Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.GR No. 86995 03 September 1992Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed. On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December, petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December, defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by PD No. 1818, which provides: Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project of the government to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.

HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCCs. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institutionrefers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.

Beja Sr. vs. Court of Appeals207 SCRA 689

FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.

HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA. With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel. On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision, Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination. With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.

Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals101 Phil. 490

FACTS: Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?

HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY MOCHAEL DEFENSOR; GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006

FACTS:Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.Sec.4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act.

ISSUE:Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed by CourtsHELD:Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20][21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

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