afghanistan plan - kagan
TRANSCRIPT
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AfghanistanForceRequirements
FrederickW.Kagan
Director,CriticalThreatsProject,AmericanEnterpriseInstituteKimberlyKagan
President,InstitutefortheStudyofWar19
SEP
2009
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Disclaimer
Theviews,opinions,recommendations,and
conclusionsin
this
document
are
solely
those
oftheauthorsanddonotreflectonthe
opinionsorrecommendationsoftheir
institutionsorofanyotherindividualororganization.
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ContentsTopic Slides
Objectives andStrategicFramework 45
GovernanceandLegitimacy 611
Afghan,US,andInternationalForces 1217
Internationalpresenceasanoccupation 18
Prioritizingefforts
country
wide 19
21
RegionalCommandSouth 2232
Helmand 2728
Kandahar 2932
RegionalCommandEast 3335
Theatersynergies 36
Force
Requirements 37
38Consequencesofunderresourcing 39
Changingtoapurecounterterrorismstrategy 4044
Noteonpopulation figures 45
Contactinformation 46
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Objectives
CreateconditionsinAfghanistantoprevent
there
establishment
of
safe
havens
for
al
Qaedaandothertransnationalterrorist
groups
Establishsufficientstabilitytoensurethat
theseconditionscanbesustainedovertime
withforeign
financial
assistance
but
with
very
limitedforeignmilitarypresence
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COINStrategicFramework Security
DefeattheinsurgencytogetherwiththeANSF
ExpandandimprovetheANSFasrapidlyaspossible
Makethelinescross
Governance Remediate
damage
that
corruption
and
abuse
of
power
have
done
to
the
legitimacyoftheAfghanGovernment
HelpandcajoleGIRoA toemplacesystemsandprocedurestoimprovelegitimacyoverthenextfewyears
ImprovethecapacityofGIRoA atalllevelstoprovideessentialservicestotheAfghan
people,
especially
security,
justice,
dispute
resolution,
and
basic
agriculturalandtransportationinfrastructure
Development FocusdevelopmenteffortsonbuildingAfghancapacitytodeveloptheirown
countryratherthanondevelopingitforthem
Ensurethatdevelopmentempowersthegovernment,nottheenemy
Addresscorruptionandtheperceptionofcorruptionwithintheinternationaldevelopmenteffort
Securityandgovernancehavepriorityoverdevelopment
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GovernanceandTroopLevels
ImprovingAfghangovernancerequiresasignificantpresenceofinternationalforcesto: Provide
security
and
mobility
to
advisors,
mentors,
andauditors
Provideindependentsourcesofinformationaboutthe
situationon
the
ground
Providethebureaucraticinfrastructurethroughwhichtodisburseandmonitortheexpenditureoffundsinanorganizedandpurposefulmanner
Createchecksonabusesofpowerbylocalofficials
Provideplanningcapabilitiesattheprovincialandlocallevel
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AfghanGovernmentLegitimacy
EstablishingthelegitimacyoftheAfghangovernmentisarequirementforsuccessfulcounterinsurgency
Electionsareonewayofestablishinglegitimacy,buttheyareneithersufficientnor
necessarilydeterminative
USmustredoubleitseffortstohelpAfghanistanestablishthelegitimacyoftheinstitutionsofitsgovernment
AkeypartoftheseeffortsmustbedramaticallyincreasingtransparencyinAfghanbudgetaryprocedures(buildingonmodelsalreadyinplaceinsomeministries)
TheUS
must
also
work
to
encourage
the
Afghan
government
to
establish
proceduresforelectingprovincialanddistrictgovernorsandsubgovernorswhoarecurrentlyappointedbythepresident
TheUSandtheinternationalcommunitytogethercontrolvirtuallyallofAfghanistansbudget;theyhaveenormousleverageiftheychoosetouseit(much
morethan
the
leverage
the
US
had
on
oil
rich
Iraq)
ThepresenceoflargenumbersofAmericanandinternationalforcesandtheirreplaceableroletheycurrentlyplayinprovidingsecurityfortheAfghangovernmentanditsofficialsalsoofferenormousleverage
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SourcesofLegitimacy Elections
are
one
source
of
legitimacy,
but
only
one
Legitimacyisalsodefinedbytheperformanceofthegovernment,bothinitsabilitytoprovidedesiredservicesandinitsadherencetosocialnorms
Karzai wouldlikelyhavewonfairelections,althoughpossiblynotinthe
first
round,
and
he
would
almost
certainly
have
carried
the
Pashtun areas
heavilysotheproblemisnottheimpositionofanunacceptableleaderbutratherthemanipulationsthatledtothisparticularoutcome
ThefraudisunquestionablydamagingtoKarzais legitimacyandthereforeharmfultotheISAFeffort
Butin
the
mid
and
long
term,
legitimacy
will
be
defined
much
more
by
theactionsKarzai andtheinternationalcommunitytakenowthanbythefraudulenceoftheseelections
Weshouldnotcondonethefraud;onthecontrary,weshoulddeploreit
Butwe
should
accept
the
outcome
of
the
Afghan
legal
processes
now
underwaytoreviewtheresultandthendevelopanduseallpossibleleveragewithKarzai toshapethenewgovernmentinwaysthewillrepairthedamagetoitslegitimacyandbegintoimprovethesituation
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LegitimacyAftertheElection TheUScanalsoworktohelptheAfghangovernmentreformitselfusing
toolssimilar
to
those
we
employed
in
helping
the
Iraqi
government
rid
itselfofmalignactorssupportingsectariancleansinganddeathsquadsin2007: USforcescancollectevidenceofmalfeasancebyAfghanofficialsatalllevels
Thatevidencecanbepresentedtothoseofficials,totheirsuperiors,toKarzai,to
Afghan
courts,
to
the
public,
or,
in
some
cases,
to
international
courts
Insomecases,criminalactionshouldresult;insomecases,theofficialsshouldberemoved;insomecases,theaimissimplytopressurethoseofficialstostopcertainspecificbehaviorsthatthreatenthesuccessofthemission
Thisisnotacrusadeagainstcorruptionofficialsareonlytargetedwhentheiractions
seriously
jeopardize
our
efforts
ThisdoesnotrequiretheremovalofKarzai orsomeofhiskeyallies(includingfamilymembers)frompositionsofpowerasinIraq,itshouldbepossibletorechannel theirbehaviorawayfromtheactivitiesthataremostdamaging
The
US
has
demonstrated
that
it
can
generate
such
precise
and
surgical
pressureon
critical
points
in
apolitical
system
in
Iraq
ThisapproachrequiressignificantnumbersofAmericanforcesactivelypatrollingamongthepopulationonlyinthatwaycanourleadersdeveloptheintelligencetheyneedtodeterminewhichmalignactorsmust
beaddressed
and
to
gather
the
information
needed
to
address
them
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LegitimacyandForceLevels The
flaws
of
the
August
20
election
increase
the
requirement
for
additionalforcesratherthandecreasingit
IftheUSdeclaresthatitwillnotsendadditionalforcesbecauseofthoseflaws,itisdefactodeclaringthatitregardstheelectionasillegitimate,theKarzai governmentasillegitimate,andtheAfghanenterpriseasunworthyof
additional
effort,
all
of
which
will
seriously
exacerbate
damage
to
the
legitimacyofthegovernmentwithinAfghanistanaswellastothewilloftheinternationalcommunitytocontinuethestruggle
Failingtosendadditionalforces,moreover,deprivestheUSoftheability
to
take
advantage
of
the
opportunities
offered
by
this
flawed
election,
particularlytheopportunitiestoleverageKarzais insecurityandgrowingrecognitionthathemusttakerealstepstoreestablishthelegitimacyofhisgovernment
Thisisnotasymbolicquestionundertakinganyofthestepsoutlinedin
thisdocument
to
address
systemic
problems
that
undermine
the
legitimacyoftheAfghangovernmentrequireadditionalAmericanmilitaryforcesoperatinginaCOINmissionontheground
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LegitimacyandtheANSF
WhatistheANSFfightingforiftheUSmakesitclearthatitregardstheAfghanGovernmentasillegitimate?
TheANSF
leadership
is
well
aware
that
it
cannot
manage
theviolenceinAfghanistanonitsown
AnnouncingthatnoUSreinforcementsareonthewayislikelytodamageANSFmoraleseriously,particularlycoupled
with
US
interactions
with
the
Afghan
government
thatsuggesttheUSdoesnotacceptitslegitimacy
TheANSFdoesnotexistorfightinavacuumitsquality
andperformance
depends
heavily
on
its
belief
that
the
internationalcommunitysupportsitandwillcontinuetosupportitadequately,andonitsbeliefthatitscauseisjust
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Security:
Making
the
Lines
Cross
Sooner
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ANSFSize&Capacity
InsurgentSize&Capacity
InternationalForces
AnincreaseininternationalforcesisneededbothtoaccelerateANSFtraining
andtoreducetheinsurgentthreat,loweringtherequirementforANSFcapability
tomanagetheresidualthreatandallowingamorerapidstarttothereduction
ininternational
forces
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ANSFCurrentStatus
As
of
June
2009,
the
Afghan
Ministry
of
Defense
had
103,475
authorized
personnel,with89,521actuallyassigned. Ofthose,AfghanNationalArmyoperationalunitshad66,406soldiersauthorizedwith53,417assignedinaround80kandaks (battalions). TheremainingMoD personnelwereassignedtoheadquarters,infrastructure,ministerialandgeneralstaffpositions,andtrainingandtransferaccounts. TheAWOLrateisrunningataround9%. Theofficial
capabilityratings
of
Afghan
kandaks puts
about
66%
of
them
in
operational
status
(CM1orCM2).
Theuniformedpolicehad47,384authorizedand51,406assigned. Thepolicehavebeenineffectiveandoftenaccelerantstotheinsurgencythroughtheircorruptionandpenetrationbymilitiasandinsurgents. TheUShasbeenoverseeingareform
programcalled
Focused
District
Development,
but
as
of
February
2009
FDD
had
trainedandwasreforming55of265districts,andanother9districtswereinprogress. CSTCAplannedtoput100districtsthroughtheFDDprograminFY2010.CorruptionandineffectivenessintheANPiscompoundedbyinadequateequipmenttoplayacounterinsurgentroleAfghanUniformedPolicehavelightweapons,noheavymachineguns,andveryfewarmoredorevenuparmoredvehicles,
so
they
are
often
outgunned
by
insurgents
with
no
meaningful
protection. Forthesereasons,wecannotnowconsiderAfghanUniformedPoliceascounterinsurgents.
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BottomLine: TheANSFnowaddsaround50,000counterinsurgentstothemix
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ANSFExpansion
Currentplans
call
for
expanding
the
ANA
to
134,000
by
theendof2011
Thisexpansioncanbeacceleratedtomeetthatgoalby
October2010
Assumingthecurrentratioofcombatforcestoendstrengthofaround60%,theANAcanprobablyhave
around
80,000
troops
in
combat
formations
by
October
2010,anadditionof30,000overJune2009
Addingthatmanytroopsrequiresrecruitingand
training
even
more
to
account
for
significant
casualty
ratesamongthecombatforces
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Bottomline: TheANAcanaddaround30,000counterinsurgentsbyOctober2010,
foratotalof80,000butonlyifdecisionstoaccelerateANSFexpansionand
resourcesnecessary
for
it
are
made
and
committed
at
once
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USForces
USForcesinAfghanistancurrentlynumberaround64,000
Ofthose,roughly34,000arecombatformationsassigned
tocounter
insurgency
roles;
the
rest
are
support
elements,
trainers,andclassifiedforces
USCOINformationsincluderoughly17maneuverbattalionsandasmanyas12combatsupportbattalionsre
missioned tofunction
as
counter
insurgents
TheUScontingentthereforecanputabout23,300soldiersonthegrounddoingcounterinsurgency
In
Iraq,
by
contrast,
the
15
US
brigades
before
the
surge
could
putaround72,000counterinsurgentsontheground;attheheightofthesurge,itwasmorelike105,000
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ISAFForces
42countriesnowcontributemilitaryforcestotheNATOmissioninAfghanistan
11of
them
provide
battalion
sized
maneuver
formationsthatcanparticipateinCOINoperations:
Italy:3
Holland:1
Canada:2
France:2
Turkey1
Poland:1
Denmark:1
UK:6
Australia:1
Romania:1
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Bottomline: roughly20deployablenonUSISAFbattalionscanprovidearound
16,000counterinsurgents
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AvailableCounterInsurgents
US: 23,200
Non
US
ISAF:
16,000
AfghanNationalArmy: 50,000*
TOTAL:
89,200 ANAexpansioncanadd30,000moreby
October2010,bringingthetotalto119,200
*Onlyabout66%ofANAtroopsareinkandaks ratedasoperationallycapable(CM1orCM2)
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Occupation?
InAfghanistan,oneandahalftimesaslargeasIraqwithatleastaslargeapopulation,thetotalnumberofinternational
forces
available
to
interact
with
the
populationnowisunder50,000
MostAfghansneverseeamemberofISAF
AfghanswhointeractwithISAFforcesaregenerallyfarmoreconcernedwithwhatthoseforcesaredoingandwhetherornottheyareprovidingsecuritythanwith
howmany
of
them
there
are
Theissueofforeignoccupationisapropagandatheme,notafinelycalibratedreality
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PrioritizingEfforts MostdangerousinsurgencyisinRC(South)andintheGreaterPaktia areaofRC(East)
RC(South)
CriticalpopulationconcentrationsinHelmandRiverValleyfromGarmsir toSangin (~650k)
CriticalpopulationconcentrationsinKandahararoundKandaharCity(~1million)
Tarin Khowt (~95k)
Enemysupportzonesandsanctuariesinsurroundingareas(~780kpopulationwidely
dispersed) COINeffortshouldfocusonpopulationof~1,650,000concentratedinanareaofabout800
squaremilesinHelmandandabout450squaremilesinKandahar
Operationsinenemysanctuariesandsupportzoneswillalsoberequired,butatlesserforcedensities
RC(East)
Contestedpopulation
centers
in
Greater
Paktia (Khowst,
Paktia,
and
eastern
Paktika Provinces)
number~650koverabout3,500squaremiles,includingsomesupportzonesandsanctuaries
COINeffortsshouldfocusonKhowst Province,Paktia Province,andBermel DistrictofPaktikaProvince
ConcentrateeffortsinNangarhar andalongtheKonar RiverValley,butnotinnorthernKonar orNuristan
SustaineffortsinWardak,Lowgar,Kapisa,andParwan
AcceptsignificantriskinGhazni,andUruzgan outsideofTarin Khowt
MitigateriskinKonduz
HoldinParwan,Wardak,Lowgar,Kapisa,Laghman
AcceptriskinHerat
Acceptsignificant
risk
in
Farah
and
Nimruz,
Badghis,
and
Ghor
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P i i A
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PriorityAreas
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i ib i f d
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DistributionofANAandISAFForces
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8USbattalions
6UKbattalions
1Danishbattalion
2Canadianbattalions
1Dutchbattalion
1Australianbattalion
1Romanianbattalion
23ANA
kandaks
4USbattalions
6ANAkandaks
2USbattalions
2Frenchbattalions
1Turkishbattalion
1Italian
battalions
1Polishbattalion
11ANAkandaks
2Italianbattalions
9ANAkandaks
1GermanQRFbattalion
9ANAkandaks
3USbattalions
19ANAkandaks
ISAFandANAforcesaregenerally
deployedinaccordwiththethreatand
theaterprioritiestherearenoexcess
forcesin
any
areas
to
be
moved
around
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PopulationofContestedAreasinRC(South)byDistrict
Source: AfghanistanInformationManagementServices(www.aims.org.af),butseefinalslideformethodologicaldetail
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106Miles
ContestedDistrictsinRC(South)withTerrain
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106Miles
HQHQ
HQ
CoalitionForcesinRC(South)
Eachsymbolrepresentsonebattalion(roughly800soldiers/Marines)
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Populations of Contested Centers and Enemy Support Zones
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106MilesContestedPopulationCenters
EnemySanctuaries
and
Support
Zones
1,014,900
173,370
95,400167,550
295,700
150,000
PopulationsofContestedCentersandEnemySupportZones
andSanctuaries
Source: AfghanistanInformationManagementServices(www.aims.org.af)
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CoalitionandAfghanArmyDeploymentinHelmandProvince
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CoalitionandANSFForcesinHelmand
4,000USMarines
3,200British
soldiers
in
combat
units
800 BritishtrainerswithAfghanunits
700 Danishsoldiers
1,800AfghanNationalArmysoldiers
TOTAL:10,500counterinsurgents
ForceRatioinHelmandRiverValley(SangintoGarmsir)
7Coalitionbattalions
3Afghanarmykandaks
TOTAL:
7,400troops
615,000population
Currentforcetopopulationratio: 1:83
Ratioof1:50wouldrequire12,300counterinsurgentsor
4,900additionalforces(roughly1.5additionalbrigades)
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CoalitionandAfghanForcesinKandaharCityandEnvirons
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KandaharCity
Urbanarea
with
around
750,000
people
ISAFdoesnotmaintainpermanentsecuritypresenceorregularpatrolsinKandaharCity
3Afghankandaks inthecityarenotpartneredwithISAFforces
Talibanis
present
in
the
city
and
influences
the
city
from
surrounding
districts,
but
theextentofitspresenceandinfluenceisnotknowable
SinceAfghansdonotgenerallyfightincities,itisnotclearwhetherornotISAFandtheANSFwillhavetoclearthecitywithatraditional1:50counterinsurgencyratioofforces
Someargue
that
sending
any
ISAF
forces
into
the
city
will
cause
it
to
explode
or,
at
least,deteriorate,butthereisnoclearevidenceorhistoricalpatterntocorroboratethisassertion
WhetherornotISAFsendsforcesintothecity,theANSFwillatsomepointhavetosecureitandmaintainitssecuritycounterinsurgentrequirementsinthe
province
therefore
must
take
account
of
this
requirement
as
well TheneedtoprovideISAFassistancetotheANSFinsecuringthecityissufficiently
likelythatsoundplanningrequiresensuringthatISAFhasadequateforcesatitsdisposalforthiseventuality,givingCOMISAFtheoptionsheneedstorespondtochangingcircumstances
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CoalitionandANSFForcesinKandaharCityarea
1,600Canadiansoldiers
2,400Afghan
army
soldiers
800 USsoldiers
TOTAL: 4,800counterinsurgents
ForceRatioinKandaharCityArea
2Canadianbattalions
1US(Stryker)battalion
4Afghanarmykandaks
TOTAL: 4,800counterinsurgents
1,015,000population
Currentforceratio:1:211
1:50force
ratio
would
require
20,300
counter
insurgents
or
15,500additionaltroops(roughly4.5brigades)
AssumingNoCoalitionForcesDeployinKandaharCity
312,700population
2Canadianand1US(Stryker)brigade
1Afghanarmykandak
TOTAL: 3,000counterinsurgents
Currentforceratio: 1:104
1:50forceratiowouldrequire6,254counterinsurgentsor
3,254additional
troops
(roughly
1brigade)
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CoalitionandANAForcesinKandaharProvince
3,200USsoldiers
1,600Canadiansoldiers
2,400Afghanarmysoldiers
TOTAL: 7,200counterinsurgents
1,151,100population
Currentforceratio: 1:160
1:50forceratiowouldrequire23,022counterinsurgentsor
15,822additional
forces
(roughly
4.5
brigades)
AssumingNoCoalitionForcesDeployinKandaharCity
450,800population
5,400counterinsurgents
Current
force
ratio:
1:831:50forceratiowouldrequire9,016counterinsurgentsor
3,616additionalforces(roughly1brigade)
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ContestedAreasinGreaterPaktia
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USandAfghanForcesinGreaterPaktia
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Coalition
and
Afghan
Forces4,000USsoldiers
4,200Afghanarmysoldiers
TOTAL: 8,200counterinsurgents
650,000populationincontesteddistricts
Currentforceratio:1:79
1:50force
ratio
would
require
13,000
counterinsurgentsor
3,800additionalforces(roughly1brigade)
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TheaterSynergies
Achieving
isolated
successes
in
Helmand,
Kandahar,
Oruzgan,
and
GreaterPaktia isnotenough Isolatedinkspotssurroundedbyenemycontrolledareasare
vulnerable
The
isolation
leaves
the
enemy
too
much
flexibility
to
respond
to
coalitionoperations,fadingawayinsomeareas,concentratinginothers
Theinkspotsmustmergeatsomepointtoachievesustainablesecurity
Withcurrent
forces,
including
planned
ANSF
expansion,
there
is
no
prospectofconnectingpocketsofsuccessinanyreasonabletimeframe
Properlyresourcingthecounterinsurgencyeffortnowwouldallow
subsequentphases
of
operations
to
connect
pockets
of
success
oncetheANSFhasdevelopedenoughtoholdareasthathavebeenclearedwithlessISAFassistance
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BottomLine: AdditionalRequirements
Helmand: 1.5brigades
Kandahar: 14brigades(dependingonassumptions
aboutKandahar
City)
GreaterPaktia:1brigade
Total: 3.56.5brigades
NB:
TheDutch
battalion
in
Oruzgan will
not
be
replacedin2010andthetwoCanadianbattalionsinKandaharwillnotbereplacedin2011
Either
the
US
or
NATO
will
thus
have
to
find
an
additionalbrigadetooffsetthosedepartureswithinthenexttwoyears
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OtherConsiderations
The
best
way
to
train
indigenous
forces
rapidly
is
to
partner
coalition
units
with
them
together
in
combat
ThenewISAFcommanderisrefocusinghiseffortsonsuchpartnership
DecidingnottosendISAFunitsintoKandaharcitymeansthatanyAfghanforcestherewillnothavecoalitionpartnership
TheabsenceofcoalitionforceslegallyabletoconductregularpatrollingintheNorth,andthelack
ofsufficient
forces
to
conduct
meaningful
patrolling
in
the
West,
means
that
Afghan
forces
in
those
areasarealsonotpartnered
ThemostrapidandeffectiveprogramfordevelopingtheANSF,therefore,wouldlikelyrequiretheabilitytosendUSforcestopartnerwithAfghantroopsinKandaharCity(thehigherendoftheestimateinthepreviousslide)ANDanadditionalUSbrigadetoprovidepartnerunitsforANAkandaks intheNorthandWest
Withthese
considerations,
the
total
additional
requirement
would
be
roughly
7.5
brigades26,500
troopswithinthebrigadesthemselves;37,500overallincludingnecessaryenablers
Thetheater,moreover,iscurrentlyverysparseandrequiresadditional Routeclearanceteams
Intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissanceassetsandanalysts
Engineeringunits(tohelpbuildandmaintainbasesforexpandingISAFandANSFforces)
Aviationsupport
(particularly
helicopters,
which
are
at
apremium
in
Afghanistans
terrain)
The4th Brigadeofthe82nd AirborneDivisionwillbedeployinglaterthisyear,butithasthemissionoftrainingAfghantroopsanddoesnot,therefore,fillanyoftherequirementsidentifiedabove
Theoverallforcerequirement,thereforeislikelyinthe40,00045,000range
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ConsequencesofUnderResourcing ISAFforcesarenotadequatetotherequirementsinanypartofthecountry
SmallscaleredeploymentsinRC(East)willaddresssomelocal,tacticalissues,butcannotmakeup
forthe
operational
level
shortfalls
in
the
area
as
awhole
TherearenoforcestoberedeployedinRC(South)allarefullycommittedintasksthatcannotbeabandoned
WithoutadditionalforcesinRC(South),therefore,commanderswillfacethefollowingoptions: ContinueanindecisivefightinHelmandwhilecedingKandahartotheenemy
AbandonthefightinHelmand,acceptingamajorpropagandadefeatandhumiliatingtheBritish,cedethearea
to
the
enemy
and
allow
the
Taliban
to
extract
vengeance
on
all
those
who
co
operated
with
us,
and
attempttoretakeKandahar
ReduceforcesinHelmand,possiblytippingwhatisnowapproachingastalemateintoaslowlosescenario,andattempttoretakeKandaharwithforcesthatarenotadequatetothemission
Inallcases,commanderswilllikelybeforcedtocontinuetoshiftISAFtroopsaroundinresponsetogrowingemergencies,vitiatinganymeaningfulCOINapproach
Current
force
levels
do
not
permit
coalition
troops
to
partner
with
Afghan
forces
outside
of
HelmandandGreaterPaktia,afactorthatwillsignificantlydelaythegrowthinqualityoftheANSF
ConsideringthatANSFtroopsDONOTROTATEaroundthecountry,thismeansthatANSFforcesinNorthandWest,inKandaharCity,andinotherpartsofRC(South)arenotandwillnotbepartneredwithISAFforces
BecauseANSFforcesdonotrotate,ANAunitsinRC(South)arebeinggroundupdisproportionately.
Itis
not
at
all
clear
that
they
will
survive
even
the
current
level
of
strain.
Increasing
the
strain
by
requiringthemtoundertaketheclearingandholdingoflargeareasofenemyheldgroundwithoutUSreinforcementscouldwellbreakthem.
Asthecommanderofthe205th CorpsbasedinKandaharasked,Areyoutryingtobuildanenduring[Afghan]Armyoranexpendableone?
Bottomline: Failingtosendreinforcementsforcesourcommanderstoask,Whatpartsofthe
countrywould
you
like
us
to
cede
to
the
enemy?
How
can
we
cede
areas
to
the
enemy
and
still
achievethepresidentsobjectivesofpreventingthereestablishmentofterroristsanctuaries?
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Counter Terrorism?
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CounterTerrorism?
TherangeofanarmedPredatorUAVislessthan500milesreachingtheareas
usedin
the
1990s
as
training
camps
for
al
Qaeda
requires
bases
in
either
AfghanistanorPakistan
SpecialForcesteamscanlaunchfromfurtheraway,butrequiretheavailabilityofCombatSearchandRescuecapabilitieswhich,again,requirebasesineitherAfghanistanorPakistan
Theonly
option
for
pure
CT
operations
that
does
not
require
local
bases
is
long
rangeprecisionguidedmunitionsfiredeitherfrommannedaircraftorfromshipsorsubmarines ButPGMscanonlyhitthetargetstheyareaimedat;theycannotgatheradditionalintelligence
onthegroundorreacttochangingcircumstancesasSFteamscan,norcantheyhangaroundtoreviewtheeffectsoftheirinitialstrikeandthenretarget,asUAVscan
Thelikelihood
of
seriously
disrupting
any
network
using
only
long
range
PGMs
is
extremely
low
CToperationssuchasthesearebyfarthemostdamagingindividualundertakingsfortheperceptionofAmericaintheregiontheyhavebeentheprincipalcauseoftheciviliancasualtiesthathavesodamagedAmericasimageinAfghanistan,and
theyhave
been
the
source
of
continual
outrage
by
Pakistanis
over
the
American
violationofPakistanisovereignty
ThisstrategywouldconfineAmericanmilitaryinvolvementinthisregionsolelytosuchoperations
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CT: Intelligence? AdoptinganoverthehorizonCTapproachmeansdependingentirelyonSignals
Intelligence(SIGINT)
and
CIA
networks
to
locate
targets
EnemyleadershipisverySIGINTsavvyandveryhardtotargetusingonlysuchinformation
CIAnetworks,evensupplementedbyISIreportinginPakistanandlocalreportingthroughUSandalliedforcesinAfghanistan,arenotabletoprovidetargetable
intelligenceon
key
enemy
leaders
even
now
IttookmonthstogainactionableintelligenceonBeitullah Mehsud evenwiththousandsofPakistanitroopsmillingaroundhisbasesandanenormousbountyonhishead
InsurgentleadersmoveintoandthroughAfghanistanevennowdespiteISAFeffortstotargetthem
ExtremelyaggressiveeffortsbyUSandIraqiforceswithnearlycompletefreedomof
movementhave
failed
to
provide
actionable
intelligence
to
target
Abu
Ayyub al
Masri,
leader
ofalQaedainIraqsincemid2006
Thefartherthestrikeasset(SFteam,UAV,ormissile)isbased,theGREATERtheintelligencerequirement: Ifthestrikeassetislocatednearthetarget,thentheintelligencerequirementistoknow
wherethetargetwillbeinanhourortwo
Ifthe
strike
asset
is
located
over
the
horizon,
the
intelligence
requirement
is
to
know
where
thetargetwillbein12,16,or24hours
Thedifferenceisenormouswhendealingwithprofessionalterroristswhoknowthedangersofstayinginoneplacetoolongormovingaccordingtoanydetectiblepattern
Thefewerintelligencegatheringassetsoperatingnearthetarget,finally,theless
likelythey
are
to
obtain
actionable
intelligence
of
any
variety
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CTBasesinPakistan?
Earlierthisyear,mediareportsindicatedthatAmericanUAVswereflyingfromaPakistaniairbasenearQuetta
The
revelation
caused
great
embarrassment
and
diplomatic
concernandreportedlyalsocausedtheUStoestablishanewUAVbaseatJalalabad,Afghanistan,incasethePakistanisbannedfutureoperationsfromtheirbase
ConsideringthesensitivityofthePakistanigovernmentandmilitaryto
the
issues
of
Pakistani
sovereignty,
and
the
problems
associated
withPakistansappearanceofsupportinganAmericanwaragainstitsownpeople,relyingontheuseofPakistanibasestoconductCToperationsinPakistanorinAfghanistanappearshighlydubious
Ataminimum,
any
such
strategy
would
be
entirely
dependent
on
thecontinuationinIslamabadofagovernmentwillingtopursuethecurrentpoliciesaneventualitythatseemshighlyquestionablegiventhevolatilityofPakistanipolitics,particularlyonthisissue
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CTBasesinAfghanistan? Scenario: TheUSwithdrawscombatforcesfromAfghanistan,includingtrainersfor
theANSF
(which
cannot
be
sustained
without
the
presence
of
combat
forces);
NATOalsowithdraws(inevitablyfollowingaUSwithdrawal);violenceincreasesastheANSFisunabletofillthevoid;theAfghanGovernmentlosescontroloverlargeareasofthecountry,andKabulcomesunderattack.
Question: WhyonearthwouldanyAfghanleadersupportcontinuedAmerican
militaryoperations
in
his
country
aimed
only
at
the
enemies
who
threaten
him
the
least?
Question: WhatwouldberequiredtoprotectUSforcesbasedinAfghanistantoconductCTmissions?
Question: Howwouldtheybesupplied?
Question:
Howwould
the
US
prevent
the
enemy
from
attacking
lines
of
communicationastheydidwiththeSoviets? Wecouldcertainlynotrelyonanyoverlandtransport
Relyingonairresupplyispossible,BUTthemujahideen hadlongexperienceinrocketingandmortaringrunwayswhentheSovietsdidnotcontrolthesurroundinghighground
Allof
the
airbases
we
could
use
for
such
operations
are
vulnerable
to
such
attacks
Wouldwethenhavetocontrolthesurroundingareas? Withwhat?
Thelargertheforcerequiredtoprotectthestrikeforce,thegreaterthelogisticalrequirementsandthemorevulnerablethelinesofcommunicationbecometoevenbriefinterruptions
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LegalFrameworkforAfghanCTBases
Presenceof
international
forces
now
is
based
on
the
requestoftheAfghanGovernmentforsupportinimplementingtoAfghanCompact
Adoptingapure
CT
approach
implies
abrogating
the
US
commitmenttothatcompact,andthereforethebasisforthepresenceandactivitiesofUSforcesinthesovereignstateofAfghanistan
TheUS
would
have
to
renegotiate
aStatus
of
Forces
AgreementwiththeAfghangovernmenttocontinueCToperationsfollowingsuchawithdrawal
Whatwould
the
Afghans
demand
in
return
for
such
an
agreement? Whatrestrictionswouldtheyimpose?Howlongwouldthenegotiationstake? Whatwouldwedointheinterim?
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AfghanPopulation
ThereisnoreliabledataonthesizeordistributionoftheAfghanpopulationbecausetherehasbeennocensusinAfghanistansince1979
ThemostdetailedandsoberpresentationisbytheAfghanInformationManagement
Services
(www.aims.org.af),
which
is
the
source
of
the
populationdatausedinthispresentation
ThedistrictpopulationfiguresgivenbyAIMS,however,totalroughly20million,whereasthegenerallyacceptedfigureforAfghanistans
population
is
around
32
million
(although
the
CIA
World
Factbook notes
thatthisfigureisbeingreviseddownwardandmaybemorelike27.5million)
EstimatesinthisproductthereforeuseAIMSnumbersmultipliedby1.5
AnadditionalcaveatisthatAfghanistanspopulationisveryyoung
roughlyhalf
the
population
is
under
15
years
of
age
according
to
the
CIA
WorldFactbook
Itisthuspossiblethatcurrentestimatesstillunderstatetheactualsizeofthepopulation
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ContactInformation
FrederickW.Kagan
Director,CriticalThreatsProject,AmericanEnterpriseInstitute
(202)8625925
orcontact
MasehZarif
(202)8625929
KimberlyKagan
President,InstitutefortheStudyofWar
(202)2935550
orcontact
DavidPhillips
(202)2935550
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]