algra, k, aristotle and the aristotelian tradition, 2005

7/30/2019 Algra, K, Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition, 2005

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Review: Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition

Author(s): Keimpe AlgraSource: Phronesis, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2005), pp. 250-261Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182781 .

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Book Notes

Aristotle and the Aristotelian TraditionKEIMPEALGRA

This will be my last set of booknotes on 'Aristotle': I am handing overthis task to Ben Morison. Four of the books which I kept for this occa-sion concern aspects of the Aristotelian tradition (ancient, medieval andmodern) rather than Aristotle himself, and I shall start with these. RobertTodd's annotated translation of Themistius' commentary on, or ratherinterpretative paraphrase of, Aristotle's Physics IV, published in RichardSorabji's series 'The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle', is dedicated tothe memory of Henry Blumenthal, to whose careful scholarship on theAristotelian commentators we owe so much.' T.'s translation appears tobe clear and reliable and his explanatory notes are brief (in accordancewith the general format of the series) but generally adequate. In his intro-duction he characterizes Themistius' paraphrases as targeted at readerswho wished to revisit Aristotelian treatises with which they were alreadyfamiliar, and as pitched at a level somewhere between strictly elementaryexpositions on the one hand and more expansive commentariesof the kindwritten by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the other. In a separate prefaceSorabji more or less qualifies Blumenthal's characterization of Themistiusas a (or in fact: the last) 'Peripatetic commentator', by noting that thereare some occasions where Themistius does side with contemporaryNeoplatonism, as in his commentary on the DA where he rejects Aris-totle's empiricist account of concept formation. True though this maybe, such occasions are few and far between. In general Themistius stayspretty close to Aristotle, although he sometimes includes digressions offer-ing material that does not correspondwith anything in Aristotle's text. Inthe commentary on Physics IV we find two examples of this procedure,both directed against Galen's attacks on Aristotle. One (149, 4-19) con-

' Themistius On Aristotle's Physics 4, translatedby Robert B. Todd (series TheAncient Commentatorson Aristotle), IthacaNY (Cornell University Press) 2003; x +150 pp.; ISBN 0 8014 4103 X; $ 62.50.? KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, 2005 Phronesis L13Also available online - www.brill.nl


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BOOKNOTES 251cerns the alleged circularityof Aristotle's attempt to define time. The other(114, 7-12) discusses a thought experiment adduced by Galen to prove theexistence of a self-subsistent three-dimensional space. Imagine a vesselwith its contents removed and no other body flowing in. What are we tosuppose will be left between its extremities? According to Themistius,Galen is begging the question by just assuming the existence of the voidspace which he is supposed to prove. In his Corollary on Place (576, 12 ff.)Philoponus will later claim that Galen is not assuming any such thing, butthat he is just exploring the consequences of the assumption that no otherbody flows in. Themistius himself, by the way, brings in his own presup-positions: 'eliminating the mutual replacement of bodies is no differentfrom completely eliminating body'. In other words, he claims that Galen'sthought experiment ignores a fundamental principle of physics, viz. thetheory of antiperistasis. As Todd suggests in his notes ad loc., there is astrong possibility that these anti-Galenic passages go back to Alexanderof Aphrodisias, who is known to have attacked Galen's views on placeand time. So even here (pace Sorabji's introduction, p. vii) 'originality'need not be the correct term. But of course in the history of ideas lack oforiginality does not entail insignificance, and instead of desperately look-ing for traces of originality we may simply value Themistius' commen-tary on the Physics for what it is: a clear and intelligent survey whichconstituted an importantlink in the transmission of Aristotle's ideas. It isgood to have this part of it available in translation.As for the significance of Themistius in general, his paraphrasesenjoyedgreat popularityamong the Aristoteliancommentators of late antiquityand,in Latintranslations, n the Aristoteliantradition n the later Middle Ages andthe early modern period. His commentaryon the De Anima, for example,played an importantrole in the late medieval debate on the immortalityofthe individual intellect. In the 15th century Nicoletto Vernia's Padovan lec-tures on Aristotle'sPosteriorAnalyticsmade constantreference to Themistius,and claimed that no one could be found who was more learned:'proindeado-rate verba Themistii'. I owe this reference to EdwardMahoney's contribution('Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers') to thevolume The Impactof Aristotelianismon ModernPhilosophy,edited by Ric-cardo pozzo.2 The book presents the papers of a 1999 conference on theRezeptionsgeschichteof Aristotle's conception of the intellectual virtues, butonly some of the articlesactually address this theme. One of these is Stanley

2 R. Pozzo (ed.),The Impactof Aristotelianismon ModernPhilosophy (Studies inPhilosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 39), WashingtonD.C. (The CatholicUniversity f AmericaPress)2003;xvi + 336 pp.;ISBN 0 8132 13479; ?50.50.


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252 BOOK NOTES

Rosen's 'Phronesis or Ontology: Aristotle and Heidegger', which focuses onHeidegger's 1924/5 Marburg ectures on Plato's Sophistes and on how theymisinterpret or adapt (the difference is not always clear in Heidegger)Aristotle's conception of phronesis by taking it as 'der Ernst der bestimmtenEntscheidung' and as the silent call of Gewissen (consciousness). Heideggershifts the focus of application of phronesis from the practical to the ontolog-ical level and by doing so rather blurs the Aristotelian distinction betweentheory and practice, while actually 'transforming both into poetry' (thusRosen, on p. 258). And of course this ontology derives all significance ofhuman life from its finitude, and the terror of its obliteration (Angst vomTode), to which man may respond by deciding to act 'authentically'.It is here,in fact, that phronesis comes in - an odd appearance, f one takes into con-sideration thatAristotle instead emphasizes the possibility of leading a supra-humanlife andthat for him eudaimoniarather hanAngstis the centraltheme.In fact the general incompatibilitybetween the two theories makes one won-der why Heidegger insisted on building on Aristotle in the first place. Andwhat, in the end, is the net result?Rosen, for one, concludes thatwhen com-pared to Aristotle's conception of phronesis with its orientation towardseveryday life, 'Heidegger's existential ontology, however brilliant,and per-haps because of its very brilliance, can bring nothing to human affairs butblindness' (p. 265). I am not quite sure I understandwhat this means, but Ihave no doubt it is right. Hans-GeorgGadamerhappensto have been amongthose who attendedHeidegger's lectureson the Sophist, but, as Enrico Bertishows in his essay 'The Reception of Aristotle's Intellectual Virtues inGadamer and the Hermeneutic Philosophy', Gadamer's Wahrheit undMethode as well as his 1998 commentaryon NE VI remainedmuch morefaithful to Aristotle's text and intentions, though Gadamerappearsto haveover-emphasized the practical element in Aristotle's ethics, while playingdown the role of theoria.

With Michael Davis' 'defense' of Aristotle against Nietzsche on tragedy('Tragedy in the Philosophic Age of the Greeks: Aristotle's Reply toNietzsche') we move away from the main topic. Nietzsche's critique,as iswell known, centered on Aristotle's rationalizingand cognitivist approachtotragedy.The upshot of D.'s defense seems to be that the Poetics is not justaboutpoiesis in the sense of 'making poetry', but also directly about humanbehaviour(p. 216: 'poiesis understoodas action') a curious claim which tomy mind gets insufficientsupportfrom the juxtapositionof Doric dran andAtticpratteinandpoiein in Poet. 1048b1-2. D. concludes, if I understandhimcorrectly, that the Poetics, in so far as it is about action, shows us how theaction on stage (even when irrational)can figureas somehow exemplary,sothat in this respect 'Nietzsche does seem to have erred in underestimatingAristotle's grasp of the intimacy of the relationbetween the rationaland theirrational'(p. 226). I am not sure whetherthis interpretation uccesfully res-


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BOOKNOTES 253cues Aristotle from Nietzsche's critique;thoughit providessome room for theirrational, t still appears to do this in some sort of moralizingcontext. ButperhapsI missed something,as in fact did the editor,who in his Introduction(p. xiv) claims that D. 'points out that Nietzsche is right [my italics] in min-imizing Aristotle's grasp of the intimacy of the relationbetween the rationaland the irrational' theexactoppositeof what the abovequotationseems to say.I single out three further contributionsall of them broadeningtheir scopebeyond the issue of the intellectual virtues, but all of them well worth read-ing. Mahoney's article 'Aristotle and Some Late Medieval and RenaissancePhilosophers', already referred to above, offers a selective but informativeoverview of the reception of Aristotle and his ancient commentators inmedieval and renaissancephilosophy,of course without breakingmuch newground for those acquainted with the author's own earlier work and withCharles B. Schmitt's classic studyAristotle in the Renaissance. Also the solidcontributions of Antonino Poppi (on 'Zabarella or Aristotelianism as aRigorous Science') and William A. Wallace ('The Influence of Galileo'sLogic and Its Use in His Science') basically take up and summarize earlierwork by the same authors. They demonstrate a common ground betweenZabarella and Galileo in their use of the Aristotelianregressus i.e. the com-binationof analysis (startingfrom the effects, 'better known to us', arrivingat a mere approximateor hypotheticaldiscovery of principlesand supplyingknowledge quia) and synthesis (moving from principlesto the effects deriv-ing from those principles,and supplying knowledge propter quid). Betweenthe two stages there is a reflective pause which should allow one to deter-mine that the cause found is really the one that is true and necessarily boundto the effect. This is what Zabarellacalls a mentale ipsius causae examen. Iwould maintain that in Aristotle's own works this role is being played bydialectical scrutiny. Zabarella ratherseems to have thoughtof somethinglikemathematicalanalysis. Galileo, who remainscommitted to the overall frame-work of the Aristotelianregressus, introduces a crucial innovation in linkingthe examen of this intermediate tage to attestationby the senses and to exper-iment (periculum). It is clear, however, that both Zabarella and Galileothoughtof the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics, on which the conceptionof regressus was based, as offeringessentially a methodusfor scientific inves-tigations (on which more below).3

I Other contributions:JohnP. Doyle, 'Wrestlingwith a Wraith:AndreSemery, S. J.(1630-1717) on Aristotle'sGoat-Stag and Knowing the Unknowable'; Christia Mercer,'Leibniz, Aristotle and EthicalKnowledge'; RichardL. Velkley, 'Speech, Imagination,Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal'; Riccardo Pozzo, 'Kant on the FiveIntellectualVirtues';AlfredoFerrarin,Hegel'sAppropriationf theAristotelian ntellect';RichardCobb-Stevens, 'The Presence of Aristotelian Nous in Husserl's Philosophy'.


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254 BOOKNOTES

A similarvolume,which appeareda few years earlier,editedby Bob Sharples,is WhoseAristotle? WhoseAristotelianism?4t features,among other contri-butions, fine essays by M. W. F. Stone on 'The Debate on the Soul in theSecond Half of the ThirteenthCentury'(which in passing has valuable thingsto say about the origin and limitationsof the notion of 'Aristotelianism'),byJonathanBarneson 'Locke andthe Syllogism',andby EnricoBertion Brentano'sinfluentialinterpretations f Aristotle's metaphysicsand theology ('Brentanoand Aristotle's Metaphysics').Monique Dixsaut ('Is There Such a Thing asNietzsche's Aristotle?') offers a clear and systematic survey of Nietszche'sreaction(s) to Aristotle's Poetics, includinghis views on katharsis,the role ofthe chorus and the importanceof dramaticperformance,andhis negativeviewof Aristotelian ethics as the ethics of 'Aristotle and everyone'.5My next book could in principlehave been covered in the book notes onNeoplatonismas well, but may be better at home here. For many centuriesPorphyry's ntroduction Eisagoge) playeda key role in the philosophicalcur-riculum,althoughnowadays it is no longer among the favourites of studentsof ancient philosophy.We are fortunate to have a translation the firstoneto be published n English- with introductionandextensive commentary 288pages on 19 pages of translated text) by JonathanBarnes, publishedin theClarendonLater Ancient Philosophersseries.6As is well known, this littletreatise discusses five items (genus, species, difference, property,accident)which later becameknown as the praedicabilia or thepente phonai or quinquevoces, i.e. 'the five words' (on the history of these terms, see further L. M.De Rijk,Aristotle. Semanticsand Ontology,vol. 1, Leiden/Boston/Koln2002,491-498). According to Porphyry's preface,knowing what these items are isnecessary 'even for a schooling in Aristotle's predications ...] and also forthe presentationof definitions,and generally for mattersconcerningdivisionand proof'. B. is probablyright in characterizing his text as an introductionto logic, and hence to philosophyin general,rather than as just an introduc-tion to the Categories (the view of many earlier commentators, such asAmmonius; note, however, that not too much is at stake here, since the Cat.was itself generallyregardedas an introduction o philosophy).The PlatonistPorphyry laims thathe has takenhis material rom 'the old masters andespe-

I R. W. Sharples (ed.), Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, Aldershot(Ashgate) 2001; ix + 181 pp.; ISBN 0 7546 1362 3; ? 35.00.s Other contributions: Helen S. Lang, 'Philoponus' Aristotle: The Extension ofPlace'; Ahmed Hasnawi, 'Topics and Analysis: the Arabic Tradition'; WilliamCharlton,'Aquinas on Aristotle on Immortality'; here are also responses by Franqoisde Gandt to the contributionsof JonathanBarnes and Monique Dixsaut.

6 Porphyry'sIntroduction,ditedbyJonathanBarnes,Oxford ClarendonPress) 2003;xxvi + 415 pp.; ISBN 0 19 9246149; ? 50.00.


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BOOK NOTES 255

cially the Peripateticsamong them', but then again the relevant Peripateticmaterial had by this time become part of the philosophicalkoine, and deepermetaphysical issues are left undiscussed.Accordingly,and paradoxically,theIntroduction,which became the starting point for all medieval discussions ofthe 'problemof universals', tselfdeclinesto deal with thisquestion.As Porphyryputsit in his preface:'aboutgeneraandspecies - whetherthey subsist,whetherthey actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsisttheyare bodiesorincorporeal ndwhether heyareseparableor areinperceptibleitems and subsist about them- these mattersI shall decline to discuss, sucha subject being very deep and demanding anotherand larger investigation'.It might be thought that with such general philosophicalquestions out ofthe way, what remains is a short and ratherbland elementary text, whichhardlydeserves a commentaryof a few hundredpages. This would be wrong.Not only is the text itself at times crabbed and obscure, it also, for all itsbrevity, raises importantand wide-ranging philosophical questions. On bothaccounts ancient students were no doubt helped by the fact that they weresupposed to study this text under the guidanceof a teacher. B.'s commentarytakes on a similarguidingrolevis-a-vishisreaders.He managesto putPorphyry'stext in perspective by explainingthe many issues of Aristotelian logic, ontol-ogy and semantics which are raisedby it, and by guiding us throughthe var-

ious ways in which these matterswere discussedby later ancient philosophers,such as Alexander, Galen, Ammonius, Dexippus,Marius Victorinus, Boethiusand Simplicius. He thus offers a marvellouslyrich and engaging context - acontext which is in many respects more interesting than Porphyry's actualtext. The book winds up with some very useful 'Additional Notes' - one ofthemsuccesfullydefusingclaimsconcerningStoic influenceon theIntroduction,anotheroffering a welcome survey of the various possible references of theterm 'the old masters' (hoi palaioi or hoi archaioi). B. ends his Introduction(p. xxiv) by expressingthe hope that 'anyonewho reads this commentarywillbe half persuadedthat Porphyry repays the ride'. In the end, however, it issurely B. who makes the ride worth while.FromPorphyrywe move back to Aristotle. Orna Harari's book Knowledgeand Demonstrationre-examines the role of syllogistic logic in Aristotle's the-ory of demonstrativeknowledge.7Her main claim is that we should view thePosterior Analyticsnot as an attemptto analyse the structureand methods ofscientific practice (on which see the remarks above on Zabarella and otherearly modern thinkers),but as an attempt to articulate a general notion ofknowledge, viewed as conceptualization, within the constraints set by

I OrnaHarari,Knowledgeand Demonstration. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics,Dordrecht(Kluwer Academic Publishers) 2004; ix + 158 pp.; ISBN 1 4020 2787 7;e 90.00.


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Aristotle's metaphysical theory and his conception of substance in particular.In her view it is the fact that Aristotleconceives all objects of knowledge asquasi-substances hatdetermines heform of reasoning focusing on the relationssubsisting between subject and predicate of demonstrative conclusions -which underlies the theory of demonstration.Against this backgroundH. con-nects the distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing the reason why'with the distinction between what she labels 'perceptualunderstanding' n theone hand and 'conceptual understanding'on the other. Just as induction (i.e.induction as presentedat APo II, 19, which H. distinguishes from the 'argu-mentative'conceptionof inductionwhich Aristotle employs in dialectical con-texts) involves moving from the sensualacquaintancewith the materialmanifoldto an apprehensionof the form (essence), apodeixis leads from perceptualunderstanding i.e. of the hoti) to conceptual understanding i.e. of the dihoti),thus in a sense coveringbothways of what renaissance philosophers in theirmethodological interpretation f the same material)called regressus.Apart from having the meritof emphasising the link between the theoryofdemonstrative knowledge on the one hand and Aristotle's ontology andsemantics on the other, this interpretation ffers some sort of a solution to thefamiliarproblemthat the extant works of Aristotledo not exhibit the methodallegedly presentedby the APo, because what the APo has to offer is now nolonger regardedas a method. On the other hand this in itself does not makeit any easier to see how then the APo should be related to actual scientificpractices.In fact what is arguablythe most interestingchapterof the book isdesigned to show that even Aristotle's formalizationsof mathematicalproofs(which surely are meantto examplify his general theoryof apodeixis) do notmatch the practiceof Euclideangeometry(where proofs are conceived as theresults of construction).But even if questions and doubts remain, H. doesoffer a challenging interpretationwhich in passing has some valuable obser-vations to make on such subjects as the ambiguityof the termarche or thenatureof epagoge. On the otherhand, the 'Select Bibliography'and the cov-erage of rival scholarly views in the text (and the footnotes) are arguablyabit too selective. I noticed, for example, the absence of Patrick Byrne'sAnalysis and Science in Aristotle (1997), and A. Back's Aristotle's Theory ofPredication (2000).Another book which focuses on the relation between Aristotle's meta-physics and the Posterior Analytics' conception of scientific knowledge -approaching t, so to speak, fromthe otherdirection is Ian Bell's Metaphysicsas an AristotelianScience.8It is basically an attemptto show that Aristotle'saccount of the science of being as developed in what he calls the 'method-

' Ian Bell, Metaphysicsas an AristotelianScience (InternationalAristotle Studiesvol. 2), Sankt Augustin (Academia Verlag) 2004; 261 pp.; ISBN 3 89665 292 3;e 4.50.


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BOOK NOTES 257

ological' books of the Metaphysics(books 1, 3, 4, and 6) is influenced bythe conceptionof scientific knowledge outlined in the APo, or even that 'theMetaphysicsrepresentsan attemptto construct a science of being along therigorous lines proposed in the Posterior Analytics' (p. 241). Here there is nohint of a conflict between theoryand practice,presumablybecause B. focuseson the explanatory frameworkunderlying these books of the Metaphysics,rather han on their investigativeprocedure.B. goes on to show that his inter-pretationof the 'methodological'books, which allows us to conceive of meta-physics as a true 'science' of being (ratherthan as a kind of second-orderinquiry into the conditions for the possibility of first-ordersciences), alsothrows light on the conclusions of the so-called 'central' books. In addition,he claims it helps us clarify the relationbetween the conception of a scienceof being qua being and the conception of first philosophy, conceived of asdealing with separate,eternal and unmoved entities as causally priorto, andexplanatory of, susbstantialityin the sense requiredby the APo (even if atruly generic account of the principlesof substance is impossible, given thefact that there is no genus of substance).IncidentallyB.'s conception of meta-physics as a 'science' in the sense of theAPo, dealingwith principlesof beingqua being, forces him to follow Ross and Owens in excluding MetaphysicsLambda from the earlierten-booksversion of the work, because (in his view)it does not present god as a principle of the being of things. Whether weneeded anotherattemptto map this rough but nevertheless muchtravelled ter-ritory is a question I do not dare to answer. Yet I do think that, given theenormous number of existing interpretations, ny book on this subject shouldat least attemptto position itself systematicallyagainst the backgroundof thestatus quaestionis. I hope I am not just being cantankerous if I say that Imissed such an overview in the Introduction,or elsewhere in the book.The SophisticalRefutations is certainlynot among the most studied worksin the corpus aristotelicum. Reason enough to welcome Scott Schreiber'sAr-istotle on False Reasoning which appearsto be the firstmodernbook-lengthstudy in English of this text.9 In the S.E. Aristotle has a double project:heaims to identify the various sources of false but 'apparent'reasoning, andthen to providethe means to resolve the resultantconfusion. His analysis isbased on a distinction between false reasoning 'due to language' (para tenlexin) and false reasoning 'outside of language' (exo tes lexeos). Commen-tatorshave tended to regardthis distinction(and the way in which Aristotleassigns examples to the various sub-classes) as arbitrary,and have evenoften regardedthe arguments'outside of language' as basically reducible to

9 Scott G. Schreiber,Ari.stotle on False Reasoning. Language and the Worlld n theSophistical Refutations,New York (SUNY Press) 2003; xv + 243 pp.; ISBN 0 79145659 5 (hc.) / 0 7914 5660 9 (pbk.); $ 68.50 (hc.) / $ 22.95 (pbk.).


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258 BOOKNOTESarguments'due to language'. S.'s main aim in this clearly written and wellorganized book is to argue against this reductionistview and to show thatmost types of false reasoning(includingall those 'due to language' that arebased on 'double meaning') derive their persuasivenessfrom some sort ofextralinguisticmisconception. Properreasoning, in other words, requires aproperontology. This is not to say that S. defends Aristotle'sapproach n theS.E. at all costs: he also shows, for example, that Aristotle'saccountof mul-tivocity is confused in failing to see the multivocityof "multivocity" i.e. bynot distinguishingbetween semantic multivocity in the strict sense and mul-tivocity which is due to the same signifiermakingreferenceto multipleindi-viduals underone universal).All in all, this book offers a clear and overallpersuasiveaccountof the logic of the S.E. as not being metaphysicallyneutral.I move on to the new general introductionto Aristotle's philosophy byRichardBode'us.'0t thinkit is fair to say thatit tries to distinguish tself frommost existing introductionsby a slightly more historical approach,focusingon what was at stake for Aristotlehimself in doing philosophy.Centralques-tions are: what is the natureof the corpus aristotelicum,how did Aristotlework and how did he see his philosophicalproject (a question which alsoinvolves the issue of the interrelation or lack of it - between the variouspartsof philosophy).The book consists of threepartswhich do not correspondto any of the traditionalways of carving up Aristotle's philosophy,but ratherwork out threekey aspects of Aristotlethe philosopher: he studentof nature,the student of Plato, the promoter of the complete life. The first part('l'Asclepiade') deals with Aristotle's physics and biology, rightly stressingthat this area representsthe main focus of Aristotle's philosophicalactivity(somethingwhich modern exegesis, with its predilectionfor the problemsof'first philosophy' tends to forget); the second part ('Le Platonicien') chartsthe continuityanddiscontinuitybetweenPlatoandAristotle,coveringnotonlyAristotle's criticism of the theory of the Forms, but also dialectic, rhetoric,logic and scientific method(one misses a treatmentof the Poetics); the thirdpart('Le philosophede l'intelligence') focuses on the two intellectualvirtuesthat are most crucial for human happiness: 'sagacite' (phronesis) and'sagesse' (sophia) and on the more or less correspondingdisciplines of prac-tical philosophyand metaphysicsor first philosophy. Because of its unortho-dox structure the book may be a bit inaccessible as a primer, and the'bibliographieselective' containssome odd choices. All in all, however,whatwe get here is a very decentandhistoricallyaccurate ntroductiono Aristotle.

't RichardBodeus, Aristote. Une philosophic en quedte savoir, Paris(Vrin)2002;267 pp.; ISBN 2 7116 1564 2; e 18.00.


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BOOKNOTES 259B. includes a fairly extensive discussion of Aristotle's concept of matter(pp. 61-66), pointingout that it is 'un concept relatif' and signalling the dif-ference between 'matiere prochaine' and 'matiere lointaine'. Yet he has noqualms in speakingof 'matierepremiere'and- probably n line with his gen-eral tendencyto keep his discussionof Aristotleas free as possible frommod-ern philosophicaland exegetical preoccupations he does not even allude tothe recentdebateon the feasibility of the very notion of materiaprima. Fromthe point of view of the earlierAristotelian traditionthis may be defensible,and it should be said that moderndiscussions of the problemare sometimesirritatinglypedanticas if it is clear to any objective observerwhat Aristotlehimself actually believed and as if the whole ancient and medieval traditionconsisted of fools who didn't realize that they were saddlingAristotle with abasically incoherent notion. Those interested in this problem and in recentattemptsto deal with it may be especially interested n the volume Aristotle'sOn Generationand Corruption,Book I, edited by Frans de Haas and JaapMansfeld,whichcontains heproceedingsof theXVthSymposiumAristotelicum,held in Deurne(The Netherlands) n August 1999." Since I am myself amongthe contributors, refrain from discussing its contents here in any detail. Letme just signal that the book contains a chapter-by-chapter iscussion of thewhole of GC I, as well as an introductorychapterby Myles Burnyeat,andan additional note on Aristotle on mixture by John Cooper,'2and that theproblem of prime matter figures prominently - and is treated in differentways - in three of the contributions Algra, Broadie and Charles).'3

" Frans de Haas & Jaap Mansfeld (eds.), Aristotle On Generation and Corruption,Book 1, Oxford (OxfordUniversity Press) 2004, viii + 347 pp.; ISBN 0 19 924292 5;? 45.00.12 Contents:M. F. Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on the Foundationsof SublunaryPhysics';

Jacques Brunschwig, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 1: A False Start?'; DavidSedley, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 2'; Keimpe Algra, 'On Generation andCorruption1,3: SubstantialChange and the Problem of Not-Being'; Sarah Broadie,'On Generation and Corruption I, 4: Distinguishing Alteration'; David Charles,'Simple Genesis and PrimeMatter';Alan Code, 'On Generationand CorruptionI, 5';Carlo Natali, 'On Generation and Corruption I, 6'; Christian Wildberg, 'OnGeneration and Corruption 1, 7: Aristotle on poiein and paschein; Edward Hussey,'On Generation and Corruption I, 8'; Michel Crubellier, 'On Generation andCorr-uption, 9'; DorotheaFrede, 'On Generationand CorruptionI, 10: On Mixtureand Mixables'; John M. Cooper, 'A Note on Aristotle on Mixture'.13 PerhapsI may add a small correction:Algra's contributiondoes not claim that

Aristotle did have a 'philosophical motivation to posit prime matter', as the Editor'sIntroduction(p. 3) seems to suggest. It just claims that such a motivation is notunthinkable; or the rest it suspendsjudgement on the general issue, which it claimsshould be treatedas an empirical question, ratherthan as a matterof principle.


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260 BOOKNOTES

Finally, I turn to RobertMayhew's The Female in Aristotle's Biology.'4 Itis a small book - actuallyin a sense more of a pamphlet designedto deflatethe often repeated claim that Aristotle's biological works are thoroughlycon-taminated by misogynist prejudice. Part of the book apparentlygrew out ofan articleon entomology ('King-bees and Mother-wasps:a Note on Ideologyand Genderin Aristotle'sEntomology') published n this journal in 1999. M.'sstarting point, in trying to salvage Aristotle, is an 'ideology test' which hetakes over, in a slightly modified form, from an article by Charles Kahn.Accordingto this test we are entitled to interpreta certain claim as ideolog-ically biased if (1) it does in fact tendto promotea certain ideological agendaor justify particularsocial interests, and (2) if it either (a) rests upon arbi-traryor implausibleassumptionsor unusuallybad arguments,or (b) conflictswith other fundamentalprinciples held by the same thinker. Armedwith thislitmus test M. attacks a variety of feminist interpretations f Aristotle's bio-logical works. Thus he shows that in entomology Aristotle is open-mindedrather hanjust intent to show male superiority against(1)), andthat his argu-ments are not unusuallybad, for he relies, as he so often does, on traditionalviews and common names (against (2a)). As for embryology, M. convincinglyargues that Aristotle allows for a specific contributionof the female in theformationof the foetus (defusing the rathercommon interpretation ccordingto which she merely offers a receptacle, or inert matter)and that the argu-mentsused by Aristotleare non-arbitary.He also arguesthat Aristotle'sclaimthat the female is 'as it were a mutilatedmale' is supportedby evidence ofsorts (i.e. by the kind of evidence Aristotle is in general prepared o admit inbiology), rather han based on mere bias. M. goes on to show thatalso in thearea of anatomy,where we encountersome notoriousviews (for examplethatwomen have smaller brains and fewer teeth), Aristotle may have had thewrong reasons for his beliefs, but that these reasons were not ideologicallybiased (the claim about smaller brains, for example, crucially depends onAristotle's conviction that the brain is supposedto cool the pericardialblood,coupled with the claim that in the male the region aroundthe heart is moresanguineand hotterthan in the female; contrary o what many critics suggest,it is nowhere connected with a differencein cognitive capacities,which afterall are located in the heart). Finally, claims on women being softer and 'lessspirited' (which, by the way, even to Aristotle is not necessarilya bad thing)are to be explained not by reference to any particular gender bias onAristotle's part,but by the boring fact that contemporaryGreek culture as awhole tended to view women in this way. And of course Aristotle's philo-sophical method,making ample room for popularlyheld beliefs, arguablydidnot foster a particularlycritical attitudeon his part in this respect.

1' RobertMayhew, The Female in Aristotle's Biology, Chicago (The UniversityofChicago Press) 2004; x + 136 pp.; ISBN 0 226 51200 2; $ 28.00.


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BOOK NOTES 261All this seems pretty sound, even if M.'s argumentis not always elegant(we hardly need the repeated assertion that Aristotle and his contemporarieslacked the microscope), and even if he is sometimes a shade too apologeticonAristotle'spart.Thus,I thinkBertrandRussell's famous remark hat 'Aristotlecould have avoided the mistakeof thinkingthatwomen have fewer teeth thanmen, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth openwhile he counted' (quoted on p. 81) is hardlya mark of 'breathtakingarro-gance' (M., ibidem). It is just funny and actually ratherto the point (giventhe fact that in other cases Aristotle the biologist does appearto be capableof the kind of straightforward nd careful observationRussell had in mind).Anyway, the bottomline of the story seems to be that Aristotle lived andworked in a differentera and in a differentculture,whereas his concept of'evidence' was broader than what we would be willing to accept. M. windsup his concludingchapterby claiming thatAristotle 'would have changedhismind about the capabilitiesof women (e.g. concerningtheir ability to be sci-entists or philosophers) after one conversation with a female scientist orphilosopher- though not with some of his harshestfeminist critics, whom hemight easily have takenas evidence for his original position'. He is probablyright on both accounts.

algra, k, aristotle and the aristotelian tradition, 2005

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