AL-GHAZALI’S CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY WITH REFERENCE TO HIS

INTERPRETATIONS OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

BY

HAMID FAHMY ZARKASYI

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA

2007

AL-GHAZALI’S CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY WITH REFERENCE TO HIS

INTERPRETATIONS OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

BY

HAMID FAHMY ZARKASYI

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy International Institute of Islamic Thought & Civilization

International Islamic University Malaysia

APRIL 2007

ii

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to examine al-Ghazali’s concept of causality from the perspective of his understanding of reality and knowledge. Two important themes around which al-Ghazali’s concept of causality revolves are the concept of the reality of thing and the manner of our understanding of that reality. These concepts are two important elements in the Islamic worldview that require metaphysical and epistemological approach. In the second chapter the discussion traces the conceptual background of causality in Islamic intellectual tradition, from the Qur’anic notion to the discourse in kalÉm and falsafah. This is to explicate the problem of causality inherited by al-Ghazali. The exposition on al-Ghazali’s concept of reality, is presented in chapter three. The fourth chapter elaborates al-Ghazali’s concept of knowledge that covers the meaning, the nature, the method of attainment and the concept of certainty of knowledge. In Chapter five, the explication focuses on the concept of causality with reference to al-Ghazali’s concept of reality, delineated in the chapter three. Causality is viewed as a part of divine acts of continuous creation and annihilation (dawÉm al-tajaddud wa dawÉm al-in‘idÉm). What he actually denies is the mode of connection (wajh al-iqtirÉn) and not the connection itself (nafs al-iqtirÉn). It is because the mode of connection is empirically unproved. Therefore, the causal nexus is conceded only within the mental reality and not in ontological reality. The issue of knowledge based on such a mode of causal connection is delineated in chapter six. Al-Ghazali admits the demonstrative science of the falÉsifah as the tool for the attainment of knowledge, but in so far as it accords with his principle of causality. Here he distinguishes between knowledge of reasoned fact and that of the fact. The former could be attained through qiyÉs al-‘illah and burhÉn lima, while the latter could be achieved by qiyÉs al-dilÉlah and burhÉn inna. The knowledge attained from those methods could provide certainty. This study arrives at the conclusion that al-Ghazzali’s concept of causality is based on the principle that causation in the natural phenomena is contingent reality related ontologically to Absolute reality, and hence it is not necessary. Causal nexus as a mental reality is certain, but not necessarily so in external reality. The whole breadth of al-Ghazali’s concept causality is an attempt to place philosophical and scientific knowledge within the ambit of revealed knowledge and not an affront to it.

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ملخص البحث

وذلك من وجهة فهمه تجاه الحقيقة ،يهدف هذا البحث إلى اختبار مفهوم السببية للإمام الغزاليمفهوم الحقيقه للأشياء والطريقة التي : ومن أهم المواضيع المندرجة ضمن مفهومه للسببية. والمعرفة

ضوعين من أهم العوامل للتصور الإسلامي أو رؤية تعد هذان المو. يجب اتباعها لفهم تلك الحقيقةوقد خصص الباب الثانى للبحث في . الإسلام للوجود والذى يحتاج إلى الدراسة الميتافيزية والمعرفية

وانتهاء بالبحوث بداية من رؤية القرآن الكريم فيه، خلفية مفهوم السببية في عرف العلوم الإسلاميةويراد من هذه الدراسة توضيح إشكالية مفهوم السببية . لام والفلسفةحول هذا المفهوم في علم الك

في الباب الرابع قدم . أما الباب الثالث ففيه بيان عن مفهوم الغزالي عن الحقيقة. الذى واجهه الغزاليالباحث عرضا في مفهوم العلم عند الغزالي و يشمل فيه معنى العلم وحقيقته ومنهج الحصول عليه

وفي الباب الخامس ركز الباحث في مفهوم السببية وذلك بالرجوع إلى مفهوم . ليقينية للعلموالنظرية اويرى الغزالي بأن السببية هى دوام التجدد ودوام . الغزالي في الحقيقة السابقة بياا في الباب الثالث

الاقتران، لأن وجه والحق أن الذي أنكره الغزالي هو وجه الاقتران وليس نفس. الانعدام في أفعال االلهومن هنا تكون العلاقة السببية مجرد حقيقة ذهنية وليس في ضمن . الاقتران لا يمكن إثباته في التجربة

. في الباب السادس تعرض فيه الأمور المتعلقة بالعلوم على أساس تلك العلاقة السببية. الوجود الحقيقيلحصول على العلوم شريطة تماشيها بمفهومه وسلم الغزالي البرهان في المنطق للفلاسفة كوسيلة ل

فالأولى يمكن اكتساا . وقام الغزالي بالتفرقة بين العلم عن الواقعة المعقولة والعلم عن الواقعة. للسببيةوالمعلومات الواردة ". إن"، أما الثانية فيمكن حصولها بقياس الدلالة وبرهان "لم"بقياس العلة وبرهان ويصل هذا البحث إلى الاستنباط أن النظرية السببية للإمام الغزالي تعتمد . اليقين من تلك المناهج تفيد

على أساس أن العلاقة السببية التي تقع على الظواهر الكونية تعتبر الحقيقة الممكنة التي تعلقت في يقينية، ولكنها لا إن العلاقة السببية التي تمثل الحقيقة الموجودة في الذهن تعتبر. الوجود بالحقيقة المطلقة

وبذلك يكمن مجمل مفهوم السببية للغزالي في المحاولة لوضع . تعتبر كذلك في الحقيقة الخارجية .المعارف الفلسفية والعلوم في حدود الوحي

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APPROVAL PAGE

The dissertation of Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi has been approved by the following:

________________________________________ Cemil Akdogan

Supervisor

________________________________________ Osman Bakar

Internal Examiner

________________________________________ Alparslan Açikgenç External Examiner

________________________________________ Ibrahim Zein

Chairman

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own research, except where

otherwise stated. I also declare that this has not been previously or concurrently

submitted as a whole for any other degrees at IIUM or other institutions.

Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi

Signature_________________________ Date ____________

vi

DEDICATION

For my late father KH. Imam Zarkasyi whose appreciation to Imam al-Ghazali

inspired my to wrestle with the thought of this brilliant master.

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA

DECLARATION OF COPYRIGHT AND AFFIRMATION OF FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED

RESEARCH

Copyright @ 2006 by Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi. All rights reserved.

AL-GHAZALI’S CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY,

WITH REFERENCE TO HIS INTERPRETATIONS OF REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

No part of this unpublished research may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the copyright holder except as provided below:

1. Any material contained in or derived from this unpublished research may only be used by others in their writing with due acknowledgement.

2. IIUM or its library will have the right to make and transmit copies

(print or electronic) for institutional and academic purposes.

3. The IIUM library will have the right to make, store in a retrieval system and supply copies of this unpublished research if requested by other universities and research libraries.

Affirmed by Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi ………………………………… …………………… Signature Date

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Praise belongs to God, the Effuser of Lights, Opener of Eyes, Unveiler of Mysteries, and Lifter of Covering. Praise be to God, Whose praise should preface every writing and discourse. Praise be to almighty Allah for enabling me to complete this humble contribution on path promoting the cause of truth. May God show us the truth as truth and guide us for its attainment. This study is not only the result of my independent research on the subject, but also the outcome of long standing process of my study at International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). Therefore, I would like thank to several individual who have instigated me to look into gates of knowledge. Special thank is due to Prof. Dr. Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, whose lectures inspired me to understand various problems and their solutions. He supervised me in the first stage of writing this thesis. He suggested and guided me in locating the problem and choosing this topic as well as the framework for dealing with it. My gratitude is also due to Prof. Dr. Cemil Ackdogan, who supervised me in the next stage of this study. His comment, criticism and encouragement are considerably instrumental in completing this study. I also would like to thank to Prof. Dr. Umar Jah, my second supervisor after Prof. al-Attas, and Dr. Ssekamanya Siraje Abdallah, my second supervisor after Prof. Cemil. I am also indebted to Prof. Dr. Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud for his advice and encouragement during my study at ISTAC. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Alparslan Açikgenç, whose lecture on Islamic Philosophy had enlightened me to understand a conceptual framework within the theory of worldview. I also owe much debt to all Professors at ISTAC for their serious and sincere guidance on their respective subjects. ISTAC academic and intellectual environment promoted by its learned leadership has been very helpful for me. Finally, I wish to record my gratitude for my wife Emira Iffat and my children Nazia Dinia, Ishma Amelia, Himma Hameesha and Zinda Danisha for their patient, understanding and unfailing support. So many weekends and long-evening hours were snatched from them during which they deprived of my personal care and attention. May Allah bless them all.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ................................................................................................................. ii Abstract in Arabic ................................................................................................. iii Approval Page ....................................................................................................... iv Declaration Page ................................................................................................... v Copyright Page ...................................................................................................... vi Dedication ............................................................................................................. vii Acknowledgement ................................................................................................ viii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem .......................................................................... 9 The Source of the Study ............................................................................ 12 Theoretical Framework of the Study ......................................................... 14 The Purposes and the scope of the study ................................................... 18 Literature Review ...................................................................................... 19

CHAPTER TWO: CAUSALITY IN ISLAMIC INTELECTUAL TRADITION

A. The Qur’anic notion of causality .......................................................... 29 1. Terminology and definition of Causality ........................................ 30 2. Causality and the Qur’anic worldview............................................ 34 3. Causality in the Natural Events ....................................................... 37 4. Causality in the Human being ......................................................... 41

B. Causality in kalÉm Tradition ................................................................. 53 1. The Sources of the Concept ............................................................ 55 2. The Theory of Atom ....................................................................... 57 3. The Theory of Accident .................................................................. 60 4. Accident and Divine Causation ...................................................... 63 5. Theory of Atoms and Causality ...................................................... 67 6. Causality in Human Being .............................................................. 71

C. Causality in Falsafah Tradition ............................................................ 82 1. Al-KindÊ .......................................................................................... 84 2. Al-FÉrÉbÊ ......................................................................................... 89 3. Ibn SÊnÉ ........................................................................................... 96

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 104 CHAPTER THREE: AL-GHAZZÓLÔ’S INTERPRETATIONS OF REALITY

A. Traditional Definition ........................................................................... 108 B. Al-GhazzÉlÊ’s Definition ....................................................................... 113 C. The Main Elements of Reality .............................................................. 121

1. The Concept of God ........................................................................ 121 a. The Unity of God ............................................................. 125 b. The Attributes of God ...................................................... 135

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2. The Concept of Cosmology ............................................................ 140 a. The Doctrine of Creation ................................................ 141 b. The Cosmic System ........................................................ 148

3. Ontology of Created Being ............................................................ 161 a. Reality of Thing ............................................................... 161 b. Reality of Human Being ................................................. 171

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 178 CHAPTER FOUR: AL-GHAZZÓLÔ’S CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE

A. Definition of knowledge ...................................................................... 182 B. Meaning of Knowledge ......................................................................... 186 C. Knowledge and Reality ......................................................................... 189 D. Nature of Knowledge ........................................................................... 192

1. Religious Knowledge ..................................................................... 193 2. Rational Knowledge ........................................................................ 197

E. The Integration ..................................................................................... 203 F. The attainment of knowledge ................................................................ 205

1. Knowledge about God ................................................................... 209 2. Knowledge of external reality ...................................................... 214

a. Psychological Process ...................................................... 214 b. Logical Process ................................................................ 217

G. Knowledge and certainty ..................................................................... 222 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 229

CHAPTER FIVE: CAUSALITY AND REALITY

A. His Stance on KalÉm ............................................................................ 234 B. His Stance of Falasfah .......................................................................... 237 C. Meaning of Cause : illah and sabab ..................................................... 242 D. Causality and Absolute Reality ............................................................ 245

1. Mode of Divine Action .................................................................. 246 2. Divine’ Will and Causality ............................................................. 253

E. Causality and Ontology of Created Being ............................................ 258 F. Causality in Human Beings .................................................................. 267 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 276

CHAPTER SIX: CAUSALITY AND KNOWLEDGE A. Dispute with Ibn Rushd ........................................................................ 281

1. On Negation of Knowledge ........................................................... 281 2. On Denial of the Nature of Things ............................................... 283 3. On Definite Pattern Things ............................................................ 286 4. On Denial of Causality Altogether ............................................... 289

B. Causal Reasoning and Demonstrative Science ..................................... 293 C. Substance of Syllogism ........................................................................ 301 D. Causality and Certainty ......................................................................... 308

1. Certainty of demonstrative science ................................................. 309 2. Certainty of Causal Events .............................................................. 314

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Conclusion ................................................................................................ 318 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION ................................................................... 321 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 327

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

One of the most crucial points in al-Ghazali’s rebuttal against the positions of the

falÉsifah is the theory of causality, the very foundation of Aristotelian natural

philosophy (physics). The point that most of the writers refer to is al-Ghazali's notion

in his TahÉfut al-FalÉsifah that “the connection between what is believed to be the

cause and effect is not necessary”.1 The causal connection in the phenomenal world is

simply habitual order of occurrence. It might appear to us that things occur with cause

and effect, but they do not occur because of them. The inanimate thing has no causal

action; and that the causal action resides exclusively in God who always acts

voluntarily. Thus all events according to this doctrine are the creation of God, either

directly or through the mediation of His angels.

The theories that al-Ghazali principally criticizes are of al-FÉrÉbÊ and Ibn SÊnÉ.

They are considered not only as the chief and best Muslim exponent of Aristotle

philosophy, but also the Muslim Neoplatonists who had vindicated and reformulated

the theory of emanative schemes.2 Their theories concerned not only about causality

in the physical phenomena, as was expressed by al-Ghazali above, but also in the

metaphysical reality, at the heart of which is the question of the nature of divine

causality.

Ibn SÊnÉ established his theory of divine causality based on his concept of God.

God, the Necessary Existent is the cause of the world's existence, but the causation

1 Al-GhazzÉlÊ, TahÉfut al-Falasifah, edited with introduction by SulaymÉn DunyÉ, 7th edition, Dar al-Ma'arif, Cairo, 1972, 239, hereinafter cited as TahÉfut, ed. S.DunyÉ

2

here can only be properly understood in terms of emanative scheme of Neoplatonism.

The model of causation would then consist of God as efficient cause, and the first

intelligence directly emanating from Him as the effect. Hence, God is the proximate

cause only of this intelligence, the rest of the existent being caused by Him through

mediation. The mode by which God causes the world's existence is not of such a

creative act, but of necessary causal nexus. God is the necessitating cause Who

necessitates the world's existence. The effect of an essential efficient cause coexists

with its cause. God’s priority to the world consists exclusively in existential

precedence.3 Since the necessitating cause is eternal the necessitated effect is eternal

too. At issue here is that God acts by necessity of His nature and not voluntarily. In

other words, God is not willful agent.

Following the principle of divine causality, Ibn SÊnÉ had almost the same

notion of causality in the realm of nature. According to Ibn SÊnÉ's theory of

ontological priority the essential efficient cause is prior to its necessitated effect, when

a) both coexist in time and b) the existence of the one can be inferred from the

existence of the other.4 Therefore, in this theory, the essential, proximate cause, in the

realm of nature necessitates its effect and coexists with it. The example is the hand's

movement that turns the key, necessitates the latter's movement and coexist with it.5

Since the falÉsifah’s doctrine of necessary causal nexus in the physical world is

originated from the principle of metaphysics, al-Ghazali’s repudiation consequently

refers to their theory of both natural and divine causality. Even though al-Ghazali

____________________________ 2 According to Al-FÉrÉbÊ the Active Intellect and the heavenly bodies are causes of our world. See Al-FÉrÉbÊ, KitÉb al-SiyÉsah al-Madaniyyah, ed. Fauzi M Najjar, (Beirut: Dar El-Mashreq Publisher, 1964): 54-55 and 72-73. 3 Ibn SÊnÉ, al-ShifÉ' IlÉhiyÉt, 2 vols, ed. G.C. Anawati, S.Dunya, M.Y.Musa and S.Zayid, (Cairo: WazÉrat al-ThaqÉfah wa al-IrshÉd al-QawmÊ, 1960): vol. I, 164-169; vol.II, 264-275. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid, 165

3

buttressed his criticism of necessary causal nexus in the nature with epistemological

argument, Ibn Rushd, in his TahÉfut al-TahÉfut, repudiates him from epistemological

perspectives. According to the former the latter’s denial of necessary causal nexus in

the observable phenomena implies the denial of the possibility of knowledge,6 given

that knowledge is based on natural causality.

Ibn Rushd's criticism, had a negative impact on modern Muslims as well as

Western scholars whose scholarship influenced their thought. They erroneously regard

al-Ghazali's concept of causality as destroying the foundation of rational science;

resulting as they asserted, in the stagnation of the Muslim thought, preventing the

Muslim intellectuals from any further philosophical speculation.7 On the one hand, the

issue was subsequently transmitted into the Middle Ages' Christian milieu of Europe,

and on the other it was claimed with insufficient proof or reason, to be parallel with

Christian doctrine. The Western scholars such as Malebranche and David Hume had

tailored and developed the idea into such a distinct concept that departs from its

original formulation.8

According to Cemil Akdogan “David Hume, who is skeptic, evaluates cause-

effect relationship after al-Ghazzali but he does it in a secular context”.9 Ibn Rushd

6 Ibn Rushd, TahÉfut al-TahÉfut, Dar al-Ma’arif, 3rd edition, vol. 1, n.d., 785, hereinafter cited as TahÉfut al-TahÉfut; English translation with intorduction, Incoherence of the Incoherence by Van Den Bergh, E.J.W.Gibb Memorial Series vol. 1, London, 317, hereinafter cited as Incoherence, trans. Bergh. 7 There are numbers of such kind of opinion and an example of the most flagrant misconception is to be found in M.T. Ansari, “Al-GhazzÉlÊ’s Repudiation of Causality, The Destruction of Philosophical Enquiry in Islam”, in M.T. Ansari, (ed), Secularism, Islam and Modernity, Selected Essays of Alam Khudmiri, Sage Publication, New Delhi/London, 2001, 119. Also in J.F.Naify, Arabic and European Occasionalism: A Comparison of al-GhazzÉlÊ’s Occasionalism and its critique by Averroes with Malebranche’s Occasionalism and its critique in the Cartesian Tradition, Ph.D. Diss., University of California, San Diego, 1975, 7, hereinafter cited as Arabic 8 It is even proven that al-GhazzÉlÊ influenced Malebranche, who have exerted a great influence on Hume thinking. See Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, “Some Sources for Hume’s Account of Cause”, Journal of the History of Ideas, No.52, 1991, 660-661; see also Thomas Lennon, “Veritas Filia Temporis: Hume on Time and Causation” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2 (1985) 287. 9 Cemil Akdogan, “Ghazzzali, Descartes, and Hume: The Geneology of Some Philosophical Ideas”, Islamic Studies, vol.42, Autumn 2003, Number: 3, 498

4

agrees with the position that the relation between causes and their effects are

necessary. His position regarding God's will have some bearing on his concept of

reality, natural events and knowledge, which signifies a deterministic scheme of

things in the world, as if God has no direct relation with the operation of natural

events. Therefore, admitting the concept of God's will, for him, entails the

impossibility of knowledge, because there is no standard of God’s will that can be

referred to, whereas true knowledge is only possible through the fixed standard or

custom that can be known.10

Those who vindicate Ibn Rushd's position from among the orientalists must

have maintained such a concept of God. It is because they have erroneously construed

that al-Ghazali's theory of causality and that of miracle indicate the direct and

occasional intervention of God towards the natural events. Such a flawed inference is

evident in the concept embedded in the term "Islamic occasionalism". It is as if God is

located somewhere outside the world and interferes occasionally the process of natural

events. The concept is incompatible with the concept of God in the Qur’an Whose act

of creating is direct and continuous. The term "occasionalism" itself is not of Islamic

origin. Thus it is neither correct nor proper to speak of "Islamic occasionalism" as

used by Majid Fakhry 11 implying hence that God seems to have no direct relationship

with the phenomenal events.

The foregoing account suggests that if al-Ghazali's concept of causality were

viewed from a different metaphysical system and worldview, it would inevitably

result in incongruity. For as pointed by al-Attas, each metaphysical system and the

worldview it projects is different from one civilization to another; and each has a

10 Ibn Rushd, TahÉfut TahÉfut, 325. 11 See Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1958. hereinafter cited as Occasionalism; Also J.F.Naify, Arabic

5

different interpretation of what is interpreted to be ultimately true and real. 12 To do

justice to al-Ghazali’s position on the issue of causality, elucidation of metaphysical

system and the worldview of Islam that he subscribes is deemed to be of critical

importance.

Al-Ghazali’s theory about cause-effect relation in the phenomenal world is

only part of his understanding about reality (al-haqÊqah), which is associated to the

wider concept of God's creation and other related issues, which constitute the Islamic

system of worldview. The worldview of Islam, as asserted by Professor al-Attas, is not

exclusively limited to the mind's view of the physical world, but encompasses:

The vision of reality and truth, which is metaphysical survey of the visible as well as the invisible worlds including the perspective of life as a whole, is not a worldview that is formed merely by the gathering together of various cultural objects, values, phenomena into artificial coherence.13 Thus, proper understanding of al-Ghazali's concept of causality requires

metaphysical survey involving both the natural phenomena (al-haqÊqah) and truth (al-

haqq). Therefore, the prevailing exposition of al-Ghazali's concept of causality, which

is discerned from the perspectives of different worldviews, requires what is called the

paradigm shift, to borrow Thomas Kuhn’s term.

Moreover, it is worth noting that al-Ghazali exposition of the problem of

causality in the second part of TahÉfut (the 17th Discussion) concerns the natural

sciences (ÙabÊ'iyyÉt). This persistently follows the first part, in which al-Ghazali

criticizes the concept of causal necessity applied to God. This in the mean time

constitutes the metaphysical foundation of the second, and even complements the

epistemological basis of the 17th Discussion. Specifically in the first three discussions,

12 S.M.N. al-Attas, Prolegomena to The Metaphysics of Islam, An Exposition of the Fundamental alements of The Worldview of Islam, ISTAC, Kuala Lumpur, 1995, see Praface, ix; hereinafter cited as Prolegomena

6

al-Ghazali reiterated his criticism of the doctrine that God's acts proceed, by necessity,

from His very essence or nature. Instead, he insisted that the divine act is voluntary

and therefore God’s eternal attributes such as life, will, power, and knowledge must be

additional to His essence, not identical with it. Otherwise, the divine acts become

essential, proceeding the necessary consequence of the divine nature. Accordingly, al-

Ghazali proceeds and infers that only living, knowing, willing being can be an agent

while the inanimate has no action.14 All changes are series of creation enacted

voluntarily and directly by God. Thus, al-Ghazali's epistemic argument in the 17th

Discussion is relevant to his metaphysics. In other words, the issue is physics

(tabi'iyyat) but the final analysis attaches to it is metaphysics, in which the concept of

God, His creation and His Attributes occupy central stage. It is by such a kind of

approach that the coherence of al-Ghazali's whole concept of causality is vividly

discernible.

There is a clear indication that al-Ghazali has a concept of his own in

interpreting the connection between cause and effect in nature which he looks from

both epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. He denies the possibility of

proving the necessary causal nexus in nature through observation, and upholds instead

the possibility of perceiving correlation or connection between the antecedent event

and the consequent one. Then, he interprets it from the metaphysical aspect that such a

connection is due to the prior decree of God who creates them side by side and not

due to its being necessary in itself.15 If al-Ghazali comprehends natural causality in

such a fashion, he must have his own concept of reality and truth that constitutes his

____________________________ 13 Ibid, 1-2. 14 Al-Ghazali., TahÉfut, ed. S.DunyÉ, 136. 8 Ibid, 225, Cf. English translation Incoherence of the Philosophers, by S.A.Kamali, Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Second Impression, Lahore, 1963, 185, hereinafter cited as Incoherence, trans.Kamali.

7

own metaphysical system, which is at variance with that of his opponents. This

metaphysical issue is the first concern of this present research.

Our second concern that closely relates to metaphysical foundation of causality

is to look as to whether Ibn Rushd’s accusation that al-Ghazali's concept of causality

entails the denial of knowledge is justifiable. If the answer is negative, then each must

have his own concept of what should be deemed knowledge and what should be the

principle of epistemology behind it.

The argument employed by Ibn Rushd in his refutation is that one only has

knowledge if that knowledge has a direct relationship with the natural cause that is

known. Even assuming that God does create knowledge in a person, that person is said

to know only if knowledge "is something dependent on the nature of the existent,

because the true is when one believes something to be as it is in existence."16 In other

words if God creates a knowledge in us, that knowledge is properly designated as

knowledge only if it corresponds to a real nature.

Moreover, to provide epistemic argument for the necessary causal nexus Ibn

Rushd distinguishes between fact and knowledge of the reasoned fact. The former is

the evidential ground for asserting that something is the case, while the latter is the

explanation of why something is what it is and does what it does. The former are the

empirical ground for knowing the latter and the latter explains the former. The burning

cotton, for example is the empirical ground for saying that the fire burns; the stars

flicker is the empirical ground for saying that they are quite distant from the earth.

These empirical evidences are compatible with interpreting the relations between

cotton and fire or flickering appearance and the great distance, therefore Ibn Rushd

regards the relation as non-contingent or necessary.

8

Ibn Rushd seems to have misunderstood al-Ghazali's position, since the latter

does not deny the principle that knowledge is always through causes. However, he

underlines that our knowledge about real nature is brought about by our habits of

knowing that is by experience, and knowledge as such is not knowledge of what is

necessary. It is because, for al-Ghazali causes are always contingent on God's will in

producing their effects, meaning that God is the real source of necessity in the causal

relationship and hence the real source of knowledge. Therefore, knowledge about

nature should not exclude supernatural causes. On this ground, it would make sense if

we say that for al-GhazÉlÊ revelation is the paradigmatic form of knowledge for man

to which unaided reason and sense perception should be attached.

Moreover, al-Ghazali held that fact and knowledge of the fact are interrelated.

What is called fact by the falÉsifah is something contingent or possible (mumkin) that

may or may not happen, and thus not necessary or certain. Consequently, knowledge

about natural events, which is claimed by the falÉsifah as necessary, is only possible

for it is habitual course ('Édah).17 Here, al-Ghazali implicitly conveys that causal

proposition belongs to the contingent and whatever contingent is not necessary. This

seems to be mean that metaphysical and epistemic arguments supplement each other.

This epistemic argument is also corroborated in another work of al-Ghazali, namely

al-Munqidh in which he says that "knowledge of the realities of things" (al-'Ilm bi

haqÉ'iq al-umËr) presupposes the inquiry of what the true meaning of knowledge is

(haqÊqat al-'Ilm).18

From the foregoing discussion, what is of particular interest to us is to

comprehend al-Ghazali's doctrine of causality from both metaphysical and

____________________________ 16 Ibn Rushd, Incoherence, trans. Bergh, 325. 17 Al-GhazzÉlÊ, Incoherence, trans. Kamali, 190.

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epistemological foundations to enable us to see its compatibility with other related

aspects.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem that can be grasped from the above dispute between al-Ghazali on the

one hand and Ibn SÊnÉ and Ibn Rushd on the other is in the incongruity of their system

of thought. This divergence in wider scope involves some fundamental concepts,

which stemmed from their interpretation of reality and knowledge. This in turn had

brought about their different conception around the essential meaning to be given to

the word "cause", either divine cause or secondary cause. The contrast between the

two systems of thought on this issue can be illuminated effectively by brief

examination of the definition of causality used by both al-Ghazali and the falÉsifah.

The former developed the conceptual structure of the mutakallimËn, whereas the latter

based their concept on Aristotle and Neoplatonic system of thought.

There are two words employed by both parties to designate “cause”, sabab and

‘illah. al-Ghazali, who follows the kalÉm terminology, prefers to use the term sabab

rather than ‘illah to convey the idea of cause,19 whereas the falÉsifah favor to use the

term ‘illah, rather than sabab. However, this divergence cannot be taken strictly,

either al-Ghazali or the falÉsifah uses the term sabab and ‘illah interchangeably.

There are different interpretations between al-Ghazali and falÉsifah on the

meaning of cause in supra-mundane reality and in the phenomenal world. According

____________________________ 18 Al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh Min al-ÖalÉl, edited and annotated by JamÊl ØalÊban and KÉmil ‘IyÉd, DÉr al-Andalus, Beirut, 1980, 9 and 11. 19 Al-GhazzÉlÊ, TahÉfut al-FalÉsifah, 239.

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to al-Ghazali sabab in relation to the existence of the universe is murajjiÍ.20 But in

relation to secondary causes and voluntary action sabab is sharÏ (condition) of the

effect or whatever contributes to the realization of an event.21 This definition refers to

kalÉm intellectual tradition that concern about the production of temporal events or

occurrences within the sphere of the contingent. 22

According to Ibn SÊnÉ ‘illah in terms of substantive change in the supra-

sensible world is ÎÉni‘ (maker, or agent), 23 and in the phenomenal world is

"condition", that indicates the means by or through which something else is done or

produced. When all causal conditions are fulfilled the effect necessarily follows.24 al-

Ghazali, on behalf of the falÉsifah affirms this that sabab is “an instrument, condition,

nature, purpose or any cause like these causes”.25 However, al-Ghazali admits those

meanings of sabab only in the sense of logical reason why something is as it is.

Al-Ghazali’s definition of causes (asbÉb) and their effects in the supra-sensible

and the phenomenal world does not seem, at least at first reading, to contradict to Ibn

SÊnÉ and the falÉsifah’s conception. Both parties, for example agree that God is the

agent of the world’s existence. However, the harmony of their ideas breaks down over

the question of the mode of their causal agency in relationship to world’s actual,

20 MurajjiÍ is that which causes to incline towards or give preponderance to something that render the existence rather than non-existence. al-GhazzÉlÊ, al-IqtiÎÉd fÊ al-I‘tiqÉd, ed.al-Shaykh MuÎÏafÉ AbË al-‘AlÉ. (Egypt: Maktaba al-JundÊ, n.d.), 30 21 al-GhazzÉlÊ, al-IqtiÎÉd, 88-89; al-GhazzÉlÊ, IÍyÉ ‘UlËm al-DÊn. ed. Al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘AzÊz SirwÉn. (Beirut: DÉr al-Qalam, n.d.): vol.4, 86; al-GhazzÉlÊ, al-MaqÎad al-AsnÉ, ed. MusÏfÉ AbË al-‘AlÉ, (Cairo: Maktatabah al-Jundi, n.d): 125. 22 According to the Ash’arite all causal action consists in the direct voluntary creative act of God. God in this sense is He whose causal action proceeds from the attribute of will and power of a living, knowing being. The observable event we habitually regard as causes and effects are only concomitant event. They are all directly created by God and their regular association are not necessary by itself. They are merely habit (‘adah) decreed by God. Al-BéqillÉni, KitÉb al-TamhÊd, Richard J. McCarthy (ed), Beirut: np. 1957, 36. 23 Ibn SÊnÉ, al-ShifÉ’: al-BurhÉn, ed. A.E. ‘AfÊfÊ revised by I.MadhkËr, (Cairo: n.p. 1956): 298; see also Al-GhazzÉlÊ , Tahafut, M. Marmura, Problem IV. 24 Ibn SÊnÉ, al-ShifÉ’: IlÉhiyÉt, (Metaphysics), edited by G.Anawati, S.Dunya and Z.ZÉyid, revised and introduced by IbrÉhÊ MadhkËr, 2 vols. (Cairo: 1960), vol. I, 37; Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1971, s.v. 'illah'

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physical realization. Inherent in this divergence is their distinct concept of the nature

of God. For Al-Ghazali God is voluntary agent Who is willing (murÊd) and knowing

(‘Élim) of what he wills, whereas for Ibn SÊnÉ God is necessarily subjected in the

exercise of His efficiency, meaning that God is the Necessitating Cause Who

necessitates the world's existence.26

The above conception of God brought about conceptual consequences of

causality in natural phenomena. al-Ghazali infers that natural things do not possess

causal agency, they can be called agents only in metaphorical signification only. This

is in complete accord with his affirmation of the Divine’s status as the voluntary agent

and the cause of the existence of the universe.27 Therefore, he denies the efficient

cause in the natural phenomena. The only efficient cause in reality is God.

In consonant with his concept of God as the agent that necessitates its effect

and as the cause (‘illah) of emanation of the universe (‘illat fayaÌÉn al-kull), Ibn SÊnÉ

deduces that the relation between cause and effect is of necessary. When the causal

power is natural and the recipient of the action is present, the effect cannot but follow.

The example is that a man’s movement precedes (yet coexist with) the movement of

his shadow.28 Ibn Rushd also in opinion that the connection observed to exist between

causes and effects is one of “consequence by necessity” (iqtirÉn talÉzum bi al-

ÌarËrah).29

The foregoing explication suggests that there are conceptual divergence

between al-GhazÉlÊ and the falÉsifah on the problem of causality. The former, so to

speak, ascribes the doctrine of creationism, while the latter applies that of

____________________________ 25 Al-GhazzÉlÊ , Tahafut, M. Marmura (trans), 28. 26 Ibn SÊnÉ, al-ShifÉ' IlÉhiyÉt, vol. I, 164; vol.II, 264. 27 Al-GhazzÉlÊ , Tahafut, problem III. 28 Ibn SÊnÉ, al-ShifÉ’: al-BurhÉn, ed. A.E. ‘AfÊfÊ revised by I.MadhkËr, 298; see also Al-GhazzÉlÊ, Tahafut, M. Marmura, problem IV.

12

emanationism. However, this study will not deal with this discrepancy, but elaborate

exclusively al-GhazÉlÊ’s concept of causality by referring to his conceptual structure

of the causal relation in the supra-mundane region as well as in the realm of nature of

the physical world. The study would hopefully shed a light on the question whether al-

Ghazali’s doctrine of causality is metaphysically well grounded and epistemologically

tenable.

THE SOURCE OF THE STUDY

Al-Ghazali's repudiation of falÉsifah concept of causality is to be found in his TahÉfut

al-FalÉsifah, which seems to be most complete treatment among the mediaeval

Islamic thinkers. The Seventeenth Problem of TahÉfut analyzes the falÉsifah doctrine

of necessary causal nexus in the physical sphere. In this section, the theory of efficient

causality in nature finds its most striking repudiation. His total view of causality,

however, demand an integrative approach involving other section of TahÉfut in which

this topic is examined.

The work has been organized philosophically. al-Ghazali repudiation of the

problem of causality in the second part of TahÉfut (the 17th Problem) concerns about

the natural sciences (ÙabÊ'iyyÉt). This persistently follows the first part, in which al-

Ghazali criticizes the concept of causal necessity applied to God. This means that the

sixteen disputations in the first part of TahÉfut are connected with the issues of the

divine sciences (al-‘ulËm al-IlÉhiyyah) – including the problem of divine causation -

while the rest or the second part fall within the ambit of the natural sciences (al-‘ulËm

al-Ïabi‘iyyÉt). So, the first part constitutes the metaphysical foundation of the second,

and even complements the epistemological basis of the 17th Problem. Specifically in

____________________________ 29 Ibn Rushd, TahÉfut TahÉfut, 512.

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the first three discussions, al-Ghazali reiterated his criticism of the doctrine that God's

acts proceed, by necessity, from His very essence or nature. So, the issue is physics

(tabi'iyyat) but the final analysis attaches to it is metaphysics, and involves primarily

the concept of God, His creation and His Attributes.

In relation to the above issue al-Ghazali treats extensively the problem of world

eternity, the everlasting nature of time and motion, and linguistically analyzes the term

'agent" and "maker", "action" and "product".30 Therefore, the seventeenth problem

cannot be analyzed either adequately or correctly without attention being paid to the

conceptual framework that is developed in sections of the TahÉfut prior to that

discussion. Theoretically, comprehension of al-Ghazali position on "natural causation"

require understanding of how he viewed the implications of the concept behind the

terms agent, action, power and cause. Here, he gives his most precise analysis of the

structure of the problem of causation in both the supernatural and the natural realm.

Al-Ghazali seems to be saying that we cannot deal with the natural causation before

we have sound and adequate foundation of divine causation. Even though TahÉfut is

not the work that provides alternative concepts that he regards as the sound one, one

can grasp at least the author's position on certain issue he rebutted. His repudiation

follows a demonstrative method of the philosophers, while in his vindication he

employs the dialectic method of the theologians.

Therefore, the author tells us that the alternative concept is caught in his other

work entitled al-IqtiÎÉd fÊ al-I'tiqÉd. In this work al-Ghazali uphold the Ash'arite

causal doctrine and discusses causation at some length. However, in this work we do

not find any mention of the seocondary causation except his rejection of the

Mu'tazilite doctrine of tawallud (generated acts). He identifies the Mu'tazilite doctrine