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AEROSPACE POWER

CADET UNDER OFFICERS

Australian Air Force Cadets

Cadet Work Book

1s t Edition, 17 October 2004

AEROSPACE POWER – CADET UNDER OFFICERS COURSE

2 PERIODS Serial # Title Period APO 1 Introduction OT APO 2 Principles of War OT - List the Principles of War APO 3 Combat Power OT - Describe the elements of Combat Power - Compare and contrast Aerospace Power with Sea &

Land Power

APO 4 Aerospace Power OT - Describe & list the Aerospace Power Roles - Describe & list the characteristics of Aerospace

Power

- Describe the role of a Force Multiplier APO 5 Structure of the RAAF OT - Describe Air Force Capability - Outline the structure of the operational groups of the

RAAF

- Describe within the context of Air Power the role and operation of the RAAF FEGS and FSU’s and the Aircraft types assigned to them.

APO 6 Case Study – 30% OT - Consolidate what you have learnt in APO APO 7 Workbook – 20% OT APO 8 Exam – 50% 1 Period APO 9 Exam Debrief 1 Period Required Reading: Chapter 4 (Pg. 105-110), 5 & 7 of AAP1000, Fundamentals

of Australian Aerospace Power.

APO- 1 Introduction Welcome to the APO Course book for the CUO’s course. Aerospace Power is often looked upon as a course that’s boring, uninteresting and irrelevant. This course book, however, has been made to be as interesting as possible, with up to date and

relevant information however, it will take you a personal commitment of 5-6 hours to understand this subject to the required level. This course has been updated to reflect recent changes in the ADF, and it should give you a good foundation if you continue on into the RAAF. Ensure that you understand the Learning Outcomes, and study for them. You will not be examined on what is not encompassed by the Learning Outcomes.

The assessment consists of an exam, case-study & workbook. You will be required to submit this workbook on the first day of course. The references used for these notes are: · AAP1000 – Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power · APO Notes 1998 · RAAF IOC Course Notes – Operations It is required that you familiarize yourself with chapters 4 (pages 105-110), 5 & 7 of the Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power (AAP1000) Available online at: http://www.raaf.gov.au/airpower/html/doctrine/aap1000- main.asp All the best.

APO 2 - Principles of War Pre-Reading: AAP1000 Pages 17-22 (attached as Annex A) MoCT Requirements: List the principles of war. Notes: According to MoCT, you are only required to list the principles of war, so as a minimum you must be able to tell me all 10 principles off the top of your head. Nothing more is required, but to understand the subject a lot better read the case studies in AAP1000. The easiest way to learn these is make up a story or an acronym that you can remember, as it says in the manual that there is no ordering to the principles of war. SCSSOSSFESM, SCOSSSSFESM… what ever suits you. Revision Questions: 1) List 5 principles of War:

*

*

*

*

*

2) Principles are set in stone, as a commander you are obliged to obide by

them: TRUE/FALSE

3) Moral and making moral decisions is a principle of war: TRU E/FALSE

4) Principles are devised from:

a) Historic Experiences

b) Current Tacticians

c) Professors

d) Law

APO 3 – Combat Power Pre-Reading: APE Extract (attached as Annex B) MoCT Requirements:

• Describe the 3 elements of combat power • Compare and contrast air power with sea and land power

Definition(s):

• Combat Power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that an armed service can direct against an opponent at a given time

• Aerospace Power is the projection of military forces in the 3rd dimension by or

from a platform above the surface of the earth. Notes: According to MoCT you are required to describe 3 elements of combat power, that being aerospace, sea and land. To do this proficiently you must understand the elements, their limitations and advantages. It is expected that you could reproduce this in the test, as well as showing how they work together. Revision Questions: 1) Describe a major limitation that Aerospace Power has over Land power. ___________________________ _____________________________

2) Aerospace power can be defined as the projection of forces into the 3rd dimension, what is sea power? ________________________________________________________

3) Speed and time taken to respond to an incident is discussed in the notes, what are the significant features of this in relation into each of the 3 powers? ____________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________

4) Can the Air Force win a war without the army? (In relation to occupation of land?) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

APO 4 – Aerospace Power Pre-Reading: AAP1000 Chpt 5 Extract (Aerospace Characteristics) [Annex C] AAP1000 Chpt 7 Extract (Aerospace Power Roles & Force Multiplier) [Annex D] MoCT Requirements:

• Describe and List the Aerospace Power Roles • Describe and List the characteristics of Aerospace Power • Describe the role of a Force Multiplier

Notes: This is a fairly large segment, and there is a large amount of eating names and facts… Such is life. I have included the relevant sections of the Aerospace Manual, and removed irrelevant sections.

The characteristics of Aerospace Power are pretty easy to regurgitate if you remember the names, how you do that successfully is up to you. By “Describing” them you may be asked to list all of them, and describe what each means… be prepared for this, you never know. The Aerospace Power roles are usually associated

with aircraft, and your assumed knowledge of ARI/B/P/A should enable you to make this association, it will be relatively easy so if you study. You also need to be able to list the aerospace power roles and what they entail, however don’t expect to be asked to list them all. Revision Questions: 1) List 4 Characteristics of Aerospace Power, and an advantage and dis-

advantage for each one.

1)_____________________ Adv:_________________ Dis: ___________________

2)_____________________ Adv:_________________ Dis: ___________________

3)_____________________ Adv:_________________ Dis: ___________________

4)_____________________ Adv:_________________ Dis: ___________________

2 Name 3 Aerospace Power Roles that the C130H Hercules fulfills: 1)______________________ 2)_____________________ 3) __________________ 3 Which of the following is a force multiplier? a) Challenger 604 b) Boeing 707 Tanker c) Boeing Business Jet d) S60 Blackhawk 4 Aerospace Power cannot hold ground. Which characterist ic recognizes this?

APO 5 – Structure of the RAAF Pre-Reading: RAAF Brief (Annex E) MoCT Requirements:

• Describe Air Force Capability • Outline the structure of the operational groups of the RAAF • Describe within the context of Air Power the role and operation of the RAAF

FEGS and FSU’s and the Aircraft types assigned to them. Notes: For this section you will be required to reproduce the definition of Air Force Capability almost word-for-word. You need to be able to sort every aircraft into its units, and the units into its chain of command and location. The RAAF Website will give you some help if you struggle with this section, however the information that has been provided should be sufficient. The RAAF FEGs also play vital roles in the provision of capabilities to the air force, you must be able to link the FEGs to aircraft and Aerospace Power Roles. Do this using your understanding of the ARI-A series and what you have learnt in previous sections. Revision Questions: 1) Where is 77SQN Based, what aircraft does it operate, and name 3 aerospace power roles that it performs. Location:_______________ Aircraft:______________

1)_________________ 2)___________________ 3)___________________

2) 92WG flies AP3C’s from RAAF Edinburgh, what units does it consist of, and what air force capability grouping does it fulfil? Units: _____________________________________________________

Grouping: _________________________________________________

3) Name 2 Flying Sustainment Units and the aircraft they operate:

1) _______________________ Aircraft: _______________________

2) _______________________ Aircraft: _______________________

4) What is Air Force Capability?

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

APO 6 - Case Study – 30% Scope: 1-2 A4 Pages of size 12 Times New Roman Font. Must be submitted typed, unless outstanding circumstances exist, to be handed in with this workbook at the beginning of your course. Objective: To consolidate what you have learnt in APO Resources: You may use any resources you feel necessary, however you must list them all and submit them with your assignment. AAP1000 would be of great use, and is available online. Task: Report: Aircraft have been around since 1903, and we have seen them develop as an effective military force. Discuss this in terms of the Aerospace Power Roles. OR Research Paper: You are to research the use of aerospace power in a war or conflict and show the advantages and disadvantages of the Aerospace Power Roles when implemented in the situation you investigate. (You may choose any situation from 1903 – 2005). OR Essay: How and why is an Aircraft Carrier a Force Multiplier?

Annex A

Extract from AAP1000 Pages 106-110

Principles of War

Nature of Conflict | 105

There were two extremely important points about him [Yamamoto] as acommander. First, he made the objectives of the operation extremely clear,and he expressed them with indomitable will. Second, although he did notpermit any criticism of the objectives of the operation, he entrusted thedetails of its execution to the discretion of his subordinates.

Lieutenant General Minoru GendaJapanese Air Self-Defense Force

Key Japanese Planner of the Pearl Harbor Attack 20

OPERATIONAL COMMAND EXPERIENCE IN THE RAAF

Up until the mid-1990s, Australia never had the opportunity to command itsown forces at the operational level. Historically, Australian forces have alwaysbeen included as part of a greater coalition of allied forces and thus alwaysfound themselves under foreign command. This was especially true during WorldWar II where Australia willingly committed the RAAF through the Empire AirTraining Scheme to operations in Europe. Rather than serving as autonomousgroupings, Australian forces were parcelled out to existing British units. ThusAustralian commanders were denied — as a matter of British policy — invaluableexperience at the operational level. This situation continued into the South-West Pacific Area where the RAAF found itself as part of the Tactical Air Force(5th Air Force) commanded by General Kenney (USAAC).

Even through Korea and Vietnam, Australia continued to supply only tacticallevel forces. It was not until General John Baker (CDF 1996-1998) recognisedthis deficiency that Australia created the necessary organisation at theoperational level with a permanent Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST).

The Tactical LevelAt the tactical level forces are deployed to confront the enemy in battle. The

tactical art is all about organising and manoeuvring forces to engage the

enemy in combat.

The single clear lesson of World War II was that the visionaries werecorrect that all future warfare would be dominated from the air. Theyagreed on that. What they argued about was just how air power woulddominate surface warfare.

Lieutenant Colonel David MacIsaac, USAF 21

Principles of WarUnderstanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstractionrequires the simplification and ordering of reality … Obviously, the realworld is one of blends, irrationalities, and incongruities: actualpersonalities, institutions, and beliefs do not fit into neat logical categories.

The Tactical LevelHow will we confront theenemy in battle?

Principles of War

Michael Maria

Principles of War

Michael Maria

There were two extremely important points about him [Yamamoto] as a commander. First, he made the objectives of the operation extremely clear, and he expressed them with indomitable will. Second, although he did not permit any criticism of the objectives of the operation, he entrusted the details of its execution to the discretion of his subordinates. Lieutenant General Minoru Genda Japanese Air Self-Defense Force Key Japanese Planner of the Pearl Harbor Attack 20 OPERATIONAL COMMAND EXPERIENCE IN THE RAAF Up until the mid-1990s, Australia never had the opportunity to command its own forces at the operational level. Historically, Australian forces have always been included as part of a greater coalition of allied forces and thus always found themselves under foreign command. This was especially true during World War II where Australia willingly committed the RAAF through the Empire Air Training Scheme to operations in Europe. Rather than serving as autonomous groupings, Australian forces were parcelled out to existing British units. Thus Australian commanders were denied — as a matter of British policy — invaluable experience at the operational level. This situation continued into the South- West Pacific Area where the RAAF found itself as part of the Tactical Air Force (5th Air Force) commanded by General Kenney (USAAC). Even through Korea and Vietnam, Australia continued to supply only tactical level forces. It was not until General John Baker (CDF 1996-1998) recognised this deficiency that Australia created the necessary organisation at the operational level with a permanent Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST). The Tactical Level At the tactical level forces are deployed to confront the enemy in battle. The tactical art is all about organising and manoeuvring forces to engage the enemy in combat. The single clear lesson of World War II was that the visionaries were correct that all future warfare would be dominated from the air. They agreed on that. What they argued about was just how air power would dominate surface warfare. Lieutenant Colonel David MacIsaac, USAF 21 The Tactical Level How will we confront the enemy in battle?

106 | Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power

Yet neat logical categories are necessary if man is to think profitablyabout the real world in which he lives and to derive its lessons for broaderuse and application.

Samuel P. Huntington

Developing a set of principles of war

is one way of reducing the problem

of urgency in times of crisis that

was discussed earlier in this chapter.

Principles are a distillation of

centuries of military experience

that should provide commanders

with some guidance in times of

great stress. The most important

thing to remember when thinking about such maxims is that they are nothing

more than guides that can help in decision-making. They are certainly not

fundamental laws or rules for behaviour that carry some penalty if not

followed to the letter.

The Australian Defence Force has defined ten principles of war as a reference

guide for commanders.22 What follows are historical air power illustrations

of each of these principles.

SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM — Battle of Britain

The German strategic planning and discussions throughout the summer of 1940reflect, in glaring fashion, a failure tograsp the essentials of strategy. The

Navy had squandered its battle-cruiserassets in strategically meaninglessoperations off Norway in the latespring. The Army drew up a plan forthe proposed cross-channel invasion,

codenamed ‘Sea Lion’ that one cancharitably describe as irrelevant to andignorant of the general state ofavailable Naval strength. The Luftwaffe

through the summer, followingGoering’s lead, paid minimal attentionto the operation problems of a channelcrossing by the Army in the belief thatits victory over the RAF would make

an invasion unnecessary.

Principles provideguidance from pastexperiences. They are notlaws or rules.

Australian principles ofwar are defined in theADDP-D.

Loading rockets onto aBeaufighter 24

Principles of War


The ‘aim’ of the German Luftwaffe was therefore ostensibly the destruction of

the Royal Air Force as a prelude to the invasion of Britain. However, the GermanHigh Command was not unanimous in this aim. In particular, the German NavalHigh Command had grave reservations as the Royal Navy was still at full strengthand could be expected to vigorously defend the English Channel. Nevertheless,

Goering, as the head of the Luftwaffe, initiated the air campaign, as much toimpress his Fuhrer with the capabilities of the new Luftwaffe, as to the defeatof the RAF. So began the Battle of Britain.

Initially, RAF airfields were selected and successfully attacked thus significantly

reducing the fighting strength of the RAF. However, after the RAF bombedBerlin in retaliation, Hitler diverted his main effort toward the bombing ofLondon. Thus the aim of the campaign, which was never clearly enunciated noragreed in the first place, was easily diverted.23

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE — Battle of the Bismarck Sea

In February 1943, Allied intelligence believed with confidence that a Japaneseconvoy would sail around the northern coast of New Britain to Lae or Salamaua,

either later that same month or early in March. Immediately, HeadquartersAllied Air Forces began preparing for a major air assault on the convoy.Reconnaissance aircraft would detect and shadow the convoy as early aspossible. Long-range heavy bombers from the United States Army Air Forces(USAAF) would then start medium altitude attacks. Once the Japanese were

within range of the Allied Air Forces potent anti-shipping strike aircraft — theRAAF’s Beaufighters, Bostons and Beauforts, and the USAAF’s Mitchells andBostons — an all-out combined attack would be mounted from medium, lowand very low altitudes.

The Japanese convoy of eight destroyers and eight merchant ships carried 6000army troops and 400 marines, primarily from the 51st Infantry Division. Itdeparted from Rabaul on 28 February headed for Lae. On the morning of 2March it was sighted by a patrol of USAAF B-24 Liberators. Immediately, 28 B-

17 Flying Fortresses attacked the convoy from 6500 feet using 1000 lb demolitionbombs. Later in the day another attack was conducted by 11 B-17s. Up to threemerchant ships may have been sunk.

On the morning of 3 March, the Japanese convoy was rounding the Huon

Peninsula. It was now within range of the entire Allied Air Forces strike force,which had been waiting for this moment for weeks. By 1000 hours the battlehad started. The Australian and American aircraft attacked in three waves andat three levels, only seconds apart. First, Flying Fortresses bombed from medium

altitude. Secondly, RAAF Beaufighters hit the convoy from below 500 feet,lining up on their targets as the bombs from the Flying Fortresses were exploding.The Beaufighters raked the ships with a withering storm of cannon fire frombow to stern. With the convoy now widely dispersed and in disarray, the thirdwave of attackers was able to concentrate on sinking ships. Some 25 USAAF B-

25 Mitchells bombed and strafed the enemy ships. While this attack was inprogress, 28 USAAF Lightning fighters provided air defence from Japanese Zeros.


The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was a devastating defeat for the Japanese.

Aircraft from the Allied Air Forces sank 12 of the 16 Japanese ships in theconvoy, killing almost 3000 enemy troops. The operation smashed Japanesehopes of regaining the initiative in New Guinea, as they had planned.

COOPERATION — Collapse of France

During the collapse of France in 1940, the British Prime Minister WinstonChurchill was angered by the news that the French, frightened of retaliationon their own cities, had driven trucks onto the airfield near Marseilles to prevent

British bombers from making raids on Genoa and industrial centres in NorthernItaly. There was no concept of cooperation and it was — essentially — everyman for himself. 25

OFFENSIVE ACTION — Air Campaign in Operation Barbarossa

The Luftwaffe’s offensive air campaign against the Soviet Air Force during theopening weeks of Operation Barbarossa was highly successful. An official Sovietstatement on 5 October 1941 declared that the Air Force had lost 5316 aircraftin about 14 weeks, including 1811 aircraft in the first 24 hours of the German

offensive in June 1941. The German success was temporary, and within 18months of the launch of Operation Barbarossa the Soviet Air Force could deployseveral thousand ground attack aircraft in support of their land offensive. 26

SECURITY — Preparations for the Normandy Invasion

One of the most successful examples of military security was the sealing ofSouthern England in late May and early June 1944 when the Allies preparedfor the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944. They mounted such a multi-faceted security plan that the Nazi leadership was deceived into believing that

the landings would be at the Pas de Calais rather than in Normandy. Even whenthe initial landings took place the Germans still believed that it was a feint andthe real landing would still occur across the narrowest stretch of water betweenEngland and France.

SURPRISE — Pearl Harbor

While the surprise attack on PearlHarbor is usually associated with thedestruction of the heart of the US

Pacific Fleet, Japanese counter-airoperations were an integral part ofthe attack. The Japanese struck firstat the US retaliatory capability, its

airfields, before it attacked ‘BattleShip Row’. The first flight ofapproximately 180 Japanese aircraftdestroyed prone US aircraft atHickam, Ewa, Bellows and Wheeler

USS West Virginia 27


airfields, in addition to those at Ford Island and Kaneohe Bay Naval air stations.

Following this initial attack, the Japanese attacked the warships docked atPearl Harbor.

The second wave of approximately 170 Japanese aircraft followed up with

attacks on both airfields and naval assets. In addition to the 18 warships eitherseverely damaged or sunk, a number of US aircraft were destroyed. Thanks totheir tactical surprise and superior numbers, Japan suffered minimal losses. 28

FLEXIBILITY — ‘Scud Busting’ in the Gulf War

During the Gulf War, key targets for air power became the mobile Scud launchersas their use by Iraq could potentially fracture the coalition. Mobile Scudlaunchers were almost impossible to detect until launch. Coalition strike aircraftwere often placed on airborne alert, and other aircraft already assigned missions

could be, and were, diverted in flight to attack identified launchers at veryshort notice.

ECONOMY OF EFFORT — Osirak Nuclear Reactor

On 7 June 1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor witha single strike. Fifteen of the sixteen 2000 lb unguided bombs hit the targetwith the other weapon a near miss. None of the Israeli aircraft were damaged.There was one casualty on the ground and little or no collateral damage. Itremoved the Iraqi nuclear weapon development capability for over a decade.

SUSTAINMENT – German Luftwaffe

The German Luftwaffe provided an example of sustainability in an operationalsense during the early days of the Battle of the Atlantic. Focke-Wulf Fw2000

Condor aircraft would shadow the British convoys crossing the Atlantic on acontinuous basis and pass the convoy’s position to their submarine operationscentre. The absence of any form of fighter aircraft in the convoys meant thatall the Condors had to do was stay outside of the range of the convoy’s guns.The British interim response was to develop a fighter that was catapulted off a

merchant ship to intercept the Condor. Even if the aircraft — usually a modifiedHurricane fighter — was successful in driving off or shooting down the Condor,the pilot had to bail out of the aircraftbecause he had nowhere to land. His

expectation was that a ship in theconvoy would pick him up. It was asuccessful tactic if somewhatexpensive in aircraft.29

MORALE — Milne Bay

RAAF and Australian militia unitsfought with dogged determinationagainst the Japanese at Milne Bay

Groundie Riding the Wing of aKittyhawk 30


under appalling conditions. Despite all of the problems, morale remained very

high and the subsequent defeat of the Japanese — their first in the war by anyAllied forces — markedly increased the Australians’ determination to win.

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

IntroductionAll activities carried out in

peacetime and combat are subject

to an internationally accepted code

of conduct, even though they will

be conducted under stressful and

often unsettling conditions. This

code is known as the Law of Armed

Conflict (LOAC).

LOAC is an internationally accepted

legal code that is unconditionally binding on the conduct of all military

operations. The individual combatants act for the nation in the application

of lethal force although they are often operating under conditions of

uncertainty and change. Even in the confusion of combat, individual

commanders and combatants at all levels can be held legally accountable for

their actions. With this in mind, no other profession has the burden of

responsibility that matches the one faced by combatants. All members of the

ADF must therefore understand the laws dealing with the application of

aerospace power in combat.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Human societies have always developed legal systems to govern their relations.This includes situations of conflict between groups. Early man and primitive

societies had basic rules and ritualistic behaviour. As societies became moredeveloped so did the rules. A rudimentary form of international law was practisedby Greek city states and the Romans. This included rules which regulated warfare.The rationale for these rules is the same today: for example, behaviour such aspoisoning wells would have detrimental effects which may destroy the gains

of victory.

During the 16th Century, nation states emerged in Europe and a system ofinternational law came into being. Part of this law was a code of chivalry;

however, the desire for regulating war derived principally from national or

LOAC

Introduction

Commanders andcombatants at all levelscan be held legallyaccountable for theiractions

Sabre, Mirage & Hornet 31

Law of Armed Conflictestablishes a code for theconduct of activitiesduring peace andcombat.

Michael Maria

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT Introduction All activities carried out in peacetime and combat are subject to an internationally accepted code of conduct, even though they will be conducted under stressful and often unsettling conditions. This code is known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). LOAC is an internationally accepted legal code that is unconditionally binding on the conduct of all military operations. The individual combatants act for the nation in the application of lethal force although they are often operating under conditions of uncertainty and change. Even in the confusion of combat, individual commanders and combatants at all levels can be held legally accountable for their actions. With this in mind, no other profession has the burden of responsibility that matches the one faced by combatants. All members of the ADF must therefore understand the laws dealing with the application of aerospace power in combat. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT Human societies have always developed legal systems to govern their relations. This includes situations of conflict between groups. Early man and primitive societies had basic rules and ritualistic behaviour. As societies became more developed so did the rules. A rudimentary form of international law was practised by Greek city states and the Romans. This included rules which regulated warfare. The rationale for these rules is the same today: for example, behaviour such as poisoning wells would have detrimental effects which may destroy the gains of victory. During the 16th Century, nation states emerged in Europe and a system of international law came into being. Part of this law was a code of chivalry; however, the desire for regulating war derived principally from national or LOAC Introduction Commanders and combatants at all levels can be held legally accountable for their actions Sabre, Mirage & Hornet 31 Law of Armed Conflict establishes a code for the conduct of activities during peace and combat.

Annex B

Function of Aerospace Power [Extracted from APO Course notes ‘98] Introduction Air Power is one of the three elements which make up combat power, the other two being land and sea power. Land Power is the use of military force on land (surface level) which comprises of an army and the usual elements associated with a land force; eg troops, armour, artillery, command and control, and supply and logistics. Land power is limited by the geographical constraints of the land mass on which the land force is operating and is usually measured in days in response time. Sea Power is based on the use of military force which is projected from the sea, either at or below the surface of the oceans of the world. Sea power elements involve surface ships and submarines of varying sizes and are usually measured in weeks in response time. Sea power has a greater capacity to project its military force over the globe than does land power. However, sea power is still restricted to certain parts of the world namely the sea and some major waterways. Air Power is the use of aircraft to project a military force, and as such is not constrained by any geographical feature (eg land mass or sea) and may be projected anywhere on the globe. Air power is usually measured in hours in response time. Air power, in the broadest sense, can be considered to be the total aviation activity of a nation, both military and civilian, in the pursuit of national objectives. Apart from the military capacity of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the civilian aviation sector can undertake many tasks which would release military air power in times of war or escalated hostilities. Combat aside, air power in the broader context, can be used in peacetime through defence cooperation programs with neighbouring countries, peacekeeping measures, disaster relief operations, regional surveillance arrangements and combined exercises with allies and neighbours. However, the objectives of APE focus on the Military application of air power. The Military Context There are positive and negative aspects to air power. Operating from the third dimension, air power is able to exploit such attributes as flexibility, surprise, mobility, range and shock. Two of these aspects require further comment. Flexibility is perhaps the most readily understood quality of air power. Simply, an aircraft can be diverted quickly from one role to another and from one type of target to another. Another major air power characteristic, surprise, is often vital to the success of modern warfare and is one of the Principles of War which is discussed in APE2. It is achieved by striking the enemy at the time or place, or in the manner, for which he is unprepared. Having said that, it is not necessary to take the enemy completely unaware, but rather to prevent him from reacting effectively. It in this last requirement, the prevention of an effective reaction by the enemy, that air power can be used in a number of ways; stealth, EW suppression etc. Air power, however, has limitations. Air forces cannot occupy ground, seize cities or accept surrender. Air power, when compared to other forms of combat power, is dependant on a relatively sophisticated base support which is itself vulnerable, and cost. Aircraft and its supporting infrastructure are expensive. Air power is, however, an essential adjunct to the firepower and flexibility of land forces, which can do these

things, and a vital shield for friendly land forces against enemy air power. Air power, relative to sea and land power, is a newcomer to the concept of extending military force in order to achieve certain objectives. The definition of air power is only a modification of the definitions of sea or land power. Specifically, air power can be defined as:

• Aerospace Power is the projection of military forces in the 3rd dimension by or from a platform above the surface of the earth.

The term "aircraft" is used in its broadest sense to include all forms of aircraft eg balloons, satellites, fixed/rotary wing machines, drones etc.

Annex C

Extract from AAP1000 Chapter 5

Aerospace Characteristics

Characteristics of Aerospace Power | 121

INTRODUCTIONAir power is the most difficult of military forces to measure or even toexpress in precise terms. The problem is compounded by the fact thataviation tends to attract adventurous souls, physically adept, mentallyalert and pragmatically rather than philosophically inclined.

Winston Churchill 1

The first use of air was confined to the direct support of land and sea forces.

That is, aerospace power was simply an extension of land and sea power.

Aircraft provided new dimensions of speed, range and height which surface

force commanders were able to exploit for reconnaissance and the direction

of artillery.

From these modest beginnings, aerospace power developed into an integral,

yet discrete, part of warfare. Aerospace power can still provide direct support

to the surface battle but, through exploitation of unique characteristics, it

will be equally able to carry out discrete functions that do not necessarily

involve surface forces.

In today’s battlefield, it would be illogical to conclude that any one element

of the military is better than the others. Air, sea and land powers have entirely

distinct yet complementary characteristics that, when integrated, can

contribute substantially to the national capability for resolving conflict.

What does aerospace power primarily bring to the joint arena? By being

able to exploit the freedom of the third dimension, aircraft can reach, in

a timely manner, any point in the battlespace in support of national

policy. Given Australia’s geographic isolation, this ability to strike at the

enemy’s vital points; that is, the enemy’s ability to project military power

over substantial distance, provides a fundamental component of our

national security.

5Characteristics ofAerospace Power

INTRODUCTION

Air power was first usedin direct support of landand sea forces.

Aerospace power can beused for direct supportor discrete operations.

Aerospace power’scharacteristicsdifferentiate it from otherforms of combat power.

Aircraft provide anability to reach anypoint in the battlespacein support of nationalpolicy.


Synergy Synergy

SYNERGY

If you say that there is synergy between two or more organisations or groups,

you mean that when they combine or work together, they are more successfulthan they are when they are on their own. 2

The key to the nature of aerospace power is found in the synergistic effect of its

characteristics. And it is this combination of aerospace power’s characteristics

that differentiates it from the other forms of combat power and provides the

foundation for the Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power.

Strengths and LimitationsIn previous editions of aerospace power doctrine, the characteristics of

aerospace power were portrayed as either strengths or weaknesses, implying

that they were absolute. This often resulted in unnecessary and odious

comparisons with sea and land power. However, this failed to take into account

the context in which aerospace power might be applied. For example, a

characteristic that is clearly a strength in one scenario, could well be a

limitation in another.

The characteristics described below are in alphabetical order to avoid erroneous

prioritisation.

AIR POWER (PRESENTATION TO SECRETARY OF STATE - 30 OCTOBER 1991)

Depending on the context, of course, air power can provide a more acceptableshow of force than the insertion of ground forces and can even achieve a

deterrent effect from outside the potential conflict zone. Its deployment ispolitically easier than ground forces - and its extraction is faster and cleaner.And of course if as a last recourse we have to resort to the use of force, wemust not forget one of the key lessons we learnt from the Gulf War; the groundwar would never have been envisaged without the hugely successful preceding

offensive air campaign. Only the latter could guarantee the low casualty ratesour media-driven public has now come to expect. I suggest that this is a trendfor the future, as we look more to crisis management outside traditional areasof interest; a successful opening air campaign preparing the way will invariably

be essential and critical. As in Iraq, winning the air war is the vital factor. Butthe maintenance of these characteristics and capabilities involves relativelyhigh readiness and hence readily available personnel and equipment in a war-fighting condition. 3

The nature of aerospacepower lies in thesynergistic effects of itscharacteristics.

Strengths andLimitationsAerospace power’scharacteristics must beconsidered in context.


Characteristics of Aerospace Power

AEROSPACE POWER CHARACTERISTICSWhen applying military power,

commanders must understand the

nature of the conflict and in

particular those threats and

vulnerabilities, both internal and

external, that shape the strategic

context. Commanders must also

appreciate the characteristics of the

available force and be able to define

an operational response that most

effectively exploits the resultant

advantages and disadvantages of

that force.

In examining the characteristics of

aerospace power, it must be understood that these are relative to those of our

sister Services. While aerospace power does contribute a potent component

to Australia’s military power, it forms neither the sole nor the dominant part

of that power. Given our circumstances, solutions for dealing with a conflict

will generally be an integration of available force capabilities.

Concentration of Force

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

Concentration of force is the concept that maximum pressure will be applied toan enemy’s weak spot, which is generally agreed to be the centre of gravity. 4

During a conflict, operational

planners may draw upon forces

deployed to forward operating

bases or reach back to those forces

remaining within the relative safety

of main operating bases, or a

combination of both. By utilising

the available reach and speed of air

assets, force can be integrated and

subsequently concentrated in time

AEROSPACEPOWERCHARACTERISTICS

Characteristics can berelative strengths orweaknesses dependingon the context.

Commanders mustunderstand thecharacteristics of anassigned force.

Response to conflict willoften involve integratedforce options.

Concentration ofForce

Aerospace power canconcentrate force in timeand space, where andwhen required.

F-111 Formation 5


and space, when and where required. However, with the recognised flexibility

and versatility of aerospace power comes the high demand that may often

exceed the forces available. In this case, there may be a temptation to fragment

the force to try and fulfil the demand for immediate, tactical objectives thus

diluting the concentration of force required for the more important strategic

objectives.

Concentration of force does not, by itself, imply the use of mass, rather the

principle of economy of effort still remains the dominant factor. Planners

will be required to coordinate effective operations with the minimum number

of assets. Yet, the near concurrent arrival of aircraft at a target (or a range of

parallel targets) combined with the effectiveness of matched payloads can

induce both a psychological shock for the adversary as well as morale support

for allied forces.

THE ENOLA GAY

Special bombing mission (#13) with Little Boy atomic-bomb,

Target: Hiroshima (Opns Order #35, Tibbets as airplane commander with modified crew)

At approximately 0200 on the

morning of 6 August, the Enola Gay,which was carrying an atomic bomb(Little Boy), started on the long flightfrom Tinian. Two observation planescarrying cameras and scientific

instruments followed behind her.

After 0600, the bomb was fullyarmed on board the Enola Gay.

Tibbets announced to the crewthat the plane was carrying theworld’s first atomic bomb.

The trip to Japan was smooth. At about 0700, the Japanese radar net detected

aircraft heading toward Japan, and they broadcast the alert throughout theHiroshima area. Soon afterward an American weather plane circled over thecity, but there was no sign of bombers. The people began their daily work andthought that the danger had passed.

At 0725, the Enola Gay, at 26,000 feet, was cruising over Hiroshima. At 0800the Japanese again detected two B-29’s heading toward Hiroshima. The radiostations quickly broadcast a warning for the people to take shelter, but manydid not follow the advice. They thought that it was the same as first time.

Concentration of force isnot necessarily equal tomass, rather theeffective coordination ofrequired force.

The Enola Gay withCOL Paul Tibbets 6


At 0809, the crew of the Enola Gay could see the city appear below; it was timeto drop the bomb. Just then, they received a message indicating that the weather

was good over Hiroshima. The bomb was released at 0816.

A terrible, strong and unimaginable explosion occurred near the central sectionof the city. The crew of the Enola Gay saw a column of smoke rising fast andintense fires springing up. [The nuclear age had begun.] 7

Concurrent Operations

CONCURRENT OPERATIONS

Concurrent operations are a range of military actions that are undertaken

simultaneously to achieve maximum effect. 9

With the advent of air power came the ability to extend the battle beyond

the front lines. Up to this point, war had been, in the main, a set of sequential

operations with only one objective being engaged at a time. Now, in contrast,

aerospace power could be employed in concurrent (or parallel) operations,

simultaneously engaging a number of military objectives.

Concurrent operations can greatly enhance a commander’s ability to control

the tempo of the battle, and are far more likely to disorientate an adversary.

Furthermore, the characteristics that enable aerospace power to conduct

concurrent operations make it possible for the same forces to participate in

two or more concurrent campaigns.

Hiroshima 8

ConcurrentOperations

Concurrent operationslook toward prosecutingobjectives in parallelrather than sequentially.

Concurrent operationscan be used to controltempo and disorientatean enemy.


B-17 Damaged By Flak 12

Fragility

FRAGILE

Something that is fragile is easily broken or damaged [or rendered inoperable]. 10

VULNERABLE

[Something] that is vulnerable is not very well defended and is therefore aneasy target to attack. 11

Modern air vehicles are required to be sophisticated which implies the use of

highly stressed lightweight materials in their construction. Therefore, aircraft

tend to be more fragile than their counterpart surface vehicles. Furthermore,

a damaged aircraft cannot be repaired in flight. The platform must be returned

to a friendly airfield for Battle Damage Repair to be completed before

continuing to operate. As a result, damage to key components can easily

create catastrophic effects on mission accomplishment or the very survival

of the platform and/or the occupants.

Fragility

Modern air vehicles areinherently fragile andhence susceptible todamage.

Platform vulnerabilitiescan be reduced throughprotective measures.

REDUNDANCY

A design feature whereby parallel or stand by items or systems are provided toenable a function to continue to be performed after a failure has occurred. 13

Although fragile; that is, easily broken or destroyed, aerospace power is not

necessarily vulnerable; that is, susceptible to attack, because of the range of

protective measures that can be applied. These measures include:

• offsetting characteristics such as speed, altitude and manoeuvrability

• low observable technologies like stealth to reduce aircraft radar cross

section, infra-red signature and engine noise


• aircraft self-defence systems including electronic counter measures, chaff

and flares

• tactics such as route planning to exploit deception and surprise

• redundant aircraft systems including flight controls, hydraulics and

electrical systems

Impermanence

IMPERMANENT

Something that is impermanent does not last forever. 14

Aerospace power by itself is unable to hold ground. Aircraft also cannot stay

airborne indefinitely. While air-to-air refuelling can greatly extend the range

and endurance of aircraft, no means has yet been found to rearm, re-crew or

service an aircraft in flight. Therefore, aerospace power is an impermanent

form of military force.

The nature of discrete aerospace power operations means that attacks are usually

focused deep inside enemy territory, often aimed at targets not within the ground

being disputed by allied forces. An attack can be carried out using the necessary

level of aerospace force but, once the strike is complete, the aircraft usually

leave the area shortly thereafter. The enemy can then repair the damage done,

thus requiring additional operations to attack the target again.

Complete destruction of a facility is not always required nor desired, especially

when the facility may be instrumental to the rebuilding of the state. Hence,

planners may use the impermanence of aerospace power to allied advantage

in that it can be used to strike and disable adversary capability for a finite

period of time, permitting ready repair afterwards.

Physical permanence of a deployed force can attract its own penalties such

as political and military inflexibility, vulnerability of assets, and the need to

establish and maintain lines of communication and supply. Therefore, in certain

circumstances, the impermanence of aerospace power can be an advantage.

It can help to avoid the potential military and political liabilities that can

arise from an extended presence in a distant land.

PERSISTENT

Something that is persistent continues to exist or happen for a long time or

happens again and again for a long time. 15

Impermanence

Aircraft cannot stayairborne indefinitely norcan they hold ground.

Targets may need to beattacked again if theenemy has theopportunity to conductrepairs after a strike.

Aerospace power may beused to temporarilydisable a capability,later allowing for repairto be completed.

Physical permanencemay be a politicaldisadvantage.


Although aerospace power is impermanent, it can be made persistent. Unlike

surface power, aerospace power’s inherent speed, range and penetration allow

forces to visit and revisit wide ranges of targets nearly at will. Aerospace

power does not need to occupy terrain or remain constantly near areas of

operation to bring force to bear on them.

INTERDICTION OF CHINESE LOGISTICS DURING THE KOREAN WAR

In April 1951, United States Far East Air Forces’ emphasis on air operations

shifted from close air support to interdiction missions.

The Chinese logistics system had virtually limitless numbers of personnel andproved itself to be eminently flexible in opening new supply routes at will,

many re-supply missions being undertaken on foot. The impossible taskconfronting the interdiction programs was compounded by the inability to attackthe supply dumps and base camps in Manchuria. Without the ability to attackthe source of supply, countless interdiction missions were conducted againstroads, railways and bridges on the Korean Peninsula with apparently little effect

on the Chinese capacity to fight.

Yet there can be no doubt that the interdiction program did cause a degree ofdisruption to the communist system of supply. The communists had to divert

thousands of men to repair the continual damage to the railways and roads. 16

FURTHER READING

Virtual Air Power by Michelle Yeaman 17

This book sets out to lay the foundations for the consideration of UninhabitedAerial Vehicles as options in support of ADF capabilities. Challenges specific totheir introduction and optimum employment are also examined.

Operating Bases

OPERATING BASES

Main Operating Bases provide a home base for aircraft, personnel and theirsupport infrastructures. Forward Operating Bases are those established usually

within a theatre as an intermediate place from which operations are staged. Asa result, the risk of hostile fire increases and only essential support elementsshould be deployed forward.

All military operations require base support. Armies in the field need depots

to support them, and navies need harbour facilities. However, aerospace

power is often perceived to be more dependent on bases than are either

land or sea power.

Operating Bases

Aerospace power isdependent uponoperating bases and thesupporting elements theycontain.

Aerospace power doesnot need to occupyterrain or remainconstantly near to areasof operation to bringforce to bear on them.


Fixed-wing aircraft depend fundamentally on air bases. Their bases are generally

large in area; providing a substantial infrastructure including fuel, power, water,

and airfield approach aids. Permanent bases are also supported by command

and control systems, well-stocked and continually resupplied. In Australia, the

use of bare bases is fundamental to the application of aerospace power. Such

bare bases do not have the same level of support even when fully activated.

The physical security of an air base

will usually require a substantial

number of personnel. Furthermore,

the high value of an air base makes

them a focus of enemy intelligence

and a focal point for attack.

Helicopters and some fixed-wing

aircraft can take off and land

vertically, but most aircraft need

runways, and all aircraft need a high

level of base support if they are to operate at their maximum sortie rate.

While individual bases can be vulnerable to attack, the risk of disruption to

aerospace power operations can be reduced by:

• creating redundancy through a network of alternative operating bases

• establishing forward operating bases for transient operations

• use of air-to-air refuelling to allow aircraft the reach to operate from

airfields in more protected rear areas

• hardening base infrastructure to reduce the long term damage from attack

• employing ground and air defence measures (both active and passive)

FURTHER READING

Airbase Operability (Second Edition) by Sal Sidoti 19

This book considers the history of attacks on air bases, the modern threats, andoffers a broad range of options for increasing the survivability of air power’smost vulnerable element.

Aerospace powerdepends on base supportto maintain maximumsortie rates.

Security of an air baseis intensive in terms ofpersonnel required.

P-3C over RAAF Edinburgh 18

Base dependency andvulnerability can bereduced by:

• creating redundancy

• establishing forwardoperating bases

• use of air-to-airrefuelling

• hardening baseinfrastructure

• employing air defencemeasures


PayloadThe payloads, both cargo and armament, that can be carried by aircraft are

far more limited than those that can be carried by ships and somewhat less

than can normally be carried by land vehicles. Payload limitations can, in

part, be compensated for by the high sortie rate conferred by an aircraft’s

speed, the range over which the payload can be carried and the accuracy

with which it can be delivered. Moreover, a small payload deployed quickly

and accurately may be of far more value in stabilising a critical situation

than one many times its size that is deployed too late.

PAYLOAD

A transport aircraft’s payload is the weight of cargo and passengers it cancarry. A strike or fighter aircraft’s payload is the weapons load and tacticalstores such as flares and other active or passive decoys. 20

Weapons Payload. The advances in

the accuracy of precision weapons

and the reduction in the size of

modern warheads mean that an

aircraft can deliver more decisive

attacks without having to resort to

the mass assaults of Word War II. It

should be borne in mind that the

carriage of weapons on external

pylons would normally increase the

aircraft’s radar cross section making it more vulnerable to detection.

Cargo Payload. The ability to reach and penetrate into enemy held territory

can result in essential supplies being delivered most effectively by air. Air

forces can penetrate where land and sea forces cannot, thus providing vital

supply to otherwise unreachable places.

EARLY PAYLOADS

The early aircraft could not carry a heavy payload. In World War I some of the

first scout aircraft could not carry a machine gun because of its weight. DuringWorld War II the attitude was that if the aircraft could carry the load it did notmatter what stress this placed on the aircraft.

Precision weapons havereduced the need formassive weaponspayloads.

F-111C Loadout21

Air delivery of cargomay be the only methodavailable for resupply.

PayloadThe limited payload ofan aircraft can be offsetby speed, reach andsortie rate.


The No 617 Squadron RAF Lancaster bombers that carried the 22,000lb [9980kg]

Grand Slam bomb were so overloaded with one weapon that their straightwings curved up towards the wingtips and became an arc of a circle in flight.

With advances in aircraft design and engineering, modern aircraft payloads

and their effect on the structure of the aircraft can be calculated withgreat accuracy. 22

PenetrationSurface manoeuvre warfare is based

on firepower, mobility and

protection. The land and sea forces

probe for and then penetrate the

enemy’s points of weakness and then

hit them decisively. The presence of

physical barriers and relatively limited

speeds of advance of the land and sea

forces means that conflict is a series

of sequential objectives. The inclusion

of the aircraft as a combat asset means that such limitations can be overcome

because the aircraft is not limited by the physical barriers and has the

advantage of speed.

While used initially as no more than a direct support extension of the surface

forces, the end of World War I brought with it recognition of the penetrating

characteristics of the aircraft. Being able to overcome physical barriers meant

that the aircraft could be used to penetrate into enemy territory, strike

strategic targets and then escape relatively unhindered. Modern aerospace

power can be used to penetrate deep into enemy territory to strike a wide

range of discrete strategic and other targets.

Space-based surveillance systems, both military and civil, are currently

relatively invulnerable and can monitor the entire surface of the battlefield

virtually unhindered. Manoeuvre from the air and deep penetration can be

combined to enhance the overall combat power of sea and land forces.

PenetrationPhysical barriers do notlimit the operationalemployment of anaircraft.

The aircraft’s ability topenetrate deep intoenemy territory allows itto strike strategictargets.

F/A-18 Dropping Bombs 23

Aerospace power canenhance the overallcombat power of sea andland forces.


USAF E-8C J-STARS 26

SHOOTDOWN OF GARY POWERS

Even though the Soviet Union madeits land borders virtuallyimpenetrable after World War II, theUnited States were able to use U-2aircraft to gather data on Soviet

capabilities and deployments. In1960, the Soviet air defences haddetermined that the U-2s used astandard route between Pakistan and

Norway. They then shot down [a U-2B piloted by USAF Captain] Gary Powersand created a major international incident.

To the Western air forces this affair initially suggested that well-prepared anti-aircraft defences would reduce the pervasiveness of air power considerably. It

was only later that Western intelligence organisations discovered that the SA-2Guideline missile that hit the U-2 was the 14th to be fired at Powers’ aircraft.Twelve had missed altogether, and the 13th shot down by a MiG-19 fighter aircraftthat was trying to conduct an air intercept of the U-2.25

PerspectivePerspective is the way a force looks at the battlespace. For all forces (land,

sea and aerospace), their perspective is out to their visible or sensor horizon.

Clearly, this gives aerospace power the advantage since the resulting

perspective can often cover the entire battlefield and vast portions of the

battlespace. By their nature, aerospace forces occupy the high ground.

Unlike surface-based platforms, aerospace-based surveillance and

reconnaissance platforms can often operate effectively outside the threat

envelope of hostile defensive systems. Consequently, aerospace power’s

perspective greatly complicates the enemy’s defensive strategy and tactics.

JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM (JOINT STARS)

The Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System (Joint STARS) is anairborne platform equipped with along-range, air-to-groundsurveillance system designed tolocate, classify and track ground

targets in all weather conditions. Itscapabilities make Joint STARSeffective for dealing with any

PerspectivePerspective is the way aforce looks at thebattlespace and is usuallylimited to visual orsensor horizons.

Aerospace power’sperspective greatlycomplicates the enemy’sdefensive strategy andtactics.

USAF U-2 24


contingency, whether actual or impending military aggression, international

treaty verification or border violation. Joint STARS consists of an airborneplatform - an E-8C aircraft with a multi-mode radar system and US Armymobile ground station modules. The E-8C, a modified Boeing 707, carries aphased-array radar antenna in a 26-foot canoe-shaped radome under the

forward part of the fuselage. The radar is capable of providing targeting andbattle management data to all Joint STARS operators, both in the aircraft andin the ground station modules. These operators, in turn, can call on aircraft,missiles or artillery for fire support.

The E-8C Joint STARS is the only airborne platform in operation that canmaintain realtime surveillance over a corps-sized area of the battlefield. Ajoint Air Force-Army program, the Joint STARS uses a multi-mode side lookingradar to detect, track, and classify moving ground vehicles in all conditions

deep behind enemy lines. 27

PrecisionThe term accuracy defines how close a result comes to the true value. If a

person fires several bullets at the bullseye of a target and all of their shots as

a group are centred on the bullseye then their firing can be said to be accurate.

If another person fires at the bullseye and all of their shots are clustered in a

very tight group - but not centred on the target - then their firing can be

said to be precise. If we combine these two terms as an analytical tool we

can say that something that is both accurate and precise is exact. We would

be living in a fool’s paradise to expect that warfare will ever be exact - but it

is something for which we should strive because it implies that we are trying

to have as much control as is humanly possible over the conduct of the war.

One of the most significant advances in weapon technology has been the

advent of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). However, precision is not the

sole domain of PGMs, rather it is simply a case of matching a weapon to a

desired, tailored effect. Precision comes from being able to strike the target

required while avoiding unnecessary casualties. Should the target be an area

one, such as a group of dispersed troops in open ground, then precision can

be achieved through the use of ‘dumb’ bombs.

However, modern targets tend not to be area ones, rather they tend to be

discrete places often surrounded by infrastructure that the attacker may not

wish, or be legally allowed to, destroy or damage. Hence, the accuracy required

in these attacks is paramount and has led to the successful development of

the precision-guided munition.

PrecisionAccuracy and Precisionare not interchangeableterms.

Precision is not the soledomain of Precision-Guided Munitions.

PGMs provide a level ofaccuracy required tostrike targets precisely.


Precision-Guided Munitions. Today,

any target that can be located and

positively identified can be struck

with a precision-guided munition.

The destructive power applied

through air-dropped or air-launched

stand-off munitions is effective

against all but specially hardened

targets located deep underground

(eg Saddam Hussein’s command bunkers in Iraq). Yet even these may be

susceptible to astutely planned strikes against their support systems, such as

communications, power, access and ventilation; or by using specifically

designed penetrator weapons. Today, there is little on the earth’s surface that

is not vulnerable in almost any conditions of visibility to aerospace power’s

lethality.

Advancement in precision is not solely the domain of aerospace power.

However, as the legal responsibility of a commander grows in terms of

collateral damage, so does the requirement to identify positively and attack

legal targets precisely. When combined with speed, penetration, reach and

perspective, aerospace power is capable of conducting decisive, accurate

attacks yet being able to minimise collateral damage.

THANH HOA BRIDGE

In the closing stages of the war inVietnam - on 13 May 1972, to beprecise - a road rail bridge over theMa River at Thanh Hoa was destroyed

by a laser-guided bomb dropped froma USAF F-4 Phantom. This bridge wason the main communication routefrom Hanoi to the south and it had

been attacked by more than 700sorties since April 1965. Although it

had sustained damage during these attacks, it had remained intact. It was alsofiercely defended and, while conducting operations against it for some sevenyears, many US airmen and aircraft were lost. 30

Aerospace power canaccurately attack targetswhile minimisingcollateral damage.

F-4 Phantom 29

The accuracy anddiscretion provided byPGMs provides anability to strike almostany identifiable target.

Loading PGMs 28


ReachAerospace power has great reach since it is able to operate unconstrained by

natural physical barriers to engage any target, anywhere.

The advantages, moral and material of fighting in the enemy’s countryare so enormous that is it folly to await an enemy’s attack on our ownsoil. All preparations for the defence of Australia, thorough and completeas they may be, may break down absolutely if, at a final and decisivemoment, the weapon of defence cannot be transferred beyond our territorialwaters.

General Sir Harry Chauvel 31

Forward deployment is one option for exploiting aerospace power’s potential

reach. Whether that is available or not, the use of air-to-air refuelling (AAR)

as a force multiplier can extend radius-of-action many times over, greatly

extend time on task or allow for deceptive routing of the strike package.

However, the use of AAR provides a vulnerable point of failure (the tanker)

because if the enemy shoots down the tanker, the entire strike package could

be lost. Therefore, this risk must be taken into consideration when planning

the operations.

AIR-TO-AIR REFUELLING DURING THE GULF WAR

On 7 August 1991 the United States

was able to deploy 24 F15-C fighteraircraft to the Middle East within 38hours of the notice to move to defendSaudi Arabia in the immediateaftermath of the Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait. The aircraft were flowndirectly from the United States toSaudi Arabia with AAR tankers insupport. The 8000 nautical mile flight, which took 15 hours, included up to 12

airborne refuels per aircraft. 33

ResponsivenessThe speed and reach of aircraft means that we now have assets that are able

to be deployed quickly to a theatre or within a theatre and undertake

operations almost immediately. Even airborne forces can be rapidly redirected

in response to an event. The responsiveness of aerospace power provides

flexibility in strategic, operational, and tactical planning by enabling a military

commander to react swiftly and effectively in a changing military situation.

ReachAerospace power canreach any point in thebattlespace.

The use of AAR tofacilitate reach mayprovide points ofvulnerability.

KC-10 Tanking F-15Cs32

ResponsivenessAerospace power canrespond to an event inthe battlespace, deployrapidly and undertakeoperations almostimmediately.


Aerospace power is the government’s most rapid form of credible combat

power to distant theatres without forward-basing or deploying standing

naval forces. This capability to deter aggression or stabilise situations

enables diplomatic resolution, or the deployment of other, less responsive

military forces.

RESTORATION OF THE MALDIVES

On 3 November 1988, a group of 200 Tamil mercenaries took over the island

nation of the Maldives in the central Indian Ocean. They were employed by twodissident Maldavians who were the only nationals to be involved in the coupattempt. The Indian Government - despite being a supporter of Tamil activitiesin Sri Lanka - decided to take action against the plotters.

It was able to respond very quickly and sent army units by air to capture themercenary group and restore order. The speed with which the Indian ArmedForces responded caught the mercenaries by surprise, which accounts in partfor the lack of casualties.

They launched Operation Cactus with an airborne assault on the capital Maleand by the morning of 6 November 1988 the mercenaries and their Maldavianemployers had been captured while fleeing to Sri Lanka. 34

SpeedSpeed is the ability to cover distance quickly and to apply force with little

delay. Speed also reduces the time that aircraft are exposed to hostile fire

and thus increases their survivability in battle. Speed is an enabling or

mitigating characteristic for many other aerospace power characteristics

(ie. fragility, reach, and responsiveness).

Speed allows military power to be projected rapidly, missions to be completed

in short periods of time, and a large number of complementary tasks to be

undertaken within a given period. At all levels of war speed creates surprise.

SR71 BLACKBIRD

The SR-71, unofficially known as the ‘Blackbird’, is a long-range, advanced,strategic reconnaissance aircraft developed from the Lockheed A-12 andYF-12A aircraft. The first flight of an SR-71 took place on 22 December 1964,

and the first SR-71 to enter service was delivered to the 4200th (later, 9th)Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale AFB, California, in January 1966. TheUS Air Force retired its fleet of SR-71s on 26 January 1990, because of adecreasing defence budget and high costs of operation. The USAF returned the

SpeedSpeed reduces the timethat an aircraft isexposed to hostile fire.

Speed facilitatessurprise.

Aerospace power is thegovernment’s most rapidform of credible combatpower.


SR-71 to the active Air Force inventory

in 1995 and began flying operationalmissions in January 1997.

The SR-71 flies at more than three

times the speed of sound at altitudesin excess of 80,000 feet (approximately15 miles high). Throughout its nearly25-year career, the SR-71 remained theworld’s fastest and highest-flying

operational aircraft. 36

TechnologyAerospace power tends to be more sensitive to technological change than

sea power or land power. Aerospace power is a product of technology, and it

is inevitable that technological advances will affect its development.

Experience has shown that relatively small technological innovations can

have a major impact on aerospace power effectiveness. As aerospace power

has advanced, so has the technology of air defence systems.

WEAPONS SYSTEM

A combination of one or more weapons with all the related equipment, materials,services, personnel and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required

for self-sufficiency. 37

Aerospace power is expensive to acquire, operate and maintain. This

characteristic applies equally to weapons systems, simulators, aircrew, specialist

enabling personnel, ground support equipment, spares and air bases. As with

other characteristics, the costs of aerospace power are not absolute but need

to be assessed in terms of relative cost-benefit.

HUMANE WARFARE

The truth is that war in the past has often been soulless - it has involved the

destruction of much of the cultural heritage of the societies that have beeninvolved. World War II saw the destruction of some of the great architecturaltreasures of old Europe: the old city of Warsaw; the monastery at Monte Casino(the mother of European monasticism); as well as museums and art galleries

which stored the glory of European art. In one fire in Berlin, 434 old masterswere destroyed including works by Caravaggio, Titian and Veronese. 38

SR-71 Blackbird 35

TechnologyAerospace power is aproduct of technologyand can be affected byrelatively smallinnovations.

Aerospace power isexpensive to acquire,operate and maintain.


Cost-Benefit. The cost of aerospace

power is often focussed on the

monetary cost of the physical

platform and of sustaining it.

However, the benefit of technology

in aerospace power can best be

considered in the savings associated

with human life and irreplaceable

national infrastructure and treasure. The advances in platform and weapon

technology mean that fewer aircrew are exposed to battle and the accuracy

of resulting strikes reduces the collateral damage.

TECHNOLOGY IN AIR AND SPACE WARFARE

Since the beginning of the 20th Century technology has made air power, andlatterly aerospace power, increasingly important. The ability to move away fromthe restrictions of movement on the Earth’s surface offers a new arena formilitary conflict. The lessons of the past suggest that our predecessors found it

difficult to make the right development decisions in a timely way. Extrapolationsof limited combat data resulted in false strategic concepts. With the benefit ofhindsight, the technological developments which have crucially affectedaerospace warfare are the invention of the aircraft, radar, nuclear weapons,and the missile. It may be that the future historian will place the helicopter/

Vertical Take-off and Landing (VTOL) aircraft, or satellites among thesemilestones. Alternatively their vulnerability may mark them down with theairships of the past.

The characteristics of the four major technological areas may give some directionto thinking about future possibilities. The aircraft offered a new scale forfirepower in both range of action and speed of reaction. It gave a new flexibilityto the use of military force, which could be applied to a whole range of widelyseparated targets. Radar made the invisible visible. The vast regions of the sky

or the sea could be explored at the speed of light, and appropriatecountermeasures taken. Nuclear weapons provide destructive power on a scaleunimagined before. Indeed with thermonuclear weapons, the energy releasedwas virtually unlimited. The potential damage from even a single weapon

changed the whole nature of international relations. Finally, the missileprovided an unstoppable delivery method for the nuclear weapon. As weexamine the opportunities for the future, the relative effectiveness of themanned aircraft against the missile will need close scrutiny. The futureapplications of space technology will also need to be examined. Aerospace

technology grows ever more expensive, and yet concepts have not madedramatic changes in recent times. 40

The benefit oftechnology inaerospace power canbest be associatedwith the saving ofhuman life.

Rapier Anti-Air Missile System 39


Tempo

TEMPO

Tempo is defined as the rhythm or rate of operations relative to the enemy. 41

In today’s information world, intelligence is only valuable if it can be exploited

before it becomes outdated. The pace at which aerospace power operations can

be generated allows this intelligence to be exploited whilst it still has currency.

The relatively short duration of air missions combined with quick turnarounds

mean that an aircraft and its crew can be used a number of times per day.

The same assets can be operated over a wide range of tempos - aircraft can

be loaded and immediately ready for operations, but held on alert; or the

same assets can be operated around the clock for considerable periods of

time; or located elsewhere on task and relocated quickly.

The problem of maintaining a high tempo is that it creates fatigue amongst

air and combat support crews which, if left unchecked can reduce effectiveness

or worse, lead to accidents. Therefore, the objective would be to generate the

necessary tempo, combined with a concentration of force for the length of

time required to cover the decisive period of the campaign.

Versatility

MULTI-MISSION VS MULTI-ROLE

Multi-mission platforms can undertake more than one specialist task during asingle sortie.

Multi-role weapon systems can be reconfigured quickly so that they canundertake alternative roles. 42

Many aircraft can be switched rapidly between widely separated and diverse

targets (flexibility) and can fulfil a variety of offensive and defensive roles

(versatility). These aircraft can carry out more than one role during a single

mission and may also be re-tasked in the air if necessary. The versatility of

aerospace is demonstrated in that:

• Air assets can be diverted in-flight from one task to another or from one

target to another.

• Multi-role weapons systems can be quickly reconfigured for alternative roles.

Tempo

Intelligence is volatileand must be exploitedquickly.

Aerospace assetscan be operatedover a wide rangeof tempos.

Operating at a hightempo can causefatigue and lead toaccidents.

Versatility

Aircraft can beswitched rapidlybetween targets(flexibility) and roles(versatility).


• Multi-mission weapons systems can perform more than one specialist task

during a single sortie.

• Identical assets can produce a wide range of effects.

While this inherent versatility gives

governments and operational

commanders many options, it comes

at a cost in terms of acquisition,

operation, training and logistic

support. Training is a case in point.

The potential to exploit the versatility

of task switching of airborne multi-

role and multi-mission aircraft, and of

the aerospace power available

through high operational tempo, comes only with highly trained aircrews and

responsive maintenance, engineering and intelligence personnel.

Aerospace power does not come from a standing start, and high levels of

competence across all approved roles are the price to be paid for versatility.

The cost of raising, training and sustaining the support personnel required to

conduct each assigned role must be weighed up against the overall value.

Whilst skills across a broad number of roles is desirable, it will come at the

cost of depth of expertise and experience in any one role.

SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS OF AEROSPACE POWEREach decision-maker must have a thorough understanding of aerospace

power’s characteristics as it applies at all levels of war and to all commanders

- joint, air, land and sea. Thorough planning based on professional mastery is

the key. For instance:

• Strategic - use aerospace power’s superior reach, responsiveness and

precision to exploit the uncertainty of asymmetric response, and to strike

directly at vital points, achieve strategic surprise and shock, and confound

the enemy’s situational awareness.

• Operational - attain military objectives using aerospace power’s reach,

versatility, tempo, penetration and precision, rather than undertaking an

attrition campaign. Aerospace power will also enable the conduct of

concurrent operations and campaigns.

SYNERGISTICEFFECTS OFAEROSPACEPOWER

Decision-makers musthave a thoroughunderstanding ofaerospace power’scharacteristics at thestrategic, operationaland tactical levels.

Versatility includes acost in trained aircrewsand responsivemaintenance,engineering andintelligence personnel.

F/A-18 Hornet 43

Versatility may result ina compromise in termsof level of competenceacross assigned roles.


Servicing an F-111G 44

• Tactical - exploit the element of surprise by dynamic leadership, high

quality crews, innovative tactics, deception and speed of manoeuvre.

The balance of a nation’s aerospace power must be consistent with defence

policy and strategy. Issues affecting balance include:

• The offensive/defensive mix - because of its characteristics, aerospace

power is an inherently offensive weapon.

• The capability mix - which must exploit aerospace power’s characteristics

and complement the national security strategy.

• Aircraft to personnel ratios - the achievement of high tempo from a

given number of platforms is dependent upon both adequate numbers

and the associated skill of both aircrews and combat support personnel.

• Aircraft to weapons ratios -

advanced platforms are only as

good as the available weapons.

• Aircraft/air training costs - highly

complex weapon systems

employed in complex operations

must be supported by effective

training. To ignore this relationship

is a recipe for mission failure at

best, defeat at worst.

• Infrastructure costs - the potency of weapons systems is only as good as

the security of their air bases.

Aerospace power is recognised as but one arm of the military capability, yet

it provides an essential part of the national security strategy. By assigning

appropriate capabilities and roles to aerospace power, and then integrating

these with land and sea power, the ADF can contribute to an effective solution

for resolving any level of conflict.

The balance of anation’s aerospacepower must beconsistent with defencepolicy and strategy.

Aerospace power isrecognised to be just onearm of the militarycapability.

Annex D

Extract from AAP1000 Chapter 7

Aerospace Power Roles and Force Multiplier

Australian Aerospace Power Roles | 161

7Australian AerospacePower Roles

INTRODUCTIONRoles and missions forma more detailed systemfor management of theforce.

INTRODUCTIONThe aerospace power capabilities

described in Chapter 6 provide the

Air Force with the strategic

framework under which to manage

(raise, train and sustain) the forces

for which the Chief of Air Force is

responsible. However, to manage

the force at the operational and

tactical level requires a more

detailed system. For the RAAF, this is provided through the assigned roles and

missions.

Roles. A role is a specific function assigned to an operational unit. By

undertaking roles, the ADF demonstrates its competence in the assigned

aerospace power capabilities. The roles recognised by the Air Force are:

• Counter Air roles are:

- Offensive Counter Air

- Defensive Counter Air

• Strike roles are:

- Land Strike

- Maritime Strike

• Aerial Mining roles are:

- Offensive Aerial Mining

- Defensive Aerial Mining

• Offensive Air Support roles are:

- Offensive Air Support - Land

- Offensive Air Support - Maritime

Orion over Sydney Harbour 1

By undertaking specificroles, the ADFdemonstrates competencein the assigned aerospacepower capabilities.


• Airlift roles are:

- Airborne Operations

- Air Logistics Support

- VIP Transport

- Special Operations Support

- Aeromedical Evacuation

• Force Multiplier roles are:

- Air-to-Air Refuelling

• Information Operations are:

- Information In War

- Information Warfare

• Search and Rescue roles are:

- Combat Search and Rescue

- Search and Survivor Assistance

• Battlespace Management roles are:

- Aerospace Battle Management

- Aerospace Management

- Early Warning and Control

• Combat Support roles are:

- Main Operating Bases

- Forward Operating Bases

- Operations Support

• Space roles are:

- Offensive Counter Space

- Defensive Counter Space

Mission. Missions are defined where a role can consist of a number of discrete

functions. A mission is a specific task assigned to a tactical unit and represents

the level at which forces are dispatched in order to carry out assigned duties.

The missions carried out by the Air Force are defined within each role as

detailed throughout this chapter.

SORTIE

In air operations, a sortie is an operational flight by one aircraft.2

A mission is a specifictask assigned to atactical unit.


Sortie. A sortie is the basic unit of

measurement in air operations. It

is completed by a single aircraft for

a specific task. It is also possible to

speak of an aircraft sortie as a

‘single aircraft mission’. Thus the

term is used to calculate a range of

statistics including ‘loss rates’,

where the number of aircraft lost

is compared to the number of sorties flown in a given campaign, and ‘rate of

effort’ where the number of sorties flown in a day defines the resources

consumed to achieve a certain effect.

COUNTER AIRAnyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against anenemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modernEuropean troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chancesof success.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel4

The aim of counter air operations

is to achieve and maintain the

required degree of control of the

air. Achieving friendly control of the

air is both an end in itself and a

means to an end. It prevents the

enemy from using aerospace power

effectively against friendly forces,

rear areas and homelands, while

allowing friendly use of aerospace

power against the enemy. Control

of the air is achieved both

offensively and defensively by

deterring, containing or defeating

enemy air forces.

CO No 6 Squadron 3

COUNTER AIR

Counter Air

Counter Air aims toachieve Control of theAir and can encompassboth offensive anddefensive means.


AIR SUPREMACY

Air supremacy is that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force isincapable of effective interference.5

Air Supremacy. Air power is key to virtually every type of military operation.

Ground and naval campaigns usually require some kind of air complement.

Ideally, an air commander would seek to establish air supremacy continuously

over the whole operational area, but this might not always be possible.

WORLD WAR I - THE EMERGENCE OF THE AIR BATTLE

Since the outset of the ‘proper’ counter air contest, the Royal Flying Corp’s(RFC) strategy had been the pursuit of a strategic air offensive against the

German Air Service. Offensivepatrols went deep into Germanterritory, often 10-15 milesbehind the lines. Attacks were

made on the German aircraftwherever and whenever theywere encountered including thebombing of enemy aerodromes.While the basic aim of this

offensive was to maximiseGerman losses, the moreimmediate reasons was the needto allow observation aircraft ‘elbow room’ to support the ground forces without

enemy interference. Thus the RFC was engaged in an air freedom and air denialcontest.

WORLD WAR II - THE SUCCESS OF ALLIED COUNTER AIR OPERATIONS

During 1944, the Allies launched Offensive Counter Air (OCA) operations over

North-West Europe to ensure that the Luftwaffe could not interfere with theNormandy landings on 6 June 1944. They were so successful that on D-Day theLuftwaffe had 170 serviceable aircraft to face the 12,000 Allied aircraft including5600 fighters. 7

Air Superiority. When faced with superior air forces a commander might

concentrate the forces available to achieve a favourable air situation over a

limited area for a limited time. In these circumstances, for effective air

superiority to be gained, close liaison is required between land, sea and air

commanders to ensure that a favourable air situation is established where

and when it could contribute most to the overall success of the campaign.

Air Superiority isachieved when there is alack of prohibitiveenemy air interference.

Air Supremacy isachieved when there is alack of effective enemyair interference.

B-17 ‘All American’6


AIR SUPERIORITY

That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another whichpermits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea andair forces at a chosen time and place without prohibitive interference by theopposing force. 8

Air Parity. When the commander is not in a position to be able to project

allied air power over the enemy territory even for a short period of time or in

a localised area, he must aim to establish air parity. That is the ability to

maintain control of the air over friendly forces thus denying the adversary

the ability to conduct operations. Unlike air supremacy and air superiority,

air parity is purely a defensive form of control of the air.

PROJECT AIR 5400 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES

Project Air 5400 seeks to provide a credible air-to-air weapons capability up to

and beyond the F/A-18A/B life of type. The air-to-air weapons capabilitycomprises the provision of Within Visual Range (WVR) and Beyond Visual Range(BVR) air-to-air missiles.

The provision of an improved BVR missile capability will increase aircraftsurvivability and exchange ratios while performing the Counter Air role.Specifically, the purpose of the BVR missile is to allow F/A-18A/B aircraft toengage aircraft prior to merge at beyond visual range with a high probabilityof success in destroying or damaging hostile aircraft sufficiently to prevent the

completion of their mission. Thisrequires the missile to be an activeradar-guided beyond visual rangeair-to-air missile with advanced

Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures (ECCM). To meet thisrequirement, the Departmentselected the AIM-120 AdvancedMedium Range Air-to-Air Missile

(AMRAAM) manufactured byRaytheon. This missile is beingacquired through US DoD Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The FMS Case was signedby the Department on 17 November 1998. Operational and training missiles

were delivered in late 2000 and early 2001. The AMRAAM has already beenintegrated onto the F/A-18 aircraft by the US Navy.

The endorsed WVR capability is for a highly agile, large off-boresight, passiveinfra-red guided missile with re-programmable Infra-Red Counter-Counter

Measures, which can be cued by a helmet mounted sight. The Advanced ShortRange Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM) manufactured by Matra British Aerospace

Air parity is achievedwhen control of air ismaintained over friendlyforces.

AIM-120 AMRAAM 9


Dynamics was selected to fulfil this requirement after a competitive tendering

process. The contract with Matra British Aerospace Dynamics was signed on30 November 1998. Under a separate agreement, ASRAAM will undergo storesrelease and firing trials in the USA with the US Navy before completion of theaircraft integration program by the RAAF in Australia. 10

Counter Air Roles. Counter Air encompasses the roles of:

• Offensive Counter Air

• Defensive Counter Air

Offensive Counter Air (OCA)Aerospace power is inherently offensive and yields the best effect when so

employed. Offensive Counter Air aims to seek out and reduce the enemy’s

aerospace power capabilities and their threat to our own control of the air.

By taking the offensive, we maintain the initiative and therefore can exploit

our aerospace power strengths.

Offensive Counter Air Missions. OCA operations are designed to reduce or

destroy an enemy’s potential to conduct its own control of the air. The conduct

of OCA includes both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions as follows:

• OCA Attack

• Sweep

• Force Protection

• Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)

OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR

An operation mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit enemy air power as close toits source as possible. 11

To conduct the OCA role successfully, the ADF must possess an offensive

capability, which has both long range and endurance. The ability of OCA

squadrons to readily deploy, and the provision of good intelligence of potential

threats are prerequisites for effective conduct of the role.

OCA Attack. OCA Attack aims to neutralise an enemy’s aerospace power,

infrastructure and assets, at its source. Destroying aircraft on the ground has

been traditionally regarded as the most effective means of conducting OCA

operations; however, selection of the right target is vital. Care must be taken

not to target aircraft to the exclusion of other, sometimes more suitable,

OCAOffensive Counter Airaims to seek out andreduce the enemy aircapability.

OCA missions:• OCA Attack• Sweep• Force Protection• SEAD

OCA requires forcescapable of readydeployment andintelligence support.

Counter Air roles:• Offensive Counter Air• Defensive Counter Air

OCA Attack aims toattack the enemy’saerospace power at itssource.


targets such as the command and control infrastructure or the network of

radars and ground-based air defence systems.

AIR DEFENCE IDENTIFICATION ZONE (ADIZ)

Airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready identification, locationand control of aircraft is required. 12

Sweep. Sweep is the use of Offensive Counter Air (OCA) assets to obtain air

superiority. In its most benign form, an offensive fighter sweep consists of

probes beyond a declared Air Defence Identification Zone into international

airspace, to intimidate a potential aggressor during periods of tension and to

deter or interfere with his ability to mount similar probes in response. During

low level conflict, these sweeps may probe this airspace with the intention of

retiring prior to being engaged. Should conflict escalate, the range of sweep

options increases dramatically. Random or dedicated sweeps over enemy

airspace would serve the dual aims of demonstrating resolve and achieving

local air superiority. Attrition of enemy forces may also be the aim of these

missions, requiring them to be structured such that the enemy has no option

but to react with its own Defensive Counter Air (DCA) assets.

Force Protection (FP). The objective

of Force Protection is to ensure that

the supported assets (including

package formations) achieve their

objective by being protected from

an enemy air threat. Force

Protection includes the following

tools:

• Force Protection (FP) Sweep. FP

Sweep (formerly Route Sweep)

uses dedicated air-to-air fighter aircraft to provide independent/

autonomous air superiority of a given area or route for the vulnerability

time (VUL time) of the package.

• Screen. Screen (formerly Detached Escort) uses dedicated air-to-air fighter

aircraft, which are acting as an integral part of the package and are able

to provide immediate radar support to the package. Screen formations

are able to take the initiative and commit on enemy aircraft rather than

Sweep aims to probeenemy airspace,attacking enemy air andground targets ofopportunity.

Force Protection aims toprotect vital assets in thecompletion of theirmission and includes thefollowing tools:• Force Protection

Sweep• Screen• Close Escort• Barrier Combat Air

PatrolF/A-18 Firing AIM-7 Sparrow 13


be hindered by the package formation they are supporting. In order to

maintain an influence the screen should aim to remain within a range

that the formation can provide weapons support.

• Close Escort. Close Escort (formerly Attached Escort) uses dedicated air-

to-air fighter aircraft which are acting as an integral part of the package

and are able to provide immediate weapon support to the package. This

defensive formation is within visual range of the protected assets and

provides the last line of defence for those assets.

• Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP). BARCAP (formerly Target CAP) uses

air-to-air fighter aircraft which are either separated from a Force Protection

Sweep/Close Escort element or are a dedicated element, tasked to provided

air cover of an airfield for a particular duration.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD). SEAD encompasses operations

that aim to destroy or temporarily degrade enemy ground-based air defences

in a specific area and for a specific time, normally in support of an attack

force. SEAD assets are either tied directly to a strike package (fighter escort)

or can operate detached in close proximity of the strike package. SEAD is a

role in which specialised weapons and systems are employed to exploit inherent

weaknesses in an enemy’s ground-based air defences. Attacks can be either

through kinetic weapons or electronic warfare (such as jamming).

F-4G ‘WILD WEASELS’

A ‘Wild Weasel’ is an aircraft that has been modified to identify, locate and

physically suppress or destroy ground-based enemy air defence systems. Theaircraft launches missiles that home in on the defence system’s electromagneticenergy emitted as these radar system tracks the aircraft. Simply put: If an anti-aircraft radar system is turned on for more than a few seconds, the Wild Weaselcan use the radar’s own signal to find and destroy it.

The F-4 Phantom was not the first,nor probably the last, Wild Weasel.The original Wild Weasels were

F-100F aircraft, which weredeveloped to combat theincreasing success of the anti-aircraft defence system of NorthVietnam. The F-100F, paired with

F-105 fighters, began flyinghunter-killer sorties over North

SEAD is the neutralising,destroying or temporarilydegrading of enemy airdefences.

F-4G ‘Wild Weasel’ 14


Vietnam in November 1965. Their mission was to detect and destroy radar-

controlled surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery. But theF-100 proved too slow; by fall 1966, converted F-105 aircraft assumed theWild Weasel role. Called ‘Thud Weasels’, the F-105F aircraft carried moresophisticated electronic detection and jamming equipment as well as more

powerful weaponry. It flew through the end of the Vietnam War, basically servingtwo missions: paired with other F-105D aircraft or F-4 Phantom aircraft as ahunter-killer team, or as strike force support to bombers. Upgraded to the F-105G aircraft, it supported B-52 bomber strikes in 1972.

By 1975, the F-4G Phantom became the Wild Weasel. These modified F-4Efighters had their cannon replaced with AN/APR-38 electronic warfareequipment. About 116 F-4Es were rebuilt as F-4G aircraft to carry a pilot andan Electronic Warfare Officer. The F-4G, which first flew on 6 December 1975,

carried the AGM-88A/B/C High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). It workedin tandem with other F-4G aircraft or as a hunter aircraft, directing fighter-bombers against SAM sites.

In 1991, the F-4G Phantom Wild Weasel was deployed in Operation DesertStorm. By this time, its EW System had been upgraded to an AN/APR-47configuration. The Wild Weasels flew 2,596 sorties and obliterated Iraqi airdefences in the opening stages of the war. The aircraft fired more than 1,000air-to-ground missiles, destroying more than 200 targets.

The F-4G Wild Weasel flew its last combat mission over Southern Iraq on 2January 1996. Shortly after, the Phantom line was retired from active serviceby the US Air Force. It had already been retired by both the US Navy and USMarine Corps. The last operational flight of the F-4 Phantom II in service to the

United States was flown by the Idaho National Guard 124th Fighter Wing in anF-4G Wild Weasel on 20 April 1996, from Gowen Field in Boise, Idaho.15

Defensive Counter Air (DCA)While offensive suppression of enemy air is preferred, the reality is that we

must be prepared for enemy air attacks as they prosecute their own operations.

Aiming to exploit aerospace power limitations, enemy operations will attempt

to gain the initiative and destroy our aerospace power before it can be

effectively employed.

DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR

All measures designed to deny the enemy control of the air by attacking hisintrusive air power in the air, and nullifying enemy air attacks. 16

Defensive CounterAirDCA aims to reduce theeffectiveness of enemy airattack.


The provision of effective DCA is dependent upon the integration of sensors,

weapon systems, communications and the near real-time transfer of data. A

centralised command and control infrastructure must be overlaid to provide

both the direction and coordination of the many elements of an air defence

system. The effectiveness of that system is heavily dependent upon its

surveillance and early warning systems to provide time in which to marshal

an appropriate response to the enemy’s initiatives. This response usually entails

committing a range of weapon systems against the threat. But, the number

and availability of defensive assets will not allow an impenetrable screen

across the vast aerial approaches to Australia. Therefore, DCA operations should

focus on achieving high degrees of control of the airspace over specified

areas such as population, defence and infrastructure centres.

Defensive Counter Air Missions. DCA involves both active and passive

measures but should be balanced against an effective OCA campaign. Military

strategy that is based solely on DCA operations concedes timing, scope and

tempo of air operations to the enemy. The conduct of DCA includes the

following missions:

• Active DCA

• Passive DCA

Active DCA. Active DCA seeks to employ a mixture of aircraft- and ground-

based air defence systems to inflict attrition upon the enemy, thus preventing

the enemy force from reaching its intended target. Active DCA consists of:

• Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD). GBAD systems (ie. land and maritime

launched surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery) allow high

readiness states to be maintained over long periods and provide quick

response. However, they have

limited coverage and therefore

large numbers of systems are

required to defend beyond point

targets.

• Air Defence. Fighter aircraft

have limited endurance but they

are flexible and able to protect

very large areas and may be

DCA missions:• Active DCA• Passive DCA

Hornets Scrambling 17

Active DCA is theinterception anddestruction of enemy airforces using:• GBAD• Air Defence

- Area Defence- Point Defence- HVAA

DCA requires anintegration of sensors,weapon systems andcommand and control.


concentrated rapidly to counter enemy air offensives. Fighter aircraft can

also be assigned to:

- Area Defence. Fighter aircraft

can be used to defend an area

in which a number of

potential targets are located.

- Point Defence. In point

defence, the fighter aircraft

are allocated to protect a

single potential target within

a given location.

- High Value Airborne Asset (HVAA). HVAA missions are aimed at

protecting high value airborne assets such as AEW&C and air-to-air

refuelling aircraft.

Passive DCA. Passive DCA consists of measures aimed toward enhancing the

survivability of friendly forces and installations from hostile air attack. Passive

DCA can include:

• camouflage of installations and assets; that is, the concealment of valuable

buildings etc, through the use of methods such as deceptive paintwork or

nets

• concealment of vital assets by creating facilities underground

• hardened construction of shelters and buildings for aircraft, supplies and

people

• dispersal of likely targets to make use of the natural protection offered by

the surroundings

• deception techniques such as electronic warfare or through the

construction of false facilities (ie. hangers, runways etc)

Dili Heliport Feb 2000 18

Passive DCA aimstoward enhancingsurvivability of friendlyforces through:• camouflage• concealment• hardened construction• dispersal• deception


STRIKEAir Strike, for all its technical intricacies, represents nothing morecomplicated than the ability to destroy things, with a high degree of choiceover timing and location, and with a significant measure of impunity.

Shaun Clarke 19

FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA (FEBA)

The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units aredeployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces areoperating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or

the manoeuvre of units. 20

While aerospace power was first

employed only in the

reconnaissance role, it did not take

commanders long to realise that

they possessed an asset that could

reach beyond the Forward Edge of

the Battle Area (FEBA) and strike at

targets in the homeland of the

enemy. By targeting beyond the

FEBA, strike provided the ability to

weaken an enemy’s capacity to fight

by degrading that enemy’s

command and control, key

production facilities, infrastructure,

logistic support capability and,

ultimately, combat effectiveness.

AIR OPERATIONS FOR STRATEGIC EFFECT

Air operations for strategic effect are aimed to destroy or disrupt the definedstrategic centre of gravity of an opponent. The effect sought by air power

could be destructive, non-destructive or a combination of both, against targetsets which undermine the opponent’s ability, will and means to continue hisaggression. Air operations for strategic effect are not limited to bombing orsolely the domain of attack aircraft. All combat aircraft and associated weapon

systems are capable of action for strategic effect. 21

STRIKE

Strike

Strike aims to attacktargets beyond the FEBAin order to weaken anenemy’s capacity andwill to fight.


THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING OF GERMANY IN WORLD WAR II

Bombing in World War II was both strategic and tactical in purpose, pursing anindependent campaign to pave the way for a combined-arms invasion of Hitler’sEurope. Central to the achievements of the Combined Bombing Offensive wasthe defeat of German air power, and the result in the spring and summer of1944 was catastrophic for the German war effort.

Direct attacks on German aircraftproduction, airfields and aircraftin transit, together with the use

of long-range fighters to contestGerman airspace, crippled theLuftwaffe. Allied bombing ofcities also forced Germanindustry to adopt a policy of

dispersal or decentralisation. Insome cases large resources weretied up in building new factoriesin bomb-safe areas in a situation where building labour and materials were in

desperately short supply.

The impact on German morale was equally debilitating. Bombing did not producethe overthrow of the Hitler regime but the effect on those regularly subjectedto bombing in the major industrial centres was nonetheless intensely

demoralising. Furthermore, Germans interviewed after the war were almostunanimous in the view that bombing was the hardest thing for civilians tobear.

Bombing also distorted German strategy and forced the massive diversion of

resources - men and weapons - to fight the bomber threat. The establishmentof an extensive German air defence system shifted valuable resources awayfrom the main battlefronts. This had a further unforseen effect on militaryperformance as German armies during 1943 found themselves slowly starved

of air support at just the point that their enemies’ production of aircraft beganto rise steeply. Bombing not only diverted German military effort to home defenceon a large scale, but also encouraged desperate solutions from Hitler that furtherundermined economic capacity and postponed the introduction of militarytechnologies that might have has a decisive effect. 23

The capacity to conduct strike operations offers Australia the flexibility to

take the initiative, to gain surprise, to minimise attrition and to target an

enemy selectively. The Air Force maintains the capacity to conduct strike

through a numerically small force yet this force still provides the Australian

Government with a viable offensive option, which by itself, acts as a deterrent.

B17s Over Germany 22

Strike provides theinitiative to gain surpriseand minimise attrition.


Strike may also take the form of a

pre-emptive strike, aimed at

deterring an aggressor before major

conflict erupts. While there would

always be significant political and

diplomatic consideration of any

pre-emptive strike, confronted by

irrefutable intelligence of

impending hostilities, the

Government may exercise a pre-emptive strike option to remove the

immediate threat and demonstrate national resolve.

STRATEGIC STRIKE OPERATIONS

Offensive actions designed to effect the progressive destruction anddisintegration of the enemy’s capability to wage war. 25

Strike Roles. Strike operations represent the prime means for prosecuting

bombardment and can employ either of the roles of:

• Land Strike

• Maritime Strike

Land Strike

LAND STRIKE

Land strike is the application of air power against land targets not directlyinvolved with enemy forces in contact (see Offensive Air Support - Land). 26

The most effective use of aerospace power in land strike occurs when it is

concentrated against targets of high value. A Land Strike capability allows the

Air Force to be discriminatory; firstly, in selecting targets, and secondly, in limiting

collateral damage through the use of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs).

Within Australia’s defence strategy, the Air Force may be tasked to conduct

Land Strike against enemy-occupied staging bases. Air Force strike assets

could also be tasked to attack the source of an enemy’s combat power. But,

given our resources, the RAAF cannot apply mass, rather it must use only a

few aircraft in coordinated attacks. Therefore, weapons and tactics that

enhance stand-off capabilities, night capabilities and self-defence are

essential.

Strike roles:• Land Strike• Maritime Strike

Land Strike

Land Strike focuses onland targets of high value,often at the source of anenemy’s combat power.

Given our resources, theAir Force cannot applymass.

Low Level F-111C 24

Pre-emptive strike can beused as an offensiveoption or to deter anadversary.


PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS IN OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE

Although initiated following the bombardment of the market place in Sarajevoby the Bosnian-Serb Army on 28 August 1995, which left 38 dead, OperationDeliberate Force was the culmination of events and related planning over along period. The warring factions in Bosnia had disregarded UN mandatesconcerning designated safe areas and heavy weapon exclusion zones. Planned

as an air attack to reduce militarycapability to threaten or attacksafe areas and UN forces, theOperation’s targets included

heavy weapons, command andcontrol centres and militarysupport facilities. Over 700 PGMs,a mixture of laser-guided bombs,Tomahawk cruise missiles, Stand-

off Land Attack Missiles (SLAM)and anti-radiation missiles (ARM)were used together with moreconventionally aimed munitions. The US Deputy Defence Secretary John White

stated ‘our accuracy has been phenomenal’, and that strikes were so precisethat crews had gone beyond looking at targets and were looking at aimingpoints within targets.

A Pentagon spokesman confirmed that bombing in the Operation had been

much more accurate than in the Gulf War. This increased accuracy, as well asensuring that air attacks were economical and highly effective, also reducedcollateral damage to such an extent that the Americans were able to claimthat although they had searchedclosely for civilian casualties

following air attacks they hadfound none. After two weeks, on14 September, offensiveoperations were suspended when

the warring factions agreed tothe conditions of the UN-brokered framework agreement.UN/NATO agreed that theobjectives of the Operation had

been met, mission accomplishedand end-states achieved. The factions had been given a signal demonstrationof the economical but devastating force of NATO air power, and in particulartheir ability to attack targets with precision. The commanders were able to

declare ‘the resumption of air strikes is not currently necessary’. 29

Pre-Strike 27


Maritime Strike

MARITIME STRIKE

Maritime strike is the application of air power against enemy naval targets not

in contact with Australian or Allied forces (see Offensive Air Support - Maritime),but posing an indirect or longer-term threat. 30

During a conflict, an adversary can be expected to employ naval and civilian

assets for force projection, force protection or force sustainment. Whether

landing a hostile force onto friendly shores, protecting civilian shipping or

resupplying forward based assets, the adversary’s naval force presents a real

threat to allied sea lines of communication.

Maritime strike provides the ADF with the capacity to detect, locate, track

and ultimately destroy any surface or sub-surface contact that may present

an indirect threat to allied forces or be used to sustain any hostile military

action. Aerospace power provides the range, speed and flexibility to engage

hostile maritime targets before they can engage with friendly assets. Maritime

strike operations can be expected to involve continuous and contiguous

missions aimed at denying enemy forces the opportunity to either operate

within a designated area or passage between specific points.

Maritime Strike Missions. The nature of naval forces result in two distinct

types of maritime strike missions:

• Independent Surface Warfare (ISuW) aims to neutralise an adversary’s

naval capability or to cut the sea lines of communication that would be

required to support any hostile action. Given the nature of the maritime

surface environment, opportunities for surprise are limited. Therefore, in

engaging surface targets, the use of stand-off weapons is preferable so as

to allow the attacking aircraft to remain outside the enemy air defences.

• Independent Under Sea Warfare (IUSW) aims to neutralise an adversary’s

sub-surface naval capability. Like surface combatants, modern submarines

can also be fitted with air defence systems thus making airborne localisation

and prosecution of a target very difficult and dangerous.

Maritime Strikemissions:• Independent

Surface Warfare• Independent

Under-SeaWarfare

Maritime Strike

An adversary can beexpected to employ navaland civilian maritimeassets.

Maritime Strike focuseson surface and sub-surface naval targets thatpresent an indirect threatto allied forces.


AERIAL MININGIn mine-laying, surface ships provide greater carrying capacity and navigational

accuracy and thus offer a preferred option for the laying of mines by the ADF.

Yet in mine-laying operations where

speed, reach and responsiveness are

of paramount importance, air assets

could be considered for the task. An

example of this would be the laying

of a defensive minefield with little

warning time in order to prevent an

amphibious landing on a remote

beach.

Aerial Mining Roles. Aerial mining exploits the speed and range of the aircraft

in order to lay mines either on land or at sea in order to inhibit enemy

movement. Aerial mining can be carried out either offensively or defensively

through the following roles:

• Offensive Mining aims to lay

mines within enemy territory or

territory under enemy control. In

the case of naval offensive

mining, these mines could be laid

within enemy territorial waters.

• Defensive Mining aims to lay

mines outside of enemy

controlled territory with the

intention of controlling movement in defence of friendly forces. In the case

of naval defensive mining, this could be within international or friendly

territorial waters in order to protect sea lines of communication.

MINE

In land mine warfare, it is an explosive or material normally encased, designedto destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats or aircraft, or designed to wound,kill or otherwise incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the action ofits victim, or by the passage of time or by controlled means. In naval mine

warfare, it is an explosive device laid in the water with the intention of damagingor sinking ships or deterring shipping from entering an area. 32

AERIAL MININGAerial Mining is usedwhere the need for speed,reach and responsivenessoutweigh the need foraccuracy.

Aerial Mining roles:• Offensive

Aerial Mining• Defensive

Aerial Mining

Aerial Mining

Aerial Mining from a P-3C 31


AERIAL MINE-LAYING IN WORLD WAR II

During World War II, Japan was dependent on imported raw materials such asiron ore, coal, aluminium and oil. American submarines played an importantrole attacking enemy ships with torpedoes and shell fire, but they also laidminefields in enemy waters. Between October 1942 and April 1943, Americansubmarines operating out of Fremantle laid about 200 mines in the South

China Sea, about the Philippines and along the Borneo coast. However, mine-laying operations were unpopular with submarine crews because they involvedgoing into shoal waters where the submarines would be almost helpless if seenand attacked.

Aircraft were next pressed into service to lay mines. American aircraft wereused in March 1943 to lay mines in the Buin-Tonolei area in southernBougainville, while Flying Fortresses and Liberators carried out diversionarybombing on Kahili airfield. Australian Catalina aircraft were also brought into

mine-laying operations. Although slow, the range over which they could operate(up to 3200 kilometres) and the load which they could carry at this range,made the Catalina ideally suited for mine-laying. In addition, the aircraft werefitted with torpedo racks which could carry both American and British mines.

OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORTWhen aerospace power first

reached the battlefield, it was used

to exploit the third dimension

without suffering the limitations of

topography. Soon after, the aircraft

began to be used as a mobile

artillery platform from which strikes

could be mounted against an

entrenched enemy. Commanders

view this form of direct support of

the frontline battle as the most

important as it has an immediate

effect on the battle at hand.

However, as important as direct

support roles are, they rarely have

a strategic impact on the overall campaign.

OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT

Offensive Air Support is the use of air power to provide direct support to the

surface forces. 33

OASOffensive Air Supportprovides direct airsupport to land andmaritime forces.

Offensive Air Support


OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT IN WORLD WAR II

In the early days of World War II, Army Air Corps assets did not operate as anindependent force. Instead, aircraft squadrons were divided among ground units.The ground commanders were responsible for assigning missions to the aircraft.The only exception to the control of air resources by ground officers was long-range strategic bombardment units. 34

Offensive Air Support Roles. The aim of offensive air operations is to contain

or defeat enemy forces, whether on land or by sea. The skills and weapons

sets required for each environment is different, with the roles as follows:

• Offensive Air Support - Land

• Offensive Air Support - Maritime

Offensive Air Support - Land (OAS - Land)

JOINT FORCE AREA OF OPERATIONS (JFAO)

That portion of a theatre necessary for joint military operations and theiradministration as part of a campaign. 35

Offensive Air Support - Land Missions. Offensive Air Support - Land is focused

primarily at the tactical level of warfare and aims to use aerospace power in

direct support of the land forces engaged by the enemy. Aircraft assigned to,

or in support of a Joint Force Commander (JFC) may be tasked for OAS missions

in the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO) as follows:

• Close Air Support

• Battlefield Air Interdiction

• Forward Air Control

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE (FSCL)

A line established by the appropriate ground commander to ensure coordinationof fire not under that commander’s control but which may affect current tacticaloperations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air,

ground or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surfacetargets. The fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrainfeatures. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must becoordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting

elements. Support elements may attack targets forward of the fire supportcoordination line without prior coordination with the ground force commander,provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on, or to the rearof the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinatedwith the appropriate ground force commander. 36

OAS roles:• Offensive Air Support

- Land• Offensive Air Support

- Maritime

Offensive AirSupport - Land

OAS-Land missions:• Close Air Support• Battlefield Air

Interdiction• Forward Air Control


Close Air Support (CAS). CAS is air

action against hostile targets, which

are in proximity to friendly forces.

CAS requires detailed integration of

each air mission with the fire and

movement of these troublesome

forces. The word ‘close’ does not

imply a specific distance; rather, the

requirement for detailed

integration because of friendly force proximity, friendly fire or planned

movement. In addition to concentration through augmenting the fire of land-

based weapons, the range and speed of CAS aircraft allow rapid application

of firepower to targets out of range or beyond the capability of land-based

weapons. Concentration of all offensive support weapons may be crucial in

some circumstances and decisive in others. CAS may be the only fire support

available during critical landing stages of airborne and amphibious operations.

The impact of CAS is not only the ‘softening’ of the enemy forces, but it can

also provide a large boost to allied troop morale. The CAS area is generally

understood as those forces within the area between the Forward Edge of the

Battle Area (FEBA) and the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

CAS can be defined as air action against targets in close proximity to friendlyground forces that requires the detailed integration of each air mission withthe fire and movement of those forces. 38

COLONEL HANS RUDEL

The most formidable close air support pilot during World War II was ColonelHans Rudel of the Luftwaffe. He completed 2530 sorties in Ju87 Stuka aircraftand was credited with the destruction of 532 Red Army tanks and two Soviet

warships. He was the only German to be awarded the Knight’s Cross with goldenoak leaves, diamonds and swords during the war. 39

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). BAI aims to delay, destroy or deter enemy

assets before they can be brought to bear on the battle lines. By attacking

these assets, aerospace power is used to isolate the FEBA from resupply and

reinforcements. If BAI missions are successful, then the allied ground force

will not have to face a fully equipped enemy ground force. The BAI area is

Battlefield AirInterdiction aims toinfluence future battlesby cutting supply andreinforcements to theenemy forces.

ARDU Mirage Firing 81mm Rockets 37

Close Air Support aimsto influence current landbattles by attackingengaged enemy forces.


generally understood as that area between the Fire Support Coordination

Line and out to the Land Component Commander’s area of influence.

Forward Air Control (FAC). The

primary concern during CAS

missions is the close proximity of

friendly forces. FAC is the link that

ensures the attack does not

endanger friendly forces. BAI strikes

usually pre-planned targets beyond

the Fire Support Coordination Line

(FSCL) but may involve the use of

Forward Air Controllers for target

identification or the engagement of targets of opportunity. CAS involves a

Forward Air Controller controlling air assets onto targets and requires detailed

integration with fire support assets and ground forces.

Offensive Air Support - Maritime(OAS - Maritime)Offensive Air Support - Maritime Missions. Like OAS - Land, Offensive Air

Support - Maritime is focused primarily at the tactical level of warfare and

aims to use aerospace power in direct support of the maritime forces engaged

with the enemy. When operating in the OAS-Maritime role, tasking and control

of air assets is at the direction of the Maritime Component Commander

whether joint (JFMCC) or coalition (CFMCC). Offensive Air Support - Maritime

encompasses the missions of:

• Surface Warfare

• Under Sea Warfare

MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE (MEZ)

Airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagementnormally rests with the surface-to-air missile. 41

FAC Training PC-9/A 40

Forward Air Controlensures that attacks donot endanger friendlyforce.

OAS - Maritime

OAS-Maritime missions:• Surface Warfare• Under Sea Warfare


Surface Warfare (SuW). SuW aims to provide airborne firepower support to

those allied naval surface forces in direct contact with or directly threatened

by enemy surface forces. While aerospace power can provide a flexible combat

capability, the air platform can also be vulnerable to naval air defence systems.

Hence, sensor and weapon fits are

aimed at providing sufficient stand-

off to keep the aircraft out of the

enemy’s Missile Engagement Zone

(MEZ). Where penetration into an

MEZ is required, self-protection

systems (ie. jamming of enemy

sensors) may be used to protect the

platform.

SURFACE WARFARE IN THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC

In May 1942, the Japanese planned to consolidate their early successes in theSouth-West Pacific with the capture of Port Moresby. Their invasion convoy,protected by the two large aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the smallerShoho, entered the Coral Sea on 5 May. However, forewarned by radio interceptand the ability to break the Japanese code, two aircraft carriers of the United

States Navy together with a small squadron of United States and Australiancruisers were waiting for the Japanese convoy. In the first encounter on 7 May,53 aircraft from the USS Yorktown sank the Shoho with bombs and torpedoes,while Japanese aircraft sank a United States tanker, believing it to be a carrier.Next day, 69 United States and 51 Japanese dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers

were involved in intense combat. The result was the loss of USS Lexington anddamage to Yorktown, and severe damage to Japan’s Shokaku. Opinions on theoutcome of the battle differ, but, while some consider it a tactical victory forJapan, the Japanese had to concede strategic defeat with their loss of domination

of the Coral Sea and the failure of their sea-borne invasion of Port Moresby.

One month later, a crushing defeat was inflicted on the Japanese by the UnitedStates Navy at Midway. On the morning of 4 June 1942, within a short space oftime, three Japanese carriers received lethal bomb-hits from American carrier-

borne dive-bombers. Some observers have called it ‘the five minutes whichdoomed Japan’. A few hours later, a fourth Japanese carrier was sunk. TheAmericans lost one carrier. For six months Japanese successes in the Pacifichad been based on their carriers. Including the carrier lost in the Coral Sea, five

were now sunk. With them went Japan’s hopes of greatly extending its dominionin the South-West Pacific.

Surface Warfare aims tooppose engaged enemysurface maritime forces.

Handheld Anti-Air Missile System 42


Under Sea Warfare (USW). USW (previously known as Anti-Submarine

Warfare [ASW]) aims to provide airborne firepower support to those allied

naval surface forces in direct

contact with, or directly threatened

by enemy sub-surface forces. The

nature of USW will often require

the prosecuting aircraft to close

with a contact to allow localisation,

classification and finally attack.

When close, modern sub-surface

contacts can easily detect and attack an air platform with anti-air missiles

able to be fired from submerged submarines.

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

The exceptional success scored by the U-boats during early March 1943 broughtabout the British Government’s decision to concentrate all of her efforts againstthis deadly prey of the ocean. In mid-March all squadrons of No 19 Group,Coastal Command, were ordered to prepare for one week’s intense flying,

beginning on the 21st. This new experiment, ‘ENCLOSE 1’, aimed at distributingthe flying effort of aircraft as evenly as possible over each period of 24 hoursfor seven days in an area bounded by latitudes 44º30’N and 48º30’N, and007º00’W and 010º30’W [approximately 25,500 nm2]. For this purpose radar

equipped aircraft were to fly at night and those not so equipped by day. Duringthe 1982 sorties subsequently flown, 27 U-boats were located and 15 attacks

carried out that resulted in the sinking of the U.665.

Under Sea Warfare aimsto oppose engaged enemysub-surface forces.

P-3C Supporting HMAS Darwin 43

USAAF B-24 Attacking a U-Boat 44


The lesson of ‘ENCLOSE 1’ was plain to all aircrew; if one area could be patrolled

with sufficient aircraft, a barrier would be placed in the way of submerged U-boats, some of which would have to surface before their battery and air supplieswere exhausted. Thus, it was obvious that they would be presenting themselvesfor attack by the patrolling Coastal Command aircraft. 45

AIRLIFTAirlift provides a military

commander with the capacity to

deploy forces quickly and over

considerable distances. It also assists

those deployed forces in applying

their military effort effectively and

affords the capacity to sustain

effort. Airlift involves more than

just transport aircraft and must be

considered as a system which

comprises several types of aircraft

(both military and civil) used in a

variety of tasks, supported by a

range of ground elements.

Unlike some other air operations, airlift in the ADF is called upon for virtually

any substantial military activity which occurs away from the confines of

fixed bases, most of which are located in the populous coastal regions.

Increased sea, land and air activities by the ADF may need to cover a broad

area in remote parts of Australia or its surrounding region. During periods of

tension and subsequent conflict, forces would be deployed and their

supporting logistics requirements pre-positioned or built up. As intelligence

reports clarify the situation, units or force elements may need to be redeployed

to more appropriate locations.

At higher levels of conflict, the volume and frequency of tasking would

increase, but the nature of airlift would be largely unchanged. Sea and land

transport would feature prominently in the logistics operation but airlift would

also be used to a great extent. In some circumstances, airlift may be the only

means available, or the only means which can meet a certain time limit or

destination requirement.

AIRLIFTAirlift provides acapacity to quicklydeploy and sustainforces.

Airlift

Airlift must beintegrated with sea andland lift.

Airlift may provide theonly form of access to agiven destination in therequired time frame.


Historically, airlift has been

classified as either tactical or

strategic to reflect both the

operating environment and level of

command and control. Strategic

airlift, which frequently included

civil charter, was used to move

troops and supplies into or out of a

theatre with command and control usually remaining outside of the Task

Force Commander. Conversely, tactical airlift encompassed intra-theatre lift

with command and control being invested in the Task Force Commander.

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Strategic airlift provides for long distance transport between theatres, Areas ofOperations (AO) or communications zones. 47

TACTICAL AIRLIFT

Tactical airlift provides for rapid and responsive movement within an Area of

Operations (AO). 48

Airlift Roles. Today, the distinction is not as clear. Air assets are often required

to combine what were traditional strategic and tactical airlift roles into the

roles of Airborne Operations and Air Logistics Support. The distinguishing

characteristic now is whether the destination will be under or potentially

under hostile fire. The Airlift roles are as follows:

• Airborne Operations

• Air Logistics Support

• Special Operations Support

• VIP Transport

• Aeromedical Evacuation

Airborne Operations (ABN)Airborne operations include all aspects of the airlift capacity needed to insert

combat-ready troops into an area close to enemy-held territory. The forces

and their support may be delivered by air landing or air drop from either

fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft.

Transporting Troops 46

Modern airlift is nolonger classified asstrategic or tactical.

Airborne OperationsABN encompass themovement of combatready troops into anobjective area toimmediately engage anenemy force.

Airlift roles:• Airborne Operations• Air Logistics Support• Special Operations

Support• VIP Transport• Aeromedical

Evacuation


OBJECTIVE AREA

A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be capturedor reached by the military forces. This area is defined by competent authorityfor purposes of command and control. 49

On dispatch from the supporting aircraft, forces may be required to engage

in combat immediately or they may develop operations against the enemy in

a nearby objective area. Combat forces, once delivered into an objective area,

normally require subsequent air logistics support until a surface link-up is

achieved or withdrawal is accomplished. Recovery of combat forces after

insertion may be carried out under fire.

WORK WITH THE SAS

In the days after the successful major action at Long Tan, three SAS patrolswhich had been watching Viet Cong movements north of Binh Gia were due to

be withdrawn. When the turn came for one of the patrols near the Long Khanhprovincial border to be lifted out, an enemy presence was discovered close tothe helicopter pick-up point. Despite the ground fire, when RAAF pilot, FlightLieutenant R. MacIntosh, came in to land, a major firefight erupted with several

platoons of the enemy. The SAS patrol had to make a run for the helicopter,firing their own weapons and ducking at times to permit the door gunners tofire over their heads. Spasmodic fire continued to be directed at the aircraft asit lifted off and until it reached about 1000 feet (305 metres). In the view ofthe SAS historian, this was an example of the excellent co-operation that was

developing between the SAS and No 9 Squadron. As the commander of 3 SASSquadron, Major J. Murphy, wrote to the RAAF squadron commander: ‘my blokesthink your blokes are doing a tremendous job for them. The joy of seeing theaircraft coming to pick them up really has to be experienced to be fully

appreciated.’ 50

Air Logistics Support (ALS)Air Logistic Support are those airlift operations conducted to deploy or recover

troops, equipment and supplies but

does not encompass the carriage of

troops ready for immediate battle

(see ABN). ALS operations may be

inter-theatre or intra-theatre and

are expected to be into airfields

where a reasonable level of

facilitation is provided.

The recovery of combatforces may be carriedout under fire.

Air LogisticsSupportALS encompasses themovement of troops andsupplies but not in areasof direct fire.

Deploying a Blackhawk ina C130J 51


THE BERLIN AIRLIFT

In the early hours of 24 June 1948 by order of Joseph Stalin, Russia halted alltraffic into and out of the Russian sector of Berlin at Marienborn, which was theRussian checkpoint located nearly one hundred miles from the city of Berlin.Stalin also cut off all electricity to the city of Berlin claiming ‘technical difficulties’.General Clay, who was the Military Governor of Germany at the time, contacted

General Curtis LeMay who was the Commander of the United States Air Forces inEurope and asked him if they could start flying food supplies into Berlin. GeneralLeMay agreed and the airlift started on the afternoon of 24 June 1948.

At the beginning of the airlift there were three supplying airfields: Rhein Mainand Wiesbaden in the American zone, and Weinstorf in the British zone. However,by the end of the Airlift there would be nine airfields. All nine would be located in

the British zone to cut down the length of time for flying supplies into Berlin. Theonly route into Berlin was by means of three 20 mile wide corridors across theSoviet zone of Berlin. Once the Allied forces were over the city, Western aircraftshared airspace with seven Soviet airfields.

The main aircraft used was the C-47 and they first were to carry 80 tons of milk,flour and medicine into thesuffering city of Berlin. TheAmerican name for the Berlin

Airlift was first called ‘The LeMayCoal and Feed Delivery Service’.The British called it OperationPlainfare.

On 2 July 1948 Britain’sLieutenant General Brian K.Robertson demanded, afterconferring with the US and French

leaders, that the Russians lift theentire blockade. On 14 July 1948Russia informed the Westernpowers that they no longer had

Berlin Airlift Map 52

Berlin Airlift 53


any right to be in Berlin and that the blockade was invoked to protect ‘the economyof the Soviet Zone’. The Russians claimed that by setting up a West Germangovernment, issuing separate currency and through other alleged violations of‘Big Four’ agreements on Germany and Berlin, the West had rendered ‘null andvoid’ its right to participate in the occupation of Berlin. Moscow asserted thatWest Berlin ‘is in the centre of the Soviet zone and is therefore part of that zone’.

The Western reaction to the allegations made by the Soviet Union was formedduring the Anglo-American, French meeting in London that began on 15 July1948. The Russians were told that ‘no threats, pressure or other actions’ couldsqueeze the United States out of Berlin.

Soon after the C-47s had started transporting goods into Berlin the Air Forcerealised that the C-47 was not large enough to haul the weight required to reachtheir goal of 4500 tons a day. So General Clay ordered 72 C-54s thus making itpossible to reach their target goal. By 26 August the total tonnage delivered toBerlin by US planes had reached the 100,000 tons mark. By September 1948 theAirlift was transporting 5583 tons of supplies into Berlin each day.

In November 1948 the Russian Military authorities threatened to force downwestern aircraft if they flew outside the 20 mile wide corridors regardless ofweather conditions. On 6 December a C-54 taking off from Fassburg, Germanycrashed within walking distance of the airfield and three airmen were killed.Undaunted by several deaths on 20 December 1948 ‘Operation Santa Clause’began to fly gifts to the 10,000 children of Berlin.

By 31 December 1948 the 100,000th airlift mission was flown and by year’s endnearly 750,000 tons of supplies had been airlifted into Berlin. The week of 12March 1949 was a record breaker. In just seven days 45,683 tons of supplies wereflown into Berlin. Then, in May 1949, Russia finally announced an end to theblockade after 328 days. The Airlift continued however, hoping to build a 200,000ton supply reserve in Berlin. Then in July 1949, the US and Britain announcedplans to phase out the Berlin Airlift by 31 October 1949. 54

Special Operations Support (SPECOPS)Special Operations Support involves

the deployment, support and

withdrawal of Special Forces whose

mission is covert or highly-

specialised. This may include

inserting troops into enemy-

occupied territory without

detection to conduct hit and run

raids or clandestine operations deep inside enemy territory. These tasks are

usually carried out at night and may employ night vision equipment and

SpecialOperationsSupportSpecial OperationsSupport encompassestactical airlift in supportof Special Forces.

Evacuating Troops 55


special training. Aircraft used in these tasks may require modifications or

special equipment fits.

VIP TransportThe transportation of VIPs will usually require flexible assets able to reach a

variety of destinations, both domestic and international, often travelling at

odd hours of the day or night. Through a military VIP transport role, VIPs can

be transported in comfort commensurate with their status but also in a secure

travel environment.

NO 34 SQUADRON - VIP TRANSPORT

No 34 Squadron was formed at

Darwin in February 1942, fourdays after the first Japanese raidon that city, and was equippedwith DH-84 aircraft. With aprinciple role of air transport, the

squadron re-equipped withDakota aircraft in mid-1943,earning battle honours in varioustheatres. Following disbandment

in 1946, the unit re-formed inMarch 1956 as No 34 VIP Flightand achieved squadron status inMay 1959. Now flying Falcon 900aircraft, 34 Squadron is responsible for providing special purpose VIP air transport

for vice-regal, parliamentary and military dignitaries. The Squadron is based atRAAF Base Fairbairn in the Australian Capital Territory and operates five Falcon900 aircraft as part of Air Lift Group.

In 2002, No 34 Squadron will be replacing the existing aircraft with two Boeing737 Business Jets (to be designated A36-001 and A36-002) and threeBombardier Challenger 604s (to be designated A37-001, A37-002 andA37-003 respectively). The new aircraft will be leased over a 13 year periodand staffed by members of No 34 Squadron. 56

Aeromedical Evacuation (AME)

AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION

The movement of patients to and between medical treatment facilities by airtransportation. 58

Through an indigenous Aeromedical Evacuation capacity, the ADF aims to be

able to evacuate its own sick and wounded personnel from a forward area to

VIP TransportThe military is oftenrequired to transportVIPs in a comfortableand secure manner.

Falcon 900 VIP Aircraft 57

AeromedicalEvacuationThe Services areresponsible for providingair evacuation of theirsick or woundedpersonnel.


a Unit or Formation Line health

facility. While Navy and Army have

responsibility for the evacuation of

their own casualties, the Air Force

is responsible for the provision of

AME to higher (force) level health

facilities either inside or outside the

Area of Operations (AO).

FORCE MULTIPLIERSRegardless of how capable a combat system can be, it will have limitations in

its effectiveness due to specifications such as operating range and onboard

sensors. By supplementing these systems with external capabilities, such as

air-to-air refuelling, the effectiveness of the combat system can be

substantially increased. These supplementary systems are known as force

multipliers and their fundamental value to a campaign should not be

underestimated.

FORCE MULTIPLIER

A force multiplier is a system or capability whose presence on the battlefield allows

other units and systems to accomplish their mission with greater effect and ease. 60

However, a force multiplier can become a single point of failure within an

operational chain. For example, in extending the range of a combat asset

through air-to-air refuelling, the loss of that AAR system may make it

impossible for those combat assets to return safely back to a friendly base.

Therefore, the protection of a force multiplier is essential.

Force Multiplier Roles . Force

multipliers do not create roles in

their own right, but they are an

integral part of conducting other

roles. Identifying them doctrinally

as roles recognises that they do

require specialist skills and systems.

Within the ADF, Air-to-Air

Refuelling is the only recognised

aerospace power force multiplier.

FORCEMULTIPLIERSForce Multipliersprovide externalcapabilities to increasethe effectiveness ofcombat systems.

Force Multipliers

Over reliance on a forcemultiplier can createcritical single points offailure.

Force Multiplier roles:• Air-to-Air Refuelling

RAAF AME Team 59


Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR)Air-to-Air Refuelling is the process

of providing additional fuel in-

flight to aircraft. The delivery

system is through another aircraft

that has been specially equipped

with appropriate hoses and

connections. Two main types of

delivery systems are available:

• The probe and drogue system

(mainly used by the USN and

RAF) in which a flexible hose and

basket are lowered from the

tanker to the receiving aircraft

which, in turn, connects using an

extendable probe.

• The boom system (mainly used by the USAF) in which a rigid boom is

lowered and controlled by the tanker operator, connecting to a receiving

receptacle on the tanking aircraft.

AAR expands the employment

options available to a commander

by increasing the range, payload

(onboard fuel can be offset against

additional ordnance), and flexibility

of air forces. Therefore, AAR is an

essential capability in the conduct

of air operations particularly

where deployments cannot use

intermediate basing.

The tanking process requires the tanker and receiving aircraft to remain in a

tight formation with minimum manoeuvre thus making both vulnerable to

enemy attack. While tankers would normally be positioned to be safe from

enemy attack, this may not always be available and counter air assets may be

needed to protect the tanker.

Air-to-AirRefuellingAAR provides in-flighttransfer of fuel toreceiving aircraft using:• probe and drogue

system• boom system

F-111G Refuelling from a USAFKC-135 Tanker 61

F/A-18 Refuelling fromB707 Tanker 62

AAR provides increasedrange, endurance andpayload capacity forother aircraft.

AAR platforms arevulnerable to attack andtherefore must beprotected.


THE ‘QUESTION MARK’ FLIGHT (1929)

On 1 January 1929, the ‘Question Mark’, so named because the crew did notknow how long it would be airborne, took off from San Diego, California. Itflew back and forth over the 70 miles between Los Angeles, California, and SanDiego for six days. Major Spaatz rode in the tail section of the airplane and wasresponsible for connecting the refuelling hose to the tank. The refuellings were

dangerous with the C-1 hovering only 20 feet above the Fokker at all hours ofthe day and night and through turbulence. When the hose was lowered, Spaatzwould ground it to a copper plate fixed to the Fokker to prevent a spark andthen fit it in the tank’s funneled opening. The gas would flow at 75 gallons per

minute. Oil in five-gallon containers, food, and supplies were lowered from theC-1 by rope and hauled into the Fokker by Spaatz.

On 7 January the Fokker’s leftengine quit and although the

plane could remain aloft on oneengine it could not maintain the5000 feet deemed safe. After 150hours, 40 minutes, and 15

seconds, the ‘Question Mark’touched down. It had flown about 11,000 miles and set an endurance recordthat would last for many years.

The contributions of this flight were numerous. Besides the obvious air-to-air

refuelling possibilities, the flight also showed that a plane powered by 1929engines could fly 11,000 miles with five men aboard. With new planes alreadyon the drawing board, regular non-stop transcontinental flights would soon bepractical. The flight also foreshadowed American bombers seeking distant targetsand likewise that the United States would soon be vulnerable to aerial attack.

Finally, the ocean was eliminated as a barrier and the Navy’s wartime role wasforever altered. 64

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)By the word ‘information’ we denote all the knowledge that we have of theenemy and his country; and therefore, the foundation of all our ideas andactions. ... Great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory,a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtfulcharacter. ... This difficulty of seeing things correctly, which is one of thegreatest sources of friction in War, makes things appear quite differentfrom what was expected.

Clausewitz

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems whiledefending one’s own information and information systems. 65

The Question Mark 63

INFORMATIONOPERATIONS


Throughout the history of warfare,

commanders have always sought to

gain the initiative by collecting

information on the enemy while

denying the enemy similar access

to information on friendly forces.

Where the collection of information

by an enemy force could not be

denied, commanders sought to

create false information, thus

contributing to the fog of war.

Information Operations Roles:

Information Operations

encompasses the two roles of:

• Information In War (IIW)

• Information Warfare (IW)

Information In War (IIW)Information In War (IIW) is focused on ensuring the ADF, whether in peacetime

operations, a crisis, or war, attains decision superiority. To do this, ADF IIW, in

partnership with the other national intelligence agencies, delivers intelligence

information when, where, and how it is needed. Aerospace surveillance and

reconnaissance, and the subsequent intelligence, provide the information

required for formulating strategy, developing plans and conducting operations.

Information In War Missions. Information In War consists of the following

missions:

• Surveillance

• Reconnaissance

• Intelligence

Surveillance

SURVEILLANCE

The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or sub-surface areas, places,

persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. 66

Information Operations

Information Operationsaim to exploit theenemy’s informationwhile denying the enemythe same.

Information Operationsroles:• Information In War• Information

Warfare

Information InWarIIW is aimed atproviding the allies withdecision superiority.

Surveillance

IIW missions:• Surveillance• Reconnaissance• Intelligence


Surveillance is fundamental to

Australia’s foreign and defence

policies. The technological

developments in the Jindalee Over-

the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN)

and satellite communications

provides a capability to detect air

and sea activity in and beyond Australia’s sovereign air and sea space and to

integrate that information with other agencies.

Surveillance involves the gathering of information by photographic, radar,

infra-red, electronic, acoustic and visual means. Surveillance information is

processed by intelligence staff to provide accurate and timely knowledge of

a potential adversary’s capabilities and intentions. Information gained from

surveillance is mainly used to support strategic peacetime intelligence or

operational intelligence in times of conflict. Two key types of surveillance

activity are supported by the ADF:

• Wide Area Surveillance

• Focal Area Surveillance

Wide Area Surveillance (WAS). The prime function of the Air Force’s WAS

role is to contribute to the compilation of a surveillance product to support

national and force level planning, analysis and intelligence collection as well

as supporting operational activities. The focus will be on air activity to compile

short, medium and long term trends of activity. The air component of the

WAS picture is developed through the integration of surveillance sensor

systems data with information provided by Airservices Australia (AsA) and

national intelligence agencies. This data can be used to assist with the

recognition and interpretation of abnormal activity, thereby providing early

warning to the ADF of events of potential strategic, operational or tactical

significance.

HIGH FREQUENCY SURFACE WAVE RADAR

DSTO’s Wide Area Surveillance Division (WASD) has been working with TelstraApplied Technologies (TAT) to develop a radar system which has the potential

to complement existing defence surveillance systems.

HF Surface Wave Radar (SWR) is a surveillance tool primarily developed formaritime coastal areas with a detection and tracking capability for air and sea

JORN Transmitter Site, Laverton,Western Australia 67

Surveillance isfundamental toAustralia’s foreign anddefence policies

Surveillance is the broadgathering of informationnot directed at specifictargets or points ofinterest.

Wide Area Surveillanceprovides data for earlywarning of potentiallysignificant events at thestrategic, operational ortactical levels.


targets of more than 300 kilometres from a shore site. While the system’s

technology is similar to HF sky wave radar (over-the-horizon), SWR occupies aspecific surveillance niche, addressing a currently unmet surveillance need,when contrasted with sky wave and ground-based microwave radar systems.Sky wave radar, such as JORN, is a true wide area surveillance sensor which is

most effective and efficient in a ‘big-picture’ rather than focal point surveillancemode. Microwave radar is highly sensitive and accurate, but is line-of-sightand hence horizon-limited.

The expectation is that SWR could provide medium-range, economical, air and

surface defence surveillance for specific locations. It complements rather thanreplaces other surveillance systems such as airborne early warning, JORN andunmanned aerial vehicle sensors.

How it Works

SWR emits radio-waves at between 5 and 20 MHz which ‘stick’ to the surfaceof the sea and propagate over the visible horizon to distances of several hundredkilometres. The system exploits this surface mode to detect aircraft and ship

targets by collecting energy scattered by objects and returned over the samesurface path. The advantages of this system include the ability to detect andtrack targets at low or zero altitude and to provide greater detection rangesthan those possible from horizon-limited ground-based microwave radars.Typical applications for SWR systems include aircraft and surface craft

surveillance, point air defence, and Exclusive Economic Zone monitoring. 68

1 Metre Commercial Satellite Imagery of the Gold Coast 69


Focal Area Surveillance (FAS). FAS provides a high fidelity, real-time tactical

sensor product, derived from all available and relevant information from

organic and non-organic sources, to support Aerospace Battle Management

(ABM) and Airspace Management. FAS contributes to WAS and is pivotal to

effective employment of response systems such as fighters and ground-based

air defence weapon systems (GBADWS).

NO 114 MOBILE CONTROL AND REPORTING UNIT

No 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit was formed at Camden, NSW, on 23

May 1943 as No 114 (Mobile) Fighter Sector Headquarters and was deployedto the South-West Pacific Theatre in June 1943. The Unit operated fromGoodenough, Kiriwina, and the Admiralty Islands off the north coast of PapuaNew Guinea before returning to Australia in January 1945 to be refitted withnew equipment.

In April 1945 the Unit, now titledNo 114 Mobile Fighter ControlUnit (114MFCU), was again

deployed overseas to support theTarakan landings in Borneo,where the Unit remained untilDecember 1945. 114MFCUreturned to Deniliquin, NSW,

following the war and in May1946 moved to RAAF BaseWilliamtown, NSW, where itremained until disbanded on 1April 1948.

On 14 November 1956 the Unitwas re-activated at Dubbo, NSW,and in August 1958 was once

again deployed overseas. On thisoccasion the deployment was to Butterworth, Malaysia, to provide a radarsurveillance and control capability at the RAAF Base during the MalayanEmergency. The Unit remained at Butterworth during the Confrontation withIndonesia (1963-1966) and was once again disbanded on 30 October 1966.

No 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit (114MCRU) was re-activated atRAAF Base Amberley, Queensland, on 1 April 1968 and equipped with theHUBCAP mobile automated air defence system and the AN/TPS-27 radar. In

1981 the AN/TPS-27 radar was replaced with the lightweight transportableAN/TPS-43F radar, and in July 1985 a new Westinghouse Tactical Air Defence

Focal Area Surveillanceis the tactical level ofsurveillance in supportof weapon systems.

TPS-43 Radar System 70


System installed in six transportable cabins replaced the original HUBCAP

equipment. In 1986, the Unit was also equipped with a Deployable Sector AirDefence Operations Centre housed in three refurbished transportable cabins.In recognition of 114MCRU’s distinguished service to Australia in war and peace,a Squadron Standard bearing Battle Honours was presented to the Unit on 23

May 1990. The Unit moved from RAAF Amberley to RAAF Tindal in June 1997,and relocated to RAAF Darwin in December 1999. 71

Reconnaissance

RECONNAISSANCE

A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detectionmethods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potentialenemy. 72

Reconnaissance is the collection of information via a specific mission usually

conducted over a limited period and directed against specific targets. The

effectiveness of modern military operations depends, to a large extent, on

being able to determine an enemy’s strengths and intentions through

reconnaissance of his order of battle. Aerial reconnaissance therefore

contributes to the deterrent value of aerospace power by denying surprise to

the enemy.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application ofmilitary force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective.

Battle damage assessment (BDA) can be applied to the employment of all typesof weapons systems (air, ground, naval and special forces) throughout the rangeof military operations. BDA is composed of physical damage assessment,functional damage assessment and target system functional damage

assessment. 73

The ADF reconnaissance force must be able to respond quickly, accurately

and at long distances, by day or night and in all weather conditions. Aircraft

can reconnoitre the vast area of primary strategic interest to Australia and

provide a permanent record of developments or changes in a potential

adversary’s posture. During conflict, aerial reconnaissance becomes more

important, by continually reporting changes to the surface picture for detailed

planning to proceed. Target identification and Battle Damage Assessment

through an indigenous, independently verifiable intelligence system are

essential.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance isthe collection ofinformation focusedat specific targets.

Reconnaissance forcesmust be responsive andaccurate.


The aerial reconnaissance role of the ADF is both strategic and tactical in its

objectives. In peacetime, the strategic objective for the ADF is the collection

of data which is assessed to establish a basic pattern of activity in the area of

interest, from which significant departures from the basic pattern, or trends,

might be observed. In times of conflict, strategic reconnaissance would focus

on those areas which are required to develop and sustain military forces,

such as command and control nodes, key production and infrastructure

support. Tactical reconnaissance will usually be required to provide enemy

disposition, accurate targeting and bomb damage assessment.

RECONNAISSANCE IN WORLD WAR II

Photographic reconnaissance aircraft detected the presence of German armoured

units in the area around Arnhem in September 1944. Allied code breakingactivities also showed that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were movinginto the area or [stopping for] rest and refit.

Nevertheless, lightly armed British paratroops were dropped in the vicinity ofthe town to seize a bridgehead across the River Rhine that marks the borderbetween Holland and Germany. Close Air Support and an attempted landbreakthrough by the Allied forces failed to stop the decimation of the Britishparatroop units in a major tactical defeat. 75

1 Metre Commercial Satellite Imagery of Kandahar Airportafter US Strikes 74

Reconnaissance cansupport strategic andtactical objectives.


Strategic and tactical reconnaissance will usually be performed by high speed,

multi-role platforms with long range and endurance. Demands on aerial

reconnaissance can be expected to be heavy with the Army and Navy requiring

substantial support as well as significant internal demands for the support of

air operations.

RQ-4A GLOBAL HAWK UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE

The RQ-4A Global Hawk is a high altitude, high endurance uninhabited aircraft

and integrated sensor system to provide intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR) capability in support of the Joint Force commander. Thesystem is envisioned to support joint combatant forces worldwide during peace,crisis and wartime operations. The Global Hawk’s exceptional range and

endurance, coupled with its ability to provide near-real-time transmission ofimagery to multi-service and joint exploitation, make it a true force multiplier.Potential applications of the Global Hawk include Targeting and Precision StrikeSupport, Battle Damage Assessment, Enemy Order of Battle Information,Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, and Sensitive Reconnaissance

Operations.

The Global Hawk air vehicle canoperate at altitudes in excess of60,000 feet and has

demonstrated endurance of over30 hours. It can carry sensorpayloads of approximately 2000pounds. It carries both Electro-

Optical (EO)/Infra-red (IR) andSynthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)and is capable of simultaneoususe of EO/SAR or IR/SAR with Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI). Air vehicleoperation is essentially autonomous using fail-safe programs with the capability

of being reprogrammed in flight should changes to the mission plan be required.System redundancy for selected systems will greatly reduce the probability ofloss and allow extended time on station while a replacement vehicle is enroute.Global Positioning System (GPS) aided inertial navigation systems provide the

accuracy required for both runway environment and flight operations.

Global Hawk ground stations include the Mission Control Element (MCE) andthe Launch and Recovery Element (LRE). The MCE is the Global Hawk’s groundcontrol station for reconnaissance operations. It contains four workstations:

mission planning; sensor data and processing; air vehicle command and controloperator (CCO); and communications. The Mission Commander is the fifthcrewmember, responsible for overall mission management. The LRE includes amission planning function as well as air vehicle command and control.77

Demands onreconnaissance wouldbe heavy during aconflict.

Global Hawk 76


Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE

The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign

nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual orpotential operations. 78

Intelligence is essential for the successful planning and conduct of aerospace

operations. The intelligence process involves four activities - direction,

collection, analysis and dissemination. Australia has a highly integrated

intelligence system that includes national and allied capabilities as well as

those organic to the ADF.

In broad terms, intelligence is knowledge about an enemy, adversary or

competitor that is not apparent or evident from the public record or by overt

observation. Intelligence activities are designed to elicit information that an

enemy, adversary or competitor would prefer not to disclose or to have

discovered. In particular, intelligence activities are designed to allow

commanders to understand the intent and capability of an enemy, adversary

or competitor with clarity and in order to avoid surprise.

YOM KIPPUR WAR

After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, several senior Israeli intelligence officerswere removed from their posts. The complaint against them was that theyknew everything about the Arab capabilities but had little concept of how theArab nations would employ these capabilities to attack Israel. Thus the Israelis

were caught unawares by the Arab attack - particularly the Egyptian thrustacross the Suez Canal. 79

The converse of intelligence is counter intelligence. Counter intelligence is a

suite of measures and activities designed to detect and thwart the intelligence

gathering activities that enemies, adversaries and competitors may conduct

against us. Sound protective security assists to counter (deter and defeat)

the activities of hostile intelligence agencies.

Historically, intelligence effort has been directed against state actors, that is,

nations whose interests may have been inimical to our own. More recently,

non-state actors, some with varying degrees of state sponsorship and

encouragement, have come to occupy most of the attention of intelligence

agencies.

Intelligence

Intelligence is essentialfor the successfulplanning and conduct ofaerospace operations.

The converse ofintelligence is counterintelligence.

Historically, intelligenceeffort has been directedagainst state actors.

Intelligence activities aredesigned to allowcommanders tounderstand the intentand capability of anenemy.


For planning and operational purposes, the RAAF calls upon intelligence

derived from many sources. Furthermore, the RAAF may be called upon to

contribute to the stock of intelligence available to Defence, the Government

and our allies by employing various collection and analysis capabilities to

solve problems.

Conventionally, intelligence has been characterised by the level of military

activity supported - strategic, operational and tactical. This distinction still

has some validity, but increasingly, integrated information systems are

combining with pervasive news media and public information to cause a

blurring. The impact of certain intelligence at one level of military activity

needs to take account possible consequences at others.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (IPB)

An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning theenemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligencepreparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential

area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analysedin detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment and terrain onoperations and presents it in graphical form. Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace is a continuing process. 80

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) occurs concurrently with

other planning activities in the pre-deployment and pre-engagement phases

of any operation. This involves a subtle interplay of intelligence, counter

intelligence, protective security and public affairs activities. Intelligence is at

its best when a range of sources or disciplines are brought to bear on the one

subject area. This militates against successful deception and provides for ‘full

spectrum’ analysis. Core intelligence disciplines are ACINT, SIGINT, IMINT,

MASINT and HUMINT.

Acoustic Intelligence(ACINT). Acoustic intelligence is derived from the spectral

analysis of signals generated by noise from such sources as turbines, pumps

and propellers.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT comprises two sub-disciplines -

Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT).

COMINT is derived from the interception of the communications transmissions

The RAAF willcontribute to thecollection of intelligence.

Core intelligencedisciplines are ACINT,SIGINT, IMINT,MASINT and HUMINT.

Acoustic Intelligence(ACINT)

Intelligence is anintegrated activity.

Signals Intelligence(SIGINT)


of an enemy, adversary or competitor. ELINT is derived from the analysis of

non-communications signals from such sources as the emissions of radars

and navigational beacons.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). IMINT is derived from the systematic collection

and exploitation of images obtained from photographic, electro-optical, infra-

red, radar and other sensors capable of producing an image. Typically these

sensors are mounted on aircraft or satellites although they can also be hand-

held.

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT). MASINT is a highly

specialised but increasingly productive area of intelligence that relates the

signatures of an object or activity collected in various spectral ranges at the

same time. Due to the intensive computational loads, MASINT until recently has

been used mainly to support technical intelligence analysis. More recently, MASINT

has been used in a variety of near real-time applications. MASINT offers

considerable opportunities to support counter surveillance planning and activities.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT is the most enduring form of

intelligence gathering - the recruitment and running of agents. Patience and

caution are the by-words of HUMINT. HUMINT offers the prospect of obtaining

direct insight into the real intent of an enemy, adversary or competitor,

providing there is confidence in the trustworthiness of the agent.

Information Warfare (IW)

Information Warfare includes manipulative, disruptive or destructiveactions taken covertly or overtly during peacetime, crisis or war againstsocietal, political, economic, industrial or military electronic informationsystems. The purpose is to achieve informational advantage over anadversary and to influence behavior, deter or end conflict or, that failing,to win a war quickly and decisively, with minimal expenditure of capital,resources and personnel and with minimum casualties on either side.Information Warfare includes actions taken to preserve the integrity ofone’s own information systems from exploitation, corruption or destructionwhile at the same time exploiting, corrupting or destroying an adversary’sinformation systems and in the process achieving an information advantagein the application of force.

Colonel Alan D. Campen, USAF (Ret.)81

Imagery Intelligence(IMINT)

Measurement andSignatures Intelligence(MASINT)

Human Intelligence(HUMINT)

InformationWarfare


Commanders strive to achieve information superiority and, through

sophisticated data processing systems, to convert that raw information into

intelligence and thus establish a dominant knowledge of the battlespace.

Yet, as information collection, fusion and processing have improved, so has

the level of reliance to the point that commanders can now be totally isolated

from a battlespace by denying them the information they require. Those very

same electronic systems that have provided the substantial improvements in

information flow are also extremely vulnerable to deception and destruction.

When considering any type of information warfare, the aim is always the

same: the denial, degradation or destruction of the flow of information to

the enemy while protecting the flow of friendly information. The main

categories considered here have been differentiated only through the skills

sets required to exploit them.

Information Warfare Missions. The Information Warfare missions are as

follows:

• Command and Control Warfare

• Electronic Warfare

• Psychological Warfare

COUNTER-INFORMATION

Counter-information seeks to establish information superiority through control

of the information realm. Counter-information creates an environment wherefriendly forces can conduct operations without suffering substantial losses,while simultaneously denying the enemy the ability to conduct their operations.The focus of the effort is on countering the enemy’s ability to attain informationadvantage. Counter-information, like counter air and counter space, consists

of both offensive and defensive aspects.

Offensive Counter-information (OCI). OCI includes actions taken to controlthe information environment. The purpose is to disable selected enemy

information operations. OCI operations are designed to destroy, degrade, orlimit enemy information capabilities and are dependent on having anunderstanding of an adversary’s information capabilities. Examples of OCI includejamming radars and corrupting data acquisition, transformation, storage, ortransmissions of an adversary’s information; psychological operations; deception;

and physical or cyber attack.

Defensive Counter-information (DCI). DCI includes those actions that protectour information, information systems, and information operations from the

adversary. DCI programs, such as operations security (OPSEC), information

Information superiorityhelps to establish adominant knowledge ofthe battlespace.

Information Warfareaims to deny, deceive,degrade or destroy theenemy information flow.

Information Warfaremissions:• Command and

Control Warfare• Electronic Warfare• Psychological

Warfare


security (INFOSEC), and counter intelligence assess the threat and reduce friendly

vulnerabilities to an acceptable level. Improving security procedures designedto safeguard equipment and information can prohibit unintentional andunwanted release of information.82

Command and Control Warfare (C2W)Command and Control Warfare encompasses the integrated use of operations

security, military deception, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and

physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to impact upon the

effectiveness of command and control (C2). C2W is an application of

information warfare in military operations and can be both offensive and

defensive:

• C2 Attack aims to prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by taking

offensive action against those C2 systems.

• C2 Protection aims to maintain effective C2 of our own forces by turning

to friendly advantage or negating any adversary efforts to impact upon

the friendly C2 system.

Operations Security (OPSEC). Operational Security is a process of identifying

critical information and subsequently analysing friendly actions related to

military operations and other activities to:

• Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence

systems.

• Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might gather which could

be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to

be useful to adversaries.

• Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable

level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Military Deception. Military Deception encompasses actions executed to

deliberately mislead adversary military decision-makers as to friendly military

capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take

specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of

the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are:

Command andControl WarfareC2W is an application ofinformation warfare inmilitary operationsthrough:• C2 Attack• C2 Protection

Operational Securityaims to secure our owncritical information.

Military Deceptionaims to deliberatelymislead the adversary’sdecision-makers.


• Strategic Military Deception. Strategic military deception is planned and

executed by and in support of senior military commanders. The aim is to

damage the adversary’s military policies and actions while supporting our

own strategic military policies, objectives and operations.

• Operational Military Deception. Operational military deception is planned

and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders. The

aim is to manipulate the adversary’s actions so that they become favourable

to our objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned

and conducted to support campaigns and major operations.

• Tactical Military Deception. Tactical military deception is planned and

executed by and in support of tactical-level commanders. The aim is to

manipulate the adversary’s actions so that they become favourable to our

objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and

conducted to support battle and engagements.

• Service Military Deception. Service military deception is planned and

executed by the Services in support joint operations. The aim is to protect

and enhance the combat capabilities of the force and systems.

• Military Deception in Support of Operations Security. Military deception

in support of operations security aims to prevent the inadvertent

compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities or intentions.

Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence

away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities.

Electronic Warfare (EW)Electronic Warfare encompasses any military action involving the use of

electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum

or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare

are:

• Electronic Support

• Electronic Attack

• Electronic Protection

ElectronicWarfareEW encompasses:• Electronic Support• Electronic Attack• Electronic Protection


Electronic Support (ES). Electronic support provides information required

for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions

such as threat avoidance, targeting and homing. Electronic warfare support

data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for

electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature

intelligence.

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT

Electronic Support (previously known as Electronic Support Measures - ESM)

encompasses that division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, orunder direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept,identify, and locate or localise sources of intentional and unintentional radiatedelectromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition,targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. 83

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT IN WORLD WAR II

An early ESM system called ‘Metox’ was installed in German submarines togive information on the first operational airborne radar being used by the Allies

during the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942. The radar could detect surfacesubmarines at five nautical miles.‘Metox’ [and later the ‘Naxos’]gave the German submarinessufficient warning for them to

submerge before theapproaching aircraft detectedthem. This forced the Allies todevelop a new radar, which

‘Metox’ could not detect. 84

Electronic Attack (EA). Electronic Attack involves the use of offensive

electronic measures to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy combat

capability. EA includes:

• actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the

electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic

deception

• employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy

as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons,

particle beams)

Electronic Attack usesoffensive means toattack the enemy combatcapability.

U-Boat Naxos Detector 85

Electronic Supportencompasses the searchfor and collection ofadversary emissions.


ELECTRONIC ATTACK

Electronic Attack (previously known as Electronic Counter Measures - ECM)encompasses that division of electronic warfare involving the use ofelectromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attackpersonnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralising,or destroying enemy combat capability. 86

Electronic Protection (EP). Electronic Protection involves the taking of action

to reduce the effect of hostile activities through operational techniques and

equipment that are resistant to Electronic Attack. EP can also be achieved

through OPSEC and deception techniques.

ELECTRONIC PROTECTION

Electronic Protection (previously known as Electronic Counter-Counter Measures- ECCM) encompasses that division of electronic warfare involving passive andactive means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any

effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade,neutralise, or destroy friendly combat capability. 87

PROJECT AIR 5416 - ELECTRONIC SELF PROTECTION FOR ADF AIRCRAFT

Project Echidna is to redress theElectronic Warfare SelfProtection (EWSP) limitations ofselected ADF aircraft andtherefore improve the

survivability of these aircraft incombat. In addition to themodified aircraft, Project Echidnawill introduce a comprehensiveEW mission support system and

provide modifications to theapplicable simulators and other support systems necessary to fulfil operationaland training requirements. 88

Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR)Psychological Warfare encompasses the planned use of propaganda and other

psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions,

emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as

to support the achievement of national objectives.

Electronic Protectionencompasses theprotection of friendlysystems from electronicattack.

Blackhawk Firing Flares 89

PsychologicalWarfarePsychological Warfareuses propaganda andother psychologicalactions to impact uponthe adversary.


CRONY TARGETING

On the night of 15 May 1999 - Day 53 of the Kosovo War - a flight of AmericanB-2 bombers attacked two industrial facilities in eastern Serbia. Before theraid, under a covert operation dubbed ‘Matrix,’ US and British information warfarespecialists used e-mail, faxes and cell phones to forewarn the plant owners ofthe attack. The warnings had nothing to do with limiting casualties, nor were

the targets of great military value. Rather, the operation was designed to senda message to cronies of President Slobodan Milosevic’s enriching themselvesthrough these factories: Prevail upon the Yugoslav leader to withdraw his forcesfrom Kosovo or face further attacks on your sources of income.

The attacks on Bor and Smederevo were the most dramatic examples of a jointUS-British effort designed to put pressure on the Yugoslav President through‘crony targeting’.

‘It’s a powerful tonic to tell them when it’s going to happen and then for themto watch it happen,’ says an officer involved in the operation.

During the 78-day conflict, the Yugoslav President and his inner circle were

treated to a small taste of what future wars may hold for American foes. Couplingcomputer technology with the power of the military, the United States wagedinformation warfare on Milosevic’s closest political associates in an effort tofrighten them into abandoning their leader.

This new mode of combat combines cyber-war tactics, espionage, psychologicalwarfare and propaganda under one umbrella and seeks to coordinate it withthe planes, tanks and ships of the traditional military. Like most new endeavors,the Kosovo information war got off to a bumpy start, encountered fierceopposition from traditional soldiers and was dogged by planning problems. Yet

even its fiercest critics acknowledge that in the future, information warfarewill be a real factor in winning the battles of the 21st Century. 90

SEARCH AND RESCUEIn the same way that the evolution

of the aircraft provided fighting

commanders with greater reach and

flexibility, so the aircraft contributed

to the field of search and rescue.

With its speed and coverage, the

aircraft can search large areas

previously inaccessible or difficult to

reach over land or by sea.

SEARCH ANDRESCUEAircraft provide quickand effective coverage oflarge search areas

Search and Rescue


SEARCH AND RESCUE

The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialised rescue teams andequipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. 91

AUSTRALIAN SEARCH AND RESCUE (AUSSAR)

Australia, as signatory to the International Civil Aviation Convention 1944, the

International Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, and the InternationalSearch and Rescue Convention 1979 is responsible for search and rescue overa vast area made up of the East Indian, South-West Pacific and Southern oceans.The internationally agreed Australian Search and Rescue Region covers 47 million

square kilometres - over one-ninth of the earth’s surface.

In each State and Territory the Police are the Search and Rescue authority. TheAustralian Federal Police are the Search and Rescue authority for the AustralianCapital Territory and the Jervis Bay Territory. Under an Australian Federal

Government - State/Territory Agreement the State/Territory police forces areresponsible for:

• Marine search and rescue operations for persons or ships in waters within

the limits of ports of the State/Territory and in respect of pleasure craft andfishing vessels

• Provision and coordination of land searches for missing civil aircraft

• Overall coordination of search for hikers, and land vehicles

The Federal Government through [Australian Defence Headquarters] isresponsible for the provision of Search and Rescue for all military and visiting

Australian Search and Rescue Region 92


military forces. This responsibility is exercised through the Navy, Army and Air

Force depending upon the circumstances of the distress situation. Operationalcontrol of Defence Force Search and Rescue facilities will normally be retainedby the appropriate Defence authority. When defence assets assist in Searchand Rescue actions coordinated by other Search and Rescue authorities, direct

liaison between the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SARMC) and thedefence unit is usually authorised.

Australia’s National Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan is derived from internationaland domestic agreements between authorities sharing a common interest. In

practice, Search and Rescue is conducted with a spirit of cooperation betweenrelevant authorities, and procedures exist to transfer a Search and Rescueincident between authorities when the scale of an incident is beyond localresources. The ideal arrangement is the seamless provision of Search and Rescue

resources to a person or unit in distress. For Search and Rescue incidents atgreat distance from the Australian coast, Australian Defence Force long rangeassets are normally requested. Even with these very capable units, not all ofAustralia’s Search and Rescue Region can be reached by Australian based aircraftor by ships in a timely fashion. 93

Search and Rescue Roles. Within Australia’s region of responsibility, the

Australian Defence Force contributes to the National Search and Rescue

responsibility through the roles of:

• Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) of downed aircrew or special forces

personnel during a conflict

• Search and Survivor Assistance (SASA) in conjunction with civilian search

and rescue authorities

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)Combat search and rescue operations involve the use of aircraft (usually

helicopters) to locate and rescue personnel in distress and, in particular, to

recover aircrew who have abandoned their aircraft. By its very nature, CSAR

is conducted in a hostile environment and is aimed as much at recovering

downed personnel for the morale factor as for denying the enemy information

gained through the interrogation of those personnel. While Australia does

not have an active CSAR capability, the inherent flexibility of aerospace power

means that platforms such as the Blackhawk helicopter could be rapidly

combined with Special Forces to create such a capability. Consequently the

ADF needs to remain aware of the issues involved in employing CSAR

operations.

Search and Rescue roles:• Combat Search and

Rescue• Search and Survivor

Assistance

Combat Searchand RescueCSAR provides recoveryof downed aircrew in ahostile environment.


FULTON SURFACE-TO-AIRRECOVERY SYSTEM

The recovery kit is dropped to theperson to be recovered who thenputs on the overall-type harnessand inflates the balloon which

carries an attached lift line. AnHC-130H engages the line withits V-shaped yoke and theindividual is reeled on board. Red

flags on the lift line guide the pilot during daylight recoveries; lights on the liftline are used for night recoveries. Recovery kits were designed for one andtwo-man recoveries, but eventually proved impractical for most rescue purposes.However, they are available for special operations.

Colonel Allison Brooks, then Commander of the ARRS, and A3C Ronald Dollparticipated in the first human testing of the Fulton surface-to-air two-manrecovery kit at Edwards AFB, California in May 1966. 96

CSAR Considerations. Search and rescue helicopters and long-range rescue

aircraft may be unarmed and therefore vulnerable to enemy attack. This is

particularly important when downed aircrew have to be rescued from within

enemy territory or near to enemy coasts in opposed CSAR operations. In

these circumstances it may be necessary to involve combat forces such as

attack helicopters, fighter-bombers and SEAD to provide covering firepower

for rescue aircraft. Such operations can be costly, because an opponent may

know the area in which an aircraft has crashed and deploy air and surface

forces to that area. CSAR missions should only be undertaken if the prospects

of success are strong, if there is an overriding operational reason to rescue

the downed aircrew or if there is intense political pressure to recover downed

aircrew to avoid the potentially negative impact of hostages and the potential

damage to public opinion.97

THE RESCUE OF CAPTAIN SCOTT O’GRADY, USAF

On 2 June 1995, Captain Scott O’Grady was flying an F-16 on a policing missionin the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia as part of Operation Deny Flight. His squadronwas based at Aviano in Italy. After he was shot down by a Serb SA-6 surface-to-air missile, the Americans subsequently launched a concentrated rescueeffort, carried out by a specialised unit of the United States Marine Corps (USMC).

O’Grady managed to avoid capture for five days, maintaining intermittentcontact with US forces, despite an extensive search for him by the Serb army.On 9 June, two CH-53E Super Sea Stallion helicopters lifted off from an

Fulton Recovery System 94

Search and rescuehelicopters and longer-range rescue aircraftmay be unarmed andtherefore vulnerable toenemy attack.


amphibious assault ship in the

Adriatic carrying a forty-strongrescue team.

After the debacle of the failed

rescue attempt of Americans heldin their embassy in Iran someyears earlier, the US wasdetermined to succeed in theBalkans. The air support coverage

for the rescue aircraft wasenormous. Escort was provided by

Cobra gunships and Harriers; SEAD missions were flown by A-6s, EA-6Bs andEF-111s. Layered above were A-10s and F/A-18s prepared for close air support,

while F-15s, F-16s and F-18s flew combat air patrol. Early warning aircraft keptwatch over the whole operation.Once located precisely, O’Gradyboarded one helicopter whilemarines from the second set up

a defensive cordon; the rescueaircraft were on the ground forseven minutes. Although shoulderlaunched SA-7s and small arms

fire were directed at the CH53Es,the aircraft were onlysuperficially damaged. 100

Search and Survivor Assistance (SASA)With any search and rescue, the culmination comes with the eventual rescue

of the survivors. While the ADF has the ability to contribute to the SAR effort,

not all platforms are able to conduct the rescue portion of the role. As a

result, the Air Force is able to contribute to the lesser role of Search and

Survivor Assistance where the locating platform (ie. AP-3C Orion or C-130

Hercules) is able to remain with the survivor, air drop essential equipment

and coordinate the eventual rescue.

SEARCH AND SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE

Search and Survivor Assistance (SASA) is the capability to locate and maintain

contact with survivors and air drop survival equipment or supplies. 101

Wreckage from the F-16C 99

Search andSurvivorAssistanceSASA providesassistance to, but not therecovery of, survivors.

Wreckage from the F-16C 98


DPR 3/97 - MONDAY 6 JANUARY 1997MEDIA UPDATE AS AT 11PM AEDT - YACHT SEARCH AND RESCUE

French yachtsman Thierry Duboisof the yacht AmnestyInternational is safe afterclimbing into a life raft dropped

by a RAAF P-3C Orion aircraft atabout 9 pm AEDT. The sameaircraft - the second to be sentto the area - also located the

other stricken yacht, Globe ExideChallenger, about 60 nautical

miles west of the Amnesty International. It is afloat, but listing. There is no signof its skipper English yachtsman Tony Bullimore, 56. However, hopes remain highthat he will be found. Dubois, 29, had climbed into one of the two life raft

systems dropped by the first Orion on the scene, but it had swamped in theincredibly rough weather. The second Orion dropped another life raft and hemanaged to climb in. He was seen to be well and preparing to bed himself downfor the night. The raft is equipped with a beacon, food, water and other provisions.

The Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Adelaide is enroute from Perth to thescene and is expected to arrive in three days time. A third Orion aircraft willlaunch from Perth to be over the search area at first light (9.30 am AEDT) tomorrowmorning. 102

BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENTBattlespace Management Roles. With any battlespace, positive control of

the air environment is essential. The ingress and egress of allied aircraft into/

out of an AO, the detection of and defence against hostile air forces and the

integration of civilian air traffic all

require a substantial level of

specialist management. With a

huge area to cover, Australia utilises

a large number of sensors from

JORN through to civilian air traffic

control radar to form an integrated

air picture. Subsequent

management of this environment

falls into three key roles:

• Aerospace Battle Management

• Aerospace Management

• Early Warning and Control

Bullimore Rescue 103

BATTLESPACEMANAGEMENTBattlespace Managementroles:• Aerospace Battle

Management• Aerospace

Management• Early Warning and

Control

Battlespace Management


Aerospace Battle ManagementAerospace Battle Management provides control of defensive and offensive

aerospace activities in an operations area and includes coordination of

defensive counter air, offensive counter air, strike and other war fighting

activities. The ADF does not possess the resources, nor is it practical, to

implement a nation-wide air defence capability which can simultaneously

defend all the potential target areas. Accordingly, the Air Force’s focus is on

conducting air defence operations over the approaches to a limited number

of high value areas that could be at risk.

PROJECT AIR 5333 (VIGILAIRE)

PA 5333 seeks to replace the fixed-site, air defence, command and control (C2)systems located at No 2 Control and Reporting Unit (2CRU) and No 3 Controland Reporting Unit (3CRU). The new Vigilare air defence (C2) systems willinterface with numerous other existing or developing ADF systems, including:

• Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft• Tactical Air Defence Radars (TADRS) project• the Australian Military Airspace Control Communications System (AMACCS)

project• The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System (TAAATS)• the Maritime Intelligence Centre (MIC) and the Australian Theatre Joint

Intelligence Centre (ASTJIC)• the JORN Coordination Centre (JCC)

• Over The Horizon Radars (OTHRs)• existing air defence and military air traffic radars• various Maritime, Land and Air assets operating Link-11 and/or Link-16

Further to this, Project AIR 5333 aims to provide a communications network toconnect ADF ground-based air-defence assets into a single integrated system.It will provide connections between command centres, civil and militarysurveillance sensors, ground weapon systems, and radio sites. Both fixed anddeployable communication links will be provided. 104

Aerospace ManagementAerospace Management maximises operational effectiveness by promoting

the safe, efficient and flexible use of airspace for legitimate military and

civilian users. Airservices Australia (AsA) is the national authority for airspace

management over non-military aircraft operating in national airspace in

peacetime. The efficient conduct of military operations, during peace and in

AerospaceManagementAerospace managementseeks to create safe andefficient use of nationalairspace.

Aerospace BattleManagementAerospace BattleManagement providescontrol of defensive andoffensive aerospaceactivities in anoperations area.


times of tension or conflict, requires appropriate coordination with AsA

agencies responsible for air traffic management in key sectors of airspace.

Procedures and operations during peace should be similar to those applicable

during contingencies, facilitating a seamless transition. Accordingly,

interoperability and cooperation between the airspace management systems

of the ADF and AsA is essential.

AIRSERVICES AUSTRALIA (ASA)

For more than 50 years, Airservices Australia and its predecessors have managed

a national asset - Australian airspace. AsA provides air traffic control, airnavigation support and aviation rescue and fire fighting services. AirservicesAustralia was formed in 1996 with the splitting of the Australian Civil AviationAuthority into two entities - Airservices Australia took on service provision forthe Australian airways and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority took on the

regulatory role.

Airservices Australia plays acooperative role in Australia’s

national security as bothAirservices and the Departmentof Defence jointly manage theNational Airspace Asset underthe Air Coordinating Committee.

As such, they work closely withthe Australian Defence Force(ADF) in times of national andstate emergencies and duringexercises necessary to keep our

defence forces prepared. 106

Early Warning and Control

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL

Air surveillance and control provided by airborne early warning platforms whichare equipped with search and height-finding radar and communicationsequipment for controlling weapons. 107

One of the key principles of war is that of surprise as it provides the initiative

to the aggressor. While modern ground-based systems can provide excellent

point coverage and warning of incoming strikes, these systems are limited in

range and thus not necessarily able to provide the level of warning required

in order to scramble and concentrate an effective counter force. An airborne

AsA Staff 105

Early Warningand ControlAEW&C providesextended coverage of thebattlespace, greaterdetection range ofhostile air forces and thesubsequent control ofintercepting alliedforces.


system provides flexibility, range and, when integrated into an overall air

defence system, provides a substantial increase in the effectiveness of warning

systems.

THE COLD WAR

Discussions between officers from NATO and the defunct Warsaw Pact in theearly 1990s showed that the Warsaw Pact had defined AWACS as a NATOcentre of gravity. They had planned to destroy the aircraft at the onset ofconflict no matter how many losses they incurred in achieving this aim. 108

PROJECT AIR 5077 -WEDGETAIL

Project WEDGETAIL is the namegiven to Australian Defence Force

Project AIR 5077, which has beenestablished to acquire anAirborne Early Warning andControl (AEW&C) capability. The

AEW&C capability will providethe Australian Defence Force

(ADF) with an enhanced surveillance capability in the broad expanse of theAustralian north.

The aircraft will be a derivative of the Boeing 737-700 Increased Gross Weight(IGW) commercial airliner. The B737-700 IGW aircraft is a commercially availablevariant of the civil B737 Boeing Business Jet which is designed to operate atheavier weights and carry more fuel for greater endurance. Modifications to

the aircraft include the installation of the dorsal mounted radar, increasing theelectrical power generating capacity from the engines, provision of an air-to-air refuelling capability (both aerial refuelling probe and a flying boom receiverreceptacle) and the addition of an Electronic Warfare self-protection system.

The Wedgetail aircraft will complement JORN and ground-based sensors,providing highly accurate data and flexible employment options to the modernair surveillance and combat environment. This will provide an excellent capabilityto support a layered air defence system, which is necessary to defend Australia.

However, Wedgetail is not just a capability for the defence of Australia. Theaircraft will be able to support deployed ADF and allied assets at significantranges, which will provide the Australian Government with a capability thatcan be used effectively to support coalition operations through the world ifnecessary. 110

B737 AEW&C 109


COMBAT SUPPORTWhile each element of the ADF can be expected to deploy in times of conflict,

the nature of aerospace power

brings with it a number of unique

problems. Since aerospace power is

expected to be a highly responsive

element of the force, able to deploy

at short notice and over long

distances, the combat support of

that force must also be highly

responsive.

To many, the combat support role may be considered somewhat benign in

that it does not often face the enemy head on and yet the capacity that

combat support provides is an essential enabler for those force projection

assets to be able to do their tasks. Aircraft are at their most vulnerable while

on the ground and therefore subject to a variety of threats, each capable of

inflicting damage that can render the platform unable to conduct air

operations. This damage need not just be restricted to the aircraft itself, rather

damage to support infrastructure and services and also interruptions to the

capacity to launch missions. For example, damage to a fuel farm,

contamination of food or water, interruption to power supplies, jamming of

C2 systems can render the weapon system ineffective. Equally, physical damage

to the actual aircraft, critical aircraft ground support equipment, aircrews or

other critical base and support personnel can pose a threat to operations.

FURTHER READING

Airbase Operability (Second Edition) by Sal Sidoti 111

This book considers the history of attacks on airbases, the modern threats, andoffers a broad range of options for increasing the survivability of air power’smost vulnerable element.

Combat Support Roles. Combat support provides enabling infrastructure and

sustainment through the roles of:

• Main Operating Bases

• Forward Operating Bases

• Operations Support

COMBATSUPPORTCombat Support must behighly responsive tocomplement theresponsiveness ofaerospace power.

Combat Support

Combat Supportprovides a fundamentalenabler for airoperations.

Combat Support roles:• Main Operating Bases• Forward Operating

Bases• Operations Support


Main Operating BaseCombat support is not just a

concept for support of contingency

operations, it begins with the

infrastructure and support facilities

required to establish the main

operating bases for our fighting

force. Base structure, fuel and gases,

ground communications for

command and control,

administration, airfield fire services,

messing, accommodation, supply and support services all integrate together

to form the basis for the weapon system capability. Given their permanent

and well-established lines of supply, these home bases will provide a place

for immediate conduct of air operations or a place to which deployed elements

will reach back for those non-critical services unable to be provided forward.

Main operating bases provide enabling functions that are vital to establishing

and maintaining the capability to which the weapon system contributes, and

often will involve functions that will not be expected to deploy either fully

or in part for any contingency. Yet, this does not mean that the functions do

not contribute to the support of the deployed force, rather that they can

remain in the relative safety of an established base.

Command of the Base. In order to provide the necessary level of response

and flexibility, the base requires a

suitable level of command. This

command allows for the

coordination of all base support

services as well as necessary

response to emergencies such as

heightened security threats,

airfield emergencies or similar

contingencies.

Base Infrastructure and Facilities. The base is required to maintain its own

infrastructure and facilities in support of air operations. Base infrastructure

will be maintained by both military and civilian organisations. This will include

Airfield Defence Guards 113

Main operating basesprovide enablingfunctions that areessential to the weaponsystem capability.

Command of the base isan essential element toestablishing combatsupport.

Base infrastructure mustbe able to be recovered inthe case of an emergency.

Administration 112

Main OperatingBaseMain Operating Basesare typically home basesfor a weapon system andits support systems.


contingency plans for the recover

of facilities resulting from attack or

other emergency.

Base Security. The physical security

of the base will include all base

security functions as well as the

ground defence training of all Air

Force base personnel.

Logistics. The base will provide a range of logistics services including resource

management, supply, industry support, messing and accommodation,

movement and ground transport and air terminal services.

Engineering. The base will provide a range of engineering services including

airworthiness, research and development, test and evaluation, modifications,

operational-level and depot-level maintenance, software development, and

armament.

Base Operations. The base will

provide a range of operational

support services including

intelligence, command and control,

communications and navigation

aids, imagery support, fuel, rescue

and fire services, explosive

ordinance disposal, airspace control

and meteorology.

Health. The base will provide a range of health services including medical,

dental, the ability to respond to base casualties and to support the aeromedical

evacuation of base personnel as required.

Personnel. The base will provide a range of personnel services including

chaplaincy, personnel administration, postal and pay.

Forward Operating BaseWhere a contingency or conflict calls for aircraft to operate from a base other

than a main operating base, then support infrastructure must also deploy forward

to that base. Given that this forward operating base will often be within a

Weapons Training 114

Physical security of thebase includes grounddefence training forpersonnel.

Logistics services includethe maintenance of linesof supply.

Airworthiness is a keyelement of baseengineering support.

Air Traffic Control 115

Bases provide theoperational support forair operations.

Health includes treatmentand evacuation.

Bases provide personnelservices.


combat zone, the threat increases

and as such only essential support

elements should deploy forward.

However, as the rate of effort and

demand on support services increase,

adequate numbers of support

elements must deploy forward to

provide the required level of support.

Typically, this support will include command of the airbase, operations,

maintenance, logistics, terminal services, communication, engineering, security,

medical, administration and personnel and chaplaincy.

To operate effectively, all of the functions of a forward operating base must

be integrated to provide a seamless, agile and responsive combat support

system. Command of the airbase, while important at all times, is critical on a

forward base to provide integrated support and an integrated response to

threats.

Operations SupportThe final level of combat support encompasses assets that are deployed in

isolation of maintenance facilities. These deployed assets are no less in need

of combat support but usually can only take the bare minimum of facilities

with them, often only those that can be carried or deployed in direct support

of the weapon systems. These deployment areas are often under hostile fire

and consequently deployed support is kept to essential items only, yet

integration of support is vital to allow operations to proceed effectively.

SPACEWhile Australia does not yet possess

an indigenous military space

capability, increased reliance on

space communication and

intelligence systems may require the

development of such a capability.

Hence, an understanding of space

roles provides an insight into future

requirements.

Functions on a ForwardOperating Base must beintegrated foreffectiveness.

Operations SupportOperations supportprovides combat supportfor assets that aredeployed in isolation ofa maintenance facility.

Combat Support 117

SPACEAustralia does not yetpossess an indigenousmilitary spacecapability, but isincreasingly reliant onspace-based systems.

ForwardOperating BaseA Forward OperatingBase must provideessential, deployedcombat support tofriendly forces.

Fire Fighting 116


SPACE ROLES

Counterspace. Counterspace involves those operations conducted to attain andmaintain a desired degree of space superiority by the destruction orneutralisation of enemy forces. The main objectives of counterspace operationsare to allow friendly forces to exploit space capabilities, while negating theenemy’s ability to do the same. They can be conducted by air, space, land, sea

or special operations forces. Counterspace operations include both offensiveand defensive components.

Offensive Counterspace (OCS). OCS operations destroy or neutralise an

adversary’s space systems or the information they provide at a time and placeof our choosing through attacks on the space, terrestrial, or link elements ofspace systems. OCS operationsare conducted to achieve fivemajor goals: deception,

disruption, denial, degradation,or destruction of space assets orcapabilities. These operationsmay include military operations

such as surface-to-surface andair-to-surface attacks againstspace support facilities or spacepayloads before they are placedin orbit, as well as jamming

of enemy satellite uplinkand downlink frequencies.Counterspace operations initiated at the onset of hostilities can result in animmediate advantage in space capabilities and in early space control. Continuedsuppression of the space threat may be required in conjunction with other

offensive actions under way within the joint area of operation.

Defensive Counterspace (DCS). DCS operations consist of active and passiveactions to protect our space-related capabilities from enemy attack or

interference. The objective of active counterspace defense measures is to detect,track, identify, intercept, and destroy or neutralise enemy space and missile forces.The objective of passive counterspace defense is to reduce the vulnerabilitiesand increase the survivability of friendly space forces and the information theyprovide. These may include operations such as designing survivability features

into satellites, satellite manoeuvre, emission control and decoys.118

INTEGRATION OF ROLESRoles defined here are based upon discrete functions able to be carried out

through aerospace power. However, that does not imply that these roles are

carried out in isolation. The Air Force cannot, and should not, expect to operate

alone in any conflict. Rather, the national approach to a conflict will always

DSP Satellite 119

INTEGRATION OFROLESRoles are defined bydiscrete functions, butmust be integrated.


involve integrating the most effective components of all of the services,

together with other elements of national power, to create the most efficient

and effective solution for Australia.

Integrated Battlespace

During conflict, manyroles will be executedconcurrently in thebattlespace.

In the same way that force multipliers have been singled out as creating

force advantage through their functionality, so too are other functions

required to be packaged together to create the intended effect. For example,

a strike on a strategic target is not simply the launch of a weapon system,

rather it involves the integration of a number of equally important roles,

often layered, to achieve the required effect.

Annex E The Royal Australian Air Force Structure Force Element Groups Currently, the RAAF is divided into FEG’s. Encompassing one or more operational Wings, the Force Element Group (FEG) provides the Air Commander with the tactical combat power, operational commanders and experience required to plan and execute the air component of any joint operation. The Force Element Commander (FEG CDR) also manages the assigned Weapon System Master Plans on behalf of the Chief of Air Force. (RAAF Website)

The following brief insights only show flying units in each group.

Air Combat Group – ACG

There are two units which you may not recognize here, they are 2 OCU and FACDU. FACDU is the Forward Air Control Development Unit, which basically flies forward air control operations using PC-9’s. 2 OCU is 2 Operational Conversion Unit, It is a unit which deals with conversion from the Hawk to the Hornet. Surveillance and Response Group – SRG

Det A stands for Detachment A in Butterworth, it is a 92WG Detachment which is prepared for AP3C’s if required. A SQN which is not mentioned is 2SQN, which currently falls under 41WG. It is planned to be the location of Project Wedgetail, the modified 737’s for AEW&C. SRG is headquartered at Williamtown. Air Lift Group - ALG

HQ SRG

92WG - Edinburgh Maritime Ops

41WG-Williamtown Air Defence Ops

44WG- Williamtown Air Traffic Control

10SQN - Edinburgh AP3C

11SQN - Edinburgh AP3C

Det A - Butterworth AP3C’s as req.

HQ ACG

78WG -Williamtown Training

81WG-Williamtown Air Control

82WG -Amberley Precision & Strike

2OCU – Williamtown Hornet

3SQN – Williamtown Hornet

1SQN - Amberley F-111C

6SQN - Amberley F-111C/G

75SQN - Tindal Hornet

76SQN - Williamtown Hawk

79SQN - Pearce Hawk

77SQN - Williamtown Hornet

FACDU - Williamtown PC-9

Detachment B is a Detachment of DHC-4 Caribou’s almost permanently based in Townsville. Changes that are likely to occur in the future, are the inclusion of the new A-A refueller, possibly to 33SQN. HQ ALG is located at Richmond. Combat Support group has no flying units, however it is based at RAAF Amberley, and provides infra-structural and security support for RAAF Activities. Flying Sustainment units FSU’s are not part of FEGS. The “Flying” FSU’s are:

• ARDU, the Aircraft Research and development unit, based at RAAF Edinburgh. ARDU fly aircraft as required for testing and development purposes. This includes Blackhawks, Iroquois, Hornets and PC-9’s.

• CFS, the Central Flight School, based at RAAF East Sale. CFS flies PC-9 and CT-4 aircraft

• 2FTS, Number 2 Flight Training School, is located at RAAF Pearce. 2FTS Flies PC-9 aircraft

• ADFBFTS, Australian Defence Force Basic Flight Training School, is located at Tamworth, flying CT-4 aircraft under contract from British Aerospace Australia.

Aerospace Power Capability The RAAF is the primary service in establishing and maintaining control of the air and potentially space when such a capability comes of age. The RAAF also supports the ARA and RAN in the control of land and sea and in wider joint-operations. Finally, the RAAF contributes to the control of information which is ADF-wide (and in some cases, national) responsibility. (AAP1000, p 155) Air Force Capability is the defined as the quality of being able, competent and efficient in the performance of the designated roles at an acceptable level of risk. Air Force Capability is derived from a combination of Force Structure and preparedness which enables the nation to exercise military power. (AAP1000, p 156) In order to facilitate the Chief of Air Force’s primary responsibility for delivering the Defence Output of ‘Air Force Capability’. The Air Force has implemented a comprehensive Capability Management System (CMS). This system defines

HQ ALG

84WG - Richmond 85WG - Richmond Training

86WG -Richmond

32SQN – East Sale B350 Kingair

33SQN - Richmond B707

34SQN - Fairbarn BBJ & Challenger 604

36SQN - Richmond C130H Herc

37SQN - Richmond C130J Herc

38SQN - Amberley DHC -4 Caribou

Det’ B – Townsville DHC-4 Caribou

aerospace power capability groupings which bring together a number of related air power roles so that they can be better integrated. (AAP1000, p156) The four groupings are: Offensive Combat, Rapid Mobility, Flexible Combat Support and Surveillance & Battlespace Management. Offensive Combat is the primary role of the ACG. It encompasses the roles required to provide the capabilities for strike reconnaissance operations, tactical fighter operations and maritime patrol operations. Rapid Mobility is the primary responsibility of the ALG, it encompasses the role to provide the capability for air lift operations. Flexible Combat Support is the primary responsibility of the CSG, it encompasses those roles to provide the capability for combat support of air operations. Surveillance and Battlespace Management is the primary responsibility of the SRG. It encompasses those roles required to provide the capability for surveillance and aerospace control.

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