Ahmet Sözen Leonidas Pantelides

PLAN C

(A common-sense proposal for the Cyprus problem)

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Ahmet Sözen

Leonidas Pantelides

Ahmet Sözen is a professor of International Relations at EMU. He wrote his PhD on the Cyprus negotiations based on interviews with the political elites and decision makers in the late 1990s (where he travelled to both sides of Cyprus, Athens, Ankara, London and Brussels). Sözen was a member of the Governance and Power Sharing Working Group during Christophias-Talat negotiations. Sözen was also in the Vision Group of Mustafa Akinci during his election campaign in 2015.

Leonidas Pantelides is a retired ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus. He has served as ambassador in Stockholm, Athens, Moscow, Geneva, and Washington DC., from where he retired in 2018. He also served as Director of the Diplomatic Office of the President, and as Director of Middle East Affairs. During the first term of President Glafcos Clerides he was a member of the Working Group on the Cyprus Problem. Leonidas studied Philosophy and holds a PhD.

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Table of Contents

(A common-sense proposal for the Cyprus problem) ............................................................... 1

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................4

A. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 5

foreword .......................................................................................................................................5

SEMIOTICS .....................................................................................................................................7

Why Gradualism ............................................................................................................................8

The Legal Impasse ..........................................................................................................................9

broadening consensus .................................................................................................................. 12

method of work ........................................................................................................................... 13

B. WHAT KIND OF FEDERATION ........................................................................................ 16

Multiregionalism.......................................................................................................................... 17

Power-Sharing ............................................................................................................................. 25

Direct Democracy......................................................................................................................... 29

Security ....................................................................................................................................... 31

C. THE ROAD TO FEDERALISM ........................................................................................... 34

The Political Process..................................................................................................................... 34

Step-by-step Implementation ....................................................................................................... 36

Endnotes ..................................................................................................................................... 41

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We present Plan C to the public in an effort to rekindle interest in the Cyprus Problem. It is meant as food for thought hoping that this will contribute to the public debate and to the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem through negotiations.

Before doing so, however, a number of academics and other experts from both Communities were asked for detailed feedback and suggestions. A bicommunal focus group was called together but also individual approaches were made especially to academics and experts living abroad. We would like to express our deepest appreciation to all those who provided us invaluable reactions on the series of earlier drafts and made it possible to complete this report.

In an effort to produce something as broadly acceptable as possible, we sought

opinions from people with different perspectives on the issue. This is the main reason in avoiding citing names here, namely, the risk of inadvertently associating them with opinions not strictly their own.

All photos were sourced from the internet. The map on the cover page is by Ferandus Bertelli, a Venetian, printed in 1562. The blue door on page 8 belongs to “Archontiko tis Anastasias” in Athienou village. The picture was taken from the TripAdvisor site. The view of inner courtyard on page 17 is from a photo uploaded on a Facebook page by an individual and was taken inside the Toufexis Mansion on Axiothea’s Street which serves as the University of Cyprus’ Cultural Center. The photo on page 35 shows the largest and best-known bridge built by the Venetians in Cyprus. Children birdwatching is from the Turkish Cypriot publication The Kibkom Times of 20 March 2014.

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A. INTRODUCTION

FOREWORD

The three chapters of this work need not be read in the sequence they are presented here. Judging from the oral questions we have been receiving in discussions, it is obvious that different readers would naturally be interested in different aspects of this study. Although informed by the same need for political Common-Sense, the three chapters that follow differ in style of presentation. The Introduction is written as if it would be presented as an argument in public debate and was conceived early on whilst prospects for public exposition of new ideas still appeared limited. Though it may appear more rhetorical than substantive to those not needing convincing, it still, nonetheless, retains its importance for placing the opinions of the authors on the current Cypriot political map. Chapter 2 is more like a set of floorplans for a building, befittingly, since it is a depiction of the edifice of governance to be constructed. Finally, the chapter on implementation can be thought of as a kind of flight vector, or mission assignment plan, or even an assembling how-to manual.

The authors intentionally have left out the history of the problem as they have

also refrained from discussing the current political circumstances surrounding it. The considerable effort required to do justice to our complex history did not seem warranted by the possible benefits for the purposes of this study. Moreover, there are multiple other books on the history.

Likewise, even though political considerations, both external and indigenous,

are of course very important, as is, also, political leadership skill and the will for making things happen, ‘pure ideas’ too have transformative and motivational value. Ideas should not be under-estimated, and history provides ample evidence of their power. Such a discussion on a blueprint should be insulated, temporarily, from the restrictive debates on prevailing political conditions which usually dominate, and doom, any discussion of the issue. Thus, the question considered here is exclusively, “what would best work if it were given an opportunity?” Even if that opportunity does not materialize now, though we believe that now is an optimal time, the concept developed here is meant to have a long shelf life. Popular support has been receding not only by pessimism over unfavorable political conditions but, also, by demotivating doubts about the feasibility of the project.

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Rather than conjecture on intentions and deliberate on the array of likely

supportive and opposing political forces or personalities, there is a need to renew the “vision” of an inclusive Cyprus which can compensate for competing nationalist visions which prey on widespread uneasiness about the suitability of current ideas.i

Finally, in consideration of how best to educe public interest, there was a decision to be made about how much technical detail to include. Since this would involve prolonging consultations with experts and seeing the public interest in new ideas grow, the authors decided that the present balance of prompts and detail is adequate. It is also the motivation behind the decision to put the text online rather than suffer the normal delays of print publications.

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SEMIOTICS

In political debates about the "Cyprus Problem" references are sometimes made to a "Plan B." Although not made entirely explicit, Plan B is supposed to reference the sets of choices the two largest Communities in Cyprus have in pursuing their separate paths in case the present negotiating process (Plan A) does not lead to the desired results. Interestingly, both Turkish Cypriot nationalists and Greek Cypriot nationalists favor the same term, having in mind, of course, different destinations. Those that remain committed to the common effort of reunification through the present process of negotiation reply that “there is no plan B, only Plan A” meaning that, even though the experience of the last fifty years seems to suggest limited prospects of success, the present course is the only acceptable option.

Plan C, as proposed here, is thus an alternative to both the above scenarios. It

is an alternative to Plan B because as a political proposal it is federalist and it supports the effort of jointly working out a power-sharing architecture that will reunify the island, uniting its people, and its institutions. It is an alternative to Plan A because it argues for a gradualist approach, which, if adopted, would constitute a paradigm shift from the present ‘delivery room concept’ that views the solution as a single, instantaneous act, similar to a birth.

It is a happy coincidence of the English language that the letter 'C' is the first letter in the name 'Cyprus'. And among the so many other positively-sounding relevant c-words that may, also, be intimated, including the important concepts of ‘consensus’, 'confidence', ‘cooperation’, etc., for the authors the letter ‘c’ denotes, above all, Common-Sense.

We believe that the overall effort will be better served by adopting two Common-Sense principles. Firstly, rather than invent something sui generis, in other words, in a category of its own, experimenting with the lives of our people, a model that has already been tried and proven successful over time was chosen as base line. Moreover, because we lack the experience of common governance, and because there is a high degree of mutual suspicion, the other Common-Sense principle was that of gradual implementation, proceeding in carefully planned well-synchronized and well-sequenced steps, rather than in one big leap.

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The success of Plan A faces four kinds of obstacles: putting the comprehensive package together; securing the approval of the people in a referendum; ensuring crucial initial thrust in implementing what is agreed; and maintaining long-term sustainability. Opting for a model that was proven successful in practice, primarily focuses on meeting the first two challenges, and, proceeding in planned steps should strengthen the chances of success in the last two.

The proposed Roadmap to a Federal Cyprus will be explained in detail further

along. But because a number of voices are being heard recently about the solution being a developmental process, a clarification needs to be made from the start. What is being advocated here is not an Emergentist idea, leaving the goal unspecified and trusting the process to deliver an outcome. Neither is it a Progressivist concept that believes that we should start with something less than optimal, but under present circumstances allegedly realistic, and improve on it over time. Rather, our proposal is for a Roadmap for phased implementation according to a set of detailed initial agreements on what the aimed-for destination is.

WHY GRADUALISM

The most recent experience with the negotiations of the last three years, which, at the outset, everybody hailed as a great opportunity illustrates amply the point about gradualism. The two leaders were burdened with the task of coming up with an overall, comprehensive agreement settling all issues. Not quite having reached that point, there is a risk now of total collapse of the process and of Plan B options coming to the foreground. It would have made more sense to have taken on a less ambitious task. For over 40 years we have been chasing the “all or nothing” option and, since we did not achieve “the all,” we have very little else that we can point to. We remain forever in square one. If we had proceeded gradually, we believe we would have been in a much better place.

If Plan A manages to produce an overall, comprehensive agreement in the near

future, all will be well. Perhaps, then, elements of gradualism can be built into its implementation. If, on the other hand, the present paradigm for negotiations cannot produce the desired result, Plan C can be thought of as an alternative choice.

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The difficulty in agreeing a comprehensive package seems to be that each side feel that it might be giving more than it will be receiving, but, also, perhaps more importantly, that it will be required to give before it is certain that what it is supposed to receive will be firmly in hand. Becoming convinced that the other side will keep their word and will fulfil their obligations under an agreement, thus building up confidence in the other’s sincerity and commitment to the partnership, as well as becoming more certain about the feasibility of the project, will be decisive to the success of the effort.

Furthermore, if the whole project is to be cast in terms of the greater good and

not simply in terms of an expedient transactional accommodation, then gaining the sustained allegiance of the people should be treated as the main value sought.

Getting the approval of the people to the ideas presently being negotiated looks, at this moment, doubtful. But even if this obstacle were overcome, a proposal approved in a referendum, although necessary, is not enough of a guarantee for success. Continuous allegiance to unified political institutions must be won and nurtured as we work out the difficulties of linking up our fragmented political spaces.

“Getting to yes once” is not the same as “getting there for good.”

American baseball may offer a good case for Gradualism. A player batting aims for a homerun, but he only runs a base at a time. If he cannot manage a homerun he aims to run as far as possible under what circumstances allow. If he can only safely run to first base it is not wise to attempt a double or a triple. The destination is clear, but the path may be in stages. Gradualism depends on a pre-agreed destination and an outline roadmap.

THE LEGAL IMPASSE

Acceptance of the proposed compromise is also closely tied to the legality-legitimacy knot of issues. Because of this link, even though it seems like a legalistic debate, the people take an intense interest in it. Without clarity on this issue neither Community will be comfortable voting “yes” in a referendum. For many voters, it constitutes primary conditionality. On the Greek Cypriot side, the risk of jeopardizing the Republic’s legal position was the main argument advanced by the

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critics against the proposal that was put forward in the referendum of 2004. It has also been the most commonly cited argument since.

The Turkish Cypriots consider the Republic of Cyprus illegitimate even though it enjoys full international legality, whereas the Greek Cypriots consider the institutions of self-governance of the Turkish Cypriots illegal even though there is no doubt that a degree of legitimacy is due to them on the basis of a universal natural Right to be represented and be provided with benevolent government. In fact, the G/Cs admit this fact implicitly by accepting the Decision of the European Court of Human Rights which describes T/C administrative structures as a "subservient administration" to the Government of Turkey, a decision which was based on the rationale that no population can remain in a vacuum as regards governance. Turkish Cypriots question the legitimacy of the Republic because they have not participated, for whatever reason, in its decisions and acts during the past decades. The Greek Cypriots would not put at risk international recognition to enter an ‘experiment’ and want certainty as to the continuity of the Republic’s legal status. The way the international facilitators conceive of solving this chicken-and-egg problem is through some kind of “virgin birth” whereby in a semi-mystical legal act, namely, the simultaneous referenda that endorse the proposed agreement, a “new state of affairs” will be timelessly born. In the minds of the Greek Cypriots it is supposed to be a continuation of the original Republic and in the minds of the Turkish Cypriots it is supposed to be an originating assent to a new partnership.

To the extent that both sentiments may be grounded on “what if” anxieties, addressing these would deflate a lot of the fervor of doctrinaire orthodoxies.

The Greek Cypriots worry that if the absolute certainty and clarity of the legal status of the Republic is put into question and then the experiment fails, they will lose their most valuable legal asset, which exasperates existential fears. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, feel that they cannot grant their legitimizing allegiance unless they are sure that they have a secure place in the bi-communal Republic. Otherwise, they would want to maintain their claim to the right to exercise separately their part of the original sovereignty of the Republic, which they consider that they did with the UDI of 1983, or, in case of a new Constitutional breakdown, that they can carry away their share of the sovereignty re-constituted in an endorsing referendum. Greek Cypriots, of course, who know that the international community does not accept the first claim, namely, that the T/Cs took

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with them, when they withdrew from Government, their part of sovereignty, are reluctant to accept, even the implication, that the Republic's sovereignty may now be deemed divisible. On the other hand, there is also a dilemma in accepting an explicit formulation stipulating that sovereignty is indivisible since in case of a new collapse it could be argued that neither could have a claim to retaining it.

Phased recognition of legitimacy in exchange for phased recognition of legality may be a good recipe for solving this intractable problem without blurring the issue and resorting to questionable "ambiguity." So, again, intelligent sequencing and synchronizing may untie a difficult knot. Playing tricks with ambiguity creates more serious problems than it solves.

The easiest path for progressive recognition by the T/Cs of the legitimacy of the Republic is through provisionally utilizing the Republic’s established representational functions abroad and participating in the opportunities they offer. The benefits of this is most obvious in the case of membership of the European Union and of the Eurozone, that in today’s conditions would be difficult for any country, not already a member, to achieve. Joint participation can start with easy things like friendly international soccer matches, the Eurovision song context, and then proceed to the more political events like mixed delegations to EU bodies.

The easiest path for the Republic to overcome the issue of its non-recognition of T/C institutions, that would open-up the free-flow of political cooperation, is through a program of decentralization of powers to sub-national level entities which should, in the relevant law, apply to the whole of the island. The Republic of Cyprus should initiate the federalization process prior to final settlement. By divesting its own powers, and without serious legal risks, in fact, by giving substance to its own claim that the new state of affairs would come by “evolution,” it could in principle recognize the same competencies to all sub-national authorities of the federation-to-be. In one stroke, and acting consistently with its legal position, maintaining its claim that it is the source from which legal standing is imputed, it could solve in principle the issues preventing cooperation with T/C educational institutions, health control bodies, etc. Matched with greater cooperation in ensuring common standards, alignment with the EU acquis etc., common bodies will progressively become a reality.

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In the implementation schedule, which is presented further along, this process is entitled Status Normalization. Under Plan A, because mutual recognition is considered unachievable, legal normalization is conceived, as we have explained, as irreversibly attained by a positive outcome in the referendum. Through creative ambiguity, it is supposed to satisfy the Greek Cypriots on their insistence about legal continuity, and, at the same time, the Turkish Cypriots that it is a new legal partnership. Our suggestion is that the normalization of the mutuality relationship proceed progressively along with other aspects of normalization and institutional integration and be done as need arises.

Since for the Republic of Cyprus all legal acts of the non-recognized TRNC are legally void, it should not be very bothered with the other side's unilateralism. What counts is its own unilateralism. By the same token, since the Turkish Cypriots no more, or, not yet, recognize the Republic of Cyprus, they should be indifferent to the Republic’s unilateralism.

There are several instruments that can be used in addition to Decisions by the Parliament and other unilateral actions. Some understandings and informal agreements, foreseeing joint and reciprocal acts, would be helpful.

The important concern is how to open some legal space for cooperation and bottom-up institutional integration.

Popular referenda, on the other hand, will remain the main instruments for initiating top-down participatory federal institutions, whether transitional, like a Constitutional Assembly, or permanent since these involve securing the universal ascent of the entire population as called for.

BROADENING CONSENSUS

The injection of some Common-Sense can make it easier to agree. It can also help in securing broader consensus.

The most marked political divisions are between those in each community that support a ‘compromise’ and those that are against "giving in." In their extreme expressions, these attitudes can be caricatured, in reverse order, by the two phrases: "no, no matter what" and "yes, and never mind what." Then there are

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those in-between that support reunification in principle, including many political leaders, for whom the specifics of the "what" are decisive and who demand certainty that the proposed experiment in change will deliver the desired result, without leading to new adventures. Depending on which side of the median line these fall, they can be characterized as either the "no, unless" or "yes, if" positions. This in-between group is the silent majority whose support may lean either way making all the difference to the prospects of reunification. In theory, this group includes everybody. Even the more fervent nationalists speak of being ready to accept “the correct solution.” Broadening consensus will, thus, be critical in any scenario. If apparently conflicting interests, claims and expectations are to be aligned, not just accommodated, and if they are to be seen as serving a greater social good, the people need to mindfully recommit to founding principles and be ready to defend them as their own conscious choices. What is needed is not a compromise of expediency but a willful re-assent of the Social Contract that unites the people as the citizens of the Cyprus Republic.

Absent sufficient mutual confidence and strong common loyalties at the outset, a gradualist approach would naturally provide more comfort to those on the two sides who are anxious at being faced with such a grand experiment in change.

METHOD OF WORK

As a political proposal, this work is, undeniably, an opinion piece. But being the common view of two people from the island’s different ethnic Communities, it is, hopefully, a proposal positioned from the start within radius of wider consensus. The authors of this work agreed that when, as it is natural, there might be different opinions, the differences would not be glossed over. The only proviso was that these differing opinions, when reported, would not be attributed but rather would be presented as possible options, allowing the reader to more objectively consider their value.

We may be at a point in the process when creative reflection on the current

paradigm is called for with the aim of improving on it, and of re-legitimizing it in the eyes of the people. Otherwise we may be heading for abandonment of the federalist framework altogether. What we advocate here is looking at how analogous federal examples are fine-tuned so that we can recalibrate our own, hitherto mutually agreed, framework, rather than discard it and search for something radically different.

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We will discuss this in detail later on. Suffice it to say here, that we consider the attraction of a Swiss-type model to be that it might offer clues on how to balance effective participation of the Turkish Cypriot Community in federal decision-making with the kind of functionality that can soften the concerns of Greek Cypriots.

The paradigm-model we have chosen as baseline for discussion in this monograph, namely, the Swiss federal model, is uniquely complex but yet has proven durable. This should not be attributed solely to subjective factors, such as the maturity of its population, shallow cultural differences, etc. A significant contributing factor to its resilience must also be its design which ensures cohesion other than by concentration.

Switzerland has managed to achieve a high degree of multicultural harmony

and integration, as well as social and economic development through the successful function of its political institutions. What makes it uniquely relevant to the Cyprus caseii is that, unlike with most other federations, in Switzerland, there is conventionalized power-sharing of federal executive power.

Hence, an important aspect of our methodology is the assumption that the

reason, more than likely, that the reference model proved successful in the first place, was its in-built balances. Therefore, this is the feature that should be given the appropriate attention. We should not eclectically borrow incongruent elements from different models. The goal must not be to replicate institutions of others, but to identify the foundational set of interconnected principles that give functionality and resilience to a successful paradigm’s overall design and see how these may be adapted to our case.

Swiss power-sharing executive arrangements are, actually, a good illustration of this point. There are differences between the two cases which make replication problematic. Yet, what is being contemplated is the possible adoption of the principle of multi-party participation from both Communities in the Cabinet of Ministers along with the set of other arrangements, including provision for popular initiatives, which buttress its smooth function.

Executive power in Switzerland is not shared between the ethno-linguistic

communities, nor the regions, but between political parties on the basis of country-wide voter strength. Like all political parties, these are organized

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essentially on ideological lines and compete for the popular vote in national elections. In Cyprus, however, the 1960 Cyprus Constitution envisioned separate electoral lists for each Community for both voters and candidates. Mainly as a result of this, no Cyprus-wide political parties exist as to date. But there is no good reason that adoption of the fundamental principle of multiparty participation from both Communities in the Executive Council is not possible, even without, or, before, a change to this system.

If popular appeal of political programs determines the composition of the

Executive, it is the geographical profile of the federation that is the main determinant of the composition of the two Legislative Bodies. These two different principles of pure democracy and federalism flow together and merge in the particular type of referenda that the Swiss practice and which require majority of voters and majority of Cantons for passage.

Historically and politically, the two cases are very different. But there are also important parallels. Like Switzerland’s larger language Communities, the Cypriot Communities articulate their cultural identities in relation to broader frames of reference beyond. Like in Switzerland, they need to supplement their sense of cultural uniqueness, with a shared civic identity as citizens of an enviable polity they consider their achievement. Similar to Switzerland’s mountains, the sea surrounding Cyprus potentially endows Cypriots with an equally clear notional demarcation of the boundaries of national sovereignty.

The original documents giving shape to the Swiss state looked more like non-

aggression treaties between feuding neighboring Cantons, but, over time, Swiss citizens developed a sense of an affirmative Social Contract. In reading the Swiss Constitution, one is struck by the extent that social values, beyond the customary idea of equality, are referenced in it. This gives a positive outlook to the Swiss experiment at coexistence. Similarly, political institutions for Cyprus should not simply reflect necessary compromises but serve a greater good through societal harmony, economic development, as well as accountability. This will contribute to building the required mindful allegiance of the population that would ensure workability and long-term resilience through cooperation.

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B. WHAT KIND OF FEDERATION

Dualism and overconcentration of power present the two greatest threats to the Cyprus federalist experiment.

The first, namely, the existence of two antagonistic power elites, is a threat to

the functionality criterion, which is an indispensable requirement for the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots fear duality because a bipolar state, like a bipolar brain, does not function well. And, dysfunction can lead to crisis, collapse, and

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conflict. This risk is especially acute if political power is consolidated both horizontally, by control over territory, as well as vertically, through institutions. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots do not accept a unitary structure because they consider it to be detrimental to political equality. Concentration of power in a single political elite representing the one Community in control of a centralized state structure, is an impediment to the full practical respect of their equality, which is so valued by them.

This divergence between the unitary logic of the larger Community and the

dualistic logic of the smaller Community appeared from the beginning of independent Cyprus. This became amply clear to UN Mediator Galo Plaza, already in 1965, during his conversations with the two sides in preparation of his Report on Cyprus.iii Galo Plaza’s Report is still one of the best analyses one can read on the Cyprus Constitution of 1960 and the clumsy attempt its authors made to marry the two conflicting logics.

Because, it continues to be the fundamental dilemma which pervades

discussions on the issues still eluding us, the authors have identified this as the foremost knot that needs to be untangled.

Hence, if duality is a problem to the Greek Cypriots and the unitary to the

Turkish Cypriots, the solution to this underlying diachronic predicament might be to factorize power to a greater number of agents through dispersal and dilution of power. This foundational logic of pluralization of political agency is the normative principle imbued in all the suggestions that follow.

In summary, we consider that the principle is best embodied in the four pillars

we propose for the Cyprus Federation in the following way: a multiregional geographic profile, power-sharing governments with multiparty participation from both Communities, an institutional role for the citizens and for the Regions via regularized referenda, and the embedding of territorial security in homeland defense.

MULTIREGIONALISM

As indicated, the first feature of the geographic distribution of the Cyprus federation is multiplicity of geographical units rather than duality. Let us call this

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the principle of plurality of regions. Additionally, supplementary pertinent principles as to subsidiarity, equality of regions and economic viability, will apply concurrently. Also, individual political rights will be exercised according to a principle of permanent domicile but there should be no exclusionary restrictions to residency, freedoms of movement, rights to property, etc. Finally, some version of the principle of variable bizonal geography and clustering may be employed for different purposes, such as the election of the President and Vice-President, military service, certain types of budget allocations, etc., for which configurations of Regions may be treated as a single constituency.

Switzerland consists of three larger, unequal, linguistic groups: German (63%), French (22,7%), Italian (8,4%) and a smaller Romansh community (0.6%).iv v But the Federation comprises of 26, not 3 or 4, federated geographical units called Cantons, varying in size and population.vi Some of them are mixed linguistically, as for example, Bern, the Canton where the Capital is located. Altogether, there are 17 German-speaking Cantons, 4 French-speaking, 1 Italian-speaking, 3 which are bilingual, speaking both French and German, and 1 which is trilingual, speaking German, Italian and Romansh. The official languages of the state are French, German and Italian. In Cyprus if the principle is applied it may give us between 6 and 12 federal Provinces.

Switzerland’s dispersed federalist geography is an important factor in the success of its integrative model. It mitigates rather than reinforce inter-communal antagonisms. By stretching out political space, it ensures inclusiveness. At the same time, like the spokes of a bicycle wheel, it secures the link-up of the center with an expanded plane of political activity.vii

But, in the case of Cyprus, there is stipulation that the new structure will be a

“Bi-zonal, bi-communal Federation.” Is bizonality compatible with such a geographical dispersal?

There is no reason why it cannot be. Why should bizonality be necessarily equated with there being only two geographical subjects to the Federation? Alternatively, bizonality can be interpreted as a feature of population distribution. Given the imperative to factorize power to as many political agents as possible, some margin seems to be warranted in considering how best to flesh out the principle of bizonality. Multiplicity of federal units, while introducing significant

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flexibility to the system by allowing more realistic and less forced relative local majorities, does not contravene the principle of bizonality which will remain as a generic attribute of the architecture. Each federated area, be it one of two, or, one of many, will be identifiable according to the actual concentrations of population, as a Greek Cypriot ‘zone’ or a Turkish Cypriot ‘zone’, in the sense that Ticino, for example, in Switzerland, is, unequivocally, an Italian Canton, Vaud is French, and Zurich is German. At the same time, it allows for more mixed areas especially along what is today the ceasefire line. There is no strict conceptual necessity to equate bizonality exclusively with the creation of only two constituent federated states. Being creative in respect of the number of geographical federal units does not repudiate the principle while it allows for the unavoidable complexity resulting from co-existence.

Such operative multiplicity can be arrived at in two orderly ways. Firstly, by building on the configuration of the six Administrative Districts that were inherited from the British Colonial Administration, with some adjustments, making this the foundation for our decentralized architecture. Secondly, by drawing the electoral map, in particular, how voting Constituencies for the Upper House of the Federal Legislative Body are designed, to coincide with these same administrative divisions. The Administrative Districts should overlap with Senatorial Constituencies. The same Administrative Districts could also be electoral districts for the Lower House, although a single constituency system would better ensure representativeness.

Even though six empowered federal Districts of the Federation, represented in

the Upper House with their own Senators, would be an improvement on two, given post-1974 actual conditions on the ground, reasonable adjustments to the breakdown of administrative regions could foresee further sub-divisions and adjustments to the Districts which contain the present dividing line. (See Map 2 following). Depending on how this is done namely, Nicosia District and Famagusta District could be subdivided into two, or three of four Districts each, creating between eight and twelve newly drawn Administrative Districts. Designating these as Senatorial Constituencies would create the basis for a functioning federal multi-regionalism. It could also play a vital “checks and balances” role, making the regular conduct of referenda less prone to precarious populist influences.

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Map 2 above shows the six traditional administrative Districts and the buffer zone.

Nicosia and Famagusta Districts could be sub-divided into northern and southern parts, bringing the number from six to eight. If, furthermore, the walled cities of Nicosia and Famagusta, together with their immediate peripheries, shown above in dark blue and dark green, were, on the model of the federal city-states of Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin in Germany, to be counted as geographical subjects of the Federation, separately from their non-urban surrounding areas, the number would rise to ten. The number could rise to twelve if the western part of Nicosia District, with Morphou as its capital, as well as north-western Famagusta District, namely the Karpas peninsular, were added to the list. To summarize, the twelve Constituencies each sending two Senators could be:

1. City of Nicosia, consisting of the old town and its immediate periphery excluding newer suburbs

2. City of Famagusta, consisting of the old town and its immediate periphery 3. North Nicosia District 4. South Nicosia District

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

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5. West Nicosia (Morfou) District 6. North Famagusta District 7. Kyrenia District 8. Karpas Peninsular 9. South Famagusta District 10. Larnaca District, 11. Limassol District 12. Paphos District

The above indicative Map 3 is based on the Map of the 2004 Annan Plan, combined with the traditional administrative divisions and suggestions for further subdivisions. Exact boundaries of new Districts would be negotiated. The eastern SBA has been omitted for reasons of clarity. The boundary between District 10 and District 9, has been realigned to make District 9, namely South Famagusta District continuous.

Territorial adjustments would be carried out between Federal Districts,

fashioned more like administrative re-alignments instead of painful or dishonorable concessions. The boundaries and the official names of the Federal Districts will be decided as part of the initial agreements.

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The principle of subsidiarity will apply to the sharing of competences between the federal government and the Federal Regions. The Federal Districts would have significant competences, including in inducting new citizens. They will function as the main platforms for political and economic interaction of citizens with state authorities. The regions will be the principal providers of services to the citizens in education, health, social welfare, etc., even for those services mandated at Federal level. They should thus have sufficient financial resources, including through the power to tax, to meet their obligations.

The Constituent Federal Districts may have their own Houses of representatives,

or they may, instead, organize the totality of their elected representatives (Members of the Upper and Lower Houses plus Mayors) coming together periodically principally for approval of the District Budget. Financing for regional political institutions should be provided by a District’s own means. District bodies will have no blocking power in foreign policy or in any other area which is an EU competence.

The principle of equality of the regions will be embodied in the Constitutional provision that they will be represented by an equal number of Senators in the Upper House regardless of their size and population. Also, in referenda, for purposes of tallying double majorities, each Region will count as a single unit.

The Regions will be the functional constituencies for elections to the Upper House of Parliament. Number of seats in the Lower House will be proportional to population. Each Region will elect two Members to the Upper House. In a scenario of twelve Federal Districts functioning as two-member Senatorial Constituencies as in the United States, the result would be an Upper House of twenty-four members. Other formulae for deriving the number of elected representatives are possible, including a higher number of single-member Senatorial Constituencies. This system would not necessarily give an equal number of elected Senators. However, there are ways to equalize the number of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot votes in the Senate by giving the Vice-President, for example, as in the US an ex officio role in the Senate and depending on the extent of the discrepancy in the numbers, his or her vote would count for the difference. Alternatively, and especially if there is rotation of the offices of President and Vice-President, other ex officio members would have to fill the gap. In this case, the principle of incompatibility enshrined in the 1960 Constitution would have to be revisited, unless the ex officio members were representatives of the regions, i.e., governors.

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For the purpose of sending Representatives to the Lower House, on the other

hand, adoption of a single-member Constituency system could have many advantages considering that different Districts would have different population blends. Moreover, a significant step in democratic modernization should be taken in relationship to the 1960 Constitution by limiting the system of separate ethnic lists to the election of President and Vice-President. A single-member constituency system, even without resorting to the complex system of cross-voting, still derives the benefit of integrating the citizenry locally where it most matters. And this, without being detrimental to the particular Constituency’s most populous Community, since the latter will enjoy the initial electoral advantage due to numbers. At the same time, it would allow competition on the basis of non-factional campaign programs. If one looks at the results of recent elections in the United States, one notices the evident increase in successful minority candidates. How the electoral map is drawn will of course also make a difference.

Federal Districts should be drawn in such a way as to ensure their economic viability and should make sense from an ecological and town-planning perspective (principle of viability). This essentially means that there should be fair distribution of the coastline. So, for example if it will be decided that there should be a separate Western Nicosia Federal District, this should be drawn so as to include the whole of Morphou Bay, encompassing Kokkina and Pyrgos to the West and Kormakitis to the North-West. It would, thus, contain coastline, fertile farmland and mineral resources making it viable despite its relatively small size. In terms of its demography it might be the most mixed federal unit encompassing not only Greek and Turkish Cypriots but also Maronites and Roma.

The Regions should have self-sustaining political institutions.

In each region, residents will be equal in every respect independently of identity. In the Implementation of the Agreements, every effort should be made to respect simultaneously the twin principles of maximum reinstatement of displaced persons and least interruption of settled conditions. While this may prove a complicated proposition, the sufficiently prolonged transitional period should facilitate equitable arrangements. It will minimize the need for relocations of present residents without impeding the return of displaced original inhabitants. Treating the issues of return of displaced persons, exercise of political rights and restitution

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of properties as District-specific and disaggregating the one big issue of how the principle of bizonality is to be interpreted, would make the issue of return easier to settle.

Political rights will be exercised according to a family’s permanent residency. Although it should be possible to transfer residency it should not be permissible to do so multiple times. Free movement, acquisition of property and the right of chosen settlement should be fully respected. (Principle of political and individual rights).

These principles, however, do not prejudice the criteria according to which the future ownership of residential properties will be determined. This is something to be decided in the context of political negotiations. The twin principles of maximum reinstatement and minimum disruption refer to the right of citizens to choose their locality of permanent domicile freely. Optimal arrangements should be made to accommodate both those wishing to return and those wishing to remain. At the same time in deciding territorial adjustments between Regions, the original demographic profile of the region should be respected, and an effort should be made to facilitate the return of groups of residents to original neighborhoods and not just of individuals to individual properties.

The above principle would result in a different population mix in different Districts. The federated Cities of Nicosia and Famagusta would likely be comprised of a 50-50 population mix. Other Districts, and depending how these are drawn, may weigh in favor of the one Community between seventy and ninety percent but with a significant presence of the other. In the case Morfou and the Karpas were made separate Districts, the mix will be strengthened further since these will likely have majorities of about 55-60 percent.

These configurations could produce an important balancing effect in those cases

that important questions are taken to the people, as well as in other instances, including in the confirmation of federal executive office holders, were consensus needs to be built.

A more differentiated “zoning” map of the twelve Districts would then roughly

look as follows:

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• Three Turkish Cypriot Districts with majorities exceeding 70 percent. (North Nicosia, North Famagusta, Kyrenia)

• Five Greek Cypriot Districts with majorities exceeding 70 percent. (South Nicosia, South Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos

• Two Districts with nearly 50-50 mix (cities of Nicosia and Famagusta)

• Two Districts likely with between 55-60 percent majorities (Morfou and Karpas).

A last principle could be that of variable bizonality whereby for different purposes a variable geography will apply. Thus, even though for administrative purposes and for elections to the Legislature the District will be considered as the relevant Constituency, for the election of President and Vice-President, for example, or for military administration, and certain types of budget allocations, we could revert to a two-constituency or three-constituency configuration accordingly.

POWER-SHARING

When we speak of power-sharing in the context of a solution of the Cyprus Problem what comes to mind is Greek Cypriots sharing power with Turkish Cypriots; While this will remain the essence of the arrangement, simply dividing power between two vertically integrated camps, as we have been arguing, might be a recipe for deadlocks. An alternative proposal, based on the principle of factorization of power, could be multi-party participation from both Communities in the Federal Executive Council.viii

Adopting the above principle would not be arbitrary. Sharing of executive

power between political parties is not unknown to Cypriots. It is at times practiced, for longer or shorter periods, because of the breakdown of voter preferences in both Communities. What we are proposing here is to customize the practice into a norm.

Federal executive power will be exercised by a nine-member Cabinet of

Ministers, six Members hailing from the G/C Community and three Members from the T/C Community. Members to the Cabinet of Ministers should be nominated by political parties according to their electoral performance. A formula providing that a place on the Cabinet should represent a community’s total vote divided by the number of communal Members on the Executive, or the biggest part thereof, should be provisionally agreed. On the basis of recent results, then, the Cabinet

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that would emerge would likely include either 2 Members from one Turkish Cypriot party and 1 from a second party or three Members from three different parties. On the Greek Cypriot side, based on recent electoral results, there would be 2 Greek Cypriot Members from each of the two big parties and one each from two additional parties.

In one stroke, this would bring together a number of historical alliances and alignments. The Greek Cypriot Left with the Greek Cypriot Conservatives; The pro-federation parties with parties less enthusiastic about the whole idea; The Greek Cypriot Left together with the Turkish Cypriot Left, and very importantly, the Turkish Cypriot Right with the Greek Cypriot Right. In the words of the English lullaby: “All the king’s horses and all the king’s men … put Humpty Dumpty back together again.”

Such a system will ensure continuity and representativeness. Big reversals in direction will be made unlikely. This has both the advantage that the original historical, political compromise, embodied in the initial set-up, will endure as well as provide the benefits of a consensus-based system rather than “winner takes all.” The people, of course, should be able to change the arrangement through a national referendum in which majority of the people as well as majority of Districts in both zones should be required.

Lists of names of potential Members of the Cabinet will be made available to the President and Vice-President by the political parties who will decide on the composition of the Cabinet according to the formula agreed based on the most recent Parliamentary elections, but also ensuring gender balance, etc.

The same principle of multi-party coalition governments, which is described above on the basis of community-based political parties, can also work in case Cyprus-wide political parties emerge. In that case, the list of, say, three candidates for every position that successful political parties submit should enable the President and the Vice-President to put together a Cabinet that satisfies the compositional requirements. By the same method other desired diversity goals, such as achieving equitable gender representation, could be accomplished.

In addition to the nine, a President and a Vice-President will complete the Federal Executive Council. This will allow us to retain the contours of the present

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system. Different election systems are possible for the election of the President and the Vice-President.

If we remain within the 1960 arrangement, the President and Vice-President will be elected directly by the people. But introducing some method of combining the support a candidate achieves in both Communities would be a good idea. This could either be weighted cross-voting, where the votes of the Community, other than the one the candidate hails from, are added to a candidate’s votes after being either weighted up or weighted down. This means that the votes of the other community count directly and their specific number may determine the successful candidate. Consequently, a possible scenario may arise whereby the other Community puts over the top a candidate who is not the most favored in the candidate’s own Community. This risk is lesser if a system of thresholds in the other Community is applied, which more than one candidate may achieve. This would allow each Community to retain a higher degree of control over its choice. According to this system a candidate would win provided she or he received the majority of votes in her or his Community and a certain minimum percentage in the other.

Alternatively, the President and the Vice-President can be elected by the two Houses of Parliament sitting together. Separate community thresholds again would ensure that the elected persons have at least minimal support in both communities.

The issue of rotating Presidency will be decided in negotiations.

If the offices of President and Vice-President were not retained, then the role of presiding can rotate between the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Finance. One of the three will always be held by a Member nominated by the largest Turkish Cypriot political formation on the basis of the last election. If Cyprus-wide political parties emerge then the Turkish Cypriot Member that will hold one of these three positions will be chosen from the list provided by the largest national party. The two Greek Cypriots Members would also be from the same party provided they are not from the same District. These three Members will form a kind of triumvirate that will have an informal facilitating role in case of threatened deadlocks in the Cabinet, and possibly a more formal function in the case of real deadlocks before the issue is referred to Parliament or the people.

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Without real power in the hands of one officeholder to change radically the

direction of the country or make arbitrary decisions, and without real power in the hands of another to effectively block the workings of the state, the chances of success at jointly running our common affairs will be greatly enhanced. With power diluted so that no individual President, Vice-President or Party Leader enjoys excessive or exclusive power, the setup favors continuity and ideological neutrality on most proposed policies including in foreign policy.

But, is there, then, a risk that no decisions will be made? And, what of a “safety

net” in case Turkish Cypriot concerns are systematically overlooked? Do we still need the one consenting Turkish Cypriot vote in the Cabinet?

Deciding this last point will be a political call to be made in the negotiations.

The point made here, though, is that there is an obvious advantage to the proposed alternative system in either case. If the three Turkish Cypriot ministers hail from the same party, securing one vote will be equally difficult as convincing all three to vote affirmatively unless one of them is willing to breach party discipline. If they do not hail from the same party, then, the onus will rest with the Turkish Cypriots to build effective inter-communal consensus if they had serious reasons to oppose a proposed decision. Such consensus would indicate a strong Communal sensitivity rather than a possible bargaining tactic.

We are, hence, proposing the principle of assumed consensus, whereby decisions will be assumed to have the support of all Members of the Cabinet unless one of the Turkish Cypriot Members requests a vote and the ensuing procedure yields three Turkish Cypriot negative votes. If this happens, the issue should be treated as a potential deadlock and should be referred to the three Members named above for conciliation. If no compromise is agreed, the issue should be referred to Parliament and the opinion of the Constitutional Court should be sought. Before such referral every effort should be made to disaggregate issues and isolate points of contention so that the question accompanying referral should be as narrow as possible. If deadlock persists in the Legislature, the issue should be decided by referendum provided that sufficient time is allowed for public debate.

The Swiss experience has shown that referring deadlocks to be resolved by popular referendum functions preventively. Proposals in the Executive Council self-

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adjust to avoid deadlock triggering a referendum on the issue. A compromise decision of the Cabinet may incorporate policy contributions from different sides whereas referenda return outright rebuff or approval. Most of the time disagreeing parties prefer to get something of what they want in a policy decision rather than risk losing all.

The President and the Vice-President will have the joint responsibility of ensuring respect of the Constitution. But, beyond guardianship of the Constitution, their role should be additionally to promote proactively the unity and social cohesion of the country. They should have a strategic consultative role in education policy, culture, youth affairs, and all other areas that strengthen the country’s uniform civic identity. As in 1960, education should be principally a decentralized competence. However, standards should be set nationally, and provisions should be made to ensure correspondence, transferability, and eventual integration by the time students reach tertiary level.

There will be a House of Representatives and an Upper House or Senate. In certain cases, they will sit together. Ambassadorial assignments and perhaps other appointments should be subject to confirmation.

There will be a Constitutional Court to adjudicate on differences between Districts, between Districts and the Federal Government. On the executive decisions the role of the Constitutional Court will be consultative.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

The free people of Cyprus are the source of all legitimacy in political life and remain the ultimate arbitrators of the direction the country follows.

In addition to free and fair elections, Democracy is well-served when greater citizen empowerment and participation is facilitated. The principle of direct democracy, In the present context, will be taken to refer primarily to the institutionalized use of referenda.

The option of a citizen’s initiative should be available to the people as a method to exercise popular control on government actions and a channel for introducing new items on the political agenda, such as for example on the environment.

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In Switzerland, there are two kinds of referenda: obligatory for the approval of

constitutional changes or important international treaties, and, optional for the adoption of important legislative decisions. A constitutional amendment may be put forward by the government or originated by Popular Initiative with the collection of 100,000 signatures. In the case of an obligatory referendum both a majority of Cantons and a majority of voters is required for passage. An optional referendum is usually initiated by the collection of 50,000 signatures or on the joint demand of eight Cantons. In this case, only a majority of the voters is needed for passage. Referenda are used in an analogous way by Cantons, although their employment is not uniform, some Cantons using them much more extensively than others.

The principle of distinguishing between different types of referenda depending on the type of issue it is called upon to decide should be made sufficiently specific and build into the relevant provisions. If for example, there is a demand put forward by an individual Region, or sub-regional group, but one that requires consent of the rest of the country, a different method for establishing the popular will should be followed than in a case of attempting to break a deadlock.

In connection with the above, some week version of the principle of compatibility between national referenda and local referenda should be at the disposal of the Constitutional Court, which without restricting the freedom of the people, should ensure that there is minimum alignment of pursued policies.

The principle of double majority, namely that for a proposal to pass it requires majority of voters on a national basis but also a minimum number of approving Regions, is a safeguard against the prospect that populist feeling alone will determine outcomes. The difference in requirements for passage is also important in lessening the possible divergence between the principle of federalism and the principle of pure democracy. In other words, how to avoid the possibility of a slim majority in the smallest Cantons imposing its will on the majority of voters.

In the case of constitutional referenda, or if it concerns a chiefly Greek Cypriot initiated demand, a strengthened majority of Districts may be considered, say 5+3. Alternatively, in the case of a popular initiative for a referendum introduced by the

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Turkish Cypriot Community, some version of a weakened majority may be considered, say 3+3.

The suggestion for the above formulae is based on the 12 Districts scenario. In

both cases what is provided for is that in addition to its own, more homogeneous Districts, the Community seeking the measure should be able to secure the majority of the four more heterogeneous Districts. The two federated ‘city-states’ of Famagusta and Nicosia, and the Federal Districts of Morfou and the Karpas, with their more balanced population mix, could play an important moderating role in determining the optimal outcome in both of these instances. Alternatively, a universal minimum, say a 30 percent rule, could apply.

SECURITY

The initial set of agreements between the parties should include the principle of non-violence and non-aggression in the resolution of all differences. Once a Federal Government is jointly set up at the end of the implementation period, these initial understandings should be incorporated into a formal Treaty of Friendship to replace the Treaty of Guarantee, which should be oriented towards external threads. Likewise, the Treaty of Alliance should be transformed into a Treaty of Cooperation.

Domestic security should be embedded in defensive structures.

Homeland security in Cyprus would be effectively organized on the principle of

subsidiarity as regards military command structure and mission definition and should consist principally of a regionally based component supplemented by a smaller national component. Both components would have their own specific missions as well as support the mission of the other.

The regional components will consist of locally based territorial army units

consisting of an agreed number of professional recruits complemented by state and municipal police units.

In the period immediately after Independence in 1960, the House of

Representatives, still comprised of TC and GC Representatives, failed to pass a law on setting up a Cypriot Army because it proved impossible to agree whether units

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should be ethnically integrated. In the new structure proposed here, national units would be integrated whereas territorial units would not. But, as the latter will be under the high command of federal army officers, they will be integrated at the top.

Equipment of territorial units should be defensive with limited longer-distance

transport and projection of power capabilities.

The national component will comprise of a limited number of ethnically integrated national forces for the defense of Cyprus’s external borders, consisting essentially in a coast guard supported by helicopter units. This federal force will, in turn, be supplemented by federal police forces and, for a period whose length will be agreed, by an international Officers’ Corps made up of Greek and Turkish officers that would have the joint responsibility of training, supervising, coordinating and otherwise supporting the territorial units. Subject to agreement, it may be sufficient to initially employ up to 65 Turkish and 95 Greek officers for this purpose, although a higher number may be provisionally envisioned. A joint federal command will be set up which will include Officers of the Cypriot Federal Forces. After an initial period, the number can be further reduced. Foreign officers would be serving under contract with the Cyprus Federal State and may eventually be completely done away with.

Although hard to imagine, in Switzerland in 1989, there was a popular

referendum on whether to abolish the army altogether. This originated in a petition signed by 111,300 citizens but was rejected by a large majority of Cantons. Likewise, if the people of Cyprus at a later stage decided to abolish the territorial component of the Armed Forces, they will be able to.

With the exception of the British SBAs, and the duration that a UN force will remain on the island, no military bases should host foreign soldiers after a certain agreed date. International officers will be accommodated in civilian housing.

Once a Federal Government is jointly set up at the end of the implementation period the Government of Cyprus will sign a Treaty of Cooperation in replacement of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance. This would be the time also to formally revise the Treaty of Guarantee by inserting the non-aggression clauses transforming it into a Treaty of Friendship.

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Such a principle of consideration of Cyprus’s special relationships should not

be understood too narrowly but should be broadly interpreted to include, among others, the European Union and Cyprus’s other geostrategic partners.

The Officers’ Corps may be supplemented by officers from other nations or international organizations. Part of the responsibility of the Officer’s Corps will be to supervise the safe storage of personal weapons that will be made available to the territorial army in case it is needed. Such weaponry should be for purely defensive purposes. There will not be any foreign soldiers stationed in the Republic but only officers of various ranks in the employment of the Republic and incorporated into the structure of its armed forces for as long as it is deemed necessary. The territorial units would have their own officers. Foreign officers will be provided with living accommodations but not in military camps.

Thus, although afforded assistance as per the relevant Agreements, security arrangements should be principally by self-sourced own means.

Cyprus will adopt a principle of flexible armed neutrality. It may build and maintain facilities that could on the decision of the federal government be made available for international operations by other Powers in agreement with the foreign policy objectives of the Cyprus State. Other than that, Cyprus should not join any military alliances on a permanent basis.

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C. THE ROAD TO FEDERALISM

THE POLITICAL PROCESS

If the proposed Roadmap for the formation of a Federal Cyprus were to be written in spreadsheet form, as shown below, the result would be a total of over 50 boxes, or cells, representing specific steps to be undertaken and measures to be put in place in preparation for the day when joint Federal institutions will open their doors for normal business. This gives a more realistic portrayal of the inherent complexity of the challenge.

Vertical columns represent sequences of parallel actions spanning the same period of time. The first column, or vertical path shows the “stations on the way” in the political process. The timeline envisioned spans two electoral cycles of agreed length. Cycle One will culminate with the convening of a Constitutional Assembly and Cycle Two with full integration in Federal Organs and the Federal Bureaucracy.

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Cycle One will include the initialling of a set of agreements, a first referendum approving the holding of elections to a Constitutive Assembly, the conduct of island-wide elections of representatives for the preparation of the Constitution and, finally, the convening of a Constitutional Assembly consisting of equal numbers of representatives from the GC and TC Communities.

Table 1. Political Process

At the same time, the remaining number of columns represent dedicated lanes

along which the two Communities will travel in preparation for their day-to-day cooperation in joint institutions. These are also meant to be gradually transforming the situation on the ground, refurbishing the common home.

The first set of measures should be made up of easier-to-do undertakings and more reversible steps. As we proceed, and especially after the first and second referenda, more far-reaching steps should be taken. Hopefully, with the passage of time a dynamic of change will replace status quo inertia. But indisputably, even though considered in principle as provisional, these steps entail greater risk because they will be more difficult to reverse. Hence, reciprocity, intelligent sequencing, and correct timing are essential. But, as with the construction of arches, once the insertion of the last keystone secures the structure, it does not only henceforth stand alone, but is also able to carry more than its own weight.

Years 00-01.5

Agreements on Principles

Year 02-02.5 First Referendum

Year 03 Elections to Constitutional Assembly

Year 03.5 Convening of Assembly

Year 06 Second Referendum

Year 07 National elections

Year 08 Federal Institutions

Year 08-10 Integration of federal bureaucracy

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In line with the timetable of the political process, supporting confidence building and implementation measures will fall into four phases. Their sequencing should reflect increasing confidence and ambition. The first phase will follow the initialing of the original agreements and build on the momentum these create. The second, more ambitious set, will follow the first referendum; the third will follow the convening of the Constitutional Assembly; the final bunch should come after the second referendum.

Cycle Two, which will coincide with the deliberations on a new Constitution, should also include a concurrent federalization or devolution process. This can, in turn, enable the legal normalization of the mutuality relation between the two Communities.

When the effort to write the Constitution is completed, a second referendum should be held, and, reasonably soon after, elections to federal organs. Sufficient time should be afforded to both processes so that the people fully accustom themselves with the imminent changes. After the second referendum, transformational measures should be speeded up, and following federal elections the final touches should be put on the new arrangements.

STEP-BY-STEP IMPLEMENTATION

If the first column will consist of agreed political steps such as elections and referenda, the first row will consist of the set of initial agreements in each of the following areas: Military de-confrontation; Political cooperation; Institutional integration; Status normalization; Economic integration and resource management; Territorial adjustments and properties; Federalization; Transitional justice; Images, Symbols, Narratives; etc.

military political institutional status Economic, Resources

Territory, Properties

federalization humanitarian, Symbolic

Table 2. Areas of supportive, restorative and restitutive measures

Progress in each of these will be by means of equivalent reciprocal parallel

steps. These steps will be sequenced in such a way as to maintain some kind of parity of value between different areas whilst boosting momentum.

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Initial agreements would be the first step. These should be supplemented by understandings as to the last steps, representing the desired destination, as well as intermediary steps.

When does joint management of hydrocarbons policy begin? Could it be a

Phase-One measure? Or, is it a step to be taken after the first referendum? The principle of reciprocity will apply. This will inevitably lead to linkages

between different steps that the two sides will be required to take. For instance, when do Turkish Cypriot footballers get to play in international games? Is there a prerequisite? Someone has suggested, in discussion, that it could be the flag on the mountain-side desisting from its obtrusive nightly flashing.

Such actions are meant to boost voter confidence, but they need a minimum

of public acceptance before they are attempted.

The list of possible initial agreements could consist of the following:

In the military sector, the initial understandings should include a principle of peaceful resolution, binding the sides to non-violence. A version of this joint statement should be incorporated as a revision of the Treaty of Guarantee in due course. The initial agreements should also include a timetable for reductions of troops and the future outline structure of federal armed forces. Early intermediate steps could include demilitarization of old Nicosia and of the area south of Varosha, followed by the pulling back of sentries from the buffer zone, lowering of troop readiness, etc..

The introduction of international monitors would allow the process of converting to the new structure to begin. The last coordinates of the above vector should be a situation on the ground that allows the Federal Cyprus Government to effectively begin organizing its own defense and policing capabilities and to provide conditions of security for all its citizens. Hence, gradual troop reductions during the transitional period should result, preferably by the time of the second referendum, in total or near total withdrawal of all foreign troops.

Likewise, political cooperation between the two sides would start with an agreement on synchronizing political clocks, and, perhaps, a possible date for

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simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, local elections. Due to the problem of recognition, the main burden of implementation will remain with the political parties on both sides. The political parties’ meetings should be put on a scheduled basis as an ongoing Cyprus Political Parties Forum and made independent of third-party facilitation. Its work should be assisted by a temporary secretariat comprised of appointed reconciliation officers. Liaisons should also be selected from the staff serving in the offices of the two leaders. The test for success of political cooperation would be the conduct of island-wide federal elections late into the Second Cycle.

Naturally, institutional integration will begin from the bottom. A temporary Advisory Board should be agreed to assist with appointments aimed at achieving integration in Boards of professional Bodies, followed by Semi-Governmental Organizations, etc. Visible results should come preferably before the first referendum. Joint management of hydrocarbons policy should also come earlier rather than later.

For the long-term, flexible ways must be found to ensure that overall equitable

employment in all organizations is achieved whilst, at the same time, attracting talent irrespective of ethnic identity. Strict quotas should not impede optimal performance. The final stage of this process will arrive when monitoring of integration is no more needed.

Economic integration is a crucial aspect and one which needs competent strategic management. So again, setting up a mechanism for monitoring progress from the beginning is crucial. But, also, certain principles need to be pre-agreed that pertain to issues of taxation alignments, compatibility of regional economic and fiscal policy with federal macroeconomic policy, and how proceeds from natural gas will be “managed”.

A lot of work has to be done in the economic field to achieve official introduction of the euro in the northern part of Cyprus, aligned economic policies, uniform supervision of banks, etc. How much competition in taxing regimes between Districts, as well as in other areas, is desirable also needs to be determined.

The territorial boundaries of the Federal Districts should be agreed. In the map we included in the previous section, we have indicatively superimposed the

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traditional administrative map of Cyprus on the Annan map of 2004 and produced the baseline for designating the areas of the new Federal Districts.

The structure of the Property Fund, possible financing sources, as well as

criteria for the issue of properties should also be part of the initial agreements. Adjustments, gradual return of those displaced persons who wish to do so,

resolution of individual property cases, and provision of alternative options should all proceed concomitantly. The transitional period should be fully utilized to achieve the maximum number of individual settlements possible. Restoration and resettlement of Varosha, and of the buffer-zone should take precedence. The 9-year implementation schedule foreseen allows enough time to manage the associated difficult tasks. After the second referendum the process can be expedited.

Federalization as a process of decentralization and devolution of powers in preparation of the future tiered governance would best wait for the second Cycle. It would be politically simpler if it were undertaken unilaterally. But, such things as the holding of, more of less, synchronized local elections would be helpful. So, as part of step one, understandings rather than agreements should be aimed for. Unilateral action is recommended because it is politically less problematic, but this does not mean that there cannot be informal understandings as to timing, consistency, etc.

The same considerations apply for the amelioration of the mutuality relationship from a legal point of view. In part, this will be achieved by means of the legitimizing functions of referenda. The knot of obstacles to easing the legal positions on the status of the other will not automatically disappear by the joint participation in referenda, however. The relationship needs to be regularized by a series of deliberate actions over time. Doing so will also free up space for cooperation in many fields. Sensibly, easier steps concerning, for example, professional chambers, athletic associations, and schools should precede. What could a set of ambitious understandings cover in this instance? Charting the hazardous reefs complicating a safe approach, and some shared ideas about how the Republic as originally set up in 1960 can accommodate all our future needs and need not be re-established, would be significant progress. Beyond these general

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suggestions, more detailed formulae need to be found by specialist international lawyers.

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ENDNOTES

i We distinguish nationalist ‘visions’ from ‘narratives’. Nationalist visions are exclusivist in character, whereas it is possible to main non-extremist nationalist narratives in a society of multiple identities provided they do not advocate action that infringes on the freedom of the other. ii Although not mandated in the Constitution, it is practiced, nevertheless, as a response necessitated by the requirements of the set-up.

iii The 1960 Constitution recognized rights of representation only to the two biggest Communities with a right to vote in the House of Representatives. The other Communities of Maronites, Latins, and Armenians could send a non-voting Representative. For the exercise of their political rights they had to choose which of the two Communities they would belong to. The Roma did not even get a non-voting Representative. The Roma being Muslim, chose to be counted as Turkish Cypriots and the three smaller Christian communities to be counted as Greek Cypriots. Not only Representatives and elected executive office-holders were elected from separate lists but voters too belonged to separate lists. The dualism was reinforced in every possible way. Even marriage between members of the two Communities was prohibited by the Constitution (Article 2). If such a couple desired to marry, the woman had to change her Community, and this was not easy bureaucratically, let alone culturally. Government departments were staffed according to quotas which were also applied to promotions. iv 2015 figures. The remainder is given as “Other” v When the population is profiled by religion, the picture looks different: 35.3% Protestant, 41.8 Roman Catholic, 2% Orthodox, 0.2 Jewish and 4.3 Moslem. vi The most populous Canton, Zurich, numbers 1,5 millions and the least only 16,000. In terms of area they vary from 172 square km to about 6,000. vii The workability of the construct was tested in the 1960’s and 1970’s when the Canton of Bern

faced a secessionist movement. In its north-western area, which is mountainous, agrarian, and

French-speaking Catholic, there was a secessionist movement agitating for a split and the

formation of a new independent Canton. The grievances were both cultural and socio-economic.

People in the Jura felt neglected by the capital, which is at the same time capital of the Canton

and capital of the Federation, as well as victims of an old historical injustice dating back to the

Vienna Congress of 1815.

Instead of asserting its sovereign authority, Bern appointed a “federal advisory commission”

consisting of non-Bernese with federal experience in the executive and legislative branches. The

commission returned an expert opinion on the obvious: the people must be asked.

But who were the people that should be asked?

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The way that this question was settled reveals, not only a mature political culture of consensus-

building, but, also, how the multi-layered Swiss Federation is built. Not only one, but, five

referenda were held according to the logic of a cascade process, or, “downward flow.” The

process lasted from 1967 to 1978.

First the people of the Canton of Bern were asked, in 1968, if they accept the recommendations

of the advisory commission on the proposed process comprised of a series of referenda. They

approved with a six to one margin.

Then, in 1974 the people of Jura were asked if they were in favor of separating or remaining with

Bern. There was a slim majority of 37,000-34,000 in favor, with an obvious differentiation in how

the northern districts had voted in comparison to the three southern districts adjoining the rest

of the Canton. The following year, and on the basis of a provision in the agreed procedure, the

three southern districts were asked to vote again on the question whether to follow Jura in

seceding or remain with Bern. Two voted again to remain with Bern and one reversed its earlier

vote. In the one district that had changed its earlier vote there was a new local referendum where

the communes were asked to make a choice whether to follow the rest of the district out or not.

Moutier, the main city of the district decided to stay in Bern Canton while some other northern

communes decided to join Jura.

The above process demarcated the borders of the new Canton in a democratic fashion. The next

thing that was needed was the writing of a constitution for the new Canton, and, when this was

ready, the arrangement was put to the judgement of the whole Swiss people who were asked

whether they would accept Jura as the 26th Canton in a national referendum in 1978. The

requirement of a majority of Cantons and a majority of the popular vote were easily met. A large

majority of Cantons voted affirmatively; The popular vote in favor outperformed the negative by

five to one.

viii Switzerland practices power sharing between four political parties, has an executive council consisting of seven Members with clear constraining criteria. The Presidency rotates equally among the seven on an annual basis.