Allied Marines in the Korean Warby LeoJ. Daugherty HI

n praise of the BritishRoyal Marines thathad been attached tohis command sincemid-November 1950,

Major General Oliver P. Smith,Commanding General, 1st MarineDivision, wrote that their services inthe recently concluded ChosinReservoir campaign made "a sig-nificant contribution to the hold-ing of Hagaru, which was vital tothe [1st Marine] Division." GeneralSmith's comments reflected theview held by many Marines, bothofficers and enlisted, of the fightingabilities of both their Britishcousins and their Republic ofKorea Marine Corps allies. Duringthe three years they fought togeth-er on the Korean peninsula, theBritish, Korean, and U.S. Marinesforged bonds that still exist today.

In the early morning hours of 25June 1950, mechanized andground units of the North KoreanPeoples' Army (NKPA) rolledacross the 38th Parallel into theneighboring Republic of Korea(ROK). Within 48 hours, President

ON THE COVER: Members of the 1stKorean Marine Co'ps Regiment man a.50-caliber machine gun in fightingnear Hongchon, Korea. NationalArchives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156476AT LEFT: Royal Marines take up positionsduring a raid to destroy enemy supplyroutes near Song/in, North Korea.National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428515

Harry S. Truman placed U.S. forcesin Japan on alert. Within a week'stime, elements of the U.S. EighthArmy, then on occupation duty inJapan, were rushed to South Koreato stem the North Korean invasion.As army soldiers, and later Marinesof Brigadier General Edward A.Craig's 1st Provisional MarineBrigade, fought the NKPA to theoutskirts of the port of Pusan, theUnited Nations undertook a seriesof votes that not only condemnedthe North Korean invasion, butbrought thousands of allied troopsto the assistance of the belea-guered ROK. Among the troopsassigned to the Korean theater wasa hastily assembled unit of RoyalMarines stationed in Great Britainand Malaya, where they werealready engaged in a guerrilla waragainst Communist terrorists.

The deployment of RoyalMarines to Korea came as the gov-ernment of Prime Minister ClementR. Attlee announced its intentionin the British Parliament to add tothe forces being sent to Korea.While there was some disagree-ment with this decision among theChief of the Imperial General Staff,Field Marshal Viscount WilliamSlim, and Chief of the Air Staff,Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, both ofwhom argued that "Britain wasalready engaged in active opera-tions in Malaya as important ... incountering communist expansionas in Korea," Admiral Lord Fraser ofNorth Cape, the First Sea Lord,strenuously advocated for the dis-patch of a brigade-sized force ofRoyal Marines to operate in unisonwith the U.S. Navy as a commando

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raiding force. Within two weeks ofLord Fraser's decision, on 16

August 1950, a 300-man RoyalMarine unit was formed and tookthe name 41 Independent Com-mando. "Independent" in the unitdesignation meant the commandingofficer had sole responsibility forthe unit and did not have to consulthigher British headquarters onoperational and logistical matters.

The commandos were drawnmostly from active duty units andindividual Marine reservistspreparing to depart for service inMalaya as part of 3 CommandoBrigade. Under the command ofLieutenant Colonel Douglas B.

Drysdale, a seasoned Marine vet-eran who had served with distinc-tion as a member of 3 Commandoin the Far East during World War II,41 Independent Commando beganpreparations for service in Korea.

The Marines assembled at theRoyal Marine Barracks at Bick-leigh, Devon, site of the comman-do school, where they receivedthe customary inoculations andissue of uniforms prior to theirdeployment to the Far East.Initially, 41 Commando drew fromthree separate contingents. Thefirst, organized from volunteersand reservists in the UnitedKingdom, was flown fromBickleigh to Japan in civilianclothes to conceal the ultimatedestination and employment. Thesecond group comprised volun-teer sailors and Marines drawnfrom the British Pacific Fleet. Thisgroup already had begun an inten-sive period of training even beforethe main body of Royal Marines

TRAIN WRECKERS AND GHOST KILLERS

character and proud lineage,American military officials permittedthe Royal Marines to retain theirunique green berets. As the RoyalMarines trained on weapons famil-iarization, small unit tactics andraiding techniques, and conductedphysical fitness exercises, AdmiralJoy decided to use them as a raid-ing force along the enemy's longand vulnerable coastline.

Like many U.S. Marines sent toKorea as part of the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade, the majority ofmen recruited for 41 Commandowere World War II veterans,although there were a few newrecruits and navy volunteers.Many, like Sergeant Major Trevor-Dodds, a European kayakingchampion, were of "superb qualityand spirit" and had volunteeredfor service in Korea. Each was acombat swimmer, demolitionsexpert, or heavy weapons special-ist. These talents proved useful

VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN,

Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, aproponent of amphibious raidingand other special operations, wasinstrumental in the deployment of theRoyal Marines to Korea and their sub-sequent assignment to the 1st MarineDivision.National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC352920

arrived from Great Britain and hadbeen organized into a rifle sectionknown as the Fleet Volunteers.The third group came from a rein-forcement draft destined for 3, 40,42, or 45 Commando in Malayaand was on board the Britishtroopship HMT Devonshire, whichhad been diverted to Japan inearly August. Vice Admiral C.

Turner Joy, Commander, NavalForces, Far East, and Admiralty

officials in London andWashington, D.C. decided theRoyal Marines would operate withthe U.S. Navy and Marines.

After arriving at Camp McGill, aU.S. Army base 50 miles south ofTokyo at Takehama and near theU.S. Navy base at Yokosuka, theCommando received a completefield issue of uniforms, weapons,and equipment supplied by theU.S. Army. To maintain their distinct

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41 Commando Weapons and Equipment

hen the British Royal Marine's 41 IndependentCommando deployed to Camp McGill, Japan,in early August 1950, they carried with them

their standard British army issued weapons. To alleviateany logistical problem, the Commander, Naval Forces, FarEast, and British military officials decided 41 Commandowould be issued the same weapons as those issued to theU.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army. This practice not onlysimplified the replacement of damaged weapons andsupply of ammunition, but enabled the Royal Marines tobecome familiar with U.S. weapons and facilitated theirtraining activities.

Personal weapons used by the Commando included theMl Garand semiautomatic rifle and Ml Carbines.Individual Marines (including their officers) preferredthe reliable Ml Garand rifle, which held up reasonablywell under extreme battlefield conditions in Korea, par-ticularly during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Whilemany Marines originally preferred to carry the light-weight Ml Carbine because of the high volume of fire itcould deliver, it proved extremely unreliable and wasprone to malfunction in the sub-zero temperatures of

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North Korea. The official submachine gun, which theBritish disliked, was the M3 .45-caliber "Grease Gun," sim-ilar to the 9mm Sten gun the Commando originally car-ried. A number of old 1926 Thompson submachine gunswere aquired and used during raids. All officers andnoncommissioned officers carried the coveted Colt .45-caliber pistol.The standard Bren light machine gun gave way to theAmerican Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), which fired.30-caliber ammunition from a 20-round magazine andwas organic to the U.S. Marine rifle squad. While the BARbecame standard issue to 41 Commando, they nonethe-less lamented the loss of their beloved Bren guns.Despite the problems the Commando had in maintainingthe effectiveness and operability of their Ml Garandsand BARs in the sub-zero cold of Korea, the weaponsnonetheless proved reliable when properly maintained.

Leaving their Vickers machine guns behind, the RoyalMarines employed the air-cooled, bipod-mountedM1919A4 light machine gun that came with a booster cupthat enabled it to fire 900 rounds per minute. Othermachine guns used were the air-cooled A4 .30-caliber ver-

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-438727

sion and M1917A1 water-cooled version on a heavy tri-pod. The heavy weapons group initially used the M1919machine guns, although they switched to the M1917,which was comparable to their Vickers machine guns. TheMarines also employed the Browning M2 .50-calibermachine guns for use on the islands in Wonsan harbor andfor targets inland.

U.S. Marines issued 41 Commando the standard60mm mortars without a tripod, as well the 81mm mor-tars, which proved far more effective than its standard 3-inch mortar. To battle the thick-armored enemy T-34tanks, the Royal Marines received both the 2.36-inch"bazooka" rocket launchers and the 3.5-inch rocketlauncher. The Commando's heavy weapons group alsoemployed several 75mm recoilless rifles, which theyused with great effect against enemy emplacements andarmored vehicles.

Communications gear was U.S. Marine standard-issue,at least a generation ahead of the British equivalent. Thetroop net radio was the short range SCR 536, which wasshapped like a large handset with pull out antenna. Thenet set was the SCR 300, which they adopted as the

"British 31 Set." The ANG/RC 9 or "Angry 9," provided 41Commando with long-range communications capabilities.The Angry 9's most notable characteristic was its abilityto be powered by a hand crank.

Along with the standard U.S. Army fatigues, during theChosin Reservoir campaign the commandos wore normalunderwear, longjohns, blouse or Angola shirt, a woolenjersey, fatigue jacket and trousers, a pile-lined parkawith hood issued to the U.S. Marines, underneath whichthey wore their traditional green beret, and ski mittenswith woolen inner liners and leather outers. Of all theclothing items, the most unpopular was the standard-issuefootwear, or shoepacks, which were rubber-soled and"gutta-percha, calf-length, lace-up" boots with feltinsoles that were prone to become damp and cumber-some. These shoepacks contributed to many cases of frost-bite as the feet would perspire and thus freeze when thetemperatures dipped. Much of the original British-issuecold-weather gear came from stocks used during WorldWar II, which often dated as far back as World War I whenBritish forces briefly intervened on behalf of the pro-Czarist forces in Archangel during the Russian Civil War.

time and again during the raidsalong the North Korean coast. Thechoice of men with such specializedabilities reflected Drysdale's recog-nition for the need of such combat-related skills as the Commandoassembled and prepared for battle.

As journalist and Member ofParliament Thomas E. Driberg saidof the men of 41 Commando in his20 December 1950 broadcast onBritish Broadcasting Corporation'sHome Service:

These lads grew remark-ably quickly into the moodand outlook that seem to becharacteristic of this specialkind of outfit: one mightdefine it as a nonchalant self-sufficiency, a debonair assur-ance that is never arrogant, aself-mocking toughness. Thecommon idea of Commando"toughness" is wrong. Theyare not muscle-bound super-men. Many of them are quiteslight and trim—physicallycompact, mentally alert. Theirtraining fits them perfectly forsuch jobs as they had to do.

The unit was organized intothree rifle troops, B, C, and D, anda headquarters troop. Each rifletroop numbered approximately 45to 50 men commanded by a cap-tain, while the small headquarterstroop consisted of administrative,motor transport, medical, commu-nications, and a 20-man heavyweapons group. At the outbreakof the Korean War, 41

Independent Commando consist-ed of 300 men of all ranks. Itsstrength fluctuated during the firstyear of the war as the fightingbecame more intense and thenumber of casualties mounted.

While 41 Commando includedmen with different military spe-cialties, only engineers and sig-nalers continued to perform theirspecific duties. The remainderfought as riflemen. Unit organiza-tion of the Commando was ad hocprior to joining the 1st MarineDivision in November 1950. Theheavy weapons group, which con-sisted of mortars, machine guns,and antitank weapons, as well asassault engineers, remained at-tached to the headquarters troop.

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Of all the Royal Marine organiza-tions, the heavy weapons groupwas the most flexible. The menassigned to this group weretrained on all weapons in compli-ance with the standard RoyalMarine emphasis on cross-training,which was designed to ensure thatif one six-man team went down, thesecond could fill in without alapse in covering fire. The value ofsuch cross-training was evidentduring the defense of WonsanHarbor when the heavy weaponsgroup assisted the island garrisonby manning the four mortars, fourmachine guns, and 75mm recoil-less rifle on Hwangto-do.

Since the Royal Marines wouldbe operating primarily withAmerican forces, they were issuedstandard U.S. firearms and otherfield equipment, including whatthe British called "battle kit," orindividual equipment. This allevi-ated the logistics problem of inte-grating British equipment withinthe U.S. Navy or Marine Corpssupply system. The use ofAmerican uniforms and equipmentmade it easier to supply and re-

equip when replacements wereneeded. A handful of veteranRoyal Marines had used AmericanMl Garand rifles during World WarII and were familiar with its oper-ation.

As the Commando prepared forbattle, General of the ArmyDouglas MacArthur questioned theuse of British Marines even beforetheir first taste of combat. In arather terse exchange with ViceAdmiral Joy, MacArthur ques-tioned not only the necessity andsecurity of conducting such raidsalong the North Korean coastline,but also the use of the Commandoinstead of the Navy's underwaterdemolition teams (UDT). Joy, anadmirer of the Royal Marines,responded:

The 41 Royal MarineCommando was formed andtrained especially to conductcommando raids. Plans areready for destruction of severalkey points between latitudes40 and 41 on east coast.

"Pregnant Perch."

Believe they can be executedwithout serious risk. Sub-marine crew and commandosare keen to fight and gainexperience for evaluation ofthis type of organization.

Joy continued to defend the useof the Royal Marines as a raidingforce and MacArthur eventuallyrelented.

In the stealth of night, a troop of41 Commando boarded the trans-port submarine USS Perch (ASSP313) for its first raid against anenemy railroad installation andsupply line. Adhering to Mac-Arthur's explicit orders forbiddingthe use of no more than 70 indi-viduals, the 63 Marines of thetroop adjusted to life on board thePerch and continued to train forcombat.

Admiral Joy's statement thatboth American submariners andRoyal Marines were "keen" for a

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fight was substantiated in the com-ments made in the log of thePerch as the Commando preparedfor its first operation from the sub-marine. Leaving Japan on board aspecially outfitted high-speedtransport, the Marines then trans-ferred to the Perch, which hadbeen assigned to carry them to theobjective area. Even as the Marinessailed toward the enemy coastline,they continued an intensive,round-the-clock training program,in which they "quickly impressedthe Americans with their enthusiasmand skill." The log of the Perchincluded more praise, noting:

These [Royal Marines] wereexperienced raiders with a"can do" attitude comparableto that of the Perch 's. Theyseemed to enjoy having morethrown at them than theycould possibly assimilate inthe short time available, androse to the occasion bybecoming a well-trained, andcoordinated submarine raid-

Royal Marines line the deck f the USS Perch (ASSP 313) asthe submarine leaves Japan for Korea. Commissioned in1944, the Perch operated out of Hawaii and Australia dur-ing World War II and was one of only two submarines toreceive the Submarine Combat Patrol insignia during the

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-421628

Korean War. In the 1960s she conducted special operationsin Vietnam and was decommissioned in 1971. The hugecylindrical watertight locker on the afterdeck stored inflat-able boats and other equipment, prompting the nickname,

S. e: 0- -- —• .—--: .4

ing team in a remarkablyshort time.

Royal Marine Fred Heyhurst waseven more blunt in his remarkswhen describing the "remarkablyshort time" (two weeks) it took forAmerican seamen and BritishMarines to become a formidableteam. Heyhurst stated: "There wasa tremendous spirit, to learn all weneeded to know and get on withthe job. We would get hang of one[U.S.] weapon and go straight outfor another, whatever the timewas. ... It was the best unit anyonecould have joined." Originallyplanned to provide relief for theallied forces, which had beenpushed into a perimeter aroundPusan, the raid was delayedapproximately three weeks be-cause of concerns about enemylines.

There was, indeed, a shortlearning curve, as MacArthur'splanned Inchon landing drewnear. Having been in the Far Eastonly a month, the British Marinescrammed weeks of training intodays as a detachment of 41Commando on board the Britishfrigate HMS Whitesand Bay (F633) prepared for its first action offthe west coast of Korea, whichcame on the night of 12 September1950. Intended to act in unisonwith a U.S. Army raiding battalionthat never deployed, the detach-ment, commanded by LieutenantDerek Pound and referred to asPound Force, found itself attachedto the 1st Marine Division, whichwas only hours away from landingat the port of Inchon on 15September. Pound Force, designat-ed a Special Activities Group byU.S. Army Major General Edward M.Almond's X Corps, launched adiversionary raid against NorthKorean army elements at Kunsan.At the conclusion of the raid, theCommando reembarked on board

the Whitesand Bay and sailed intoposition off Inchon, where it cameunder operational control ofGeneral Smith's 1st MarineDivision on 17 September, twodays after the Inchon landings.During subsequent actions ashore,Lieutenant Pound's detachment ofRoyal Marines accompanied theirU.S. Marine counterparts duringthe 1st Marine Division's push toSeoul. Acting as a motorizedreconnaissance force, the Com-mando drove as far inland asKimpo Airfield. After seizure of theairfield, they rejoined other RoyalMarines conducting hit-and-runraids against North Korean railroadand communications lines.Another team of Royal Marinesserved with a Marine air and navalgunfire liaison officer directingnaval gunfire from the supportingBritish warships participating inthe Inchon landing.

With the South Korean capitalunder United Nations control,General MacArthur's attentionturned to the pursuit of the retreat-ing NKPA. Both U.S. Marines andRoyal Marines were withdrawn toprepare for a subsequent end runagainst the east coast port ofWonsan. While the 1st MarineDivision reassembled at the port ofInchon, the Royal Marines reem-barked on board their respectiveships and sailed back to Japan formore training and to await furtherorders. While in Japan, 41

Commando participated in twomajor raids against a section ofrailway line along the enemy'snortheastern coastline betweenChongjin and Hungnam.

As the Perch approached thefirst target area west of Tachon onthe evening of 30 September, she

Royal Marines plant demolition charges under the railroad tracks of enemy sup-ply lines along the eastern coast of Korea. During the raid, the Marines demol-ished a section of embankment under the rail line and concealed explosivecharges with pressure activated detonators in two adjacent railway tunnels.

National Archives Photo (U5N) 80-G-428242

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was detected by enemy radar.With the landing party already inthe rubber boats, disaster was nar-rowly averted when the motor onthe skimmer refused to start.Enemy activity ashore soon made itclear that a trap had been set andthe Perch re-embarked the Com-mando and withdrew.

The next morning, the Perchrendezvoused with the destroyersUSS Maddox (DD 731) and USSHerbert J. Thomas (DD 883) todevelop an alternative plan. Thenew plan called for the Thomas tocreate a diversion at the originaltarget while the Perch carried outthe landing at a second site. Onthe night of 1 October 1950, 41Commando landed from the Perchon the coast above Hungnam andwest of Tanchon, where a day ear-lier they had been forced to cancela mission when a pre-landingreconnaissance of the objectivearea detected an enemy patrolboat guarding the entrance of twoadjoining rail tunnels, which werethe intended targets. Under cover ofdarkness and in a known minedarea, the Perch drew close toshore. After a quick periscope sur-vey of the coastline, the skipper ofthe submarine gave the OK to landthe Commando. Numbering 67strong, they boarded 10 black rub-ber rafts and paddled ashore.Lieutenant Colonel Drysdaleassumed personal command of 41Commando's first major raidagainst enemy supply lines.

The Commando stepped ashoreunopposed. While one group ofDrysdale's force hurriedly plantedexplosives beneath the steel rails ofthe targeted tracks, two othergroups fanned out along the flanksto stave off enemy attacks. Thedemolitions were then detonated,resulting in a pile of twisted railsand a destroyed rail culvert. Withthe mission completed, the com-mandos were recalled to the

Photo courtesy of the Naval Historical Center

Fellow Marines and the ship's compa-ny gather on the deck of the Perch forthe burial of Marine Peter R. Jones.For many Marines it was their firstburial at sea. For some it was theirfirst military funeral, but it would notbe their last.

Perch. With one troop coveringtheir withdrawal, the BritishMarines found themselves in afurious firefight with the fullyalerted enemy. In the action that fol-lowed, they suffered their firstcombat fatality as enemy guardskilled Private Peter R. Jones.

Later, while the Perch lay to inthe Sea of Japan, a solemn cere-mony was held on her afterdeck.On a stretcher covered by theUnion Jack rested the body ofPrivate Jones. Drysdale read abrief service and the body wascommitted to the deep. EightCommando riflemen fired threevolleys in tribute and the twoAmerican destroyers each paidtheir respects with a full 21-gunsalute.

As was the custom, the captain ofthe Perch, Lieutenant CommanderRobert D. Quinn, arranged for theensign to be folded and sent to thenext of kin. The ensign and Jones'medals are now displayed in theRoyal Marines' Museum alongsidethe U.N. flag flown by the Perch.

Several days later, another force

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of 125 Royal Marines, under thecommand of 31-year-old MajorDennis L. St. M. Aldridge,embarked on board the convertedAmerican fast destroyer-transportsUSS Bass (APD 124) and USSWantuck (APD 125), each ofwhich came equipped with fourlanding craft that could accommo-date 162 men. The significance ofthe raid was twofold. This was to bethe first raid against the 120-milestretch of North Korea's rail line,which ran along the northeastcoast. It also was the first com-mando raid launched from adestroyer.

Once ashore in the objectivearea south of Songjin, approxi-mately 80 miles from the NorthKorean border with the SovietUnion and even less from theChinese border, the Marines splitinto a number of parties. The"powder-train" carried explosivesup to a railway tunnel; demolitionexperts laid the charges and setthe fuses; others guarded thebeach and boats and checked outthe buildings between the beachand railway. All went like clock-work.

Journalist Thomas Driberg, whoaccompanied the Marines, de-scribed the results:

We "got the hell out of it" asthe Yanks say, as quickly aswe could. It was a terrificmoment for all the chaps—many of whom ... had neverbeen in anything like it, thereal thing, before when,halfway back to the ship, wesuddenly saw the sky torn bya vivid orange flash, and thetremendous roar as the tun-nel went up in the air andknew that our mission hadbeen successful.

Unfortunately, the Marines suf-fered two casualties, the group's

Vietnamese civilians from HaiphongFrench defeat in 1954.

youngest Marine and a World WarII veteran. Both were buried atsea. Despite the loss, the raid,which "involved transportingquantities of limpert mines andexplosives ashore in rubberdinghies through the surf and cur-rents," was highly successful indisrupting enemy rail lines andsoon gave rise to the nickname theRoyal Marines proudly adopted asa trademark of their mission inKorea, "the train wreckers."

As the navies assigned to theUnited Nations forces heldsupremacy in the waters off theKorean coast, attention now shiftedinland as MacArthur's forces drovefurther north in what appeared tobe a war-ending offensive againstthe retreating NKPA. As the militarysituation on the Korean peninsularapidly changed, so to did the mis-sion of the Royal Marines. Theyregrouped and headed back toCamp McGill to reorganize and

to Cam Rahn Bay in the wake of the

train in small unit tactics, coldweather operations, and companyand battalion weapons. The just-completed coastal raids would bethe last in which the commandoswould use rubber rafts. Followingthese two missions, the commandos

used landing craft in what theytermed "dry ramp landings."

In his postwar account of theservices of 41 Commando,Drysdale noted the techniquesused by his Marines had evolvedfrom those used by the U.S.Marines during World War II, par-ticularly those of LieutenantColonel Evans F. Carlson's raiders,and had been adapted in Korea"to suit the prevailing circum-stances." Drysdale, who had beenimpressed with the use of sub-marines in raiding missions, laterwrote: "it is enough to say that allwho took part in the operationwere deeply impressed by theobvious potential of a new form ofsubmarine warfare." He added thatwhat made the raids an evengreater success was the planning,cooperation between the navaland ground commanders, and theadequate time for training andrehearsal prior to launching theoperations.

As U.N. forces pushed towardthe Yalu River and the RoyalMarines trained at Camp McGill, itwas suggested the commandos beattached to the 1st Marine Divisionas a reconnaissance force. At firstrejecting such a proposal,

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-438738

Commandos from the USS Horace A. Bass (APD 124) load an assault boat fora raid on installations deep behind enemy lines. Commissioned in 1944, the Bassfirst saw combat at Okinawa and is credited with sinking a Japanese submarinein thefinal days of World Waril. In addition to carrying out raids in Korea, sheparticipated in the evacuation of Chinese Nationalist troops to Formosa and

A bazooka team from 41 Independent Commando takes its position during a raidon enemy rail and supply routes near Song/in. The raids brought this vulnera-ble area of North Korea under allforms of naval attack.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428248

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