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A critical evaluation of the Indian materialistic philosophy of the Cārvākas

Agnieszka Rostalska Institute of Middle and Far East Studies, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India

Cārvāka, as a philosophical school, is mostly associated with a materialist tradition that embraces strong empiricism, rejects explicitly the existence of heaven, hell, souls, gods/God, efficiency of rituals, transmigration and liberation. Only sense perception is accepted as a means of valid knowledge (pramダṇa).1 As a philosophical tradition it had also a political dimension, which may be found e.g. in the critique of Vedic rituals and privileges.2 In general, Cārvākas are usually considered non-theistic or even atheistic, sometimes even being accused of hedonism or scepticism.

The aim of this paper is to present this ancient Indian materialist tradition. The paper is divided into following sections:

1. Cārvāka as a philosophical tradition in India 2. Frequently quoted fragments attributed to Cārvākas 3. Cārvāka metaphysics

3.1. the combination of elements an consciousness 3.2. theory of causation: the doctrine of inherent nature (svabhダvavダda) 3.3. main objections to Cārvāka metaphysics

4. Cārvāka epistemology 4.1. the status of sense perception 4.2. the rejection of inference 4.3. main objections to Cārvāka epistemology

5. Cārvāka ethics and its problems

1. Cārvāka as a philosophical tradition in India

The establishment of ancient school of Indian materialism is historically attributed to Bṛhaspati, the heretical teacher whose sūtra had vanished. Sometimes it is believed that Cārvāka was the

1 ‘Pramāṇa’ is a Sanskrit term which literally means the norm, standard or measure. In Indian epistemology it is usually translated as means of acquiring knowledge or cognitive criterion. Phillips (2001:1) explains that this term refers to views about knowledge-generating processes or “knowledge sources” and distinguishes the main three types: perception, inference and testimony; the remaining means (analogy, inference from circumstances, cognition of absences, gesture, rumour) he regards as not truth-conductive or reducible to perception and inference. 2 King, 1999:17.

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chief disciple of Bṛhaspati,3 hence the name of the school. It remains unknown if the name “Cārvāka” comes from a single person; in literature “Cārvāka” is the name mostly used for materialists or people supporting views sympathising with materialism. Only a few names of philosophers (mentioned in the texts of other philosophical traditions) associated with the materialist tradition are knownŚ Aviddhakarṇa, KambalāWvatara, Purandara, Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa and Bhāvivikta.4

“Cārvāka” literally means ‘the one who eats’ or ‘eating up’ and while it is not clear what is supposed to be eaten, the main options seem to be:

1. all that is given in perception,

2. own words,

3. all moral and ethical considerations.

It is also used for a person who is a “sweet-talker” (cāruvāk).5 Guṇaratna (14th century CE), the commentator of Haribhadra’s 訓aḍdarWanasamuccaya,6 explains that it is called thus because it ‘swallowed up’ (carvaṇa) all those categories (e.g. virtue and vice) of other systems. Sharma (2003:40-41) adds that “Cārvāk” refers to the doctrine that is superficially attractive (chダru). Cārvākas are often portrayed as people who believe in the “eat, drink and be merry” rule.7

Another name attributed to materialists in ancient India is “Lokāyata”. The term “Lokāyata” stands mostly for philosophy of the people, philosophy of ‘this-worldliness’ and materialism. It happens to be explained8 as what is prevalent (ダyata) among the people (loke群u) or the world-outlook of the people.9 However, “philosophy of the common man” may bring to mind a negative connotation with the uneducated (or untrained).10

3 Sharma, 1960:40. 4 Bhattacharya, 2003:597. 5 King translates (1999:17) cダru as sweet and vダk as speech. For Sharma (2003:40) the meaning of charuvak is sweet-tongued, which he explains as those “whose doctrine is superficially attractive”. Vダc can mean: speech , voice, talk , sound and language (also of animals), but may also stand for: the word, saying, phrase, sentence, statement and asseveration. Also, other possible translations of cダru are: agreeable, approved, beloved, pleasing, lovely and beautiful, all of which have not negative connotations. 6 Haribhadra Sūri was a Jain philosopher (from ca. 8th century), who - among many other writings - is famous for being an author of the first Indian doxography 訓aḍdarWanasamuccaya (‘A Compendium of Six Philosophies’). 7 King, 1999:17, Sharma, 2003:40. 8 Chattopadhyaya, 1968:1. 9 The term loka means: world, mankind , folk, people, ordinary life, worldly affairs, common practice or usage, common language and popular speech. Since it can also mean sight (or the faculty of seeing) in the context of materialist epistemology it may be understood as all that could be the object of sense-perception. 10 Sharma (2003:40) comments that Lokダyata means “a commoner and therefore, by implication, a man of low and unrefined taste”. Another term used for materialism which also sounds unsympathetic is jaḍavダda (after: King, 1999:17), which means the theory or doctrine (vダda) of inanimate, unintelligent, dull or dumb (jaḍa).

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2. Frequently quoted fragments attributed to Cārvākas

The original texts of Indian materialists were not preserved11 apart from some fragments found in texts of other Indian traditions of philosophy. Materialist views were described in Mahabharata (12.211.26-27),12 Upani群ads (e.g. Kaṭha I.20; 2,6 and Maitr┆ 7,8-9),13 Kダmasūtra (I.2.25-30)14 and doxographies (of Haribhadra and Mādhava).15 Mostly, the position of Cārvākas was described by the philosophers of opposing schoolsŚ Naiyāyikas, Vedāntins, Jains and Buddhists.16 The most recent collection of Cārvāka fragments (aphorisms, pseudo-aphorisms, extracts from commentaries and verses attributed to them) has been prepared by Bhattacharya (2003:599-640). In these sources (from which metaphysics, epistemology and ethics of the Cārvākas are commonly being inferred) frequently cited views ascribed to Cārvākas are:

Haribhadra in Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya:17

“The Lokダyatas say thus: There is no God, no liberation; dharma and adharma do not exist; there is no fruit of puṇya (virtue or merit) and pāpa (sin).

And this is their opinion: This universe is only so far as it is an object of the senses. As for what the fools say, (it is like)Ś “bhadre [dear], look at the footprint of the wolf”.

Drink and eat, O beautiful one; (for) what is past, O fine-limbed one, is not yours; O cowardly one, the past verily returns not. The body is just a combination.

Further: For these people the four elements, earth, water, fire and air are the ground of consciousness; and as for means of knowledge, it is perception only.

11 The text Tattvopaplava-siṁha (‘The Lion of the Dissolution of Categories’) of JayarāWi Bhaṭṭa (8th/ 9th century CE) is sometimes treated as the only preserved text of the materialist tradition. It is highly probable that he was trained as a Cārvāka, but his views would affiliate him with the sceptics. At best, his work may form an interesting source on the particular division of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata school but not a good description of the typical claims later criticised by other philosophical traditions. For more on JayarāWi, seeŚ Franco (1983:147-166 and 1987), Balcerowicz (2011). 12 Of a critical ed. by V.S. Sukthankar and others (1933-1966). See: Bhattacharya, 2010:426. 13 After: King, 1999:17. 14 After: King, 1999:18. 15 “Doxography” as a term was introduced by Herman Diels (19th century CE) who distinguished the terms: doxographus - “the writer of opinions” and biographus – “the writer of lives” (seeŚ Nicholson, 2010Ś145). In ancient Greek the term doxa literally meant view or conviction. Nowadays, the term “doxography” is used for the texts which present in a systematic way the views of different philosophers and traditions. The recent study on Indian doxographies was conducted by Halbfass (1988: 349-368), Folkert (1993:341-409), Qvarnström (1999Ś 169-210) and Nicholson (2010: 144-165). 16 Views of the rivals were usually presented in the first part of a chapter (pūrvapak群a) and were afterwards addressed and rejected by the opponent (one by one) in the second part of a chapter (uttarapak群a). The reconstructed arguments frequently contained also what could or should have been said in order to strengthen the criticised position, which could lead to the possibility that the reconstruction could not be fully adequate, but it was used to strengthen one’s own position. CompareŚ Bhattacharya (2003:599) and Qvarnström (1999:174). 17 Translation of Murty, 1986:101-107. See also: Bhattacharya, 2003:610-611, Wlokas 13 and 14 (translation: there p. 617, verses 13 and 14).

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And, when there is a combination of elements such as earth, etc., there is generation of body, etc. Just as the power of intoxication (comes) from these ingredients of liquor, even so stands self-hood.

Therefore, engagement (or concern) in the unseen on account of the abandonment of the seen... (this) the Cダrvダkas realised (and maintained) as the foolishness of the world.

The pleasure that is generated by the obtainment and non-existence of certain desired and undesired things (respectively) is in their opinion meaningless; and it is not verily different from ダkダWa.” 18

Mādhavāchārya (14th century) in Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha:19

“There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another worldś nor do the actions of the four castes, orders etc. produce any real effect.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic’s three staves and smearing one’s self with ashes, were made by Nature at the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.

If a beast slain in the Jyoti群ṭoma rite will itself go to heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?

… If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Vraddha here, then why not give up the food down below to those who are standing on the house top?

While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee (clarified butter) even though he runs in debt; when once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return here?

… (All the ceremonies are) a means of livelihood (for) Brダhmaṇas. The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons”.

Ch. Sharma (2003:41-42) helpfully lists some important fragments attributed to Bṛhaspati:

(1) Earth, water, fire and earth are the elements.20

(2) Bodies, senses and objects are the results of the different combination of elements.21

18 For comments on Haribhadra’s verses 81-84 and further explanation of wolf’s footprint parable seeŚ Bhattacharya, 2011:175-186. 19 Translation of Cowell and Gough, 1908:10. See also: Bhattacharya, 2003:609-610, Wlokas 1-3, 6-7, 9-10 (translation: there pp. 616-17, verses: 1-3, 6-7, 9-10). 20 Also in: Bhattacharya, 2003:603 aphorism I.2 (translation p.612).

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(3) Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast.22

(4) The soul is nothing but the conscious body.23

(5) Enjoyment is the only end of human life.24

(6) Death alone is liberation.25

3. Cārvāka metaphysics

3.1. The combination of elements and consciousness.

It is a widely accepted view that materialists assumed the existence of four basic elements: earth, water, fire and air which were supposed to be the only existing elements from which one’s body is produced (hence they were called the ‘four-elementalists’).26 The other metaphysical principles which were postulated by the competing systems like: soul (j┆va), God (┅Wvara) and afterlife (paraloka) were rejected by Cārvākas. They are not confirmed by ordinary perception, but argued on the basis of inference which, according to Cārvākas, may be false therefore is not a valid means of knowledge. Materialists argued that in ordinary life there is no convincing proof for the acceptance of the soul. Thus, a person is identical with its material body. From the supposition that everything what exists is according to the combination and development of the four elements, they concluded that so is with the human mind or consciousness, it evolved like the intoxicating power of wine from the ingredients which does not have this power before combined together and fermented. According to some sources, Cārvākas believed that the elements are eternal but once combined they undergo the process of production and dissolution.27 As a result, consciousness is a by-product of matter and vanishes when the body dies. In this theory, the self is nothing else but the body and by means of direct experience one should come to the conclusion that every person has only one life and there is no proof of afterlife or the law of karma.

21 Bhattacharya, 2003:604 aphorism I.3. 22 Ibid. aphorism I.5. 23 Ibid. aphorism I.6. 24 This aphorism is rejected by Bhattacharya, 2003:618. 25 Also rejected by Bhattacharya, 2003:618. 26 As opposed to ‘five-elementalists’ e.g. the representatives of the Nyāya-VaiWeṣika tradition, which accepted also space or ether (ダkダWa). Compare: Bhattacharya, 2010:536. 27 The process of solution and dissolution of elements brings to mind evolution and involution of the principles in Sāṃkhya tradition.

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3.2. Theory of causation: the doctrine of inherent nature (lit. own being – svabhāvavāda)

For Cārvākas, since everything in the world undergoes constant evolution, it entails that there is no need for postulating the external cause or agent (God) who created the universe. Cārvākas were identified with the view that objects exist in their own natures – svabhダva (sva = self, bhダva = being).28 But usually there are three interpretations of causality theory associated with Cārvāka:29

(1) everything (something) happens incidentally or by fate (yadṛcchダ = chance, accident, vダda = concept, theory), there is nothing responsible for an event - yadṛcchダvダda;

(2) everything happens through self, being from self without any help or dependence and there is no other cause – svabhダvavダda;

(3) there is nobody who can cause any thing; it is not applicable to the whole world but only to one by one cases (a = negation, kasmダd = whom, from something / anything) – akasmダdvダda.

Sometimes all of those interpretations are understood as different formulations of the same theory of causation, but the exact Cārvāka position remains unknown.

In Guṇaratna’s commentary of Haribhadra’s 訓aḍdarWanasamuccaya, svabhダva is explained as “naturalism”Ś30

“There is no causality in the worldś every thing is just natural, a brute irreducible fact, with no before and no after, no explanation and no purpose (This is called svabhāvavāda, naturalism.) Every thing originates accidentally and from nowhere. (This is called as akasmāt bhūti, i.e. generation from nowhere.) Whatever is sensed is real; whatever is not sensed is non-existent.”

The causal theory of materialists is explained here as natural, accidental production of things or facts without the help of anything else. The validity of sense perception and day to day experiences is emphasised.

The Nyāya teacher Udayana (ca. 1050-1100 CE) in his work Nyダyakusumダñjali objects to the svabhダva theory of Cārvāka. In his view, this theory is nonsensical, because it is not possible to observe how a thing can be produced from its own self. For him and other Naiyāyikas cause and effect are different, they are not identical and cannot be taken as the same. The effect can be produced by something else but not by itself. Production from self seems logically impossible, because one’s own self and the product are not the same, there must be some external cause.31

28 For a discussion on svabhダvavダda within the framework of Indian materialists see: Bhattacharya, 2012:593-614. 29 I am grateful for this division and for other useful comments on Cārvākas to my teacher in India prof. Sachchidanand Mishra (B.H.U., Varanasi). 30 Transl. Murty, 1986:104. 31 This is the Nyāya theory of causation called asatkダryavダda.

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One might claim that the svabhダva theory of Cārvākas resembles the satkダryavダda theory of Sāṃkhya philosophy, which states that the effect is already present in the cause, e.g. the yoghurt comes from the milk, because the yoghurt is already present (inherent) in the milk (in some form), so it pre-exists in the milk before it is produced. Svabhダva theory states that the nature of milk is such that it turns into yoghurt, but it is not clear if the effect is already present in the cause, hence it is rather a theory of the natural way of evolution.

3.3. Main objections to Cārvāka metaphysics

As one might suspect, there are some problems with Cārvāka metaphysical theory. To begin with, if consciousness is a by-product of matter, how is this established? The self or consciousness is not perceived through sense perception, so it looks like its existence is inferred from other facts. Yet, Cārvāka denied the validity of inferences as means of valid knowledge. Also, even if consciousness is not experienced without a material body, it doesn’t follow that it is a by-product of matter.

As to the Cārvāka theory of causation, it may be problematic to rely solely on perception to establish whether something is a cause or not. Often observations by themselves cannot lead to further conclusions (e.g. that where there is a smoke there is a fire).32 Many observations are required and even they may not lead to the proper conclusion.

Moreover, if (according to the second interpretation) everything happens because of its nature (svabhダva), e.g. milk turns into yoghurt because to become a yoghurt lies in the nature of milk, we are in fact allowing that effects already exist in their causes. This stands in contradiction with the third interpretation (akasmダd) which states that nothing is caused and there is no production of a cause - which applies not to the whole world but to particular events.

However, it is possible that the meaning of the second and third interpretation is different and applies to different cases.33 The third statement can refer to the type of causation understood as the law of karma – which entails that this life’s fruits have an impact on the next life. This type of causation is negated by Cārvākas because no observation can support the conclusion that there is liberation or afterlife. Such an interpretation is plausible, since materialists were against rituals performed by Brahmins, they believed that they do not produce any effect (akasmダd) and are fruitless with respect to this and alleged future life. On the other hand, by the second claim (svabhダva) all phenomena in the material world can be explained. This is consistent with the first theory (yadṛcchダ) that assumed that everything happens by fate or incidentally. Everyday experience convinces us that causation exists, that there are causes and effects which are not identical.

32 This sounds like a very Humean theme in the thought of Cārvāka school. 33 Compare: Bhattacharya, 2012:611.

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Another problem in this materialistic philosophy is the assumption of the elements or atoms. Since atoms are not visible, it is impossible to establish their existence solely by sense perception. Through perception of qualitative differences between objects we infer that divisible aggregates exist. Some scholars34 suggest that the atomistic theory could have been accepted because it was popular among contemporaries of Cārvāka, and since it was a philosophy of common people, it was also accepted.

However, to claim that Cārvākas were atomists could be an overstatement. The elements – fire, earth, air and water are experienced in perception, and since they may be experienced mostly in different combinations, it is possible that living bodies consist of them. This is inferred rather than perceived. The combinations of the elements are in a way perceptible. There is a difficulty with establishing what the original theory was, since the views of Cārvāka are inferred mostly from the writings of their opponents what could result in an unfair assessment or misinterpretation of the materialist thought.

4. Cārvāka’s epistemology

4.1.The status of sense perception

It is often emphasised that Cārvākas regarded sense perception as the only valid means of knowledge (pramダṇa). The remaining means of valid knowledge admitted by other schools of philosophy, like: inference, analogy, verbal testimony etc. were disregarded. The status of the testimonial source of the Vedas as a revelation (Wruti) was also questioned together with the authority of Brahmin priests and the efficacy of Vedic sacrifices.35

It is believed that later Cārvāka sustained the view that some inferences are possible but only those which are verifiable by sense perception. Inference is not treated as an independent means of knowledge. Thus, it was emphasised that logical inferences cannot support beliefs in gods, demons, afterlife or liberation which could “draw our attention away from here and now”.36

What seems surprising is that although the primacy of perception was widely attributed to materialists, in the preserved fragments there is no precise explanation of what perception is - besides the ethical but not epistemic statement: whatever happens in everyday life should be accepted. There is no certainty of the law of karma, because it is inferred. Moreover, the aims of life which were accepted by the opposing philosophical schools in India: the absolute

34 E.g. King, 1999:21. 35 King (1999:21) emphasised the stimulating role of Cārvākas in the debate between schools of philosophy on the valid means of knowledge. 36 After: King, 1999:20.

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righteousness (dharma) and liberation (mok群a) were only probable and therefore neglected by materialists due to the fact that whatever cannot be perceived is doubted.

4.2. The rejection of inference

Inference was usually presented as being neglected by the Cārvākas because inductions were insufficient for the establishment of a certain conclusion. However, from the fact that inference is not treated as an independent means of knowledge, it does not follow that it has to be rejected or that it cannot depend on sense perception or something that supports the final conclusions. It might be true that the common inquiries begin and end with some kind of perception and inference does not provide as strong and convincing justification as direct perception, but inferences are made in everyday life and are useful to support our experiences and therefore they cannot be totally rejected.

Sometimes what Cārvākas meant by ‘perceiving’ was described as equal to ‘knowing’ - in particular: knowing that there is nothing beyond. According to this interpretation, there are things which are possible to perceive and to be the subject of knowledge. In opposition, there are things which are only possible to infer, which cannot be perceived in a particular place and time. However, if we boil it down to knowing (e.g. by taking an example “whenever there is smoke, there is fire”), then it is impossible to know all of the smokes and all of the fires. Only particulars are perceptible and possible to be known, not the universals.

Another possible interpretation is that inference is not a valid means because of its mere probability; generalizations happen, but they are only possibilities. Things present in the moment seem sure and perceivable. However, future discoveries may prove that inferences verifiable by perceptions may turn out to be accepted or accidentally true. Still, probability is not the same as certainty.

4.3. Main objections to Cārvāka epistemology

One famous objection to Cārvāka’s refutation of inference37 is that their statements are actually based on inference themselves. All the debates and argumentations use inferences as their means. It is impossible to talk about the future or to acquire some ideas of other places without them. GaṅgeWa Upādhyāya38 noticed that the viewŚ “inference is not a valid means because if you perceive many things hundred times there is no guarantee that in the future it will be the same” –

37 Formulated by Udayana amongst others. 38 GaṅgeWa Upādhyāya (ca.1350 CE) was a philosopher who established the Navya-Nyāya school of Indian logic, which was a development of the classical Nyāya tradition.

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is an inferential statement in itself. Moreover, there is no proof or guarantee that inference is not a valid means of knowledge (pramダṇa). So in a sense Cārvāka position on inference refutes its own justification.

Other important objections which apply to Cārvāka’s epistemic theory are:

- Thoughts and ideas are not perceivable, they are inferred. What makes it possible to oppose a statement or a position? All of the discussions, doctrines, proofs and disproves are possible only by inferences. It is not possible to understand and communicate with others without inferences.

Udayana expressed the view that not accepting inference as a valid means of knowledge would disturb practical life:

“If this doctrine is consistently applied and people begin to disbelieve all that they do not perceive at any particular time, then all our practical life will be seriously disturbed and upset”39

- Perceptions can also be invalid (take any case of illusion), and such mistaken perceptual data is contradicted by inference. Mere perceptions cannot be regarded as the only fundamental means of knowledge.

Because of the obviousness of these problems, it is claimed that there were also ‘soft-core’ Cārvāka philosophers (suWik群ita).40 According to their view, not all inferences were incorrect. Only those relying on perceptual process could be accepted. According to the views ascribed to materialist Purandara (7th century CE)41 inference as a means of knowledge is useful in determining the nature of all worldly things (where perceptual experience is available) and within the range of empirical world. But it is not useful for establishing of any dogma, transcendental world, law of karma or life after death, because they are not available to perceptual experience.42 Purandara also distinguished between inferences about past and future - only those about past can be valid, for they can be verified by direct perception. Thus, there is a strong connection between the materialist epistemology and their defence of popular interests and their criticism of religious exploitation and deception.

Another interpretation of Cārvāka doctrine is that perception can be treated as a source of justification, but not as a source of knowledge. It is possible that Cārvāka school evolved and had different branches with different interpretations of the doctrine.43 In fact, their position is reconstructed from different fragments and (despite various interpretations) it is highly likely that

39 Quoted after Chattopadhyaya, 1968:23. Udayana’s polemic with the Cārvāka inŚ Nyダyakusumダñjali III, 5-6 (after: Dasgupta., Vol. III, 1952:539). 40 SuWik群ita were associated with the ‘well-thought’ or ‘refined’ Cārvākas vs. dhūrta - crude, naïve, knave Cārvākas. This division was first found in Nyāyamāñjari (after: Dasgupta, 1952:516). The division on crude and refined materialists may be found also in: Gokhale, 1993:681, King 1999:18. 41 An interesting article on Purandara was written by Bhattacharya (1999:485-497). 42 After: Dasgupta, 1952:536. 43 King (1999:20) mentions 4 schools divided according to the view on the nature of the self.

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Cārvākas assumed that reliability of inference was reducible to that of perception. The widespread view that Cārvāka denied inference is based mostly on Mādhava writings44 (belonging to Vedānta tradition), who seemed prejudiced and treated materialists as heretics, misinterpreted them and as such cannot be trusted. In fact, it is possible that materialists were the earliest logicians in India, so their views should not be considered that naïve (and used for destructive purposes).45

5. Cārvāka’s ethics

From the four aims of our life which are: dharma, artha, kダma and mok群a Cārvāka’s are believed to accept in total only two: wealth (artha) and pleasure (kダma), because there is no proof that there is liberation (mok群a) or absolute righteousness (dharma). There is no way to prove karmic relations which require certain moral actions to achieve liberation. The fruits of actions in this life are not accepted. There is only one life and nothing beyond, therefore a person should earn money and enjoy life. Wealth should be treated as a secondary aim, because we earn money to enjoy ourselves. Enjoyment is the main aim of life.

It is sometimes held that Cārvākas accepted only pleasure as the aim of life. However this again could be suggested by the opponents of Cārvākas willing to present their views in a negative light. Another option is that in the division between crude and refined materialists the latter accepted a hierarchy of pleasures and valued intellectual pleasures over sensual ones.46

Materialists rejected dharma and adharma but it may be argued that they had some deeper principles than what their opponents presented. It is suggested that Lokāyata philosophers were against hiṃsa – causing suffering to other beings, in particular against animal sacrifice and wars. The story of the killing of Cārvāka (in Mahabharata) who accused the king Yudhiṣṭhira of killing his own relatives and murdering elders may be an example: materialists were against destroying lives and supporting non-violence (ahiṃsa).

The main objection to the ethical theory of materialists is that it gives no answer to the question how to live our lives, which when only pleasure and possession are valued, is similar to the life of an animal. Intuitively, the case is much more complex because of the intellectual life, we should accept some higher values.

Another popular objection is that this philosophy is hedonistic and egocentric, which from the perspective of the Brahmin priests was seen as very destructive (especially to the structure of

44 Which are probably based on Vaṅkara’s writings. 45 Kautilya in ArthaWダstra mentions (among Sāṃkhya and Yoga) Lokāyata as anvik群iki - the science of logic. In Manusmṛti the logicians were represented as heretics but only with respect to the Vedic point of view: disproving heaven, liberation and efficacy of Vedic sacrifices (Chattopadhyaya 1968:25-7). 46 After: King, 1999:18.

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society). But are such conclusions well founded? What Cārvākas were probably prescribing was: ‘Carpe diem!’ or ‘as long as you live, spend your life in happiness!’. If you are not happy, borrow a loan, eat good food47 etc., because once the body is destroyed there is no return. One should enjoy life as it is, using all that she or he is endowed with. The accusations that materialists recommended stealing, drinking wine, etc. do not seem justified.48

Their philosophy sounds positive in tone: to accept what we are by nature, to not to worry and to act. The emphasis on happiness (sukha) differentiates Cārvāka from other schools of Indian philosophy (with their contempt for suffering - duḥkha).49 Everywhere when there is happiness, there is also grief, without sorrows we cannot enjoy and appreciate our life fully. We should take life as it is, because miseries are only small obstacles in life. Pain and happiness are natural and there are different levels of pleasure which we should explore.

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