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ELFUTURODELAALIMENTACIÓNYRETOSDELAAGRICULTURAPARAELSIGLOXXI:Debatessobrequién,cómoyconquéimplicacionessociales,económicasyecológicasalimentaráelmundo.

THEFUTUREOFFOODANDCHALLENGESFOR

AGRICULTUREINTHE21stCENTURY:Debatesaboutwho,howandwithwhatsocial,economicandecological

implicationswewillfeedtheworld.ELIKADURARENETORKIZUNAETANEKAZARITZARENERRONKAKXXI.MENDERAKO:Munduanork,nolaetazer-nolakoinplikaziosozial,ekonomikoetaekologikorekinelikatukoduenizangodaeztabaidagaia

‘Ideal-types’andtheDiversityofCommerce:LandlordsandLabourersin

RuralPunjabMuhammadAliJan

Paper#95

Apirila–Abril–April24,25,262017

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AugmentingSmallFarmers’IncomethroughRuralNonfarmSector:RoleofInformationandCredit

InstitutionsMuhammadAliJan

Introduction:Historicaltheoryandtheoreticalhistoryinthestudyofrurallabour

Nationalistandneo-marxistscholarshavebothassumedthattheintegrationofcolonialIndiaintotheglobaleconomywasanevenprocessthatproducedeitherofthesetwoideal-types;fortheNeo-Marxistsandworldsystemtheorists,thediversityoflabourrelationscansimplybereadfromtheworldcapitalistsystemproducingthe‘developmentofunderdevelopment’(Frank,1969).Ontheotherhand,forthe‘semi-feudal’schoolalleffortsatagrariandynamismweredoomedtofailsimplybecausethecolonialstateforgedareactionaryalliancewithfeudalandusuriouselementsthatledtothereproductionofthesebackwardformsandprecludedanyagriculturalgrowth(Bhaduri,1983).

Againstsuchabstractions,thispaperarguesthatthespecificformsoflabourrelationscannotsimplybereadofffromapriorilabelssuchas‘semi-feudalism’and‘globalcapitalism’;throughahistoricalreadingoftheevolutionoflabourrelationsinCanalColoniesofpresentdayPakistaniPunjabiaswellasinsightsfromfieldstudies,itaimstoshowhowthespecificformsoflabourrelationsthatcametodominatetheseareaswereaproductoftheimperativesofcommercializationandstatepolicy,butalsoarosefromthespecificwaysinwhichcultivatorsandlabourersreactedtotheirenvironments.Thestrategiesofaccumulationofthecultivatorsandthestrategiesofsurvivaloftenantsandlabouralongsidethestrugglesbetweenthemarecrucialinunderstandingthewayeconomicrationalityisunderstood.Infact,theveryconstitutionofthe‘labourmarket’withinwhichchoicesaremadedidnotsimplyexist‘outthere’asanexogenousvariabletoborrowfromthelanguageofeconomics:theyaresociallyconstitutedandmediatedthrougheverydayconflictsandnegotiationsbetweensocialgroupswhereidentitiesandaccesstoresourcesplayanimportantpartandthroughcontestationsovertheverydefinitionoftheacceptableandunacceptable(Bhattacharya,2014:16).

Indoingso,wehopetohighlighthowcommercialandevencapitalistagricultureiscompatiblewitharangeofseeminglybackwardlabourarrangementswhosesocialandinstitutionalformsneedtobestudiedintheirspecificitiesanditisthesecontextualizedandhistoricalunderstandingsratherthansomeabstract‘global’and‘local’processesthatbetterexplaintheformsofrurallabourrelationsinPakistaniPunjab.Finally,howcontrarytocertainorthodoxMarxistideasof‘forms’oflabourrelationsasmasksbehindwhich‘real’relationsarehidden,the

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formsoflabourrelationsareconstitutiveofthecontentthemselves,inotherwords,itwastheveryformofshare-croppinginourfieldsitewhichelicitedthespecifickindsofreactionsfromlandlordsoncecertaininstitutionalandpoliticalconditionsarose.Inotherwords,whilewedounderstandshare-croppinginourfieldareatobeaformoflabourcontrol,thedifferencesbetweenthisandotherformssuchaswagedandbonded,aresignificant.

Inthefirstpartwearguethatinourareaoflargelandownership,share-croppingwasaformoflabourorganizationarisingoutofthepressuresofrisinglabourdemandandsupervisionthatcanalirrigationunleashed.Wealsoexaminethewaysinwhichthesystemwasundermineddramaticallywherenewtechnologydefinitelyplayedapart,althoughthecentralityofpoliticalstrugglebetweentenantsandlandlordsishighlighted.Thepaperthenbrieflyexamineshowimportantdebtandcreditaretotheworkingsoftherurallabourmarketinourfieldareaandhowtheseinformalrelationsandnottheformallawsofthestate,definehowlivelihoodsarecreated,constrainedandcontestedincontemporaryPakistaniPunjab.

Caste,CustomandCanals:LandownershipandagriculturallabourintheCanalColonies

WhentheBritishconqueredPunjabin1849,itwasthelastprovincetobeannexedbytheCompanybeforethe1857revoltbroughtitunderthedirectruleoftheRaj.TheprovincethatwasconqueredincludedpresentdayIndianPunjabaswellaspartsoftheNorthWestFrontierProvince(nowcalledKhyberPakhtunkhwa)(map1).InthewesternpartofthePunjab,thebars(pastoralhighlands)beyondtheSutlejwereavastscrublandstretchingallthewaytoMultanintheSouthWest(map2).Theyhadanaridclimateandapartfromafewplacesofsettledagriculturenearriverbanks,werelargelyinhabitedbynomadicpastoralistswhotraversedthelandscapewiththeircamelsandherds,ascenariothatwasananathematothecolonialstate’sideaof‘order’and‘progress’.Bythe1880’s,thesevastscrublandsweretakenover,reclassifiedasrakh(wasteland),mapped,surveyedandbounded(Bhattacharya,2012:1)

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Map2–CanalColonies

Thehigh-mindedideologiesoforderandprogressco-existedwithmoremundaneneedssuchasthatoffindingnewrawmaterialandfoodgrainmarketsfortheirindustries,enlargingtherevenuebaseanddecreasingthedemographicpressureonlandinthedistrictsofEasternPunjab.Theseconsiderationscombinedintheconstructionof9canalcoloniesbetween1886and1930inthelargelypastoralareasopening10millionacresofirrigatedlandforcultivationandcomprisingthelargestcanalsystemintheworldatthetime(Fox,1985:53).Overthesehugenewtracts,thousandsoffamiliesweresettledfromtheEasternwingoftheprovince,accompaniedbytheirartisanalservants,pejorativelycalled‘menials’bytheBritishandkaminsbythezamindars(landowners).Bytheearly1930sthepopulationofthecanalcolonieshadbeguntoovertakethatoftheoldersettleddistrictsandtodaycomprisethemostdenselypopulatedpartsofPakistaniPunjab(Heitzman,2008).

Asscholarshaveshown,thecolonistsaimedtodelicatelybalancethelogicofcommercializationandrevenuegenerationwiththatofmaintaininghierarchyand

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socialorder(Akhtar,2006:483).Thelattercouldbestbeguaranteedintheirview,iftherationalizedbureaucraticauthorityofthecolonialstaterestedonculturalfoundationsthatwere‘indigenous’tolocalsociety,especiallyinthewakeofthe1857revolt.Thelegitimatebasisforbureaucraticauthoritywastobefoundintheaffectivebondsofbiraderi(kinship/tribe)solidaritywhichcolonialofficialsbelievedwasthedefiningfeatureofPunjabisociety.Thetermliterallymeans‘brotherhood’denotingtheprincipleofcommondescentamongagroupofpeopleandwhilethismaybepossibletotraceforasmallgrouplivinginalocality,itisimpossibletotrackforalargerentitysuchasforexample,thejatsandtheirvariousgoths(sub-biraderis)(Ahmad,1972).Therefore,inpracticebiraderirelationsoftenmanifestedinanexpectationofreciprocalobligations(oftenunequal)betweenmemberswhonotionallyconsiderthemselvestobehailingfromacommondescendent.

WhatmatteredfortheBritishwaslessthecomplexityandfluidityofactualbiraderirelationsbuttheirconversionintorationallegalcategoriesasameansofstabilizingruralsociety(Gilmartin,1988:20-21).PunjabwasconsidereddifferentfromBengal,where‘HinduLaw’setoutinupper-castetextswastobethedefiningfeatureofthelegalorder.Instead,itwasarguedthatthevariousbiraderisofruralPunjabweregovernedby‘customarylaw’,thecentraltenetofwhichwasthepreservationoftheagnaticbrotherhoodthroughinheritanceoflandwithinthe‘patrilineal’family(Nelson,2011;34).Itwasonlythroughthecodificationandenforcementof‘tribal’customarylawaimedatpreservingthecoparcenarybodyofvillageproprietorsthattheBritishcouldbestguaranteetheiralienrule,asC.LTupper,oneofthechiefarchitectsbehindthecodification,explainedinthefollowingwords:

“ItisthroughthetribeandclanthatGovernmentcangainitsfirmesthold

ontheinclinationsandmotivesofthepeople.Thepeoplecanbeledbytheirownleaders.

ItismucheasierforaforeignGovernmenttodealwithorganizedbodiesofmen,through

thosewhocanbetrustedonbothsides,thanwithmiscellaneoushordesofindividuals”(1881;17)

These‘leaders’weretobeidentifiedamongthevariousagricultural‘clans’andquiteoftencreatedwheretheypreviouslydidnotexist.ThelatterwasespeciallythecaseinthecanalcoloniesthatwerepreviouslyinhabitedmostlybypastoralistswithsocialrelationsdifferentfromtheagriculturalistsofcentralPunjab.Adualitywastherebycreatedwithinthelegalregimewhereontheonehandthestaterecognizedindividualpropertyrightsbasedonpaymentofrevenuethroughthelawofcontracts,whileontheotherhand,incrucialmatterssuchaslandinheritance,lawwastofollowthe‘custom’ofpreservingthepropertyofthepatrilinealfamily(Gilmartin,2003;5061).

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ColonialethnographyandthetenetsofBritishpoliticaleconomyhadidentifiedtwodistinct‘groups’ofcultivatorswithdifferentorigins,castesandapproachestofarming;oneweretheself-cultivating(Khudkasht)peasantrywhomtheBritishconsideredthe‘finestcultivatorsinPunjab’(Ibbeston,1916:102).Thesewere‘familyfarmers’fromtheEasternpartoftheprovincebelongingtothe‘agriculturalcastes’primarilytheJats,Arains,Kumbohs,SainisandGujjars(Chaudhuri,2008:362).Ontheotherhand,theBritishalsorecognizedtheexistenceofastratumseparatefromtheself-cultivatingpeasantrywhoweretherentier,absenteelandlordsbelongingtotheupper-castearistocraticgentry(Major,1996).

Furthermore,theprismof‘community’colouredthesettlementasthesegranteesweretobeselectedfromtherich‘agricultural’castesandnotthenon-landedbiraderis.Britishagrarianpolicyfurthersolidifiedthisstructurethroughthepassingofalandmarkpaternalisticlegislation,theLandAlienationActof1900thatpreventedcultivatorsfromalienatingtheirlandormortgagingitforextendedperiods,excepttoothercultivators.TheActsolidifiedtheinterestsofthediversekindsoflandownersexistingwithinthevastexpansesofthePunjab(primarilythegentryandthepeasantgrantees)intoareasonablycoherent‘agricultural’interestorganizedaroundthelegallysanctionedidentityof‘agriculturalcastes’againstwhichthe‘non-agriculturalcastes’werepittedincludingboththeupper-casteurbanmercantilegroupsaswellasthelowercastelaborers(Ali,2002)

Thus,thepracticeoftyingagriculturalpropertywithcertain‘castes’/‘tribes’throughcustomarylawanditsculminationintheLandAlienationActwasofimmensesignificanceforthestructureofrurallabourmarketsforitturnedlandintoahereditarypropertythatcouldonlybetransferredtothenextofkinwithinthepatrilinealfamilyofkinshipgroupsthatthelawidentifiedas‘agrariancastes’,therebycompletelydenyingownershiprightstoatleast3setsofgroups;i)womenwhohadnocustomarysharesinlandaccordingtocolonialunderstandings;ii)amajority(thoughnotall)pastoralistsinhabitingWesternPunjabbeforetheconstructionofthecanalcolonies;iii)‘non-landed’labouring(Kamin)servicecastes,manyofwhommadecontributionstoproductionaslabourers,serviceprovidersandtenants(Ali,1988:44)Thus,evenwiththedifferencesamongthelandowners,theBritishpracticeofreifyinglandownershipthroughbiraderiidentityandmakingthistheprimarycriteriaforobtaininglandgrantsexcludedtheentirenon-landedpoorandsolidifiedfurthertheirstatusaslabourersearningtheirlivingthroughavarietyofarrangementsthatweshallexploreinthenextsection.

GlobalMarketsandLocalImperatives:Share-croppinginthelandofthepeasant?

Despitethebureaucraticstereo-typeofthePunjabasthelandofthe‘peasant-proprietors’thesituationinthecanalcoloniesseemedtobemovinginexactlytheoppositedirection.Bytheearly1920s,theproportionoftotallandcultivatedundertenancyagreementsofvariouskindshadexceededmorethan50%inLyallpur,reachingupto80%inthecaseofMontgomery(Table1).Itseemedthat

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thelandofthepeasantwastransformingintowhattheBritishfearedthemost,anareaofrack-rentinglandlords.ThedominanceoftenancyinWesternPunjab,mostlyundershare-cropping(batai)arrangementshaspromptednationalisthistoriansnotablyMridulaMukherjeetodeclarethatthePunjabremained‘semi-feudal’duringtheBritishtimeperiod,experiencingagriculturalstagnationinlinewiththerestofIndia(Mukherjee,2005:177).Howcredibleisthisclaim?Didthecanalcoloniesexperienceagriculturalcommercializationandifso,ofwhatkind?Whatformdidshare-tenancytakeinthecanalcoloniesandwasthisconnectedintrinsicallytocommercialagriculture?Finally,whatroledidcastehierarchiesplayinstructuringthelabourrelationsinthispartofPunjab?

Table1–TotalareaundertenancyindifferentdistrictsofPunjab(1922-32)

District Areaas%oftotalascultivatedundertenants

Jullunder 31

Hoshiarpur 26

Hissar 36

Sialkot 35

Lyallpur 55

Montgomery 83

(Source:PunjablandrevenueAdministrationreportquotedinAgnihotri,1987:346)

Mukherjee’sargumentrestson4claimsthatcharacterizetheagricultureofPunjabassemi-feudalandlackinginanydynamism;i)alargeamountoflandwascultivatedonshare-croppingbasisandalthoughsheagreesthatthisbyitselfdoesnotmeanpre-capitalistsocialrelations,therewasnowagedlabouronanappreciablescale;ii)mostoftherentwasappropriatedasrentinkindandnotascashrent,theassumptionbeingthatonlythelatterindicatesgreatercommercialization;iii)veryhighrentscouldbechargedalmostatwillbythelandlordsandthetenantshadtocomplyduetoalackofalternativesourcesoflivelihoodandfinally;iv)asaresultofthehighrentstherewasnoinvestmentinimprovedproductivity(Mukherjee,2005:177-179).Therefore,muchliketherestofIndia,agricultureshowednoappreciablegrowthinPunjabcontrarytotheclaimsofthecolonialstate.

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Itisimportanttonotethatherthesisisheavilyinformedbythe‘semi-feudal’viewofIndianagriculturefirstformulatedbynationalistandcommunisthistoriansandmosteloquentlyarticulatedinAmitBhaduri’swork(Bhaduri,1973).However,asanumberofscholarshavedemonstrated,Mukherjee’sgeneralizationsdonotstandwhenagriculturaldataisdisaggregatedfromanall-Punjableveltoonebetweencanalirrigatedareasandunirrigatedones.Table2forexample,showstheweightageofoutputofgroupsofcropsbetweencanalirrigatedandunirrigatedareashighlightingafargreateramountoflanddevotedtocashcropsonirrigatedratherthanunirrigatedlands,evenastheweightageforothercropsissimilar.Table3showsthetrendratesinacreageandyieldsofthemaincashcropsbetweenirrigatedandunirrigatedareaswhichagainpointtoasubstantialincreasenotonlyintheacreageofcashcrops(madepossiblebythenewperennialcanals)butalsoimprovedyields(especiallywiththeintroductionbythePunjabgovernmentofnewwheatand‘American’cottonvarieties).Finally,thePunjabemergedasoneofthemostexportorientedregionsinallofIndiaandthiswasreflectedintheverystrongcorrelationofpriceswithglobaltrends,bothintermsofasteepriseduetodemandaswellasafallinpricesduringthegreatdepression(Table4)promptingonecolonialobservertoremark‘thepriceofcropsinPunjabdependsnotonlocalconditionsbutonthepriceinLiverpool’(Calvert,1936:12).Therefore,therewassubstantialdynamismandaturntowardscommercialagricultureinthePunjab,evenifthebenefitsofagriculturalgrowthwereunevenlydistributed.

Table2–WeightageoftheOutputofGroupsofCrops

Year CashCrops MinorCrops FoodGrains

a B A B A B

1907-16 17 8 20 28 83 92

1917-26 21 8 18 28 79 92

1927-36 21 7 17 26 79 93

1937-46 23 8 17 26 77 92

a=irrigated;b=unirrigated(source:Islam,1997:68)

Table3–TrendRatesinAcreageandYieldsinColonialPunjab

Crops Acreage Yield

1887-1900 1906-46 1906-46

a B a B a B

Total 2.4 -3.05 1.39 -0.19 0.8 -.05

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Cereals 1.8 -3.66 1.00 -0.21 -0.01

-0.02

Wheat 2.00 -2.23 0.92 -0.09 0.26 0.04

Cotton 4.35 -.2.81 2.88 -.2.57 1.78 0.48

CashCrops 3.46 -4.64 2.29 -1.62 0.86 0.23

(source:Islam1997;Pray,1984)

Table4-HarvestPricesofSelectedCrops:Punjab(1913–14to1943–44)(Agnihotri;)

Thehighpricesofmajoragriculturalcropsandtheextensivecultivationmadepossiblebythecanalsystemledtoasubstantialincreaseinthedemandforlabour(Fox,1985:65)coincidingwithandacceleratingthelooseningoftraditionalseypidari(aformofjajmani)relationsintheEasternpartoftheprovinceleadingtothemigrationofseveralkaminlabouringhouseholdstothecanalcoloniesinsearchofwork(Chaudhuri,2008:363).Moreover,notonlydidcanalirrigationmakedouble-croppingpossiblebutthecolonydistrictstypicallyhadamuchgreaterproportionofcashcrops(primarilycotton,whichoccupiedabout25%inthecanalcoloniesasagainsttheprovincialaverageof10%)thatweremorelabour-intensive,therebyincreasingthenumberoffarmhandsrequired,particularlyatharvesttime(Bhattacharya,1985).

Despitetheexistenceofthesediversitiesitisnonethelesstruethatthecanalcolonieshadaveryhighincidenceofshare-croppingwithalargemassoftenantsdividedinto2maintypes;1)Occupancytenantswithsecurityoftenurethroughinheritance(MaurusiMuzara)and;2)tenants-at-willlackingtenurialsecurity(ghair-maurusimuzara).Bythe1930stheirnumbersintheMontgomerycolonyhadreachedcloseto80%,withanoverwhelmingmajoritybeingtenants-at-willandamajorityofthesepayingrentinkindratherthancash.Whydidtheincreaseddemandforlabournotresultinagreaterincidenceofwage-labourinsteadofshare-cropping?Howdidtheintersectionofaglobalized,export-orientedand

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labourintensivecommercialagricultureleadtothedominanceofaformofcultivationoftenconsideredbackwardfromthepointofviewofscholars?Clearly,integrationintotheglobalcapitalistsystemcannotbyitselfexplaintheincidenceofshare-croppingwhichhastobelocatedintheintersticesofthelocalenvironmentandthedecisionsmadebylandownersandlabourersinthesecontexts.

Herethegovernment’sgrantpolicyandthetechnologicalconstraintswere2majorfactorsinducingshare-cropping;surveysconductedbyCalvertundertheauspicesofthePunjabBoardofeconomicinquiryfoundthatinthecolonydistrictsareacoveredbyownersholding25acresandaboveaccountedforcloseto70%ofthetotalasagainsttheprovincialaverageof40%(1925:35).Furthermore,indistrictslikeMontgomery(ofwhichDepalpurwasapart)‘gentry’grantsofupto500acrescoveredamajorpartofthesettlements.Alargeconcentrationoftheselandholdingsinthecoloniesmadeself-cultivation(khudkasht)basedonfamilylabour(orwithouthiredlabouronasubstantialscale)impossibleevenasitwaswidespreadonpeasantholdingsintheEasternpart(Bhattacharya,1983:122).Indeed,manyholdingsweresolargethatinordertoassumeoperationalresponsibilityitwouldhavebeennecessarytouselabour-reducingimplementsliketractorswhichwerenotwidelyavailableatthetime.Thus,thesizeofthegrantsandthetechnologicalconstraintsprecludedboththegrowthof‘familyfarming’onasubstantialscaleaswellasoffull-scalecapitalistfarmingusinghiredlabour.

Atthesametime,theincreaseinthedemandforlabourasaresultoftheirrigationcoincidedwithalooseningofseypidaritiesbetweenzamindarsandkaminsintheEastandtheirlargescalemigrationtotheWest,asdiscussedabove.ReportsonMontgomeryfromattheturnofthecenturyindicatethatlandwasinexcessoftheamountoflabourasaresultofwhichthebargainingpositionoftenantswasmuchhigherthaninLyallpur(Agnihotri,1987).However,evenastheirtraditionaloccupationswerebecominglessremunerativeundermarketpressure,industrialgrowthwastardyandnotenoughtopulllandlesslabourersoff-farm.Inasituationofincreasingcultivation,theywereboundtoparticipateactivelyintheleasemarketforexcesslandavailableforshare-tenancyagreements.Giventheseconstraints,amoredirectformofbondedlabourwasdifficulttoenforcesincelandwasabundantandthetenantscouldmigratetootherpartsofthecolonies.Share-croppingthereforebecameanidealarrangementasitreducedtheproblemoflabourdemandbytyinglabourtothelandforlongertimeperiodsevenifsomeconcessionshadtobemadeintermsofproducesharing.

Moreover,thehighsupervisioncostsofmonitoringwaged-labourintheconditionsoflargertractsoflandalsomadeitdifficulttodeployitonamassscaleandbygivinghimastakeinthecultivationprocessthroughashareintheproduce,thebataidarisystemovercametheproblemofthesupervisionconstraintbyinducingthemuzaratoworkharderforalargershare(Majid,1998:72).Furthermore,thelackofadevelopedmarketinindivisibleimplements,

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especiallybullocks,alsomeantthatlandlordscouldlease-outlandtotenantswhocouldarrangeforsuchimplementsontheirown.Finally,tenancywasbeneficialforthelandlordsinceitallowedhimnotonlytotapintothelabouroftheindividualtenant,butintotheresourcesandlabourofhisentirefamily.Thiscouldalsobeused,wherethebalanceofpowerbetweenlandlordsandtenantsallowedit,forcarryingoutpersonalservicessuchaswatercourseclearingandwelldigging.

InplaceslikeMontgomery,anoverwhelmingmajorityoftenantsweretenants-at-willandthemassofthesebelongedtoDalitandkamingroups.AccordingtoJuergensmeyer,theirimpressivepresenceishighlightedinthe1931censuswhichidentifiedformeruntouchablecastessuchaschamarsandchurasalongsideothermenialartisanal(kamin)castesascomprisingcloseto70%oftheagriculturallabourforceinthecanalcolonies,amajorityofwhomworkedasshare-tenants(1974:87).

Thus,thespreadofshare-croppingmustnotonlybeseenasaonesidedimpositionoflandlords,forthereweresomebenefitsthatcouldaccruetothelowercastetenantsfromthisarrangementaswell.First,theprospectoffoodsecuritythatshare-croppingunderanassuredsupplyofwaterheldwasclearlyonemajorreasonforgroupspreviouslylabouringunderprecariousconditions.Sowastheprospectofearningextraincomethroughmoreintensivecultivationaccompaniedbyariseinprices.Buttherewereextra-economicreasonsaswell;themostimportantbeingthattheideaofbecomingshare-croppersmeantamoredirectassociationwithlandwhichconferredacertaindegreeofhonour(izzat)thattheirpreviousoccupationsdidnotaccordthem(Islam,1997:143).Inthissensemanytenantsdidnotsimplyviewthemselvesasagriculturallabourersbutaspartownersoftheland.Thedesignofvillageswassuchthatitallowedformuchgreaterinterminglingbetweendifferentcastesinschoolsandplacesofworshipandevenifharijans,musallisandmazhabiscontinuedtoliveontheoutskirtsofthecitycasterigiditiesprobablyloosenedupmoreherethaninotherpartsofthePunjab(Bhatia,1987).

Mostlandlordswerenotsimplyrent-seekersbuttookamuchmoreactiveinterestincultivation,decidingthecrop-mixatthetimeofsowingandfinancingpartoftheproductioncosts.ThisisnotedinsurveyscarriedoutbythePunjabgovernmentbutwasalsoexpressedbymanyolderlandlordandtenantsduringourfieldinterviewswhoexplainedhowthelargelandlordwasoftenamajorsourceofproductioncreditfortenants-at-will,mostofwhomweretoopoortoundertakeallcostsofproduction(GOP,1948:84).Finally,thepreferenceforpaymentsinkindratherthancashwasalsoparadoxically,duetotheincreaseinpricesthatgreaterexportdemandhadinducedforinsuchasituation,thelandlordwouldprefercontroloveragreatershareoftheproducewhichcanthenbesoldatagreaterprice,thanafixedsumofcashnorindulgeinthecumbersomeprocessofadjustingthecashrentwithcropprices.

However,incontrasttothefunctionalistanalysisofthe‘semi-feudal’thesiswhichtendstoassociateshare-croppingwithunderdevelopmentandlackofagrariandynamism,ouranalysishasshownhowthegreatexpansionofshare-tenancyin

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thecanalcolonieswasintrinsicallyconnectedtoagreatercommercializationofagriculturebutoneinwhicharangeofconstraintsandopportunitiesmadetheinstitution,withallitstensionsandcontradictions,themostviablelabourarrangement.

Whetherthisarrangementcanbecalled‘capitalist’isamajorsourceofcontroversyanditiscertainlytruethatafullblownagrariancapitalismbasedonhiredlabourandmechanizationneverdevelopedincolonialPunjabonanappreciablescale.However,astheprecedinganalysishopestohaveshown,neithercanitbeconsideredanexpressionof‘semi-feudal’backwardnesssinceshare-croppingbasedonrentinkindwasanexpressionofexpanded,notreducedcommercializationandwithdemonstrableagriculturalgrowth.Itwasmoreover,inourfieldarea,overwhelminglyaformoflabourcontroloflowercasteworkersratherthanonebasedonaself-cultivatingpeasantryusingacombinationoffamilyandhiredlabour.

Theindigenousrootsoflabourmarketliberalization:classandtechnologyinRuralPunjab

Depalpur,thefieldsiteforthepaperisthenameofatehsil(sub-district)indistrictOkaraaswellasthetownheadquartersforthetehsil(seemap3).1Thetownislocatedapproximately150kmSouth-WestoftheprovincialcapitalLahorewithinthecanalcolonydistricts.DepalpurwaspartoftheMontgomerydistricttill1982whenitbecameatehsilofthenewlycreatedOkaradistrict.WhentheBritishtookovertheprovinceDepalpurhadalreadybeenawell-developedtownandmilitaryoutpostbothintheMughalandSikhkingdomwithasubstantialpresenceofupper-casteMuslimlandlordsinthesurroundingcountryside(Vandal.1996:85).Asarguedearlier,theBritishpolicyofstabilizationgainedtheupperhandhereasthelandedgentrywasstrengthenedfurtherthroughlandgrantsbythecolonialstate.Furthermore,theareabecameacentralhorse-breedinggroundwithlargegrantsgiventomembersofthe‘martialcastes’forthispurpose(Ali,1988:chapter4).AsaresultofstatepolicylandbecameconcentratedinthehandsofMuslimupper-castearistocracybelongingmostlytotheSyedandRajputclans.Bythe1930stheoverwhelmingmajorityoftheirlands(around90%)werecultivatedbyMusalli(MuslimDalit)tenantsonashare-croppingbasisandthisremainedmoreorlessconstanttillbeginningofthe1960s(Calvert,1936:37).

Yet,bythetimeofthe1980censustheareacultivatedonshare-tenancyontheseestatefarms(100acresandmore)haddeclinedtolessthan10%,withthetenantsbeingreplacedbyacombinationofpermanentandcasualseasonallabour(Zaidi,2008:45).Today,theproportionoflandcultivatedonbataihasbecomenegligibleandcultivationonlargefarmsisdoneprimarilybycasuallabourorganizedthroughsub-contractorscalledthekedarsmanyofwhomhailfromformermusallitenanthouseholds.Howdidasystemthatdominatedagricultureforclosetohalfacenturyendsodramatically?Theansweronceagainliesinacombinationofstatepolicytowardsagriculturethatcreatedanincentivetowardsself-cultivation,

1ForabasicunderstandingoftheadministrativedivisionsinPakistansee(Hasan&Raza,2013:Chapter1)

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accompaniedbytechnologicalchangethatmadeitfeasible.However,thisisonlypartofthestoryasthepoliticalstrugglebetweentenantsandlandlordsthattheseforcesunleashedexplainswhythetrendtowardstenantevictionbecamemorepronouncedthantheimperativesofprofitalonewouldhavepushedit.Indeed,insomewaysshare-croppingcouldhavebeenmoreprofitableforcapitalistlandlordsbutwasnonethelessnotpursued.

Mostscholarsagreethatagricultureunderwentalongperiodofstagnationfromthemid-1940sonwardsanddespiteabriefperiodofcommoditypriceboominthewakeoftheKoreanWarcrisisintheearly1950s,agriculturalgrowthremainedbelowtherateofpopulationgrowthtilltheendofthedecade(Mccartney,2011:87).Thiswasnotonlybecausethelandfrontierinthecanalcolonieshadcloseddownandwithitthescopeforextensivecultivation,butbecausestatepolicywasgearedtowardsdeliberatelyworseningthetermsoftradeforagricultureinordertodirectittowardsindustrialgrowth(Zaidi,2008:Chapter2).Fromthelate1950sthegovernmentactivelysubsidizedtheproliferationofprivatetube-welltechnologyasaprecursortotheGreenRevolutionpackage,therebyeasingconsiderablythebynowburdenedcanalsystembyshiftingthemostdynamiccultivationtowardsgroundwatertechnology(Nazir,1991:54).

The‘GreenRevolution’packageoffertilizersandhigh-yieldvariety(HYV)seedsmaybeconsideredakeymomentinthereconfigurationofrurallabourrelationsinthePunjabingeneralandinDepalpurinparticular.First,beinganareawithaconsiderablesupplyofgroundwater,thenewtubewelltechnologywasideallysuitedtothedistrictandwasthustakenupenthusiasticallybythelandedelite,especiallysincethefertilizerandHYVpackageworkedbestwithanassuredsupplyofwater.Second,thenewtechnologywasheavilysubsidizedbythestatewhichmadeitevenmoreattractive;third,thegovernmentprovidedasupportpricemechanismforcropsinwhichHYVseedswereintroduced,mainlycotton,wheatandrice.Thispolicypackagegreatlyincreasedtheprofitabilityofagricultureintheearly1960screatinganincentiveforlandlordstoassertgreatercontroloverthecultivationprocesswhichcouldbestbeachievedthroughresumptionoflandfromformersharecroppers(Hussain,1982:172).

Althoughwedemonstratedintheprevioussectionhowfarlargelandownerscontrolledtheproductionprocessinthecaseofshare-croppingarrangementsthroughthecrop-mixaswellascost-sharing,itisnonethelesstruethatthebataisystemstillinvolved,byitsverydefinition,adivisionoftheproducebetweentheconsentingparties.Thiswasusefulforlandlordsintheprevioussituationofstagnantyieldswheretheycouldstillgainthroughafixedrent,butoncetheprofitabilityofagriculturesoaredintheearly1960s,theincentiveforsharingpartofthisgainwiththeirtenantsdeclinedconcomitantly.Thus,onceprofitabilityincreasedthelargelandownersbegantoresumeagreateramountoflandfromtheirsharecroppersforself-cultivationusingwagedlabour.

ButtherewasnolinearpathfromtheintroductionoftractorsandthewidespreaddisplacementoftenantsthatoccurredacrossthePunjabilandscape.Infact,ourinterviewswithmanylargelandlordsrevealedthatthetenancyarrangementwas

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highlyprofitablesincesupervisioncostswerelowerandwitha50-50or60-40sharesettlement,theygainedaccesstotheunremuneratedlabouroftheentirehousehold(includingwomenandchildren)whereasallhiredlabourhadtobepaid.Indeed,theprofitabilityofshare-tenancyinSindhhasmeantthatowner-cultivationhasonlygraduallyreplacedtheformerandinsomecasesofveryprofitableagriculture,ithasevenincreased(Majid,1998:72).Indeed,evenalmostadecadeaftertheintroductionofthenewtechnology,onlyfarmersinthe50-100acrescategoryhadreplacedmostoftheirtenantswithtractorsandhiredwagedlabourers,whilethelargerlandlordsinDepalpurretainedamajorityoftheirtenantsasanassuredsupplyoflabourtocopewiththeseasonalpeaksinducedbythenewtechnology(Alavi,1976:341).Yet,bythetimeofthe1980censusalmost80%ofthemhadbeenevicted.WhydidPunjabnottakethemorecautiouspathtowardsthereplacementofshare-cropping?Whathappenedinthedecadebetweenthelate60sandearly80sthatmadethedisplacementoftenantssoverydramaticinthecanalcolonies?

TheanswerliesnotintherealmofeconomicsbutofpoliticsforthisperiodcoincidedwiththeincreaseindemandsbypoorersectionsofsocietyculminatinginthepopulistgovernmentofZulfiqarAliBhutto.EvenmoredramaticwastheannouncementbythegovernmentofasetofmajorTenancyReformActsaccompaniedbytheplansforathorough-goinglandreformwhichthreatenedtoeffectivelyendlargelandownership,atleastaccordingtotherhetoricofthegovernment(Herring,1983:82).Whiletheactualamountoflandreformdidlittletochangetheagrarianstructure,thethreatoftenantmilitancy(incidentsofqabzas(takeovers)andsquattingwerewidespread)andthe‘shock’ofthe1970electionresultssprungtheruraleliteintoactionandpromptedtheircounter-offensive(Gotsch,1976:368).Between1971and1977‘aidedbythebureaucracyandthepolice,thiscounter-offensiveproducedaspateoftenantejections’withanumberofviolentconflictsbetweencontendingparties,evenifonewasoverwhelminglystronger.Whathelpedthecauseofthelandlordswasthehugesubsidygiventotheimportoftractorsbythegovernment,whichmadethemoneofthecheapestcapitalimportsinacountrywherecapitalwasscarce.AsJonesnotes,thePPP’s(Bhutto’sparty)ruralorganizationwasunabletostemwhathecallsthe‘quietcounter-revolutioninthecountryside’(Jones,2003:429).

Thus,evenasapurelyeconomicrationalityofcostsandprofitswouldhaveelicitedaresponseofretainingasignificantchunkofshare-croppersonthelandandintroducingnewtechnologyandperhapsshiftingtoacashrentsystemformaximizingoverallsurplus,landlordschosetopushtheirlowercastetenantsoffthelandinordertosubverttheirclaimsonthepropertyownershipevenasitmeantagreatdisruptionandevenoutrightlossofproductionandprofitsintheshort-run.Inotherwords,thelogicofshort-termprofitwastrumpedbytheimperativesoflong-termpreservationoftheireconomicandpoliticalpower.

Therefore,thecontestovertheformoflabourturnedoutnottobeatrivialmatterbutconstitutiveofthecontentitself.Inotherwords,itisbecauseoftheambiguitiesoftheownershipstatusoftheshare-croppervis-à-visthelandthat

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theywereabletomakeclaimsforbetterratesofadjustmentofrentaswellasoftenuresecurityandevenlandownershipanditwasthisambiguitythatledtothecounter-offensivebythelandlordstoevictthemwhichmaysimplynothavehappenedwithdifferentlabourarrangementssuchashired-labourforexample.

OurcaseissimilarJuanMartinez-Alierstudyofthelargeruralestates(orLatifundias)ofAndalusiainSouthernSpainwhereformsoflabouruseshowedgreatflexibilitybetweenshare-croppingtohiredlabourandback,withnolinearpattern(Martinez-Alier,1971:Chapter7).InSouthernSpain,despiteasurplusoflabourinwhichalllandlordsagreedtheycouldgivelandoutonshare-croppingforextraprofits,theyrefusedtodoso.Thiswasbecausetenancywasassociatedwithdemandsforredistributionofestatesandattacksagainstrentiersandabsenteelandownersespeciallyinthewakeofcivilwarandsincethattimelandownershadbeenwaryofgivinglandoutonshare-cropping.Soinmakingtheireconomicdecisionstheywerewillingtoforgothepotentialbenefitsofprofitsbecauseearlierstruggleshadattachedtoshare-croppingasenseofthreattotheirsymbolicandsocialpowerwhichwereconstitutiveoftheformsthatthelabourmarkettook.

Thus,itwasthecontradictionsaroundsurplusappropriationandpropertyrelationsunleashedbythenewtechnologywhichgeneratedsufficientsocialtensionsinthePunjabicountrysideandledtoalargelysuccessfulcounter-offensivebythelandedelitetosubstituteerstwhiletenantswithwaged-labour.Theevictionoftenantsgreatlyenhancedthepoolofcasuallabourthatcouldbeemployedbothonandoff-farm;itwastheseindigenousmechanismsandnotsimplythepressuresof‘neoliberalglobalization’thatusheredintheliberalizationofrurallabourmarketsthroughaglutofevictedtenantsfromlowercastebackgroundsbecomingwaged-labourerswhenwebeganourresearch.

LabourControlina‘liberalizedmarket’

Atthetimeofourfieldresearch,largeruralestates(thelargestweencounteredwasupto700acresperhousehold)intheareanowhada3cropcyclesincludingpotatoandmaizebothofwhicharehighlylucrativecashcropsforexportandrequirealargeamountoflabouratharvest.Evenastechnologylargelyreplacedlabourfromthesowingpartofthecultivationprocess,whichhadbecomehighlymechanized,itisstillrequiredatharvest.Atthetimeofourresearchwebroadlyobservedthreedifferenttypesoflabourinourfieldsites,whichbrokedownintovariouslevelsofduration,tasksandformsofpayment;i)familylabour;ii)permanent(mustaqilmazdoor)labour;iii)casuallabour(aarzimazdoor).

Whywaspermanentlabour,acategoryantitheticaltotheideasofacasualandliberalizedlabourmarket,continuingtoexist?Itaroseoutoftheneedsofgreaterlabourdemandofaparticularkind.Landlordscomplainedthatitwasmuchmoredifficulttomonitorandmaintainlabourintheimmediateaftermathoftheendoftenancy,sincetheproblemtherewasresolvedthroughprovidingastakeintheproducetothetenant.Dailywageoftenledtoalossofmotivationsincethelabourerswerenotpaidforanyextraeffort.Moreover,mostlargelandowners

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havealsohadtoemploymanagerstosupervisetheirlands,therebyaddingtothecostsofsupervision.Althoughthesetasksvariedwitheachcropandsizeoffarm,ingenerallargerfarmersrequiredlabourforploughing,levelling,sowing,weedingaswellaslookingafterthelivestock.Sincecareisneededduringthematurationprocess(forexampleseeingthatthefieldsarewateredontime,therightamountoffertilizer,pesticideisappliedetc.)farmersprefernottoleavethesetocasuallabourers.Hiringmustaqillabouralsogivesaccesstotheentirefamilyofthelabourerwhichcanassistwithdomesticworkalongsidefarmwork.

Apartfromduration,whatdistinguishespermanentlabouristheprocessofrecruitmentwhichwasmorepersonalized;eitherasindividualsorasafamily,workerswenttoparticularlandlordsaskingforwork.Theywereprovidedaplacetoliveoftenmakeshifttentsorwereallowedtobuildamudhouseonthelandlordslandwithoutrent.Singlemenwereoftenprovidedaroomtosleepintheshednexttothefarmimplementsanddomesticlabourwasprovidedwithquartersinsidethehouseifitwasforawomanwithachild.Therangeofpaymentscombinedcashandgrain.Althoughtraditionallylandownersprovidedtheirfarmservantswithconsumptionloans,inbothareasthispracticehadbeendrasticallyreduced.Thiswasoneofthemaincomplaintsheardduringourfewinterviewswithpermanentlabourersintheabsenceofthelandowner.

TheoverwhelmingmajorityofpermanentlabourerswereMusallis(DalitconvertstoIslam)orMuslimSheikhs(tobedifferentiatedfromthemercantileSheikhs)whowerealsothebiraderimostfrequentlyfounddoingfarmlabouringeneralinourfieldarea.AlthoughconversionfromHinduismtoIslammeantthatideasaboutritualpollutionholdlessswayforMusallis,theywerenonethelessconsideredtobeatthebottomrungofPunjabiruralsociety(belowtheotherKammiorservicecastessuchasbarbers,blacksmiths,carpentersetc.someofwhomhavemadeatransitionintoRCCaswehaveseen).SinceabandoningtheirtraditionaloccupationsMusallisaremainlyfoundasrurallabourersthroughoutPunjab(Gazdar,2007).

Thatsuchlabournotonlysurvivedbutinthecaseofintensivecultivationincreasesundera‘liberalized’labourmarketshowsthefutilityofthinkingofcommercializationand‘attached’labourasbinaryopposites.Therelationsbetweenlabourandlandownershavebecomelesspersonalizedandshort-termatteststotheinfluenceofgreatermobility.However,severallabouringhouseholdsprefertoenterintolongertermarrangementstoshieldthemselvesfromsomeoftheuncertaintiesofacasuallabourmarket,evenifitmeansreducingtheirmobilityandalternativeoptionsforsubstantialperiodsoftime.Thus,notonlydocasualandpermanentformacontinuumthatisentirelycompatiblewiththelogicofcommercializationandcapitalaccumulationbutalsocompatiblewithoneanother.Inordertounderstandtheirreproductionweneedtoplacetheminstrategiesofaccumulationandsurvivalofemployersandemployees(Guerin,2013:419).

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TheThekedar:Debtandmediationinthelabourmarket

Asimilarkindofdiversitywastobefoundwithinthecategoryof‘casual’labour–inourfieldareasitincludedboththoselabourerswhowerehiredonadailybasis,orforparticulartasksforuptoamonth.Manyoftheseseasonallabourerswerelocalsandnotmigrantscomingfromoutsidethedistrict.ThefarthestlabourreportedtouswasinDepalpurwherethelargestlandlordhiredlabourfromavillage15kmaway.These‘casual’/temporarylabourerswereknownlocallyas‘aarzimazdoor’(meaningtemporaryworker).

Incontrasttopermanentlabourwheredemandwasdeterminedbythelevelofactivityandinvestmentwithalongertimespan,demandforcasuallabourwascorrelatedwithneedsthatwerebothexpectedandunexpected.Theoverwhelmingmajoritywasemployedforharvestandimmediatepost-harvestoperations.Depalpurhashighrurallabourdemandyearroundaswellasgreaterlabourdemandatpeaktimes;thecalendaryearbeginswiththeverylabour-intensivepotatoharvestfollowedimmediatelybytheequallylabour-absorbingmaizesowingprocess.Forthosethatsowriceagreatamountoflabourisrequiredatsowingaswellasforwheatharvesting.Thehigherintensityofcroppingiscompoundedbythesizeofbiggerlandholdingswhicharethemainutilizersofcasuallabourandrequireitinlargequantitiesatparticularpointsintimeashighlightedearlier.Butlabourisalsoimmediatelyrequiredforloading/unloadinggoodsinthemandi(market)aswellasforsmall-scaleindustry.Inotherwords,thehighdemandforlabourworksonanurban-ruralcontinuumlargelyduetotheseasonalnatureofboththemarketsaswellassmallscaleprocessing.

Moreover,aswediscoveredduringoursurvey,landlordswerepreoccupiedwithdecisionsonsecuringcredit,cropprocurementandtimingofsalesandstorageandneededtominimisetimespentrecruitinglabourandthehighersearchcostsforrecruitinglabouronsuchascalewasextremelydifficult,particularlyafterthedemiseofshare-cropping.Asaresult,whathadcrystallizedinDepalpurovertimewasasystemwherebythetaskofrecruiting,organizinganddeployingthebulkofbothruralandurbancasuallabourwasoutsourcedtoaseparategroupofindividualsknownlocallyasthekedarswhoactedaslabourrecruiters/jobbers.Thesewereindividualswhoseprofessionwastoorganizeanddeploylabour-gangsinordertoworkonfarmsforspecificpre-harvest,harvestandpost-harvestoperationsbutalsoforoff-farmworkinthemandiparticularlyasPalledar(‘coolie’labourforloading/unloadingproduce).

TheinstitutionoftheThekedarisparticularlysuitedtoaplacelikeDepalpurwhereaccesstolargepoolsoflabourneedstobeorganizedinatimelymanner.Nonetheless,itisalsoimportanttonotethatthemereexistenceofthekedarsdoesnotguaranteethatlabourwillberecruitedintherequiredquantitiesattherequiredtime.Thisisprimarilybecausecompetitionforlabourishighparticularly

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forthemainhirersoflabour-powerasevensmallfarmersrequirelaboratharvesttime.Howdidlandedcapitalistsensureatimelyandadequatesupplyoflabourinacontextofhighcompetitionandhowdidthisimpactboththechoicesoflabourersthemselvesaswellasshapeaccesstolabourforsmallfarminghouseholds?

Themainmethodoftyinglabourwasthepaymentofanamountofmoneyinadvancetothekedars,calledboth‘advance’andkhatalocally.Theadvancepaidactedasapledgebyaparticularthekedartoguaranteeatimelyandadequatelaboursupplyforaparticulartasksothatthefarmer’ssearchcostsarereducedsubstantially.Byinterlinkingthelabourmarketwiththecreditmarket,rural-commercialcapitalistsensuredthatinexchangeforanadditionalamountofmoney,theyspentaminimumamountoftimesearching,organizingandsupervisinglabouronsuchalargescale.Thenumberofthekedarsvarieddependingonthesizeofcultivatedlandbutitwasnotgreaterthanthreeforthelargestfarmersandmostrural-commercialcapitalistscontactedonlyone.TheamountpaidinadvancevariedfromthelowestofRs.20,000tothehighestofRs.50,000andwastied(albeittenuously)tothenumberoflabourersthatneededtoberecruitedforaparticulartask.

Theintendedeffectistobindlabourerstoaparticularlandlordforaspecificperiodoftimesothattheymaynottakeadvantageofanyotheremploymentopportunity,evenifitisbetterpaying.Thisisbecausethenon-agrarianeconomyhasstillnotunhitcheditselffromagricultureandthebulkofemploymentforlowercaste,unskilledlabourisonfarmorwithinthemarketingsystem,i.e.themarketsandagro-processing,allofwhichprovideseasonal,short-termjobs.Asaresult,mostlowercaste,unskilledlabourersseekemployersthatcanengagethemforlongerperiodsoftimeratherthanonewiththehighestwagerate.Inthisway,bytheprovisionofamoney-advanceandthedearthofalternativeemploymentoutsideoftheagro-commercialsystem,employersareenabledaccesstolabouratalowerpricepreciselyattimeswhenthedemandforlabourandpotentially,theirbargainingpower,isatitspeak.Moreover,sincetheorinthemarketascoolies,inwhichwomendon’tparticipatewhilefarmlabourisdominatedbywomenandchildren.

Furthermore,theblurredlinesbetweenwageanddebtwhichtheexistenceofthe‘moneyadvance-labourtying’arrangementsuggestsisalsoduetothecontinuousneedforborrowingthathouseholdslabouringininformalizedlabourmarketswithprecariousemploymentconditionshave(seeGuerin,2013foranexcellentdiscussiononthispointfromSouthIndia).Owingtotheincreasingconsumptionrequirementsofhouseholdsthisoftenmeansthatindebtednessbecomesapermanentfactoflifeformostlabourers.Italsoreiteratestheearlierpointabouttherenotbeingoneformof‘permanent’labourtyingbutthatindebtedness

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actuallybeingcompatiblewithahostofdifferentlabourrelationsandarrangementsofvaryingdurations;themoney-advancedtohighlymobileruralworkersfortheshort-termseasonalcultivationofoneparticularcropbeingdifferentforexample,fromthelong-termbondedlabouronbrick-kilnsevenifdebtisawayoforganizingboth.Neitherisenteringintotiedarrangementsapurecoercionasmanymayactivelyseeksuchrelationsandinsomecasestheaspirationofincreasedconsumptionmaybethedrivingforce.Thus,debtcanexistwithahostoflabourarrangementsandinsteadofthedichotomybetween‘free’and‘unfree’labourpositedbysomescholars(e.g.Brass,2002)wehaveinsteadacontinuumofrelationsofbondagewithvariousdurations,modesofrecruitmentandrationalesbehindit.

AvastmajorityofthekedarswerefromtheMuslimSheikhcastesandagreatnumberofthemwerealsowomen,particularlyinagriculture.Atypicalpatternwefoundwasthatmanyofthemwereformershare-croppersorbelongedtoformershare-croppingfamilies.Manyofthemwerealsothemselvesolderlabourerswhocouldnolongercarryoutthedrudgeryoffarmortheback-breakingpaledar(coolie)workinthemarketduetohealthreasons.Therefore,thehighlycommercialized,capitalistagricultureofDepalpurgreatlydependedonkinshipandcastenetworkstoorganizeanddeploylabour.

Interestingly,bytyinglabourwithmoneyadvancesthelandedRCCreducetheavailabilityoflabourforlesspowerfulplayers;aswe’vearguedabove,PCPandpetty-capitalisthouseholdsalsohirelabouratharvesttimeforcertainoperations.Sincetheyareunabletopayanadvancetothekedarsandthebulkoflabourersarealreadyengagedonthefarmsoflargelandlordsandcapitalistfarmers,thebargainingpowerofsubcontractorsandlabourersoverPCPhouseholdsishigher.Inexchangefordivertingasmallnumberoflabourersalreadyengagedonalargefarmtocarryoutparticulartasksontheirfarms,PCPhouseholdshavetopaythekedarsawagehigherthanthatbeingpaidonthelargerfarm.Duringourinterviews,wefoundPCPhouseholdspayingbetween700to1,000Rupeesmoreinwagesforeveryacrecultivatedthanrural-commercialcapitaliststhathadtiedlabourwithmoneyadvances.

Thus,asegmentationexistswithinthelabourmarketwherebylabourseeksgreaterworkdayswithemployerswithalowerwageandcanbargainoverwageswithPCPfarmers.OneofthekeystrategiesthatPCPhouseholdsuseinsuchasituationtosurviveandreproducewithoutaccumulatingistorelyasmuchaspossibleontheirownandtheirfamilieslabour,takeonadditionaldebtordiversifythelivelihoodportfolioofthehouseholdthroughoff-farmworkinordertoholdontotheirland.Thediversificationoflivelihoodsoff-farmandtheploughingbackofearningsintoretaininglandisoneofthereasonswhythereisnoclearmovementasyetinPunjabagriculturetowardspolarization,i.e.the

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existenceofhighlycapitalistfarmersalongsideamassoflandlessworkerswhichwaspredictedbyearlierliterature(e.g.Hussain,1982).EveninDepalpurwhereseveralvillagesarehighlypolarized(suchasthe2landlordvillageswesurveyed)therearearangeofcultivatorsofdifferentsizesandtheycontinuetoexist.

Inshort,theinstitutionofthethekedarowesitsexistencetotheincreasinglycapitalistpotatoAMS.Aftertheendofshare-croppingthepressuretosecureaccesstoalargepooloflabourforfarmandoff-farmoperationsatpeakperiodshasintensified.ByinterlinkingcreditandlabourmarketsthelandedRCCareabletosecureaccesstolabourinacontextofhighcompetitionoverlabour-powerwithoutspendingextratimesearchingforitlikefarmersinTTS.Moreover,thekedarslinkthelabourmarketfortheentireagro-commercialsystem(farming,marketingandprocessing)withgreatoverlapbetweenthedifferentparts.ThismirrorsthegreatlyintegratedcharacterofagricultureinDepalpurandallowsforlabourtomovewithindifferentpartsofAMSwithrelativeease,reproducingthelow-wage,casualworkwithininformallabourmarkets.

Theheterogeneitywewitnesswithintheagro-commercialmarketingsystemswasmuchmorecomplexthateitherneo-classicalornewinstitutionalanalysiswouldsuggest.Contractsandarrangementswereembeddedwithinlocalpowerstructuresandinstitutionsasweretheaccumulationstrategiesofemployersandsurvivalstrategiesofemployeesintheinformallabourmarkets.ThatsimplisticanalysisofsupplyanddemandwasunhelpfulorthatinstitutionswouldalwaysworktoreducetransactioncostsforeveryoneastheNewInstitutionalistassumeisnotbornebyactuallyexistinglabourmarkets.

Conclusion

Thepaperhasdemonstratedtheimportanceofahistoricalinformedpoliticaleconomyoflabourrelations.Againstthetrendofanalyzinglabourrelationsthroughoverarchingtheoreticalframeworksfromwhichtheconclusionsaresimplyreadoff(Tomich,2004:18)wetryandmaintainaproductivetensionbetweenwhatGeertzcalls‘thickdescriptions’oftheprocessesandrelationsinvolvedandcategoriesusedtodescribetheseprocessesandrelations(Clough,2015:82).Againsttheunproblematicmovefromaboveofexogenousfactors‘globalcapitalism’,‘semi-feudalism’etcweshowhowanexport-orientedcapitalismwasconstitutiveofshare-croppinginthecanalcoloniesevenastheactualformittookplacewasaproductofthesometimescontentiousbutalsocooperativerelationsbetweenlargelandlordsandtheirlowercastetenantsatthemicrolevel.

Wehopedtohaveshownhowseveralinstitutionalmediationsandrationalitiescoexist(oftenconflicting)atthislevelwithintheseeminglysimplerelationofarurallabourmarketbetweenlabourandlandowner.Fromstatepolicyto

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environmentaltechnologyaswellastheconsiderationsofpolitics,arangeofvariablesenterintothelogicofdecision-makingbydifferenttypesofsocialgroupsovertheactofproductionanddistribution.Byunderstandingthesedifferentlogics,wecandispensewiththeteleologyofcapitalistdevelopmentandtheidealconstructionsofhistoricmissionsof‘the’bourgeoisieandtheproletariatwhichburdenthemwithanaprioriasetofinstitutionalandculturaltraitsandultimatelyobfuscatemorethantheyilluminate.Onlybybreakingwiththeseteleologicalstudiesofmarginality,canproperunderstandingsofthemultiplewaysoffighthingitcanbeconceived.

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NazioartekoHizketaldiaELIKADURARENETORKIZUNAETANEKAZARITZARENERRONKAKXXI.MENDERAKO:

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