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[email protected] Paper 8 Tel: 571-272-7822 Entered: October 11, 2017
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________
ITRON, INC., Petitioner,
v.
SMART METER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Patent Owner. ____________
Case IPR2017-01199 Patent 7,058,524 B2
____________
Before BRYAN F. MOORE, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION Institution of Inter Partes Review
37 C.F.R. § 42.108
IPR2017-01199 Patent 7,058,524 B2
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Itron, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) for inter
partes review of claims 17–22 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent
No. 7,058,524 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’524 patent” or “the challenged patent”).
Smart Meter Technologies Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
Response (Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”) to the Petition.
We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an
inter partes review may be authorized only if “the information presented in
the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
Upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition and
Preliminary Response, we determine that the information presented shows
there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing
the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims for one of the
asserted grounds.
A. Related Proceeding
As required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(2), the parties identify Smart
Meter Technologies, Inc. v. Duke Energy Corp., Case No. 1:16-cv-00208 (D.
Del.) as a judicial matter that would affect or be affected by a decision in
this proceeding. Pet. 1; Paper 4 (Patent Owner’s Mandatory Notices), 2.
B. The Challenged Patent
The challenged patent relates generally to a power metering system
for measuring electrical power consumption, converting the measurements
to Internet Protocol (“IP”) format, and transmitting the IP format
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measurement information across a network. Ex. 1001, 1:6–11, 1:55–62.
Figure 1 of the ’524 patent is reproduced below.
Ex. 1001, Fig. 1.
Figure 1 depicts “a schematic diagram showing the [] power metering
system of the present invention, indicated generally at 10 and installed in a
dwelling 65. A power line 50 connects the dwelling 65 to the local power
distribution grid.” Id. at 2:57–60. The challenged patent discloses that
“[t]he power metering system 10 includes an antenna 15, processor 20,
multichannel transceiver 30, power meter 35, one or more clamp contacts
40, split-core transformer 42, and clamp filter 44, which operate together to
provide data acquisition, power measurement, data conversion, and data
transmission services.” Id. at 3:17–22.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Claim Construction
We interpret claims of an unexpired patent using the “broadest
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
[the claims] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016) (concluding the broadest
reasonable construction “regulation represents a reasonable exercise of the
rulemaking authority that Congress delegated to the Patent Office”). Under
that standard, claim terms are presumed to be given their ordinary and
customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504
F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term
must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re
Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Further, “[t]he PTO should
also consult the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the
patent has been brought back to the agency for a second review.” Microsoft
Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover,
the Board may not “construe claims during IPR so broadly that its
constructions are unreasonable under general claim construction principles.”
Id.
Petitioner proposes a construction for “autonomously.” See Pet. 11–
12. Patent Owner “takes no position on whether Petitioner’s construction
[for autonomously] is correct or not.” Prelim. Resp. 11.
For purposes of this decision, we construe “autonomously.” This
preliminary claim construction may change as a result of the record
developing during trial. We note, for example, that Patent Owner has not
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6
yet filed its response under 37 C.F.R. § 42.120. We determine that no other
terms require express construction for this decision.
Independent claim 17 recites the term “autonomously.” Petitioner
notes the word “autonomously” does not appear in the ’524 patent’s
specification. Pet. 11. Rather, Petitioner proposes, based on the prosecution
history of the ’524 patent, the broadest reasonable interpretation of
“autonomously” is “without external prompting.” Id. at 11–12.
Petitioner argues the Patent Owner (then, Applicant) overcame an art
rejection by arguing the reference “must be proactively accessed using a web
browser to acquire data. Power quality data is not transmitted autonomously
(i.e., without external prompting) to a remote location over a power line
network.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002,5 218, 219, 221). Based on the above,
Petitioner contends “autonomously” should be interpreted to mean “without
external prompting.” Id. at 12.
On this record, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed construction.
Accordingly, given the claim language and considering the prosecution
history, we preliminarily construe “autonomously” as meaning “without
external prompting.” Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The PTO should also consult the patent’s
prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought
back to the agency for a second review.”).
B. Asserted Ground of Obviousness over Suh
Petitioner contends claims 17–22 of the challenged patent are
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Suh. Pet. 3, 14–16, 18–
5 File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,058,524 B2.
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47. In so doing, Petitioner also cites to statements (i.e., Alleged Admitted
Prior Art “AAPA”) in the challenged patent for establishing what one of
ordinary skill in the art would have understood and known at the time of
invention of the challenged patent.6 See id. at 19. Petitioner also cites to the
declaration testimony of Dr. Robert Akl (Ex. 1003) in further support of its
contentions. Patent Owner opposes Petitioner’s contention that the
challenged claims are obvious over Suh. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 3–6, 13–
19.
A claim is unpatentable as obvious “if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. “In
an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show
with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic
Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify
“with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the
challenge to each claim”)). Furthermore, “the burden of persuasion is on the
petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35
U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” Dynamic
Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
6 Petitioner states that “[w]hile [it] does not rely on the ’524 APA as an additional reference, its disclosure confirms the state of the prior art that would have been part of a POSITA’s knowledge.” Pet. 19 (citations omitted).
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1. Summary of Suh
Suh describes “[a]n internet ready electronic power meter with
automatic reporting capabilities, the electronic power meter recording
electrical power usage and other utility usage, and periodically transmitting
utility usage reports to a remote site using internet and conventional
protocols of the public or private computer network.” Ex. 1006, Abstract.
Suh’s Figure 1 is reproduced below.
Figure 1 illustrates a perspective view of Suh’s electronic power meter
in a cylindrical housing. Ex. 1006 ¶ 15. Suh’s “meter . . . incorporates a
communication component that enables the electronic meter to communicate
in a dedicated local area network (LAN) or wide area network (WAN)
including a public or private network, such as the internet.” Id. ¶ 8. More
specifically, Suh’s meter “includes the communication components
necessary to communicate by telephone line, power line or wireless
communication systems to periodically transfer collected data to a remote
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site.” Id. (emphasis added). For example, Suh’s meter can include a modem
“connected to the international computer network 70 via communication
lines 72, power line 73 using developed data transmission overlay
technologies or, using a transceiver 74 via airway transmissions through an
antenna 76.” Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added), ¶ 8 (stating that the Internet is “also
called the world wide international computer network”). “In the customary
system, multiple meters . . . communicate with a remote host 176 typically
through a dial up modem pool 178 through one or
more of the multiple communication pathways 72, 73 or 76 shown with
reference to FIG. 1.” Id. ¶ 51.
2. Petitioner’s Contentions
Petitioner provides analysis purporting to explain how Suh would
have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the limitations recited in the
challenged claims. See Pet. 14–16, 18–47. We below address Petitioner’s
analysis for independent claim 17.
Petitioner argues, with support of Dr. Akl’s Declaration, Suh teaches
or suggests all of the limitations of claim 17 to one of ordinary skill in the
art. See id. at 18–32.
(i) measuring
Petitioner argues that Suh teaches “measuring current fluctuations in
the power line,” as recited in claim 17. See id. at 21–22. More specifically,
Petitioner argues Suh teaches “a meter chip U2 [] receives current and
voltage as input and provides measured current information to the
microprocessor U1.” Id. at 22 (citing Suh, Fig. 2); see also id. at 21–22
(citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 2, 26, 31 (teaching, inter alia, periodically reading the
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meter chip connected to the power supply to generate voltage and current
representations)).
(ii) calculating
Petitioner argues that Suh teaches “calculating power consumption
information from the current fluctuations in a processor,” as recited in claim
17, via Suh’s teaching of a microprocessor calculating power consumption
information based on the input current. See id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26,
41–43, Fig. 5 (arguing Suh teaches “read energy pulses from [a] meter chip”
are used by the microprocessor to prepare at least kilowatt-hours (“kWh”)
and date/time)).
(iii) converting
Petitioner argues that Suh teaches “converting the power consumption
information into IP-based power consumption information in the processor,”
as recited in claim 17. See Pet. 24–27.
The ’524 patent (8:66–9:2) provides an example of this type of
conversion, i.e., “[t]he power meter . . . stores power consumption
information in the payload data block 408, thereby converting power
consumption information into IP-based data” (emphasis added). See Pet. 25
(citing Ex. 1001, 8:65–9:2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 145–147); see also id. at 24–25
(citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 6 (illustrating payload data block 408), 2:32–34 (“FIG.
6 is a block diagram showing a standard Internet Protocol, Version 4
(‘IPv4’) packet utilized by the present invention.”).
Petitioner argues Suh also teaches this example (i.e., storing power
consumption information in the payload data block of an IP packet), and
thus, teaches the limitation. See Pet. 25–27. More specifically, Petitioner
argues Suh teaches storing kWh usage (i.e., power consumption
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information) in the payload data block of an IP datagram. Pet. 26 (citing Ex.
1006 ¶¶ 35–36 (“In the subsequent layer, the IP (Internet Protocol) is added
to comprise the IP datagram 102 including the IP header, the TCP header
and the data.”), Fig. 4 (showing kWh data block 98 and IP datagram block
102)); see also id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 148 (opining “[s]toring information in a
payload data block of an Internet Protocol packet is direct encapsulation in
IP packets at the network layer”).
(iv) transmitting
Petitioner argues that Suh discloses, or renders obvious, to one of
ordinary skill in the art, “transmitting the IP-based power consumption
information from the processor to a destination autonomously in IP format
over an external power line network,” as recited in claim 17. See Pet. 27–
32; see also id. at 27, 32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 152–156).
Petitioner first focuses on the term autonomously with respect to
transmitting the power consumption information, and argues Suh teaches
“transmit[ing] power consumption data (including kilowatt-hour usage)
automatically every hour to the remote destination, without external
prompting.” Id. at 27–28 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 40–42, Figs. 4–5; Ex. 1003
¶¶ 152–154). More specifically, Petitioner cites to Suh’s teaching “that
power usage data is recorded every minute and an email containing the
power usage data is sent by the power meter to the data collection center
every hour autonomously, without external prompting.” Id. at 29–30 (citing
Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 40–42) (emphasis added).
Petitioner contends in Suh “[t]his email is generated by adding
Internet Protocol headers to the power consumption data to form IP-based
[(i.e., an IP datagram)] power consumption data that can be emailed or
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otherwise sent over the Internet.” Pet. 28–29 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 8, 30, 40–
42, Fig. 4 (annotating IP Datagram block); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 154–156); see also
id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 2, 8, 30, Fig. 4; Ex. 1003 ¶ 154) (arguing Suh
teaches having kWh usage data in an IP datagram for transmission “over the
internet, ‘also known as the world wide international computer network,’
which a POSITA would have understood is an IP-based network.”).
As to the remainder of the limitation, Petitioner argues Suh teaches to
one of ordinary skill in the art that these IP datagrams can “be sent over
power line communication systems to a data collection center, which would
be over an external power line network.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 30, 51;
Ex. 1003 ¶155). More specifically, Petitioner argues “Suh’s power meter ‘is
either line connected to the international computer network 70 via
communication lines 72, power line 73 using developed data transmission
overlay technologies or, using a transceiver 74 via airway transmissions
through an antenna 76, as also shown in FIG. 1.’” Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1006
¶ 30).
Furthermore, we understand Petitioner contends it was known to one
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to transmit data in IP
format over an external power line network, as evidenced by statements (i.e.,
AAPA) in the ’524 patent. Pet. 15–16. For example, Petitioner contends the
AAPA shows HomePlug was a “known power line protocol allow[ing] for
the transmission of IP data across power lines at speeds of up to 13.75
Mbits/second, with guaranteed Quality of Service (QoS).” Pet. 15–16
(citing Ex. 1001, 3:52–66 (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1003 ¶ 73 (citing Ex.
1001, 3:64–4:4)). We understand Petitioner argues based on one of ordinary
skill in the art’s knowledge of the AAPA, Suh would have conveyed to them
IPR2017-01199 Patent 7,058,524 B2
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transmitting the requisite data in IP format over an external power line
network.
Petitioner also relies on Dr. Akl’s testimony to support that (i) one of
ordinary skill in the art would have known that external power line networks
existed (see Pet. 14–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 73 (citing, inter alia, the
HomePlug protocol)) and (ii) Suh teaches to one of ordinary skill in the art
transmitting data in IP format over an external power line network (see Pet.
27, 31–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 152–156)). For example, this testimony
includes:
In the email messaging system disclosed in Figure 4 of Suh, the lowest layer discloses an embodiment that uses a telephone modem. However, a POSITA would have understood that the patentees intended that any of the suggested physical layer communication networks, including a power line communications modem, could be substituted into Figure 4 without altering any other steps of that Figure. That is, the system would still communicate power measurement data over a TCP/IP connection, but that connection would be carried over a power line rather than a phone line.
Ex. 1003 ¶ 156; see also id. ¶ 155 (opining that transmitting the IP datagram
“would have, at least in some cases, involved transmission over a power line
network external to the building where the power meter is located”)
(emphasis added).
3. Patent Owner’s Contentions
In response, Patent Owner contends that there is not a reasonable
likelihood that Suh would have rendered obvious the challenged claims. See
generally Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner provides a declaration of Mr. Thomas
L. Blackburn (Ex. 2001) in support of its contentions.
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Patent Owner does not respond to Petitioner’s contentions concerning
the first three elements of claim 17. Patent Owner disputes that Suh teaches
the last element of claim 17. Prelim. Resp. 12–19.
Patent Owner contends that Suh does not teach “transmitting the IP-
based power consumption information from the processor to a destination
autonomously in IP format over an external power line network,” as recited
in claim 17. Id. at 13–19.
Patent Owner argues the only portions of Suh that (i) teach
transmitting data in IP format or (ii) allegedly teach autonomously
transmitting data, do so using telephone (i.e., dial up) modems on telephone
lines — not power lines. See id. at 13–14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 35–36
(teaching “an e-mail is converted into IP datagram packets that are
transmitted ‘by the telephone modem 64’”), 39 (describing Fig. 5 as “[t]he
basic process for collecting, storing and transmitting data by the electronic
power meter”), 40 (teaching data polling), 44 (teaching at block 130 of Fig.
5, “the modem is activated and an off-hook connect to the ISP is effected”),
Fig. 4 (disclosing sending meter readings as an e-mail (which is in the
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (“SMTP”) as a heading)), Fig. 5 (disclosing
modem “off-hook”)). Importantly, however, telephone modems cannot be
used for power line networks, according to Patent Owner. Prelim. Resp. 15
(citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 59).
Moreover, Patent Owner argues Suh teaches away from transmitting
IP format data on an external power line network because (i) a telephone
modem cannot operate on a power line, (ii) Suh “did not disclose
transmitting IP formatted data over an external power line,” and (iii) Suh
“did not disclose [any method of] transmitting IP formatted data over an
IPR2017-01199 Patent 7,058,524 B2
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external power line [network].” Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 35–36, 40–
42) (emphasis added). Patent Owner also submits Suh (i) excludes using
power lines from the allegedly autonomous transmission process detailed in
Figure 5 because “only . . . a dial-up internet connection” is disclosed, and
(ii) fails to include power lines as a potential alternative to telephone lines
when discussing the availability of wireless for areas where using telephone
lines is impractical. See id. at 14, 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 30, 40–42, 45, Fig.
5; Ex. 2001 ¶ 59).
As to the alleged AAPA, Patent Owner argues that although the ’524
patent discloses the use of known home network protocols, including
HomePlug (i.e., AAPA), “the ’524 patent recognizes that at the time of the
invention, each of those protocols were internal communication protocols,
and all occurred on the ‘post’-meter side of the smart meter.” Prelim. Resp.
5, 15; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 46–47, 54. In fact, Patent Owner argues the ’524 patent
discloses modules and firewalls that were configured to allow for the
conversion of HomePlug data into IP-based communications. See Prelim.
Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:49–9:33, Figs. 6–8).
4. Analysis
On the present record and for purposes of institution, we determine
that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Suh would have conveyed
to one of ordinary skill in the art all of the limitations of claim 17. As
discussed above with respect to Petitioner’s Contentions, Petitioner has
described sufficiently its contentions, with citations to Suh, the AAPA, and
Dr. Akl’s declaration.
For example, Petitioner’s position that Suh teaches transmitting IP-
based power consumption information (e.g., emails containing kWh usage)
IPR2017-01199 Patent 7,058,524 B2
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from the processor to a destination autonomously (e.g., programmed,
periodic data polling) in IP format (e.g., IP datagrams) over an external
power line network (i.e., across power lines external to the building) is
sufficient for institution. See Petitioner’s Contentions supra.
We acknowledge that Dr. Akl and Mr. Blackburn disagree as to, inter
alia, the HomePlug Protocol, emails, and transmitting IP format data over an
external power line network. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 152–156; Ex. 2001
¶¶ 46–47, 54. For purposes of deciding whether to institute an inter
partes review, however, a genuine issue of material fact created by Mr.
Blackburn’s testimonial evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable
to the Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Based on the record before us and
for the purpose of this decision, we credit Dr. Akl’s testimony. We
encourage the parties to consider further addressing these disagreements
between Dr. Akl and Mr. Blackburn, relying on appropriate record evidence.
Furthermore, on the present record, we are not persuaded by Patent
Owner’s arguments that we should deny institution because Suh teaches
away from transmitting IP formatted data over an external power line
network, as Patent Owner contends. A reference teaches away from a
claimed invention if it criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages
modifying the reference to arrive at the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391
F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more
than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of the[]
[disclosed] alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit,
or otherwise discourage the solution claimed . . . .”).
In addition, on the current record, we are not persuaded that we should
deny institution based on Patent Owner’s argument concerning Suh’s alleged
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failure to disclose any method of transmitting data over an external power
line network. Petitioner’s contentions based on express disclosures of Suh,
statements concerning how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand
Suh based on evidence of the state of the art (e.g., AAPA), and testimony by
Dr. Akl are sufficient for institution. The prior art must be read in context,
including, where relevant, the background knowledge possessed by a person
having ordinary skill in the art. C.f. Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health,
Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We also disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Dr. Akl’s
testimony, on which Petitioner relies, is insufficient for institution of an inter
partes review because Dr. Akl does not “disclose the underlying facts or
data” for his conclusion or “simply repeats the unsupported attorney
argument.” Prelim. Resp. 1–2; see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–73 (citing the
challenged patent for AAPA), 152–156 (citing Suh’s teachings).
On the present record, and for purposes of institution, we determine
that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Suh would have taught or
suggested all of the limitations of claim 17. Accordingly, the information
presented shows it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims
challenged in the Petition would have been unpatentable for obviousness
over Suh, as set forth in the Petition.
Having concluded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of demonstrating that one claim would have been obviousness
over Suh, we institute an inter partes review of claims 17–22 on this ground.
37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (“Inter partes review shall not be instituted for a
ground of unpatentability unless the Board decides that the petition
supporting the ground would demonstrate that there is a reasonable
IPR2017-01199 Patent 7,058,524 B2
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likelihood that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is
unpatentable.”).
C. Asserted Grounds of Obviousness over (i) Suh and Bartone and (ii) Bartone and Villicana
We have reviewed the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and
determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would
prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of claims 17–22 for either
the combination of (i) Suh and Bartone or (ii) Bartone and Villicana.
For the asserted ground of Suh and Bartone, Petitioner relies on its
arguments regarding how Suh would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill
in the art each of the limitations recited in the challenged claims. See, e.g.,
Pet. 51, 54, 56 (regarding the measuring, calculating power, converting, and
transmitting limitations in independent claim 17). Petitioner additionally
contends that Bartone discloses each of the limitations. See, e.g., Pet. 51–64
(regarding Bartone). In its asserted ground of Bartone and Villicana,
Petitioner relies on its contentions regarding Bartone’s disclosure and
additionally contends that Villicana discloses each of the limitations. See,
e.g., Pet. 76, 78, 80 (regarding Villicana).
For each of these grounds, Petitioner has failed to articulate, with
reasonable clarity what specific element from which reference is to be
combined with what specific element of the other reference, and in what
manner, to meet each element of independent claim 17. See generally Pet.
47–64, 72–83. In other words, even assuming that the references would
provide the teachings alleged based on some possible combination, we are
not persuaded that Petitioner has explained sufficiently the exact
combination of teachings, out of the numerous possible combinations, that it
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is relying upon. See Pet. 47–48 (“To the extent that the Board finds that Suh
does not explicitly teach any of the elements of the Challenged Claims, there
is a teaching, suggestion, or motivation for combining Suh with Bartone,
which also teaches all claim elements.”), 74–83 (incorporating Bartone’s
disclosure by reference into each element of claim 17 and also showing how
Villicana allegedly discloses the elements).
Furthermore, the rationale for the proposed combinations also fails to
address specifically any proposed modifications. Instead, for each ground,
Petitioner describes the systems disclosed in the references and cites Dr.
Akl’s testimony positing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been
motivated to combine the systems, as taught by the references, including by
substituting known elements of one system in the other system, and would
have expected success given the similarity in technology. See Pet. 48–49,
72–74 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 179, 242). The reasoning provided is excessively
generic and does not make a meaningful clarification of what specific
elements of which reference are combined with what specific elements of
what other reference or references, and in what manner. See id.
A petition must identify with particularity each claim challenged, the
grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that
supports the grounds for the challenge. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). Under
37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a), a petition must include a statement of the precise relief
requested and a full statement of the reasons for the relief requested,
including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including
material facts, the governing law, rules, and precedent.
As discussed above, Petitioner has failed to meet these requirements
with respect to grounds two and three. Accordingly, we determine the
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information in the Petition does not show a reasonable likelihood that
Petitioner would prevail in establishing that independent claim 17 is obvious
over (i) Suh and Bartone or (ii) Bartone and Villicana. On the same basis,
we determine the information presented in grounds two and three of the
Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would
prevail in showing that at least one of claims 18–22, which each depend
from claim 17, is unpatentable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we determine that there is a reasonable
likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of
claims 17–22 of the challenged patent is unpatentable over Suh.
Any discussion of facts in this decision are made only for the purposes
of institution and are not dispositive of any issue related to any ground on
which we institute review. The Board has not made a final determination
with respect to the patentability of any challenged claim. The Board’s final
determination will be based on the record as fully developed during trial.
IV. ORDER
After due consideration of the record before us, it is:
ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes
review of the challenged patent is instituted on the following ground asserted
in the Petition: claims 17–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Suh;
FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and
37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; the trial
commences on the entry date of this decision; and
FURTHER ORDERED that the trial is limited to the ground identified
above and no other ground set forth in the Petition as to any challenged
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claim is authorized.
IPR2017-01199 Patent 7,058,524 B2
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PETITIONER:
Kirk T. Bradley [email protected] Christopher Douglas Alston & Bird LLP [email protected]
PATENT OWNER:
Decker A. Cammack WHITAKER CHALK SWINDLE & SCHWARTZ PLLC [email protected]