and offered to clientsvia insurance intermediaries or any otherentity identified as a financial institutionunder AMLD III;

44. Notes that the lack ofdocumentation and inquiry also applies tocertain life insurance policies granted byinsurance companies and offeredsystematically to clients via insuranceintermediaries or any other entity identifiedas a financial institution under AMLD III;

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Or. en




44a. Notes that the real estate sector isused to launder vast amounts of moneyfrom criminal proceeds; highlights thatFIUs demand that central real estateregisters be put in place to tackle thisproblem;

Or. en




45a. Recalls the request expressed bysome FIUs to have greater access toinformation through increasedcooperation with their counterparts andaccess to more sources of information likecentralised bank accounts data orregistries for real estate or life insuranceproducts;

Or. en

Amendment 288

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46. Notes that EU FIUs have differentstructures, powers and often a lack ofresources across the Member States, andthat these differences affect the ways inwhich EU FIUs collect and analyseinformation, and ultimately impact theexchange of information between them;underlines that this leads to fragmented,asymmetric and incomparable responsesfrom the EU FIUs36 ;

46. Notes that EU FIUs have differentstructures, sizes, powers and often a lack ofresources across the Member States, andthat these differences affect the ways inwhich EU FIUs collect, analyse anddisseminate information, and ultimatelyimpact the exchange of informationbetween them; underlines that this leads tofragmented, asymmetric and incomparableresponses from the EU FIUs36 ; Recalls theimportance of having independent andautonomous FIUs receiving STRs directlyand exclusively, which is not the case inall Member states;

_________________ _________________36 EU FIU Platform mapping exercise andgap analysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation, 15 December 2012.

36 EU FIU Platform mapping exercise andgap analysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation, 15 December 2016.

Or. en




46. Notes that EU FIUs have differentstructures, powers and often a lack ofresources across the Member States, andthat these differences affect the ways inwhich EU FIUs collect and analyseinformation, and ultimately impact the

46. Notes that the FIUs of EU MemberStates have different structures, powersand often a lack of resources across theMember States, and that these differencesaffect the ways in which EU MemberStates' FIUs collect and analyse

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exchange of information between them;underlines that this leads to fragmented,asymmetric and incomparable responsesfrom the EU FIUs36 ;

information, and ultimately impact theexchange of information between them;underlines that this leads to fragmented,asymmetric and incomparable responsesfrom the EU Member States' FIUs36 ;

_________________ _________________36 EU FIU Platform mapping exercise andgap analysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation, 15 December 2012.

36 EU FIU Platform mapping exercise andgap analysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation, 15 December 2012.

Or. en




46a. Notes that in practice there aresignificant limitations to the exchange ofinformation, as the exchange ofinformation between FIUs: a) is alwaysassociated with the explicit determinationof appropriate conditions of use (purposelimitation), which depends largely ondomestic requirements regarding the useof the information by other governmentagencies and in judicial processes; b) hasbeen found to be affected by the under-reporting (e.g. Switzerland) and over-reporting (e.g. United Kingdom) strategiesof the obliged entities1a; and c) relies alsoon political will to enable such exchangeof information;

_________________1a ‘Fighting tax crimes – cooperationbetween Financial Intelligence Units’, DrAmandine Scherrer and Dr AnthonyAmicelle, European ParliamentaryResearch Service (EPRS), March 2017.

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Or. en




47. Regrets that the Commission is notable to conduct its own proper assessmentof money laundering high-risk thirdcountries as it does not have sufficientqualified staff to fulfil this obligationunder the AMLD;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 292Angel Dzhambazki




deleted

Or. en



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47. Regrets that the Commission is notable to conduct its own proper assessmentof money laundering high-risk thirdcountries as it does not have sufficientqualified staff to fulfil this obligation underthe AMLD;

47. Regrets that the Commission is notable to conduct its own proper andindependent assessment of moneylaundering high-risk third countries as itdoes not have sufficient qualified staff tofulfil this obligation under the AMLD;

Or. en





47. Calls on the Commission toreallocate its resources in order to conductits own proper assessment of moneylaundering high-risk third countries asrequired by the AMLD;

Or. en

Amendment 295Beatrix von Storch



47. Regrets that the Commission is notable to conduct its own proper assessmentof money laundering high-risk thirdcountries as it does not have sufficientqualified staff to fulfil this obligation underthe AMLD;

47. Notes that the Commission is notable to conduct its own proper assessmentof money laundering high-risk thirdcountries as it does not have sufficientqualified staff to fulfil this obligation underthe AMLD;

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Or. en




48. Points in particular to the increasingnumber of STRs driven by new legislationand to the fact that the lack of resourcesimplies that the FIUs can deal with only afraction of the problem37 ;

48. Points in particular to the increasingnumber of STRs driven by stricterlegislation and to the fact that FIUsurgently need to step up their resources inorder to deal not only with a fraction of theproblem37 ; Notes that according toEuropol statistics, two countries alone(UK and the Netherlands 1a) account for67% of all STRs filed in the EU and thatthe level of STRs in certain countries 1b

does not appear to be commensurate withthe activities of the regulated sectors,including offshore financial services oronline gambling; Notes that certainEuropean FIUs receive threshold-basedreports which are a useful tool to enrichthe FIUs’ information basis;

_________________ _________________1a UK FIU may be the recipient of some ofthe highest reporting volumes in the EUas it is one of the largest financialmarkets in Europe and operates aSuspicious Activity Regime. Reportingvolumes in The Netherlands areanomalously high and can be explainedby way of the fact that they do not receiveSTRs, but rather Unusual TransactionReports (UTRs), the vast majority ofwhich stem from exchange/remittanceinstitutions who are obliged to report alltransactions in excess of 2000 Euros1b Notably Cyprus, Malta andLuxembourg, which receive very few

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STRs compared to the size of theregulated sectors in their jurisdictions.

37 PANA FIU hearing of 21 June 2017. 37 PANA FIU hearing of 21 June 2017.

Or. en




48. Points in particular to the increasingnumber of STRs driven by new legislationand to the fact that the lack of resourcesimplies that the FIUs can deal with only afraction of the problem37 ;

48. Points in particular to the increasingnumber of suspicious transaction reports(STRs) driven by new legislation and to thefact that the lack of resources implies thatthe FIUs can deal with only a fraction ofthe problem37 ;

_________________ _________________37 PANA FIU hearing of 21 June 2017. 37 PANA FIU hearing of 21 June 2017.

Or. en




49. Regrets that the current FIU.netplatform under Europol is not efficientenough owing to the varying levels of useby the Member States and the lack ofresources and competences at EU level;

49. Regrets that the current FIU.netplatform under Europol is not efficientenough owing to the varying levels of useby the Member States and the lack ofresources and competences at EU level;Notes that FIUs in the Union often havescarce human and financial resourcesand face increasing workload to properly

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carry out their mission of receiving,analysing and disseminating suspiciousreports;

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Amendment 299Beatrix von Storch




49. Notes that the current FIU.netplatform under Europol shows varyinglevels of use by the Member States;

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49. Welcomes the work done byFIU.net under Europol; but stresses thatsignificant strengthening is necessary toallow for better fight against ever moresophisticated money laundering, tax fraudand tax evasion practices.

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Amendment 301Cora van Nieuwenhuizen, Enrique Calvet Chambon

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49. Regrets that the current FIU.netplatform under Europol is not efficientenough owing to the varying levels of useby the Member States;

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49a. Notes that Europol compared itsdatabase of individuals and companiessuspected of criminal involvement withthe Panama Papers and identified 3,469probable matches; whereas 1,722 of thesematches are linked to money launderingand 116 to terrorism; whereas most ofthose cases were identified in the UnitedKingdom most likely due to the size of itsfinancial sector; notes that banks underthe control of the Islamic State haveaccess to SWIFT and thus can send fundsto and through the EU; notes that bankshave confirmed to Members of theInquiry Committee to have filednumerous STRs related to terroristfinance; notes that neither theCommission, the Council, banks nor FIUscould deliver information on how manybank accounts in EU Member States havebeen frozen due to terrorist finance;

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50. Notes that time delays in responsesto requests affect FIUs’ cooperation andthat the replies to these requests are oftenof poor quality and lacking in detail, thusconstituting an obstacle to internationalcooperation by FIUs themselves;

50. Notes that time delays in responsesto requests affect FIUs’ cooperation andthat the replies to these requests are oftenof poor quality and lacking in detail, thusconstituting an obstacle to internationalcooperation by FIUs themselves; Regretsthat certain FIUs limit the usage oftransmitted information, includingprohibiting their use for judicialprosecution or fiscal investigations; Notesthat some European FIUs have seen theirrequest for cooperation with non-European counterparts hindered becauseof legal or administrative obstacles inthird-country jurisdictions;

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51. Notes that not all EU FIUs areempowered to approach obliged entitieswith requests for information, and that inmany cases these requests are conditionalupon the prior receipt of STRs; notes,therefore, that some FIUs cannot requestinformation from reporting entities onbehalf of foreign FIUs if they do not have

51. Notes that not all MemberStates' FIUs are empowered to approachobliged entities with requests forinformation, and that in many cases theserequests are conditional upon the priorreceipt of STRs; notes, therefore, that someFIUs cannot request information fromreporting entities on behalf of foreign FIUs

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related suspicious transactions recorded intheir database;

if they do not have related suspicioustransactions recorded in their database;

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51. Notes that not all EU FIUs areempowered to approach obliged entitieswith requests for information, and that inmany cases these requests are conditionalupon the prior receipt of STRs; notes,therefore, that some FIUs cannot requestinformation from reporting entities onbehalf of foreign FIUs if they do not haverelated suspicious transactions recorded intheir database;

51. Regrets that not all EU FIUs areempowered to approach obliged entitieswith requests for information, and that inmany cases these requests are conditionalupon the prior receipt of STRs; notes,therefore, that some FIUs cannot requestinformation from reporting entities onbehalf of foreign FIUs if they do not haverelated suspicious transactions recorded intheir database;

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52. Notes that in some Member Statesthere are no clear guidelines on mutualcooperation between national FIUs andnational tax authorities in order to ensuretax compliance;

52. Notes that in some Member Statesthere are no clear guidelines on mutualcooperation between national FIUs andnational tax authorities in order to ensuretax compliance; Regrets that there are stillfrequent cases of refusal to provide

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cooperation by some FIUs (in full or inpart) in response to requests by theircounterparts and considers that thecapacity to exchange for FIUs should bebroadened and made unconditional bynarrowing down the possibility ofexemptions to exceptional circumstancesonly; Suggests that European FIUs’cooperation would benefit from a morehomogeneous categorisation of theirresponsibilities and tasks;

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53. Notes that tax crimes have onlyrecently been recognised as a predicateoffence of money laundering under AMLDIV, the deadline for transposition of whichexpired on 26 June 2017; points out thatthe directive explicitly indicates thatdifferences between national lawdefinitions of tax crimes will not impedethe ability of FIUs to exchangeinformation; notes, however, thatinternational cooperation between FIUscan still be refused on the grounds of thesignificant differences across MemberStates as to how predicate offences tomoney laundering are defined andcriminalised;

53. Notes that tax crimes have onlyrecently been recognised as a predicateoffence of money laundering under AMLDIV, the deadline for transposition of whichexpired on 26 June 2017; points out thatthe directive explicitly indicates thatdifferences between national lawdefinitions of tax crimes will not impedethe ability of FIUs to exchangeinformation; regrets the lack of a commonEuropean definition of tax crimes 1a

which so far has hampered investigationand prosecution of tax crime related casesin the Union and the fact that severalEuropean countries consider only veryserious tax offences as tax crimes; notesthat international cooperation betweenFIUs can still be refused on the grounds ofthe significant differences across MemberStates as to how predicate offences tomoney laundering are defined andcriminalised;

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_________________1a whether tax crime is criminalized whencommitted as a positive act, by omissionor both and whether tax crime is dealtwith by administrative bodies or byjudicial authorities

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53. Notes that tax crimes have onlyrecently been recognised as a predicateoffence of money laundering under AMLDIV, the deadline for transposition of whichexpired on 26 June 2017; points out thatthe directive explicitly indicates thatdifferences between national lawdefinitions of tax crimes will not impedethe ability of FIUs to exchangeinformation; notes, however, thatinternational cooperation between FIUscan still be refused on the grounds of thesignificant differences across MemberStates as to how predicate offences tomoney laundering are defined andcriminalised;

53. Welcomes the fact that tax crimeshave been recognised as a predicateoffence of money laundering under AMLDIV, the deadline for transposition of whichexpired on 26 June 2017; points out thatthe directive explicitly indicates thatdifferences between national lawdefinitions of tax crimes will not impedethe ability of FIUs to exchangeinformation; notes, however, thatinternational cooperation between FIUscan still be refused on the grounds of thesignificant differences across MemberStates as to how predicate offences tomoney laundering are defined andcriminalised;

Or. es




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53a. Notes that judicial cooperationbetween Member States can be improved,especially regarding the execution ofmutual legal assistance requests, whichoften involves multiple sub-requests forwhich different national authorities mightbe competent to execute; Notes thatobstacles to effective judicial cooperationcan arise when national legislationrequires that the predicate offence formoney laundering is precisely establishedand because there is no uniformdefinition on predicate offences across theUnion;

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54. Notes that the obligation toestablish central UBO registers is includedin AMLD IV; regrets that to date thisobligation has not been fulfilled by allMember States and that not all FIUs haveaccess to this information on UBOs;

54. Notes that the obligation toestablish central UBO registers is includedin AMLD IV; regrets that to date thisobligation has not been fulfilled by allMember States and that not all FIUs haveaccess to this information on UBOs;observes that making those centralregisters publicly accessible wouldfacilitate the identification of UBOsand/or of anomalies and suspicions ofwrongdoings by relevant stakeholdersincluding competent authorities, obligedentities and citizens and increaseaccountability;

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54. Notes that the obligation toestablish central UBO registers is includedin AMLD IV; regrets that to date thisobligation has not been fulfilled by allMember States and that not all FIUs haveaccess to this information on UBOs;observes that making those centralregisters publicly accessible wouldfacilitate the identification of UBOsand/or of anomalies and suspicions ofwrongdoings by relevant stakeholdersincluding competent authorities, obligedentities and citizens and increaseaccountability;

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54. Notes that the obligation toestablish central UBO registers is includedin AMLD IV; regrets that to date thisobligation has not been fulfilled by allMember States and that not all FIUs haveaccess to this information on UBOs; sees astrong need for interconnecting centralUBO registers and for establishing fullpublic access to effectively scrutinise illicitbehaviour;

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Or. en

Amendment 313Monica Macovei, Traian Ungureanu, Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, Maite PagazaurtundúaRuiz, Fabio De Masi, Ana Gomes



54a. Notes the ongoing negotiations ona proposal for a Directive on counteringmoney laundering by criminal law aimedat establishing minimum rules concerningthe definition of criminal offences andsanctions in the area of money launderingoffences

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amendments 1 - 313 - european parliament · amendment 18 miguel urbán crespo, miguel viegas, fabio...

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