afgh.political reconc. policy conceieved and self defeating

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Afghanistans Political ReconciliationPolicy: Ill Conceived and Self-DefeatingAhmad Shayeq QassemPublished online: 28 Jul 2014.

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Afghanistans Political Reconciliation Policy: Ill Conceived andSelf-Defeating

Ahmad Shayeq Qassem

Abstract: The Afghan governments peace and reconciliation overtures to themilitants, initially at the unofficial level but later sanctioned officially, have formed akey theme of state security policy from the early days of the post-Taliban admini-stration in Afghanistan. Yet far from producing peace and stability, they seem to haveplayed into the hands of the violent groups intent on overthrowing the countrysinternationally supported and legitimate political system in the past decade. There isno doubt about the importance of national reconciliation as a wider process of over-coming the legacy of beleaguered social relationships and forging a common vision forthe future among all Afghans, but the nature of the governments reconciliation policy,which borders on appeasement of the militants, seems so far to have created morevulnerabilities than strengths in the face of increasingly emboldened anti-state violentgroups.

While the discussion of reconciliation at the interpersonal level has deeper rootsin psychology, theology or indeed general human experience, more focusedstudy of the concept as an essential ingredient of social and political reconstruction inpost-conflict societies is of relatively recent origin. Contemporary literature on poli-tical reconciliation generally draws on the experiences of post-conflict societiesmaking the transition from intrastate violence or dictatorship to democracy inAfrica, Asia, Latin America and Europe since the 1970s.1 Proponents and practi-tioners of political reconciliation generally acknowledge the uniqueness of circum-stances in individual societies, yet there appear to be certain common characteristicsrelevant to most, if not all, reconciliation initiatives in post-conflict societies.Scholarly literature and case studies of reconciliation programmes in different nationaland sub-national contexts variously focus on a range of themes, mechanisms andpractices that seem to run almost as a common thread through most reconciliationinitiatives.2

Afghanistans official policy of national reconciliation presents a curious caseof political initiative with little or no mooring in the relevant academic literature orempirical lessons of reconciliation programmes in other countries.3 The Afghangovernment and its international partners have proposed national reconciliation asan indispensable part of their stabilisation strategy, which on the face of it soundsdesirable as it has been the standard practice in most post-conflict societies. Yet, atits very core the initiative appears to present little more than an open-ended offer ofimpunity and possibly even privileged status to suspected war criminals and

A former First Secretary at the Afghan Embassy in Canberra, at present Dr. Ahmad Shayeq Qassemis a Current Affairs Analyst (Iran and Afghanistan) based in London.

Strategic Analysis, 2014Vol. 38, No. 4, 476492, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.918425

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perpetrators of serious human rights violations who may opt to withdraw fromactive violence at a time of their own choosing. Hence, the official Afghan reconci-liation programme may even fall below the threshold of what has come to be knownin the transitional justice literature as a thin or minimalist form of reconciliationpolicy.4

The following sections mirror the nature of the Afghan reconciliation initiativeagainst the attendant challenges and the broader imperatives of political reconciliationin transitional justice literature. The article mainly focuses on the Afghan govern-ments official reconciliation policy towards the Taliban but only marginally on thepositive effects of the relatively open political institutions and democratic practice thathave facilitated a fair level of understanding and coexistence among some of thehitherto belligerent factions that profess commitment to the political system.

Background, nature and challenges of reconciliation

Although Afghanistans modern history is replete with recurrent periods of repressionand violence, national reconciliation as official state policy has been a relativelyrecent phenomenon in Afghanistan as in most other countries.5 Unlike most othercases of national reconciliation in post-conflict societies, however, the Afghan statehas twice in the past three decades employed the concept as part of its security policyduring ongoing conflict situations rather than as a genuine process of addressing thelegacy of past violence and rebuilding the broken relationships it has caused.6

The rhetoric of national reconciliation as official state policy found its way intothe Afghan political jargon after the late president Mohammad Najibullah launchedhis policy of Mosaleha-e Melli (national reconciliation) in December 1986.Najibullahs government unsuccessfully sought to end the Afghan conflict through astate-run reconciliation programme which proposed power-sharing incentives to theMujahedeen factions whose political leaderships were based mainly in Pakistan andIran. While the international circumstances and the nature of the Afghan governmentsthen and now are different, the mechanisms and religious-ideological rhetoric thatKarzais government has employed for the implementation of the peace and reconci-liation programme exhibit strong similarities to those employed by Najibullahsgovernment. Both Najibullahs National Reconciliation Programme (NRP) andKarzais peace and reconciliation initiative defined their armed opponents as dis-affected brothers, used Jirgas (traditional gatherings) to legitimate overtures toviolent groups, established peace commissions at both the capital and provinciallevels and offered government positions to entice their armed opponents to join thegovernment.7

Najibullahs policy of national reconciliation failed as it could not win the supportof the major stakeholders in the Afghan conflict, including the Mujahedeen, Pakistan,Iran and the US. The Mujahedeen factions harboured extreme distrust and hostilitytowards Najibullah, as Pakistan, the US, Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent Irancontinued to support their rebellion against Kabul even after the withdrawal of theSoviet forces. Furthermore, the former Soviet Union increasingly became preoccupiedwith its own domestic problems until its fall, which effectively ended the sole lifelineof support to Najibullahs government.8

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the rhetoric of reconciliation gained momentumwith President Karzais re-election inaugural address and the subsequentConsultative Peace Jirga in 2010, but the policy was not at all recent or novel.9

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Karzai had been interested in reaching out to the Taliban from the earliest days whenhe was appointed chairman of the interim administration in late 2001. In February2004 Karzai formally launched his Tahkim-e Solh (Strengthening Peace) programme.Soon after winning his first term election, Karzai established the IndependentNational Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (INCPR) under the chairmanshipof his erstwhile factional leader and mentor Sebghatullah Mujaddadi in May 2005.The INCPR in its various reincarnations served as the sole body responsible forpromoting and implementing the peace and reconciliation policy, and continued itswork even after the creation of the High Peace Council (HPC) in 2010. The INCPRsmain functions were to work with the provincial authorities and security officials forinitiating contact with the militants, organising reception events and facilitatingtemporary accommodation, vocational training, recruitment opportunities and mone-tary incentives for active or former Taliban and Hezb-e Islami members who agreedto abandon violence. Mujaddadi has claimed that the INCPR succeeded in reinte-grating over 10,000 Taliban and Hezb-e Islami militants into peaceful life, butobviously it did not achieve peace as the conflict has continued in the countryunabated.10

During the 2009 presidential elections, one of Karzais major campaign promiseswas to bring about peace and stability through national reconciliation. In his secondterm inauguration speech, Karzai vowed to place national reconciliation at the top of[his governments] peace-building policy.11 In keeping with this promise, Karzaiorganised the National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ) (Peace Jirga) on June 24,2010. The consultative label was used for the occasion to circumvent the constitu-tional requirement for participation of elected District Council representatives in anational grand Jirga, since the District Council elections had not materialised. ThePeace Jirga simply reaffirmed the governments decision on the appointment of itschairman, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the creation of the HPC. As anticipated, Karzaisubsequently appointed Rabbani as HPC chairman.

The governments decision to create the HPC was also likely influenced byleading reconciled Taliban figures, particularly the former Taliban foreign ministerWakil Ahmad Motawakkel and Taliban ambassador to Islamabad Abdul Salam Zaeef.In several media interviews, and presumably also in private audiences with PresidentKarzai, both Motawakkel and Zaeef had urged the government to create a peacecouncil that would pursue reconciliation with the Taliban.12 After the HPC wascreated, however, they declined to join the body, suggesting instead in a number ofmedia interviews that they would join only if permitted to do so by the Talibanleadership.13 The Taliban still refuse to talk to the Afghan government. However, theAfghan government has continued to present its ineffective interactions with ex-Taliban members as a sign of progress. Other than the support of Western govern-ments who have established the Peace and Reconciliation Trust Fund, Afghanistan isyet to receive genuine support from Saudi Arabia or Pakistan in its reconciliationefforts.

Role of religion

Religion has played a very important role in most reconciliation initiatives around theworld. The concepts of truth, repentance, empathy and forgiveness and the relevantmechanisms and procedures to practise and promote these values all have strongreligious roots. In the words of one scholar, reconciliation is the conceptual centre of

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gravity among religious perspectives on transitional justice.14 As with many othernational transitional justice programmes where religious institutions, concepts andpersonalities have played a key role in the reconciliation initiatives, they play adominant role in the Afghan context too. Both Sebghatullah Mujaddadi and the lateBurhanuddin Rabbani, as the first and second successive heads of the governmentsofficial reconciliation programme, were prominent religious figures as well asMujahedeen leaders. A majority of the members of the HPC are either clerics orformer Mujahedeen and Taliban members with Jihadi and religious credentials.

However, unlike the religiously inspired conduct of truth commissions in othercountries where emphasis is put on elucidation of truth and expressions of repentanceand apology in return for forgiveness and possible mutual empathy between theviolators and victims, the HPC and its predecessor under Mujaddadi seem to haveafforded no such provisions. Instead, at a practical level they have acted to incentivisethe return of active militants by offering temporary lodging or long-term housing,personal or family expenses, employment and/or political positions in state institu-tions depending on the importance and seniority of the returnees. From this perspec-tive, the perks and privileges enjoyed by prominent reconciled Taliban officials,while not even working in any state institutions, would be the envy of most hard-working Afghans.

At a rhetorical and ethical level, the HPC has constantly invoked the narrative ofpeace and fraternity among Muslims. The partial Quranic verse wassulh-u khayr,meaning that peace/settlement is best, taken completely out of its matrimonialcontext, is inscribed on the logo of the HPC, as is another Quranic verse, thebelievers are but a single brotherhood; so make peace and reconciliation betweenyour two [contending] brothers on the HPCs official website.15 HPC members oftenrecite these verses to justify their actions, denoting the unfailing religious mission ofpeaceful overtures towards the Taliban and other Muslim militants no matter whattheir record of past or recurrent atrocities. To be sure, there are numerous Quranic andwider Islamic provisions for retributive justice against serious crimes such as murder,brigandage, rebellion, extortion and profiteering from narcotics which the Taliban andother militants are accused of, but the HPC apparently has no difficulty in selectiveand out-of-context application of religious teachings to justify and even sanctify itsactivities.16 Moreover, the HPCs approach also begs the question of how they dealwith the Taliban and Hezb-e Islamis claim of Jihad against the occupation forces,given that the US-led coalition forces are drawn predominantly from non-Muslimmajority countries. The HPC and the pro-government clerical establishment do notseem to have made an attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the Taliban and Hezb-eIslamis Jihad against the coalition forces which enjoy UN Security Council (UNSC)mandate for their operations in Afghanistan.

The governments promotion of a largely clerical body in the form of HPC andits associated use of selected religious injunctions to advance the reconciliationinitiative seems to have produced an utterly pacifist policy against the narrative ofJihad and liberation that the Taliban have actively promoted through their officialwebsite Voice of Jihad, Layeha (Code of Conduct) and a variety of other documentsand dissemination outlets. In stark contrast to HPCs policy and symbolism, theTalibans defiant narrative is perhaps best exemplified by their partial application ofthe Quranic verse and fight them on until there is no more dissention/disbelief, andthere prevails the religion for Allah, inscribed on the Voice of Jihad as the Talibanmotto.17


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Reconciliation and democracy

The bulk of the academic literature on transitional justice is very clear about theorganic relationship between the success of reconciliation programmes and theimperative of democratisation and representative institutions in a post-conflict society.The two are arguably intertwined and interdependent because democracy is a politicalsystem designed to manage differences which may otherwise build up towardsrecurrent violence.18 As a democratic political system, representative parliament andindependent media are key augmenters of a sustainable reconciliation initiative, it isessential that the conflicting parties at the minimum agree on the necessity of ademocratic political system as part of their common vision for the future.19

The Afghan governments reconciliation programme seems quite unilateral on thisaccount as there is a fundamental conflict between the future vision of Afghanistanprojected by the political establishment in Kabul as opposed to the Talibans vision forthe countrys future. Although not without serious flaws and misconceptions, theoverall nature of the internationally supported political reconstruction since the Bonnagreements of late 2001 has followed clear benchmarks towards democracy andrepresentative institutions. Major achievements in this regard are the Constitution,Parliament, elections and relatively independent media. The Afghan government andits Western partners have publicly stressed these achievements as red lines thatshould not be compromised in any negotiations or settlement with the Taliban.

In contrast, the Taliban do not show great interest in a democratic political systemas defined by the Constitution, periodic elections, Parliament and independent media.Officially, the Taliban have insisted on the restoration of their Islamic Emirateheaded by Mullah Omar as Amir-ul-Momeneen or the leader of the faithfulappointed indeterminably through a clerical body rather than general elections.They have maintained the so-called Islamic Emirates constitution named Dastooror Guidance arguably approved by a relatively large number of clerics during theTaliban regime. The abrogation of the current Afghan constitution is part of theTalibans precondition for negotiations which they have refused to undertake withthe Afghan government so far, and their violent campaign is directed against theentirety of the political system including the executive, legislature and the judiciary.The modern notions of citizens equality in political participation, periodic elections,human rights, media freedoms and freedom of thought and speech are anathema to theTalibans ideology and vision of Afghanistans future. It is difficult to see how the twocontrasting visions could be reconciled with the absence of a minimum agreement onthe rules of the game between the two sides.

The question of justice

Justice for the victims of past human rights abuses is among the major concerns ofreconciliation initiatives in most cases. While the modalities and methods of dispen-sing justice may differ in various national contexts, there is general agreement amongthe practitioners and experts in the field of transitional justice that some form ofretributive or restorative justice in any post-conflict society is essential in the interestof sustainable peace. The institutional mechanisms for the purpose may range fromnormal or special courts/tribunals to combined national/international tribunals, foreigncourts and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in high profile cases. Prosecutorialdecisions handed down to perpetrators of human rights abuses may range from


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various forms of liberty-constraining sentences to employment disqualifications orsocial exposures (naming and shaming) which may well have the effect of constrictingaspects of the subjects usual social liberties by default.20

Most experts and practitioners of political reconciliation prescribe due initiativesto address the pains and losses of the victims as a key element of any successfulreconciliation strategy. For example, South Africa established the Truth andReconciliation Commission (TRC) and proposed a tax levy on the incomes of thebeneficiaries of the apartheid regime; Northern Ireland instituted the office of aMinister for Victims; the UN levied taxes on Iraqi oil exports as reparation for thevictims of its invasion of Kuwait; and Rwanda set up a public fund towards reparationpayments to the victims of its tragic past.21 The degree to which these and othersimilar initiatives towards restorative justice have been successfully implemented isopen to debate, but at the minimum they recognise the sufferings of the victims andthe need to alleviate them as far as possible.

In the case of Afghanistan, however, the issue of justice in relation to reconcilia-tion is a fairly confused affair between the government, National Assembly (parlia-ment) and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). TheAfghan governments official reconciliation policy not only appears oblivious to theimperative but has effectively obfuscated the distinction between the victims and theoffenders in Afghanistan. President Karzais rhetorical definition of the Taliban asdisaffected brothers misrepresents the Taliban as victims rather than perpetrators ofviolence and human rights abuses, despite numerous studies and reports holding theTaliban responsible for the absolute majority of all atrocities committed againstcivilians.22

The Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan (IHRCA) has advo-cated the prosecution of alleged human rights violators over the past three decades. In2005, the IHRCA produced its Call for Justice document which summarises theresults of surveys it apparently conducted on public perceptions and demand forjustice across the country.23 The Afghan government adopted the document in thesame year,24 but there has been much criticism by international research and advocacyorganisations of the Afghan governments failure to implement the transitional justiceproject. Apparently, the influence of human rights abusers in state institutions presentsthe main obstacle against government action in this regard.25

For its part, the Afghan parliament (200510), dominated by the presence of manyformer Mujahedeen and the erstwhile Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan(PDPA) regime officials, remained suspicious of the transitional justice project.Many lawmakers, rightly or wrongly, alleged that the initiative was a political ployto discredit and reduce the influence of the former Mujahedeen and former PDPAofficials in state institutions. The limited scope of the project, which did not seek toaddress alleged state-sponsored abuses before the 1980s, and suspicions that IHRCAchief Dr. Sima Samar was pursuing a political agenda and personal vendetta againstthe former Mujahedeen and former PDPA officials, helped to forge an alliance ofconvenience between the two sides. Finally, in March 2007 the parliament passed asweeping amnesty bill which barred the state from prosecution of anyone involved inthe conflicts of the previous three decades, except of course in cases where specificcharges are brought by victims against their alleged tormentors.26 The amnesty lawhas an indeterminate remit, thus enabling the government to offer virtual impunity toviolent individuals and groups who may wish to join the peace process at any time in


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the future. In fact, as one scholar observes, Article 3 of the amnesty law opens up thepossibility of amnesty even for crimes not yet committed.27

Political dynamics of reconciliation

As much as Afghanistan may need a genuine policy of national reconciliation forlasting peace and stability, the issue seems to have been used by various national andinternational actors mainly in pursuit of their various political and security objectivesin the course of the past decade. To elaborate on the issue, a brief description of thenature of domestic power relations before and after the fall of the Taliban regimemight be in order.

Prior to the overthrow of the Taliban regime in late 2001, Afghanistan was thebattleground of military and political rivalries between two main politico-militaryforces, the Taliban and the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation ofAfghanistan (UNIFSA), better known in the international media as the NorthernAlliance. The Taliban and UNIFSA were the only Afghan parties that could directlyaffect developments on the ground in Afghanistan.

In the wake of the overthrow of the Taliban regime, there were concerns on thepart of the US-led coalition and the UN mission to Afghanistan about the disenfranchi-sement of the Pashtun ethnic group in the new political establishment. Hence, in theirquest for a broad-based government in Afghanistan, the UN representative mission,supported by the US, the UK, Germany and other allies, sought to inject expatriateAfghans affiliated with the former king Mohammad Zahir in the form of the RomeGroup as representatives of the Pashtuns and technocrats based in the West. Someother expatriate Afghans also claiming to represent the Pashtuns quickly organisedaround the pro-monarchy Mujahedeen leader Sayed Ahmad Gailani in Peshawar, anda third team of expatriate Afghans came from the Cyprus Group under the steward-ship of Gulbuddin Hekmatyars son-in-law Hamayoon Jarir. The Peshawar and Cyprusgroups allegedly enjoyed the support of Pakistan and Iran respectively.28

Yet very few, if any, of these expatriate Afghans who were put in leadershippositions in the new administration exercised real influence in Afghanistan. Many hadremained outside the country, and largely out of touch, for the better part of theprevious three decades when Afghanistan had gone through major upheavals andwide-ranging socio-economic and political changes. Hamid Karzai, coming from theminor Mujahedeen faction Jabha-e Nejat-e Melli Afghanistan (National SalvationFront of Afghanistan), perhaps epitomised this brood of returnee Afghan politicianswho had no immediate following of their own in the country.

Nevertheless, the expatriate Afghans, particularly those returning from the West,found a powerful ally in the US-led coalition for a number of reasons. First, they wereviewed as representatives of the Pashtuns under the circumstances where neither theTaliban nor the Hezb-e Islami Hekmatyar had formally joined the new administration.Second, they were considered as Western-educated technocrats, expected to put thecountry on the path to reconstruction and development. Third, unlike the UNIFSAleaders who had to endure constant criticism for alleged past human rights abuses, theexpatriates were neither Islamists nor a political liability for Western governments asthey had largely bided their time outside the country with no direct involvement in theconflict.


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Reconciliation and political factions

Despite the US-led coalitions goodwill and support, the expatriate politicians found itdifficult to extend their political authority beyond Kabul city and possibly a few otherlocations where the coalition forces, known as the International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF), had a significant presence. In such a context, and as frictions started toemerge between UNIFSA leaders and expatriate politicians in the Karzai-led admin-istration, the governments reconciliation policy came under suspicion. Sections of themedia and commentators affiliated with UNIFSA leaders started to express apprehen-sion about the governments true motives in pursuing reconciliation under the leader-ship of Karzais erstwhile factional leader and self-declared wali nema orbenefactor.29 They alleged that Karzai was using reconciliation as a pretext tobroaden his personal support base among the Pashtuns, particularly the Taliban andHezb-e Islami supporters, and intimidate his UNIFSA-affiliated political rivals in thegovernment. The officially registered reconciled Hezb-e Islami faction under theleadership of the minister of economy, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, did in fact supportKarzais re-election bid in 2009 and remained part of Karzais team in thegovernment.

In April 2007, Burhanuddin Rabbani, former Afghan president and Mujahedeenleader who had joined the parliament in 2005, formed a major political oppositionumbrella group called Jabha-e Melli Afghanistan or the National Front of Afghanistan(NFA). The NFAs leadership was largely made up of UNIFSA remnants who had losttheir government positions in the preceding years, a number of senior government andmilitary figures from the erstwhile Soviet-supported Afghan regime (197892) and afew expatriate politicians affiliated with the erstwhile King Mohammad Zahirs camp.The common thread binding this motley collection of politicians was their inability tomaintain and/or win senior government positions in the highly complex and fluidpolitical environment in the years since ISAFs military intervention in the country inlate 2001.

The NFA opposed the governments reconciliation programme initially, although itdid not articulate clearly whether their opposition was against the entire notion ofreconciliation with the Taliban or simply that they were critical of the allegedly non-transparent nature of the governments approach on the issue. In April 2008, how-ever, NFA spokesman Fazel Sancharaki made a dramatic announcement claiming thatsenior Taliban leaders had met and asked the NFA leadership to mediate in negotia-tions with the government. The NFA leadership also held a press conference andannounced their support for reconciliation. Taliban spokesman Mohammad YousufAhmadi strongly denied the NFAs claim, but Karzai welcomed the NFAs support ofreconciliation.30

Given the very recent history of extensive violence between NFA leaders and theTaliban, it is unlikely that the Taliban would have asked the NFA to mediate in allegednegotiations with the government. As for the question of why the NFA leadershipshould have made such a claim, Rabbani presumably sought to undercut Karzaisalleged attempts to use reconciliation as a political tool to blackmail political oppo-nents and maintain Western support for his continued leadership. It is noteworthy thatby this time major Western powers, including the UK and the US, had clearlyendorsed the proposed policy of negotiations with the Taliban at the core of whatthey regarded as a political solution in parallel with continued military pressure onthe insurgents.


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The NFAs claim of contact with the Taliban and its opposition to what its leadersalleged to be a non-transparent reconciliation policy on the part of the governmentcontinued until Rabbanis appointment as HPC chairman in 2010. The NFA hadsuffered serious splits in the run-up to the 2009 presidential election, but came outof the election with reaffirmation of its popular base as its candidate, AbdullahAbdullah, secured around 32 per cent of the national vote amidst claims of wide-spread electoral fraud. Yet the appointment of Rabbani as HPC chairman effectivelydissolved the NFA and left Abdullah, who had begun wearing the mantle of opposi-tion leader, high and dry. After the assassination of the senior Rabbani in September2011, Karzai appointed his son Salahuddin Rabbani as HPC chairman. Coming as itdid after the junior Rabbanis assumption of interim leadership for his late fathersJamiat-e Islam faction, his appointment as HPC chairman further reinforced mediaand elite perceptions that the move was designed to keep the political oppositionfragmented.

In the post-2009 election period until the formation of electoral alliances inpreparation for the 2014 elections, the governments main opposition reconstitutedin two major political groupings: the NFA and the National Coalition of Afghanistan(NCA) led by former vice president Ahmad Zia Massoud and former foreign ministerAbdullah respectively. The two groupings included other major erstwhile anti-Talibanfigures such as former parliament speaker Mohammad Younus Qanuni, Uzbek leaderAbdul Rashid Dostum, Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqeq and former intelligencechief Amrullah Saleh. The NFA and NCA did not have any discernible policydifferences on any issues, but they both remained the main critics of the non-transparent nature of the governments reconciliation programme. They neveropposed reconciliation with the insurgents per se, but characterised the governmentsapproach as appeasement and insisted that the government should take the politicalopposition and civil society into confidence about its policy.

At the time of writing and in the run-up to the 2014 presidential elections, almostall the major political figures and factions outside the government have reorganisedaround the 11 presidential elections tickets, each consisting of a presidential candidateand two running mates. They have all expressed support for peace negotiations withthe militants in principle, but none has yet elucidated how exactly they could makethe official reconciliation policy more effective.31

Reconciliation for the US and allies

The US-led international coalition has made no secret of their intention to use thereconciliation policy to peel off Taliban fighters from the ideological core and weakenthe insurgency. They seem to have recognised and pushed for a superficial division ofthe Taliban into Afghan vs. non-Afghan and insisted that the Taliban should severlinks with Al-Qaeda. The UNSC separated the list of Taliban leaders from those ofAl-Qaeda in a move to support the Afghan governments peace initiative, without anyreciprocal initiative on the part of the Taliban leadership to vindicate the separation.32

The Taliban have stated through a number of statements that they do not have anyinternational agenda outside Afghanistans borders, and sought to reassure the worldthat their foreign policy would be based on mutual respect and non-interference in theaffairs of other countries in accordance with Islamic injunctions.33

Yet the Taliban have neither denounced Al-Qaeda as an organisation nor aban-doned its violent methods with ideological underpinnings in extremist religious


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discourse. For example, suicide bombing as an instrument of war had been alien toAfghanistan before Al-Qaeda employed it for the first time in the assassination ofAhmad Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001. This author does not know of anyrecent surveys to establish how the majority of Afghans view the phenomenon atpresent, but not a single incident of suicide bombing seems to have been reportedduring the Jihad years against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The actof suicide, no matter what the cause, is arguably forbidden in orthodox Islam, but theTaliban clerics have employed standard Al-Qaeda arguments to justify suicide bomb-ing as amaliat-e esteshhadi or martyrdom operations.34 From this perspective, theseparation of Taliban from non-Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda seems more a matter ofexpedience than reality, except for the fact that the Talibans leadership council doesnot endorse attacks against Pakistani state institutions while Tehrik-e Taliban-ePakistan (TTP) apparently does not have such reservations even when professingloyalty to Mullah Omars overall leadership. Hence, the superficial separation of theAfghan Taliban from TTP and Al-Qaeda boils down to an unhelpful suggestion thatwhatever the Taliban did in the past or may intend to do in the future, there are no barsagainst them becoming part of the political process as long as they do not directlythreaten Western countries and Pakistan.

The US government has also tried to secure the release of Sergeant Bowe RobertBergdahl, the sole US soldier in Taliban captivity, through negotiations. To this end,President Barack Obamas administration sought to open a political representationoffice for the Taliban in Qatar which would have served as a conduit for negotiations.The US administrations purported gesture of goodwill plan to release a number ofTaliban leaders from detention in Guantanamo Bay ran into opposition in the USCongress in 2012. The hiccup temporarily put the official inauguration of theTalibans office in Qatar and the proposed negotiations between the Taliban and theUS on hold, although the Talibans designated representatives remained in Qatar.

As for the success of the US-led coalitions strategy to woo the Taliban fightersaway from the battlefield and create rifts within the Taliban leadership through thereconciliation initiative, the jury is probably still out. Some media reports haveclaimed rifts within the Taliban leadership over negotiations with the US and theAfghan government. What is absolutely clear, however, is that so far none of theTaliban leaders alleged to have favoured negotiations has spoken against MullahOmars leadership nor have the so-called rifts made a discernible mark on theTalibans willingness or ability to carry out increasingly lethal and unconventionalattacks on military and civilian targets across the country. Even those Taliban leaderswho have lived under the Afghan or foreign governments patronage in Kabul,Turkey, the UAE, Qatar or elsewhere have continued to profess loyalty to MullahOmar.

Although Motasem Agha Jan, former Taliban finance minister and deposed headof the political commission of the Taliban leadership council in Quetta-Pakistan, hasspoken of moderate vs. extremist Taliban tendencies under Mullah Omars unifiedleadership, the issue seems to be more one of approach than principle or objective.According to him, the extremists believe in success solely through the militarycampaign while the moderates also recognise the value of negotiations.35 Some ofAgha Jans remarks in his interview from Turkey were indeed unprecedented, such asthe apology for the Talibans past atrocities and the admission that there are extremistsamong the Taliban, but these are the views of someone whose authority to speak forthe Taliban has been repudiated by the latter and there is no evidence to suggest the


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existence of support to him on the ground in defiance of the Talibans official policydictated from Quetta.36 In February 2014, the Afghan government once again steppedup its media campaign to claim that it was negotiating with representatives of theTaliban under the leadership of Agha Jan in the UAE, but the Taliban once againdenounced Agha Jan and reiterated their refusal to negotiate with the government.37

On the contrary, a case could be made for the sceptics of the official reconciliationprogramme to argue that the policy has in fact undermined cohesion within thebroader outlines of the anti-Taliban political forces that collectively formed thepost-Taliban administration in earlier years. It has also undermined trust betweenthe Afghan government and the US, as indicated by Karzais suspension of theBilateral Security Agreement (BSA) negotiations which caused concern toAfghanistans other international partners such as India and Germany showing dis-quiet at the way the Talibans Qatar office was inaugurated. Even after the BSA wasendorsed by the Consultative Loya Jirga (CLJ) in November 2013, Karzai raised thestakes, and tension, by asking the US to facilitate the launch of peace negotiationswith the Taliban as one of three preconditions for signing the document.38

At the time of writing, Karzai seemingly remains firm in his refusal to sign theBSA, arguably hoping to win over the Taliban leadership to reciprocate his peaceovertures with the intermediary help of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In the latest twistto the saga and in the wake of a headline-grabbing terrorist attack by the Taliban on apopular Lebanese restaurant in the heart of Kabul, the Afghan interior minister OmarDaoudzai spoke out against the policy in these words:

If anyone is thinking that the delay in the conclusion of the security pact would induce them[Taliban] to come to the negotiating table, last nights attack made it clear that it is not thecase. They neither come to the negotiating table nor forgive us.39

Talibans manipulative response

Although the Taliban have officially rejected the Afghan governments reconciliationpolicy and refused to negotiate with it, they have taken advantage of it for securingthe release of their prisoners, obtaining international legitimacy, infiltrating statesecurity structures, extending the reach of their propaganda and influencing popularperceptions of security through public agitation and symbolic action.

The release of Taliban prisoners from the US-run detention facilities inGuantanamo Bay and Bagram Airbase, and other prisons under the control of theAfghan government, has been a persistent demand of the Taliban. While the belli-gerent Taliban have held fast to their official position of not negotiating with theAfghan government, the reconciled Taliban appear keen on using every opportunityin the media and possibly in private audiences with government leadership to press forthe release of more Taliban prisoners as a confidence-building measure. Apparentlydesperate for the Talibans recognition of its reconciliation policy, the Afghan govern-ment has not only released hundreds and possibly even thousands of Taliban prisonersin Afghanistan, but it has become the primary advocate of the release of other Talibanprisoners from US-run detention facilities and Pakistani prisons as well.40 Thegovernment and HPC officials have suggested that released Taliban leaders wouldfacilitate negotiations with the belligerent Taliban. More recently Karzai asked thevisiting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to ensure the full release of formerTaliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Beradar.41


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While the released Taliban leaders are yet to prove that they are willing and able tofacilitate such negotiations, the policy of unilateral concessions to the Taliban in thehope of winning their unforthcoming confidence has caused concern to the advocatesof the rule of law and even some government officials as evidence abounds ofnumerous released Taliban leaders having rejoined the insurgency.42 In someinstances freed Taliban prisoners have carried out highly significant terrorist attackson various military and civilian targets. In November 2012, a high profile HPCdelegation visited Islamabad and lobbied the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) govern-ment and the Pakistani military for the unqualified release of Taliban prisoners inPakistan. Upon his return, HPC chairman Salahuddin Rabbani held a press conferencein Kabul and presented the Pakistani authorities concession to release nine Talibanleaders as a major achievement towards peace and reconciliation.43 In subsequentweeks and months when it became clear that none of the released Taliban leaders werewilling to facilitate negotiations, the Afghan government and the HPC resumed theirdeflective rhetoric of Pakistani betrayal without even trying to explain the rationalefor their previously euphoric statements.44

The governments reconciliation policy has also served as a useful vehicle to bringthe Taliban out of the cold and accord them political legitimacy in Afghanistan andabroad. Parallel to its efforts to secure the release of Taliban prisoners, the Afghangovernment became a key advocate of official Taliban representation offices incountries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey and the Obama administration sought toopen a political office for the Taliban in Qatar. The governments support for theTalibans political offices likely also stems from its desire to provide an address forthe belligerent Taliban in order to facilitate official negotiations, a policy concessionlong sought by the reconciled Taliban figures living under the governments patron-age. Meanwhile, the government has advocated the right of safe passage and traveldocuments to any Taliban representatives who wish to participate in national orinternational initiatives for negotiating peace in Afghanistan.

The Taliban leadership appears intent on taking full advantage of the favourabledisposition of the Afghan government and the US-led coalitions increasing opennesstowards the Talibans political offices and participation in international fora. Havingconsistently denied reports of negotiations with purported Taliban representatives onseveral occasions elsewhere in the past, the Taliban leadership council for the firsttime in January 2012 officially designated their representatives to negotiate with USofficials in Qatar.45 Later, in June and December of the same year, the Talibanleadership authorised their official representatives to participate in two differentconferences organised by a university in Japan and a research organisation inFrance respectively. The Afghan government and HPC representatives also partici-pated in the two conferences, as did a number of other individuals representingvarious Afghan political factions.

The Afghan governments attempt to portray the conference in Japan as evidenceof progress in its reconciliation policy was pre-empted as the Taliban issued astatement rejecting any notion that the event marked a departure from their policyof not negotiating with the government or the HPC. The Taliban issued a similarlyabortive statement prior to the conference in Paris, thereby denying the Afghangovernment and the HPC any chance of claiming even the smallest amount of creditfor the event. In both cases, the Taliban statements claimed that their representativeshad participated in the events to present their stance and policy of Islamic Emirate


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regarding the situation in Afghanistan to the participants and the international com-munity rather than negotiating with any parties therein.46

Rebuffed and possibly feeling humiliated, the Afghan government responded byquestioning the bona fides of the Taliban representatives at the Paris conferencedespite an official Taliban statement clearly designating them in such a capacity.47

Later, the Afghan foreign minister clarified that the government would never acceptthe Talibans office in Qatar unless they agreed to negotiate directly with the govern-ment. During his visit to Washington in January 2013, President Karzai also soughtassurances from the US leadership that the Talibans office in Qatar be made condi-tional upon their acceptance of direct negotiations with the Afghan government.

Finally, in June 2013 the Talibans office under the title Islamic Emirate ofAfghanistan was inaugurated with wide media publicity. In a joint press conferencewith the Qatari deputy foreign minister, the Taliban representatives read out theirdefiant inaugural statement ruling out any negotiations with the Afghan government,stressing the continuation of its armed campaign and describing the role of thePolitical Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in lines reminiscent of a fulldiplomatic mission.48 Apparently, the name of the Taliban office and the manner inwhich it was inaugurated ran contrary to the assurances given by US officials toPresident Karzai that the office would not be used for any purposes other thannegotiations. The Afghan government, political opposition groups and many main-stream politicians in Afghanistan denounced the event. President Karzai suspendednegotiations on the BSA expected to provide for the continued presence of residualUS forces after ISAFs mandate comes to an end in 2015.

There is also some evidence to suggest that the Taliban have tried to takeadvantage of the governments placatory peace policies to target key officials, infil-trate the security forces and undermine the perception of security through highlyspectacular and symbolic actions. Examples include the assassination of BurhanuddinRabbani and the attempted assassination of the Afghan intelligence chief by purportedpeace emissaries; the attack on the UN office and killing of a number of UN staff andtheir security guards in demonstrations spearheaded by Taliban agitators who hadenjoyed government hospitality at the HPC guesthouse as reconciling formerTaliban; and reports of reconciled Taliban joining the Afghan police force only tokill their colleagues before rejoining the Taliban.49

Last but not least, some of the reconciled Taliban have served to extend the reachof the belligerent Talibans propaganda into the mainstream Afghan and internationalmedia. For example, Mullah Motawakkel, Mullah Zaeef, Sayed Akbar Agha andWahid Mozhda have participated in numerous TV talk shows and have given inter-views to Afghan and international media in which they have consistently defendedand justified the Talibans present and past policies in all manner of ways. Theirnarratives and assertions are hardly any different from those proffered by the belli-gerent Talibans official spokesmen.50 More recently, Afghanistans National SecurityAdvisor (NSA), Rangin Dadfar Spanta, accused an unidentified political activist andmedia commentator of acting as a Taliban stooge to organise anti-BSA publicdemonstrations and giving media interviews in support of the Taliban.51 Soon afterthese allegations, the Afghan intelligence apparatus leaked extensive records of WahidMozhdas telephone conversations with a member of the Taliban leadership council,where Mozhda could be heard taking orders and seeking to coordinates his mediainterviews and political activities in Kabul with the Taliban.52


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Conclusion

Afghanistans official policy of peace and reconciliation partakes little of the empiricalstudies and experiences of other post-conflict reconciliation initiatives around theworld in the past several decades. It is mainly intended to facilitate negotiationsbetween the government and violent armed groups rather than a nationwide processof healing and reconstructing broken relationships through active community involve-ment, recognition of the sufferings of the victims and admission of wrongs committedby perpetrators. The imperative of justice has fallen victim to politics of convenienceand appeasement towards some of the worst human rights abusers that are neitherrepentant nor recognise the legitimacy of the representative political system designedto manage and sublimate the potential for future conflicts. Meanwhile, the selectiveand convenient use of religious concepts and values by both sides has facilitated apacifist government policy as opposed to aggressive violent groups intent on over-throwing the political system.

The government leadership, political factions or personalities and the US havemade use of the rhetoric of peace and reconciliation for their varied political purposes,but the anti-government violent groups seem to have benefited the most from the lackof a unified approach among these stakeholders in the survival and continuity of thecurrent political system in Afghanistan. Far from reciprocating the governmentspacifist policy, the violent groups, particularly the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami, haveused the available opportunities to secure the release of their prisoners, win interna-tional legitimacy, infiltrate the state security structures and other bodies, extend thereach of their propaganda and influence popular perceptions of security throughpublic agitation and symbolic action. In what appears to be a well-calibrated policyresponse, the Taliban have relentlessly and regularly slighted the government leader-ship as a puppet in their statements and publications and have refused to negotiatewith it. The strategy seems to have had the desired effect, prompting the governmentleadership to become exceedingly more aggressive against the US-led internationalpartners but pleading ever more for negotiations with the Taliban.

Unless review and remedial measures are undertaken towards a just, accountable,broad-based, unified and results-oriented programme, Afghanistans official reconci-liation initiative in its current shape is unlikely to facilitate peace in the country. Onthe contrary, it can incentivise resort to violence, further embolden the violent groupsand undermine cohesion among the supporters of the political system, with increas-ingly deleterious consequences for the stability of the country.

Justice is an integral part of any meaningful reconciliation policy. While painfulcompromises and some degree of amnesty and forgiveness seem pertinent to the caseof Afghanistan, as in many other national reconciliation initiatives elsewhere, thedeliberate attempts to blur the lines of distinction between the perpetrators and victimsis unlikely to be helpful for the purpose. Dividing serious human rights violators andwar criminals into Afghan and non-Afghan and calling the latter disaffected brothersis neither justice nor deterrence against recidivism. In cases where pardons andamnesties are due, the programme should avoid giving the impression that criminalscan overcome or steer clear of the judicial process through exceeding violence as itundermines the morale of the law enforcement agencies and further alienates thepublic from state institutions.

The Afghan parliament enjoys the sole constitutional authority to hold the govern-ment accountable for its policies and performance, but the reconciliation programme


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has continued effectively under the auspices of the government without any parlia-mentary oversight of the HPCs membership or policies. Closely related to theimperative of accountability and public confidence is the necessity to broaden thescope of consultations and even membership of the HPC through engagement andpositive cooperation with major political groupings, civil society organisations andconflict resolution experts. The government cannot hope to pursue a successfulnational reconciliation programme without genuine engagement and consultationwith various official and unofficial agencies of public representation. It will alsoensure a unified approach to negotiations and minimise the chances for the militantsto manipulate internal competition for deal making among various factions andstakeholders in the political system.

Finally, the reconciliation programme needs to show evidence of its effectivenessin terms of reducing violence, inducing the militants to come to terms with theconstitutional order and holding the reconciled elements responsible to genuinelyshow remorse about past violations and disavow their belligerent colleagues whocontinue to commit war crimes and human rights violations.

As Afghanistan approaches presidential elections in April 2014, the Afghansappear eager for positive change in the status quo. Leading presidential candidateshave variously expressed commitment to defend the democratic political order andenforce the law, while keeping the doors of reconciliation open to the insurgents. Yetthere is little by way of specific policy proposals as to how exactly they would makethe programme more effective for lasting peace and less susceptible to insidiousmanipulation.

Notes1. Mark Freedman, Making Reconciliation Work: The Role of Parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary

Union and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, France, 2005.2. David Bloomfield et al. (eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook, Bulls

Tryckeri AB Halmstad, Stockholm, 2003, p. 23.3. However, the scope of Afghanistans official reconciliation policy is not explicitly limited to

any particular militant group, but in reality is mainly directed at the congeries of persons andfactions collectively known as Taliban. Hence, the focus of this article is mainly thegovernments reconciliation policy towards the Taliban. Those who have joined the politicalsystem in various capacitiesi.e. government officials, elected or appointed parliamentariansare reconciled with the political system and the nature of its relations with the outside world,therefore the reconciliation policy is not directed against them.

4. James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? RussellSage Foundation, New York, 2004, pp. 213257. See also Elin Skar et al. (eds.), Roads toReconciliation, Lexington Books, New York/Oxford, 2005, p. 4.

5. For an account of violence in repression in modern Afghan history see R.D. Mcchesney andM. Khorrami (eds.), The History of Afghanistan: Fayz Muhammad Katib Hazarahs Siraj Al-tawarikh, Brill, Leiden, 2012. See also Mir Gholam Mohammad Ghobar, Afghanistan in theCourse of History, Vol. II, American Speedy, Herndon, VA, 1999.

6. Karen Fogg, in David Bloomfield et al., no. 2, p. 5.7. See Heela Najibullah, Afghan Attempts at Peace and Reconciliation 1986 and 2010: A

Comparison, Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi, 2011.8. Moonis Ahmar, A Tale of Two Reconciliations, South Asia Global Affairs, August 2011.9. Ashley J. Tellis, Reconciling with the Taliban: Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in

Afghanistan, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, DC, 2009, p. 5.10. Afghan Voice Agency (AVA), January 3, 2011, at http://www.avapress.com/vdchk-ni.23nkidftt2.

html.


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http://www.avapress.com/vdchk-ni.23nkidftt2.htmlhttp://www.avapress.com/vdchk-ni.23nkidftt2.html

11. President Karzais Inauguration Speech, Kabul, November 19, 2009, at http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2009/11/president-karzai%E2%80%99s-inauguration-speech/ (AccessedJuly 10, 2012).

12. On a TV talk show hosted by Ajmal Alemzai, Abdul Salam Zaeef and Wakil AhmadMotawakkel were present in the studio and Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahmadi spokevia telephone. At the time of writing, this talk show still holds the distinction of being the onlylive Afghan TV programme in which the three have participated together. Ariana TelevisionNetwork, Kabul, March 18, 2009, at www.arianatelevision.com.

13. Ariana Television Network, February 1, 2010; Tolonews, October 15, 2010 (www.arianatelevision.com; www.tolonews.com).

14. Daniel Philpott, Religion, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: The State of Field, SSRCWorking Papers, October 2007, p. 17.

15. The Quran, Chapter 4, Verse 128 and Chapter 49, Verse 10. The official website is found atwww.hpc.org.af (Accessed July 21, 2013).

16. A more complete understanding of Chapter 49, Verse 10 is possible only in conjunction withits preceding Chapter 49, Verse 9 which enjoins collective martial action against the belligerentparty that defies peaceful mediations.

17. The Quran, Chapter 8, Verse 39. A more complete understanding of this verse and the similarChapter 2, Verse 193 is possible only if they are read in full as they enjoin positive reciprocityin case of cessation of hostilities by the enemy.

18. David Bloomfield, Reconciliation: An Introduction, in David Bloomfield et al., no. 2, pp.1011.

19. Mark Freedman, no. 1.20. Siri Gloppen, Roads to Reconciliation: A Conceptual Framework, in Elin Skar et al., no. 4.

See also Luc Huse and Mark Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after ViolentConflict: Learning from the African Experiences, Institute for Democrary and ElectoralAssistance (IDEA), Stockholm, Sweden 2008, pp. 1746.

21. David Bloomfield, no. 18, p. 16.22. Afghanistan Annual Report 2012: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, United Nations

Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), Kabul, February 2013.23. A Call for Justice: A National Consultation on Past Human Rights Violations in Afghanistan,

IHRCA, 2005.24. Peace, Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan: Action Plan, Government of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan, 2005.25. Emily Winterbotham, The State of Transitional Justice in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research

and Evaluation Unit, April 2010.26. National Reconciliation, General Amnesty and National Stability Law, Official Gazette of

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Serial No. 965, December 13, 2008.27. Sari Kouvo, After Two Years in Legal Limbo: A First Glance at the Approved Amnesty

Law, Afghan Analysts Network (AAN), February 22, 2010.28. Bonn Talks: Who Is Being Heard?, BBC News, November 28, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.

uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1681329.stm (Accessed January 22, 2014).29. During the closing session of the Consultative Loya Jirga on November 24, 2013, Mujaddadi

famously reaffirmed the term by declaring in front of Karzai that he has always acted asKarzais spiritual father and wali nema (benefactor).

30. Anand Gopal, Afghan Opposition Courts Taliban, The Christian Science Monitor, April 3,2008.

31. The profiles and interviews of all 11 presidential candidates could be accessed from thewebsite of Afghanistans leading news channel, at www.tolonews.com/elections2014(Accessed January 19, 2014).

32. Security Council Votes to Separate Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Lists, UN News Centre,June 17, 2011.

33. See, for example, Taliban leader Mullah Omars Eid-ul-Adha message, Voice of Jihad, October13, 2013, at http://shahamat.info/index.php/paighamoona/40372 (Accessed January 22, 2014).

34. Most recently the Taliban put forth their perspective in support of martyrdom operations inan article entitled Lets Understand Suicide Bombing, Voice of Jihad, June 12, 2013.

35. Exclusive interview with Motasem Agha Jan, Tolonews, June 24, 2013.


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http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2009/11/president-karzai%E2%80%99s-inauguration-speechhttp://www.afghanistan-un.org/2009/11/president-karzai%E2%80%99s-inauguration-speechhttp://www.arianatelevision.comhttp://www.arianatelevision.comhttp://www.arianatelevision.comhttp://www.tolonews.comhttp://www.hpc.org.afhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1681329.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1681329.stmhttp://www.tolonews.com/elections2014http://shahamat.info/index.php/paighamoona/40372

36. Statement of the Islamic Emirates Spokesman against an Unfounded Claim, Voice of Jihad,August 16, 2012.

37. Statement of Islamic Emirate Regarding Allegations by Agha Jan Mutasim and DubaiInitiative, Voice of Jihad, February 20, 2014.

38. President Karzais inaugural and concluding speeches to CLJ delegates, Afghanistan NationalTV, November 21 and 24, 2013.

39. Daoudzai: Talks with the Taliban is Unrelated to the Signing of the Security Agreement withAmerica, BBC Persian, January 18, 2014, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2014/01/140122_k02-daoudzai-bsa-taleban.shtml (Accessed January 22, 2014).

40. According to an investigative report by independent Afghan Channel 1 TV, since late 2012 theHPC has requested and President Karzai has ordered the release of 536 Taliban prisonerscaptured and sentenced to various terms on charges of planning and facilitating suicidebombings and other terrorist offences. Channel 1 TV, December 23, 2013.

41. President Karzai Stresses on Official Start of Peace Process and Called for Full Release ofMullah Abdul Ghani Beradar, Press Release, Presidential Website, November 30, 2013, athttp://president.gov.af/fa/news/26808 (Accessed December 23, 2013).

42. Pardoned Taliban Lead Conflict in Afghanistan, Tolonews, January 10, 2010; Insurgents inHerat About-Face on Peace, Rejoin Fight after Release, Tolonews, November 14, 2013.

43. Rabbani: The Release of 9 Taliban Prisoners in Pakistan is Useful for Peace, BBC Persian,November 17, 2012; Rabbani: Our Visit to Pakistan Has Been Full of Achievements, RadioLiberty, November 17, 2012.

44. The independent Hasht-e Sobh Daily ran a commentary to question the HPCs early positivestatements after it could not account for the whereabouts of any of the released Talibanprisoners from Pakistani jails. See High Peace Council Should Admit Its Mistake, Hasht-eSobh Daily, January 21, 2013.

45. The Statement of the Islamic Emirate Regarding Negotiations, Voice of Jihad, January 3,2012.

46. Clarification of Spokesman of Islamic Emirate Regarding Participation in Paris Conference,Voice of Jihad, December 11, 2012. See also Text of Speech Enunciated by Islamic Emirateof Afghanistan at Research Conference in France, Voice of Jihad, December 24, 2012.

47. Bona Fides of Taliban Representatives at Paris Meeting Unclear: MoFA, Tolonews,December 25, 2012.

48. Statement Regarding Inauguration of Political Office of Islamic Emirate in Qatar, Voice ofJihad, June 18, 2013.

49. Taliban Infiltrator Kills Five Police, Frontier Post, December 25, 2012; Betrayed WhileAsleep, Afghan Police Die at Hands of Their Countrymen, New York Times, December 27,2012.

50. The author has reviewed numerous media appearances of these and other reconciled Talibanleaders in Afghanistan. Some of their interviews with Afghan and international media arereadily accessible via YouTube and other online platforms.

51. Wahid Mojhda Confirmed Telephone Conversation with the Insurgents, BBC Persian, 22November 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2013/11/131121_l09_jirga_first_day_afghanistan.shtml (Accessed May 10, 2014).

52. Wahid Mozhda Confirmed Telephone Conversation with Taliban, Hasht-e Sobh Daily,November 24, 2013.


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http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2014/01/140122_k02-daoudzai-bsa-taleban.shtmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2014/01/140122_k02-daoudzai-bsa-taleban.shtmlhttp://president.gov.af/fa/news/26808http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2013/11/131121_l09_jirga_first_day_afghanistan.shtmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2013/11/131121_l09_jirga_first_day_afghanistan.shtml

AbstractBackground, nature and challenges of reconciliationRole of religionReconciliation and democracyThe question of justice

Political dynamics of reconciliationReconciliation and political factionsReconciliation for the US and allies

Talibans manipulative responseConclusionNotes

afgh.political reconc. policy conceieved and self defeating

Documents