admiral von levetzow - political career from kaiser to hitler

From Kaiser to Fuhrer: The Political Road of a German Admiral, 1923-33Author(s): Holger H. HerwigReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1974), pp. 107-120Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260049 .

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From Kaiser to Fuhrer: The

Political Road of a German

Admiral, 1923-33*

Holger H. Herwig

'Only the dictator can now free us, lead us towards libera- tion - until the great hour when, with God's gracious help, the bell tolls for our Prussian Crown.' These words sum up in a nutshell the hopes and ambitions nurtured throughout the 1920s by Rear-Admiral Magnus von Levetzow.1 The future dictator and forerunner of the monarchist restoration, according to Levetzow, would not come to power by a coup d'etat, but would be legally appointed by the President of the Reich, 'constitutionally, so to say'. Only the suitable person- ality remained to be discovered. Levetzow rejected General Erich Ludendorff's choice, Adolf Hitler, because the latter lacked the necessary 'unfaltering sense of mission; he also

*This project was supported through the Klaus-Epstein-Memorial-Fellowship of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.

BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, N 239, box 5, vol. 14. Levetzow to Ludendorff, 29 July 1923. The voluminous correspondence of Rear-Admiral Magnus von Levetzow is deposited at the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (BA-MA) in Freiburg i. Br., West Germany. Magnus von Levetzow was born on 8 January 1871 in Flensburg. He entered the navy in 1889 and was commissioned four years later. Before the first war he took part in the blockade of Venezuela in 1902-03 and served in the High Sea Fleet from 1906. From 1913 until 1916 he commanded the battle- cruiser Moltke, taking part in the attack on Yarmouth and Hartlepool and the battle of the Dogger Bank in 1914, operations in the Bay of Riga in 1915, and the battle at Skagerrak (Jutland) in 1916, where he served as Chief of the Operational Division. In 1917 he was Chief of Staff during the German occupation of the Baltic islands of Moon, Oesel, and Dago, receiving the Pour le merite decoration. The following year he was promoted to Commodore and served as Chief of Staff of the Seekriegsleitung headed by Admiral Reinhard Scheer to the end of the war. Levetzow attained the rank of Rear-Admiral in 1920 as Chief of the Baltic Naval Station and was forced to retire in the fall of that year because of his enthusiastic support of the Kapp Putsch. From 15 February 1933 until July 1935 he served as Police President of Greater Berlin.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

lacks a leader'.2 Ludendorff agreed. The events of 9 November 1923 before the Feldherrnhalle in Munich were not encouraging; the German National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP) seemed to have collapsed, its leaders either in prison, fled abroad, or in hiding. A year later Levetzow reported to the exiled Kaiser at Doorn that Ludendorff also regretted Hitler's 'lack of leadership qualities', adding that Hitler himself admitted this deficiency and only wanted to be 'the pure and noble agitator'.3

Such early doubts regarding Hitler's ability to lead the regeneration of Germany and the eventual restoration of the Hohenzollern dynasty continued to haunt Levetzow. After the early Sturm und Drang period of the national-socialist movement, there is a gap of four years in the admiral's correspondence on the subject of Hitler and the NSDAP. This is hardly surprising. At the end of 1928 the party still had only 60,000 members; in May of that year it had received 810,000 votes and twelve seats in the Reichstag. It was not an impres- sive accomplishment. Levetzow found the NSDAP's political tactics 'too rough and revolting to lead to success. For Hitler lacks a master. He himself is simply not qualified to be a leader'.4

Levetzow had good cause for anxiety. The German monarchists were adrift on troubled waters during the early period of the Weimar Republic. Military defeat in 1918 had made monarchism widely unpopular, and it was only after two years of general economic ills and political decay that it recovered; by 1920, reaction and anti-republicanism became its political platform. The monarchists were sharply divided

tactically between the 'patients' who desired a peaceful monarchical restoration at a future date when the monarchy might again be popular, and the 'impatients' who desired an immediate forcible overthrow of the republic. Ideologically the monarchists consisted of three main groups: the legiti- mists in the German National Peoples Party (DNVP) and the

2 BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 5, vol. 14. Levetzow to Ludendorff, 29 July 1923.

3BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 5, vol. 15. Levetzow to Wilhelm II, 12 November 1924.

4Ibid, box 7, vol. 30. Levetzow to Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt, Spring 1930.

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FROM KAISER TO FUHRER

Stahlhelm, who wanted to restore to the throne, if not Wilhelm II, at least some Hohenzollern prince; a pro-Bavarian group that advocated the transfer of power from Protestant Hohenzollern North Germany to Catholic Wittelsbach South Germany; and the small faction that hoped to fulfil the dream dating back to 1848 of a Volkskaisertum based on a constitutional parliamentary monarchy. Levetzow clearly belonged initially to the first of these groups, but he hoped to add to their power and prestige also the South German monarchists. The abortive Hitler Putsch in November 1923 ended the dominance of the 'impatients' within the monarchist camp, with many of them going over to the still miniscule fascist right, while the 'patients' in the DNVP even-

tually entered the government and after the spring of 1925 rallied behind President Hindenburg.s

In the fall of 1928 Levetzow became actively involved in the attempt to unify all right-wing forces for the purpose of

restoring the monarchy, and Wilhelm II was asked for financial assistance. Exact information regarding the support received from Doorn is not available; on 12 September 1928 the Kaiser ordered General von Kleist (Minister Meines

Kbniglichen Hauses) to send Levetzow 2000 Marks a month for a period of six months, beginning 1 October 1928. The money was to be used for 'patriotic endeavours' (vaterlandische Arbeit).6 In this vein Levetzow began his activities on behalf of the Kaiser with speeches at various nationalist clubs, including the Deutsche Herrenklub and the Hamburger Nationalklub von 1919. The funds from Doorn sufficed for an office with requisite staff in Berlin. Further precise information on royal support is unfortunately not available; on 6 September 1929 Baron Ulrich von Sell, Wilhelm's representative in Germany, informed Levetzow that because of the

5See Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-32: Grundriss ihrer Weltanschauungen (Stuttgart 1950); Klemens von Klemperer, Germany 's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century (Princeton 1957); and Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933 (Munich 1962).

6BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 10, vol. 2. Wilhelm to von Kleist, 12 September 1928. See also Levetzow's 'Arbeitsubersicht' of 25 September 1928, ibid, box 10, vol. 1.

109 H




general financial crisis the subsidies would have to be reduced.7 Nevertheless, they continued until the spring of 1933.

Levetzow immediately set out to establish contacts with right wing groups in South Germany. Here was fertile ground. On 27 October 1928 he informed Sell of his intention to go to Munich on 8-9 November to see the leaders of the Stahlhelm and the Augsburg nationalist leader Baron Franz von Gebsattel, 'and where it will be possible, I hope, to build a bridge to Hitler, in order to incorporate him and his movement as well into a broader front'.8 On the same day Levetzow informed his closest friend, Guidotto Count Henckel von Donnersmarck, a member of Hermann G6ring's Berlin circle and head of one of the richest noble families in Germany, with extensive coal and tin operations in Silesia, of his coming trip to Munich and his desire to speak with Hitler. It is clear that Hitler was not yet politically or socially accep- table to high conservative circles: 'In particular, I beseech you not to utter a single word about the planned union with Hitler.' Nevertheless, Levetzow was favourably impressed by 'the popular dynamism of the whole development'. He ordered several back issues of the Vblkischer Beobachter, which he sent on to Donnersmarck and to Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt. Several admirals of the former Imperial Navy were also called upon for assistance.9 On 26 November Levetzow

7Ibid, box 10, vol. 1. Levetzow to Sell, 31 August 1928. Later he reported that of the 12,000 Marks received to date, 10,818.96 were spent between 1 October 1928 and 31 March 1929. Ibid., box 10, vols. 5, 7, Levetzow to Sell, 27 March 1929, Sell to Levetzow, 6 September 1929.

8Ibid, box 7, vol. 31. Four days earlier he had written to Beno Reichsfreiherr von Hermann auf Wain; 'What must be done to channel their unified strength into the bed of one great national stream so that it will become ever broader, ever more torrential, ever more powerful, ever more irresistible, and finally washes away the dams that stand in the way of our freedom - our freedom at home and our freedom abroad?' Ibid, box 10, vol. 1.

9BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 7, vol. 31. The Nachlass contains the following list of former naval officers whom Levetzow considered reliable nationalist contacts: Admirals Adolf von Trotha, Ludwig von Schroder, Hans von Quaet- Faslem, Ehrhardt Schmidt, Eberhard von Mantey; Vice-Admirals Ludwig von Reuter, Georg Hebbinghaus, Wolfgang Wegener, Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz, Alfred Begas; Rear-Admirals Wilhelm von Haxthausen, Theodor Eschenburg, Karl von Restorff; and Captains Bogislav von Selchow, Johann von Mann, Carl Kiister, and Baron von Grancy.

110




informed the Kaiser that successful contacts had been established in Berlin with Admiral Reinhard Scheer, Admiral

Ludwig Schr6der, and Rudiger von der Goltz, head of the Vaterlandische Verbinde. The line to Doom was kept open through Levetzow's friendship with the Empress Hermine, the Kaiser's second wife. Through her, Hitler's publications found their way to Doom.10

Throughout this period Levetzow viewed the Stahlhelm as the future saviour of Germany, with Alfred Hugenberg or Wilhelm Cuno as the men most likely to rescue the nation. The admiral recommended himself as liaison man to the South German nationalist groups. At a meeting of the central committee of the Vaterlindische Verbande, founded 4 January 1929, it was decided to have Levetzow 'take up renewed negotiations with South Germany'. The members of the central committee represented the leading nationalist clubs and personalities in Germany.'1 Levetzow also turned his attention to the problem of finding a suitable candidate for the coming presidential election. The choice was not easy, as candidates appeared everywhere. Levetzow rejected the candidate 'of the Schleicher circle', Oskar von Hindenburg, son of the Reich President. At a meeting on 7 May between Goltz, Count Quandt, Holten, Levetzow, and representatives of Rhenish industry, Cuno emerged as the most likely candidate. Hans Luther, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans von Seeckt, Georg Escherich, Wilhelm Groener, Otto Gessler, and Emil Kardorff were all ruled out as unsuitable. Hitler's name was not even mentioned. Levetzow still maintained his position that Hitler simply did 'not possess the stuff for a great leader'.'2

The Reichstag elections of September 1930 brought the NSDAP 6,409,000 votes and 107 seats in the Reichstag,

'?Ibid, box 7, vol. 31. Levetzow to Empress Hermine, 27 May 1929, box 10, vol. 5.

lThey included the Stahlhelm (Duesterberg and Seldte), Herrengesellschaft von Berlin (Levetzow and Alvensleben), Vereinigte Vaterlandische Verbdnde (Goltz), Nationaler Klub von Sachsen (Wildgrube), Deutscher Klub Augsburg (Gebsattel), Nationaler Klub Berlin (Kreth and Vietinghoff), and the Hamburger Nationalklub von 1919 (Holten). Ibid, box 14, vol. 13, Levetzow's memorandum of 11 January 1929.

"Ibid, box 7, vol. 33, box 11, vol. 9. Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 13 April, 11 May 1930;

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second only to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) vote. Levetzow took note. He became a frequent visitor to Berlin where he visited 'all important people' - by which he meant Wilhelm Cuno, Riudiger von der Goltz, Alfred Hugenberg, Heinrich Class, Wilhelm Widenmann, and Adolf Hitler. The admiral was especially pleased that his military rank facili- tated contact with 'Hauptmann Goring', and hence with Hitler and the inner circle of the party leaders. Levetzow's major break-through into the inner national-socialist circle came during the fall of 1930. On 30 September Cuno and Hitler met in Hamburg; Levetzow claims to have been the driving force behind this meeting. In return, he was allowed to attend the gathering along with G6ring and other high party figures. After an hour-long private discussion, Hitler and Cuno rejoined the assembled company. 'And now Cuno received us with the declaration that he was fully and totally in agreement with Hitler on their individual analyses of the present situation, and he stated his complete agreement with his [Hitler's] outlook on external and internal politics.' Hitler then repeated what he had told Cuno. In external politics he would make a clean break with Stresemann's rapprochement policy vis-a-vis France. Instead, he would strive for 'closer ties with Italy, and through Italy with England'. A common German-Italian-British front was to be

forged against the spread of Bolshevism, which Hitler

explained was directly threatening Britain in India, and

against 'France's satrap Poland', where its aim would be 'the return of the Corridor and Upper Silesia'. As to disarmament, his simple suggestion was 'rearmament by us or disarmament by the others'. Nor did reparations pose a problem to Hitler: 'Cessation of all Young Plan payments... France will not march.' Hitler was careful to veil his domestic programme in vague generalizations:

Most radical break with the present parliamentary-democratic system, cleansing of this corrupt state, reduction of the party-based civil service, strengthening of the professional civil service, increases in their salaries if need be, federal courts for the November criminals, death sentences for treason against the fatherland.

He was careful to dispel the fears of the Hamburg group concerning the demands of his party's left wing for the aboli-

112



FROM KAISER TO FUHRER'

tion of private capital and landed property, and also disguised his views on the Jewish question: 'No action against the

Jewish person as such, but destruction of the Jewish predominance in the state.'13

Hitler had tailored his views to the audience. The success of the meeting with Cuno is reflected in Levetzow's report to Heinrich Prince von Reuss, in which he wrote that Cuno had agreed 'most especially' with Hitler's 'stance against the Jewish Geist and against the predominance of Jews in the state, not against individual Jews, in the form of a violent persecution'.14 Adolf terrible had become Adolf legalite for Admiral von Levetzow, as he had for many German leaders.

Several aspects of the national-socialist programme, however, continued to irritate Levetzow. He still feared that the NSDAP might advocate nationalization of private capital and land. Donnersmarck, who shared this fear, added that business circles, which had originally been favourable to Hitler, 'have now again got cold feet'. But when Giring assured Levetzow that no such action was contemplated, the admiral reported to Donnersmarck that 'we can therefore be calm: the National Socialists do not have enough clever scoundrels at their disposal for ... such an expropriation'. As for party members with radical views, Goring assured Levetzow that in future 'there will be no more stepping out of line'.18

Levetzow also kept the ex-Kaiser's circle informed of his

progress. He took credit for arranging G6ring's visit to Doorn in 1930, and constantly urged his friends at home to read Mein Kampf which, he told a fellow retired officer, he 'liked very much'. Donnersmarck was told that 'it is a pleasure to read this book', and Baroness Tiele-Winckler was informed that it was necessary to read it 'if one wants to make progress with the Nazis'.19 In short, Hitler's opus was being read in at least some nationalist circles.

'3Ibid, box 7, vol. 33, Levetzow to Fritz Voigt, 31 October 1930; Levetzow memorandum of 3 October 1930, box 11, vol. 10.

4Loc. cit. Levetzow to Heinrich Prince von Reuss, 23 October 1930. 18Loc. cit. Donnersmarck to Levetzow, 6 November 1930; ibid., box 7, vol. 33.

Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 7 November 1930; and ibid., box 11, vol. 10. Levetzow to Beno von Hermann, 4 November 1930.

'9Loc. cit. Levetzow's memorandum on his activities during November and

113




On 24 January 1931 Levetzow helped to arrange a meeting between Hitler and Prince Friedrich-Svend von Eulenburg- Hertefeld. Hitler, as usual, captivated his listener. He assured Eulenburg that he did not intend to nationalize private capital or landed property and that he sought to solve the agrarian problem by means of colonization in the East, 'about which I have written in detail in my book Mein

Kampf'.20 With regard to the aversion that some conservatives harboured against his political methods, Hitler told

Eulenburg:

What, above all, was important? The rallying of the broad masses! It was my main task to tear them away from Marxism, to make them once again receptive to nationalist ideas. I went to these masses, baited by the communists, and I struggled with them. I was interested in success and not in methodology . . . Let those gentle- men who criticise my methods go into the industrial centres and

try with their methods to reach the masses that have been driven mad by Marxism! I went into the industrial centres because I could not dethrone Marxism without these masses of workers. Now 107 National Socialists sit in the Reichstag and I expect that it will be

180 the next time ... I wage the fight against Marxism ruthlessly and with all, even the utmost, means that the laws, including those of the Emergency Decree, allow me, until the total, final annihila- tion and rooting-out of this pest from among the German people. To this I have dedicated myself. For this I fight without mercy and

ruthlessly to the end.

Eulenburg was impressed. He circulated his notes on the

meeting to the Kaiser, Donnersmarck, and Levetzow, and informed them that he had left the German National Peoples Party for the NSDAP in order to be with that party, 'behind which the masses stand today and... without which in the

long run no form of stable government can exist'. Eulenburg was especially impressed by Hitler's eyes, by his 'disciplined fanaticism', and by his book, 'which contains a wealth of

December 1930. Levetzow desired 'that later Hitler should also go to Doom'. Loc. cit., Levetzow to Colonel Friedrichs, 5 November 1930; loc cit., Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 13 December 1930; and loc. cit., Levetzow to Baroness Tiele- Winckler, 6 November 1930.

2The following citations on the Eulenburg-Hitler discussion are taken from

Eulenburg's notes in ibid., box 14, vol. 14. Eulenburg's reactions cited here are from a letter dated February 1931 to Axel (?), which he also circulated to the Kaiser, Donnersmarck, and Levetzow.

114




brilliant thoughts, also with regard to cultural goals'. He con- cluded: 'The sacrifices that we shall have to make in the "Third Reich" may possibly be great, but we shall be able to live, act and work.'

On 17 May 1931 Levetzow informed Admiral Schmidt that he regarded Hitler 'as the best person' for the office of Reich President. In a public appeal, Levetzow pointed out to the leaders of the Reichswehr the dangers of a left wing revolution and added that 'in contrast, the NSDAP plans no revolution but instead seeks its goals along legal paths'. Hitler, the admiral argued, had shown this clearly at the trial of the Ulm officers. On 24 August 1931 Levetzow assured Donnersmarck 'that Hitler spoke very nicely in favour of monarchism, strongly sympathetic to Protestantism, and with a pronounced distaste of ultramontanism'.21 Hitler was on the verge of replacing Hugenberg and Cuno as the most likely saviour of the nation.

On 10 October 1931 Hitler met President Hindenburg. The meeting was arranged by Emil von Stauss of the German Peoples Party (DVP).22 For one hour, Hitler delivered a monologue on his political convictions, couching his arguments 'in terms of military analogies in order to make them more comprehensible to the "Old Man".' Goring informed Levetzow that Hitler 'had advanced the arguments of a company commander'. Hindenburg was flattered by Hitler's repeated references to 'former Field Marshal von Hindenburg', but he was annoyed by his condescending atti- tude. The president repeatedly tapped his head to remind his guest not to forget that it was to this skull that 'Germany

21Ibid, box 7, vol. 33, Levetzow to Schmidt, 17 May 1931;ibid., box 7, vol. 14. Levetzow 'Ein Warnruf an die Reichswehr!'; and loc. cit., Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 28 August 1931. In February 1930 three lieutenants from the Ulm garrison were tried by the Minister of Defence, General Wilhelm Groener, in the Supreme Court at Leipzig for spreading NSDAP propaganda in the army. On 25 September Hans Frank, the National Socialist defence lawyer, introduced Hitler as a witness; the latter used the occasion to reassure the army of his loyalty to it.

22BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 7, vol. 14. The following report of the meeting comes from a lengthy, handwritten letter from Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 14 October 1931. Levetzow assigned himself 'the role of honest broker'. Stauss was director of the Deutsche Bank, a member of the DVP, a son-in-law of Admiral Georg Alexander von Muller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet from 1906 until 1918.

115




owed its salvation', and showed signs of annoyance about the NSDAP's slogan 'Deutschland erwache' (Germany awake). Was Hitler trying to imply that the Reich was asleep under the Field Marshal's guidance? Hindenburg brushed aside Hitler's protestations to the contrary 'and went into an un- motivated fit of rage'. Two hours later, however, the two men parted with outward signs of cordiality after Hitler had

evaded Hindenburg's query with whom Hitler would be will-

ing to form a coalition government. After the meeting, the

president sent his secretary, Otto Meissner, to inform Giring 'how deeply he had been moved by Hitler's ethos and burning patriotism'. On the other hand, General Kurt von Schleicher is said to have made it known that Hindenburg thought Hitler more fit to be the Minister for Posts than Chancellor.23

Levetzow continued to act out his role as honest broker, keeping Hitler up to date on the latest developments in the nationalist camp, 'which are passed on to me by my loyal [Admiral] Raeder'. Levetzow still believed that 'only the

King can be master' and was sure that Hitler could be won over to this view. In fact, Hitler informed Levetzow that in the next parliament the NSDAP would have 200 mandates and that he had already thought out a course of action in case he should be called upon to form a government:

The chancellor in question appears before the Reichstag and, while

appealing to the German people, develops his new, generous programme. If it does not meet with the approval of the Reichstag, he

pulls the dissolution order from his pocket and dissolves the

Reichstag. Until the new chancellor [is elected] the designated chancellor conducts the business of the government.24

On 11 October 1931 the right wing forces met in Bad

Harzburg. The honeymoon was over before it ever started. Levetzow records that both Hugenberg and Hitler sought 'to

yield as little as possible to the other, and to insist on their

independence and their prerogatives'. Hugenberg, Hitler, and the Stahlhelm could simply 'not be brought under one hat' unless 'they would be willing to put themselves under the

23Bullock, Hitler, 187. 24BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 14, vol. 14. Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 14

October 1931.

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command of... Hitler'. This solution Levetzow thought un- likely. His parting of the ways with Hugenberg, the representative of the 'bow tie and Prince Albert' era, had come.25 On 11 October Levetzow returned to Berlin in the company of Hitler, Goring, and Goebbels.

The Harzburg meeting nevertheless proved to be a mile- stone in the history of German monarchism. Many 'patients' were now willing to accept a national-socialist dictatorship as a transitory step toward a monarchical restoration. They felt confident that they could control Hitler because they had behind them the money of big business and banking circles, the major German press and motion picture services, the support of the German upper class, and Germany's most experienced politicians. But they failed to realize the power of the street and the demand of the masses for something new. Dissatisfied with the Weimar Republic, many Germans wanted not a return to the past in the form of a monarchy, but the new Third Reich offered them by the NSDAP. Many monarchists saw only the National-Socialists' nationalism, and not their revolutionary dynamism.

Levetzow was not among these. He met various political leaders throughout November 1931 in an attempt to forge an alliance between the revolutionary fervour of the NSDAP and the established wealth and power of the conservatives:

If National Socialism goes on the rocks, then we can pack up. This view is also shared by Hefflich Schmidt-Hannover of the DNVP, Hugenberg's closest collaborator. Therefore everything must be done to bring them together: the Prussian-Germans, more closely tied to the soil and to land and property, politically more mature and experienced, and the overall intellectually superior elements of the German Nationalists [DNVP] with the young National Socia- lists, more endowed with easer vitality, more passionate, but politically still less experienced.

6

25The following citations are also from loc. cit. Levetzow singled out Hugenberg for his vitriolic comments: 'Germany can expect nothing from this clumsy bigwig, from this pig-skinned, dull fellow, from this crew-cut complainer, from this fusspot and pedant. With such fellows I will not strike any blows for Germany.' Loc. cit. See also Goebbels's comment on 10 January 1932: 'Hugenberg is only the fifth wheel on the wagon.' Joseph Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei (Munich, 1933), 23.

26BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 7, vol. 34. Levetzow to Rebeur-Paschwitz, 16 November 1931.

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Levetzow, who in a letter to Admiral Schmidt referred to Hitler as 'a knight without fear or blemish', encouraged Donnersmarck, Admiral Rebeur-Paschwitz, and Heinrich Class to support Hitler's candidacy for the presidency. He also appealed to old comrades from the navy, asking Admiral Bernhard Rosing to publish in the Zentralblatt Marinever- bande Levetzow's appeal that former naval colleagues vote for Hitler, and advised the Kaiser not to support Hindenburg; the admiral assured Wilhelm that Hitler 'had repeatedly expressed the thought that the Kaiser might live among us with honour'.27 Active officers of the Reichsmarine were like- wise called upon to support Hitler and the NSDAP. Finally, Levetzow reminded Admiral Raeder not to pass up this chance 'to harness this young, restless, and often impetuous and wild national strength' for rebuilding the navy.28

Levetzow now feared that a premature political alliance

might sap the youthful vigor of the NSDAP. As he wrote to Goring: 'You and your NSDAP find yourself in the position of Odysseus between the two sirens [sic] ... To me falls the

ungrateful, humble role of the ship's guest.' The NSDAP had to ward off the 'black brothers' from Brining's Center Party as well as the 'par fratrum Schleicher/Hammerstein'. Especi- ally the Reichswehrminister, 'one of the shadiest figures that stands at the top', required watching. 'He tries to be too clever, hence he will trap himself in his own complex web.'29

27Ibid, box 11, vol. 13. Levetzow to Schmidt, 16 November 1931. Loc. cit., Levetzow to Donnersmarck, 20 and 22 November 1931; ibid., box 7, vol. 35, Levetzow to Rebeur-Paschwitz, 22 February 1932; ibid., box 12, vol. 15, Levetzow to Class, 3 March 1932. Levetzow informed the latter that he regarded a vote for Hindenburg as 'a crime against Germany'. Ibid., box 7, vol. 35. Levetzow to 'Moltke Kameradschaftsbund' (as well as to individual sailors such as Willy Thiel, Walter Schonstadt, Herrn Joseph, among others), 30 March 1932. Levetzow had commanded the battle-cruiserMoltke from 1913 to 1916. Loc. cit., Levetzow to Rosing, 30 March 1932. Levetzow lectured Rosing that 'we can thank God for such a man'. Ibid., box 12, vol. 16. Levetzow to Sell, 5 April 1932.

28Goebbels did not fail to take note of these efforts. On 28 May 1932 he wrote: 'The navy is in fantastic form. All, officers and men, fully for us. They read the Vblkischer Beobachter and Angriff.' 4 June he noted: 'The navy is all right.' And 17 August: 'Once again we discover: the navy is and remains all right. All officers support us and are immeasurably sad that we did not make it this time.' Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, 102, 106, 147. BA-MA,Nachlass Levetzow, box

7, vol. 35. Levetzow to Raeder, 14 May 1932. 29Ibid, box 12, vol. 16. Levetzow to Goring, 5 May 1932. See also Goebbels's

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The admiral was now rapidly approaching his own moment of decision. He found it increasingly difficult to sit between two chairs. During the fall and winter of 1932 his relations with the Kaiser were severely strained. The parting of the

ways came over the issue of whether or not Levetzow could accept a seat in the Reichstag as a member of the NSDAP. At first Wilhelm raised no objections, but when faced with the reality of such a move he recoiled. On 22 August 1932 Levetzow informed Hitler that he was coming to Berlin on 30 August 'in order there to don the brown shirt'. He still reiter- ated his plea for a monarchist restoration, but added that 'if Crown and sceptre were to remain firmly rooted in the German soil, then they must find their support and succour in the vblkische anchorage [Ankergrund] of your movement'. The hour of decision had come for the exiled Hohenzollern. Levetzow informed the Empress: 'The possibility of a solution still exists and the decision [lies] in the hands of His Majesty.' The admiral recommended an eleventh hour restoration. If the Kaiser did not act now, 'this would irrevocably bury the most promising hopes for the Crown in the future'. 30

In December 1932 Levetzow, along with such other notables as Count Hans Adolf von Moltke, General Franz Ritter von Epp, Count Rudiger von der Goltz, and Colonel Alfred Niemann, helped to found the Bund der Aufrechten, otherwise known as the Kampfring der monarchischen Bewegung Deutschlands. Its express purpose was to restore Wilhelm II to his 'rightful' throne; Levetzow, at least, recog- nized by then that this could be realized only with the co-

diary entry for 7 January 1932: 'the main thing is that we remain strong and do not make any compromises. Then we will win according to a law of nature.' Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, 20. BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 7, vol. 35. Levetzow to Admiral Schmidt, 17 May 1932. Colonel-General Kurt Baron von Hammerstein-Equord was Chief of Army Command from 1930 until 1934.

30Loc cit., Levetzow to Hitler, 22 August 1932. Loc cit., Levetzow to Empress Hermine, 22 September 1932. Other members of the royal family did not remain as circumspect as Wilhelm II. His sons Crown Prince Wilhelm, Eitel Friedrich, and Oskar were strong supporters of the Stahlhelm; the Crown Prince expressed his support for Hitler at the latest by 1931. One son, August Wilhelm (Auwi), was an early vocal supporter of the NSDAP, thus earning the title 'Naziprinz'. See Klaus W. Jonas, Der Kronprinz Wilhelm (Frankfurt, 1962), 234-236.

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operation of Hitler. But Wilhelm was not willing to pay the price. On 13 December 1932 he informed the admiral through Count von Schwerin that, because he was now a member of a political party, the royal subsidies would be terminated at the end of the first quarter of 1933. Levetzow had reached the end of his monarchist career. Cut off from the past, he now set sail for the future. On 22 December he informed the Kaiser that, until now, all his efforts had been

possible only because he could rely on the trust and good will of the Kaiser:

From this I drew my strength. I deceived myself . . . The purpose was to build a bridge between the Crown and the volkische libera- tion movement of National Socialism.. . That was the goal. In the decisive hour the Crown ... failed to pursue the steep course

[steilen Weg] boldly and deliberately, without wavering or falter-

ing. In the misjudgement of this new age . . .and the strength inherent in it, lies the tragedy for the fate of the Crown.31

In the eyes of Levetzow, Wilhelm had missed the bus. On 30

January 1933 Adolf Hitler became chancellor. The Hohenzollern remained at Doorn.32 Levetzow, however, reaped what he had sown - he was appointed first National Socialist police president of Greater Berlin.33 Admiral Magnus von Levetzow had traversed his course from Kaiser to Fuhrer.

31BA-MA, Nachlass Levetzow, box 7, vol. 35. Count Schwerin to Levetzow, 13 December 1932. Ibid, box 12, vol. 16. Levetzow to Wilhelm II, 22 December 1932. The letter was effective: 'Your letter shocked him and has already caused him two sleepness nights .. .He completely rejects your way.' Ibid., box 12, vol. 17. Empress Hermine to Levetzow, 26 December 1932.

32The National Socialists left no doubt concerning their desire not to see the Kaiser returned to the throne. In March 1933 Goebbels gave instructions to the press for the event of the Kaiser's death. News of this 'may only be printed in a single column on the bottom half of the first page. Short commentary may follow, but is not necessary. The less, the better'. For the new, young Germany the Kaiser represented an age 'that has long been condemned to the garbage heap. Wilhelm II is the representative of a system that suffered shipwreck'. Cited in Jonas, Der Kronprinz Wilhelm, 236-237.

33See Goebbels's entry for 15 February 1933, the day of Levetzow's appoint- ment: 'Admiral Levetzow is being appointed police president of Berlin ... Things are starting to roll. We are already slowly taking roots in the administration.' Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, 262.

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admiral von levetzow - political career from kaiser to hitler

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