Dis-embeddedcentersandarchitectureofpowerinthefringesoftheInkaempire:NewperspectivesonterritorialandhegemonicstrategiesofdominationSoniaAlconini*DepartmentofAnthropology,UniversityofTexasatSanAntonio,OneUTSACircle,SanAntonio,TX78249,USAReceived1December2006;revisionreceived17July2007Availableonline1November2007AbstractEmpireswereexpansivepolitiesbasedontheextractionof resourcesandeconomicsurplusfromsubduedterritoriesandpeoplethrougharangeofstrategiesofdomination.BasedonresearchonOroncotaintheSoutheasternInkaregion,thisarticlepresentsevi-dencefromarchitecture,settlementshifts,storagecapacityandartifactsdistribution,toillustratethemechanicsofdis-embeddedInkaimperialcenters.Asanalternativeformofcontrolintheterritorialandhegemonicspectrum,thisresearchfocusesonthenatureandevolutionofInkadis-embeddedcentersasanalternativeformofprovincialcontrolbasedontheuseofarchitectureofpower.2007ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.ResumenLosimperiosfueronentidadespol ticasexpansivasbasadasenlaextraccio nderecursosyexcedentesecono micosdepoblacionesyterritorios conquistados a traves de una serie de estrategias de dominacio n. Con base en investigaciones en Oroncota en la regio n SudesteInkaica, esta art culo presenta evidencia de estudios de arquitectura, cambios poblacionales, capacidad de almacenamiento y distribucio nde artefactos que ilustran la mecanica de centros administrativos inkas divorciados de procesos locales. Como una alternativa forma decontrol enel espectroterritorial yhegemo nico, estainvestigacio nseenfocaenlanaturalezayevolucio ndeestosdivorciadoscentrosInkascomounaalternativaformadecontrolprovincialenbasealusodearquitecturadepoder.2007ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.Keywords: Inka;Inca;Andes;Empire;Power;Territorial;Hegemonic;Dis-embedded;Inkaarchitecture;InkaprovinceDuringthe15thcenturyAD, theInkaconstitutedthelargest empires of the Pre-Columbian World. With itspolitical coreinCuzco, theInkaEmpireextendedoveraarray of environments including the dry coast, the tropicalmontana,andthecoldhighlands.Thisecologicaldiversitywas alsoaccompaniedbytheincorporationof amyriadofpolitiesvaryinginpolitical complexity, ethnic,andlin-guisticbackgrounds, includingthepowerful ChimustateinthePaciccoast, andanumberof chiefdom-level andtribalorganizationsfromtheAndesandAmazonianmar-gins (Rowe, 1946; Patterson, 1991; DeMarrais et al., 1996;Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, 1999; DAltroy et al.,2000).Inrecentyears,substantialresearchwasconductedontheimperial coreanditsprovincestounderstandtheevolution of this empire, the economic strategies of controlat regional and household scales and the associatedchangesintheindigenoussettlementpatternsandcultural0278-4165/$-seefrontmatter 2007ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.doi:10.1016/j.jaa.2007.08.002*Address: 3314PrinceGeorgeDrive, SanAntonio, TX78230, USA.Fax:+12104587811.E-mailaddress:Sonia.Alconini@utsa.edu.www.elsevier.com/locate/jaaAvailable online at www.sciencedirect.comJournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381materials(Morris, 1982; CostinandEarle, 1989; Hastorf,1990;Hayashida,1995;Stanish,2001;Mackey,2006).With regard to the more distant frontier regions, currentresearch is also revealing the dierent kinds of Inkafrontiers andtheir relatedsocioeconomic changes inthelocal structures (Lorandi, 1980; Dillehay and Netherly,1988; Bray, 1991; ParssinenandSiiriainen, 1998; RanoandStehberg, 1999; Lippi, 2004). Myowninvestigationsinthe SoutheasternChacopiedmonts conductedseveralyears ago, documented the uneasy interaction betweenthe Inkas and the tropical Chiriguano-Guarani tribes fromthe Amazons (Garcilazo de la Vega, 1960 [1609]; BarraganRomano, 1994; Alconini, 2002, 2004). BeyondtraditionalfrontiermodelsmyresultsrevealedthattheSoutheasternInkafrontierwasconsistentwithasoftmilitaryperime-ter. In this type of frontier, the defensive systemwasformed by small outposts at strategic nodes of communica-tion instead of representing true garrisons with large stand-ing armies. Within the margins of the frontier,administrative centers were established in order to facilitategovernmentandcontrolofthefrontierregionandwithin.AsinthecaseofOroncota,thiswassupplementedbytheconstruction of ne Inka architecture. However, these cen-terswithinandwithoutdidnotdisruptexistingsocioeco-nomic trends anddidnot havesignicant eects onthelocalpoliticaleconomies(Alconini,2002,2004).Inthe Oroncota region, within the frontier margins,Inka control was manifested in the establishment of adis-embedded administrative center. This Inka center reliedin the construction of ne architecture to compensate for aratherminimalimperialpresence.Inthispaper,Iwilldis-cuss thenatureof dis-embeddedcenters, andarguethatthese settlements combined hegemonic and territorial strat-egiesofdominationbyemphasizingarchitectureofpowerdespitethelowimperial revenues. Inordertoexploretheuniquewaysinwhichdis-embeddedcentersfallintheter-ritorialhegemonicspectrum, Iwill summarizeinthesec-tions that followthe dierent ways in which both theterritorial and hegemonic strategies are understood byscholars studying ancient empires, including the Inka. I willthen discuss the dierent forms of Inka provincial power inorder toshedlight onthenatureof Inkacontrol intheOroncotaregion.Territorialandhegemoniccontrol:contendingviewsEmpires are often characterized as highly extractive pol-ities, expanding over vast territories through a combinationof political, ideological, economic and military subjugation(Mann, 1986). Depending on the focus, dierent theoreticalframeworks are often used to understand the mechanics ofimperial expansion including the core-periphery modelwithatop-downapproach(Wallerstein, 1976), or moreagency-orientedviews where the peripheries are seenasthe catalysts of imperial expansion (Doyle, 1986). In recentyears, new models seeking to understand the wide variationof power strategies exercised by ancient empires areexplored.The territorial and hegemonic theoretical frameworkstands as one of the most inuential approaches emphasiz-ingthevariationofimperialstrategiesofdominationinaspectrum of possibilities, depending on the degree of inter-actionbetweenimperial coresandsubject provinces, andthe varying scales of military, political, economic and ideo-logicalcontrol(Luttwak,1976;Hassig,1985,1992;DAlt-roy, 1992). Formulators of this model have arguedthatrather than constituting isolated typologies, territorialandhegemonicstrategiesconstituteendsof acontinuumof direct and indirect forms of domination where we shouldnot onlyconsider thevestedinterests of theempire, butalsothevaryingreactionsofnativeeliteandlocalpopula-tions, the existinglevels of political complexityandthekinds of resources in dispute (Luttwak, 1976; Hassig,1985,1992).The territorial strategy, at one end of the spectrum, typ-ied a direct form of imperial control. Because of the linearcorrespondence between control and economic benet, thisstrategywascharacterizedbyahighcontrol-highextrac-tion strategy (DAltroy, 1992; Hassig, 1985, 1992; Luttwak,1976).Thereforehighlevelsofcontrolconditionedsigni-cant levels of economic extraction (Table 1). Politically, thesubduedregions wereunder direct rulethroughimperialelites andbureaucrats, while the provincial centers wereenclavesoflarge-scaleproductionofmaterialsdestinedtosupplythecoresneeds. Standingarmiesintheprovinceswere also a requirement of imperial rule in order tostrengthen inner security, and therefore, the direct adminis-tration of the provinces (DAltroy, 1992; Hassig, 1985,1992;Luttwak,1976).Territorial control also involved signicant levels ofinvestmentinadministrativeinfrastructureinordertotaplocal resourcesforimperial ends. Thisinvolvednot onlythedeploymentofbureaucratsandentirearmiesintothesubjugated provinces, but also the construction of all kindsofimperial installationsaimedatfacilitatingthemanage-mentoflocal resourcesandlabor. FortheInka, thiswasmanifestedinthe signicant investment of constructionssuchasadministrativecenters, storagefacilities, roadsorTable1Forms of provincial control based on the combination of investment andrevenuesInvestmentHighLowHigh investment and high revenues(Territorial control) Low investment and high revenues(Optimum control) High investment and low revenues(Dis-embedded centers) Low investment and low revenues(Hegemonic control) RevenuesLow High64 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381agricultural terraces in order to ensure large revenues(DAltroy,1992,2002).The second form of imperial control, at the other end ofthe spectrum, was indirect and based on a low controllowextraction strategy (Table 1). This strategy, known as hege-monic, was also manifested in the minimum infrastructuralinvestment in the subdued provinces, and accompanied bythe delegation of political control to local elites. Thisresultedinlowlevelsof economicextractionandlackofpoliticalintegration,althoughoneclearadvantagefortheempirewastheincorporationofabroaderterritory. Pro-vincial populations maintained patron client relations withthe core, and because these regions were not well integratedintotheempire, theeconomicrevenues werenot signi-cant. However, becauseoftherelativelylargerexpansionandlowercostsof extractionandinvestment, hegemonicempires could also extract a signicant amount of netextractionfromtheirsubjectprovinces. Intheabsenceofsizablestandingarmies, theburdenof defensewasoftendelegatedto nativeelitebackedbythepromise ofmilitarysupportandpreferentialdistributionofvaluablematerials(DAltroy,1992;Hassig,1985,1992;Luttwak,1976).Because of the spatial and temporal implications ofhegemonic andterritorial strategies, theyare interpreteddierentlybyresearchersstudyingancient empires. First,it is oftenassumedthat bothterritorial andhegemonicstrategies were arranged in a temporal scale and that there-fore, theyweresequential inanevolutionarycontinuum.Earlyinthesequence, it is implicit that empiressuchasRome usedahegemonic andconsequently, indirect ruleinordertoensureagreaterimperial expansion. Bycom-parison, inthesecondphaseempiresareoftenviewedasmoremature, andtherefore, withthecapacitytoconsoli-datetheir power byexercisingmoredirect formsof ruleoversubjectpopulations(Luttwak,1976).Second, hegemonicandterritorial control canalsobeseenas opposedstrategies of domination, leadingtotheformation of dierent kinds of empires (Hassig, 1985,1992). It is oftenassumed that territorial empires were rel-atively small, as they could not invest equally everywhere inimperialfacilities,standingarmiesorbureaucratswithoutthreateningtheirownpoliticalstability.Incontrast,hege-monic empires were relatively larger. They couldaordtoexpandover signicant territories withlimitedinvest-ment, thanks to the vertical alliances established with clienteliteandthethreat of punitiveactionsratherthandirectmilitarypresence(Hassig,1985,1992).Third, hegemonicandterritorial strategiescanalsobeinterpreted as distributed along a spatial continuum. Whileterritorial anddirect control were more commonintheimperial coresuchaswiththeInka, RomanorAssyrianempires,ahegemonicandindirectrulewasmorefrequentindistant andperipheral regions of later incorporation(DAltroy, 1992, 2002). Inthis last case, the farther theprovincefromthecore, thegreaterthecostsandlesstheimperial benets. Therefore, in marginal regions the trans-portationexpensesforthetransferofgoods, soldiersandbureaucratswerehigherwiththeconsequenceof makingterritorial administrationunlikely. This of course, trans-latesintolessintensiveformsof administrationandeco-nomicextraction(Luttwak,1976;DAltroy, 1992;Parker,1998).Most likely, territorial and hegemonic strategies ofimperial control werenot xedforms of administration.Rather, the combination of dierent forms of power,whether this was based on varying degrees of militaryforce,politicalintervention,economicextractionandevensymbolic control craftedunique ways inwhichimperialcontrol tookplace. Inthenextsection, Iwill exploretwoadditional forms of Inka provincial control using a territo-rialandhegemonicapproach.InkaimperialextractionwiththeleasteortRecent studies in the Inka provinces have shownmarkedvariationinthelevels of imperial infrastructure,population movement or eects on the indigenous politicaleconomies (Santoro et al., 1987; Morris, 1988, 1998; Julien,1993; Acuto, 1999; Mackey, 2006; MalpassandAlconini,inpress).Thisvariationrespondedtoanumberoffactorsweighing dierently inthe balance of provincial power.Amongothers, these factors includedthe kinds of localresources, proximity to the imperial core, the distinct levelsof local cooperation and resistance, and the existingdegrees of political integration(Schreiber, 1992; Morris,1998;Stanish,2001).Despite suchdierences, recent researchalsodemon-strates that most Inka provinces shared commonalities.Themost important similarityintermsofadministrationwastheincorporationofthenativeeliteintotheimperialbureaucracy.Sometimestheywereintegratedashighleveladministratorsorlowrankingbureaucrats. Forexample,inthecase of Farfan, amajor Chimu center, local elitealong with high and low ranking Inka administrators wereall part of anemergingimperial bureaucracydestinedtooptimize the local production(Mackey, 1987, 2006). Inareas of less political integrationsuchas withthe QaraQara and Yampara in southeastern Bolivia, (Alconini,2002; RiveraCasanovas, 2004)orinthenortherncoastalvalleys of Chile (Santoro and Mun oz, 1995; Santoroet al., 2004), there is also increasing evidence that local rul-ersplayedakeyroleintheimperialreorganizationofthelocal political economies. Insomecases, theselocal lordswereevenrewardedfor theirservices byacquiring thesta-tusofInkasdeprivilegio.Consequently, no matter the kinds of imperial control orhowmuchtheInkasinvestedintheregion, onecommonfeature of most provinces was that the Inka sought toincorporate allied native elites into the emerging statebureaucracybyestablishingalliances throughmarriages,preferential distribution of gifts, Inkanization and accultur-ation, or the construction of ctive kinship with core elites(Rowe, 1946; Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, 1999; BauerandCovey, 2002). The delegationof authority, partiallyS.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 65dependedonthe strengthof thealliances, the degreeoflocal competitionamongelitefactions, andthelevels oftrustinvolvedinthenegotiation.Inthis sense, theInkas, as anyother ancient empire,sought to minimize their investment while also maximizingthe revenues.Other factors beingequal,the strategic com-bination of territorial and hegemonic forms of controlrespondedtoasinglepurpose: tomaximizetheimperialrevenueswiththeleast eort(Morris, 1998). Takingintoconsiderationthattheconquestandincorporationofnewterritories was an expensive enterprise, additional strategieswererequiredintheaftermath.Thisofteninvolveddiplo-matic negotiations and whenever this strategy did notwork, it requiredthedeployment of armies, bureaucratsandtheimpositionof imperial institutions. Onestrategytoreducetheexpenses of conquest entailedthestrategicestablishment of pockets of direct exploitationindistantregions (Williams and DAltroy, 1998). Taking into consid-eration inner processes of competition among elite kingroups and ethnicities, the Inkas might have favored alliedelite factions for administrative positions while positioningthemselvesontopofthesocialladder.Therefore, the optimum imperial strategy was to strike abalance inthe territorialhegemonic spectrum(Table 1).That is, the imperial ideal involved a low investment strat-egy that ensured marked levels of economic extraction andcontrol. I denominated this variant as the optimum form ofimperial rule(Table1). Asmentioned, onewaytoreachthisideal wasthroughtheincorporationofnativeleaderswhodidnot onlyabsorbtheexpenses of administrationanddefense, but alsowhowereinchargeof transferringtheimperialagendatothelocals.Hence,theInkanizationof local elite was a fundamental aspect of the Inka imperialpolicy. Local elites wereeectiveagents of acculturationand intermediaries. They did not only have the opportunitytoenhancetheirownstatusandwealththroughallianceswiththe Inkas, but alsowere successful mediators withlocal populations based on alleged claims of commonancestryandethnicity.InkaimperialcontrolthroughsymbolsofpowerHowever, it remains to be understood if the Inkaemployedalternative forms of control inthe provinces,particularlyfartherawayfromthecore.Oneformofrulethatawaitsfurtherexploration,isbasedonthemanipula-tion of local beliefs and the signicant investment of powerarchitecture without necessarily generating immediate eco-nomic rewards or substantial extraction of resources (Table1). Iarguethatthiskindofcontrol promotedtheforma-tionof dis-embeddedimperial centers. Inorder toshedlightonthenatureofthisformofcontrolitisrstneces-sary to discuss the ways in which imperial power was main-tained in distant provinces, and the association ofarchitecturetosuchnotionofpower.Manyscholars havediscussedthestructureof power,and the ways in which power is manifested, exercised, con-testedandnegotiated inpublicarenas(BachrachandBar-atz, 1970; Foucault, 1980, 1986; Weber, 1986; Bordieu,1989). In the case of ancient empires, power can be under-stoodas thecapacityof theelitetoachieveandimposetheirgoalsbyensuringthecomplianceof thedominatedthrough a series of strategies ranging from threat, coercion,manipulation, rewards and masked inuence (BachrachandBaratz,1970;Weber,1986;Lukes,2005).Inthisde-nition,itisimplicitlyassumedtheasymmetricdistributionof resources and power among the diverse social units mak-inguptheempire.Four forms of imperial power can be distinguishedbased on political, economic, military and ideological con-trol(DAltroy,1992; Mann,1986).AlthoughtheseformsofpowerwereextensivelystudiedbymanyInkascholars,ideological power, particularlyintheInkaprovinces, hasbeenthesubjectoflessintensiveexamination.In this context, it is useful to consider Lukes (2005) the-sisonpowerandthemechanismsemployedtoensurethecompliance of the dominated. He distinguishes three kindsofpower.The rst dimension, involves overt andvisible poweraimedtoimposecontrol overthesubjectsthroughdirectforce. Oftenassociatedwithopenconictandconfronta-tion, this formof power is relatedtothe impositionoftheagendaofthedominantgroupbydirectforceandthethreat of punitive actions. Without conict and directimposition, this formexercise of power fails to appear(Lukes, 2005). Wecanspeculatethatthisformofpower,entailingmilitarycontrol andconquest, was strategicallyused by the Inkas in cases of direct confrontation and openrebellion. Archaeologically, this materializedinthe con-structionof forts, outpostsandother formsof defensiveinstallations aimed at suppressing inner and outerrebellion.Theseconddimensionof power, oragendacontrol, ismore subtle as it involves setting and controlling the polit-icalagendabypromotingtheparticipationofthesubjectsinactivitiesaimedatlegitimizingthepowerofthedomi-nant while deliberately excluding issues that are simplynon-negotiable (Lukes, 2005; Bachrach and Baratz,1970). Inthis case, the compliance of the dominatedisensuredthroughmaskedinuence, manipulationandtherecognitionoftheelitesauthority.Incontrasttotherst,more direct form of power, agenda control powerseeks toexcludeopenconict, andinstead, cultural practicesandsocial institutions are used to incorporate the subjectsthroughthe acceptance of the imperial agenda. For theInkas, this implied the institutionalization of rituals, hospi-talitycelebrationsandverticaldistributionasmechanismsthat facilitated the compliance of the subjects while absorb-ingthemintotheInkawaysoflife.Archaeologically,thismaterialized in the construction of Inka administrative cen-ters,templesandreligiousarchitectureintheprovinces.The thirddimensionof power refers toaless direct,althoughmoreinsidious formof power. Inthis casethedominated, consciously or unconsciously, assimilate the66 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381rules of behavior, social institutions andagenda of theempireinsuchawaythattheyaredeprivedorevenuna-wareof their ownchoices (Lukes, 2005). This last formofpower, alsoknownashegemonic, wasstudiedingreatdetailbyFoucaultwhoalsoassociatedthiskindofpowerwithsocialcontrolthroughnormsandpublicinstitutions.Withhegemonicpowernot onlytheimperial institutionsbecameseenas neutral andevenbenecial tothewholesociety, butalsothesubjectsnotconsciousoftheirownexploitationareincorporatedintomarkedlyasymmetricsociopolitical structures (Foucault, 1980). However, he alsowarns us that where there is power, there is also local resis-tance (Foucault, 1980, 1986). Withthe Inka, this thirddimensionofpowermightbemanifestedinthesuccessfulacculturationof theprovincial elitethroughtheeectiveassimilation of the Inka values and forms of life. Archaeo-logically, thismaterializedinthereproduction, emulationandmimickingofimperialarchitectureandculturalmate-rialsbytheprovincialeliteandprivilegedsocialsegments,including the reenactment of imperial rituals that ulti-matelyservedtolegitimizethemainruler.Therefore, there is no doubt that state public works wereeective inthe transfer of the imperial agenda(Morris,1991; DeMarrais et al., 1996; Moore, 1996). One key aspectin Inka provincial studies that deserves greater explorationistheevolutionofimperialcontrolandthedierentwaysin which the construction of architectureand related cul-tural materialsoers insights into the agenda of the dom-inant. In this context, it is important to comprehendwhether theconstructionof architectureof power was afunctionof highlevelsof economicextraction, orrather,if theinvestment of publicarchitecturewasthebasisfordistinctformsofcontrol andeconomicextraction. InthenextsectionIwilladdressthisfascinatingsubject.InkaarchitectureofpowerintheprovincesIn order to understand the dierent ways in whichpower was manifested in the provinces, in this section I willdiscuss thedierent kinds of architecture of power. ForGasparini and Margolies (1980), architecture of powerinvolved public construction sponsored by the state inorder tofacilitate civil, religious andmilitary activities.This architecture, visualized in the landscape over large dis-tances,didnotonlyservetoenhancetheauthorityofthedominant, but also was used as a mechanism of indoctrina-tion,controlof the populace,anddissemination of propa-ganda (DeMarrais et al., 1996). Incontrast toportablematerials, where imperial symbols were imprinted inobjects that could be moved over large distances, the archi-tectureof power wasrelatedtospecicplaces andland-scapes(DeMarraisetal.,1996;Moore,1996).Becauseofthevariabilityofpublicconstructions,thesebuildingsalsoreectdierentaspectsofsocial powerandpolitical life. Some public works facilitated state ceremony,economic and defensive tasks, and in some cases, they evenserved to commemorate important political events (Gaspa-rini andMargolies, 1980; Hyslop, 1990). While some ofthese constructions made possible the participation ofbroadaudiences,othersenforcedanideologyofexclusionandsocialdierence(Moore,1996).In the Inka provinces, dierent types of public architec-ture are reported. These rangedfrom military installations(includinggarrisonsandoutposts),administrativecenters,templesandshrines,royalestates,andextensiveroadnet-workswithsupport storagefacilitiesandtampulodgings(Gasparini and Margolies, 1980; Morris, 1982; Hyslop,1984,1990;Kendall,1985;Niles,1998).Fromtheseconstructions,theoriginsanddevelopmentof administrative centers is crucial to understand the evolu-tionofprovincial power. Ingeneral terms, administrativecenters served tofulll the administrative duties of theempire in the provinces. Administrative centers usuallywere multifunctional settlements located nearby demo-graphic centers that facilitated the control of tribute, laborstorage and redistribution in the provinces. They were alsothe focus of political life and celebratory feasts (Morris andThompson,1985;Julien,1993;Niles,1993;Morris,1998).More important, these centers reproduced asymmetric rela-tionsofpower.Theybuiltsupportforstateauthorityandinculcated the Inka religion, beliefs and social norms (Mor-ris,1998:302303).RecentresearchontheInkaprovincesalsorevealsvar-iationinthekindsofprovincesandtheirassociatedcen-ters. While some provinces were organizedaroundlocalpopulations,otherswerebasedonforeignmitmacolonies,orevenacombinationof both. Whereassomeprovinceshad administrative centers, others simply lacked these con-structions (Julien, 1993: 187). Althoughsome provincialcentersexhibitedsubstantial investmentofstateconstruc-tions, other provinces hadtheminimum. Whilesomeoftheseprovincial centerswerethefocusofsignicantpro-ductionanddistributionof Inkamaterials across socialsegmentssuchasinHatunXauxaintheMantaroValley,others were not (DAltroy, 1992). Similarly, while someof these centers emphasized the construction of large openplazas suggesting their involvement in large-scale state-sponsored celebrations and redistributive feasts such asHuanuco Pampa, others had smaller plazas with morerestrictedaccesssuchasLaCentinela(Morris,2004).Therefore, the variation and evolution of Inka adminis-trative centers reects the evolution of the dierent kinds ofpower in the provinces. For example, some of these centersstartedas small temples withattachedsupport facilitiesaimedat acculturatingthelocalsthroughtheinculcationoftheimperialreligiousideology(agendacontrol power).Incomparison, othercentersbeganasdefensiveinstalla-tionsinregionsofinitialresistance(overtpower).One key aspect in the study of provincial architecture ofthat can help understand the dierent Inka power strategiesis the evolution of administrative centers in comparison toroyal estates. Takingintoconsiderationthe split inheri-tance system, where the future Inkakings inheritedtheoce but not the resources, the pressure for acquiringS.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 67new lands and tributaries must have increased over the lastperiods(ConradandDemarest, 1984; Niles, 2004). Sincethebest landsintheCuzcoheartlandwerealreadyusedby the state or the royal panaca families (Niles, 1998,2004),the lastInka kingsneeded toengage inan unprece-dented imperial expansion. Therefore, although the territo-rialinterestsofthestateandthoseoftheindividualkingsoverlapped, we can speculate that both agendas were com-binedindistinct ways. Thismight haverangedfromthecomplete amalgamation of both interests to the dominanceofeitherone.In this sense, it is useful to discuss the dierencesbetween Inka administrative centers and royal estates.Whereas administrative centers were the focus of state-leveladministration geared towards facilitating the organizationandextractionof laborandresources, royal estatesweretheindividual residencesoftheInkakingsandtheirpan-aca. Therefore, royal estates were dierent than other pub-lic works because of their elegant architecture andexpensive construction, including elaborate agriculturalterraces, waterworks, andsupport facilities. Theyusuallylackedlargeandopenplazas suggestingthat incontrasttoadministrativecenters, large-scalestatehospitalitywasnot a dominant feature (Hyslop, 1990; Niles, 2004).Whereas royal estates inthe imperial heartlandhadaneconomy that sometimes surpassed the states nances, far-ther royal estates lacked a sizable economic infrastructure.Royal estates were not part of the state economy and wereusually founded after a military conquest to commemoratethe triumph of an Inka king, and as a reminder of the con-questandnewpoliticalorder(Niles,2004;Salazar,2004).In a sense, royal estates and palaces materialized the purestform of architecture of power on behalf of individual Inkakings.Nevertheless, thereisadebateconcerningtherelation-shipbetweenroyal estatesandpalaces. Someresearchersagree that the heart of the royal estates were the royal pal-aces (Niles, 2004). However, other scholars suggest that notall royal estateshadpalaces, particularlythosewithintheCuzco heartland (Morris, 2004). In the provinces, adminis-trative palaces were sometimes part of larger administrativecenters illustrating the convergence of both forms ofpower. Other provincial centers simply lacked palaces(Morris,2004).Inorder toexplore the evolutionof Inka provincialpower andthe nature of dis-embeddedcenters, thenextsectionwill focusontheOroncotaregionof present-dayBolivia. Particularattentionwill bepaidtoassessingthefunctionof the Inkainstallations inthe studyregioninrelationtotheevolutionof administrativecenters, royalarchitecture andkinds of imperial control. Taking intoconsideration that the results of my eld research aredetailed in other publications (Alconini, 2002, 2004,2005a), inthisarticleIwill onlyreviewtherelevantdatapertinenttomyarguments. Therefore, inthenextsectionthere will be presenteda summary of: (a) ethnohistoricaccounts of the region, (b) architecture, (c) shifts in the set-tlement pattern, (d) storage capacity, and (e) ceramicassemblages. Basedonthisinformation, Iwill developinthe conclusions section competing explanations to accountforthisformofInkacontrol.EthnohistoryThe Oroncotaregionwas locatedinthe southeasternAndean valleys along the Pilcomayo river, in what is todayChuquisaca-Bolivia (Fig. 1). This region is strategicallylocatedbetweentheSouthernAndes andtropics, andasaconsequence, wasthescenarioofsocial interactionandtradebetweenhighlandandlowlandgroups.Therefore,itis not surprising that ethnohistoric accounts describe Oron-cotaasamultiethnicregioninanecological andculturalinterfaceevenbeforetheInkas.Notonlydidgroupssuchas the Yampara, Chui, Churumata and Moyomoyo inhabitsimultaneously these spaces, but many shared cultural sim-ilarities with the eastern tropical populations (Fig. 2). Thismultiethniclandscapewasaccentuatedwiththemigrationof Altiplanic and eastern mitmakuna populations mobilizedby the Inka in order to strengthen the security of the South-easternimperial borders(BarraganRomano, 1994; Espi-nozaSoriano,2003).Withthe Inka, the Oroncota regionwas part of theYamparapolitywhose political core was inYolataandQuila-Quila. Specically, Oroncota was located in thesoutheasternvalleys, andinhabitedbyYampara, Chichaand Chui groups (Parssinen and Siiriainen, 2003). Archae-ologically, this region was located in the stylistic and polit-ical boundaries of the Yampara and Chicha polities with adominance of the Yampara styles along the culturalsequence(Alconini,2002,2004,inpress).At a broader scale Oroncota and the nearby valleys wereall partoftheCharcasconfederationintheSoutheasternAndes, in what is today Bolivia (Barragan Romano,1994; Platt et al., 2006). This multiethnic confederation,locatedtothenorthof theCollao, incorporatedat leastseven nations from the highlands and valleys varying in lev-els of political complexity, language and cultural traditions(BarraganRomano, 1994). Theoriginsofthisconfedera-tionprecede Inkaconquest.Despitethelinguistic andcul-tural dierences, ethnicities under the Charcasconfederationsharedasetoffeaturesthatmadepossibletheir political cohesion. Some of these features includedintermarriage, common religious belief, exchange acrossthe ecological spectrumto maintain resource variation,and mutual defense concerns against the invading Chirigu-ano-Guaranies(Plattetal.,2006).Some documents indicate that the Charcas territory wasrst incorporated by Pachacuti through alliances anddiplomacy (Platt et al., 2006). With Tupac Inka Yupanqui,sonof Pachacuti, relationswiththeCharcasshiftedtoamore conictive interaction. This Inka did not only subduerebellious Colla groups in the Titicaca basin, but alsoexpandedthe empire further SouthbyconqueringCoc-habambaandnearbyvalleys(GarcilazodelaVega, 196068 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381[1609]; Cobo, 1993). IntheOroncotaregion, thePucaraPlateauis describedas the last Charcas defense bastionbefore nal Inka subjugation. Around 20,000 Indians fromdierent ethnicitiesewintothePucaraPlateauwiththegoal ofneverleavingthisnatural fortress. Asaresponse,Tupac Inka Yupanqui did not only order the constructionFig. 2. Yampara territory in the 16th century: Observe the distribution of Highland and Valley populations in the Yampara region (based on BarraganRomano,1994).Fig.1. TheInkaempire:LocationoftheOroncotaregionintheSoutheasternInkafrontierregion.S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 69ofInkainstallationsbutalsothesettlementof1000mili-tarymitmakunas inthe Oroncotaregion. Usingaseriesof tricks, including celebrations and the distribution of beerandwomen, thisInkakingmanagedtoweakentheresis-tanceoftheguardstonallyinltratethesecurityoftheplateau(Cobo, 1993[15821657]). Therefore, thereignofTupacYupanquimarkedthedeniteconquestofCharcasandtheestablishmentofverticalsociopoliticalrelations.Later, duringthereignofHuaynaCapacInka(sonofTupacInka),theincorporationofCharcasintotheimpe-rialadministrationwasconsolidated.Thisperiodwasalsomarked by the intermittent invasions of the eastern Chirig-uano-Guarani groups from the tropical forest. Thesegroups hadanethos tiedtowarfare, andwere activelyengagedinendemic cycles of warfare (Alcaya[ga], 1961[1605]; Susnik, 1968). In order to defend this and neighbor-ingterritoriesHuaynaCapacorderedtheconstructionofnewfortications. Chiriguano-Guarani speaking groups,attracted by the wealth and mineral sources in the Inka ter-ritory, invaded the southeastern valleys in consecutivewaves includingOroncota. Suchmigrationswerepart ofthe Chiriguano-Guarani quest for the mythical Candire,the promisedlandwithout evil (Alcaya[ga], 1961[1605];Susnik,1968).Fig.3. Oroncotaregion:SitedistributionintheEarlyYamparaperiod(400800AD).70 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381These Chiriguano-Guaran tribes didnot only repre-sent athreat tothe regional imperial interests, but alsoto the local populations. In most cases, invasion tookthe formof quickraids, slavery, assassinationof males,kidnapping of women, and the looting of food, goldand valuable resources. Many Southeastern Inka for-tresses suchas Cuzcotorowere invadedandset onreby these invading groups (Sarmientode Gamboa, 1943(1572)). As a consequence, a number of local groupsretreated west abandoning their land. The ones thatremainedwere forcedtopaytribute tothe Chiriguano-Guarani invaders (Julien, 1986). Responding to suchaggravations, Huayna Capac ordered not only therebuildingandstrengtheningofthefrontierdefensivesys-tem, but alsothemobilizationof asignicantcontingentof militarymitmakunas.PartofHuaynaCapacagendainCharcasincludedthereinstatement of existing alliances with local elites andthe formation of a common defensive block against Chirig-uano-Guaran inltrations to ensure local stability andprotectionof the borders andresources within. HuaynaCapac, based on a pact with Francisco Aymoro a Yamparacacique, sentagroupofmilitarymitmakunastopopulatethe valleys near Oroncota, including Tarabuco and Presto,in order to strengthen the local defense (AGI, Charcas 44.151v.citedinJulien,1995:105).Fig.4. Oroncotaregion:SitedistributionintheClassicYamparaperiod(8001300AD).S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 71Toilluminate the nature of Inka control inCharcasfromanethnohistoricstandpoint, it isuseful toconsidera colonial document known as the Memorial de Charcas(EspinozaSoriano,2006[1600]).Thisdocumentalsopro-videsanaccount of theeconomicactivitiesandkindsofservices that these nations provided to the Inka. For exam-ple,highlandgroupssuchastheCarangaaredescribedassheepherders. Incomparison, fournationsincludingtheCaracara, Charcas, Chui-Yampara and Chicha of the east-ernmost valleys, paid their tribute only in military services.AssoldiersoftheInka, theironlydutywastoghtonbehalfoftheInkas. Theirparticipationwascrucial intheincorporationofNorthernChinchaysuyuduringthereignof Tupac Yupanqui. In exchange, Charca soldiers receivedaprivilegedpositionandsomeofthemwereevengrantedthe honorary title of Inkas de privilegio as they wereallowed to use ear spools, known to be emblem of the Inkanobility(EspinozaSoriano,2003;Plattetal.,2006).However, did this privileged service left distinct marks inthe archaeological record? And what kinds of changesassociatedtotheInkaarrival canbereconstructedfromthematerialsremains?Inordertoaddresstheseissues,inthe next sections I present relevant archaeological informa-tiondocumentingtheeectsof theInkaconquest inthestudyregion.InkaarchitectureAnimportantchangegeneratedbytheInkasinOron-cotawastheconstructionofarchitectureof neelabora-tion following stylistic canons found only in the Inkaimperial coreandinhigh-prestigebuildings. Bycompari-son, Oroncotaisgeographicallylocatedonthefringesofthe empire. The buildings inOroncotawere constructedwith carefully cut and smoothed pillowed face red sand-stone walls. In the main Oroncota center, this was coupledwithdoubleandtriplejambs, body-sizenichesalongthewalls (Fig. 6). It is documented that double andtriplejambsindoorwaysandlongniches, werefeaturesstylisti-callyassociatedwithInkaconstructionsof elevatedpres-tige(Niles, 1987). Theywereusuallyabsent inperipheralandfrontierregions.ThismarkedelaborationoftheInkainstallationsinOroncotaindicatestheiruseinpublicandadministrative tasks, but more important, that theyembodied and symbolized the imperial power in theseterritories.Three main Inka constructions were found in the Oron-cota region, all with a strategic location depending on theirfunction.ThemainOroncotacomplex(6ha),waslocatedin the Pucara Plateau at the center of an existing congrega-tion of indigenous settlements while also being close to thesecond cluster of sites (Fig. 5). Rather than establishing anadministrativecenterinadepopulatedareatolaterpro-moteapopulationinux, theInkaspreferredtosettleinan existing population aggregation to exercise control.TheOroncotacomplexdidnotattractanimmediatepop-ulationof supportersandretainersasseeninthelimitednumberofresidencesinthevicinities(Fig.6).Interms of architectural distribution, themainOron-cota complex was built withcarefully dressedstones inthestyleknownaspillowedfaces.Itwasformedbyanenclosedplaza, andtwomainkallankas at the entrance(Fig. 6). Aline of rectangular rooms were laidout thesouth and west of the plaza, perhaps involved with admin-istrativetasks. Ofparticularinterestaretheroomsatthesouthwest corner as they exhibited ne architectural execu-tion.Thewallsoftheseroomswerebuiltwithdoubleandtriplejambs, andenclosedbody-sizenichesintheclassictrapezoidal style. Windows of delicate elaboration dramat-icallyframingthelandscapearestillpreserved(Fig.6).Inthenortheastsideofthecomplex, thelineofrectangularstructures hadaconcentrationof grindingstones onthesurface, perhapstohelpintheprocessingof chichacornbeer. Near the complex, a limited number of storage qolqasand residences were found. Excavations in a preserved res-idential complex suggested the presence of Pacajes popula-tions,perhapsasimperialretainers.Architectural comparisons with other Inka constructionsreveal important similarities. Usually, double andtriplejamb body-size niches in the walls were features used in pres-tigious religious centers such as those found in Pilco Kayma(Island of the Sun), and the Aqllawasi of Koati (Island of theMoon),bothmajorInkapilgrimagecenterslocatedinthesacred Titicaca lake (Fig. 7) (Gasparini andMargolies,1980; Hyslop, 1990). In the imperial core, temples like Mau-kallaqta and the royal estate of Chinchero owned by TupacYupanqui, alsoexhibitedsimilarelements(Gasparini andMargolies, 1980; Bauer, 1991). Both were also built with tri-ple jamb niched walls and smoothed stones (Fig. 7).The second Inka facility was El Pedregal (1 ha), locatedonthePlateau. ThisInkasettlementwasasmall defenseandcontroloutpost.ItwasstrategicallyhiddeninacrackofthePlateausclisoverlookingthePilcomayoriverandValley oor. The settlement data suggests that this outpostwaslocatedinadepopulatedarea. Incomparisontothemain Oroncota complex, El Pedregal outpost exhibited lessarchitectural investment. It was built with partially cutstonewallsintheintermediatemasonrystyle, andlackedjambs or body-size niches. In addition, it also displayed ter-raced platforms, a small open plaza with an ushnu outcrop,andagroupofrectangularstructures. Directaccessfromthe Pilcomayo river was virtually impossible, althoughthevisual controloftheentireValleyoorwasoutstand-ing. This strategic location might have facilitated thedefenseofthePlateauandcontroloftheValleyoor.The third Inka complex, Inkarry Moqo (2 ha), waslocatedwithinagroupof local sitesstretchingalongtheInkapampa River onthe Valley (Fig. 8). This site alsohadelaboratearchitecturewithdressedstonesinthepil-lowed face style, and a modest distribution of rectangularandcircular storage units. The limitednumber of ware-houses might have facilitatedthe collectionandstorageofagriculturalstaplesproducedintheValley.72 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381Overall, taking into account that these imperial facilitieswere within a days walk around the main Oroncota center,the signicant level of investment in Inka installations facil-itatingdefenseandcontrolintheregionbecomesevident.AlthoughtheInkainstallations weresmall bystandardsfound in other provincial centers, their elegant architecturemade themunique. By comparison, adjacent Yampararegions lacked Inka constructions. In Icla and Quila-Quila,bothintheYamparacore,Inkaimperialarchitectureandcultural materials were nearly absent (Janusek et al.,19931996; LimaTo rrez, 2000). Therefore, wemust con-cludethattheInkasfavoredOroncotaasaself-containedpocketofadministrationastheystrategicallyinvestednotonlyindefensebutalsoinnearchitecture.Moreimpor-tant, thesebuildingsmighthavesymbolizedthepoweroftheempireinacontestedlandscape.LocationalshiftsToelucidatetheregional settlementdynamicswithinadayswalkfromthemainOroncotabuildingcomplex, apedestriansurveyandsystematic surface collectionwereconducted(92 km2, Fig. 2). Thissurveyrevealedadensepopulationandalongprehistoricoccupation. Atotal of308 sites were identied, and their ecological and temporaldistributionisinTable2.Fig.5. Oroncotaregion:SitedistributionintheLateYampara-Inkaperiod(13001536AD).S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 73In the Early Yampara period (400800 AD) the few siteswere located on the Valley oor next to the Pilcomayo riverin the form of large settlements. In comparison, the PucaraPlateau above the valley oor was scarcely inhabited(Fig.3andTable2).LaterintheYamparaClassicperiod(8001300 AD, still before Inka arrival), there was a radicalsettlement shift manifestedintheintensivepopulationofthe Pucara Plateau (Fig. 4 and Table 2). Even though mostFig.6. Oroncotamain complexintheOroncota region(locatedinthePlateau zone).Observetheuseofpillowedstones anddoubleand triplejambbody-sizeniches.Fig. 7. Examples of nichedwalls (doubleandtriplebodysizejambs) inhigh-prestigeInkabuildings. Koati (left, Gasparini andMargolies, 1980),Maukallaqta(center,Bauer,1991),PilcoKayma(right,GaspariniandMargolies,1980).74 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381of the Early Yampara sites remained inhabited, many newsiteswereestablishedonthePlateau. Therefore, thisshiftinthepopulationrevealsnotonlyanincreaseinthenum-ber of sites, but also in the ecological preference ofsettlement.During the Late Yampara-Inka period (13001556 AD),whichincludesInkaconquest, thetrendsof thepreviousperiod were intensied. Not only were there more sites thanever beforeassettlement continuedtogrowrapidly, butalsomostofthenewsiteswereestablishedinthePlateau(Fig. 5andTable2). AsnotedinTable2, thenumberofsitesonthePlateaudoubled. Bycomparison, thenumberofsitesintheValleyduringthisperiodremainedapproxi-matelythesameinrelationtothepreviousone.A visualinspectionof the settlement trends, and a non-hierarchical K-means analysis, revealedthe grouping ofsites in two congregations (Figs. 4 and 5). In the YamparaClassic before the Inkas, the settlement distributionwasnotrandom, butshowedspatial aggregationintoclusters(Alconini, 2002, 2004). Two clearly dened settlementgroups were delineated in the Pucara Plateau, and an addi-tional twointheValleyoor. TheclustersofthePlateauwere tightly grouped while those in the Valley were formedbyfewerandmoredispersedsitesalongtherivers. Sincemost of the Valley settlements were large villages, the con-centrationofpeopleinthesesitesmightreectastrategyforallocatingmoreproductivelandtoagriculture.In the following Late Yampara-Inka Period, the numberofclusterswasmaintained. However, inthePlateausub-stantially moresitesin thetwoclusters were added, ratherthanexpandingovermorespace. Thisclusteringcontrib-uted to an even tighter pattern than ever before, suggestingthat these site groupings represented some sort of political,social,orcorporateunits.Therefore, the continuityand increase inexistingsettle-ment preferencessuggeststhat theInkas, insteadof pro-moting radical settlement changes upon arrival as theydid in other provinces, chose to adapt to existing settlementpatterns in Oroncota. One canassume thatthe indigenoussettlementpreferenceswerealreadyinlinewiththeimpe-rial policiesforthisregion, orthattheInkaexercisedanindirect control by promoting minimum changes in the set-tlementdynamicsandlandusestrategies.In order to evaluate the internal factors promoting suchchanges, I calculated the agricultural potential of thePucaraPlateauandtheValleyoor, andcomparedsuchestimateswiththetotalareainhabitedbytakingintocon-siderationthe total number of sites (see Alconini, 2002,2004 for more information). The results revealed thatchangesinthepopulationpreferencesdidnotrespondtopopulation growth pressure or to the scarcity of arable landaseachzonecouldeasilysupport its inhabitants. There-fore, populationpressureorshortageofcultivatablelanddidnot constitute determining factors that canaccountFig.8. InkarryMoqointheValleyoor.Table2SitedistributionintheOroncotaregion,chronologyandlocationPeriod Dates Numberofsites Valley(zone1) Pucara Plateau (zone 2) Meanaltitude(m) Standarddev.(1)EarlyYampara 400800AD 24 19 5 2203 313.24(2)ClassicYampara 8001300AD 107 32 75 2588 370.49(3)LateYampara-Inka 13001536AD 190 44 146 2643 344.21(4)Colony 15361700AD 10 10 0 2030 43.17(5)Notdened 100 14 86A total of 308 sites were found. The number of sites is based on the independent count of settlements by period. Therefore, multi-component sites werecountedseparatelyforeachperiod.S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 75for thesettlement preferences towardthePlateau. Otheraspects needtobeconsideredsuchas increasedpoliticalinstability in the form of internal conict among local pol-ities, or the ethnohistorically documented Chiriguano inva-sionsfromtheeasternlowlandsintotheregion.Whateverwasthecase, theInkasatarrival didnotonlyadaptbutalsoreinforcedexistingpopulationtrends.StoragecapacityTheintensityofagricultural exploitation, locationandnumber of storage facilities provides a window for evaluat-ingtheempiresextractioncapacityinaregion,theimpe-rial mechanisms of labor organization, and the roleplayedby the Inka centers inthis process (Morris andThompson, 1985, 1992; DAltroy and Earle, 1992). Ancientempiresusedtwostoragestrategiesdependingonthewaylabor was allocated and resources were mobilized orexpended:(a)storagefacilitiescanbelocatedinsidetheimperial administrative center when both, storage and con-sumptiontookplaceinsidetheInkacenter,andwhenthemobilization and allocation of storage goods to highernodes was controlled by the center. (b) An alternative strat-egy was that the storage facilities were dispersedthroughouttheregion,whenproductionandstorageweresimultaneoustaskstakingplaceinstatefarmlands, orinthevillages of theproducers (DAltroyandEarle, 1992:195). A regression analysis of storage capacity as a functionof distance was conducted. Storage capacity was measuredby the number and volume of storage qolqas. Distance wasmeasured by their location in relation to the main Inka cen-ter. This analysis revealedthat distance itself couldnotaccountforthedistributionofstorageunitsintheOron-cotaregion, asmoreofthesefacilitieswerefoundwithin1 and 2 km of the center (Fig. 9). Taking into account thatwithin1and2 kmtherewereimportant populationcon-centrations, I suggest that the decentralizationof qolqaswasaresponsetomoreeectiveaccessoflocal laborfortheproductionandprocessingofgrains.Compared to other Inka administrative centers, inOroncota the scale and magnitude of storage capacity weresmall.Table3comparestheamountandintensityofstor-agefacilitiesinotherInkaprovincesinrelationtoOron-cota. We foundabout 82storage units distributedbothinthePlateauandtheValleyZone. This number is lowwhen compared to other Inka provincial centers. Althoughit is possible that with the Inka there was an increase in theagricultural exploitation, the relatively low number of stor-agefacilitiesandlackof agrarianterracesorcanalssug-geststhatthisincreasewasnotsignicant.Therefore, we can conclude that the storage capability atOroncotasuggests theabsenceof astapleeconomyandthatproductionwasforlocal needsratherthanbeingforexport(DAltroyandEarle,1992;MorrisandThompson,1985). Nevertheless, it is possible that other vicinity valleyssuchasthoseinthewesternCochabambaregionwerethefocus of intensive agricultural productiontonance thedefenseoftheeasternfrontier(Gyarmati,1998;GyarmatiandVarga,1999).CeramicsdistributionIn spite of the investment and quality of Inka buildings,wehaveseenthatthesettlementpatternsinOroncotadidnot indicatemarkedchanges. Asimilar patternis foundin the infrequent distribution of Inka ceramics on the localsettlements. Oneresearchgoal wastodeterminewhetherOroncota developed a prestige economy through therestricteddistributionofimperial goodstolocal elites, orif theallocationof theseimperial goodswasunrestrictedandwidespread, perhapsasanInkastrategyofeconomicintegrationoracculturation.Inordertoevaluatethisandotheralternatives, Idividedtheceramics associatedwithInkaoccupationinthefollowingcategories: (1) regionalInkastyle (Yampara-Inka), (2) InkaCuzquen o, and(3)Pacajes-Inka(Saxamar)pottery.The distribution of Inka and Inka-related pottery in thedierent kinds of local settlements provided additionalinformationregardingthenatureof Inkaimperial strate-giestocontrol andadministertheOroncotaregion. Like-wise,thisdistributionenlightenedthewaysinwhichInkaFig.9. Regression analysis showing thestorage capacityas afunctionofdistance(R2 = 0.32,SEy = 416.3).Table3Comparison of the Oroncota regions storage capacity with other parts oftheInkaempireRegion No.ofstorehousesSourceMantaroValley 1992 DAltroyandEarle(1992:188)Cotapachi,Cochabamba2491 GyarmatiandVarga(1999:46)HuanucoPampa 497 Morris(1982)WillkaWaman 700 GaspariniandMargolies(1980:293)Oroncota 82Cuzcotuyo 2776 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381pottery was distributed in the local population. Thisincluded (a) the acceptance, reproduction and broad adop-tionof the imperialculturalmaterial by the populace, and(b) the limited distribution of Inka materials in the form ofaprestige-goodseconomyaimedat buildingvertical alli-anceswiththelocalelites.Tosummarize, theanalysisrevealedthatfewsiteshadaccess toInkaandInka-relatedceramic styles includingInka Cuzqueno, Pacajes Inka and Inka regional styles.Theseceramicswerefoundinjust 8%of thesitesintheLate Yampara-Inka period. This indicates restricted accesstoor limitedacceptance oftheseitems bytheoverallpopulation. From this proportion, Inka Cuzqueno ceramics(ortheirfaithful reproduction) werefoundinthreeInkasites. This means that all Inka sites in the region were asso-ciated with Inka pottery, although the distribution was lim-ited.(Fig.10).Bycomparison,thelocalsettlementsduringthisperioddidnotuseimperial pottery. Infact, excavationsinInkainstallations andYoroma, alocal Yamparacenter, haveshown that access to Inka pottery was restricted to a hand-ful ofsherds(Alconini, 2005b, inpress). Therefore, therewas an absence of a prestige economy based on the verticaldistribution of imperial ceramics. This might also suggest alack of local demand among the local inhabitants for thesematerials. This pattern strikes in sharp contrast with otherInkaprovinces, whereInkapottery(whetherimportedorlocally produced)wasmorefrequent(Morris and Thomp-son, 1985; CostinandEarle, 1989). Intheseregions, thedistributionof Inkapotterywas signicant andpart ofanextensiveprestige-goodseconomyaimedat enhancingverticalrelationswithnativeelites.IntheOroncotaregion, theInkainuenceinthelocalartifact inventory was expressed in the rise of a Yam-para-Inka style, combining local and Inka decorationsandshapes(Fig. 10). However, thedistributionof Yam-para-Inka ceramics was not common, and was found in lessthan10%ofthesitesinthisperiod.Thesesettlementsdidnot shareverymuchintermsof size, function, location,or accessto other prestigeitems. Mostof themwere smallcommunitiesorhomesteads. Therefore, itisveryunlikelythat the use of Yampara-Inka ceramics representedtheacculturationofabroadpopulation, ofprivilegedgroup.Instead, asegmentofthepopulationmighthaveadoptedInkastylisticcanonsinthelocal pottery. However, thesepreferenceswerenotfullydevelopedorcrystallized.Someexplanationsmight relatetothelimitedInkapresenceinthe region, and the retreat of the empire due to theincreasedconictswithChiriguano-Guaranigroups.Inaddition, Pacajes potteryfromthe circum-TiticacabasinwasrestrictedtothefewresidencesattachedtothemainOroncotacomplex. ThismightindicatethatPacajesgroups were perhaps imperial retainers, mitmakunas oryanaconas as documentedinethnohistorical accounts oftheregion(BarraganRomano,1994).Complementingthesendings, excavationsinthelocalcenter of YoromaintheValleyoor revealedthat locallordsmaintainedindependentaccesstovaluablematerialsfrom inter-regional exchange across the valleys and Chaco.Duringthe Late YamparaInkaperiod, elite householdsincreased in size while their inhabitants maintainedsigni-cantaccesstovaluablegoodsincludingstar-sheetcopperbells and personal adornments made from terrestrial shells(Alconini, in press). Therefore, through their alliances withFig. 10. Examples of some pottery styles found in the Oroncota region. Left column: Inka Cuzquen o and Pacajes Inka ceramics, center column: Yamparastylepottery,rightcolumn:YamparaInkaceramics.S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 77the Inkaempire, Yamparaleaders managedtopreserveaccess to wealth materials while enhancing their own statusin the emerging imperial bureaucracy. This situation standsinsharpcontrast withother Inkaprovinces where localelites suered a decline in their access to prestige materials,andtheirconsequentreplacementwithInkastatusgoods(CostinandEarle,1989;Costin,2001).Discussion:explainingdis-embeddedinkaimperialcentersTo summarize, despite the high-quality architecture, theOroncotacomplexwasasmallInkaprovincialcenterthatexercised minimumeects on local socioeconomic pro-cesses.Wedonotseeradicalshiftsinthelocalsettlementtrajectoryasaresponsetoimperial policies. Instead, thesettlement tendencytowardpopulatingthe PlateautookplacebeforetheInkas. At arrival, theempireadaptedtothe indigenous preferences. At aneconomic level, therewas a minimumof agricultural extraction, reected bythelowstoragecapacityandabsenceof agricultural ter-races, perhaps destined to supply local imperial needsrather than being for export. In addition, there was a nearabsence of a prestige-goods economy based on the produc-tion and distribution of Inka pottery as a marker of status.Infact, themainOroncotabuildingcomplexwasneitherthefocusofpopulationattraction, northecenterofcraftproductionaswas alsorevealedbymyexcavations. Theattachedresidenceswerealsofew.All this evidence suggests that Oroncota was a dis-embeddedimperialcenterinadistantprovince.Althoughthe investment in ne architecture was signicant, this cen-ter lacked an immediate support population directly associ-atedwiththecenter andwas not involvedinsignicantagricultural extraction for export or craft production activ-ities. Instead, itseectsonthelocal political economyorsettlementtrajectorywerelimited.Ihaveexplainedinthisarticlethatdis-embeddedcenterswerethoseInkaprovin-cialinstallationsbuiltwithnearchitectureandfollowingthe imperialcanons,thatnevertheless, were divorced fromindigenoussocioeconomicprocesses.Therefore, the investment of public Inka architecturewasnotnecessarilyincorrespondencetosimilarlevelsofeconomic extraction. In the territorialhegemonic spec-trum, dis-embeddedprovincial centers standinthe mid-point of bothbecause imperial control was basedonahigh investment but lowextraction strategy (Table 1).Some explanationis requiredtounderstandthe originsandmechanicsoftheseuniqueInkacenters.TherstpossibleexplanationisthatOroncota,locatedinthe route connecting highlands andlowlands, gainedimportance as atrade gateway. Inthis context, the nearchitecturewouldsignal theimperialpowertotheexter-nal tradinggroups. However, noevidence was foundtosuggest that the Oroncota buildings were commercial gate-ways or the centers of craft production. Neither were thesefacilitatesmeanttobeseenbyouterpopulations.Rather,mostwerestrategicallyhiddenandlocatedonthePucaramesa.The secondexplanationtakes intoaccount the statusandkindsoftributeoflocalpopulations.AsdocumentedintheMemorial deCharcas, fournationsoftheCharcasconfederationinhabitingthestudyregionwereexemptedfrom paying tribute in productive tasks. Their main servicewas military, serving as soldiersto the Inka.As such,theyreceivedprivilegedstatusbecausethesefournationswereresponsible for the subjugationof NorthernInka prov-inces. Therefore, if suchwas the case, we shouldexpectinthesesettlementstheabsenceof signicant productionfor export, because these groups were exempted from pay-ingcorveelaborinproductivetasksdirectlybenetingtheempire. Inotherwords, theabsenceof extensiveagricul-tural terraces orirrigation canals, sizablenumbersofstor-ageunits or largecraft workshops inthecenters shouldsignal that thesegroupswerenot directlyinvolvedinaneconomydirectlybenetingthecore.Thethirdexplanation,isrelatedtotheuseofbuildingsas landmarks of conquest and colonization. In ethnohisto-rical documents, the natural fortress of Oroncota isdescribedasthelast bastionof local defenseagainst theInkatroopsleadbyTupacInkaYupanqui.Thiskingdidnotonlyvanquishtheindigenouspopulationsbutalsoheordered the construction of Inka installations in Oroncota.In the main Oroncota building complex, dressed stones anddoubleandtriplejambbody-sizeniches wereusedinitsconstruction. These features are usually associatedwithhighprestige buildings (Gasparini andMargolies, 1980;Niles, 2004). Therefore, beyond their practical use, the con-structions inOroncota were part of the architecture ofpower tradition in the provinces that served to glorifyandcommemorate theInkaconquest andas such, wereusedasemblemsofauthorityandcolonization.Hence, theuseof publicbuildings as imperial propa-gandawas animportant avenue for the Inkas toassertauthority in the provinces in the absence of standingarmies. This might have been supplemented by other mech-anisms including periodic visits of the Inka king and high-rankingadministratorsforavarietyofpurposesincludingcensuses (Rowe, 1946; Rostworowski de Diez Canseco,1999). The goal of such visits was not only for administra-tive ends, but more importantly, to visually remind the sub-jects of the might of the empire. Considering the delegationofcontroltonativeleaders, thisstrategycouldhavebeenimportant in reinstating existing alliances while alsoreminding subject leaders of the dominance of theconquerors.The fourth explanation takes into account the evolutionof royal estates in the provinces. We should not discard thepossibilitythat dis-embeddedInkacenters likeOroncotarepresentedthe aspirations of royal panacas toestablishpockets of direct administration in distant territories. Con-sideringthesystemofsplitinheritancesystemwherenewInkarulersasfoundersoftheirownroyalpanacashadtoamassnewlandsandtributariesfromscratch, theestab-78 S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381lishmentofpocketsofcontrolinpromising,althoughdis-tantregionsmusthavebeenimportantinfuelingimperialgrowth(ConradandDemarest,1984;Julien,1993;DAlt-roy, 2001; Niles, 2004). This was particularlyimportantinthelastperiodsofInkaexpansionasthebestlandsinCuzcowerealreadytransformedintoprivateroyalestates(Julien, 1993; Niles, 2004). Strengthenedbythe securityof their alliances with trustworthy native lords, Inka rulersandtheirpanacascouldhavetargetedpreferredareasforfuture political consolidation that for a number of reasonsdidnottakeplace.Therefore, it is possible that the main Oroncota buildingcomplexrepresentedtheaspirationoftheInkarulersandthepanacas toestablishinthis regionanodeof controlinthenearbyfuturethatformanyreasonsdidnotoccur.This is supported by the fact that the main Oroncota build-ing complex had elegant architecture, a small enclosedplaza and mitmakuna retainers, features that are consistentwithroyalestates(Niles,2004;Salazar,2004).Hence,itislikelythat dis-embeddedcentersconstitutedanextensionofprivateestatesindistantpocketsthatpromisedfurthereconomicrevenues, orwereattractivetoindividual rulersandroyalkingroupsfordierentmotives.ConclusionsTakingintoaccounttheseexplanationsthatarebynomeansexclusionary, Iconcludethat Oroncotawasadis-embeddedcenterintheimperialhinterlandsthatusednearchitecture to symbolize power. Taking into considerationthattheInkakingembodiedtheconvergenceofreligiousandpolitical leadership, it isreasonabletoconcludethatsomeprovincialInkainstallationsbuiltonhisbehalfalsocombined both forms of power. In this sense, using Morrisdenition (2004), Oroncota was also a provincial royaladministrativecenter. Thesecenterswereuniquebecausebesidestheconstructionsdedicatedtoadministrationtheyalsoincludedinstallationsbuiltwithnearchitectureusu-ally used as residences of the royal families. Whether theseconstructionswerelargeornot, dependedontheperma-nency o the royal families or theirrepresentatives, the reg-ularityof theirvisitsand theintensity of associated ritualsandhospitalitycelebrationsconductedontheirbehalf.Inthissense, thesmall sizeoftheneconstructionsinOroncota, indicatesthatOroncotawasasmallroyalpro-vincial center that did not fully evolve into a typicaladministrative installation. Some reasons might includeits distance to the core, short occupation, or its rapidabandonment after the Spanishconquest. Whatever wasthecase, theevolutionofOroncotaillustratestheimpor-tance of architecture of power in the foundation ofadministrative provincial centers. In addition, whereasadministrative centers and royal estates in the CuzcoheartlandrepresentedtwodistinctformsofInkainstalla-tions, perhapssuggestingthesecularizationoftheadmin-istration,someprovincialcenterscombinedbothformsofcontrol.Thispeculiaruseof architectureasanembodiment ofpower is in line with the agenda control dimension ofpower (Lukes, 2005). In this context, the elegant construc-tionsinOroncotaunderscoredthepresenceoftheempirein the landscape. They were the focus of indoctrination intotheInkareligionandways of life. However, judgingbytheir small size, enclosed plaza and limited cultural materi-als, thesepracticeswererestrictedtofewsocial segments,includingthelocaleliteandassociatedsupporters.Hence,the power of the Inka rulers was not basedonsizablestanding armies or direct rule, but on the authority materi-alizedinthelandscape.Tosummarize, I have arguedinthis article that dis-embeddedimperial centers, althoughcharacterizedbytheinvestment in ne infrastructure as symbols of power, exer-cised a minimum of inuence in the dynamics of local pop-ulations and indigenous socioeconomic processes. Dis-embedded centers, at the mid point of the territorialhege-monicspectrumof formsof administration, wereuniquebecausetheycombinedtheinvestmentofnearchitectureas landmarks of power in distant, although strategic areas,wherepotentiallymore direct forms of control couldbeexercised.Inmystudyregion,thisstrategyofindirectbutselectivecontrol wasencouragedbytrustedalliancesandcommoninterestswithlocallordsincluding thedefenseofthe Southeastern Inka frontier against external invasions.Finally, dis-embeddedcentersasananalytical concepthelpedustounderstandthedierentformsofpower, theusesofarchitecturetoconveyimperial authority, andthevariouswaysinwhichthesesymbolswereactivelymanip-ulatedbytheInkatoexercisecontrol inremoteandcon-testedlandscapes. Future studies will determine whetherOroncota is an anomalous case, or instead, if dis-embeddedimperial centers were part of a broader Inka policydesignedtoexertcontrolindistantbutdesiredterritories.AcknowledgmentsThis manuscriptis dedicatedto the Quechua communi-ties in Oroncota, Chuquisaca, Bolivia, the source of perma-nent inspiration. This research was funded by dierentorganizationsincludingtheNational ScienceFoundation(SBR9712711), WennerGren(No. 6361), National Geo-graphic Society (No. 6150-98), and Heinz Foundationthrough the University of Pittsburgh. They nanced dier-ent stages of the research over the last years. Without theirsupport, this investigation would have been virtuallyimpossible.IreceivedtheinstitutionalsupportfrommanyBolivianorganizationsincludingtheUnidadNacional deArqueologiaunder thedirectionof Javier Escalante, theArchaeology Museumfromthe Universidad Mayor deSanFranciscoXavierinChuquisacaheadedbyEdmundoSalinas, and the Prefectura de Potos . I also want to expressmy gratitude toCarla Jaimes, SoledadFernandez, JoseLuis Paz, GaryPalacios, StellaNair, Michael Kruschek,Edmundo Salinas, Gasto n Vacaores, Velia Mendoza,Juan Mujica and Dante Angelo, who participated in dier-S.Alconini / JournalofAnthropologicalArchaeology27(2008)6381 79ent stages of theinvestigation, despitethe dicult eld-work conditions. I amalso thankful to the followingfriendsandcolleagueswhosharedtheirknowledge, ideasandenthusiasmforBolivianarchaeology:ClaudiaRivera,Carlos Lemuz, Marcos Michel, and John Janusek. Mygratitudegoes toMarcBermann, James RichardsonIII,Robert DrennanandOlivier de Montmollinfor sharingtheir knowledge. Andy Speer helped to improve the clarityofthemanuscript.Inallywanttothanktheanonymousreviewers. Their constructivecriticismandadvice helpedme to signicantly improve the quality, clarity and organi-zationofthismanuscript.ReferencesAcuto, F., 1999. Paisaje y dominacio n: La constitucio n del espacio socialen el Imperio Inka. 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