Montejo vs COMELECG.R. No. 118702Facts:TheprovinceofLeyteis composed of 5 legislativedistricts.Biliran, located in the thirddistrictof Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141.When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the thirddistrictcomposed the new province.As a consequence, the composition of the thirddistrictwas reduced to 5 municipalities.To remedy the resultinginequalityin the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred themunicipalityofCapoocanof the seconddistrictand themunicipalityofPalomponof thefourthdistrictto the thirddistrictof Leyte.

Issue:Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislativedistrictto another legislativedistrict

Ruling:

The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws.But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power.Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made.Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about animbalancein the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislativedistrictsofLeyte.But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislativedistrictsand petitioners remedy lies with Congress.Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion.The Court held that COMELECcommittedgrave abuse of discretion amounting tolackofjurisdictionwhen it promulgated a resolution transferring themunicipalityofCapoocanof the seconddistrictand themunicipalityofPalomponof thefourthdistrictto the thirddistrictof Leyte.

SEMA VS.COMELECG.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act No. 6734, as amended byRepublic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989.There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII.On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI ofRA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress.

Issue:Whether or not delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.

Ruling:

The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI ofRA 9054. However, pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid.

The creation of local government units (LGUs) is governed by Section 10, Article Xof theConstitution. There are three conditions that must be complied with in creating any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay to wit:1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is another matter.

The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. This is clear underSection 5 (3), Article VIof theConstitution(Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution( Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.

However, Congress cannot validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.Section 5 (1), Article VIof theConstitutionvests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives.Section 5 (4)empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondent.G.R. No. 178628Facts:It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft ofpersonalproperty was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidates disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code [Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local electiveposition... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.] was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled thatArticle73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:Article73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective localposition:xxxx(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers toa personwho has been convicted byfinaljudgment.It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted byfinaljudgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case.The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and theHouse of Representatives, made thisreservation: de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a.

The Oversight Committee finally came out withArticle73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from runningfor any elective localposition: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers toa personwho has been convicted byfinaljudgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice.

MASTURA vs. COMELEC285 SCRA 493, 1998

Facts:Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog.

Issue:Whether or not COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers.

Ruling:We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself. That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself - on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.

Macalintal vs Comelec

G.R. No. 157013

Romulo Macalintal, asa lawyerand a taxpayer,questionsthe validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). Hequestionsthe validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes andproclamationof winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE:Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

RULING:No. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include theproclamationof the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing andproclamationof the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

Domino vs COMELECG.R. No. 134015Facts:The case is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998[1] of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998[2] of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs motion for reconsideration.On 25 March 1998, petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.On March 30, 1998, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy against Domino.According to respondents, Domino is not a resident nor a registered voter of the province of Sarangani. For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998.Domino prayed: for Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.The candidate who gathered the second highest number of votes intervened in the case and said that she should be declared as a winner since Domino was disqualified from running for the position.

Issues:Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner.Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 1998 election

RULING:Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine whether false representations as to the material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy including the residence requirement.No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his original domicile.

MANUEL B. JAPZON vs. COMELECG.R. No. 180088Facts:Manuel B. Japzon andprivate respondent Jaime S. Ty were candidates for theOffice of Mayor in thelocal elections held on May 2007. Japzon filed a petition to disqualify Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground ofmaterial misrepresentationwhen thelatterfalsely represented therein thathewas aresident ofBarangay 6,Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and that he was not a permanent resident or immigrant ofany foreign country. Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. However, he further claims that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225, which grants dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, and subsequently renounced his American citizenship through an execution of a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He furtherclaims that he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for more than one yearprior to the May 2007 elections exhibiting his passport issued on 2005 bearing the aforementioned residence community tax certificates for the years 2006 and 2007, respectively, and his registration as a voter in Barangay 6,Poblacion, General MacArthur, Eastern Samar. Ty won the elections and wasproclaimed Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. The COMELEC ruled in favor of the private respondent.Issue:Whether or not Tys compliance ofthe one-year residency requirement for running for public office, requires the Court toreview, examine and evaluateor weigh the probative value ofthe evidence presented by the parties before theCOMELEC.RULING:The Court found no merit in the petition at bar. Factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquiredexpertise in their field arebinding and conclusive onthe Court.

The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact ofthe COMELEC are binding on the Court. The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by the Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidenceis necessary. The resolutions assailed by the COMELEC were supported by substantial evidence and are, thus, binding and conclusive upon the Court.

LEWIS VS COMELECG.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

Facts:Nicolas-Lewis and the other petitioners were dual citizens who re-acquired their Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizens Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. They filed a petition to the COMELEC praying to avail themselves the right of suffrage under RA 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 before the May 2004 elections. The COMELEC rejected their petition arguing that upon acquisition by the petitioners of their foreign citizenship, they have renounced their Philippine citizenship and have abandoned their domicile. The COMELEC further stated that before they could exercise the right of suffrage, they had to meet the residency requirement among others provided in Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution by first establishing their domicile in the.Issue: Whether or not the dual citizens who have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can exercise their right of suffrage under RA 9189?Ruling:Yes. Section 5 of RA 9225 states that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under this act shall enjoy full civil and political rights, subject to certain conditions including the fulfillment of the requirements under Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution and RA 9189. The phrase all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise authorized by law served as the guide to Congress in establishing a system for absentee voting. Applying the doctrine of necessary implication, the strategic location of Section 2 Article 5 of the Constitution indicates that it provides for an exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 which is the affidavit to express the intention to reacquire the domicile in the Philippines without the requirement to physically stay in the Philippines.AASJS vs. DATUMANONGG.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007FACTS:Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?RULING:No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.The intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with the provision in the CA 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What RA 9225 allows is dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225.BANAT vs COMELECG.R. No. 179271

Facts:Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before theCommissionon Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the fullnumberof party list representativesprovided bythe Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues:Is the 20% allocation for party-listrepresentativesprovided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI ofthe Constitutionmandatory or is it merely a ceiling?Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?Doesthe Constitutionprohibit majorpolitical partiesfrom participating in the party-list elections? If not, can majorpolitical partiesparticipate in the party-list elections?

Ruling:Neitherthe Constitutionnor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-listrepresentativesfound inthe Constitution.The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of thenumberof the members of the House ofRepresentativesto Congress. The 20% allocation of party-listrepresentativesis merely a ceiling; party-listrepresentativescannot be more then 20% of the members of the House ofRepresentatives.No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximumnumberof available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House ofRepresentativesshall consist of party-listrepresentatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI ofthe Constitutionand prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House ofRepresentatives.

No. Neitherthe Constitutionnor RA 7941 prohibits majorpolitical partiesfrom participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers ofthe Constitutionclearly intended the majorpolitical partiesto participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided tocontinuethe ruling in Veterans disallowing majorpolitical partiesfrom participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Atong Paglaum vs. COMELECG.R. No. 203766FACTS:Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.RULING:No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases ofAng Bagong BayaniandBANAT. However,the SupremeCourtremandedthe cases back to the COMELEC asthe SupremeCourt now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:I.Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)national parties or organizations, (2)regional parties or organizations, and (3)sectoral parties or organizations.2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

Tecson vs ComelecGR. No. 161434 : March 3, 2004

Facts:Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case underArticle VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.Issue:Whether or not Poe was a Filipino citizen.Ruling:The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided thatamong the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election CodeMoya Lim Yao Vs. The Commissioner Of ImmigrationG.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

FACTS:On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake ,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.Issue:Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.Ruling:Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization nas Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Aznar vs ComelecG.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990FACTS:Respondent Emilio Lito Osmena filed his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC as the Governor of Cebu Province. Aznar, herein petitioner, as the representative of the Cebu PDP- Provincial council and as the incumbent Chairman of such, filed a petition against the respondent before the Comeleccontending that he should be disqualified because he is nota Filipino citizen, instead an American citizen. Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation showing a Certificate issued by the Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago that the respondent as an American Citizen is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence. The Comelec en banc ordered the Board of Canvassers to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation upon the filing the motion of herein respondent for the Temporary Restraining Order to the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulation and proclamation of the respondent until the resolution of said petition.Private respondent alleged that he is a Filipino Citizen that he is the legitimate son of Dr. Emilio D. Osmena, the latter being the son of the late President Sergio Osmena.He also claimed that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and he has not gone out of the country for more than six months. Furthermore, he contended that he is a registered voter of the Philippines since 1965.COMELEC directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent Emilio Lito Osmena has lost his Filipino Citizenship and thus be disqualified as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.RULING:No.The respondent did not lose his Filipino Citizenship and thereby qualified as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided under C.A. No. 63 namely: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of Citizenship; and (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Thus, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned herein above or by any other mode of losing Philippine Citizenship.Frivaldo vs COMELEC174 SCRA 245FACTS:Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.ISSUE:Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.RULING:No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.Frivaldo vs COMELEC257 SCRA 727Facts:Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.

Issue:Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Ruling:The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have been taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessarynor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

CO vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL199 SCRA 692FACTS:The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.ISSUES:Whether or not such decision by HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion therefore subject tojudicial review?Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines?RULING:There is no abuse of discretion made by the HRET therefore no judicial review is necessary. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of their representatives. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals. So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court.In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide.The petitions were dismissed. The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines: Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. The Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest.Mercado vs Manzano307 SCRA 630FACTSPetitioner Mercado andrespondentManzano were candidates for vice mayor of theCity of Makatiin the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent received the highest votes from the election but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition fordisqualificationfiled by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent was not aFilipino citizenbut aUScitizen.Manzano was born inSan Francisco, California, USAand acquired US citizenship by operation of theUS Constitution&lawsunder the principle ofjus soli. However, he was also a natural born Filipino citizen as both his parents were Filipinos at the time of his birth. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent is both a Filipino and a US citien a dual citizen.UnderSec.40(d) of the LGC, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.ISSUEWhether under our laws, respondent is disqualified from the position for which he filed his CoC and is thus disqualified from holding the office for which he has been elected.RULINGDual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of 2 or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.Considering the citizenship clause (Art.IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle ofjus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of the latters country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country, the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160,Sec.40(d) and in RA 7854,Sec.20must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, mere dual citizenship does not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their CoC, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.Jacot vs. DalG.R. No. 179848FACTS:

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?

RULING: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.Cordora vs. ComelecG.R. No. 176947Facts:Tambunting ran for a public local office which was opposed by Cordora. The latter alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. In lieu with this, Cordora seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate ofcitizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting's father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting'scitizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting's possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or theCitizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Paraaque.The COMELEC was convinced and affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.IssueWON Tambunting was qualified to holda local public office.RulingTambunting possesses dualcitizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire Americancitizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the Americancitizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dualcitizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dualcitizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.Dualcitizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle ofjus sanguinisis born in a state which follows the doctrine ofjus soli. Such a person,ipso factoand without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.Suffice it to say, thatthe twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 (Oath of Allegiance and an execution of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship) do not apply to Tambuntingfor the reason that he is natural-born Filipino. The twin requirements apply only when a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipinocitizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's foreigncitizenship.Caasi vs ComelecG.R. No. 88831

Facts:Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.

Issues:Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

Marcos vs. COMELECG.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995FACTS:Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.ISSUE:Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte?RULING:Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.Having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Aquino VS. COMELECG.R. NO. 120265SEPTEMBER 18, 1995FACTS:On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.ISSUES:Whether or not residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district?Whether or not it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.?RULING:The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.

The framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.Limbona Vs ComelecFACTS:This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeks to reverse and nullify the September 4, 2007 Resolutionof the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, as well as the January 9, 2008 Resolutiondenying the motion for reconsideration.Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of candidacy with Acting Election Officer, Alauya S. Tago, on January 22, 2007 and March 29, 2007, respectively; while Malik filed his certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer on March 26, 2007.On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to comply with the residency requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-188. Subsequently, or on April 12, 2007, Malik filed another petition to disqualify Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-611.On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy. Thereafter, or on May 2, 2007, she filed before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismissthe petition for disqualification in SPA No. 07-611 on the ground that the petition had become moot in view of the withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy.The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainies certificate of candidacy in Resolution No. 7949dated May 13, 2007.Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May 24, 2007 a Resolutionin SPA No. 07-188 granting the petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from running as municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for failing to satisfy the one year residency requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said place.The May 24, 2007 Resolution became final and executory on June 2, 2007.Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad which was given due course by the Comelecen bancin its Resolution No. 8255dated July 23, 2007.Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie docketed as SPA No. 07-621.After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and accordingly took her oath and assumed office.However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-611 disqualified Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place other than the Office of the Election Officer.Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition in SPA No. 07-611 moot and/or for reconsideration, arguing that the Comelecen banchad approved the withdrawal of her first certificate of candidacy and had given due course to her new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for Mohammad. Malik opposed the omnibus motion.Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-621, promulgated on November 23, 2007 a Resolutiondisqualifying Norlainie from running as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. It held thus:As regards the residency requirement, We rule for petitioner.As borne out from the record, respondents domicile of origin was in Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is her place of birth. When she got married, she became a resident of Marawi City, specifically, in Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as Barangay Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by operation of law pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the case ofLarrazabal v. Comelec(G.R. No. 100739, September 3, 1991).What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she has changed her aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x xIn the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent "has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.On January 9, 2008, the Comelecen bancin SPA No. 07-611 denied Norlainies motion for reconsideration.IssuesWhether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the petition in SPA No. 07-611 despite the approval of petitioners withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.Whether or not Norlainie satisfied the one-year residency requirementRulingOn January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order effective immediately enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the Comelec Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.The petition lacks merit.The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate voidab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) provides:Sec. 73.Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007, such act produced legal effects, and the withdrawal of the same, despite the approval of the Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal proceedings it had set in motion. As such, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The Comelec correctly held that a case only becomes moot when "there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits."In the instant case, although petitioner withdrew her first certificate of candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband required that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate. The second filing of a certificate of candidacy thus once again put her qualifications in issue. Hence, a ruling upon the same is necessary.The fact that petitioners certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was given due course by the Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her qualifications to run as municipal mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec:Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only the following: a) movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for her husband who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy was duly accomplished in form and substance and c) the certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the voters. Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed upon by the Commission in the said resolution.Movant may have been given the impression that the Commissions act of giving due course to her substitute certificate of candidacy constitutes a pronouncement that she is not disqualified. It must be pointed out, however, that the bases for giving due course to a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified. x x x1Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) "authorizes the Commission (Comelec) to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections,"thus:SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protestand, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis ours)As such, the Comelec did not err when it continued with the trial and hearing of the petition for disqualification.The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually resides.Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; andthird, a man can have but one domicile at a time.In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.A persons "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically beanimus manendicoupled withanimus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections,is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the Comelec:In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent "has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence,then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:Art. 68.The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.Art. 69.The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis ours)Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioners disqualification would not result in Maliks proclamation who came in second during the special election.

Labo Vs ComelecG.R. No. 86564FACTS:In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor ofBaguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he hasdual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.ISSUES:Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.RULING:No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a f