amadae - cold war, security dilemma and prisoner's dilemma

8/11/2019 Amadae - Cold War, Security Dilemma and Prisoner's Dilemma

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S.M. Amadae

Cold War, Security Dilemma, and Prisoners Dilemma:Does Insecurity Rationalize Hegemony?

S.M. madae

p. 1 Introduction

p. 6 Thomas Schelling, Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack, and A!

p. 1" #uclear $se Theor% $Ts'

p. 1( )lenn S%nder*s 1+1 *-risoner*s !ilemma* and /hicken* odels in 0orld

International -olitics

p. 1 Ro2ert 3er4is* 1+ /ooperation under the Securit% !ilemma

p. 5 )lenn S%nder*s The Securit% !ilemma in Alliance -olitics

p. 5 3er4is* 5""1 0as the /old 0ar a Securit% !ilemma7

p. (5 3ohn earsheimer*s 5""1 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

p. ( /onclusion

p. 8 T9: :#! ;


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Cold War, Security Dilemma, and Prisoners Dilemma:

Does Insecurity Rationalize Hegemony?

One goal of my book (Rationalizing Hegemony) is to argue tat te !risoner"s

dilemma (!#) is a better model to $a%ture &ould'be %redators tan it is to study te

%roblem of $oo%eration. My goal in tis %a%er is to follo& a line of argumentation tat

suggests tat te no& multi'dis$i%linary norm of using te !# to model $oo%eration,

$olle$tie a$tion, and te so$ial $ontra$t as be$ome normalied troug te &ides%read

use of te !# to $a%ture te *old +ar se$urity dilemma. n international relations teory

&e see a &ell'arti$ulated argument tat a$tors &o %refer mutual $oo%eration oer

unilateral su$$ess may get tra%%ed in a !risoner"s dilemma %urely by te ne$essity of

self'defense. argue tat tere are t&o main aenues by &i$ it is asserted tat o%eful

$oo%erators be$ome mired in a !risoner"s dilemma- distrust, or te un$ertainty of te

oter, and an antagonisti$ a$$ount of se$urity tat stresses eiter mutually e$lusie

&orld isions, or $om%etion oer %o&er and resour$es.

/en toug it is $lear tat some *old +ar strategists eld a definite %referen$e

for unilateral i$tory oer te Soiet nion instead of a$$e%ting stalemate grounding te

strategy of Mutually Assured #estru$tion, do not mean to %ro%ose tat any use of te

!risoner"s dilemma to model nu$lear brinkmansi% im%lies tat tose de%loying te

model &ere %ro%onents of egemony. 3ater maintain tat te manner in &i$ it

be$ame routinely a$$e%ted tat te !risoner"s dilemma model best $a%tures te se$urity

dilemma of o%eful yet fearful $oo%erators as led us do&n a %at of a$$e%ting tat te

!# %referen$e %rofile e%itomies te %roblem of $oo%eration. 4is as $ontributed to

&at refer to as 5!risoner"s dilemma %edagogy6- tea$ing tat te %risoners must

defe$t out of self'defense, &itout $learly em%asiing tat ea$ %risoner fa$es no

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dilemma as ea$ o%es to su$ker te oter. 8en$e, te !risoner"s dilemma better

$a%tures a %roblem fa$ed by &ould'be %redators, or a den of tiees, in &i$ ea$ agent

$onsistently as te goal of gaining unilateral adantage. t seems odd tat tis dilemma

of $ons%irators as $ome to re%resent te essen$e of routine $oo%eration in uman

so$iety.1 4is $on$lusion may be &arranted. My %oint is only in $alling for te

arti$ulation tat te !risoner"s dilemma model assumes a %o%ulation of %redators, and not

a %o%ulation &ose %rimary goal is tat of mutual se$urity and $ommodious $o'eisten$e.

n $oering tis territory, and %osing a $allenge to te &ides%read use of te

!risoner"s dilemma to study $oo%eration, &e en$ounter t&o $onfusions tat are diffi$ult

to first e%lain, and ten to set straigt. One %roblem is stri$tly logi$al- gien tat te

definition of a o%eful $oo%erator is se &o %refers $oo%eration to unilateral defe$tion

(**#*), o& $an it be %ossible to assume tat te !risoner"s dilemma re%resents te

%roblem of $oo%eration as its agents stri$tly %refer unilateral defe$tion to mutual

$oo%eration (#***):2 ndeed, it is in %osing tis ;uestion tat &e be$ome immediately

$lear tat te a$$e%tan$e tat te !risoner"s dilemma $a%tures te %roblem of $oo%eration

%lays on a $ontradi$tion- allegedly o%eful $oo%erators a$tually %refer to gain at te

oter"s $ost. *oo%eration &ill be diffi$ult to a$iee if ea$ a$tor a$tually arbors te

o%e for sole gain. *ontem%orary teorists &o u%old tis line of argument su%%ose

tat it is $onsistent &it &estern liberal tougt insofar as te role of te state is to make

agreements binding ia te $oer$ie %o&er of enfor$ement.7

1Made eident in 8argreaes 8ea% and mutual $oo%eration> mutual defe$tion> unilateral $oo%eration>#***##*#.7James ?u$anan, 3ussell 8ardin.

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A se$ond $onfusion is tat te !risoner"s dilemma re%resents te $lassi$ %roblem

of liberalism- o& to a$iee binding agreements. 4e state or eiatan is introdu$ed

as te solution to te !risoner"s dilemma. 4us it is asserted tat traditional &estern

liberal tougt introdu$ed te $oer$ie state to sole te !risoner"s dilemma tat

$ara$teries 4omas 8obbes" state of nature. 4erefore, in terms of te !risoner"s

dilemma, te a$$urate statement of te %roblem of $oo%eration is tat &ereas all agents

%refer sole use of a resour$e (Art Stein, 19B@), still tey seek $oo%eration as a se$ond

$oi$e in order to aoid !areto inferior mutual defe$tion. 4e role of goernment is to

alter te %ayoffs su$ tat mutual $oo%eration be$omes eery agent"s first $oi$e. 4e

se$ond $onfusion is tat $lassi$ liberalism soles te %roblem of $oo%eration in te form

of a !#> altoug tis $onfusion is no& ram%ant, it is not absolute.@ /lse&ere in tis

book argue tat $lassi$ liberalism ie&s $oo%eration as an assuran$e %roblem or Stag

8unt.C

Of $ourse, in 3 teory, te state $annot be introdu$ed to sole tis %roblem of

$oo%eration. Anar$y and self'el% $ara$terie te international system- ea$ state

must ultimately go'it'alone in te ig'stakes surial game of international se$urity.

4us it a%%ears tat tere is one $onsistent ta%estry of argumentation. 4e %roblem of

$oo%eration is te same in 3 and domesti$ %oliti$al e$onomy. 4e solution of te state

to enfor$e agreements is not aailable in 3, terefore, if $oo%eration is ie&ed as a

!risoner"s dilemma, ten a$ieing $oo%eration %resents $onsiderable $allenges.

@3ussell 8ardin $onsistently argues tat 8obbes" state of nature is a multi'%erson!risoner"s dilemma> /d&ard M$*lennen %roides an alternatie reading of 8obbes.C4e Stag 8unt or assuran$e game as te follo&ing %referen$e ordering (for te ro&%layer)- **#*##*#.

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n my book mobilie t&o lines of atta$k on tis re%resentation of $oo%eration as

a !risoner"s dilemma s$enario tat better des$ribes as &ould'be %redation. One, &i$

&ill not e%lore in tis %a%er, is tat te eiatan solution to te !risoner"s dilemma as

te means to realie te so$ial $ontra$t (8ardin D ?u$anan), rater tan refle$t

traditional +estern liberalism from 4omas 8obbes on&ards, instead re%resents a ne&

%iloso%y of goernment re;uiring a maimal se$urity state to monitor and treaten

san$tions on all transa$tions. argue tat te use of te !risoner"s dilemma model to

motiate an argument for goernment makes a $lear de%arture from $lassi$ liberalism to

neoliberalism.

4e se$ond line of argument, &i$ is te %oint of tis $urrent %a%er, is o& te

%roblem of $oo%eration, or te se$urity dilemma, is misre%resented as a !risoner"s

dilemma. f tere is a $ogent argument tat mutual se$urity is a !risoner"s dilemma, it

&ill eist in international relations &i$ bot fa$es te $allenge of anar$y, and is

ty%i$ally regarded as a ig'stakes situation Eustifying a ero'risk %oli$y for error. &ill

%roide a istori$ally delineated narratie of o& te reasoning tat te se$urity dilemma

is e;uialent to a !risoner"s dilemma deelo%ed. 4is takes us troug 4omas

S$elling"s germinal 19F0 essay 54e 3e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k6 &i$

%resented te intelle$tual blue%rint for Mutually Assured #estru$tion (MA#). ten

tou$ on te alternatie %osition of Gu$lear se 4eory (G4s) tat ta$itly a$$e%ted te

im%ossibility of mutual se$urity and te ne$essary goal of unilateral i$tory. dis$uss

Hlenn Synder"s 19I1 5!# D *i$ken games in 3,6 and is 19B@ 5Allian$es and te

Se$urity #ilemma.6 =ollo&ing tis is 3obert Jeris"s 19IB, I9, and 2001 $ontributions

addressing te se$urity and !risoner"s dilemmas. n $on$lusion &ill tou$ on

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$ontem%orary analysis %resented by Jon Mearseimer 2001 Tragedy of Great Power

Politics.

4omas S$elling and MA#

#efense Se$retary 3obert M$Gamara"s re$onstitution of S nu$lear strategy

along te lines of assured destru$tion made is %ossible to re$ognie 4omas S$elling"s

$ontributions to &at &ould be$ome te %reailing $on$e%tual frame&ork for organiing

military $a%ability and %osture (a&ren$e =reedman, 271). S$elling"s essay,

5#i%loma$y of


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8unt transforms into a !risoner"s dilemma in &i$ it is in ea$ a$tor"s adantage to

defe$t.

S$elling is $onsidered to be te $ief ar$ite$t of mutually assured destru$tion.

8e a%%lied te reasoning of te ome burglar standoff to te nu$lear standoff, and

reasoned tat te &ay to a$iee mutual $oo%eration instead of mutual defe$tion in te

!risoner"s dilemma is troug introdu$ing mutually assured destru$tion- ea$ a$tor as

te $a%ability to destroy te oter een after e as been atta$ked. 8is assessment fits

&it 3obert M$Gamara"s idea of $a%%ing te nited States nu$lear arsenal at @00

megaton of e%losie %otential, regarding tis as suffi$ient to a$iee a deastating

$ounterstrike in $ase te Soiets laun$ed a %reem%tie atta$k.

=o$using on te ;uestion of &eter S$elling"s re%la$ement of a Stag 8unt

model &it a !risoner"s dilemma rationalies egemony by suggesting tat %otentially

$oo%eratie a$tors assume te %referen$es of a %redator in self'defense, it is $lear tat tis

is an im%li$ation of is &ork, altoug it is not $lear tat e $learly $onsidered tis

im%li$ation. t is %ossible to $on$lude tat S$elling rationalies egemony by %ermitting

is status ;uo a$tors to assume te %referen$es of a reisionist a$tor, &o $learly %refer to

su$ker te oter, and to a$iee unilateral su$$ess (#***). 8o&eer, in ie&ing te

use e %ut is analysis to, indi$ating an argument for nu$lear deterren$e oer an arms

ra$e, it is $lear tat e did not beliee tat i tougt eer$ise rationalied egemony.

8is %er$e%tion tat nu$lear &arfare altered &ar foreer due to teir inerent destru$tie

$a%ability led im to see te *old +ar nu$lear standoff as a %osition of stalemate tat did

not offer eiter side te o%e for unilateral i$tory.

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S$elling"s deterren$e solution to te !risoner"s dilemma game mimi$s te role of

te eiatan in a nation'state- no a$tor &ill ae te in$entie to tres%ass on or atta$k

anoter as te %unitie $onse;uen$es &ill be $ostly. 8is solution to te %roblem of

$oo%eration tat is modeled as a !risoner"s dilemma under te assum%tion tere is a

reasonable likeliood of %redators seres as te basis of neoliberal %oliti$al order. ts key

$ara$teristi$ is tat suffi$ient likeliood of te %resen$e of a %redator transforms all

agents into %redatory a$tors seeking dominan$e oer oters. 4is ado%tion of te

%redile$tion for aggression is defended as ne$essary for self'defense.

8o&eer, S$elling does not ade;uately defend is reasoning tat status ;uo

a$tors transformation into aggressors. n final analysis is argument remains un$lear. 8e

im%lies tat gien a status ;uo a$tor a ome o&ner in te burglary in$ident e des$ribes,

and tat te oter agent a$ted first by $oo%erating, tat te ome o&ner &o %reiously

%referred resolution &itout iolen$e, &ould soot te burglar as e left. f tis is not

&at S$elling im%lies in is analysis, ten te ado%tion of !risoner"s dilemma

%referen$es by status ;uo a$tors is misleading. f tis is &at S$elling meant, ten it

must be %ossible to argue tat a status ;uo a$tor %refers to $oo%erate &it oter status ;uo

a$tors, but tat if tat agent"s $ara$ter is suffi$iently in ;uestion, te status ;uo a$tor

%refers to subEugate a &ould'be %redator. t is un$lear &i$ S$elling ad in mind. 4e

first rendering $onfuses a Stag 8unt game &it a !risoner"s dilemma, and, as far as $an

tell, remains %art of te state of te art reasoning tat in a situation of %otential

$oo%eration, een toug one is a $oo%erator, one must $eat in self'defense. 8ere

S$elling ignores tat %layers in a ig'stakes Stag 8unt ae am%le reason to $oose te

maimin strategy. Moreer, one $ould enision a situation in &i$ fully ae Stag

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Gu$lear se 4eory (G4s)

S$elling"s o%%onents, 8erman Kan, Albert +olstetter, and !aul Gite, &o

ado$ated Gu$lear se 4eory (G4s) similarly %er$eied of te need to err on te side

of se$urity, but tey ado%ted a different solution to te nu$lear stand'off. 4ey belieed

tat S$elling"s neoliberal solution troug MA# signified te a$$e%tan$e of a stalemate.

4ey &ere un$omfortable &it a balan$e of terror as it ad too many limitations- te

irrationality of te deterren$e as an a$t of sui$idal des%eration, te la$k of any $oerent

%lan for te failure of deterren$e, and te $on$ern tat deterren$e &as %o&erless in lesser'

s$ale $onfli$t su$ as te


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destru$tion. 4eir logi$ &as %robably as sound as &as tat of te MA# %ro%onents.

4eir %remise &as at if mutually assured destru$tion &ere %ossible, ten surely

unilaterally assured destru$tion, ensuring tat te Soiet nion alone &ould be %ressured

to $oo%erate, is also be %ossible. f an arms ra$e &ere ineitable, ten it &as $ru$ial tat

te S &in it. Soring u% te &eakness of S$elling"s first translation of a se$urity

dilemma into a !risoner"s dilemma, and subse;uent transformation of te !# into a

$i$ken game ia mutually assured destru$tion, te %roto'neo$onseraties &orried tat

tis $i$ken game style brinkmansi% signified tat te S &ould %refer in some

$ir$umstan$es to surrender to te Soiet nion rater tan $arry troug on te sui$idal

a$t of mutually assured destru$tion.10 4erefore tey eld out te o%e for unilaterally

a%%lying %ressure on te Soiets to $oo%erate so tat te S $ould be i$torious in te

*old +ar. *onsistent &it teir idea of a$ieing unilateral defe$tion or mutual

$oo%eration oer unilateral $oo%eration, tey ado%ted a %ro'nu$lear use %oli$y to treaten

destru$tion for lesser a$ts of aggression on te @@ run ladder of es$alation, ultimately

oning in on a %oli$y of 5full s%e$trum dominan$e.611 4is &as offi$ially initiated as te

5S$lesinger do$trine,6 in 19I7 %ubli$ly announ$ing tat te S &ould use nu$lear

&ea%ons to $onfront a ariety of a$ts of aggression temseles sort of nu$lear &ar.12

4ere $an be no doubt tat te %roto'neo$onseratie %osition &as one tat eld

out te o%e for i$tory, reEe$ting S$elling"s stalemate. n se$ret do$uments

104is transferen$e of a !# into a $i$ken game of deterren$e is dis$ussed in an earlierse$tion of my book. /ssentially te idea is tat mutually assured destru$tion $reates asituation in &i$ ea$ $ountry &ould rater surrender or submit tan be anniilated, or*###.114is &as originally arti$ulated in 8erman Kan"s 19F0 On Thermonuclear War.124ere &as an earlier %re$edent in te 19F7 SO! %lan under M$Gamara, but teintention to use nu$lear &ea%ons to retaliate for a nonnu$lear atta$k &as made %ubli$ in19I7.

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$onseraties argued trougout te *old +ar tat tere &as a fundamental

in$om%atability bet&een Soiet *ommunism and Ameri$an free enter%rise.17 /a$ state

sougt for its ision of te &orld and its instantiation to be dominant. 4erefore tere

&as %er%etual $onfli$t at all leels on te es$alation ladder to se$ure unilateral su$$ess.

4e stalemate %essimism of assured destru$tion, and its relian$e on irrational treats, &as

re%la$ed by a bid for egemony tat &as billed as $onsistent &it liberal alues of mutual

%ros%erity. 4e $ore idea is tat te nited States stands for fundamentally good alues,

or at least alues it trusts. t is better to stand as a sole su%er %o&er defending alues one

regards as good tan to rest $ontent &it a balan$e of terror. Geer mind tat te %ursuit

of egemony &ould trigger te ery s$enario tat S$elling feared- te re$i%ro$al fear of

sur%rise atta$k as te o%%osition &ould likely also u%old a %iloso%y for %re%aring for

te &orst'$ase, and &ould not feel se$ure een gien te assuran$es of one"s 5good guy6

intentions.1@

Mutually assured destru$tion is an attem%t to re%li$ate $lassi$ liberalism"s

eiatan by a$$e%ting tat distrustful %arties ea$ ae te %o&er of deterren$e, tereby

in$entiiing a$tors to $oo%erate. One diffi$ulty, tat te neo$onseraties %i$k u% on, is

tat it may be diffi$ult to a$iee mutually off'setting deterren$e> if one agent %ulls

aead, it seems tat e &ill gain te unilateral adantage. /en toug numerous

teorists tougt Mutually Assured #estru$tion su%erior to Gu$lear se 4eory be$ause

it eld out te best o%e for %ulling ba$k from te destru$tie $asm brinkmansi%

o%ened for a$tors to fall into, still its &eaknesses &ere roundly a$kno&ledged

(=reedman). Anoter &ay of stating te &eakness of neoliberalism"s mutual deterren$e is

174ere are numerous S statements to tis affe$t, notably Gite"s 19C@ ($e$k) GS*'FB.1@=or dis$ussion, see 3obert Jeris"Percetions and !isercetions.

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tat a$kno&ledge tat bargaining %o&er &ill be dire$tly linked to deterrent $a%ability, and

tat terefore ea$ side &ill ae te $ontinual in$entie to sore u% its armed for$es to

retain te edge oer te oter. 4e neo$onseratie %osition merely a$kno&ledges tis

ineitable fa$et of neoliberalism, and o%enly builds %oli$y a$$ordingly.

Synder"s 5"!risoner"s #ilemma" and L*i$ken" Models in +orld nternational !oliti$s6

4e %oint of reie&ing te %rominent arti$les on te se$urity dilemma is to reeal

bot te etent to &i$ it be$ame a$$e%table to regard te !risoner"s dilemma model as

$a%turing te %roblem of o%eful $oo%erators &o are frustrated by teir inability to trust

ea$ oter, and its de%loyment to $a%ture te $ase in &i$ mutual se$urity is not

%ossible as one agent"s se$urity ne$essarily undermines anoter"s. n te !#"s

a%%li$ation to bot s$enarios a $ru$ial distin$tion bet&een %ea$e seeking and te %otential

for mutual se$urity ersus aggression an antagonisti$ a$$ount of se$urity is lost.

+e $an be $onfident tat te !risoner"s dilemma &as &idely %er$eied to refle$t

nu$lear brinkmansi% and te %roblem of un$ertainty in Synder"s 19I1 %a%er,

5"!risoner"s #ilemma" and L*i$ken" Models in nternational !oliti$s.6 inking

S$elling"s landmark 53e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k6 to 3obert M$Gamara"s 19FI

assessment of nited States" nu$lear strategy, Snyder for$efully argues my tat te

!risoner"s dilemma model eem%lified te ig'stakes *old +ar brinkmansi%.1C 4ere

$an be no doubt tat te !risoner"s dilemma, tat no& is $ommon %arlan$e trougout te

so$ial s$ien$es, s%e$ifi$ally for studying $oo%eration, first %roed its &ort for modeling

te nu$lear standoff and for %roiding te strategi$ logi$ underlying MA#. uoting

1C3obert Jeris, 2001, agrees &it tis estimation of te im%ortan$e of S$elling"s53e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k,6 autor $orre$ted footnote in email $orres%onden$edated NNN.

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M$Gamara at lengt, Snyder $oneys tat un$ertainty oer te oter"s intentions is

suffi$ient to s%ark an arms ra$e-

n 19F1, &en be$ame Se$retary of #efense, te Soiet nion %ossessed a ery

small o%erational arsenal of inter$ontinental missilesand ery littlete$nologi$al and industrial $a%a$ity to augment teir military $a%ability.

Go&, &e ad no eiden$e tat te Soiets did in fa$t %lan to fully use tat$a%ability. ?ut as ae %ointed out, a strategi$ %lanner must be 5$onseratie6in is $al$ulations> tat is, e must %re%are for te &orst %lausible $ase

Sin$e &e $ould not be $ertain of Soiet intentionsPsin$e &e $ould not be suretat tey &ould not undertake a massie buildu%P&e ad to insure against su$an eentuality by undertaking ourseles a maEor buildu% of te Minuteman and!olaris for$es

*learly, te Soiet buildu% is in %art a rea$tion to our o&n buildu% sin$e tebeginning of tis de$ade. Soiet strategi$ %lanners undoubtedly reasoned tat ifour buildu% &ere to $ontinue at its a$$elerated %a$e, &e migt $on$eiably rea$,in time, a $redible first'strike $a%ability against te Soiet nion.

4is &as not in fa$t our intention. Our intention &as to assure tat teyP&itteir teoreti$al $a%a$ity to rea$ su$ a first'strike $a%abilityP&ould not in fa$toutdistan$e us.

?ut tey $ould not read our intentions &it any greater a$$ura$y tan &e $ouldread teirs. And tus te result as been tat &e ae bot fuilt u% our for$es to a%oint tat far e$eeds a $redible se$ond'strike $a%ability against te for$es &eea$ started &it

t is futile for ea$ of us to s%end Q@ billion, Q@0 billion, or Q@00 billionPand atte end of all te s%ending, at te end of all te de%loyment, and at te end of allte effort, to be relatiely at te same %oint of balan$e on te se$urity s$ale tat&e are no&. (Synder, 19I1, I7).

Synder $on$ludes tat tis regrettable situation is best $a%tured by te !risoner"s dilemma

model- 54us, te Se$retary of #efense, &it remarkable $larity, and in a tone &i$ $an

only be des$ribed as &istful frustration, e%ounded te essen$e of te %risoner"s dilemma

in te nu$lear age6 (Synder, 19I1, I7). Synder a$kno&ledges tat tis state of frustration

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is a$$om%anied by 5te belief tat one"s o&n $ountry is %ea$efuland tat one"s o&n

arms are only defensie rea$tions to te oter"s treat6 (IB).

4e S"s inter%retation of te *old +ar as ena$ted by M$Gamara and is staff

&as inse%arable from S$elling"s early game teoreti$ a%%li$ation of te !risoner"s

dilemma to nu$lear &ar and is solution of tis oter&ise mutually subo%timal situation

&it deterren$e in te form of se$ond'strike $ounter'$ity military $a%ability. S$elling"s

analysis a$$e%ted tat nu$lear &ea%ons foreer altered &arfare as te destroyed nation

$ould guarantee itself te &ere&ital to laun$ a deastating $ounter'atta$k on te

&ould'be i$tor. An im%ortant $onse;uen$e of S$elling"s assertion tat te Stag 8unt of

mutual $oo%eration may degenerate into a !risoner"s dilemma gien a suffi$ient

likeliood tat te oter ad %redatory intent, and furter outrigt stating tat 3ousseau"s

Stag 8unt is a !risoner"s dilemma, is tat te t&o'fold noelty of nu$lear &ar and its

solution in mutual deterren$e are lost. n fa$t, S$elling"s reasoning ;ui$kly be$ame

absorbed into te ne&ly deelo%ing *old +ar $anon tat su%%osed tat liberalism ad

al&ays re;uired a solution to te !risoner"s dilemma in te form of a eiatan &o

altered %ayoffs tus ensuring tat $oo%eration &ould be all %arties" first $oi$e.

Synder, follo&ing S$elling"s lead, asserted tat te se$urity dilemma &i$ is

%o%ulated by status ;uo agents seeking self'%reseration, but &o are aunted by te

s%e$tre tat te oter is seeking to get te u%%er and, is best $a%tured by a !risoner"s

dilemma- 5t %roides a more $om%lete %ortrayal of te $onse;uen$es of anar$i$ system

stru$ture be$ause it allo&s for te %ossibility of illusory $onfli$t engendered by mutual

sus%i$ion and fear andfor te %ossibility of a$tual in$om%atibilities of interest and

aggressie intent not motiated by se$urity $onsiderations6 (B2). 4e $ore idea is tat

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un$ertainty, &itout any a$tual %redatory intent, is suffi$ient to mimi$ a real

in$om%atability of interests. n$ertainty is e%loited to $arry tis assessment be$ause &e

must a$kno&ledge tat ultimately it is im%ossible 5eer to be sure of te oter %arty"s

intentions6 (I@). ike S$elling, te se$urity dilemma is drien by te belief tat tere

may be a %redator> real $onfli$t may eist, and tis $onfli$t is beyond $on$erns of

se$urity. Synder, in o%ening u% te %roblem of oter minds and te im%ossibility of eer

%eeking inside tem, %aes te road for te %roto'neo$onseratie %osition tat tis

unresolable unkno&ability $an only be $ountered by %lanning for te &orst.

4us Synder, follo&ing in S$elling"s footste%s, oi$es te essen$e of &at refer

to as te !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy tat defends te %referen$e for unilateral su$$ess

in te name of self'defense- 5n te !risoner"s dilemma, te realiation of te $ommon

interest may &ell be a %rimary desire of bot %arties, but neiter $an trust te oter to

$ollaborate in realiing it> against te &ill of te %arties, te situation degenerates into

$onfli$t6 (B@). Synder builds in, as did S$elling, tat un$ertainty rests on te diffi$ulty

of dis$erning &eter &ea%ons are designed for offense or defense. t &as &ell a$$e%ted

from M$Gamara on&ards tat it is less $ostly to build nu$lear &ea%ons tan it is to

defend against tem. 4erefore a nation de%loying a nu$lear arsenal for deterren$e may

be indistinguisable from a nation %lanning a sur%rise atta$k- 5defensie %o&er

a$$umulation by one &ill be %er$eied as a treat by te oter6 (II). t &as tis

reasoning tat lead S$elling to em%asie te im%ortan$e of $ounter'$ity instead of

$ounterfor$e &ea%ons as te latter &ould a%%ear offensie. Still, gien te $ea%ness of

offensie $a%ability and un$ertainty about intention, Synder &orries tat se$urity'seekers

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are tra%%ed in a 5grand su%ergame of te !risoner"s dilemma from &i$ tere is no real

es$a%e6 (II).

Synder suggests te %ossibility tat se$urity may ae a ero'sum $om%onent as

one state"s in$rease in se$urity may dire$tly detra$t from anoter"s. 8o&eer, tis is not

&ere e rests te burden of is argument tat %ea$e seekers &ill be tra%%ed in a

!risoner"s dilemma &it little o%e for es$a%e. 8e assumes %ea$eful intent, te diffi$ulty

of differentiating offensie and defensie &ea%ons, and te im%ossibility of dis$erning

intent. 8e e%lains tat te driing for$e of te se$urity dilemma, modeled as a

!risoner"s dilemma, is te un$ertainty status ;uo a$tors ae in determining te nature of

te oter %o&er-

4e se$urity dilemma idea $larifies te determining effe$ts of system stru$ture,igligts te $entral im%ortan$e of te se$urity drie in international beaior,and so&s o& te sear$ for se$urity $an be tragi$ally self'defeating. "ut itdoes not em#race o#$ecti%es of ower and e&ansion which are not fueled #y the

security moti%e. (B2, em%asis added).

4us, Synder argues tat un$ertainty alone, &itout te a$tual %resen$e of a state &it

e%ansionist goals, is suffi$ient to drie te se$urity dilemma tat e e%lains is best

$a%tured by te !risoner"s dilemma model. n fo$using on un$ertainty, Synder seems to

miss tat, as S$elling s%e$ifies, te %oint is in $ombating some likeliood tat a

aggressie state eists. Synder is not able to e%lain o& a %ea$e seeker $ara$teried by

a %referen$e order of ** #* $omes to ae te #* ** %referen$e %rofile of a

reisionist state. 4e no& routine e%lanation of te !risoner"s dilemma follo&s Synder

in su%%osing tat a %ea$e seeker &ill ado%t a %referen$e for unilateral su$$ess as a

$onse;uen$e of un$ertainty and distrust. 4ere are t&o stages in tis moement from a

se$urity dilemma %o%ulated by does to one of a&ks. =irst, a a&k must be introdu$ed.

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Se$ond, te doe determines tat be$oming a a&k is te best means of self'defense.

Again, &it teir ero'risk %oli$y, te %roto'neo$onseraties %ermitted tat any

likeliood, no matter o& slim, is suffi$ient to ne$essitate te a%%ro%riation of te

a&kis $ountenan$e. 4roug tis logi$, it be$omes %ossible to regard te !risoner"s

dilemma &it its me'first a$tors as de%i$ting a tragi$ $ir$umstan$e of t&o a$tors &o

really &ant to get along.

3obert Jeris 19IB 5*oo%eration under te Se$urity #ilemma6

n is 5*oo%eration under te Se$urity #ilemma,6 3obert Jeris e$oes S$elling

in using 3ousseau"s Stag 8unt to refle$t te true moties of se$urity'seekers-

4e la$k of an international soereign not only %ermits &ars to o$$ur, but alsomakes it diffi$ult for states tat are satisfied &it te status ;uo to arrie at goalstat tey re$ognie as being in teir $ommon interest. ?e$ause tere are noinstitutions or autorities tat $an make and enfor$e international la&s, te%oli$ies of $oo%eration tat &ill bring mutual re&ards if oters $oo%erate maybring disaster if tey do not. (19IB, 1FI).

Jeris"s analogy is e%li$it. 8e refers to te Stag 8unt, &it te follo&ing %referen$e

ordering-

(1) $oo%erate and tra% te stag (te international analogue being $oo%eration anddisarmament> (2) $ase a rabbit &ile oters remain at teir %osts (maintain a igleel of arms &ile oters are disarmed)> (7) all $ase rabbits (arms $om%etitionand ig risk of &ar)> and (@) stay at original %osition &ile anoter $ases arabbit (being disarmed &ile oters are armed). (1FI).

+itin a fe& %ages, Jeris introdu$es te !risoner"s dilemma %ayoff matri as %era%s

more a%t to international relations as 5tere are offensie as &ell as defensie in$enties

to defe$t from te $oalition &it te oters6 (1I1). Altoug Jeris does not s%e$ify &at

te $ardinal utility alues in te %ayoff matri stand for in is !risoner"s dilemma

rendering of te se$urity dilemma (again %o%ulated &it se$urity seekers), e adds

$onsiderations beyond tose of Synder and S$elling"s un$ertainty. 4oday"s doe may

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be$ome tomorro&"s a&k, but ere te a$tie %oint of ealuation is not made $lear. s it

tat unting stag and Eointly %ros%ering may lead te oter to find a &ay to unt stag

alone at te same time tat one forgets o& to unt are: Or may states" interde%enden$e

lead one state to 5$ontrol resour$es or land outside teir o&n territory6 (1FB). 8o&eer,

in tis latter reasoning it is un$lear if te main idea is tat tere are no %ure se$urity

seekers gien a need to $ommand s$ar$e resour$es in $om%etition &it oters, tereby

rendering te Stag 8unt meta%or and %ayoff matri meaningless. 8en$e, %era%s in

5international %oliti$sone"s state"s gain in se$urity often inadertently treatens oters6

(1I0). 8ere it remains un$lear &eter Jeris means to im%ly tat international se$urity

ne$essarily or %ossibly as a ero'sum $om%onent.

Jeris" %ule is o& to a$iee mutual $oo%eration under te assum%tion tat

des%ite te aboe $onsiderations, te nations fundamentally seek to get along. 8o&eer

is introdu$tion of te !risoner"s dilemma &itout a $lear dis$ussion of &at its re&ard

stru$ture signifies, makes it un$lear o& te #*** %referen$e $onfiguration signifies a

fundamental o%e for %ea$eful $oeisten$e. Again falling into te !risoner"s dilemma

%edagogy of fo$using on fear and self'%rote$tion as te %rime moer, Jeris obseres,

54e fear of being e%loited (tat is, te $ost of *#) most strongly dries te se$urity

dilemma6 (1I2). sing an eam%le tat %roides more eiden$e tat te eay relian$e

on te !risoner"s dilemma to $a%ture te se$urity dilemma defined by o%eful

$oo%erators frustrated by distrust is ina%%ro%riate, Jeris dis$usses te dilemma fa$ed by

&ite'skinned 3odesians &o ad to de$ide &eter to emigrate &it te introdu$tion

of a ne& goernment. A$$ording to Jeris" analysis, 5&ites are in a multi'%erson

!risoner"s dilemma &it ea$ oter.6 8e e%lains

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Assume tat all &ites are &illing to stay if most of te oters stay> but, in teabsen$e of guarantees, if tere is going to be a mass eodus, all &ant to be amongte first to leae (be$ause late'leaers &ill get less for teir %ro%erty and &ill aemore trouble finding a $ountry to take tem in). (1I@)

4e diffi$ulty in a%%lying te !risoner"s dilemma to tis $ase, all te &ile a$tually

seeking to $a%ture a se$urity dilemma, is tat te ra$e to defe$t is defended by te

$onsideration of aoiding a bad out$ome if one is te sole $oo%erator, or stag unter,

among are unters. 8o&eer, and ere is te sleigt of and tat underlies !risoner"s

dilemma %edagogy, Jeris im%lies tat ea$ agent &ould %refer tat all stayed in

3odesia, yet te !risoner"s dilemma %ayoff stru$ture olds tat ea$ agent"s first $oi$e

is to su$ker te oters by being te first to sell is %ro%erty and resettle. 8ere, as is often

te $ase &it te a%%li$ation of te !risoner"s dilemma to $a%ture %roblems of te so$ial

$ontra$t, $olle$tie a$tion, and $oo%eration, an assuran$e %roblem is $onflated &it a

!risoner"s dilemma. Often in large multi'%arty intera$tions ea$ %refers mutual

$oo%eration but la$ks any genuine assuran$e tat oters &ill not estimate tat defe$tion is

su%erior due to maimin reasoning guaranteeing te igest minimum %ayoff. 4is

$onsideration is suffi$ient to a%%raise Jeris" 3odesian dilemma. 8o&eer, in

transmuting te situation into a !risoner"s dilemma, een toug ea$ agent is su%%osed

to defe$t %urely out of self'defense, in fa$t a ne& motiation of unilateral su$$ess is

introdu$ed.

do not mean to single out Jeris as an international relations teorist &o %lainly

gets ;uestions of domesti$ $oo%eration &rong by a%%lying te !risoner"s dilemma in a

$onfused &ay. nstead mean to demonstrate te ready transition from an analysis of

mutual se$urity seeking to te a%%li$ation of te !risoner"s dilemma model tat is

$ara$teried by te o%e for indiidual dominan$e. 4e *old +ar analysis of te

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se$urity dilemma ad as its allmark te a%%li$ation of te !# model to study

brinkmansi% as a dilemma of mutual distrust. 8o&eer te model suggests ea$ is

drien by te o%e for dominan$e in addition to te fear of being su$kered. Of $ourse

one reason beind te default use of te !risoner"s dilemma game &as tat of soling te

&orst'$ase s$enario, but tis &orst'$ase $ase &as tat of a$ieing $oo%eration among

aggressors. Stret$ing its narratie to suggest tat te a$ieement of $oo%eration is

%ossible in $ertain $ases &erein te introdu$tion of san$tions insures tat **#* as

made it normal to bot a$$e%t tat $oo%eration troug te treat of san$tions re%resents

$lassi$ liberalism, and tat te default $ase tat must be soled is tat of mutual

antagonism.

Jeris" arti$le is no mere %edanti$ dis$ussion of te Stag 8unt ersus !risoner"s

dilemma models of te international se$urity dilemma. Jeris" %a%er %resents a staun$

defense of assured destru$tion in o%%osition to nu$lear use teory, $ounterfor$e strategy,

and arms ra$e. Jeris" assum%tion of status ;uo states $augt in a se$urity dilemma best

re%resented by te !# game is a strategy of argument tat %ermits a&ks to entertain te

same line of reasoning- te !# is better e;ui%%ed to model a situation of mutual

antagonism, tus it may el% $onsider te best strategy for defeating a %redator assuming

one"s %rimary goal is to defeat tem. 8en$e, %resenting te se$urity dilemma in terms of

mutual $oo%eration among distrustful and $ary does $augt in a !risoner"s dilemma

seems to $oer all eigen$ies. Most im%ortantly it $oers te situation in &i$ a status

;uo seeking S is $onfronted by a %otentially belligerent Soiet nion. A side effe$t of

tis de%i$tion of te *old +ar &as to normalie tat a defensie agent &ill ado%t te

&ays of an aggressorurely out of self'rotection. 5Me'first6 seems to flo& from te

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need to %rote$t oneself, gien tat one $annot trust oters, een as underneat tis

%referen$e tra%%ing, as S$elling originally suggests, one %er$eies of oneself as

%rimarily moed by $oo%eration.

Jeris" goal is to argue bot tat no one $an be te unilateral i$tor of a nu$lear

&ar, tus tat offense is transformed into deterren$e (19B), and tat &ea%ons %rograms

$an be tailored to&ard identifying oneself as a $oo%erator instead of an aggressor. Jeris

%oses a series of ;uestions about te $urrent state of brinkmansi%-

Are &ea%ons %ro$urements used as an inde of resole: Must tey be so used: fone side fails to res%ond to te oter"s buildu%, &ill it a%%ear &eak and tereby

inite %redation: *an bot sides simultaneously ae images of ig resole or istere a ero'sum element inoled: (199)

4e su%%osition of a ero'sum element is ty%i$al of a !risoner"s dilemma game in &i$

one side definitely %ros%ers at te oter"s e%ense. n fa$t, &ere it te $ase tat se$urity

did ae a ero'sum $om%onent, ten $lassi$ liberal teory &ould fail. Jeris seems to

indi$ate is belief tat se$urity need not ae a ero'sum $om%onent, again suggesting

tat a Stag 8unt game is more a%%ro%riate to te se$urity dilemma tan te !# game

(199).

Jeris fo$uses on t&o ariables tat are $ru$ial for resoling te se$urity dilemma-

te ability to differentiate bet&een offensie and defensie &ea%ons, and &eter

offensie or defensie armaments ae te adantage. 4is ty%ology is dire$tly

a%%li$able to te *old +ar be$ause it %ermits Jeris to $on$lude tat &ea%ons %rograms

tat $an be differentiated any su%%orting offensie aims &ill aid in demonstrating one"s

$oo%eratie intent, tereby disru%ting te distrust tat seems to %roide a reason for te

sift in orientation from a Stag 8unt to a !#. 4us, &it S$elling, Jeris is adamant in

%ro%osing tat te S ado%t !olaris'ty%e submarine based missiles (S?M"s)- 54e

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%oint is not tat sea'based systems are less ulnerable tan land'based ones (tis bears on

te offense'defense ratio) but tat S?M"s are defensie, retaliatory &ea%ons6 (20I). 8e

dra&s te $lear %oli$y im%li$ation tat to %resere te a%%earan$e of a $oo%eratie state,

te oter"s submarine'based nu$lear for$e must not be treatened- 5A status';uo state

tat &anted to forego offensie $a%ability $ould sim%ly foregoanti'submarine &arfare

(AS+) resear$ and %ro$urement6 (20I). 4is &as of $ourse a maEor %oint of

$ontention in 4eam ?"s 19IF re%ort asserting tat te Soiets must surely ae AS+

$a%ability as tere is no %roof tat tey do not, follo&ing te logi$ of ultimately

un$ertainty and ero'risk. 4eam ?, namely !aul Gite and !aul +olfo&it, dra&s te

%oli$y im%li$ation tat at a minimum te S must deelo% AS+ $a%ability.

Still, Jeris a$kno&ledges tere is te additional %roblem tat offensie &ea%ons

may yet $arry te adantage by standing as an inde of ea$ nation"s &ill (20B).

Moreoer, nu$lear $a%ability $ould be used, as te S$lesinger do$trine re$ommends, to

treaten lesser aggression troug 5limited, gradual, and $ontrolled strikes6 (20B). Jeris

a$kno&ledges tat te use of nu$lear &ea%ons in lesser $onfli$ts o%ens te %ossibility tat

tey may su%%ort dominan$e, and not Eust deterrent $a%ability in te $ase of an all'out

atta$k by te oter. 4is signifies a ero'sum $om%onent to se$urity. Jeris e%lains,

?ut be$ause te 5S$lesinger #o$trine6 $ould be used not only to $o%e &it a%arallel 3ussian %oli$y, but also to su%%ort an Ameri$an attem%t to $ange testatus ;uo, te ne& Ameri$an stan$e &ould de$rease 3ussian se$urity. (209)

Jeris finds te S$lesinger #o$trine %ermitting nu$lear use in lesser &ars to be a

destabiliing strategy insofar as it relies on offensie $a%ability tat is indistinguisable

from status ;uo goals. Hien tat many teorists doubted te %ossibility of guaranteeing

a limited nu$lear &ar, and e%e$ted tat it &ould be rational for te Soiet"s to res%ond

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&it a S$lesigner do$trine of teir o&n, Jeris feared tat tis nu$lear %oli$y &ould be

self'defeating as refle$ted in te !risoner"s ineitable out$ome of mutual defe$tion.

Jeris is $lear tat te S$lesinger do$trine %ursues se$urity as aing a ero'sum

$om%onent be$ause it a$$e%ts tat 54e means of %resering te status ;uo &ould also be

te means of $anging it6 (217).

=or Jeris, a$ieing mutual %ea$e is de%endent on eliminating te ero'sum

$om%onent from se$urity, and e adises tat tis may be a$ieed by realiing tat

nu$lear &arfare $an ae no i$tor, and tat se$ond'strike $a%ability $ombined &it te

differentiation of offensie and defensie $a%ability, is te re$i%e for stability (210).

Jeris $oneys te idea tat se$urity'seeking states $an %ursue teir aim by de%loying

&ea%ons systems tat $learly signal teir %referen$e for defense and deterren$e oer

offense and aggression, and tat moe a&ay from %ursuing a form of se$urity tat

demands unilateral adantage. !era%s &at is im%li$it if not e%li$it is tat te sear$

for mutual se$urity is best %ursued by a$$e%ting te im%ossibility of dis$erning intent,

terefore fo$using on $a%ability instead, and demonstrating one"s status ;uo $redentials

by sele$ting &ea%ons systems tat faor defense oer offense. 8ere it is a$kno&ledged

tat &itout te benefit of $on$rete earmarks mat$ing intent &it a %redile$tion for

a$tion, te means of signaling tat one is a status ;uo, or Stag 8unt, a$tor and not an

aggressor or !risoner"s dilemma a$tor, lies in $onstru$ting strategy tat leaes no doubt

tat one"s %referen$e for se$urity is mat$ed by obserable material artifa$ts eiden$ing

one"s %ea$e'seeking $redentials. 4e key is to signal not troug $ea% talk but real

a$tions tat one stri$tly %refers **#*. 8o&eer, again it is $lear tat te #***

%referen$e ordering does not indi$ate te o%e for $oo%eration.

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Hlenn Synder"s 54e Se$urity #ilemma in Allian$e !oliti$s6

4is sli%%age from starting &it se$urity'seekers &o find temseles needing to

defe$t out of te motie of self'defense in a !risoner"s dilemma situation is so

&ides%read tat it is diffi$ult to first isolate te mis%er$e%tion and ten to $orre$t it.

*onsider Hlenn Synder"s 54e Se$urity #ilemma in Allian$e !oliti$s6 (19B@). Again, &e

see te %resu%%osition tat un$ertainty and te inability to trust te oter is te %rimary

drier of te se$urity dilemma &rit as a !risoner"s dilemma- 54e se$urity dilemma

arises from te state"s un$ertainty &eter its adersary as far'rea$ing e%ansionist

aims, or, like itself, is interested essentially in te %reseration, or limited modifi$ation of

te status ;uo6 (@FB). Synder admits tat states or a$tors ten do not a$tually kno&

&i$ game is being %layed, as tey do not kno& te oters" %referen$es oer out$omes.

Synder does not %roide te $ain of reasoning tat &ould %ermit a se$urity seeker to

ado%t te %referen$es of a o%eful aggressor, altoug e essentially makes tis

assum%tion.

4e semblan$e tat one $ould be a se$urity'seeker &o is tra%%ed in a !risoner"s

dilemma &it te ultimate frustration of te im%ossibility of $oo%eration follo&s from

first obsering tat ea$ a$tor as one of t&o $oi$es- to $oo%erate or to defe$t> and

se$ond obsering tat of $ourse no one &ants to be su$kered, and terefore defe$tion is

te only iable $oi$e as a matter of self'defense (see Synder, 19B@, @F2). n is

!risoner"s dilemma %ayoff matri, a$tors $oose bet&een allying (defe$ting) and

abstaining from Eoining an allian$e ($oo%erating). Synder"s analysis a%%ears seamless-

a$tors %refer tat no allian$e forms tan bi'%olar rial allian$es form> as &ell, no %arty"s

last $oi$e is tat of being isolated &ile an e$lusie allian$e forms. 8o&eer, Synder

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S.M. Amadae

fails to make sense of te main'drier of te !risoner"s dilemma model tat e uses- if

states are %rimarily se$urity seekers, &y do tey %refer to isolate te oter %arty &ile

tey Eoin in an allian$e if tey are not %oised to benefit from tis dominant %osition: f

fundamentally %refer a $oo%eratie system and ae no %redatory intent, een if may

need to %rote$t against aggression, need not ado%t te %referen$es of a %redator. Ret te

routine use of te !risoner"s dilemma model to $a%ture all manner of $oo%eration,

es%e$ially in domesti$ %oliti$al e$onomy, automati$ally assumes tat 5ea$ a$tor most

%refers to be te only user of a $ommon resour$e6 (Stein, 19B2, 717).

t is tis routine oersigt of te %referen$e for unilateral gain tat stru$tures

!risoner"s dilemmas, es%e$ially in a%%lying tis model to se$urity studies in &i$

%resumably state"s %rimary goal is tat of a$ieing self'defense, tat $ara$teries its

%resentation as a situation of o%eful $oo%erators tat are frustrated. 4e idea is sim%le,

and it translates from international relations teory to %oliti$al e$onomy and so$ial

$ontra$t teory- status ;uo seekers or &ould'be $oo%erators $annot be tra%%ed in a

!risoner"s dilemma unless tey ado%t te %referen$e %rofile of a reisionist state or of a

o%eful free'rider. n tis &ay, te dilemma is a%tly named, im%lying te inerent

diffi$ult of a$ieing armony in a den of tiees, or domesti$ tran;uility amidst me'first

adantage takers. 8o&eer, it is mysterious o& it as be$ome $ustomary to assume tat

agents seeking $on$ord and $ommodious liing (8obbes) ea$ %refer to su$ker eeryone

else in te o%e of unilateral gain. 4is routine 5!risoner"s dilemma %edagogy6 as

re%eated oer and again deriing te dilemma from te o%eless bind oter&ise agreeable

a$tors are $augt in solely due to te inability to trust oters> un$ertainty is used to Eustify

te ado%tion and e%ression of myo%i$, me'first, %referen$es. nternational relations

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teorist 3andall S$&eller $on$urs, %ointing out, 5*onfusion about tis %oint arises

be$ause neorealists ae mistakenly $on$e%tualied te se$urity dilemma as a !risoners"

#ilemma (!#) rater tan a Stag 8unt6 (199F, 10@). S$&eller %atiently e%lains-

n a !# game, te first $oi$e is to su$ker your o%%onent (you defe$t &ile teoter %layer $oo%erates)> in a Stag 8unt, mutual $oo%eration is bot %layers" first$oi$e. +en se$urity is te goal, as in te se$urity dilemma, states &ill seek tosu$$or, not su$ker, teir neigbors (te ** %ayoff). (10@)

/en if one is unsure of oters" %referen$es, still one $an be sure of one"s o&n. *a%turing

te faulty, but %erasiely used, logi$ tat se$urity seekers and o%eful $oo%erators $an

find temseles in a !risoner"s dilemma, S$&eller dire$tly addresses Synder- 54is !#

%referen$e ordering suggesting tat $oo%erators &ould most %refer to su$ker te oter is

all te more %uling in ligt of Synder"s first assum%tion tat Lno state is aggressie, but

none $an kno& te intentions of te oters6 (10@).

As international relations teory deelo%ed to simultaneously analye te *old

+ar &orld stage and a%%ly game teoreti$ models, tere &as a %rofound intermiing of

abstra$t teory and material %ra$ti$e. S%e$ifi$ally, one keen interest in te se$urity

dilemma &as tat of inter%reting te *old +ar itself as su$ a dilemma in &i$ %era%s

bot te S and te Soiet nion really &anted to get along, but &ere $augt u% in an

arms ra$e tat seemed ineitable, een des%ite essentially ami$able intent. !risoner"s

dilemma %edagogy tat 53ational states tus e%and only to a$iee se$urity,6 (10F) $an

be dire$tly related to making sense of te S strategy during te *old +ar. Altoug it

as been $ommon to %resent te S as a &ary a$tor tra%%ed in a !risoner"s dilemma out

of te ne$essity to aoid being dominated by te SS3, S$&eller fo$uses on te

$om%onent of Ameri$an a$tion tat &as drien by te o%e for stru$turing te &orld

system a$$ording to its &ises-

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More generally, o&eer, te aim of .S. %oli$y &as not merely negatie anddefensie. As !aul Gite argued at te time, te nited States &as $om%eting&it te Soiet nion and its allies for te %ositie goal of de$iding &o &ould$onstru$t a ne& international order. (10B, $iting Gite)

4e im%ortant %oint is tat te relian$e on te !risoner"s dilemma, &ile ostensibly used

to de%i$t se$urity seekers, a$tually seems to %roide te Eustifi$ation for oneself

manifesting te %referen$es of a %redatory state. !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy ta$itly

a$$e%ts tat one seeks dominan$e and a$$e%ts tis stan$e as flo&s dire$tly from a motie

of self'defense. !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy a$$e%ts tat one seeks dominan$e but

Eustifies tis %redile$tion by suggesting it flo&s dire$tly from te motie of self'defense.

Jeris" 2001 5+as te *old +ar a Se$urity #ilemma:6

+riting in 2001 3obert Jeris obseres tat in understanding te *old +ar as a

se$urity dilemma, 5/a$ side &ould ae seen its o&n beaior as designed to maintain

te status ;uo and &ould ae &el$omed measures to stabilie it..&ould be %oliti$ally

and %sy$ologi$ally attra$tie6 (7B). +e like to beliee tat our moties are %ure, een

&ile &e ;uestioned our o%%onent"s. Most often it &as assumed tat te 5ideologi$ally

drien Soiet nionis inerently e%ansionist6 (@2). Of $ourse, altoug do&n'

%layed, it &as also a$kno&ledged tat regardless of &eter te Soiet nion eisted or

not, 5te nited States &ould ae sougt to t&art any %otential rials and o%en te

&orld to Ameri$an $a%italist %enetration6 (@7) during te %ost'+orld +ar %eriod.

Jeris a$kno&ledges tat suggesting tat bot states &ere inerently e%ansionist, more

s%e$ifi$ally tat te S ad egemoni$ %retensions, is un%alatable- 5t is un$omfortable

to find tat no a$tors on te &orld s$ene are sym%ateti$.6 (@7)

Jeris" goal is to determine &eter te *old +ar &as a se$urity dilemma,

im%lying tat bot nations &ere oriented to&ard te status ;uo but feared te oter

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S.M. Amadae

arbored ostile intent. A de$isie feature of a se$urity dilemma is tat se$urity does not

ae a ero sum $om%onent and is best re%resented as a Stag 8unt. Jeris realies tat

tis determination, een using indsigt, may be diffi$ult as it is not yet agreement on

&eter ++ re%resented a se$urity dilemma. Again a$$ording to S$elling, a Stag 8unt

is translated into a !risoner"s dilemma gien suffi$ient likeliood tat a %redator eists.

!era%s it is %ossible to %ro%ose tat te S and SS3 &ere a$tually status ;uo a$tors,

&o imagined te %ossibility te oter ad ostile intent- tis 5diagnosis tat te *old

+ar &as a se$urity dilemma &ould be %oliti$ally and %sy$ologi$ally attra$tie6 (7B).

8o&eer, Jeris suggests, tat gien tat te *old +ar ended &it te demise of te

Soiet nion, instead of mutual a$$ord, tat &e may ae reason to $allenge te

se$urity dilemma rendering.

As Jeris e%lores te *old +ar more fully, e tou$es on te du%li$itous as%e$t

of !risoner"s dilemma %edagogy- it seems &rong to suggest a rationale for %redation

based on self'defense> 5te definition of self'defense as a Eustifi$ation for murder is

$ontentious6 (79).1F n deelo%ing is tougt, Jeris rea$es te $on$lusion tat tere

may be elements of se$urity'seeking tat are indistinguisable from e%ansionist goals.

f tis is te $ase ten 5states &ill be for$ed to $om%ete een if teir %rimary goal is

se$urity.6 Jeris refers to tis latter situation as a 5dee% se$urity dilemma.6 t is

a$$urately be de%i$ted by a !risoner"s dilemma, and is $on$e%tually distin$t from te

se$urity dilemma $a%tured by a Stag 8unt transformed by un$ertainty (@1).

8o&eer, Jeris also a$kno&ledges tat %ossibly te *old +ar &as not any form

of se$urity dilemma. t $ould ae been te $ase tat 5one of te su%er%o&ers sougt to

1FOn tis s%e$ifi$ %oint Jeris $ites S$eller,(eadly Im#alances) Triolarity andHitler*s Strategy of World Con+uest(Ge& Rork- *olumbia niersity !ress, 199B), B7'91.

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e%and in order to a$iee nonse$urity goals6 (@2). One su$ s$ool of tougt olds

tat 5te Soiet nion ad no o%%ortunity to establis good relations &it te nited

States oter tan by $on$eding .S. dominan$e,6 and tat te S &ould ae taken

&ateer ste%s &ere ne$essary to 5o%en te &orld to Ameri$an $a%italist %enetration6

(@7). n running troug %otential inter%retations of te *old +ar, Jeris also tro&s in

ea$ $ountry"s domesti$ %oliti$al agenda &i$ may ae drien %oli$y out$omes, but

not ne$essarily been %rimarily dire$ted to eternal e%ansionist goals. A ty%i$al eam%le

of tis is a state"s military'industrial $om%le tat as its o&n momentum to maintain te

need for &ea%ons systems and e$onomi$ deelo%ment troug armaments manufa$tor.

n sele$ting &i$ analysis of te *old +ar is more fitting, Jeris first

a$kno&ledges tat it seemed tat te 5*ommunist ie& of $a%italist states&as

ineitably ostile6 (@F). Still, it is not at all $lear tat te *ommunists sougt su$$ess

troug military $on;uest, instead tey &ould 5gain %o&er troug a $ombination of

ele$tions, subersion, and unrest6 (@B). n fa$t, $ommunists asserted tat $a%italism

&ould $olla%se of its o&n a$$ord, due to internal in$onsisten$ies (@9). 3egardless of te

Soiet"s self'im%ression, o&eer, it seemed to te +est tat te SS3 ad little

toleran$e for dissent, and e%ressed tis intoleran$e using $oer$ie for$e (C1).

Jeris %ortrays a nited States tat &as similarly un$om%romising- 5Ameri$an

leaders did not beliee tat mutual se$urity &as a realisti$ goal6 (C2). Jeris $on$ludes

tat S %oli$ies, een if ineffe$tie, 5&ere $learly offensie in teir im%a$t6 (C2).

ndeed, S stated %oli$y &as $onsistent in its aim 5to redu$e te %o&er and influen$e of

te SS3.61I At a minimum, terefore, 5.S. efforts to e%loit o%%ortunities tat arose

&ere indistinguisable in teir effe$t from e%ansionism, &i$ means tat te situation

1IJeris ;uotes GS* 20@, in =3S, 19@B,


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&as a dee% se$urity dilemma6 (C7). +alking te find line bet&een asserting tat te S

$ondoned %reem%tie murder in self'defense, or instead &as %re%ared to engage in man'

slaugter if atta$ked, Jeris determines tat te *old +ar &as a dee% se$urity dilemma

meaning tat bot states $ould not a$iee se$urity. n introdu$ing te dee% se$urity

dilemma Jeris moes in te dire$tion of Jon Mearseimer"s neorealism tat also argues

tat nations $annot lie togeter %ea$eable> one"s se$urity must $ome at te e%ense of

anoter"s. 8o&eer, for Mearseimer tis reality is based on obEe$tie resour$es tat

nations must $ommand in $om%etition &it oters as a $ondition for teir surial. =or

Jeris, te dee% se$urity dilemma is based on te ideational features of se$urity set fort

by bot antagonists. n is final estimation, Jeris maintains tat te root of te *old +ar

$onfli$t 5at best &as a $las of so$ial systems.6 *ru$ially, 5Mutual se$urity in tese

$ir$umstan$es &as a goal tat $ould not be attained6 (CB). n a dee% se$urity dilemma in

&i$ a nation %er$eies tat e%ansion is ne$essary in self'defense, ea$ nation &ill

%ursue its se$urity aims $ountering te oter. uoting from a 19C2 !oli$y !lanning Staff

%a%er tat all subse;uent S !residents, sae Jimmy *arter in is early %residen$y, ad

agreed &it, Jeris re%orts-

+e beliee tat$ontainment is inade;uate and also unrealisti$. +e do notbeliee tat te situation $an remain indefinitely stati$. One side &ill gain and teoter &ill de$line as a fa$tor in &orld affairs. t must be our obEe$tie to be teone &i$ gains. (Jeris, C9)

?y Jeris" analysis, te *old +ar &as not a sallo& se$urity dilemma, but rater a dee%

se$urity dilemma. Se$urity &as terefore not a mutually attainable goal. n %resenting

tis line of tougt Jeris suggests te rationale tat self'defense may be %er$eied as

re;uiring offensie and e%ansie efforts. 8o&eer, again, e suggests tat tis $onfli$t

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for se$urity deried from $lasing &orld ie&s and systems, not from a stru$turally

enfor$ed ne$essity to $ommand resour$es and %o&er a military.

Jon Mearseimer"s 2001 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

?efore introdu$ing Jon Mearseimer"s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,

&ill re$a% te maEor %oint of te deelo%ment of our understanding of te se$urity

dilemma, and its entanglement &it S nu$lear strategy. 4e first signifi$ant use of te

!risoner"s dilemma model &as its a%%li$ation by S$elling to a se$urity dilemma defined

by te absen$e of $onfli$ting interests. ntrodu$ing un$ertainty, S$elling argues tat in

anti$i%ation of $onfronting a %redator, or een of being taken as one, te best %oli$y is to

ado%t te %referen$es of a %redator. +ereas S$elling $learly makes an argument tat

one ado%t a %oli$y of unilateral dominan$e in self'defense, te main im%ort of is

%osition is to sole te !risoner"s dilemma &it mutually assured destru$tion. S$elling

eld tat in a &orld &it nu$lear &ea%ons, tere $annot be a unilateral i$tor as ea$

nation as te %o&er to destroy te oter een after it as suffered a massie atta$k.

8o&eer, tere are t&o maEor im%li$ations of S$elling"s !risoner"s dilemma su%%ort for

MA#. 8e definitely %resents an argument for striing for egemony in a $ase &erein

one is &orried tat tere is a %redator. Moreoer e alters te footing of liberalism &i$

as iterto been $on$e%tualied to sole te assuran$e %roblem> en$e te role of te

eiatan is to alter a$tors" in$enties for defe$ting, not to assure a$tors tat one anoter

is fundamentally $oo%eratie.

Gu$lear se 4eorists, re%resented by Albert +olstetter, 8erman Kan, !aul

Gite, James S$lesinger, and *olin Hray, &ere dissatisfied &it te %res$ri%tion tat te

S a$$e%t a stalemate solution to te *old +ar standoff &it te SS3. 4ey reEe$ted

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S$elling"s solution to te !risoner"s dilemma stru$ture of te *old +ar in mutually

assured destru$tion. /en toug suggesting tat te S is best $ara$teried as a benign

a$tor, tey a$$e%ted te !risoner"s dilemma stru$ture of te se$urity dilemma fa$ed by

te S by in$or%orating te idea of radi$al un$ertainty about te Soiet"s intentions, and

een $a%abilities, to mobilie an argument to ado%t a %oli$y of &orst'$ase analysis and

ero'risk toleran$e. S$elling"s argument for a suffi$ient likeliood tat a %redator eist

in order for a se$urity dilemma or assuran$e game to transform into a !# &as reEe$ted in

faor of te %osition tat any degree of un$ertainty %resents te need to ado%t te

$ara$teristi$s of a %redator in order to figt %redation. 4e %roto'neo$onseratie

%osition &as to use te radi$al un$ertainty of oter minds in order to mobilie an

argument tat one must ado%t te strategy of a %redator as te best res%onse to a &orst'

$ase situation. An a$tual $al$ulation based on rational e%e$tations &as e$anged for a

maimin strategy in res%onse to any $on$eiable likeliood of an atta$k by te Soiet

nion.

Synder and Jeris du%li$ate S$elling"s logi$ for MA# and Kan"s arguments for

G4s. 4ey, too, %ro%ose tat a situation %o%ulated &it se$urity seekers deoles into a

!risoner"s dilemma gien te $an$e tat a %redator eists. 8o&eer, te %roblems of

assuran$e and %redation are $onfused be$ause it is ta$itly assumed tat a se$urity seeker

really%refers to $oo%erate not&itstanding te fa$t tat te !# %referen$e ordering

mandates tat all a$tors %refer unilateral su$$ess. Solutions to te assuran$e %roblem are

oerlooked be$ause $oo%erators are assumed to ado%t te $ara$teristi$s of %redators.

A%%arently follo&ing S$elling"s lead, Synder and Jeris assume tat agents" ado%t

%referen$es $ontrary to teir true or defining interests, as in te $ase of te 3odesian

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&ites &o really %refer for eeryone to stay, but a$t on te %rerogatie of te agent

&ose first $oi$e is to su$ker eeryone else, or te se$urity seeker &o really %refers

%ea$e, but a$ts on te strategy of dominating oter nations. 4is ado%tion of me'first,

!risoner"s dilemma %referen$es, su%%osedly out of self'defense, as be$ome so ty%i$al of

our dis$ourse and analysis of $oo%eration tat Art Stein obseres of domesti$ a$tors tat

ea$ seeks to be te sole user of a $ommon resour$e (19B2). Obiously su$ a %osition is

selfis or antiso$ial, and destru$tie to $olle$tie a$tion. Ret it as be$ome normalied as

te a%%ro%riate res%onse of rational agent is seeks $oo%eration.

n is 2001 arti$le dis$ussing &eter te *old +ar &as a se$urity dilemma,

Jeris takes is analysis a ste% furter in %ro%osing tat tere is a routine se$urity

dilemma in &i$ agents" fundamental interests do not $onfli$t, and a more fundamental,

5dee% se$urity dilemma6 in &i$ agents" fundamental interests do $onfli$t. Of $ourse,

as bot ae been %ortrayed by a !# game, te analyti$ distin$tion is lost. argue tat

Jeris" standard se$urity dilemma %o%ulated by status ;uo seekers is best $a%tured by an

assuran$e game, and te situation in &i$ one agent"s se$urity undermines anoter"s is

best $a%tured by te !risoner"s dilemma. ltimately Jeris $on$ludes tat te *old +ar

&as a dee% se$urity dilemma as te S and SS3"s interests &ere o%%osed> mutual

se$urity $ould not be ad.

8o&eer, Jeris makes $lear tat te dee% se$urity dilemma is a %ers%e$tie not

&idely sared by *old +ar international relations teorists &o took te %osition tat

mutual se$urity &as an attainable goal. Jeris suggests tat many 3 teorists a$$e%ted

te %osition arti$ulated by S$elling, M$Gamara, and Steen ?rams, tat assured

destru$tion, %redi$ated on te assum%tion tat nations are status ;uo seekers &o are

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S.M. Amadae

un$ertain of te oter"s intentions, $an resole nu$lear brinkmansi% and, &it

a%%ro%riate means of dete$tion, $an undertake arms $ontrol. n Jeris" ie&, S

strategists did not sare tis ie& of te &orld &it liberal 3 teorists> 5most $iilians

&o sougt su%eriority did so for self'%rote$tion6 (CC). Mutual se$urity &as out of rea$

for tese strategists be$ause tey ie&ed te o%e for se$urity as ne$essarily antagonisti$.

4is ie& of international relations %er$eies of te %ursuit of su%eriority as te means to

se$ure surial &as re$ently arti$ulated by Mearseimer in The Tragedy of Great Power

Politics, een toug Mearseimer differs from Jeris in assigning te res%onsibility for

te mutual antagonism. +ereas Jeris looks to mutually e$lusie &orld ie&s,

Mearseimer looks to te stru$ture of &orld in &i$ agents must $om%ete for %o&er.

/en if do not ye for %o&er, te net agent &ill> terefore all agents must $om%ete for

s$ar$e resour$es as a $ondition of teir surial.

Mearseimer elaborates is teory in $ontradistin$tion to Kennet +alt" Theory

of International Politics. 4e latter %osition e refers to as defensie realism, &i$ e

$laims Jeris" offensie'defensie balan$e is an attem%t to buttress (20). n essen$e,

Mearseimer $a%tures te distin$tion bet&een $on$e%tualiing Jeris" mundane se$urity

dilemma as an assuran$e game in &i$ se$urity is a %ositie sum good, and Jeris" dee%

se$urity dilemma in &i$ se$urity as a negatie sum $om%onent. Mearseimer

arti$ulates is offensie realism in $ontradi$tion to +alt" and Jeris" defensie realism-

My teory of offensie realism is also a stru$tural teory of international %oliti$s.As &it defensie realism, my teory sees great %o&ers as $on$erned mainly &itfiguring out o& to surie in a &orld &ere tere is no agen$y to %rote$t temfrom ea$ oter> tey ;ui$kly realie tat %o&er is te key to teir surial.Offensie realism %arts $om%any &it defensie realism oer te ;uestion of o&mu$ %o&er states &ant. =or defensie realists, te international stru$ture%roides states &it little in$entie to seek additional in$rements of %o&er>instead it %uses tem to maintain te eisting balan$e of %o&er. !resering

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%o&er, rater tan in$reasing it, is te main goal of states. Offensi%e realists, onthe other hand, #elie%e that status +uo owers are rarely found in world olitics,

#ecause the international system creates owerful incenti%es for states to loo- foroortunities to gain ower at the e&ense of ri%als, and to ta-e ad%antage of

those situations when the #enefits outweigh the costs. A state*s ultimate goal is to

#e the hegemon in the system. (My em%asis, 21)

Mearseimer e$oes Jeris" sentiment $a%tured by te dee% se$urity dilemma- 5surial

mandates aggressie beaior6 (21). Mearseimer asso$iates liberalism &it te ie&

tat se$urity $an be mutually attained, and offensie realism in &i$ se$urity $annot be

sared.

Mearseimer s%e$ifi$ally dis%arages Ameri$an a$ademi$s &o 5are es%e$ially

good at %romoting liberal tinking in te market%la$e of ideas6 (2C). 4ese liberals, &o

in$lude S$elling, Jeris, Snynder, Jose% S. Gye Jr, and 3obert Keoane es%ouse te

o%timisti$ ie& tat states $an get along, and tat free trade leaes %ros%erity in its &ake,

remoing te motie for aggressie e%ansionism. 8o&eer, 5beind $losed doors

te elites &o make national se$urity %oli$y s%eak mostly te language of %o&er, not tat

of %rin$i%le, and te nited States a$ts in te international system a$$ording to te

di$tates of realist logi$6 (2C).

/en in a%%re$iating te teoreti$al similarity bet&een Jeris" dee% se$urity

dilemma and Mearseimer"s offensie realism, es%e$ially insofar as bot a%%ear

admirably suited to using te !risoner"s dilemma model, still te t&o are distin$t as te

former fo$uses on ideas as an im%ortant $om%onent of se$urity seeking, and te latter

&olly looks to material $onsiderations- 5Hreat %o&ers need money, te$nology, and

%ersonnel to build military for$es and to figt &ars, and a state"s latent %o&er refers to te

ra& %otential it $an dra& on &en $om%eting &it rial states6 (CC). Mearseimer admits

tat is teory of offensie realism, as its label suggests, may be offensie to many

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S.M. Amadae

%eo%le &o &ould rater beliee, or at least state for %ubli$ $onsum%tion, tat &orld

%oliti$s a%%ens in a$$ordan$e &it liberal teory. iberals %ro%ose tat maintaining an

eisting balan$e of %o&er, %otentially a balan$e of terror, is te best means to a$iee

%ros%erity as tis fosters mutually benefi$ial trade (1F). iberal teory olds tat

%redatory states $an be in %rin$i%le, een if not %era%s in fa$t, distinguised from status'

;uo seeking states (1F). Of $ourse een in follo&ing Mearseimer"s des$ri%tion of

liberalism &e may ae a eigtened sense of dis$rimination in differentiating bet&een

$lassi$ liberalism"s %redi$ation of a Stag 8unt and neoliberalism"s $on$ession of a

!risoner"s dilemma. Again, sin$e tis distin$tion &as blurred in S$elling"s &ork, e set

te %re$edent for grounding neoliberalism on te mutually antagonisti$ !risoner"s

dilemma as o%%osed to te mutually benefi$ial Stag 8unt.

=or Mearseimer, 5states do not be$ome status ;uo %o&ers until tey $om%letely

dominate te system6 (7C), terefore a$$ording it im, it is not %ossible to a state to be

se$ure &itout $ontrolling te %o&er relations stru$turing te &orld system. Sin$e

egemony &ill al&ays be $ontested and is terefore im%ossible to maintain, tis endless

%ursuit of se$urity means tat states are $onstantly in $ir$umstan$es of dire$t or indire$t

&ar &it one anoter. n te language of te !risoner"s dilemma, a$tors endlessly seek to

su$ker oters to a$iee unilateral su$$ess as a means to teir o&n %reseration.

*on$lusion

S$elling, Synder, and Jeris ea$ inadertently make arguments tat su%%ort te

idea tat it is rational to ado%t te $ara$teristi$s of an aggressor in order to figt an

aggressor. 4ey suggest tat een a suffi$ient likeliood tat an aggressor eists %resents

a suffi$ient reason for one to be$ome an aggressor. Ret, een in a$kno&ledging tis

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S.M. Amadae

!risoner"s dilemma model for se$urity, in %ro%osing deterren$e or mutually assured

destru$tion, tese teorists suggest tat an in$entie s$eme may be introdu$ed to mimi$

$lassi$ liberalism"s a$ieement of mutual se$urity. !redators &o atta$k &ill be

destroyed, and tey terefore %refer to $oo%erate.

S$elling argues tat an assuran$e situation may degenerate into a !risoner"s

dilemma gien a suffi$ient likeliood tat a %redator eists. 4e nu$lear use teorists, by

$ontrast, ado%ted a ero'risk o%tion tat assumes te final unkno&ability of oter minds

and intentions, terefore going furter do&n S$elling"s %at in suggesting tat it is only

natural tat a se$urity seeker &ill %re%are for te &orst, tereby assuming tat any a$tor

$ould be a %redators and $ombating it &it te %ursuit of dominan$e. Jeris

a$kno&ledges tat in S strategi$ %lanning su$ reasoning &as assisted by te mutually

in$om%atible &orld ie&s of $a%italism and $ommunism- S %oli$y offi$ials &ere $lear

tat 5One side &ill gain and te oter side &ill de$linet must be our obEe$tie to be te

one &i$ gains6 (2001, C9).

Jeris" admission of tis dee% se$urity dilemma, in &i$ not all agents $an be

se$ure, differs from Mearseimer"s be$ause e ultimately asso$iates it &it a 5$las of

so$ial systems6 (CB), and not a fundamental $on;uest for te resour$es $om%rising %o&er.

4us Mearseimer %uts a ne& set of $onsiderations on te table in suggesting tat te

stru$ture of te &orld system re;uires tat nations %ursue %o&er &itout limit as a

$ondition of teir self'%reseration.

n ste%%ing ba$k an assessing te arguments for te %ursuit of unilateral su$$ess in

self'defense, &e obsere four. =irst, underlying S$elling"s un$ertainty argument is te

first %osition &i$ olds tat &ereas it is rational for a %ea$e'seeker to $oo%erate &it

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anoter %ea$e'seeker, if one &ere fully $onfident one fa$ed an aggressor instead, ten it is

rational to seek domination. 4is admission is ne$essary to dra& te furter im%li$ation,

as does S$elling, tat an estimation of a suffi$ient likeliood tat tere is an aggression

is similarly Eustifa$tory of ado%ting te %referen$es of a %redator. 4e im%li$ation is tat

te 5&ite $o&boy6 &ill not soot oter &ite $o&boys &o re%resent te o%e for

$oo%eration. 8o&eer, e &ill %refer to kill a bla$k $o&boy, or any indiidually

suffi$iently likely to be a bla$k $o&boy, be$ause subduing an aggressor is %referable to

attem%ting %ea$eful $oeisten$e.

Se$ond, te %roto'neo$onseraties take S$elling"s reasoning a ste% furter in

insisting tat it is im%ossible to eer kno& anoter agent"s intentions, s%e$ifi$ally tose of

a nation. Hien tat te state of anar$y is ig'stakes, and no single misste% $an be

afforded, it makes sense tat een te smallest degree of un$ertainty $an %roide

Eustifi$ation to ado%t te $ara$teristi$s of an aggressor in anti$i%ation of meeting an

aggressor. 8o&eer, tird, te %roto'neo$onseratie se$urity dilemma a%%ears to be

more like Jeris" dee% se$urity dilemma gien tat te %ursuit of dominan$e and i$tory

$ould not be sared by bot su%er%o&ers.

=ourt, Mearseimer dis%enses &it te %roblem of un$ertainty and oter minds

in is %resentation of offensie realism. 8e a$kno&ledges te tenden$y underlying te

use of te !risoner"s dilemma to re%resent te se$urity dilemma im%lies tat a$tors like to

tink of temseles as motiated first and foremost by $oo%eration, but tat underneat

tis all must $onfront te stark reality tat self'%reseration $an only be a$;uired troug

te $ontinuous a$$umulation of %o&er. 4us, 5Hreat %o&ersare al&ays sear$ing for

o%%ortunities to gain %o&er oer teir rials, &it egemony as teir final goal6 (29). 8e

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distan$es imself from te %roblem of oter minds be$ause de$lares it obious tat all

a$tors must seek %o&er> no un$ertainty is inoled.1B n fa$t, e derides as y%o$riti$al

te tenden$y to %retend 5&e all &ant to get along,6 all te &ile kno&ing tat it is

ne$essary to gain te adantage &eneer %ossible. Altoug is analysis sares little

&it S$elling"s un$ertainty, te neo$onseraties radi$al un$ertainty, or Jeris" dee%

se$urity dilemma, still e, too, %resents a rationaliation for self'%reseration in te form

of egemony.

S$elling"s 53e$i%ro$al =ear of Sur%rise Atta$k,6 in arguing tat does assume

te %referen$es of a&ks, introdu$es an ongoing $onfusion into te literature on te

se$urity dilemma and $oo%eration. ?ot of tese literatures use retori$ tat %resumes

agents are status ;uo oriented, but must ado%t te %redator"s $ara$teristi$ %referen$e for

unilateral su$$ess (#***). 4is im%li$ation of S$elling"s &ork, enan$ed by is

outrigt statement tat 3ousseau"s Stag 8unt is e;uialent to a !risoner"s dilemma, and

is insisten$e tat su$ !risoner"s dilemmas abound trougout so$iety, as mired te

literature on te so$ial $ontra$t, $olle$tie a$tion, and $oo%eration in $onfusion leaing

te oerall im%ression tat 5agents %refer to be te sole user of a $ommon resour$e6 (Art

Stein, 19B@).19 =ollo&ing S$elling it as been ty%i$al to %resume tat te %roblem of

a$ieing so$ial order is tat of resoling a multi'%arty !risoner"s dilemma.20 8o&eer,

S$elling"s fo$us &as more dire$ted at soling te *old +ar brinkmansi%. 8ere te

$allenge seemed to be soling te !risoner"s dilemma as te tougest $ase for a$ieing

$oo%eration. 8is solution of mutual deterren$e relies on nu$lear &ea%ons being foreer

1B=or dis$ussion see Hlenn 8. Synder"s 5Mearseimer"s +orld,6International Security,2I-1, 1CC.19S$elling makes tese $laims in a 19F@ %a%er-20?u$anan, 19I@> 8ardin, 19B2> Hautier, 19BF.

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distin$t from $onentional arms in offering uni;ue retaliatory %o&er. Altoug S$elling

definitely suggests tat status ;uo agents assume te %referen$es of an aggressor,

noneteless e stands by te idea tat in nu$lear &ar, $old or ot, tere $an be no i$tor.

4erefore agents" best out$ome is to a$$e%t a balan$e of terror.

4e nu$lear use teorists (G4s), !aul Gite, Albert +olstetter, and 8erman

Kan, follo&ed S$elling"s analysis, but reEe$ted its fundamental assum%tions. 4ey

a$$e%ted tat un$ertainty &ould make it ne$essary to take on te %referen$es of an

aggressor, but tey re%udiated tat it is im%ossible to &in a nu$lear &ar. n

$onentionaliing nu$lear &ar, tey determined tat mutual deterren$e is irrational.

nstead of a$$e%ting a stalemate and balan$e of terror, tey %romoted te %ursuit of

unilateral dominan$e and i$tory. n seeing nu$lear &ar as no different from

$onentional &ar, tey bot ado$ated using nu$lear &ea%ons in lesser $onfli$ts, and tey

argued tat it is $ru$ial to be able to dominate an out$ome on any leel of es$alation,

terefore %romoting full s%e$trum dominan$e.

S$elling ad already argued tat status ;uo seekers &ill ado%t te %referen$es of

an aggressor gien a suffi$ient likeliood a %redator eists, terefore %referring unilateral

i$tory, and te %roto'neo$onseraties agreed. 8o&eer, tey altered S$elling"s

argument tat a ig %robability be ne$essary to make tis $onersion. nstead tey

argued tat nu$lear &ar is a ig'stakes situation in &i$ tere $an be no toleran$e for

error, and in &i$ a ero'risk %oli$y must be ado%ted. 4us, tey ado$ated %re%aring

for te &orst $on$eiable situation- if a situation &ere $on$eiable een if im%ra$table,

ten it ne$essitated a res%onse. +itout blinking an eye, Gite, +olstetter, and Kan all

strenuously a$$e%ted tat te S *old +ar goal must be to &in, and tat deterren$e &as

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saky if not buttressed &it su%erior and not e;ual means to old te Soiet nion in

$e$k. 4e %roto'neo$onseratie %osition, tat &ould see $ontinuity &it late t&entiet'

$entury neo$onseratism in te figure of !aul +olfo&it, +olstetter"s niersity of

*i$ago !.#. student, definitely rationalied egemony, and $ould do so by building on

S$elling"s reasoning. 4ey sim%ly reEe$ted te non$onentional status of nu$lear

&ea%ons, and te %otential tat deterren$e &ould &ork if not guaranteed by su%erior

for$e. 4us tey soled te !risoner"s dilemma game re%resenting nu$lear standoff by

urging unilateral deterren$e.

Synder and Jeris built on S$elling"s reasoning tat a se$urity dilemma of %ea$e'

seekers &o arbor un$ertainty about ea$ oter"s intentions is best %resented by a

!risoner"s dilemma game. 4ey %ersist in %ermitting $onfusion oer &eter te

%resumed status ;uo a$tors ado%t te as first $oi$e te %referen$e for unilateral

adantage. 4is seems ne$essary a$$ording to teir analysis, yet also seems

$ontradi$tory. n teir &ritings &e $an see te lega$y of a%%lying te !# model to te

*old +ar &it te inter%retation tat te a$tors really Eust &ant to get along, but are

%reented from doing so due gien te insurmountable distrust of oters. demonstrate

te ongoing $onfusion of alleged se$urity'seekers %referring to su$ker one anoter in

Jeris" dis$ussion of te 3odesian &ites" de$ision making, and in Snyder"s dis$ussion

of allian$e building. agree &it S$&eller tat a se$urity dilemma is an assuran$e game

in &i$ no one as te in$entie to $on;uer te oter> tat a troublesome $onfusion is

introdu$ed in %ermitting se$urity seekers to ado%t te %referen$es of an aggressor.

4e $ru$ial %oint in differentiating bet&een te %roblem of se$urity as a Stag 8unt

or as a !risoner"s dilemma is tat te former game %ermits all agents to a$iee se$urity

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in a %ositie sum fasion &ereas te latter game assumes tat se$urity as a negatie

sum $om%onent. S$elling un&ittlingly a$$e%ted te inter%retation tat se$urity as a

negatie sum $om%onent in is use of te !# to model te se$urity dilemma. 8o&eer,

in %ermitting deterren$e to mire a$tors in a stalemate tat mimi$s a eiatan, S$elling

stries to res$ue $lassi$ liberalism"s o%timism tat se$urity is mutually attainable. Still,

te damage &as already done, and any use of te !# to $a%ture te %roblem of se$urity,

and not tat of %redation, &ill $allenge te liberal foundation in te %romise of mutual

se$urity. 4is &atersed in tinking about te %ossibility of mutual se$urity as gone

unnoti$ed as it as be$ome normal to a$$e%t tat te %roblem of $oo%eration and te

so$ial $ontra$t are best refle$ted by te !risoner"s dilemma.21

/en if $lassi$ liberals %resumed te %ossibility of mutual se$urity, and S$elling

&orked to a%%roimate teir out$ome &it te introdu$tion of mutual deterren$e, oter

late t&entiet'$entury teorists &ere more $omfortable tinking in terms of se$urity &it

a negatie sum $om%onent. n tis manner one agent"s in$rease in se$urity may &ell

$ome at te $ost of anoter"s. Jeris finally makes te distin$tion bet&een a regular

se$urity dilemma, re%resented as a !# but $ontaining status ;uo oriented a$tors (een if

tis is not logi$ally %ossible), and a 5dee% se$urity dilemma6 in &i$ agents"

a$ieement of se$urity is antagonisti$. Altoug many 3 teorists tougt of te *old

+ar as a mundane se$urity dilemma soluable troug mutual deterren$e, Jeris

a$kno&ledges tat many in te S %oli$y elite ie&ed te *old +ar as a situation in

&i$ only one nation $ould &in. Mutual se$urity of te S and SS3 &as im%ossible

to a$iee. 4is latter %ers%e$tie $ara$teries tat of te %roto'neo$onseraties and

teir se$ond generation in te form of today"s neo$onseraties.

21See, for eam%le, 8argreaes 8ea% and


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Jeris $ara$teries is dee% se$urity dilemma as one of $lasing &orld ie&s,

and e em%asies an ideational $om%onent driing te $onfli$t bet&een $ommunism and

$a%italism. Geo$onseratie tinkers $on$ur. 4e onus is on a$ieing full s%e$trum

dominan$e, su%%osedly to be te &orld"s good $o%, but re$ogniing te need to figt

oters on teir o&n terms. 4us, 3i$ard *eney ado$ates taking te gloes off, and

using des%i$able means to figt odious a$tors &o &e %er$eie ae een a small

likeliood of being terrorists. 3e$ent neo$onseraties ado%t bot S$elling"s initial idea

tat un$ertainty $an motiate ado%ting te %referen$es of a %redator> moreoer tat

ado%ting tese %referen$es ne$

amadae - cold war, security dilemma and prisoner's dilemma

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