afghanistan-pakistan taliban are pak army proxies, not pashtun nationalists farhat taj

7/31/2019 Afghanistan-Pakistan Taliban Are Pak Army Proxies, Not Pashtun Nationalists Farhat Taj

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Afghanistan- Pakistan Taliban are Pak Army

proxies, not Pashtun nationalists I

By Farhat Taj

The Friday Times- Pakistan

TFT CURRENT ISSUE|March 30 - April 05, 2012 - Vol. XXIV, No. 07

Taliban, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, are an attempt to wipe outentho-nationalism among the Pashtun and temper with the Pashtun

cultural identity


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Bacha Khan speaks to his followers

One of the media and academia's axiomatic constructions about Pashtun is that Taliban are Pashtunnationalists. This construction is based on distorted one-sided information and selective referencesto the Pashtun history that too are misrepresented to concur with the notion that Taliban arePashtun nationalists. Drawing upon the current Pashtun ground realities and history, I will argue

that Taliban, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, are mere proxies of the Pakistani state to wipe outforces of entho-nationalism among the Pashtun as well as temper with Pashtun cultural identity on

both sides of the Durand line in the state pursuit of the foreign and domestic policy objectives setand controlled by the military establishment of Pakistan.

Let me say on the outset that the Pashtun experience of having been assaulted with state proxies ingarb of religion is not new. In the past the Mughal and the British states have done the same in orderto force the Pashtun to behave in line with the states' strategic interests. There are basically three bigpan Pashtun nationalist movements in the Pashtun history. All the three movements were perceivedas clashing with the contemporary states' interests. Thus all the three were assaulted with states'proxies and propaganda skillfully camouflaged with religion.

The first movement was initiated by mystic, Bayazeed Ansari, from Kaniguram, South Waziristan.He was called 'Pir-Rooshan' (the saint of light) by his followers. He lived during the reign of theMughal Indian Emperor Jalaludin Akbar (1542-1605). The Mughal emperor imposed a ban on himand his followers. Above all the supposedly secular Mughal ruler, Akbar, tasked mullahs to launch apolitically-motivated religious campaign against the teachings of Pir-Rooshan. Prominent among thethose mullahs are Akhund Darveza (a mullah of Tajik origin) and another Pir Ali Tirmizi (of Uzbekorigin). These two state sponsored mullahs declared him Peer-Tareek (the saint of darkness) andassaulted his movement with a sustained malicious propaganda apparently rooted in Islam.

The second Pashtun nationalist movement was launched and led by Khushal Khan Khattak, well-known Pashtun poet, political leader and warrior. The nationalist movement led by him was fullysupported by two other influential Pashtun tribal leaders, Darya Khan in Khyber agency and Aimal

Khan in Mohmand agency. Arguably, Khushal Khan can be regarded as the founder of modernPashtun nationalism. For the ethno-nationalist inspiration of future generations of Pashtun, KhushalKhan, also known as lord of pen, has left volumes of his Pashto poetry that is full of Pashtunnationalistic motivation, aim and expression. In one of his well-known couplets, he says this: 'DrastPashtun la Kandahara tar Attoca sara yo da nang pa kar pat ao ashkar, pa yowa zhaba wail saraPashto kro walay nashoo la yo bal khabardar' ( All Pashtun from Qandahar to Attock speak Pashtolanguage (and) are (socio-culturally) one and the same, but are (politically) oblivion to one another).Khushal Khan's movement was suppressed by the most bigoted Mughal ruler of India, Aurangzeb

Alamgir (1618-1707). One of the Khushal Khan's couplets in which he condemns the Mugahl ruler'satrocities is this in. 'Che pa noom Pakhtanay ghuseegi pray khawkheegi, Aurangzeb dasay badshahde da Islam' (He (Aurangzeb) derives pleasure from massacre of Pashtun, such is Aurangzeb'skingdom of Islam)

The third great Pashtun nationalist movement was launched by Khan Ghafar Khan, popularly knownas Bacha Khan. A prominent difference between Khushal Khan and Bacha Khan is that the formerran his movement with sword in form of armed struggle against the Mugahl army led by a fanaticMuslim ruler and the latter's movement was non-violent. Essentially, Bacha Khan's movement wasfor mass-scale social reformations in the Pashtun society in order to cleanse it from socio-culturalpractices that hindered wide spread human development in the society, such as revenge or theinhibition towards modern education.


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The British-Indian and the successor Pakistan states used religious proxies to oppress Bacha Khan'smovement. Wali Khan's book, Facts are Facts, contains interesting research about the role ofmullahs against the Pashtun nationalist movement under the British Raj. Both the British-Indianand the Pakistani states never allowed Bacha Khan to enter the Federally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA) although despite all the states' opposition, his movement did inspire countless people across

FATA, including many parents who sent their children to the schools established by Bacha Khan inKhyber-Pakhtunkhwa areas on the border with FATA.

Linked with Bacha Khan's movement was the mass scale social reform and state building agendas ofAmanullah Khan, the great Pashtun King of Afghanistan (1919-1929). The king made arrangementsfor compulsory education for all Afghans and gave right to vote to women. Pashto was declared theofficial language of Afghanistan. He began to build a strong Afghan armed force, including the airforce with help of the Russians, and initiated a process of industrialization. He tasked the Russiansto build a road linking Tashkand with Kabul and Khyber agency in FATA. The king regularly used toread Pakhtun, a Pashto language magazine launched by Bacha Khan, and used to advise other peoplein Afghanistan to do so. The Pashtun, although divided by the British drawn artificial Durand Line,

had turned their faces towards progress, development and ethno-national unity.

All this was too much for the British rulers of India to bear because it was happening in the area thatthe British had assumed their buffer zones vis-a-vis Russia. Their first buffer zone, Afghanistan, andtheir second buffer zone, FATA, along with the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formally NWFP) seemedgoing out of the British control coupled with a possible tilt towards the Russians. The British had toact to eliminate the reforms undertaken on both sides of the Durand Line. The British knew theycould not do it militarily. It could have brought the British face to face with the Russians that theBritish never wanted. Secondly, the harsh experiences of the three Afghan wars had taught them thatmilitary intervention in Afghanistan is pointless. Thus they unleashed mullahs on Bacha Khan andKing Amanullah Khan to rob their reform agendas of religious legitimacy. In case of the king theBritish lowered themselves to such an extent they made fake photos of his wife, Queen Soraya,

showing her half naked. The photos were distributed in Afghanistan with the malicious propagandathat the king is not a Muslim in his personal and political life and hence cannot be king of thePashtun, who are Muslim. Deadly chaos was created in Afghanistan in which Bacha Saqa took power

who did with Afghanistan what the ISI backed Taliban did during their reign (1996-2001). Girls'schools were closed down, Afghan Shias were massacred, the state building agenda was rolled

backed and Kabul was ravaged. Similarly, mullahs were also unleashed by the British to discreditBacha Khan's movement as well.

King Amanullah Khan's agenda for social reforms, imposed from above, was very vulnerable toconspiracies by anti-Pashtun forces, who exploited the vulnerability to the full. Contrary to this,Bacha Khan's movement for social reforms was firmly rooted in people's confidence that he and hisfollowers had successfully won through direct interaction people in villages and towns. Thus his

movement could be never rolled backed despite severe and prolonged oppression by the British-Indian and Pakistani states. Nevertheless, the implantation of the social reforms that both BachaKhan wanted was thwarted by the successive states' oppressions. Imagine where the Pashtun asnation would have been today if the reform agendas undertaken on both side of the Durand Line had

been carried forward.

To be continued


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Afghanistan- Pakistan Taliban are Pak Army proxies, not Pashtunnationalists II

Hekmatyar and Rabbani with former president Ghulam Ishaq Khan

Pakistan has been actively pursuing a foreign policy rooted in religious discourse vis-a-vis Afghanistan. This is also because Kabul was pursuing a foreign policy rooted insecular Pashtun ethno-nationalism, including its claims over the Pashtun territory ofPakistan. Secondly, Pakistani army, deeply concerned about its military imbalance vis-a-

vis India, does not want a pro-India government in Afghanistan. Thus the nurturing of

the Afghan religious figures, displeased by the secular pursuit of the successivegovernments of Afghanistan, came up as an ideal opportunity in the strategic calculus ofthe military establishment of Pakistan. Afghan religious figures, including GulbadinHikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masood, were invited to Pakistan where they were trained

by Pakistan military's Special Services Group.

This happened well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. All those trainedreligious figures were used as proxies in the war against Soviets in Afghanistan. Severalkinds of Afghan groups, such as secular Pashtun nationalists, traditional tribal leaders
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/20120406/large-Hekmatyar%20and%20Rabbani%20with%20former%20president%20Ghulam%20Ishaq%20Khan.jpg


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and religious figures, were ready to resist the Soviet occupation of their country. Pakistanignored the nationalists and traditional tribal leaders and exclusively supported the

Afghan religious forces. The West, which had backed the Afghan resistance against theSoviets, provided military, financial, political and diplomatic assistance to the resistance,

but had no physical control over the so-called Afghan Mujahideen. It was only the ISIthat exerted the control, including training and flow of funds and weapons to the proxy

fighters. It was the time when Pakistani generals, led by dictator Gen Zia, assaulted theAfghan (including Pashtun) identity and Afghan state with their policy of StrategicDepth, an assault that continues to this date in the form of the Taliban.

The Strategic Depth is proactive policy to install an indoctrinated Pashtun-dominatedPakistan-controlled government in Afghanistan that disowns Pashtun/Afghan identityand bans any Indian influence in Kabul. The policy also means strengthening Pakistan'sties with the Arab world by cutting the country's cultural roots in Persian and Indiancivilizations. This especially includes a systematic tempering with the Pashtun identity toerase the cultural memory of the present and future generations of the Pashtun andreplace it with an Arabized identity.

Afghan national identity since the last 1,000 years following the rule of Mahmood ofGhazna (971 -1030) has been strong Afghan Muslim identity, just like the PersianMuslim identity or the Turkish Muslim identity. Both Persians and Turks havethoroughly indigenized Islam. The two nations have firmly evolved peculiar Muslimidentities that can be distinctly distinguished from Muslim identities elsewhere in the

world, especially the Arab Muslim identity. Over the centuries, the Pashtun did the samewith Islam by aligning it with Pashtun traditions and culture.

The military ideologues of the Strategic Depth tempered with the strong Pashtun identityby exaggerating and expanding its Muslim part. They carefully groomed and encouraged

the religious extremists and crushed the secular Afghan nationalists who were opposedto Soviet occupation. Above all, they brain washed thousands and thousands of youngAfghan refuges in a systematic way in religious schools especially established for thepurpose in the refugees camps in Pakistan.

They did not do so out of their love of Islam. If that had been the aim, they would havefocused on the universal principles of Islam, such as justice, fair play and public welfare -the principles that can be applied to any society in the world. It was these universalprinciples of Islam that Bacha Khan Movement was striving to promote in the Pashtunsociety. Instead, the ideologues of the Strategic Depth indoctrinated young AfghanPashtun with a narrow, intolerant and violent version of Islam that glorifies a particulararchaic version of the Arab tribal culture. The aim was to homogenize the future of

Afghanistan by cutting the cultural roots of its people with their history and traditions.In other words the aim was to destroy Afghaniat (Afghanhood), including Pashtunnationalism. One of the Strategic Depth ideologues, Gen (r) Hamid Gul, has said onmany occasions that 'Afghanistan is a blank paper and it would look like whatever we

write on it'.

I would like to link this point to something not directly related to our discussion onTaliban and Pashtun nationalism, but still relevant. Some friends from Sindh and


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Baluchistan are reporting that a network of Sunni extremist madrassas (religiousschools) is being set up in the two provinces to damage the secular ethno-nationalistSindhi and Baloch political forces through religious discourse that is also tempering withthe ethnic identities. If so, Sindhi and Baloch nationalists should take it very seriously.Their ethnic identities are enriching parts of human heritage, and they must do whateverthey can to stop the anti-civilization indoctrination of their youth in the name of Islam.

Coming back to the issue of Taliban and Pashtun nationalism, Pakistani militaryideologues began to implement the agenda of Strategic Depth by importing the AfghanMujahideen parties they had nurtured on the Pakistani soil to Afghanistan following the

withdrawal of the Soviet forces. These outfits were too artificial to deliver. Theyfragmented very quickly in the rising tide of civil war in Afghanistan. This time round,the military establishment began to support the Taliban.

Rejecting the various stories about the origins of Taliban, the Pashtun nationalists inPakistan and Afghanistan believe that they were created in 1994 by the Afghan Cell of theISI led by Major General Aziz Khan. Although retired general Nasirullah Babar boasted

of his share in the creation of the Taliban, Gen Aziz remained the 'focal person' forTaliban in the security establishment of Pakistan almost up till 9/11.

Nationalists all over the world are recognized by their actions, conduct and attitudes thatconcur with their national identity. Let's look at the actions, conduct and attitude of theTaliban. What were their first major steps when they entered Kabul in 1996? They

banned the Afghan national flag, Afghan national anthem and Nowroz (Afghan NewYear) - a five thousand year old festival. Radio Kabul became 'Voice of Sharia'. Jirga, themost important social institution of Pashtun tribes, was declared anti-Sharia and also

banned. The statue of Buddha in Bamian, a symbol of Afghan culture that had remainedintact and respected among countless past generations of Afghans, was demolished.

Everything that represented Afghan (or Pashtun) national identity was brutallysuppressed. Is this the way nationalists treat their national identity? Far from beingPashtun nationalists, the Taliban religiously imposed the Strategic Depth agenda duringtheir rule from 1996 to 2001, destroying Afghan identity and state and making thecountry a de facto fifth province of Pakistan.

To be continued

Taliban are Pak Army proxies, not Pashtun

nationalists III

By: Farhat Taj


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In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan was forced to fight the Taliban. Pakistani generalsaccommodated the immediate US concerns about Al Qaeda but also continued a lowprofile relationship with the Afghan Taliban to preserve them for strategic depth in

Afghanistan after the US had left the country. They managed to play the double role bycreating a managed chaos in FATA that made the region too insure for independentobservation from the outside and too frightening for the local tribal people to share

information with the outside world. It was systematically propagated in Pakistani mediathat fiercely autonomous tribes in the weakly governed FATA have given refuge in line

with the code of Pashtunwali to the fleeing militants from Afghanistan in defiance of thePakistani state. All this is utter nonsense.

Not even a single tribe in FATA gave refugee to any militants. People who cooperatedwith the militants were individuals within tribes. These individuals have longstandinglinks with the military establishments and their tribes have no control over them. Forexample, Maulana Noor Muhammad from South Waziristan was openly urging the tribesin his Friday sermons to support the militants following their escape in the area.

South Waziristan was the first FATA agency where the managed chaos was imposed toconstruct a fake popular support for the militants. While most people watched theactivities of the militants as unconcerned bystanders, it were the local Waziri Pashtunnationalists and other sensible local tribal people who foresaw the danger in suchactivities and began to educate people about them. At this point mysterious targetedkilling of such anti-Taliban people began in 2003. The first anti-Taliban tribesman who

was target killed in 2003 was Farooq Wazir, the local leader of the Pashtun nationalistPashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party, PMAP, who had publicly declared in response toMaulana Noor Muhammads sermons that no militants will be allowed to enter the citycentre of Wana, capital of South Waziristan.

Between 2003 to 2007, over 200 political activists, including tribal leaders in South

Waziristan were target killed under mysterious circumstances never investigated by thegovernment of Pakistan. The common denominator among them is that they all wereanti-Taliban. Their families hold the ISI responsible for their killing. Many of theeliminated anti-Taliban people were local activist of Pashtun nationalist political parties,PMAP and ANP. Mahmud Achakzai, leader of PMAP, repeatedly visited Waziristan toattend the funeral ceremonies of his assassinated party workers.

When the managed chaos had to be shifted to the Mehsud area of South Waziristan, theintelligence authorities could not even find a suitable local Mehsud to crown as Talibancommander. Thus a non-local Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud, was chosen for the purpose onthe recommendation of Maulana Mirajudin, an establishment linked Mehsud cleric.

Although originally from South Waziristan, Baituallahs family had settled in Bannu for a

long time. At the time of his arrival in South Waziristan as a Taliban commander,Baitullah could not even speak Pashto in the typical Mehsud dialect. He used to speakBanuchi the Bannu Pashto dialect. Later during his stay in Waziristan as a terrorleader he learned the Mehsud dialect.

Taliban apologists, such as PTI leader Imran Khan, have been claiming that Talibanmilitancy in Waziristan is inspired by Faqir of Ipi, the Waziri tribesman who led

Waziristans armed resistance to the British. This is a misleading claim. The Faqirs


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struggle was basically nationalist despite his religious orientation. This is the reason thatdescendents of the Faqirs family have disassociated themselves from the Talibanmilitancy, implying that Taliban have no ideological connections with the Faqir.Moreover, descendents of the close associates of the Faqir, all of them Pashtunnationalists linked with PMAP and ANP, have been target killed for their public anti-Taliban stance. One of them, Mirza Alam had been approached by the military

authorities in Wana to give them one of his sons or nephews for leadership of the WaziriTaliban. He refused and later was killed along with six members of his family.

In North Waziristan, unlike South Waziristan, there was almost no local resistance to theTaliban and Al Qaeda. This does not imply any popular tribal support for the militants.The brutal massacre of the anti-Taliban people in South Waziristan was being closely

watched in the neighbouring North Waziristan. By the time the militants reached NorthWaziristan, people there had clear idea that resistance to Taliban/Al Qaeda was pointlesssince the state is behind them. That was further confirmed when they saw that JalaludinHaqqani hosted all the militants. Thus the militants landed and continue to live there inpeace amid the terrified local tribals whose free will is under siege.

A Pashtun from Afghanistan, Jalaludin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Network, is oneof the veterans of ISIs proxies, who were recruited in 1974 and later trained by colonelImam in Peshawar for Afghan jihad. He was settled in Danday Darpa Khel, a village inthe suburbs of Mir Ali, the second important town of North Waziristan. His extendedfamily owns almost half of the real estate in Mir Ali. A signal phone call from his houseor madrassa is enough to ensure postings and transfers in all government offices inNorth Waziristan. Also, the Haqqani family has houses in Rawalpindi and Peshawar.

The Haqqani network based in North Waziristan, a frequent target of the US dronestrikes, is the most formidable Taliban group attacking the US and Afghan forces in

Afghanistan. It is the Haqqani Taliban leaders that the military establishment of

Pakistan wants to accommodate in the future government of Afghanistan as has beensuggested by the establishment linked think tank, Jinnah Institute, in its reportPakistan, US and the Endgame in Afghanistan (page 13). The same report warns ofPashtun backlash in FATA if the Taliban are not accommodated in power in Afghanistan.But there is no public support for Afghan Taliban in FATA that could translate in such a

backlash. Although the ISI did try to create that support, it failed.

For example, the ISI tried to create a stature for the Haqqanis as respected tribal leadersin FATA. They were directed to make peace among the Shia and Sunni tribes in Kurram.The objective was to argue to the world that Haqqanis are respected tribal leaders whohave managed to make peace among the Shia and Sunni tribals, something that even thegovernment of Pakistan had not been able to achieve. Thus any action against the

Haqqani Network, that the US is asking for, would enrage the fiercely autonomouspeople of FATA.

The Shia and Sunni tribal leaders questioned the wak (authority) of the Haqqanis tonegotiate Kurram disputes. The Haqqanis responded that they were directed by the ISI.They demanded full authority from the tribal leaders for a peace deal. The Shias flatlyrefused. The Sunnis gave them the authority that practically means no authority: theyasked the Haqqanis to use their influence with the ISI to implement the Murree


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agreement negotiated between the Kurram Shias and Sunnis by the government ofPakistan in 2008 but never enforced.

In the past, Kurram has been accepting mediation from Waziristan. Khandan Mehsud, arespectable tribal elder from Waziristan target killed in the post 9/11 Waziristan due tohis opposition to the Taliban, has been leading the negotiations. Why did tribes ofKurram welcome Khandan Mehsud but not the Haqqanis? This is because the Mehsudhad the stature of a popular tribal leader in FATA that the Haqqanis simply do not have.The fact that Mehsud belonged to the Sunni sect never damaged the Shias trust in him.In this context he was a Pashtun nationalist who sincerely worked for well being of thePashtun regardless their religious affiliations. Contrary to this, the Shias see the Haqanisas their murderers and the Sunnis fear, not respect, them. This is not how popularnationalist leaders are looked upon by their people.

To be continued

Taliban are Pak Army proxies, not Pashtun nationalists - IV

April 27, 2012

Farhat Taj

Those who insist that Taliban are Pashtun nationalists claim that Pashtun tribeshave historically preferred to be led by religious figures (mullahs) rather thantheir traditional tribal leaders in the event of a foreign invasion. They specificallyrefer to the Pashtun tribal resistance in FATA led by religious leaders against thecolonial British-Indian government, and conclude that the present-day Talibanterrorism rooted in religious discourse is an indigenous and popular Pashtunresistance to a foreign invasion. The Taliban, we are told, are Pashtun nationaliststhat the world must deal with as true sons of the Pashtun soil, rather thanoutright terrorists who no human society could accommodate.

The way the Taliban are being associated with the Pashtun history and thecurrent popular Pashtun will implies that there are no non-Pashtun Taliban inPakistan Afghanistan, and that the Taliban outfits exclusively draw its leadersand foot soldiers from the Pashtun ethnic group.

Ifthetribeshadbeen so


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universallyanti-

British,whywouldtheBritish-Indianstateentrustthemwithguardingoneofitsvital

bufferzones,FATA,fromRussianinte

rvention?


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Such authors also seem to imply that from the Pashtun perspective, a foreigninvader always means a non-Muslim invader. Thus the entire narrative presents ahomogeneous picture of the wider Pashtun society (a large complicatedpatchwork of tribes, sub-tribes, clans and sub-clans) that is devoid of internaldissent, contestation and ambiguity that can be expected in any human society in

the world. On one hand they claim that the Pashtun are fiercely independent, andon the other hand they assume absolute unanimity of opinion among the 'fiercelyindependent' people in terms of their response to foreign states. This entirenarrative is highly misleading.

The fact is that the Pashtun tribes have never made any distinction between aforeign Muslim and foreign non-Muslim invader and have resisted both withequal vigour. Khushal Khan Khattak, Darya Khan and Aimal Khan, all historicsymbols of Pashtun nationalism, had put forward a long armed resistance to theoccupation of the Pashtun land by the Muslim Mughal army led by the most'poise' Mughal ruler of India, Aurangzeb Alamgir. Neither Khushal Khan norDarya Khan and Aimal Khan were mullahs.

In the 19th century, foreign fanatic Indian Muslims led by Syed Ahmad Barelvi,also an Indian Islamist, came to 'Islamize' the Pashtun tribes against their wishesand their socio-cultural norms. The Yousafzai tribal leaders had a grand jirga thatconcluded that there was no way to get rid of the 'Indian Mujahideen' and their'Islam' but to massacre them all. In pursuit of the jirga's decision, the Yousafzaitribesmen attacked the mujahideen killing several of them. The rest fled to theKhyber-Pakhtunkhwa town of Balakot where a waiting Sikh army killed each oneof them, including their leader. The Yousafzai tribal leaders were not mullahs.

AfriditribesfromDarraAdamKhe

lcooperatedwiththeBritish


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duringthe3rdAng

lo-Afghanwarin1919

The towering symbol of Pashtun nationalism Samad Khan Achakzai was not amullah. The secular and democratic Pashtun nationalist movement led by himwas linked with the Indian National Congress party's struggle against the British.The universal symbol of Pashtun nationalism, Bacha Khan, was not a mullah. Heresisted the British colonial invasion of the Pashtun land in league with MahatmaGandhi's non-violent movement against the British in India. Even the mullahs orreligious leaders in FATA who put forward armed resistance to the British werebasically Pashtun nationalists with religious orientations. Almost all of them hadcordial relations with Samad Khan Achakzai and Bacha Khan's secular ethno-


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nationalist movements against the British. One of the religious leaders, HajiTurangzai, was so close to Bacha Khan that some contemporary British officerseven thought that he was father-in-law of Bacha Khan, which is untrue. None ofthe religious leaders in FATA was known to have attacked the activitiesundertaken by Bacha Khan's Khudai Khidmatgar movement. They had never

attacked the schools in villages and towns established by Bacha Khan. None ofthem was known to have attacked or even verbally opposed the traditionalPashtun decision-making body, the tribal jirga. Actually, all of them frequentlyconsulted tribal jirgas on matters related to their resistance to the British as wellas other matters. They had never attacked women, children, tribal leaders,religious scholars, mosques, weddings and funerals in their armed resistance tothe British colonization. They had never banned music and dance, two prominentaspects of the Pashtun culture. In short, their attitude, actions and conduct hadbeen totally different from those of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistantoday.

Those who promote such false notions about the Pashtun history also give theimpression that the Pashtun struggle against foreign invasions has been devoid ofany pragmatism, and that all Pashtun tribes have always been united against allinvaders.

The fact is that the tribes' responses to the foreign invaders have been pragmatic,including interactive cooperation with the invaders. Minus a few eventfulencounters between the British and the Afridi tribes in Darra Adam Khel - suchas the Afridi snatching of the British rifles and the killing of a British officer andkidnapping of another British officer's daughter by a group of Afridi tribesmen -the tribes in Darra Adam Khel remained cooperative towards the British.Following an agreement with the tribes, the British built Kohat-pass road through

the Afridi territory, a vital British link to Afghanistan. Contrary to several othertribes, the Darra Afridi tribes cooperated with the British during the 3rd Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, the third British colonial invasion of Afghanistan. PashtunShia tribes in Kurram even went a step further. Due to their differences with thethen government of Afghanistan, they invited the British to take control of theirarea. The British accepted the invitation by taking over the administration ofKurram Agency in 1890. Several tribes across FATA entered in agreements withthe British-Indian governments to receive allowance from the government in lieuof their cooperation with the British authorities.

Moreover, countless Pashtun tribesmen across various tribes joined the British

imperial army. During the second war many of the tribal soldiers were sent by theBritish on war fronts in Asia and Africa. Many of them died fighting for theBritish. Similarly, the tribesmen also joined the Khasadar forces, the tribal policeforce raised by the British for assistance of the civil administration in FATA. Also,the British established two paramilitary forces, Frontier Corps and FrontierConstabulary. Both the FCs exclusively draw their ranks and files from thePashtun tribes on the eastern side of the Durand Line. If the tribes had been souniversally anti-British, as portrayed in the war on terror literature, why would


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the British-Indian state entrust the FCs, composed of Pashtun soldiers, to guardone of its vital buffer zones, FATA, from Russian intervention as well as 'anti-state' activities of some of the tribal people. Commenting on the relatively lownumerical strength of Orakzai tribesmen in the British military, a colonial author,White King, says this in his contemporary book The Orakzai Country and Clans:

"The paucity of Orakzais in the native ranks (of the military) is not due to anydistaste for service, but to the fact that few regiments enlist them (Orakzaitribesmen), either because it is against the rules to do so or because theirsoldierly qualities are not properly appreciated... I am led to believe that there isno difficulty in recruiting Orakzais (tribesmen in the military), and more couldeasily be enlisted, if required (by the British-Indian government" (pp 126-127).Inshort, the narrative in the media and the academia that depicts the Taliban as amanifestation of the continuation of the Pashtun history of resistance to foreigninvasions contradict the history.

To be continued

Taliban are Pak Army proxies, not Pashtun nationalists V

4 May , 2012

Let us put faces on the Pashtun nationalists and Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan toclearly pin down who is who. Pashtun nationalists both in Pakistan and Afghanistan arethose who have suffered atrocities and gross human rights violations at the hands of theTaliban who they strongly believe are proxies of the Pakistani military establishment.

In Pakistani context, they first and foremost include two political parties - ANP andPMAP. Both parties, especially the ANP, have lost hundreds of workers and middle levelleaders in targeted killings by the Taliban. The two parties have to function under


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constant death threats. Pashtun nationalists also include more than 1,000 popular andwell respected tribal leaders, many of them linked with the ANP and PMAP, all overFATA who were assassinated due to their stiff resistance, including armed struggle,against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the tribal areas.

The entire Salarzai tribe in Bajaur is Pashtun

nationalist, because it has successfully resisted,without any state support, the Taliban infiltration inits area. The tribe has tremendously suffered in termsof human and military losses in their armed anti-Taliban resistance - a resistance that they say isconstantly burdened by the direct state backing for the Taliban.

The entire mixed Sunni-Shia Ali Khel tribe in Orakzai is Pashtun nationalist. Theyevicted the Taliban from their area by force and in response the tribe was punished by asuicide attack that eliminated its entire leadership - over 100 tribal leaders who wereleading the anti-Taliban lashkar of the tribe. This tribe also accuses the state of backingthe Taliban.

The Shia tribes in Kurram are Pashtun nationalists. They have refused to allow safepassages to the Haqqani network, the establishment's favorite Taliban, for attacks inside

Afghanistan. Everyone knows how much the Shias have been punished for this defianceof the establishment. There are countless examples that demonstrate how stiffly the localpeople in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa resisted the Taliban and how much the state

betrayed them by extending support to the Taliban.

Generally, the term 'Pashtun nationalist' can also be loosely applied to include all peoplewho disagree with Taliban's action, conduct, attitude and policy, although they may nothave directly suffered any Taliban atrocities for their anti-Taliban views. In other words,these are the people who concur with the anti-Taliban stance adopted by the ANP and

PMAP even though many of them may not be directly linked with the parties. By thisyardstick, all the people of Malakand who are not shedding tears after the end of Talibanrule in their area are Pashtun nationalists.

Countless people of FATA who have preferred to suffer in internal displacement ratherthan joining the Taliban despite the good salaries are Pashtun nationalists. Also, alltribal Sikhs who directly or indirectly suffered Taliban atrocities are Pashtunnationalists. The Shia tribes in Orakzai who gave refuge to some of the internallydisplaced tribal Sikhs from Khyber and Orakzai are Pashtun nationalists.

Pashtun writers, intellectuals and socio-political activists, such as the people linked withthe Amn Tehrik, are Pashtun nationalists. Amn Tehrik passed the Peshawar Declarationin a grand tribal jirga that identifies the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan as theproxies of the Pakistani generals and underscores that the Pashtun on both sides of theDurand Line are victims of the notion of strategic depth as well as Al Qaeda's pan-Islamism. The Amn Tehrik is the first civil society group in Pakistan that held a publicdemonstration against the establishment's backed Dafa-e-Pakistan Council. All studentsand teachers in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtun who have defied the Taliban threats toschools by continuing educational activities one way or the other are Pashtun

All Pashtun people who carryon with their routinelives despite constantTaliban threats arePashtun nationalists


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nationalists. All musicians who have not given up their love of music despite the Talibanthreats or have been killed by the Taliban for singing are Pashtun nationalists. Last butnot the least, Pashtun nationalists are the countless local human rights activists whocontinued their activities despite serious Taliban threats to their lives. Many of them

were target killed by the Taliban. One such activist is Zarteef Khan Afridi of Khyber

Agency, who was killed some months ago.

In Afghanistan, Pashtun nationalists are people linked with the Afghan Millat Party, aPashtun nationalist party that is more or less like the ANP in Pakistan. Afghan Pashtunnationalists are also the people who subscribe to the ideologies of the former Khalaq andParcham political parties of Afghanistan. Generally, Pashtun tribal leaders in

Afghanistan can be also regarded as Pashtun nationalists. It should be noted that many,if not all, of the tribal leaders could also be seen as the pro-Afghan establishment. Thisimplies that they are likely to back the government of Afghanistan regardless of who isleading the government. This does not automatically imply that they would support anyfuture Taliban power setup in Kabul. One must not forget that one of the first Taliban

assaults have always come against the tribal leaders. In addition to that, just like thepopular tribal leaders in Pakistan, many leading Afghan Pashtun tribal leaders have also

been target killed by the Taliban due to their public anti-Taliban stance. Such leadersinclude Zahid Zadran and Malik Mudar Khan in Khost, Abdul Rasheed and Meran Gul inPaktia, Zareef Khan, Shaista Khan and Juma Khan in Paktika, and Haji Qalander Khanand Ali Ahmad Khan in Qandahar.

The Pashtun people in post 9/11 Afghanistan have organized themselves in many smallor large civil society organizations. Almost all of these are anti-Taliban, as can be seen intheir public statements and activities. Pashtun MPs in the Afghan parliament have beenmaking anti-Taliban as well as anti-ISI speeches in the parliament. Generally, just likethe Pashtun in Pakistan, all Afghan Pashtun who carry on with their routine lives despite

constant Taliban threats are Pashtun nationalists.

Two things must be noted here. One, no Pashtun nationalists from Afghanistan orPakistan are fighting the US, NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan armyand also the nationalists are not involved in any attacks on civilians in both countries.Two, the Pashtun nationalists do not see the presence of the US and NATO forces as aforeign occupation of Afghanistan. Instead they see Pakistan and Iran as foreignaggressors and invaders. They believe that both countries, especially Pakistan, havedevastated Afghanistan, its people, culture and the Afghan state. Thus the Afghan soil, intheir view, needs to be protected from Pakistan and Iran at all costs, including a militarycooperation with non-Muslim powers, such US, NATO or Indian forces. This view is

thoroughly in line with the Pashtun history. In the past, the Pashtun had confrontedforeign Muslim aggressions. In response they entered into interactive cooperation withforeign non-Muslim powers to deal with the Muslim invaders.

To be continued


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If Pakistan stops backing Taliban commanders, Pashtuns will not protest

Taliban are Pak Army proxies, not Pashtun nationalists VI

TFT CURRENT ISSUE|May 25-31, 2012 - Vol. XXIV, No. 15

There are three groups of Pashtuns fighting the US/NATO and Afghan securityforces in Afghanistan - the Peshawar Shura led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, theNorth Waziristan based Haqqani Network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, and theQuetta Shura led by Mullah Omar. All three of them are closely linked with themilitary establishment of Pakistan.

A section of Hekmatyar's party has already given up violence and is part of thecurrent Afghan government and parliament. Many of the remaining prominent

party leaders are frustrated with Hekmatyar's rigid stance and have privately saidthey are willing to give up violence for a peaceful political process.

Hekmatyar's son in law Ghairat Baheer has recently met Afghan PresidentHamid Karzai to speed up the process of peaceful political settlement in

Afghanistan. The group is therefore likely to have a role in Afghanistan's futurepolitical set-up. But that cannot be said about the other two groups.

The Haqqani Network is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, but its operations arecontrolled by his son Sirajuddin Haqqani. The group has attacked US, NATO and

Afghan forces, and is also accused of attacking Afghan civilians anddevelopment workers sent by India to help rebuild the Afghan infrastructure. TheUS accuses Pakistan of supporting the Haqqani Network and using it as a tool in

Afghanistan.

Peshawar Corps Commander Lt Gen Khalid Rabbani said last month thatPakistan Army had conducted more than 1,000 military operations in FATA in2009 and 2010. Pakistan's Air Force chief had reportedly said in Dubai that morethan 10,600 bombs have been dropped on FATA since 2008. But no leadingTaliban commanders have been captured or killed in FATA during this period.Those in FATA who are critical of the military establishment say Taliban are notcaptured or killed, but handed over to leaders of the Haqqani Network.

And while most of the media attention is on Waziristan, a lot of jihadi activitiesare taking place in the Pashtun belt in Baluchistan. NATO commanders haverepeatedly described the area as major command centre for expanding cross-border attacks on the US/NATO and Afghans forces. The Quetta Shura havealso been accused of targeted killings of Pashtun tribal leaders and clerics whoadvocated against Taliban militancy in Pashtun villages in Afghanistan.


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Mao Tse-tung once said that guerrilla freedom fighters must live among theirpeople as fish swim in the sea. History shows that almost all genuine guerrillafighters have come back to fight the foreign aggression amid their people withtheir help after necessary training abroad. If the Afghan Taliban are so confident

of the Pashtun public support in Afghanistan, why don't they go back toAfghanistan and fight the US/NATO forces with the public support? Why do theysneak in, strike and run back?

In fact Afghans, both Pashtun and non-Pashtun, accuse Pakistan and morespecifically the Punjabis of nurturing the insurgents in Afghanistan. Many of thePashtun in FATA also accuse Pakistan Army of backing the Taliban or notsupporting local anti-Taliban forces. Just because the Pakistani media is notshowing Pashtun anger does not mean it does not exist on the ground.

The Pashtun nationalists and generally all other anti-Taliban Pashtun from all

socio-economic statuses and statures in Afghanistan and Pakistan are wellknown people in their communities. Their names, faces, addresses, and tribal orfamily affiliations are there for the whole world to see. They stand firmly on theirnative soil in the face of Taliban atrocities. Contrary to this, most of the Talibancommanders and foot soldiers do not even show their masked faces in public.The Pashtun people do not even know who is behind those masks - Punjabis,

Arabs, Uzbeks, culturally uprooted Muslim immigrant terrorists from the Westerncountries, or Pashtun outlaws?

Most of the Pakistani Taliban also do not operate in the areas they claim tobelong to or represent. The popularity of Mullah Omar, the Haqqanis, Gul

Bahader, Mullah Nazir and Mullah Faqir is a myth perpetuated by incompetentresearchers. The same analysts had said Mullah Fazlullah was popular in Swat.But the locals welcomed his ouster. Now that he is gone, nobody is protesting.

And if Pakistan stops backing other Afghan and Pakistani Taliban commanders,no Pashtuns will protest.


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The Pakhtun, the Taliban and ignorant outsiders

by Farhat TajFriday 16 January 2009

The News

The Pakhtun are caught up in one of the most difficult times of their history. The Taliban

are aggressively attacking their lives, livelihoods, culture and history. Pakistan army, thedefender of the frontiers of Pakistan, including the Pakhtun areas, is failing to protect them

against the atrocities of the Taliban. Some influential outsiders continue to depict in media

that the Pakhtun and Taliban are one and the same people. The outsiders have almost no or

at best a superficial knowledge of the history and culture of the Pakhtun. Most of themnever even care to come to the Pakhtun areas to see the realities of the people with their

own eyes and still they believe themselves to be authorities on the Pakhtun. They seem totake pride in their ignorance about the Pakhtun. They do not even care to check the bases oftheir arguments in media discussions against the culture, history and current realities of the

Pakhtun.

One such outsider is Dr AQ Khan who expresses views on Pakhtun that have nothing to do

with their current realities, culture and history. An example of this is his article GrassrootCauses in your newspaper dated 24 December 2008.

Dr AQ Khan portrays the Pakhtun and the Taliban as one and the same people. Actually

the Pakhtun and the Taliban are not the same people. The Pakhtun belong to the areas that

are presently known as NWFP, FATA, parts of Baluchistan and southern and eastern partsof Afghanistan. They are culturally, historically and geographically a homogeneous group

of people. The Taliban are culturally, historically and geographically a diverse mix of

different ethnic groups-the Pakhtun, Punjabis, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs, Africans and evenEuropeans, both ethnic and Muslim immigrants. They have established bases in the

Pakhtun areas because they (and their predecessors, the Mujaheedin) have been facilitated

by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan to do so. The Taliban generate their revenue byrelentlessly kidnapping affluent Pakhtun for ransom. They have imposed a savage social

order, completely different from the Pakhtun social order, in the areas that Pakistan army

have surrendered to them, i.e. several parts of the tribal areas and some parts of NWFP,including the beautiful valley of Swat. Many Pakhtun also believe that various groups of

the Taliban are funded by the intelligence agency of Pakistan, i.e. the ISI and foreignagencies, like the Indian RAW, the American CIA, etc.

Dr AQ Khan advocates a dialogue with the Taliban to bring peace in the Pakhtun areas ofPakistan. A dialogue can only be successful if it stands on mutually respected ground

between the two parties. In this case the common ground can be the law of Pakistan, the

Code of Pakhtunwali and Islam. The Taliban respect neither of the three.
http://www.sacw.net/auteur234.htmlhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=157179http://www.sacw.net/auteur234.htmlhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=157179


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The Taliban have no respect for the law of Pakistan. There is abundant proof of it in their

attacks on the security forces, destruction of infrastructure including bridges, hospitals and

education institutions etc. Some of my friends who have had face to face discussions withfoot soldiers of the Taliban informed that the Taliban do not accept the authority of the law

of Pakistan. The Taliban have no respect for the code of Pakhtunwali. The most revered

institution under the code is jirga. Even the mighty empires that the Pakhtun resisted- theMuslim Mughal Empire and the non Muslim British Empire did not violate the respect of

jirga- I do not know of any attacks on jirga that were carried out by the Mughals and the

British. The Taliban have repeatedly bombed jirgas all across NWFP and FATA. The codeof Pakhtunwali dictates that there shall be no attacks on women and children. The Taliban

have repeatedly violated the dictate by brutally killing women and children. The Taliban

have violated the respected norms of Islam. Islam never justifies any disrespect of dead

bodies. The Taliban takes pride in their humiliation of dead bodies. Islam orders everyMuslim man and woman to get education. The Taliban forbid education for both girls and

boys. In Islam there is no compulsion in religion. The Taliban imposed their version of the

religion through terror and violence. How can there be a dialogue in such conditions with

the Taliban. It is perhaps due to the lack of mutually respected grounds that almost allagreements between the Taliban and the Pakistan army fell apart.

Does Dr Khan know that Taliban are preventing the Pakhtun, in the areas that have been

surrendered by Pakistan army, from integration into the state system? There are manyexamples of this. The latest example happened in North Waziristan where the Taliban

recently stopped women from making Computerized National Identity Cards, CNIDC, with

NADRA. The women had wished to enroll themselves in Benazir Income SupportProgram. As a precondition for the enrollment, they have to have CNIDC.

People of FATA had always seen the most oppressive and cruel face of the state of

Pakistan. It happens rarely that they see the benevolent face of the state. They alwayshappily welcome this face of the state. The Benazir Income Support Program is one of therare opportunities to see the benevolent faces of the state. Many women in Waziristan

welcome it. The enlargement of the Benazir Income Support Program to North Waziristan

also shows that the state has some wish to integrate the tribal people into the its system.The local Taliban in Waziristan are preventing this integration. Those Taliban have signed

a peace agreement with Pakistan army almost two years ago.

People in Waziristan and the Pakhtun in general want the Pakistan army to make the

contents of their agreement with Taliban open to public. They want to know whether theagreement contain the condition that the Taliban will be free to prevent poor people of

Waziristan from getting lawful benefits from state sponsored programs like the Benazir

Income Support Program. If the agreement does not contain any such conditions, wouldPakistan army care to tell the people of Pakistan why are the Taliban preventing the poor

women of Waziristan from integration into the state system? Is there any one in Pakistan-in

the government, media and the military establishment- to explain why are the Taliban

stopping women from making national ID cards and what is being done to halthighhandedness of the Taliban? Would Dr. AQ Khan, a supporter of the Taliban, care to


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ask the Taliban, on behalf of the poor Pakhtun women, why have the women been deprived

from making national ID cards and getting some financial benefits from the state?

Dr AQ Khan wrote: If we allow them (America) to enter our country/tribal areas, they willbribe/buy some traitors with green cards and greenbacks.

The Americans do not need to offer green cards, green dollars or other kinds of bribes to

the Pakhtun. Both Taliban and Pakistan army have created catastrophic conditions in terms

of human rights. This may soon force the Pakhtun to be open to help from any where inorder to survive. Thus tens of people of Swat told me they pray after every namaz for the

US drones to fall on the headquarters of the Swat Taliban. Because Pakistan army has

failed to eliminate the Swat Taliban, we would be happy if the American send their dronesto do the job, many Swatis told me. Contrary to the wide spread believe in the wider

Pakistani society, many people of Waziristan are satisfied with the US drone attacks on the

militants in Waziristan. Both the Swatis and the people of Waziristan have one regret

though: the American are doing the duty (target killing of the militants) of Pakistan army.

They said they would love to see Pakistan army eliminate the militants in precisely targetedoperations. Pakistan army, they said, has so far proved to be unwilling or unable to

decisively deal with the Taliban. The Taliban have created hell like conditions in thewords of a man, in the areas surrendered by Pakistan army to them. The terrorized Pakhtun

of the areas have increasingly begun to look in their prayers towards anyone, the

Americans or the devils, as one woman put it for help.

Dr AQ Khan has a right to support anyone he likes, even the Taliban, the murderers of thePakhtun. However, as a Pakhtun I believe he has no right to float pro-Taliban suggestions

that depict complete disrespect to the sensitivities of the Pakhtun, terrorized and

traumatized, in the words of many tribesman and women, by the aggressive Taliban and

passive Pakistan army.

afghanistan-pakistan taliban are pak army proxies, not pashtun nationalists farhat taj

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