added value of salmonella genomics in ... - ministry of health
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Added value of Salmonella genomics in outbreak investigations
Dr Qinning Wang
CIDM-Public Health, Pathology West-ICPMR
Major outbreaks due to Salmonella serovars other than
STM between 2015-2016
Serovar Notified Possible source Outbreak
S. Saintpaul Dec. 2015 Food related Multi-jurisdictional
S. Mbandaka Early 2016 Food related NSW
S. Bareilly Early 2016 Contaminated sushi NSW
S. Hvittingfoss June 2016 Rockmelon Multi-jurisdictional
2014 2015 2016 up to Aug
Rank No. (%) Rank No. (%) Rank No. (%)
S. Saintpaul 8 53 (1.2) 3 138 (3.6) 4 120 (4.0)
S. Mbandaka 18 30 (0.7) 35 14 (0.4) 14 36 (1.2)
S. Bareilly 13 42 (0.9) 15 44 (1.2) 9 56 (1.9)
S. Hvittingfoss 34 12 (0.3) 30 17 (0.4) 6 81 (2.7)
Total 4434 3814 3027
Changes in the impact of difference serovars
(NSW ERL data)
WGS investigation of the outbreaks
• Sequencing platform:
NextSeq500, Nextera XT library prep kit (Illumina)
• Selection of isolates:
included isolates collected during the epidemic periods together
with isolates from possible food/environmental sources and
backgrounds
• DNA extraction
single colony, pure culture, automated extraction system (Perkin
Elmer), RNase A treatment, QC
Sequencing workflow and data analysis
DNA
QC
Library prep
QC
Flowcell
Raw data (Basespace, Illumina)
QC (FastQC: quality check, GC content, etc.)
Reads
trimming
(FASTQ-Toolkit: adapter/quality trimming, length
filtering, down-sampling)
(NextSeq500, Illumina)
Mapping
reads to ref
De novo
assembly
Web-based
server Nullarbor
SNP calling, phylogenetic tree
(CLC Genomic
Workbench)
(Selection of Ref,
Coverage analysis
(contig check)
Serovar ID, MLST, antibiotic resistance, core
SNP, cgMLST, Minimum spanning tree etc.
Report
01-16-025-4615-B34
80-15-315-4697-B43
80-15-254-2933-B41
80-16-020-4338-B33
80-16-053-5203-B21
80-15-254-3004-B40
80-15-351-4409-B44
80-15-261-1767-B45
80-16-029-4490-B46
80-16-022-4248-B30
80-16-033-5065-B24
80-16-027-4514-B23
80-16-051-2473-B28
80-16-022-4313-B11
80-16-029-4491-B47
80-16-030-2500-B31
80-16-039-5105-B1
80-16-077-4808-B15
80-14-344-4587-B39
80-14-153-4895-B37
80-14-153-4897-B38
80-16-036-4634-B16
80-16-016-2298-B7
80-16-050-4651-B20
80-16-104-4797-B36
80-15-315-4696-B42
80-16-013-4293-B9
80-16-019-4845-B10
80-16-021-4385-B5
80-16-018-4711-B8
80-16-029-4485-B12
80-16-034-4917-B13
80-16-025-4842-B14
80-16-037-2359-B17
80-16-020-4336-B18
80-15-020-4484-B3
80-16-030-2497-B26
80-16-063-5108-B27
80-16-029-4509-B32
80-16-014-4386-B6
80-14-227-4738-B2
Reference
80-15-341-5131-B4
80-16-057-4481-B29
80-16-023-2397-B25
80-16-050-4612-B19
0.2
80-16-020-4336-B18
80-16-053-5203-B21
80-16-013-4293-B9
80-16-018-4711-B8
80-16-020-4338-B33
80-16-014-4386-B6
80-16-016-2298-B7
80-16-019-4845-B10
80-16-036-4634-B16
80-16-051-2473-B28
80-16-021-4385-B5
80-16-029-4490-B46
80-16-029-4491-B47
80-16-077-4808-B15
80-16-027-4514-B23
80-16-029-4509-B32
80-16-039-5105-B1
80-15-254-2933-B41
80-16-022-4248-B30
80-16-025-4842-B14
80-16-022-4313-B11
80-15-261-1767-B45
80-16-029-4485-B12
80-15-254-3004-B40
80-16-030-2500-B31
80-16-037-2359-B17
01-16-025-4615-B34
80-16-030-2497-B26
80-16-033-5065-B24
80-16-034-4917-B13
80-15-315-4696-B42
80-15-315-4697-B43
80-15-020-4484-B3
80-15-351-4409-B44
80-16-050-4651-B20
80-14-153-4897-B38
80-14-153-4895-B37
80-14-344-4587-B39
80-16-104-4797-B36
80-16-063-5108-B27
80-14-227-4738-B2
80-15-341-5131-B4
reference
80-16-057-4481-B29
80-16-023-2397-B25
80-16-050-4612-B19
0.2
The reference genome
mapping based SNP
tree of S. Bareilly
isolates
Denovo assembly based
SNP tree of S. Bareilly
isolates
S. Bareilly cgMLST profile and allele distances
Details of the 38
isolates cluster
38 isolates cluster
AA
C
C
BB
Food/environmental sample
• A rare seen serovar
• Isolated from human, animal and environmental sources in
northern Queensland
• Previous multi-state outbreak was reported in Australia in
2005, no food vehicle identified (Oxenford, et al 2005)
• Recent outbreak involves cases from NSW, SA, WA, VIC
and QLD
• 128 isolates and WGS sequence data from human and food
samples were subject to WGS investigation
S. Hvitiingfoss outbreak investigation
S. Hvittingfoss SNP maximum likelihood tree
by mapping reads to an assembled local
isolates (128 isolates in total)
Cluster I
C1
C2
Re-generation of the tree by
exclusion of outliers
S. Hvittingfoss SNP distance matrix
S. Hvittingfoss whole genome
sequence cgMLST profile
OC 1
C 2
Re-generation of the
MST from C1 cluster
C 1
Includes 11 food/
environmental
isolates
S. Hvittingfoss cgMLST comparison of
Australian and international isolates
S. Saintpaul multijurisdictional
outbreak NSW isolates (2015-
2016) cgMLST profile
S. Mbandaka outbreak cgMLST profile NSW, 2016(Highlighted in yellow: food/environmental isolates)
OC
Report
Sent to OzFoodNet and Public Health for the integrated epidemiological analysis
• Generate complete public health microbiology reports from sequenced isolates
(Reads to report)
• Variants calling
• Species identification: k-mer analysis against known genome database (Kraken)
• MLST, Resistome
• Core genome SNPs
• Draw tree (Maximum likelihood)
• SNP distance matrix
• Pan genome
• Report : Table of isolates, yield, coverage, species, MLST, SNP distance matrix
Nullarbor pipeline
(Developed by Torsten Seemann from MDU)
https://github.com/tseemann/nullarbor
2016-12974
QLDSH2
QLDSH4
SA15
QLDSH10
QLDSH3
QLDSH6
QLDSH8
QLDSH9
SA16
2016-13536
QLDSH1
H20
H19
QLDSH7
QLDSH12
2016-11136
H35
2016-11149
H18
SA17
SA5
H5
SA14
H43
SA13
2016-14214
QLDSH5
QLDSH11
H7
2016-13030
2016-13909
2016-09557
2016-11450
Reference
H36
QLDSH14
WA7
WA5
WA8
H17
2016-15951
QLDSH13
WA2
H2
2016-16164
H29
SA1
SA10
SA8
SA11
H1
H10
H11
H12
H13
H14
H15
H16
H21
H22
H23
H24
H25
H26
H27
H28
H3
H31
H38
H39
H4
H40
H41
H44
H6
H8
H9
SA12
SA2
SA3
SA4
SA6
SA7
SA9
WA1
WA3
WA4
WA6 Example of a report generated by Nullarbor
SerovarNo. isolates sequenced OC
Food/environmental isolates
Food source
identified Outbreak Scope
S. Saintpaul 157 118 3 from SA by MDU Yes, by MDUNSW, SA, QLD, VIC, NT, WA, ACT
by MDU (~400 isolates)
S. Bareilly 45 27 11 Yes NSW
S. Mbandaka 46 19 7 Possibly NSW
S. Hvittingfoss 128 80 11 Yes NSW, SA, WA, QLD, VIC
WGS summary
Conclusions
• The added value of high-resolution and high-throughput capacity of
WGS was demonstrated through the outbreak investigations
• WGS enabled isolates clustered into groupings that would be
problematic when relying on epidemiology or serotyping alone
• Multiple approaches to the comparison of bacterial genomes helped
to validate analytic pipelines
• Sequence data analysis turnaround time would be improved by well
designed and validated analytic pipelines
• Proper report format needs to be further developed for easy
interpretation by Public Health and epidemiological professionals
19
Acknowledgements
NSW ERL/CIDM-PH
Vitali Sintchenko
Peter Howard
Agnieszka Wiklendt
Cristina Sotomayor
WGS lab staff
NSW Communicable Diseases Branch, Health
Protection
OzFoodNet
NSW Food Authority
Microbiological Diagnostic Unit
Public Health Laboratory, University of
Melbourne
PathWest, WA
Queensland Health Forensic & Scientific
Services
SA Pathology