ajc_part 2
TRANSCRIPT
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Presented By:
Prateek Daglia 15
Harish Daryani 17
Anagha Deshpande 18Varun Doshi 19
Nishith Gandhi 21
Sourav Guha Roy 24
Australia Japan Cable: Structuring
the company
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Presentation Flowy Potential Problems
y Structural Attributes
y Why structure matters?
y
Governance Framework
y Organizational Structure
y Ownership and Capital Structure
y Organizational Design
y Management Compensation
y Conclusion
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Potential problems for capital providers
y Prioritization of the problemsy Market Risk
y Demand Risk Volatility in Capacity demand (Unused Capacity or Excess
Demand)
y Price Volatility 25% decline in prices every year
y Mitigation strategy
y Pre sales capacity contracts
y Collapsed Ring Configuration (Lowering of costs)
y Hedging Strategy (Forward contracts)
y Technological Risk Introduction of newer technologies
y Mitigation Strategy
y Co-opetition
y Quick launch and up gradation of existing technology
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Other Significant Risks
y Sovereign Risk Country wide relationships may get hampered
y Operational Risk
y Cable failures due to shipping, dredging and fishing activities
y Landing Stations Permission from govt. to build new stations
y Mitigation Strategy
y High Expertise Level
y Shared Ownership with companies having stations
y Environmental Risk Environmental concerns may lead to delay in project
y Mitigation Strategy
y Prior submission of Environmental Impact Report to respective governments
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Structural Attributes
y Organizational Structure Special Purpose Vehicle
Legally independent
y Capital Structure
Debt to capitalization ratio
y Ownership Structure
Number of owners
Share allocations
y
Board Structure Composition
Size
y Contractual Structure
Contracts with suppliers of inputs and buyers of output
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Why structure matters ? (1)Agency Conflicts
Problem Solution
Conflicts between ownership and
management
Projects having large, tangible assets with
high free cash flows are susceptible tomismanagement
1. Capital Structure - Reduces free cash
flow through high debt service.
2. Ownership Structure - Concentrated
ownership for critical monitoring.3. Extensive contracting - Cash-flow
waterfall. Capex., maintenance
expenditures, debt service, shareholder
distributions agreed in advance.
4. Board structure - Mainly comprise of
directors from sponsoring firms, gives
them the ability to hire and fire senior
managers and approve important operating
decisions.
5. Governance system - For project assets
rather than traditional systems designed to
manage portfolio of assets.
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Why structure matters ? (2)Agency Conflicts Contd
Problem Solution
Conflicts between ownership and
management (Contd)
6. Separate legal incorporation -
Reduces the cost of monitoring. Instead of
monitoring cash flow from numerous assets
the capital providers monitor relatively
simple cash flow streams from single asset.
Conflicts between ownership and
related parties (opportunistic
behavior
)Related parties include suppliers, buyers ,
governments.
1. Joint ownership structures and long
term contracts - To reduce opportunistic
behavior by suppliers of critical inputs orbuyers of primary outputs. Eg: Partnering
with sponsors who owned landing stations
was important in AJCs case to mitigate
hold-up by landing station owners.
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Why structure matters ? (3)Agency Conflicts Contd
Problem Solution
Conflicts between ownership and
related parties (Contd)
2. Separate legal incorporation -
Expropriation and other forms of sovereign
interference would be highly visible to the
outside world.
3. Capital Structure - High leveragediscourages expropriation. Even small acts
of creeping expropriation will cause highly
leveraged project company to default. In
corporate finance expropriation can occur
without default because multiple corporate
assets and cash flows cross-collateralize eachdebt obligation.
4. Financial Structure (multi-lateral
lenders) - Having international lenders like
IFC, World Bank who lend to project
companies and not corporations act as a
deterrent against expropriation.
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Why structure matters ? (4)Agency Conflicts Contd
Problem Solution
Conflicts between debt holders and
equity holders
Related to distribution and re-investment of
cash flow , and restructuring during
distress
1. Capital Structure - Sponsors benefit
from high leverage as it reduces managerial
discretion over cash flow
Note: High leverage may lead to
underinvestment problem but with very few
growth options available in such projects
problem of underinvestment due to
leverage is negligible.
2. Extensive contracting - Lenders impose
stringent contractual provisions to protect
their investments. Opportunities for risk
shifting do not exist as cash flow waterfall
restricts investment decisions.
3. Financial structure - Few classes of debt
is employed as compared to corporate
finance which is easier to restructure.
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Why structure matters ? (5)Underinvestment problem
Problem Solution
Leverage-induced underinvestment
(Debt overhang problem)
Leveraged sponsoring firm has trouble in
financing attractive investment
opportunities
1. Non recourse debt - Eliminates
recourse back to the sponsoring firm and
preserves corporate debt capacity. Helps
leveraged sponsors avoid the opportunity
cost of underinvestment.
Underinvestment due to distress
costs (Risk management motivation)
Failing project can cause an otherwise
healthy firm to fail (Risk contamination).
Managers may not invest in risky positive
NPV projects financed through corporate
debt due to increased distress costs
(Underinvestment problem)
1. Separately incorporated project
company and nonrecourse debt -
Reduces risk contamination. Sponsors are
able to share project risks with other
related parties.
2. Capital structure -Sponsors are exposed
to losses only as large as their equity
commitments (which are a small fraction of
total project cost due to high leverage)
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Governance Framework
y Constitution
y Shareholder agreement
y Board Charter
yAppointment of Board
y Appointment of Chief and Senior Executives
y Remuneration for Board and Senior Executives
y Organizational Design
y Leadership and Management Structurey Policies
y Project Management
y SPV Exit
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Shareholder Agreement
y Scope and objective of the AJC
y Capital Structure
y Ownership Structure
y Management and Board of Directorsy Broad Principles for deriving Fair Market Value of Equity
Shares
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Australia Japan Cable
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Capital StructureTotal Capital required: $567 million
y Debt : 85% ($482 million)
y Equity : 15% ($ 85 million)
Securities for the lenders:
Pre sales contract : 59% of the total capitalMarket Sales : 26 % of the total capital
Reason for high leverage
y Agency Cost motivation: Discourage costly agency conflicts among participants
y Forces project managers to disgorge free cash flow
y Discourages expropriation
y Lowers reported profitability
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Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratios:
Project Companies vs. Corporations
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Criteria Telstra Japan
Telecom
Teleglo
be
AT&T NTT MCI
World
Com
Country Australia Japan Canada United
States
Japan United
States
LandingStation
on AJC
Route
Y(2) Y(1) N Y(2) Y(3) N
Debt
rating
AA+ AA BBB+ AA- AA+ A-
Ownership Structure(1)
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Ownership Structure(2)
Strategic Partners/Sponsors
y Telstra: 40% of the total
equity(Lead sponsor)
y AT&T:30%y Japan Telecom:20%
y Teleglobe:10%
40
30
20
10
Telstra
AT&T
Japan Telecom
Teleglobe
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Board Structure(Size of 9)*y Telstra - 2 directors
y AT&T - 1 director
y Japan telecom - 1 director
y
Teleglobe - 1 directory Lending Institution - 1 director
y Independent Directors - 3
*The research conducted by Benjamin Esty shows that the median size of board of project companies of the similarproject size is 9.
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Comparative study of size ofBoard of
Directors
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Organization Design
Board ofDirectors
ChiefExecutiveOfficer
Head ofAdministration
Executive Manager
ChiefFinancialOfficer
Finance Manager
Technical Services
Executive Manager
Operations
Executive Manager
RegionalOperations
Manager
Australia
RegionalOperations
Manager
Japan
RegionalOperations
Manager
Guam
Head of Sales andMarketing
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Roles and Responsibilities (1)
Role Responsibility
Board of Directors Approving pricing decisions
Capacity expansion
Selection of senior management
Chief Executive Officer Project execution
Head of Administration Corporate governance
Human resources
Chief Financial Officer Coordinating with bankers
Financial dealing
Finance Manager Production of financial and managementreports
Liaising with external auditors
Managing accounts payable and receivable
and general ledger
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Roles and Responsibilities (2)
Role ResponsibilityTechnical Services Executive Manager Specifying, procuring and testing network
aspects
Product development of transmission
capabilities
Operations Executive Manager Risk Management
Service Assurance
Contact with Landing parties and
Equipment vendors
Regional Operations Manager Maintenance in respective area
Head of Sales and Marketing Sales and marketing strategy
Product management, development and
pricing
Brand direction, media and sponsorships
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Compensation
y Chief executive & Project managers
Flat pay-for-performance compensation schemes.
yBase salary
yPerformance bonus equal to a relatively small fraction(0-50%) of the executives base salary
y Reason
yNo high growth opportunities
yInvolved with operational decision making rather than
strategic
yPrevent agency conflicts
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Advantages of Take out finance
y Advantage To lender
y Helps banks in their asset liability management
y The financing of infrastructure is long term in nature against
their short-term resources
y Advantage to Borrower
y Get finance for long term as required for a project
y Need not go and search for re-financer
y
Advantage to taking over institutiony Economic and social development
y Faster Infrastructure creation
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What happened in reality
AJC Ltd(Bermuda)
AJC
Australia
AJC Japan AJC Guam
39.9
1515
10.1
1010
Telstra
MCI WorldCom
Teleglobe
Concert Global Networks Ltd.
Japan Telecom
NTT
Ownershi in AJC Ltd. %)
Concert Global Networks Ltd Incorporated in Bermuda, owned by AT&T and British Telecom (50%
each)
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ConclusionFrom the companys perspective
y Structuring the project finance is a time consuming andcostly affair.
y The advantages such as high leverage, risk separation andsingle purpose motivate the company to go for it.
From the lenders perspective
y The only security for the lenders is the cash flows along with
the project specific assets so they try to mitigate through thecontractual agreements and look at the credibility of thesponsors.
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Thank You