agendas, past & future || blair & africa: the africa commission

ROAPE Publications Ltd.

Blair &Africa: The Africa CommissionAuthor(s): Martin PlautSource: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 102, Agendas, Past & Future (Dec.,2004), pp. 704-711Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007042 .

Accessed: 25/06/2014 07:37

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and ROAPE Publications Ltd. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Review of African Political Economy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.209 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 07:37:59 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007042?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


704 Review of African Political Economy

newable energy financing by 20% annu- ally, the base line the lender is using is so low that the target for renewable support in 2005 is lower than the bank's loans for renewables in 1994. Currently fossil fuel financing at the World Bank exceeds renewable lending by a factor of 17 to 1.

Although the World Bank is a taxpayer- funded institution whose mission is to help the poorest people on the planet, it is putting the interests of oil companies based in rich countries ahead of the needs the world's poor.

Twelve years have passed since the World Bank and most of the nations in the world committed to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the Rio Earth Summit. Yet the Bank remains one of the biggest catalysts of fossil-fuel extraction in the developing world, and nothing that the board did in response to the Extractive Industries Review will reverse that trend.

The World Bank's rationale for continuing to subsidise oil companies is that people in developing countries need energy. However, the Institute for Policy Studies' research suggests that 82% of the bank's oil extraction projects wind up supplying consumers in the United States and Europe. The Institute has also calculated that the main beneficiaries of World Bank fossil fuel extractive projects are Halliburton, Shell, ChevronTexaco, Total, and ExxonMobil, in that order, and the list continues.

Another rationale the World Bank offers is that its involvement in these projects offers oversight that makes them more environmentally sound and less prone to corruption. In reality, many of the bank's projects are riddled with these kinds of problems. For example, the president of Chad reportedly used part of the first proceeds from the World Bank-supported Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline on military weapons.

The bank's own review of extractive industries was proof enough that oil companies' profits don't trickle down to the people the institution is supposed to serve - but the World Bank chose not to bring its lending more in line with its stated mission.

Blair & Africa: the Africa Commission Martin Plaut

The Announcement

In February this year Tony Blair held one of his regular press conferences. But instead of tackling the domestic issues of the day, he announced the establishment of a Commission for Af- rica.

Africa is the only continent to have grown poorer in the past 25 years, its share of world trade has halved in the generation, and it receives less than 1% of direct foreign investment, 44 million children do not go to school, millions as you know die through famine, or disease, or conflict, and Africa risks being left even further behind. That's why in the context of our G8 Presidency in the year 2005 I have decided with others to form a Commission for Africa to take afresh look at Africa's past, present and future. It will be a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Africa and policies towards Africa. What has worked, what has not worked, and what more can and should be done.

Like all major initiatives by the Prime Minister, this one had been leaked in



Blair & Africa: the Africa Commission 705

advance, and drew little interest from the assembled political correspondents. The Guardian newspaper had already carried a lengthy article on the subject, indicat- ing a blissful lack of concern for the substance of the announcement by por- traying it in a totally British political context: the power struggle between the prime minister and his chancellor. 'The prime minister will pull rank on Gordon Brown by announcing that he will per- sonally chair a follow-up to the 1980 Brandt report, which examined the gulf globally between rich and poor.'"

Despite this, the announcement contained a good deal that was of interest. In particular, it gave an indication of the reason for the Commission, which include the fact that the Millennium Devel- opment Goals, adopted by the world's leaders are fast approaching, and are looking unlikely to be met. Unless action is taken immediately this could lead to considerable political opprobrium, particularly given Mr Blair's well known remark about Africa as a 'scar on the conscience of the world'.

How will the Commission Work?

The Commission, which Tony Blair chairs, brings together leaders from the developed world and Africa. Of the seventeen commissioners, nine are from Africa. The Africans include President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, K. Y. Amoako of the Economic Commission for Africa and Anna Tibaijuka, a UN Under' Secretary and Executive Director of UN ffa1itat. In addition to Tony Blair the commis>sioners from the developed world include Gordon Brown, the former head of the IMF, Michael Camdessus and Nancy Kassebaum - the former US Senator. Finally there is Sir Bob Geldof, former singer with the Boomtown Rats, and aid campaigner from the Ethiopian famine of 1984, whose brainchild this Commission is. In a memorable phrase Sir Bob described it as 'a generational

opportunity' to tackle Africa's many ills.2

All the Commissioners participate in their personal capacity, but since most are current political figures in their own right, they are expected to carry real clout. Mr Blair has promised to use the British presidency of the G8 and the European Union to provide an African focus. The Commission met for the first time in London in May. It will meet again in Ethiopia in October and then again in the spring of 2005. This is when its report will be published. The Commission Sec- retariat has begun work on background papers on a wide range of subjects, from economic issues to health and educa- tion. It has also begun to talk to a number of groups, including the development community and the African diaspora.

Reaction

The first reaction from the aid agencies and development sector was generally hostile and sceptical. The World Devel- opment Movement (WDM), one of the leading British aid lobby groups ap- peared to have little time for the prime minister's initiative.

In light of existing analysis on the problems facing Africa, the range of previous political declarations from African Gov- ernments themselves, the range of existing - and still unfulfilled - promises of industrialised countries, and the way the UK and EU have ignored African governments in the WTO, WDM is deeply sceptical over the needfor, and usefulness of, the Commission for Africa. WDM believes that the plight of many African countries is not due to a lack of research or understanding. In fact, the analysis of Africa's problems is already well developed and a wide range of progressive solutions for many of Africa's problems has already been proposed. What is lacking is political will in the industrialised world to make good on existing commitments and make use of this wealth of knowledge




and the strength of feeling in Africa in favour of lasting and radical change.3

The WDM then proceeded to resurrect a long list of familiar demands that it had made down the years, including a call for aid to reach the 0.7% target for aid, an end to 'unsuccessful, undemocratic and unfair' policies of the World Bank and IMF and an attack on multinationals.

Some reaction from the African diaspora was also hostile. Chukwe-Emeka Chikezie, director of Afford (Africa Foun- dation for Development) called for the Africa Commission to consult Africans, while at the same time predicting that this process was probably doomed, since the agenda would already have been set, and complaining that 'Most of us, in any case are suffering from acute 'consultitis' - we're all researched out.'4

But organisations based in Africa ap- peared to be more relaxed in their approach. Dennis Kabaara, of the Institute of Economic Affairs in Kenya welcomed the Commission as a real opportunity for African initiatives to win support from the developed world.5 At the same time he raised a series of issues that it would have to tackle to meet African needs, including multilateral trade, debt and aid.

Considered reaction from the British aid community as a whole was positive, if somewhat cautious. BOND, the alliance that links nearly 300 organisations work- ing in the development sector - supported the Blair initiative while placing on record what it felt the Commission should achieve in order to succeed.6 In particular, BOND asked for a clear out- line from the Commission of how any consultation process would take place and what had been learned from the process. Having said that, the organisation offered to provide the Commission with support and advice through its network of partners in the UK and in Africa.

Son of Brandt?

There was a clear recognition from the start of the Commission's work that it would be treading a path that had, at least in part, been walked by the Brandt report twenty-five years earlier.7 The Brandt 21 Forum, which has nurtured the work undertaken by the former Ger- man Chancellor and his associates all those years ago, helpfully published an excellent report for the Commission, lay- ing out exactly what had to be done to learn the lessons from Brandt.8 James Quilligan, of the Brandt 21 Forum, outlined some of the main differences in the historical circumstances in which both commissions took place. On the positive side these included:

* Global security is no longer de- fined by the nuclear arms race;

* The fall of Communism has ended the bi-polar world;

* The successful development paths opened up by the Far East and India;

* The success in regional and sub- regional integration (e.g. The Afri- can Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), etc.

But there were negative developments as well:

* The world's population has risen by 1.7 billion people;

* Absolute poverty has increased from 800 million to 1.8 billion;

* The HIV and AIDS pandemic has swept through the developing world;

* The debt burden has increased, trade is still skewed against Afri- can producers and they still have




an unfair representation in the world's major organisations (IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.).

The paper also pointed to some of the differences in approach between the two commissions. Brandt met 14 times over five and a half years. Blair will meet three or four times in the space of just one year. At the same time Brandt was saddled with politicians who were no longer in office. Blair has serving politicians as most of its commissioner - men and women who do not just carry clout by virtue of their previous stature, but who are actually still in 'positions of power.'

Perhaps most importantly Quilligan be- lieved that after nearly twenty years of inactivity on the Brandt agenda, the conditions may at last be ripe for the implementation of its recommendations. As evidence he pointed to the following:

* The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals by 191 mem- bers of the UN in 2000, with de- fined targets for 2015;

* The World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 launched a series of public- private partnerships for development;

* The New Partnership for Africa's Development is providing a bridge for co-operation between the developed world and Africa;

* The 'Doha' trade negotiations provide a forum in which African concerns over trade could be ad- dressed.

He concluded:

No one need lament thefact that the Blair Commission does not have the advantage of independence, a broader mandate, more time for deliberation, or a broader global focus - the Brandt Commission served

that role. From this perspective, the more limited scope of the Commissionfor Africa is necessary in order to implement the first step of the Brandt Commission's plan - immediate action for those countries deserving special attention.

Why did Blair Choose Africa as a Key Focus for 2005?

There are two answers to this question: his father and his religion. In February 2002 the prime minister went to Sierra Leone to celebrate Britain's role in suc- cessfully ending eleven years of civil war. It was an emotional time for Mr Blair, with crowds lining the streets to celebrate the achievements of his troops. Before a crowd that included fire-eaters, dancers and acrobats as well as local dignitaries, Mr Blair said 'My first intro- duction to Sierra Leone came many, many years ago because my father used to come to Freetown to the University here to teach' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/uk_politics/1812394). Blair's father, Leo Blair, visited Fourah Bay Col- lege several times in the 1960s to lecture in law and administer exams. This early exposure to Africa gave the prime minister personal familiarity with the continent and its concerns.

There is no doubt that Tony Blair, like Gordon Brown, also feels a strong, personal commitment to Africa - something that Bob Geldof attested to when he wrote:

I like Brown and Blair as men. Whatever you read about the cynicism and spin behind this Commission, it's simply not true. In private conversations over many years, both these men have been fero- ciously impassioned on this issue.9

Part, at least, of this concern is motivated by Mr Blair's own Christian beliefs. In an interview with Michael Cockerell of the BBC, Blair talked about the role faith had played in his life, and in particular the part that an Anglican priest he met at




Oxford University, Peter Thompson, had played in shaping his views.

I am a practising Christian and that's part of me - there's no point in denying it; but I suppose that what I drew from Peter Thomson is the idea that your religious belief wasn't something that shut you awayfrom the world but something that meant that you had to go out and act.'"

It was this kind of injunction to 'go out and act', together with the early memo- ries of Sierra Leone brought to him by his father, that explains the enduring vision of Africa as somewhere that demands attention.

To note this is not to suggest that Mr Blair is anything less than an utterly deter- mined, frequently ruthless politician. Rather it is to indicate that he is also driven by a set of ideals that cannot simply be explained in terms of electoral advantage. Sending troops to Sierra Leone was a risky venture that could easily have backfired. Adopting Africa as a key theme for the 2005 presidencies of the EU and the G8 also carries risks, but can, at least in part, be explained by Mr Blair's fundamental beliefs.

Is Africa Ready for Change?

The Commission comes at a fortuitous time. As the twentieth century drew to a close a good deal of thinking was taking place inside Africa. Much of this focused on just why the continent had so spec- tacularly failed to emulate the development achievements of the Far East and still languished at the bottom of all economic growth charts.

The first African initiative was therefore primarily economic. In 1998 South Afri- can President Thabo Mbeki's delivered a speech launching the concept of 'African Renaissance'. This then came to be incorporated into a number of similar initiatives - including the 'Omega Plan for Africa' proposed by President Abdulahi

Wade of Senegal. These ideas were trans- formed into a 'Millennium Africa Ren- aissance Programme' after discussions between the presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria in 1999. Finally, in October 2001 a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria launched the 'New Partnership for Afri- ca's Development' or Nepad.11 Although Nepad has come in for considerable criticism on the left, it did provide Africa with an agreed strategy that it could then take to the rest of the world.12

When African heads of state met the leaders of the world's richest countries at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in June 2002, they were able to extract promises of support for the Nepad agenda, despite the fact that it contain- ing an extraordinarily ambitious set of programmes, which together were priced at a staggering $64 billion a year. The question was how to translate general- ised support into the hard cash needed to bring to fruition Nepad's plethora of projects.

In addition to its economic proposals Nepad contained an important political dimension - it incorporated a 'Peer Review Mechanism', which was designed to ensure good governance by African governments. In return for an end to corruption, conflict and chronic waste, the developed world agreed to accept the African development agenda spelled out by its leaders.

The second initiative was directly political - the abolition of the Organisation of African Unity and its replacement in 2002 by the African Union. This was considerably more than a mere change of name. In particular, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act that brought the African Union into being provides for 'the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the As- sembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity' (African Union Con- stitutive Act, adopted 9 June 2002, Dur-




ban, South Africa. Article 4h). For Africa, which had always rejected any intervention in the internal affairs of a member state of the OAU this was little short of revolutionary. The Peace and Security Council of the Union is now attempting to put this into practice in Sudan, although it is proving to be no easy matter.

By early 2004 it was therefore possible to say that Africa's leaders had outlined the kind of economic agenda they wished to follow, and had begun to tackle the chronic problems that had plagued the continent for generations. As the African Union Commission Chairman, Alpha Oumar Konare, told the opening session of the organisation's summit in July this year, war and instability were key barri- ers to growth on a continent that had seen 186 coups d'etat and 26 major wars in the past half century.13

This was the kind of realism that the developed world could recognise and embrace. Mr Blair, and the Commission that he has initiated, can therefore genu- inely be said to have partners in Africa with whom they can work.

The South African Dimension

There is one other reason for optimism, which is the re-emergence of South Af- rica as a major force in Africa, following the ending of apartheid.

Pretoria, which used to spread war and instability across vast swathes of southern Africa by its cross-border attacks on Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Lesotho, as well as its occupation of Namibia, is now generally a force for good. First President Nelson Mandela and now President Mbeki have worked tirelessly to try to resolve a host of African conflicts. Their intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi are perhaps the best-known examples of this. On the other hand, there has been President Mbeki's well- known reluctance to criticise other Afri-

can leaders, something that has resulted in his continuing support for a dictator like Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. De- spite this, there is little doubt that the overall account is positive.

Even more significant has been the re- emergence of South Africa as an economic force in Africa. Although the statistics are far from accurate and tend to vary wildly, one reputable source (UNCTAD) esti- mates that South African investment in the rest of the continent has been worth US$1 billion a year since 1994.'4 Much of this has been concentrated in southern Africa, in former British colonies and in sectors in which South Africans had expertise: mining, agriculture and infrastructure construction (roads, bridges, air- ports, harbours, pipelines) and in the management of energy generation and telecommunications.

Despite this, as the South African econo- mist Wolfgang Thomas points out, these investments bring a range of benefits to Africa, including job creation, skill and technology transfers and improvements in infrastructure."5 Not that South Afri- cans have always been welcomed in their newfound role. Some African politicians and commentators now look upon the country's involvement in their countries as a form of 'sub-imperialism'. Although there is some disquiet in this regard, this has not been widespread, so far.

Can the Commission Change Anything?

No sneering, please. Let's go for it. Give us a hand.6

Despite Geldof pleas, it is not clear whether the Commission can achieve a great deal. Africa's decline is so endemic, its problems so deep seated that it is far from clear what could turn its fortunes around. For the Commission to be judged a success it will have to cross a number of hurdles even before it publishes its final report.




First, its commissioners will have to forge a united vision that can be sold to the international community in general, and Africa in particular. This will require skilful political footwork in its meetings and in its consultations both in Africa and with the diaspora.

Second, it will have to come up with a well-written report that is accessible to a wide public and backed by papers that bear academic scrutiny across a broad range of issues.

Third, the commissioners will have to hope that no major disaster befalls any of their countries. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia could, for example, become a considerable embarrassment if his country becomes engaged in a fresh round of fighting with Eritrea, or if his plans to resettle a million highland Ethiopians in the western lowlands were to go badly astray.

Finally, the Commission will have to come up with the money to back its vision. There is no point in Mr Blair complaining that this is not the purpose of the exercise. Africa has drawn up its plans (Nepad), is beginning to reform its governance (Peer Reviews) and to tackle its coups, crises and wars (African Un- ion). Now it is for the rich and powerful of the world to back their words of support with concrete actions. Some of these will, of course, have to come in other fora, including the World Trade Organisation. But additional resources will have to be mobilised for Africa or else the Commission will be judged a failure.

This has already been recognised, if somewhat obliquely, by Sir Nick Stern, the Commission's director of policy research. Speaking in South Africa he said:

The Commission wants to work and interact with pan African institutions and tofind ways to support their programmes. It will not have its own money but will try

to arguefor and pressure rich countries to give support.17

Fortunately, for Mr Blair, help is at hand. His chancellor, Gordon Brown, has outlined a means by which additional fi- nances on a really large scale can be mobilised. This is his proposal for an International Finance Facility (IFF).18 This aims to require the developed world to pledge their aid flows over a number of years, so that these promises can then be used to go to the international money markets to raise bonds, which would then be repaid over a period of time. Mr Brown believes that this could raise the amount the developed world spends on aid from the current $50 billion a year to $100 billion a year up to 2015.

The Facility is designed to achieve both the additionalfinance and the valuefor money necessary to meet the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals so that by 2015 every child has schooling; infant and maternal mortality is reduced and poverty halved.

At a stroke, the financial resources Africa requires would be released. Better still, it would require not a cent more from the taxes of Mr Brown's constituents. So far this proposal is just that - a scheme that is being worked on with vigour. If, however, it could be brought into operation it might be possible to meet some of Africa's economic needs without caus- ing insuperable political demands on the rich world.

If the necessary resources can be found, and if there is a fair wind and careful political footwork, the Blair Commission could provide useful assistance and support for the changes already under way in Africa. But there is no magic wand or silver bullet. In the end Africa's destiny lies in its own hands. It will have to find its own way out of its difficulties, implementing its own plans and finding its own solutions.



Building & Sustaining Stability in Lofa County, Liberia 711

Martin Plaut, Africa Editor, BBC World Service News.

Endnotes

1. Guardian, 31 January 2004.

2. Guardian 27 February 2004.

3 'UK Government's Commission for Africa' World Development Movement, 29 April 2004.

4. 'The Commission for Africa: who is framing who?' Chukwe-Emeka Chikezie, http: / / www.bond.org.uk/networker/aprilO4/opinion. htm

6. BOND Response to the Commission for Africa, Press Release, 19 July 2004

7. 'North-South: A Programme for Survival' Brandt Commission, 1980.

8. 'Passing the torch: The Brandt and Blair Commissions', James Bernard Quilligan, Brandt 21 Forum at the Centre for Global Negotiations; http: / /www.brandt21forum.info/

9. Guardian, 27 February 2004.

10. New Statesman, 14 February 2000; http:// www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOFQP/ is_4473_129 / aiL60120738 / pgil

11. 'The New Partnership for Africa's Develop- ment (NEPAD): How Does It Address the Land and Resource Rights of the Rural and Urban Poor?' Daniel A. Omoweh; www.acts.or.ke/ paplrr/docs/CTPAPLRR-FinalDraftofNepad. Omoweh.pdf; see also John Loxley, 2003, 'Imperialism & Economic Reform in Africa: What's New About the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)?', Review of African Political Economy 95:119-128.

12. See, for example, Patrick Bond, 'Cultivating African Anti-Capitalism', http: / /zmagsite. zmag.org/Feb2003/bondO2O3.html

13. Reuters, 6 July 2004.

14. Wolfgang Thomas, January 2004, 'South Africa's FDI in Africa: Catalytic Kingpin in the Nepad process?', unpublished paper, Table B; See also John Daniel, Jessica Lutchman and Sanusha Naidu, 2004, 'Post-Apartheid South Africa's Corporate Expansion into Africa, Review of African Political Economy 100:343-348.

15. Thomas, note 14.

16. Bob Geldof, Guardian, 27 February 2004.

17. Consultation with Sir Nick Stern on an agenda for the Commission for Africa, 1 July 2004; http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/ dO000865/index.php

18. Proposal by Gordon Brown, 14 February 2003; http: / /www.hm-treasury. gov.uk/ newsroom_and_ speeches/press /2003/ press_21_03.cfm

Building & Sustaining Stability in Lofa County, Liberia

Jonathan Temin

Wedged between Guinea and Sierra Leone and a day's drive from the capital Monrovia, Lofa County is one of Libe- ria's more remote regions. In recent history it has also been one of the more volatile. In the series of wars fought since Charles Taylor began his insur- gency on Christmas Eve, 1989, Lofa has frequently been a primary battleground. In the fighting from 1998-2003 - re- ferred to as 'World War Two' by some Lofa residents - death and destruction in Lofa was particularly severe. Reli- able casualty figures are not available, but the evidence is everywhere: com- munities are populated by a small fraction of their pre-war population (some residents were killed and many are now refugees and internally dis- placed peoples (IDPs)), almost no per- manent buildings remain intact and markets are devoid of the most basic goods, such as charcoal and bread.

This briefing is based on one month spent in eastern Lofa County in May and June 2004. It describes the current situation and identifies challenges to stability and reconstruction likely to arise in the near future, some of which may threaten the national-level peace and reconcilia- tion process. Observations are based on dozens of community meetings and more than a hundred individual conversa-



agendas, past & future || blair & africa: the africa commission

Documents