afghanistan’s security and development: a grassroots, field-research perspective jorrit kamminga...
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Afghanistan’s Security and Development:
A grassroots, field-research perspective
Jorrit Kamminga
Workshop: Civil-Military Interaction Contributing to a Comprehensive Approach from an Experimentation
Perspective9 December 2010
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About the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS)
ICOS is an international, independent policy think-tank working to combine grassroots research and policy innovation at the intersections of security, development, counter-narcotics and public health issues.
ICOS is a project of the Network of European Foundations’ Mercator Fund. By developing projects on core global social issues, the objective of the NEF-Mercator Fund is to generate innovative ideas to respond to key global challenges.
The Network of European Foundations is a compact and flexible not-for-profit international organisation located in Brussels. Comprising fourteen foundations, NEF acts as an operational platform for the development of joint initiatives by foundations and other types of organised philanthropy.
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ICOS Mandate
• Independent policy think-tank with no official linkages to governments or international organisations;
• Grassroots field research and policy analysis in the fields of development, security, and counter-narcotics;
• Investigating the interaction between military and civilian policies on the ground;
• Policy recommendations for improved coordination of military and development strategies in Afghanistan and other (post)conflict zones.
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ICOS Fieldwork ExperienceThe International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) has been conducting studies in conflict zones since 2007. In this time, ICOS has carried out over 20,500 interviews across Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan. This fieldwork has examined the root causes of current crises, in order to help achieve measurable and direct policy results.
Previous ICOS Conflict Zone field research includes: Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables (November 2010); Afghanistan: Relationship Gap: (July 2010); Operation Moshtarak: Lessons Learned (May 2010); Iraq - Angry Hearts and Angry Minds (June 2008); Chronic Failures in the War on Terror - From Afghanistan to Somalia (April 2008); Afghan and Somali Views on the United States Presidential Elections 2008 (April 2008); On a Knife Edge: Rapid Assessment Field Survey, Southern and Eastern Afghanistan (May 2007).
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ICOS Fieldwork Experience in Afghanistan
Challenges Geographical focus of the field work sometimes limited by the security environment; Interviewees willing to participate yet mindful of insurgent and government presence in the area; Outspoken about the general situation in the country yet sometimes reluctant to evaluate openly local and national political actors;Opportunities Many Afghans eager to express their views, needs, and frustrations; Grassroots interviews at regular intervals crucial for evaluation of trends in Afghan public opinion and to develop targeted, comprehensive approach.
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ICOS Fieldwork Planning
1)Trip planning and organisation;2)Development, testing and fine-tuning of the questionnaires;3)Forming research teams in the field;4)Analysis of data;5)Presentation of main findings to military community;6)Presentation of main findings to international media and policy community.
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Addressing civil-military interaction
1) Grassroots approach to Afghan perceptions: asking what people feel, think, need and desire;
2 ) Evaluation: comprehensive assessment of the situation in Afghan communities targeted by Taliban recruitment;
3) Policy solutions: developing civilian policies linked to the existing military strategies, as part of the comprehensive approach.
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Current situation
• Post-Lisbon: Transition calendar has been established;• Learning from or within Afghanistan?• Is there enough time to improve the comprehensive approach on the ground?• Democratization process seriously under threat• Future with us vs future with Taliban/Al Qaeda 8
Field Research March – October 2010
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March: 527 interviews in Helmand and Kandahar
June: 552 interviews in Helmand and Kandahar
October: 1500 interviews in Helmand, Kandahar, Panjshir and Parwan
Research Findings:
Longitudinal Questions
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L1.Was the recent military operation in your area good or bad for the Afghan people?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Good’March 2010
June 2010
October 2010
Status
Marjah31% 1% 44%
Improved
Lashkar Gahn/a 27% 59%
Improved
Garmsirn/a 23% 25%
No change
Nawan/a 20% 51%
Improved
Kandahar City n/a 64% 66%No
change
Panjwai n/a 24% 30%Improve
d
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L2. Do you think that working with foreign forces is right or wrong?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Right’
June 2010October
2010Status
Marjah 2% 30% ImprovedLashkar Gah 35% 61% Improved
Garmsir 16% 20% ImprovedNawa 16% 30% Improved
Kandahar City 49% 64% ImprovedPanjwai 19% 16% No change
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L3. Do the foreigners respect or disrespect your religion and tradition?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Respect’
June 2010October
2010Status
Marjah 22% 39% ImprovedLashkar Gah 18% 21% No change
Garmsir28% 15%
Deteriorated
Nawa 8% 47% Improved
Kandahar City 30% 18%
Deteriorated
Panjwai 5% 8% No change
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L4. Do you support or oppose military operations against the Taliban in the area?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Support’March 2010
June 2010October
2010Status
Marjah 67% 20% 37% ImprovedLashkar Gah n/a 42% 67% Improved
Garmsirn/a 46% 22%
Deteriorated
Nawa n/a 35% 32% No changeKandahar
City n/a 68% 60%Deteriorate
dPanjwai n/a 5% 18% Improved
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L5. Was the number of Afghans joining the Taliban in the last year higher, lower or the same as before?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Higher’
March 2010 June 2010October
2010Status
Marjah 95% 81% 14% ImprovedLashkar Gah n/a 44% 24% Improved
Garmsir n/a 64% 22% ImprovedNawa n/a 31% 23% Improved
Kandahar City n/a 59% 21% Improved
Panjwai n/a 65% 36% Improved
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L6. Do you believe the NATO forces protect the local population?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Yes’
June 2010October
2010Status
Marjah26% 13%
Deteriorated
Lashkar Gah 27% 34% ImprovedGarmsir 40% 59% Improved
Nawa35% 24%
Deteriorated
Kandahar City 36% 45% ImprovedPanjwai 14% 17% No change
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L7. Compared to one year ago is your opinion of the foreign forces more positive or more negative?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘More negative’
June 2010October
2010Status
Marjah 73% 23%Improvem
ent
Lashkar Gah 46% 15%Improvem
ent
Garmsir 47% 18%Improvem
ent
Nawa 55% 17%Improvem
entKandahar City 44% 44% No change
Panjwai 59% 60% No change
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L.8 Who is winning the war?Percentage of respondents saying ‘NATO and
the Afghan government’
June 2010October
2010Status
Marjah34% 64%
Improvement
Lashkar Gah 73% 69% No change
Garmsir58% 53%
Deterioration
Nawa80% 64%
Deterioration
Kandahar City 71% 67% No change
Panjwai 41% 47%
Improvement
Selected Research Findings:
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Pictures of 9/11 shown to interviewees before asking the
next question
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Do you recognise this picture?
Yes NoGarmsir 53% 47%Marjah 61% 39%Naawa 60% 40%
Lashkar Gah 45% 55%Sangin 39% 61%
Helmand 52% 48%Kandahar City 83% 17%
Panjwayi 83% 17%
Zhari 86% 14%
Kandahar 84% 16%
Total 68% 32%
After being shown the picture on previous slide:
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Interviewer reads: “On September 11 2001, Al Qaeda attackers hijacked planes in the United States which were full of ordinary passengers, including women and children. They flew these planes, full of people, into two tall buildings in the city of New York. They destroyed both buildings, which were full of ordinary people.
The attacks killed 3000 innocent citizens, including Muslims. They were organised and directed by Al Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden, who was then living in Afghanistan protected by the Taliban government.
The American government asked the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. They refused, so the Americans and their allies NATO attacked the Taliban, and came into Afghanistan to look for Osama Bin Laden and overthrew the Taliban.”
Explanation of 9/11
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Did you know about this event which the foreigners call 9/11?
Yes No
Garmsir 1% 99%Marjah 12% 88%Naawa 11% 89%
Lashkar Gah 14% 86%Sangin 3% 97%
Helmand 8% 92%Kandahar City 8% 92%
Panjwayi 1% 99%Zhari 13% 87%
Kandahar 8% 92%
Total 8% 92%
After being read the explanation on previous slide:
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Interviewer reads: “NATO is an alliance of lots of foreign countries, including the United States. If one member of the alliance is attacked, all other members have a duty to join them in the response.
So because the United States was attacked the other foreigners, like Canadians, British and Dutch, are also in Afghanistan.”
Explanation of NATO
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, June 2010
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
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Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
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What could a Taliban government provide which the current Afghan government cannot?
Total
Security 52%Stop corruption 19%
No answer / Don’t know 11%Efficient government and
administration 9%Provide Justice 6%
Sharia law & Islamic schools 3%Nothing 1%
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
What can we do?
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I. Influencing Grassroots Political Dynamics to
tackle Taliban Recruitment
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Current situation Afghans do not understand why we are there; Military operations have provoked anger, disillusionment and more hostility; Civilian casualties and refugee flows are seen as consequences of the international presence; We need “Dramatic Positive Local Actions”; Symbolic cultural and political acts to increase support for the international community’s presence. We should deal directly with the Afghan people
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International Community and
NATO-ISAFAfghan
Government and Afghan
Elites
The Afghan People
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Dealing directly with the Afghan people…
Non-Violent Security Instruments
Tackling the insurgency recruitment by providing the youth with a sustainable future,
social empowerment and a stake in the society:
Marriage allowances and grants for necessary wedding celebrations;Family allowances and grants for new families on the birth of their first child;Housing allowances;Land allotments for residences and businesses;Monthly stipends for poor families; A widespread, dramatic programme of micro-financing.
COIN Impact Equation
Meet Negative Impact with a Positive Impact
Positive Impact must be greater than Negative Impact
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Interfering With Insurgency Recruitment
Example 1: Marriage Allowance
Providing young Afghans with a sense of social achievement, belonging and purpose:
ICOS field research has revealed that supporting young men to get married is perceived by Afghan interviewees as one of the key factors for limiting Taliban recruitment.
Providing financial assistance to cover the high costs of a dowry and a wedding would provide them with a stable family situation and socio-economic responsibilities, reducing the risks of Taliban recruitment.
Example 2: Restoration of religious sites and Quran
distributionDemonstrating respect for Afghan culture and
religion
The presence of the international community in Afghanistan is often portrayed in Taliban propaganda as a “War against Islam”. Countering this perception is vital to winning hearts and minds, including:
A programme to restore local mosques and shrines, as well as sites of historical importance
A Quran distribution programme could be a complementing element to this initiative. 42
Example 3: Land Allotments
Providing Afghans with a stake in stable development
Land titling is designed to help or facilitate landless poor purchase land through grants. It usually involves the redistribution of state-owned land.
In Afghanistan this would increase land ownership, create sustainable households, and help inoculate the youth against Taliban recruitment.
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II. Refugee Support and Aid Capacity
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Current situation
Each substantial military operation since 2006 has caused new flows of internally displaced people. Since 2006 many new IDP camps, especially in the south. Makeshift refugee camps are overcrowded, lack of sufficient food, medical supplies and shelter. Symbolic failure of our “hearts and minds” approach. Solution: military should deliver humanitarian aid and assistance.
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III. Counter-Narcotics Policy
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Current situation Poppy cultivation stable (123,000 hectares); Opium production down 48% (3,600 metric tons) 1.6 million of Afghans directly dependent on the illegal opium economy. No structural, short term solutions. Alternative livelihood programmes take time. Taliban earns roughly US$ 125 million a year from the illegal opium economy.
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Poppy for Medicine (P4M)
Poppy for Medicine is a combination of a classic counter-narcotics policy addressing illegal poppy cultivation and opium production.
It is an economic development tool aiming at reducing Afghanistan´s dependence on the illegal opium economy, and a counter-insurgency instrument tackling the recruitment base of the insurgency.
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How would P4M work?
Counter-Insurgency Putting the Afghan poppy farmers in business with us, not with the
Taliban Decreasing dependence of farmers on insurgency and criminal actors Linking local communities with the central government Giving Afghan farmers a vested interest in stable and legitimate state
institutionsCounter-Narcotics
Producing an Afghan brand of morphine instead of illegal heroin Integrating poppy farming communities into the legal economy
Control “One village – one license”: Local Afghan ownership and commitment Central role for the local shura Expertise and support of international (development) community Export of medicines, not raw opium 49
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Taliban Revenues
“Externally, funding originates in Islamic states…
Internally, a significant portion of funds are derived from opium trade or other illicit activities, such as timber
smuggling and illegal chromite mining in RC-East.”
Source: The Report to Congress on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010
