agency detection-hadd
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Agency detection/HADD
General questions
Does the hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD) hypothesis hold positive or negativeimplications for particular theologies/religious positions, or perhaps for theology/religion in
general? Does the HADD hypothesis sit uneasily with traditional theistic conceptions of how
human beings acquire natural knowledge of God? Would accepting an evolutionary picture ofthe production of God beliefs seem to require at least the modification of certain traditional
religious doctrines for instance, the Christian doctrines of original perfection and the fall?
Summary
According to a widely endorsed cognitive account of the production of religious belief (see alsoAgency detection/HADD topic in empirical summaries, coming soon) religious beliefs are
generated by a mental tool which has been described by Barrett [1] as a hypersensitive agency
detection device. HADD is set off by various ambiguous environmental stimuli such as theapparently goal-directed movement of objects, etc., and when triggered, HADD produces beliefs
in unseen agents who are presumed to be the causes of such ambiguous stimuli. Guthrie [2] and
others (e.g., Barrett [1]) hypothesise that hyperactive agency detection would be adaptive sincehaving a strong perceptual bias to interpret ambiguous events as caused by an agent makes it far
less likely that our ancestors would have ended up as a predators kill. It would have been far
less costly for our ancestors too have detected too much agency in their environment than toolittle.
Examples of philosophical and theological issues
The HADD theory of the origins of religious belief can be and has been interpreted as showing
that religious beliefs are nothing other than a trick played on us by evolution. Some within theCognitive Science of Religion community as well those outside the field (e.g., the biologist
Richard Dawkins [3], and philosopher Daniel Dennett[4]) have implicitly or explicitly endorsed
some such view. Advocates of this position tend to appeal to considerations such as HADDsunreliability, the mutual incompatibility of the religious beliefs produced, and the sufficiency of
a psychological explanation of religious belief formation in order to defend their conclusions. If
HADD is hyperactive, it will produce many false positives, giving us reason to doubt the
reliability of the beliefs produced in this way; it also produces mutually incompatible beliefsacross the different religious traditions; and it offers an account of the origin of religious beliefs
which makes no reference to supernatural entities, but for a belief to be reliable it is normally
expected that the belief will be causally connected to its referent in certain ways (for a summaryof arguments which attempt to show that CSR undermines religious belief see [5]).
By contrast, some within the Cognitive science of religion community draw different
conclusions concerning the implications of HADD (e.g., [1]), and the philosopher Michael J.Murray [5] has suggested that the HADD theory is not incompatible with religious claims.
Murray has pointed to the importance of assessing the reliability of beliefs produced by HADD
with reference to the contexts in which it is activated rather than just in general, and insists on
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the point that HADD does not give rise to mutually incompatible beliefs all on its own, but rather
produces only highly non-specific beliefs of agency in general which are then elaborated by
divergent cultural traditions. Further, he notes that the absence of a direct causal connectionbetween religious beliefs generated by HADD and their purported referents is compatible with a
view that God perhaps orchestrated evolutionary history in such a way that human beingsevolved a cognitive architecture which would lead them to form beliefs in supernatural entities -
religious belief would then have an indirectconnection to its referent [see 5]. The philosopher
Kelly James Clark [6] has additionally argued that far from undermining religious claims, theHADD model of religious belief formation is quite compatible with certain readings of the
traditional Christian doctrine of natural knowledge of God through a sensus divinitatis.
According to Clark, reformed epistemology and cognitive science of religion show aconvergence on belief in God, since both hold that belief in God is a natural, non-inferential
belief immediately produced by a cognitive faculty.
Up to this point the theistic response to anti-theistic construals of the implications of theHADD theory has come mostly from the reformed epistemology end of the discussion, but
traditions of theological reflection which see a more prominent role for reason in the acquisition
of religious beliefs may come to take a different view about what HADD means for theology.Also, accepting something like a HADD explanation of the production of religious beliefs would
seem to require the modification of other traditional religious doctrines - in the Christian
tradition, for instance, those such as the doctrine of original perfection and the fall. By contrast,the anti-theistic case also awaits a fuller treatment. These and other issues remain to be
explored.
See also
Minimal counterintuitiveness; Cognitive science of religion and evolutionary theory (comingsoon)
Outstanding issues
Does HADD only explain superstition? Do the supreme gods have a different ontogeny? Does the generation of religious beliefs via HADD require believers to alter their
understanding of divine-human relationship?
Is a God who generates human belief in him via HADD a deceptive God? Which religious doctrines may have to be modified in the light of HADD? Does HADD reductively explain away much/all of religion?References
1. Barrett, J.L., Why would anyone believe in God? 2004, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira
Press.2. Guthrie, S., Faces in the clouds: a new theory of religion. 1993, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
3. Dawkins, R., The God delusion. 2006, London: Bantam Press.
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4. Dennett, D., Breaking the spell: religion as a natural phenomenon. 2006, New York:
Penguin.
5. Murray, M.J., Four arguments that the cognitive psychology of religion undermines thejustification of religious belief, J. Bulbulia, et al., Editors. 2007, The Collins Foundation
Press: Santa Margarita, CA.6. Clark, K.J.,Reformed epistemology and the cognitive science of religion. forthcoming.