ajc_part 2

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    Presented By:

    Prateek Daglia 15

    Harish Daryani 17

    Anagha Deshpande 18Varun Doshi 19

    Nishith Gandhi 21

    Sourav Guha Roy 24

    Australia Japan Cable: Structuring

    the company

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    Presentation Flowy Potential Problems

    y Structural Attributes

    y Why structure matters?

    y

    Governance Framework

    y Organizational Structure

    y Ownership and Capital Structure

    y Organizational Design

    y Management Compensation

    y Conclusion

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    Potential problems for capital providers

    y Prioritization of the problemsy Market Risk

    y Demand Risk Volatility in Capacity demand (Unused Capacity or Excess

    Demand)

    y Price Volatility 25% decline in prices every year

    y Mitigation strategy

    y Pre sales capacity contracts

    y Collapsed Ring Configuration (Lowering of costs)

    y Hedging Strategy (Forward contracts)

    y Technological Risk Introduction of newer technologies

    y Mitigation Strategy

    y Co-opetition

    y Quick launch and up gradation of existing technology

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    Other Significant Risks

    y Sovereign Risk Country wide relationships may get hampered

    y Operational Risk

    y Cable failures due to shipping, dredging and fishing activities

    y Landing Stations Permission from govt. to build new stations

    y Mitigation Strategy

    y High Expertise Level

    y Shared Ownership with companies having stations

    y Environmental Risk Environmental concerns may lead to delay in project

    y Mitigation Strategy

    y Prior submission of Environmental Impact Report to respective governments

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    Structural Attributes

    y Organizational Structure Special Purpose Vehicle

    Legally independent

    y Capital Structure

    Debt to capitalization ratio

    y Ownership Structure

    Number of owners

    Share allocations

    y

    Board Structure Composition

    Size

    y Contractual Structure

    Contracts with suppliers of inputs and buyers of output

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    Why structure matters ? (1)Agency Conflicts

    Problem Solution

    Conflicts between ownership and

    management

    Projects having large, tangible assets with

    high free cash flows are susceptible tomismanagement

    1. Capital Structure - Reduces free cash

    flow through high debt service.

    2. Ownership Structure - Concentrated

    ownership for critical monitoring.3. Extensive contracting - Cash-flow

    waterfall. Capex., maintenance

    expenditures, debt service, shareholder

    distributions agreed in advance.

    4. Board structure - Mainly comprise of

    directors from sponsoring firms, gives

    them the ability to hire and fire senior

    managers and approve important operating

    decisions.

    5. Governance system - For project assets

    rather than traditional systems designed to

    manage portfolio of assets.

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    Why structure matters ? (2)Agency Conflicts Contd

    Problem Solution

    Conflicts between ownership and

    management (Contd)

    6. Separate legal incorporation -

    Reduces the cost of monitoring. Instead of

    monitoring cash flow from numerous assets

    the capital providers monitor relatively

    simple cash flow streams from single asset.

    Conflicts between ownership and

    related parties (opportunistic

    behavior

    )Related parties include suppliers, buyers ,

    governments.

    1. Joint ownership structures and long

    term contracts - To reduce opportunistic

    behavior by suppliers of critical inputs orbuyers of primary outputs. Eg: Partnering

    with sponsors who owned landing stations

    was important in AJCs case to mitigate

    hold-up by landing station owners.

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    Why structure matters ? (3)Agency Conflicts Contd

    Problem Solution

    Conflicts between ownership and

    related parties (Contd)

    2. Separate legal incorporation -

    Expropriation and other forms of sovereign

    interference would be highly visible to the

    outside world.

    3. Capital Structure - High leveragediscourages expropriation. Even small acts

    of creeping expropriation will cause highly

    leveraged project company to default. In

    corporate finance expropriation can occur

    without default because multiple corporate

    assets and cash flows cross-collateralize eachdebt obligation.

    4. Financial Structure (multi-lateral

    lenders) - Having international lenders like

    IFC, World Bank who lend to project

    companies and not corporations act as a

    deterrent against expropriation.

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    Why structure matters ? (4)Agency Conflicts Contd

    Problem Solution

    Conflicts between debt holders and

    equity holders

    Related to distribution and re-investment of

    cash flow , and restructuring during

    distress

    1. Capital Structure - Sponsors benefit

    from high leverage as it reduces managerial

    discretion over cash flow

    Note: High leverage may lead to

    underinvestment problem but with very few

    growth options available in such projects

    problem of underinvestment due to

    leverage is negligible.

    2. Extensive contracting - Lenders impose

    stringent contractual provisions to protect

    their investments. Opportunities for risk

    shifting do not exist as cash flow waterfall

    restricts investment decisions.

    3. Financial structure - Few classes of debt

    is employed as compared to corporate

    finance which is easier to restructure.

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    Why structure matters ? (5)Underinvestment problem

    Problem Solution

    Leverage-induced underinvestment

    (Debt overhang problem)

    Leveraged sponsoring firm has trouble in

    financing attractive investment

    opportunities

    1. Non recourse debt - Eliminates

    recourse back to the sponsoring firm and

    preserves corporate debt capacity. Helps

    leveraged sponsors avoid the opportunity

    cost of underinvestment.

    Underinvestment due to distress

    costs (Risk management motivation)

    Failing project can cause an otherwise

    healthy firm to fail (Risk contamination).

    Managers may not invest in risky positive

    NPV projects financed through corporate

    debt due to increased distress costs

    (Underinvestment problem)

    1. Separately incorporated project

    company and nonrecourse debt -

    Reduces risk contamination. Sponsors are

    able to share project risks with other

    related parties.

    2. Capital structure -Sponsors are exposed

    to losses only as large as their equity

    commitments (which are a small fraction of

    total project cost due to high leverage)

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    Governance Framework

    y Constitution

    y Shareholder agreement

    y Board Charter

    yAppointment of Board

    y Appointment of Chief and Senior Executives

    y Remuneration for Board and Senior Executives

    y Organizational Design

    y Leadership and Management Structurey Policies

    y Project Management

    y SPV Exit

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    Shareholder Agreement

    y Scope and objective of the AJC

    y Capital Structure

    y Ownership Structure

    y Management and Board of Directorsy Broad Principles for deriving Fair Market Value of Equity

    Shares

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    Australia Japan Cable

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    Capital StructureTotal Capital required: $567 million

    y Debt : 85% ($482 million)

    y Equity : 15% ($ 85 million)

    Securities for the lenders:

    Pre sales contract : 59% of the total capitalMarket Sales : 26 % of the total capital

    Reason for high leverage

    y Agency Cost motivation: Discourage costly agency conflicts among participants

    y Forces project managers to disgorge free cash flow

    y Discourages expropriation

    y Lowers reported profitability

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    Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratios:

    Project Companies vs. Corporations

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    Criteria Telstra Japan

    Telecom

    Teleglo

    be

    AT&T NTT MCI

    World

    Com

    Country Australia Japan Canada United

    States

    Japan United

    States

    LandingStation

    on AJC

    Route

    Y(2) Y(1) N Y(2) Y(3) N

    Debt

    rating

    AA+ AA BBB+ AA- AA+ A-

    Ownership Structure(1)

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    Ownership Structure(2)

    Strategic Partners/Sponsors

    y Telstra: 40% of the total

    equity(Lead sponsor)

    y AT&T:30%y Japan Telecom:20%

    y Teleglobe:10%

    40

    30

    20

    10

    Telstra

    AT&T

    Japan Telecom

    Teleglobe

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    Board Structure(Size of 9)*y Telstra - 2 directors

    y AT&T - 1 director

    y Japan telecom - 1 director

    y

    Teleglobe - 1 directory Lending Institution - 1 director

    y Independent Directors - 3

    *The research conducted by Benjamin Esty shows that the median size of board of project companies of the similarproject size is 9.

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    Comparative study of size ofBoard of

    Directors

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    Organization Design

    Board ofDirectors

    ChiefExecutiveOfficer

    Head ofAdministration

    Executive Manager

    ChiefFinancialOfficer

    Finance Manager

    Technical Services

    Executive Manager

    Operations

    Executive Manager

    RegionalOperations

    Manager

    Australia

    RegionalOperations

    Manager

    Japan

    RegionalOperations

    Manager

    Guam

    Head of Sales andMarketing

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    Roles and Responsibilities (1)

    Role Responsibility

    Board of Directors Approving pricing decisions

    Capacity expansion

    Selection of senior management

    Chief Executive Officer Project execution

    Head of Administration Corporate governance

    Human resources

    Chief Financial Officer Coordinating with bankers

    Financial dealing

    Finance Manager Production of financial and managementreports

    Liaising with external auditors

    Managing accounts payable and receivable

    and general ledger

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    Roles and Responsibilities (2)

    Role ResponsibilityTechnical Services Executive Manager Specifying, procuring and testing network

    aspects

    Product development of transmission

    capabilities

    Operations Executive Manager Risk Management

    Service Assurance

    Contact with Landing parties and

    Equipment vendors

    Regional Operations Manager Maintenance in respective area

    Head of Sales and Marketing Sales and marketing strategy

    Product management, development and

    pricing

    Brand direction, media and sponsorships

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    Compensation

    y Chief executive & Project managers

    Flat pay-for-performance compensation schemes.

    yBase salary

    yPerformance bonus equal to a relatively small fraction(0-50%) of the executives base salary

    y Reason

    yNo high growth opportunities

    yInvolved with operational decision making rather than

    strategic

    yPrevent agency conflicts

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    Advantages of Take out finance

    y Advantage To lender

    y Helps banks in their asset liability management

    y The financing of infrastructure is long term in nature against

    their short-term resources

    y Advantage to Borrower

    y Get finance for long term as required for a project

    y Need not go and search for re-financer

    y

    Advantage to taking over institutiony Economic and social development

    y Faster Infrastructure creation

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    What happened in reality

    AJC Ltd(Bermuda)

    AJC

    Australia

    AJC Japan AJC Guam

    39.9

    1515

    10.1

    1010

    Telstra

    MCI WorldCom

    Teleglobe

    Concert Global Networks Ltd.

    Japan Telecom

    NTT

    Ownershi in AJC Ltd. %)

    Concert Global Networks Ltd Incorporated in Bermuda, owned by AT&T and British Telecom (50%

    each)

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    ConclusionFrom the companys perspective

    y Structuring the project finance is a time consuming andcostly affair.

    y The advantages such as high leverage, risk separation andsingle purpose motivate the company to go for it.

    From the lenders perspective

    y The only security for the lenders is the cash flows along with

    the project specific assets so they try to mitigate through thecontractual agreements and look at the credibility of thesponsors.

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    Thank You