AdaptationtoClimateChangeTheimpactsofclimatechangearealreadybeingfelt.Learninghowtolivewiththeseimpactsisapriorityforhumandevelopment.Inthiscontext,itistooeasyto see adaptation as a narrowly defensive task – protecting core assets orfunctionsfromtherisksofclimatechange.Amoreprofoundengagement,whichsees climate change risks as a product and driver of social aswell as naturalsystems,andtheirinteraction,iscalledfor.Adaptation to Climate Change argues that without care, adaptive actions candeny the deeper political and cultural roots that call for significant change insocialandpoliticalrelationsifhumanvulnerabilitytoclimatechangeassociatedrisk is tobereduced.Thisbookpresentsa frameworkformakingsenseof therange of choices facing humanity, structured around resilience (stability),transition (incremental social changeand theexercisingof existing rights) andtransformation (new rights claims and changes in political regimes). Theresilience– transition–transformation framework is supported by three detailedcase study chapters. These also illustrate the diversity of contexts in whichadaptionisunfolding,fromorganisations tourbangovernanceandthenationalpolity.Thistextisthefirstcomprehensiveanalysisofthesocialdimensionstoclimatechange adaptation. Clearly written in an engaging style, it provides detailedtheoretical and empirical chapters and serves as an invaluable reference forundergraduateandpostgraduatestudentsinterestedinclimatechange,geographyanddevelopmentstudies.MarkPelling is aReader inGeographyatKing’sCollegeLondonandbeforethisat theUniversityofLiverpoolandUniversityofGuyana.Hisresearchandteaching focus on human vulnerability and adaptation to natural hazards andclimatechange.HehasservedasaleadauthorwiththeIPCCandasaconsultantforUNDP,DFIDandUN-HABITAT.

AdaptationtoClimateChange

Fromresiliencetotransformation

MarkPelling

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Contents

ListofillustrationsListofacronymsandabbreviationsAcknowledgementsPARTIFrameworkandtheory1TheadaptationageAdaptingtoclimatechangeTheideaofadaptationTheIPCC–UNFCCCframeThecostsofadaptingConceptualdevelopmentStructureofthebook2UnderstandingadaptationAnadaptationlexiconTheantecedentsofadaptationCyberneticsCoevolutionAdaptivemanagementCopingmechanismsAdaptationasacontemporarydevelopmentconcernAtypologyofadaptationResilienceandadaptationAdaptationthresholdsEvaluatingadaptivechoices:economicsandethicsThreevisionsofadaptation:resilience,transitionandtransformationPARTIITheresilience–transition–transformationframework3Adaptationasresilience:sociallearningandself-organisationAvisionofadaptationasresilienceFramingofresilienceSociallearningSelf-organisationOrganisationsassitesforadaptationPathwaysfororganisationaladaptationConclusion4Adaptationastransition:riskandgovernance

AvisionofadaptationastransitionGovernanceandtransitionSocio-technicaltransitionsUrbanregimesandtransitionaladaptationConclusion5Adaptationastransformation:risksociety,humansecurityandthesocialcontractAvisionofadaptationastransformationModernityandrisksocietyThesocialcontractHumansecurityDisastersastippingpointsfortransformationConclusionPARTIIILivingwithclimatechange6AdaptationwithinorganisationsContext:policyandmethodsCasestudyanalysisTheEnvironmentAgencyGrasshoppersfarmers’groupConclusion7AdaptationasurbanriskdiscourseandgovernanceContext:policyandmethodsCasestudyanalysisCancunPlayadelCarmenTulumMahahualConclusion8AdaptationasnationalpoliticalresponsetodisasterContext:policyandmethodsCasestudyanalysis1970, East Pakistan (Bangladesh): the Bhola Cyclone and the politics ofsuccession1998,Nicaragua:HurricaneMitch,amissedopportunityfortransformation2005,NewOrleans,USA:transformationdeniedbypoliticaldilutionConclusionPARTIVAdaptingwithclimatechange9Conclusion:adaptingwithclimatechangeHowtoadaptwithclimatechange?

DiversifythesubjectandobjectofadaptationresearchandpolicyFocusonsocialthresholdsforprogressiveadaptationRecognisemultipleadaptations:thevisioneffectLinkinternalandexternaldriversofadaptationAsynthesisoftheargumentTheageofadaptationTheadaptationtapestryTheresilience–transition–transformationframeworkSitesofadaptiveactionFromtheorytoactionReferencesIndex

Listofillustrations

Box 4.1 Lessons in making transitions from community-based disaster riskmanagementBox9.1OthervoicesmakethecaseFigure1.1GlobaldistributionofvulnerabilitytoclimatechangeFigure2.1AdaptationintervenesinthecoproductionofriskanddevelopmentFigure2.2Thecopingcascade:copinganderosionofhouseholdsustainabilityFigure2.3AdaptationthresholdsFigure3.1AdaptationpathwayswithinanorganisationFigure7.1QuintanaRooandstudysitesTable1.1FrameworksoftheanalysisofadaptationTable2.1BarriersfortheimplementationofadaptivemanagementTable2.2DistinctionsbetweencopingandadaptationTable2.3AtypologyofadaptationTable2.4Attributesofadaptationforresilience,transitionandtransformationTable3.1FiveadaptivepathwaysTable4.1TransitionpathwaysTable4.2LinkingvisionsofthecitytopathwaysformanagingvulnerabilityTable4.3Urbandisasterriskreduction:multipleactivitiesandstakeholdersTable5.1AdaptationtransformingworldviewsTable5.2DisastersascatalystsforpoliticalchangeTable6.1WarmingandcoolingscenariosforWalesTable7.1AdaptationasanopportunityandnarrativefordevelopmentdiscourseandactionTable8.1Lessonsforadaptation

Listofacronymsandabbreviations

ASEAN AssociationofSoutheastAsianNationsCARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (formerly the Cooperative for American

RemittancestoEurope)CBA costbenefitanalysisCHS CommissiononHumanSecurityCOP ConferenceofthePartiesDEFRA DepartmentforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs(UK)DETR DepartmentoftheEnvironment,TransportandtheRegions(UK)DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(UK)DOE DepartmentoftheEnvironment(UK)EIU EconomistIntelligenceUnitFAO UNFoodandAgricultureOrganisationFEMA FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(USA)GDP grossdomesticproductGECHS GlobalEnvironmentalChangeandHumanSecurityProgrammeGNAW GovernmentoftheNationalAssemblyofWalesGROOTS GrassrootsOrganisationsOperatingTogetherinSisterhoodIADB InterAmericanDevelopmentBankIDESO UniversidadCentroamericana,InstitutodeEncuestasySondeosdeOpiniónIFRC InternationalFederationoftheRedCrossandRedCrescentSocietiesINETER InstituteforTerritorialStudies(Nicaragua)IPCC IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeISDR UNInternationalStrategyforDisasterReductionMAFF MinistryofAgricultureFishersandFood(UK)NGO non-governmentalorganisationODA overseasdevelopmentassistanceOECD OrganisationofEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentSDN SustainableDevelopmentNetworking

SES socio-ecologicalsystemSEDESOL SecretaríadeDesarrolloSocial(Mexico)SEMARNAT SecretaríadeMedioAmbienteyRecursosNaturales(Mexico)SINAPRED SistemaNacionalParalaProtectión,MitigaciónyAtencióndeDesastres(Nicaragua)UK UnitedKingdomUN UnitedNations

UNCED UnitedNationsConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopmentUNHABITAT UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgrammeUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNFCCC UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeUSA UnitedStatesofAmericaUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentUSGS UnitedStatesGeologicalSurveyWRI WorldResourcesInstitute(USA)WWF WorldwideFundforNature

Acknowledgements

This bookwould not have been possiblewithout the inspiration and generousexchange of ideas with colleagues, in particular: Kathleen Dill (CornellUniversity), Cris High (Open University), David Manuel-Navarrete (King’sCollege London) and Michael Redclift (King’s College London). Researchunderpinning thisbookwasundertaken aspart of threegrants awardedby theUKEconomicandSocialResearchCouncil(RES-221-25-0044-A,RES-228-25-0014andRES-062-23-0367).Withoutthisfinancialsupporttheworkwouldnothave been possible. I would also like to give thanks for the many richdiscussions I’ve enjoyedwith PhD andmasters students in theDepartment ofGeographyatKing’sCollegeLondon–twoPhDgraduates,MarcoGrassoandLlewellynLeonard,havetheirthesesreferenced.Widerdiscussions,inparticularthroughtheGlobalEnvironmentalChangeandHumanSecurityProgrammeledby Karen O’Brien at the University of Oslo, have also been instrumental inshaping thiswork.Forpatiencebeyond the call ofduty I thank theRoutledgeeditorial and print teams, in particular AndrewMould. Special recognition isalso due to Ulli Huber for creating the time and atmosphere necessary tocomplete thisworkand toLillyPelling forherwordprocessingandcomputermanagement skills.Of course, the real thanksgo to all those respondentswhohavefreelygivenof their timeandenergies toprovide theempiricalbackbonefor this work, many of whom remain at the sharp end of adapting to theconsequencesofclimatechangeanddevelopmentfailure.

PartIFrameworkandtheory

1Theadaptationage

Everyonehastherighttolife,liberty,andsecurityofperson.

(UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,Article3)Climate change adaptation is an opportunity for social reform, for thequestioning of values that drive inequalities in development and ourunsustainable relationship with the environment. But this outcome is by nomeans certain and growing evidence suggests that too often adaptation isimagined as a non-political, technological domain and enacted in a defensiverather than a progressive spirit. Adaptation has been framed in terms ofidentifyingwhatistobepreservedandwhatisexpendable,ratherthanwhatcanbe reformedor gained.Dominant development discourses put the economy asfirst tobepreserved,aboveculturalflourishingorecologicalhealth.Thereisadanger that adaptation policy and practice will be reduced to seeking thepreservationofaneconomiccore,ratherthanallowingittofostertheflourishingof cultural and social as well as economic development, or of improvedgovernance that seeks to incorporate the interests of future generations, non-humanentitiesandthemarginalised.Theargumentput forward in thisbooksuggests thatadaptation isasocialandpoliticalact;oneintimatelylinkedtocontemporary,andwiththepossibilityforre-shapingfuture,powerrelationsinsociety.Butitalsorecognisesthatdifferentactorsperceivecontrastingrolesforadaptation.Thattheremaybemultiplewaysofadaptingisalreadyrecognisedintheliteraturethroughtherangeofdifferentscopes and timings for adaptive interventions (for example, Smit et al., 2000;SmitandWandel,2006).Theseareimportanttechnicalconsiderationsbutmoreemphasis is needed on the underlying socio-political choices that are madethrough the selection of adaptation pathways. Here we propose three suchpathways leading to resilience (maintaining the status quo), transition(incremental change) and transformation (radical change). No one pathwaynecessarilyleadsto‘progressive’ormoreequitableandefficientoutcomesthanthe others. The evaluation of pathways and subsequent outcomes will be afunctionofcontextandtheviewpointofindividualactors.Openinganalysisofhowitisthatindividualadaptivepathwayscometodominateorbemarginalisedis one of the aims of this book, which offers theoretical and empirical

exploration.Recentexperiencesuggests thatconsensusonaprogressiveadaptationwillnotbeeasy.Ourcurrentageofadaptationisthesecondtimeinrecenthistorythataglobal environmental challenge has provided an opportunity to questiondominant forms of development. The first, coalescing around the notion ofsustainabledevelopment,has(todate)manifestlyfailed.Theinternationalrootsof thesustainabledevelopmentagenda lay inaconcern that theenvironmentallimits to economic growth were fast approaching. Indeed the combination ofmitigation and adaptation agendas represents a reprise of the sustainabledevelopment agenda, and climate change a strong signal that existingdevelopments are far from sustainable (Le Blanc, 2009). Underlining thesignificance of adaptation for sustainable development, Adger et al. (2009a)remind us that climate change adaptation decisions have justice consequencesacrossaswellaswithingenerations.ThefirstmainstreamexpressionofasustainabledevelopmentapproachwastheBrundtlandCommission,1983,whichstimulatedasearchforradicalecologicalandsocialalternativestodevelopment(Redclift,1987).Thesepeakedinpublicawarenessat theUNConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopment (UNCED)in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992. Here, differences in the prioritising ofdevelopmentandenvironmentbetweenrichandpoorernationsandtheinfluenceofastrongindustrylobbylimitedreformattheinternationallevel.Theparallelswith current challenges facing international negotiations at the UNFCCC arestriking. The policy legacy of UNCED has been a constrained version ofsustainable development largely restricted to ecological modernisation and anacceptanceofthesubstitutabilityofenvironmentalforeconomicvalue(Pelling,2007a).Wheresomesuccesshasbeenachievedthroughthisprocessitisoutsideofthecompromiseddomainofinternationalpoliticsthroughtheinnovationsofcivil society groups, fair trade companies and concerned individuals, whereenvironmental and social justice goals have been brought into projects foreconomicdevelopment(Adams,2008).Buttheseinitiativesremainfragmentedandoverwhelmedbytheglobalpolicyconsensus.Can climate change adaptation reinvigorate these debates and provide animpetus for stronger sustainable development action? Might climate changeadaptationbebotharepriseofsustainabledevelopmentandanewopportunityinitsownright?TheoriginsoftheUNFCCCprocessliepartlyinUNCEDwherethefirstFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeagreementwasopenedforsignature.Thisconnection todebatesonsustainabledevelopmentalso remindsus that climate change and resultant adaptation are but one expression of anunderlyingcrisis inenvironment–societyrelationships.Thedeepestrootcauses

ofclimatechangeand the inabilityof thosewithpower insociety(locallyandglobally)toactlieinthedominantprocessesandvaluesofthepoliticaleconomythatincreasinglyconcentratewealthinthehandsofafew,withunjustsocialandenvironmentalexternalitiesasaccepted.Atthislevelclimatechangeriskisbutone expression of a deeper social malaise in modern society. For the poor,comfortable and rich alike aspiring and acquiring in order to consume havebecometherationalefordevelopment;arationalepropelledasmuchbyfearoffailureasthepleasuresofconsumption.Cantheburgeoningacademicandpolicyinterestinadaptationbeleverstoaddressthesedeeperquestionsofsustainabilityandjustice,aswellasadjustingtomeetthemoreproximateriskspresentedtousbyachangingclimate?Herewepropose and illustrate a framework tohelp reveal andunderstand thesocial, cultural and political pathways through which adaptation to climatechange unfolds. Adaptation is conceptualised through three layers of analysis(Chapters3–5)whichbuild froma startingpoint in thenotionof resilience toencompass adaptation as a process of socio-political transition andtransformation. Each stage of theoretical analysis brings together work fromsystemstheorywithawiderliteratureincludingregimeanalysis,discourse,risksociety,humansecurityandthesocialcontract.Thisreflectsthestronginfluenceofsystemsthinkingonadaptationworkbutalsoenablesthetheoreticalprecisionderived from systems thinking – for example, on social learning and self-organisation – to run throughout the book while bringing to the fore power,which is more ably addressed through other theoretical discourses. Thesetheoretical discussions are then illustrated through three case study chaptersshowinghowadaptationcanunfoldthroughcontestedpolitics inorganisations,urbansystemsandnationstates.Power lies at the heart of this conceptualisation of adaptation. Powerasymmetries determine for whom, where and when the impacts of climatechange are felt, and the scope for recovery. The power held by an actor in asocialsystem, translated intoastakeforupholding thestatusquo,alsoplaysagreat role inshapinganactor’ssupportor resistance towardsadaptationor thebuilding of adaptive capacitywhen this has implications for change in social,economic,culturalorpoliticalrelations,orinthewaysnaturalassetsareviewedandused.Acceptingthatadaptationiscontestedmakesinterpretingadaptationasprogressivehostagetotheobserver’sviewpoint.Thisrequirestheimpositionofanormativeframeworktoprovideaconsistentandtransparentpositionalityforanalysis. Here we are guided by Rawls’ theory of justice that identifiesprocedural(inclusionindecision-making)anddistributional(socialandspatial)elements.Rawls (1971, see alsoPaavola etal., 2006) prioritises human rights

over public goods; holds the social contract between citizens and the state indynamictensionsothatitisliabletocapturebyvestedinterestsatmomentsofpressure;andargues that society shouldbegovernedbyprinciples thatprotectinclusivegovernanceandseektoenhancethequalityoflifeofthepoorest.Thisfinal statement is perhaps the most important for making judgements oncomparativeadaptationpathways.Inseeking tomakethesocialandpoliticalelementsofadaptationvisible threequestionsrunthroughoutthisbookandstructureitsnarrative:1.Howisadaptivecapacityshaped?Or,towhatextentisadaptivecapacitydependentuponexistinginstitutionalandactorcapacity;canitbeconstructedanewthroughexternalinfluenceorthroughautonomousactions?2.Howisadaptivecapacityturnedintoadaptiveaction?Or,whatinstitutionsandactorsareimportantinmediatingthisthresholdandthewiderfeedbackbetweenactionandfuturecapacity?3.Whatarethehumansecurityoutcomesofadaptiveactions?Or, how far do framing institutions and individual actors control processes ofadaptationandhowdoesthisaffecttheexerciseofrightsandresponsibilitiesinsociety,andthesocialdistributionofwellbeing,basicneeds,humanrightsandsubsequentadaptivecapacity?The following sections in this introductory chapter establish the scope of thebook.Firstadaptationisdefinedandtheapproachtakentomakeclimatechangeandassociatedadaptationsvisibleexplained.Second, tohelpcontextualise thiswork,someofthemainstrandsincontemporaryadaptationtheoryarepresented.Finallythestructureofthebookisoutlined.

Adaptingtoclimatechange

Adaptationinthefaceofenvironmentalchangeisnothingnew.Individualsandsocio-ecological systems have always responded to external pressures. Butclimate change brings a particular challenge.Uncertainty in theways throughwhich climate change will be felt set against its speed and scale of impact,combined with the invisibility of causal linkages in everyday life, bring newchallengesforthesustainabilityofsocio-ecologicalsystems.Itisforthisreasonthat understanding adaptation to climate change is a critical challenge of ourtime. As the title of this book suggests, adaptation is conceived of here as adynamic phenomenon – as a process rather than a status. An individual orbusiness may be well adapted to a particular moment in history, but thedynamism of climate change requires an adaptation that can coevolvewith it.

Climatechangeisnolongeranexternalthreattobemanaged‘outthere’,butisan intimate element of human history – both an outcome and driver ofdevelopment decisions for individuals, organisations and governments. Thisrequiresacloser lookatsocialrelationsandpractices,evenvalues,assitesforadaptation, and suggests that it is necessary, but not sufficient, to control theimpactsofclimatechangethroughtechnologicalinnovationslikeenvironmentalengineeringandcropselection.There are many ways of characterising adaptation, which as an intellectualconstruct cannot bedirectlyobserved.Here akeydistinction ismadebetweenadaptationthatisforwardorbackwardlooking.Asabackwardlookingattribute,adaptation is revealedby capacity to copeduringmoments of stress or shock.For example, well-adapted urban communities have fewer losses to hurricaneevents.GreatercapacityinCuba’searlywarningandevacuationsystemswhencompared to thesouthernstatesof theUSAin largepartexplain the far lowerhuman losses in Cuba from hurricane events (UNDP, 2004). As a forwardlookingattribute,adaptationcannotberevealedthroughimpacts(whichhavenotyet happened) and instead is made visible through theoretically identifiedcomponents associated with adaptive capacity. An important gap in ourunderstanding of adaptation comes from the difficulty of being able to followadaptiveprocessesovertimeandsoverifythroughobservationthecontributionoftheoreticallydefinedcomponentsonadaptivepractices.Despite this caveat, our focus is on forward looking adaptation. It is here thatadaptation has the potential to intervene in development policy and practicethrough progressive risk reduction. To this extent the work is driven bytheoreticalunderstandingsofwhatconstitutesadaptivecapacity.Ontheground,however,pastexperiencesthatrevealbackwardlookingadaptationcanfeedintolocal understandingsof thepressures shaping capacity looking forward.A fulldiscussionofadaptationtheoryispresentedinChapter2.For researchers and policy makers alike the invisibility of forward lookingadaptive capacity is compounded by the dynamism of climate change. Forspecificphysicalor ecological systemschangecanbegradual andpersistent–forexample,insealevelrise.Forotherstemporaryequilibriummaybeviolentlydisrupted when thresholds are breached and systems enter new states – forexample, the potential reversal of the thermohaline circulation system in theNorthAtlantic.The impactofsuchglobalscaleprocesses ismediatedby localsocio-ecologicalandenvironmentalconditions.Thishasledmanytoarguethatadaptationisalocalagendaincontrasttomitigation,whichisglobal.Whileourconcerniswithadaptation,wemakeacaseforbothagendastohavelocalandglobal components and indeed national level action too. High level legal

frameworks andvoluntary agreements can support local action,but local levelaction is also a potential driver for higher level policy.Where politicalwill isabsent at higher levels, local action has the potential to be decisive indeterminingcapacityandactionandinfluencinghigherlevelpolicy.Thisisthecase formitigationandadaptation– for investing inzerocarbon lifestylesandtechnology as much as livelihood diversification. Those fundamental socialattributesthatenableandshapeadaptivecapacityalsoinfluencethepotentialforlocalcontributionstomitigation(BulkeleyandBetsill,2003).Climatechangeisalsoaslipperyconcepttodemonstrateempirically.Outsideoftheimaginaryworldsofcomputermodelsitisasyetimpossibletodeterminetheproportion of any hydrological or meteorological event that is attributable toclimate change.O’Brien and Leichenko (2003)were among the first to arguethat searching for the incremental riskassociatedwithclimatechange is a lostcauseandmanyyearsawayfromresolution.Meanwhilethenumbersofpeopleand socio-ecological systems at risk and bearing loss from climate changeassociated events is increasing. Climate change is manifest locally throughextreme events and in the heightened variability of precipitation, temperatureandwind.Wemayneverunderstandtheprecisecontributionofanthropocentricclimate change to these events and trends but we can be certain that climatechangeisadecisivecontributingfactorandthatvulnerabilityexists,demandingaction.

Theideaofadaptation

WhilemitigationwasclearlydefinedintheoriginalUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)negotiatedintheRioSummit,1992,adaptation was not. Despite this the termwas used in the agreement text. Itsmeaningcontinuestobedebated(Burton,2004).Arguablyitistheslipperinessof the term that has been part of its attraction for discussion in academic andpolicy circles alike. Here we present an overview of some of the maincontributionstotheadaptationdebateasscholarsandpolicymakershavesoughtto make sense of the term handed to them from the UNFCCC. The sectionbeginswithanassessmentoftheinfluenceoftheIPCC–UNFCCConscholarlyworkonclimatechangeadaptation,ofthewaysinwhichclimatechangeimpactsare evaluated and the geographical distribution of climate change impact risk.Fromthispointanoverviewofworkonsocialaspectsofadaptationispresentedaroundfourquestionsthatcross-cutresearch.ThisdiscussionisapreludetothatinChapter2,whichoffers an extended response to the intellectual inheritanceandcurrentshapeofadaptationtobuildaconceptualframework.

TheIPCC–UNFCCCframe

The IPCC andUNFCCC procedures and agendas have greatly influenced thedirectionofthinkingaswellaspolicyonclimatechangeadaptation.Thereisahigh levelof interactionbetweenthese institutions,with theIPCCfeeding intotheUNFCCCprocess,whichinturnhelpstodrivefundingandpoliticalwillforadaptiveactionsandresearch.ThestatedaimoftheIPCCistosupportnationalpolicy on climate change through offering scientific consensus. Founded in1988, the IPCC has produced Assessment Reports in 1990, 1995, 2001 and2007.Eachinturnhasincludedagreateremphasisonadaptationasevidencehasaccumulated.InthiswaytheIPCChasactedasbothastimulusandaresourceforresearchonadaptationtoclimatechange.The First Assessment Report helped to shape the UNFCCC and drive itsratificationattheUNConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopment,Rio,1992(Agrawala,2005),butsaidrelativelylittleaboutadaptation.ItwasintheSecondAssessment Report that the socio-economic aspects of climate change wereseriouslyaddressedforthefirsttime.Thereportconcludedbysketchingoutthescope of support needed for adaptation. It argued that efficient adaptationdepended upon the availability of financial resources, technology transfer andcultural, educational, managerial, institutional, legal and regulatory practices,bothdomesticandinternational.Thevisionwasfirmlyonthepotentialrolesandresponsibilities of international actors with limited evidence of local adaptivebehaviour.TheThirdAssessmentReportincludedagreaterfocusonadaptationstrategies and concluded that adaptation was necessary to complementmitigationeffortsraisingthesignificanceofadaptationintheUNFCCCprocessand helping to achieve the Nairobi work programme. The Fourth AssessmentReport stated that adaptationwas necessary to address the impacts of climatechange, was clear that this was already occurring and that more extensiveadaptation than was being undertaken would be necessary to address futurevulnerability to climate change. Hinting at the possibility of a progressiveadaptation agenda, the report also connected sustainable development withvulnerability to climate change, and argued that climate change could impedenational abilities to follow sustainable development pathways. This reportprovided the scientificbasis for theBaliActionPlan reachedbyparties at the13thsessionoftheConferenceoftheParties(COP).While the IPCC process is scientific it reports back to governments and isinfluenced by their interests and priorities (Grundmann, 2007). It has beendescribed as a boundary object, and a hybrid science-policy project at the

interface between science and politics. As a consensus organisation, and oneopentointensepublicscrutiny,itisconservative,carefultofollowcoresciencerather than policy or advocacy trends. This has been its strength in terms ofscientific credibility for policymakers, but has alsomade it difficult for someevidence on climate change and human reaction to be included. For example,much local evidence for climate change impacts and experience in adaptation,particularly inAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean, isgainedbylocalactorsandheldbycivilsocietyactorsorpublishednationallyorregionally– but not in international peer review journals – and so has been difficult toinclude.TheIPCCinthisrespectoffersaconservative,rigorousviewofclimatechange, but should not be seen as a full acccount of existing information orknowledge. The Fourth Assessment Report fromWorking Group II began toaddressthisbydrawingalsofromthegreyliteratureproducedbygovernmentsand NGOs. A concern for inclusiveness in scientific representation from allworld regions has also led to a quota system and travel funds to supportparticipationfromscientistsbasedinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries.Evenso,thisdoesnotmeanthatgovernmentsareequallyhappywithIPCCfindings,withvariousUSgovernments largely ignoring the IPCCwhile others (especially inEurope)haveendorsedandacteduponitthroughtheUNFCCCandunilaterally(Grundmann,2007).TheIPCCprocesshasalsobeenconstrainedbyitsslowrecognitionof thefullcontribution to climate changedebates tobemade fromparallel disciplinesorpolicy areas that may cover very similar ground but not use the language ofclimate change or publish in climate change associated journals. Thus, forexample, the considerable academic and policy literatures on disaster riskreduction,socialsecurityandfoodsecurityindevelopingcountries,community-basedwatermanagementandriskinsurancearemakingonlyslowimpactontheIPCC.Suchasharpfocuswasperhapsappropriatetomanaginginformationonthe natural and physical science components of climate change. ForWorkingGroup II’s remit of vulnerability and adaptation,where impacts and responsesoften build on past experience but ultimately transcend policy or disciplinaryboundaries,thisislesshelpful–attimesthreateningthattheIPCCwillreinventtheoreticalormethodologicallessonsthatcouldbetterbebroughtinfromotherspecialisms.For example, much of early conceptual work on adaptation mirrored existingworkoncopingwithinthefoodsecurityanddisasterriskdisciplines.TheFourthAssessmentReport fromWorkingGroup IIwent someway to addressing thisconcernwith the inclusionof cross-sector and indeedcross-report case studiesincluding the consequences and responses to Hurricane Katrina and the

vulnerabilityofmega-deltas(IPCC,2007).WorkingGroupIIalsotooktheleadrolebetween2009–11inorganisingaSpecialReportonManagingtheRisksofExtremeEventsandDisasters toAdvanceClimateChangeAdaptation, tohelpbringknowledgefromdisasterriskmanagementintoclimatechangeadaptation.At this stage of mapping and understanding vulnerability and adaptation theinclusionofknowledgefromcognateareasisimportant.However,itisalsokeythattheIPCCbeseenincontext.Itisamechanismforconsolidatingknowledgefor the policy community on climate change. As the IPCC increasinglyrecognises parallel communities the challenge will be in retaining its corepurpose and intellectual focus while embracing ever wider sources ofknowledge. For the academic community the challenge is to communicateeffectivelywiththeIPCCprocesswithoutrestrictinganalysisandthoughttotheprioritiesoftheIPCC.

Thecostsofadapting

Itisdifficulttoestimatethefuturecostsofadaptingtoclimatechange.Fromthemore restricted world of disaster management we know that the differencebetween investing in prevention and the costs of a disaster impact can easilyexceedaratioof7:1(DFID,2004a).Thecostsofadaptingtoclimatechangearemore far-reaching.Futuredemands foradaptationarealso tobeshapedby theactions we take now to mitigate it. One estimate, by Stern (2006), suggestsadaptationcosts in theorderof5 to20 times theestimatedcostsofcontainingclimate change throughmitigation. The economic costs of adaptation are alsonot evenlydistributedworldwide.Usingdata frompast natural disaster eventsshowsthatrichernationswithanaccumulatedlegacyofphysicalinfrastructureand housing have the most absolute economic exposure. However, thesecountriesalsohavetheassetstoadapt(andarguablyhavesubstantialpowerandduty tomitigate, and in this sensehave somecontrolover, theirowndestiny).Poorer countries have less physical assets exposed but economies tend to bemore dependent upon primary production and ecosystem services. As aproportion of GDP potential economic losses are highest in low and middleincome countries. In addition, it is the same countries – fromAfrica,Central,SouthandSoutheastAsiaandCentralAmericaandtheCaribbean–thatrecordthe highest mortality rates from natural disasters, adding human to economicvulnerability (UNDP, 2004). Past experience and projected risk of human lossthroughmortality andmorbidity are also strongly skewed to poorer countrieswhereincomeisdependentonprimaryextractionandwherepopulationsarenot

protected from environmental hazards by safe buildings, infrastructure, healthservices,andtransparentandresponsivegovernance(IFRC,2010).Observeddatabasedonlossestopastpatternsofdisastereventsisthebestguideto current vulnerability and backward looking adaptive capacity, but climatechangemeanspastpatternsofhazardmaynotbeasusefulaguidetothefutureas hadoncebeen assumed; the so-calledproblemof non-stationarity (Millyetal., 2008). Figure 1.1 shows an example of forward looking assessment ofrelative vulnerability to climate change and extremes under awarming of 5.5degrees C. It incorporates adaptive capacity as a component of vulnerability.Vulnerability is calculated based on input variables for human resources(dependency ratios and literacy rates), economic capacity (market GDP percapitaandincomedistribution)andenvironmentalcapacity(populationdensity,sulphur dioxide emissions, percentage of unmanaged land). The advantage ofthisapproachisthatitisnottiedtopastexperiencesofextremeevents.Despitethis, results largely confirm the burden identified above for poorer countries.HighlevelsofvulnerabilityareassociatedwithlowandmiddleincomecountriesinSouthAmerica,southernAsiaandAfrica.HighvulnerabilityisalsofoundinChina and some of Eastern Europe. But this method also suggests NorthAmericaandEuropeareextremelyvulnerable,paintingaportraitofwidespreadvulnerability across the globe where adaptive capacity is overwhelmed byclimate change even over the next 40 years (Yohe et al., 2006). This is acompellingcasefortheneedforurgentanddeeplevelsofmitigationalongsidethe need to support adaptation to reduce vulnerability from current andinescapablefutureclimatevariabilityandextremes.TheIPCC(2007)calculatesthatforthemostexposedcountries,suchascoastalstatesinAfrica,adaptationcostsmaybeashighas10percentofnationalGDP.For low-lyingsmall islanddevelopingstates the relativecostsareevenhigher.Oxfam (2008) estimates that at least US$50bn is needed annually to supportadaptation indevelopingcountries.UNDP (2007) identifies anadditionalneedofaroundUS$86bnby2015(0.2percentofdevelopedcountryGDP)ontopofexistingoverseasdevelopmentassistancebudgetsfrombilateralandmultilateraldonors.Thesearelargesums,butnotunprecedented.TheUNDP(2007)equatesitstotalcostestimatetoaround10percentofthecurrentmilitaryexpenditurebyOECDcountries.The international architecture for support of adaptation is developing asadaptation rises on the political agenda. The UNFCCC provides onemanagementstructureforsupportoflowandmiddleincomecountries.Bilateraland multilateral agencies, such as the development banks and other UNagencies, also provide financial and technical support. Investment decisions in

thecorporateprivatesectoralsoimpactonadaptation,includingpolicydecisionsfrom the insurance and reinsurance sectors, and are likely to increase inimportance as businesses in middle and high income countries are forced toadapt. The emerging infrastructure is, however, built around existing poles ofpower–nationstatesandtheUNsystemwhichisbeholdentothem,orbankinginterests,withnationstatesorprivateinvestorsatthehelm.Cantheseactorsbeexpected to embrace adaptation as anything other than resilience – acts toreinforcethestatusquo?Indeedshouldtheybeencouragedtodoso?Assertingmore radicalchange insocialandpolitical systemsneeds tocomefrombelowthrough the actions of people at risk building on existing social and politicalreformmovements.With the costs of climate change increasing and adaptation being increasinglydemanded,meetingthefundinggapforadaptationintheshorttermisakey

Figure1.1Globaldistributionofvulnerability toclimatechange.Combinednational indicesofexposureandsensitivity(Source:Yoheetal.,2006)challenge.Withoutadditionalandearmarkedfundsforadaptationthereisariskofmoney being forced from existing overseas development assistance (ODA)budgets.ODAfinanceisalreadybeingsqueezedbyincreasedrecentdemandforhumanitariananddisasterreconstructionfunding(Whiteetal.,2004).Agrawala(2005) has estimated that between 15–60 per cent of official developmentassistance (ODA) flows will be affected by climate change. This trend is aparticulartragedyasODAisakeymechanismforreducinggenericvulnerabilitytodisasterriskandclimatechangeimpactsaswellasachievingbroaderhuman

security goals. A range of proposals exists for identifying additional funds.Oxfam(2008)proposesthatfundingbegeneratedfromauctioningafractionofemissions allocations to developed countries under the post-2012 agreement,including proposed new emissions-trading for international aviation andshipping.OtherproposalsincludeincreasingtheshareoftheCleanDevelopmentMechanismcontributingtoadaptationandincreasingtheroleplayedbyprivatecapitalthroughventurecapitalorcommercialloans.

Conceptualdevelopment

Since its reintroduction into social scientific and policy debates following theRioSummit, theinterestsofdifferentanalysishavemadeadaptationaslipperyconcept.Forsome,adaptation’scontributionwouldbestbeasatightlydefined,technicalterm(likemitigationintheexistingUNFCCCdocumentation)thatcanadduniversalclaritytopolicyformationincludingattheinternationallevel(forexample, Schipper and Burton, 2009). Others, who see adaptation not as atechnicalcategorybutasaresearchfield,tendtohaveawiderview.Fankhauser(1998) suggests that adaptation can be synonymous with sustainabledevelopment. This challenge was noted as early as 1994 by Burton, just twoyearsaftertheRioSummit,andtheplethoraofinterpretationshascontinuedtogrow as individual disciplines and intellectual communities have investedadaptationwiththeirownworldviews(KaneandYohe,2007).Theadaptationtoclimatechangedebateisdrivenbyfourquestions:•Whattoadaptto?•Whoorwhatadapts?•Howdoesadaptationoccur?•Whatarethelimitstoadaptation?Noneofthesequestionshaveeasyanswers.

Whattoadaptto?

Climate change itself is agreed to bemanifest in at least three interacting andoverlappingways: climate changehas come to encompass long-term trends inmean temperatures and other climatic norms, importantly precipitation, andsecondaryeffectslikesea-levelrisetogetherwithvariabilityaboutthesenormsfrom inter-seasonal to periods of a decade with particular implications forinfrastructure planning, agriculture and human health, and extremes invariabilitythatcantriggernaturaldisasterssuchasfloods,hurricanes,firesand

soon(IPCC2007).Furthermore,localstudiesofadaptationmakeitincreasinglyclear that while international and national policy makers may seek a clearmeasurement of impacts and adaptation associated with climate change – theincremental costs of mitigating or adapting to climate change, as the GlobalEnvironmentalFacilityputsit(Labbate,2008)–ontheground,anymeaningfulmeasurementofadaptationneedstoacceptclimatechangeiscontextualisedwiththe other risks (social, economic and political as well as environmental) thatshape and limit human well being and the functioning of socio-ecologicalsystems(PellingandWisner,2009).Thisisthedifferencebetweenaneconomicanalysis of the farming sector of a country, and understanding the competingchoicesthatshapeadaptivecapacityandactionsforanindividualfarmerputinthe context of the markets and regulatory regimes within which the farmeroperates. Both are useful but partial lenses. The overlapping of seasonal andother climatic cycles with variation in baseline climate change and extremesmakesitverydifficultforspecificeventstoseparateoutclimatechangesignalsfrombackgroundweatherpatterns.Bothshort-termuncertaintyinvariabilityandextremesandlong-termtrendsneedtobeconsidered(AdgerandBrooks,2003).

Whoorwhatadapts?

Initial work on assessing who or what adapts came from the assessment ofregionalornationalscaleagro-economicsystems.Forexample,Krankinaetal.(1997) refer to boreal forestrymanagement strategies as a means of assistingforests adapt.Here the systemof interestwas ecological and themanagementsystemaninterveningvariablebetweenitandclimatechange.Thiskindofworkcomplementswell thescaleofresolutionavailablefromclimatemodellingandtheexistingunderstandingofecologicaladaptationwithinagriculturalsciences,but is less suited to explore well the social processes driving and limitingadaptive decision-making.Economic assessment has also operatedwell at thisscale,seekingtoidentifythecosts(andbenefits)ofclimatechangescenariosforagriculturalsystemsandtovaryingextentsfactoring inhumanadaptation. Inareview of the economics of climate change literature, Stanton et al. (2008)observe the narrow framing used to approach decision making for climatechangepolicy.Harvey(2010)goesfurther,arguingthatanewmacro-economicvision is needed to helpmove past the internal contradiction of contemporaryeconomics that promotes energy intensive growth and so accelerates climatechangewith consequent growth inhibiting outcomes.Contemporary incentivespushforgreaterandgreatereconomicgrowthinanattempttogrowourwayout

of climate change and its attendant risks. The extraction and concentration ofwealth that results increases collective vulnerability while simultaneouslyacceleratingclimatechangeassociated(andotherenvironments)hazards.More human-centred analyses have also flourishedwhich seek to identify thehumanandsocialcharacteristics thatdetermine thecapacityofcommunities toface a shock or stress (Adger et al., 2005a). Local viewpoints help tocontextualiseadaptationwithindevelopmentandexplainwhypeopleareunableor unwilling to take adaptive action (helping to identify the limits to climatechange adaptation). From an analysis of two communities in Puerto Rico,Lopez-Marrero and Yarnal (2010) found that concerns for health conditions,familywellbeing,economicfactorsandlandtenureweregivenmoreprioritybylocalactorsthanadaptationtoclimatechange,despitetheirexposuretofloodingandhurricanes.Theresultsshowtheimportanceofaddressingadaptationwithinthecontextofmultiplerisks,andofpeople’sgeneralwellbeing.

Howdoesadaptationoccur?

Thediversityofworkexaminingprocessesof adaptationhasbenefited fromanumberoftypologiesofadaptiveactionandtheircoherentsynthesis,seeSmitetal. (2000), Smit andWandel (2006),Burtonetal. (2007).Carter etal. (1994)distinguished between autonomous (automatic, spontaneous or passiveadaptations) that occur as part of the routine of a social system, and planned(strategicoractive)adaptations.Smitetal.(2000)alsoaddthatadaptationsmayoccur unintentionally as an incidental outcome of other actions – furtheremphasisingtheimportanceofcontextualisingassessmentsofadaptivecapacityand action. The timing of the adaptation relative to its stimulus has led toadditionaltypes.Somedrawfromthedisasterscommunity,whichusesastagedmodelofactionsfortrackingbehaviourbeforeandafterdisasters.Burtonetal.(1993) distinguish adaptations that prevent loss, spread loss, change use oractivity, change location or engage in restoration.More generally, adaptationscan be reactive, concurrent (especially important for analysis of adaptation togradual and ongoing changes in climatic norms) and anticipatory. Adaptiveactions can be long-or short-term, and this has come to be associated with adistinction between actions aiming for short-term stability (coping) or longertermchange(adaptation)(seeChapter2).Adaptationhasalsobeencharacterisedaccording to the form of action (technological, behavioural, financial,institutional or informational), the actor of interest (individual, collection), thescaleof theactor (local,national, international)andsocial sector (government,

civilsociety,privatesector);andthecostsandeaseofimplementation(Smitetal., 2000). Maladaptation is used to describe those acts that, through badplanningorinadvertentconsequences,causeeitherlocalordistantconsequencesthatoutweighgains(Smit,1993).

Whatarethelimitstoadaptation?

Literatureonthelimitstoadaptationhaslargelybeenframedbytheconcernsofinternationalactors.Thechallengesodefinedis toprovideguidanceforpolicymakers on what might be achieved through adaptation to limit or avoid thedangerousimpactofclimatechangeasaparallelagendatomitigation–tohelpachieve a balance in investment between mitigation and adaptation (Hulme,2009).Atfirstthisseemsatechnicalproblemofassessingtheeconomiccostsofa rangeof technical solutions and applying cost–benefit analysis to a rangeofscenarios. This can certainly help. But if adaptation is to move us towards amoresustainabledevelopmentpaththentechnologicalinvestmentsareonlypartofthesolution.Changesinvaluesandassociatedgovernanceregimeswillalsoneedtobeontheagenda,ormayforcethemselvesonasestablishedinstitutionsfailinthefaceofclimaticextremes.Examiningtheselimitsismoredifficult.Atrootthisapproachtodefiningthelimitstoadaptationiscontingentuponthelevelsofriskassociatedwithclimatechangethataresociallyacceptable(Adgeretal., 2009a).Given the unequal social and geographical distribution of costslikely tocome frommitigationoradaptation (andacceptable,or ‘unavoidable’impacts) led strategies, this is also a political question. The limits to climatechangeadaptationwhenframedinthiswayarecultural,socialandpolitical.Thismay produce some surprising outcomes. Kuhlicke and Kruse (2009), forexample, showhow local adaptive actions to reduce flood risk along theElberiver,Germany,relymainlyonanticipationandassumptionsaboutstatesupport,the latteractuallybeingseen toundermine local resilience. InAustraliariskofthe reintroduction of mosquitoes carrying dengue disease is increasing as aconsequenceofgovernmentadviceforhouseholdstoadapttoincreasingdroughtriskbyinstallingdomesticwatertanks,theperfectbreedingenvironmentfortheAe.Aegyptimosquito(Beebeetal.,2009).So,howcanthelimitsofadaptationbeascertained?TherearebiglessonsfromthepastinthefailureofsophisticatedcivilisationsfromtheGreenlandNorsetoEasterIslandandtheMayaofCentralAmerica.Ineachcaseachangingclimateinteractedwithdynamic socialpressures toundermineproductive systems thatoverwhelmed adaptive capacity and led towards collapse (Diamond, 2005).

Contemporary extractive land management systems are revealing their limitstoo. Sharer (2006) shows how contemporary industrial agriculture in lowlandGuatemalaandsouthernMexicosupportsfewerpeopleandgeneratesmorelocalenvironmental degradation than Mayan farming practices, forcing anintensifyingdrivetofellmoreforestforshort-termproductivegain.Morethananythingthesecasestellusthattheriskfromenvironmentalchangeisaproductofsocialamplification–thefailuretorecogniseandrespondintimetoemergentrisk – rather than an intrinsic quality of the hazard itself.More contemporaryevidenceofthelimitstoadaptalongsideclimaticvariabilityandextremescomesfrom the failure of coping and past rounds of adaptation made manifest bynatural disasters from regional food security crises, to major hurricanes andfloods,orlocaleventssuchasflashfloods,waterloggingandlandslidesthatarelocaldisasters(ISDR,2009).Disasters occur when socio-ecological systems coping capacities areoverwhelmed(ISDR,2004).Therearefourbasicpathwaysforthisfailure.First,asaresultofalackofresources–andthemarginalitythatunderpinsthis.Thiscanforcepeople(thepoorandmarginalised)toknowinglyliveorworkinplacesexposed to risk in order to access other benefits such as close proximity tolivelihoodopportunities.Lackof resourcesalso limitspeople’sability for self-protection.Second,asaresultofa lackof information.Proactiveadaptation isconstrained when new hazards or vulnerability drivers emerge that are notplannedforandmaynotberecogniseduntil it istoolate.Thiswasthecaseinthe2003heat-wavethatclaimedmorethan35,000livesinEurope,withearlierevents, notably in Chicago, USA (Klinenberg, 2002), failing to stimulatelearningandanticipatoryadaptationinEuropeancities.Atthelocallevelsocialnetworks can be as important as formal extension and advisory services forlearning. Most acutely information fails when early warning is not provided(IFRC, 2005). Third, as a result of institutional failures. This is the principalreasonforphysicalinfrastructuralfailure–theproximatecauseformanyevents.Institutions fail to enable adaptationwhen those at risk andmanaging risk arenot able to learn critically, but rather are trapped in cycles of marginalimprovementsofexistingbehaviour(seeChapter4);whenthoseatriskandtheiradvocates cannot hold risk managers to account; and when information andresources cannot be used effectively or equitably (Wisner, 2006). Fourth, as aresultofthespeedofdevelopmentandapplicationofappropriatetechnologicalinnovations. InSouthAsia, in thespaceofagenerationcellphone technologyhasenabledmobilephonestospreadfrombeingthepreserveofthewealthytoaubiquitousfeatureofurbanandrurallifealikewithknock-onbenefitsincludingproviding early warning for disaster risk (Moench, 2007). These accounts

indicate the complexity of identifying limits to adaptation and the greatsociologicalandgeographicalvariationtobeexpected.Theargumentpresented in thisbook responds to these four strandsofenquirystarting from a perspective of wishing to understand, rather than measureadaptation. This requires a broad lens, close to Fankhauser’s comment thatadaptation as a research field can be interpreted as a revision of sustainabledevelopment. Following the critical literature on sustainable development (forexample,Grinetal.,2010),climatechangeadaptationisseenasaprocessnotanobject, with discrete capacities, actions and outcomes offering windows forobservation. Elements that are subject to being contested in discourse (asdifferent explanations for events and situation are presented) as well asmaterially (as different actors compete for the control and use of assets andresources).Thisapproachalsobuildsonabeliefthatthelimitsofadaptationarerootedincultureandsociety; theycanbesubjectivebutaremutable(Adgeretal.,2009c).Theprimaryaspirationofthisworkistoopendebateonadaptationas a critical process. It uses adaptation as resilience, transition andtransformationasabasisfor thiscontribution.Inonesensethiscanbeseenasaddinganovel lineofcategorisation to thosediscussed in the typologyabove.But amore fundamental aim is to highlight adaptation to climate change as amulti-layeredprocess,withobservedactsofadaptationpotentiallyconcealingordenyingopportunitiesforalternativepathwaysthatcouldleadtodifferentsocialandsocio-ecologicalfutures.Makingthesethreelevelsofadaptationtransparentisaninitialstepinsupportingactorsatriskandmanagingriskinquestioningthepowerrelationsthatgiveshapetoadaptationasobserved.Thesearetoolsforacriticalconsciousnessinclimatechangeadaptation.

Structureofthebook

Thebook isorganised into fourparts.Part I (Framework and theory) containsChapters1and2.Chapter1seekstooutlinetheintellectualandpolicylandscapethat has thus far shaped understanding of adaptation to climate change.Following from this,Chapter2 offers a detailed account of those theories andresearch agendas in social science that have preceded the current interest inadaptation to climate change, but nonetheless, and often without recognition,continuetoshapethinking.Lessonsthatcanbelearnedfromtheseprecursorsarethen taken into a discussion of the contemporary literature on adaptation toclimatechange.Thischapterendswiththeoutliningofthreebroadcategoriesofadaptationbasedontheintentionoftheinitiatingactor:resilience,transitionandtransformation.

Thecharacteristicsand the rangeof literature fromwhich toolscanbebuilt toanalyse governance for each type of adaptation are outlined in Table 1.1.Adaptation that enhances resilience is characterised by functional persistence,self-organisation and social learning. Adaptation to promote transition ingovernance regimes includes self-organisation and social learningbut can alsobenefit from insights provided by literature on governance and socio-technological systems. Understanding adaptive capacity or actions that couldresult in transformational change in socio-political regimes can usefullyincorporatesocialcontractandhumansecuritytheoryinadditiontoliteratureonregimes,socio-technologicalregimes,self-organisationandsociallearning.In Part II (The resilience–transition–transformation framework) Chapters 3, 4and 5 describe the qualities of and develop the resilience–transition–transformation framework; this isexploredempirically inPart III (Livingwithclimatechange)throughChapters6,7and8.Table1.1Frameworksoftheanalysisofadaptation Resilience Transition TransformationFunctionalpersistence

*

Self-organisation

* * *

Sociallearning

* * *

Regimetheory

* *

Socio-technologicaltransitions

* *

Socialcontract *

Humansecurity

*

InthiswaythebookbuildsitsargumentacrossChapters3–8,andtosomeextent

itsseparationundertheheadingofresilience(Chapter3),transition(Chapter4)and transformation(Chapter5) is heuristic asmuch as it is analytic.This saidthere is a logical progressionwith the analysis of functional persistence, self-organisationinChapter3beingaddedtobytheanalysisofgovernanceregimesand socio-technological transitions inChapter4 and finally socio-contract andhumansecurityinChapter5.Each case study is set in a different context: Chapter 6 focuses on theorganisation, Chapter 7 on urban settlements and Chapter 8 on the nationalpolicy as sites for adaptation. These contexts have been chosen because theyhighlighttheprecedingchapter’sdiscussion,buttheyalsoservetwoothertasks.The first is to indicate the complexity of distinguishing adaptive capacity andaction which is always dependent on the viewpoint of the observer. In eachchapterelementsof resilience, transitionand transformationcanbefound.Thesecond goal is to use these case studies to demonstrate the range of socialcontexts where adaptation unfolds and analysis is needed. At present themajority of analysis of adaptation focuses on local actions, with the site ofanalysisbeingthelocalcommunityorhousehold.PartIV(Adaptingwithclimatechange)containstheconcludingchapter,Chapter9.Thisfinalchaptersynthesisesthedetaileddiscussionmadeineachprecedingchapterandoutlinestheresearchandpolicydevelopmentneedsthatarisefromthecentralargumentthatadaptationisasocial,culturalandpoliticalaswellasatechnologicalprocess.

2Understandingadaptation

Theadaptedman,neitherdialoguingnorparticipating,accommodatestoconditionsimposeduponhimandtherebyacquiresanauthoritariananduncriticalframeofmind.

(PauloFreire,1969:24)Freirewarnsusthatwithoutacriticalawareness,adaptationishostagetobeinglimited to efforts that promote action to survive better with, rather than seekchange to, the social andpolitical structures that shape life chances.Similarly,Clarke (2009:21) warns that people tend to adapt to poverty by ‘suppressingtheir wants, hopes and aspirations’ rather than attempting to change thestructures thatconstrain their lifechances.Canthesamecritiquebelevelledatadaptation to climate change – that efforts are being directed more towardsaccommodating risk and its root causes rather than at the root causesthemselves? The difference is between responding to drought by provinghumanitarianrelieftoalleviatehunger,andidentifyingdistortionsinagriculturaltradepolicyandmarketconditionsthatpreventfoodsurplusesfrommovingtomeethumanneed.This chapter builds on Chapter 1 by reviewing the academic literature onadaptationandadaptivecapacity.Theaimistomapoutananalyticalframeworkandsetoflinguistictoolstoexaminethesocio-politicalnatureofadaptation.TheframeworkisdevelopedinChapters3–5andappliedinChapters6–8.Webeginbydefiningkey termsandoutlining thebroad intellectual legacy that thinkingaboutadaptationcanlearnfrom.Contemporarydebatesarethenoutlinedandthenotionsofadaptationasresilience,transitionandtransformationareintroduced.

Anadaptationlexicon

Adaptationisadeceptivelysimpleconcept.Itsmeaningappearsstraightforward:it describes a response to a perceived risk or opportunity. The IPCC definesclimate change adaptation as ‘adjustments in natural or human systems inresponsetoactualorexpectedclimaticstimuliortheireffects,whichmoderatesharmorexploitsbeneficialopportunities’(IPCC,2008:869).Complexity comes with distinguishing different adaptive actors (individuals,communities, economic sectors or nations, for example) and their interactions,exploring why it is that specific assets or values are protected by some or

expendedbyothersintakingadaptiveactions,andincommunicatingadaptationwithin contrasting epistemic communities. It is also important to distinguishbetweencopingandadaptation,andadaptivecapacityandadaptiveaction.Coping precedes adaptation as a concept in explaining social responses toenvironmental stress and shock by some 30 years, and continues to be usedwithindisasterstudiestodescribemanyofthesameprocessesnowcapturedbyadaptation in the climate change community.The latter has to someextent re-invented thewheel indoing this (Schipper andPelling,2006).With these twoterms inuse,approacheshavebeen taken todemarcateseparatemeanings.Forsome coping is associated with reversible and adaptation with irreversiblechanges in behaviour (White etal., 2004).However,work on both adaptationandcopingaccepts that the transitionfromreversible to irreversiblechanges iscritical for measuring the collapse of system sustainability (Swift, 1989). Inpractice,copingandadaptationstillexistasparallelconceptsservingepistemiccommunities with different origins but very similar interests and conceptualframeworks (see below). This can be seen by the slowness with which IPCCincluded the term coping and ISDR the term adaptation in their respectiveglossaries(ISDR,2004).Here adaptation is defined as: the process through which an actor is able toreflectuponandenactchangeinthosepracticesandunderlyinginstitutionsthatgenerate rootandproximatecausesof risk, framecapacity tocopeand furtherroundsofadaptation toclimatechange.Copingwithclimatechangeisdefinedas: the process throughwhich establishedpractices andunderlying institutionsaremarshalledwhenconfrontedbytheimpactsofclimatechange.Adaptationincludesbothadaptivecapacityandadaptiveactionassubcategories.Capacity drives scope for action, which in turn can foster or hinder futurecapacitytoact.Thisismostkeenlyseenwhenadaptationrequiresthesellingofproductive assets (tools, cattle, property) thus limiting capacity for futureadaptiveactionandrecovery.Adaptivecapacityhasbeenconceptualisedbothasacomponentofvulnerabilityandasitsinverse,decliningasvulnerabilityincreases(Cutteretal.,2008).Thisdistinction is important indesigningmethods for themeasurementof adaptivecapacityandvulnerability,whicharegenerallyconceivedofasstaticattributes,andthesubsequenttargetingofinvestmentstoreducerisk.Thedistinctionislessimportant for theoreticalworkandmethodsaimedat revealingvulnerabilityoradaptive capacity as dynamic qualities of social actors in history. For theseprojects more important is the recognition that vulnerability and adaptationinteract and influence each other over time, shaped by flows of power,information and assets between actors. The relationship between vulnerability

and adaptive capacityvaries according to size and typeof hazard risk and thepositionofthesocialunitunderanalysiswithinwidersocio-ecologicalsystems.Position matters as vulnerability and adaptive capacity at one scale can haveprofound and sometimes hidden implications for other scales. For example, afamily in Barbados may benefit from living in a hurricane-proof house (lowmicro-vulnerability) but still be impacted by macro-economic losses shouldtouristsbedeterredbyhurricaneriskinanislandwhoseeconomyspecialisesintourismwithlimiteddiversity(lowmacro-adaptivecapacity).Thepredominantunderstandingofadaptationisthatwhileitisadistinctconceptit is part of the wider notion of vulnerability. The IPCC conceptualisesvulnerabilityasanoutcomeofsusceptibility,exposureandadaptivecapacityforanygivenhazard(andinadvertentlycompoundsthedefinitionthroughuseoftheterm‘tocope’!):Vulnerabilityisthedegreetowhichasystemissusceptibleto,andunabletocopewith,adverseeffectsofclimate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character,magnitude,and rateofclimatechangeandvariation towhichasystem isexposed, its sensitivity,and itsadaptivecapacity.(IPCC,2008:883)Exposure is usually indicated by geographical and temporal proximity to ahazard with susceptibility referring to the propensity for an exposed unit tosuffer harm. Adaptation then can either reduce exposure or susceptibility.Adaptive actions to reduce exposure focus on improving ways of containingphysicalhazard (buildingseawalls, riverembankments, reservoirsandsoon);theycanalsoincludeactionstoshieldanassetatriskfromphysicalhazard(byseasonal or permanent relocation or strengthening the physical fabric of abuilding, infrastructure and so on). There is some contention here withindividualstudiesincludingshieldingunderexposureorsusceptibility.However,this is only problematic when assumptions are not made clear, preventingaggregation of findings (a specific concern for the IPCCwhich seeks to buildknowledge on vulnerability and adaptation from local studies worldwide).Susceptibilitycanbereducedbyawiderangeofpossibleactionsincludingthosetakenbeforeandafteraclimate-change-relatedimpacthasbeenfelt.The separation of mitigation and adaptation by the UNFCCC may helpinternational policy formulation, but it is intellectually problematic.Mitigationcan most logically be viewed not as a separate domain but as a subset ofadaptation. It is an adaptive act aimed at ameliorating or reversing the rootcauses of the anthropocentric forcing processes behind climate change.Changinglifestylesandtechnologiestoreducecarbonarethenactsofadaptationtargetedatsupportingmitigation.Bridgesbetweenadaptationandmitigationarebeing made. Already the need to consider mitigation when developingadaptationstrategy is recognisedby theengineeringcommunity in theconcept

ofclimateproofing(McEvoyetal.,2006).Theanalysispresented in thisbookdoes not includemitigation acts or policy, but does include discussion on theculturalandsocialnormsthatshapedevelopmentworldviewsandacts;alineofanalysis that iswellsuited toquestionsofmitigationand in thiswayoffersanapproachthatcanbedevelopedtoconnectmitigationtotheadaptationagenda.Adaptation occupies a pivotal position in the coproduction of risk anddevelopment (see Figure 2.1). Through this one phenomenon one can gaininsight into the social mechanisms leading to the distribution of winners andlosers and identify opportunities and barriers to change as both risk anddevelopmentcoevolve.Toooften, though, researchandpolicydevelopmentonadaptationhasfocusedonnarrowtechnicalormanagerialconcerns;forexample,in determining water management or sea-defence and building structuralguidelines.Widerquestionsofpoliticalregimeform,socialvaluesandsoonthatdirecttechnologicalandsocialdevelopmentandriskhavebeenacknowledgedasrootcauses,butputinthebackgroundastoointangibleorbeyondthescopeforadaptation work (Adger et al., 2009c). Within the community of socialresearcherstacklingclimatechangethesocialrootcausesarewellacknowledgedand amongst many policy-makers they are recognised too. Multilateraldevelopment agencies and NGOs such as WRI, WWF, Practical Action andCAREare taking a lead and tools are being developed to help policy-makers,whohaveunderstood thecomplexityof theproblembutnothadaccess to thetoolstobeginplanningforadaptation.The possibility that adaptation can inform political aswell asmanagerial andtechnical discourses and structures is presented in Figure 2.1 as a distinctionbetween resilience, transition and transformation. Resilience (see Chapter 3)refers to a refinement of actions to improve performance without changingguiding assumptions or the questioning of established routines. This couldincludetheapplicationofresilientbuildingpracticesorapplicationofnewseedvarieties.Transition(seeChapter4)referstoincrementalchangesmadethroughthe assertion of pre-existing unclaimed rights. This might include a citizens’group

Figure2.1Adaptationintervenesinthecoproductionofriskanddevelopmentclaiming rights under existing legislation to lobby against a development thatwould undermine ecological integrity and local adaptive capacity. Transitionimplies a reflection on development goals and how problems are framed(priorities, include new aspects, change boundaries of system analysis) andassumptions of how goals can be achieved. Transformation (see Chapter 5)referstoirreversibleregimechange.Itbuildsontherecognitionthatparadigmsand structural constraints impede widespread and deep social reform; forexample, in international trade regimes or the individual values that areconstitutive of global and local production and consumption systems. Whereadaptationisnotundertakeninresponsetoaperceivedrisk(ahazardeventforwhichasocialactor isbothexposedandsusceptible)vulnerabilitywill remainunchallenged.The three levels of adaptation are nested and compounding. Nesting allowshigher-order change to facilitate lower-order change so that transformativechangeinasocialsystemcouldopenscopefor local transitionsandresilience.Compounding reflects the potential for lower-order changes to stimulate orhinder higher-order change. Building resilience can provoke reflection and beupscaled with consequent changes across a management regime, enablingtransitionalandpotentiallytransformativechange–butitcouldalsoslowdownmoreprofoundchangeasincrementaladjustmentsoffsetimmediateriskswhilethe system itselfmoves ever closer to a critical threshold for collapse.On thegroundmosaicsof adaptation aregenerated from theoutcomesofoverlapping

effortstobuild(andresist)resilience,transition,localtransformativechangeandremaining unmet vulnerabilities; mosaics that can change over time asunderlying hazards and vulnerabilities aswell as adaptive capacity and actionchangedrivenbylocalandtop-downpressures.The discussion of terms so far has been generic with climate change leadingpotentiallytoopportunitiesaswellasthreats.Onthegroundopportunitiesarisefor some actors from even themost catastrophic of climate change associatedevents.Thisisespeciallysowhenaccountabilityandtransparencyarelimited,asthey are post-disaster creating gross market distortions: following HurricaneKatrina,acontractingcompanyShawchargedFEMAUS$175asquarefootfortemporary roof repairs,material costswere provided by theUSA governmentand workers paid as little as US$2 a square foot (Klein, 2007). Elsewhereincreased rainfall and temperaturesmayextend thegrowing season, leading tolocally increased agricultural productivity, particularly in developed countriesthatcanalsocapitaliseon technological innovation leading to localbenefitbutfurther global inequality (UNDP, 2007). There may be more benignopportunities from climate change that need not contribute to greenhouse gasemissions or exaggerate social inequality (such as crop reselection), but theseappeartrivialcomparedtopresentandpredictedcosts.Theannualimpactfromnatural disasters associated with climate change alone accounts for tens ofthousandsofdeaths,millionsofpeopleaffectedandbillionsofUS$ lost,withdrought, flooding, temperature shocks and wind storms causing the greatestimpacts (Guha-Sapiretal.,2004).By2080 thenumberofadditionalpeopleatriskofhungercouldreach600million(Hansen,2007).Climatechangethreatensthe Millennium Development Goals and most especially the developmentprospectsofalargesectionofhumanity.UNDP(2007)arguesthatsome40percent of theworld’s population, over 2.6 billionpeople,will be consigned to afuture of reduced opportunity without action tomitigate and adapt to climatechange.Withthiscontext,ourfocusonadaptationisprimarilyasamechanismtoavoidharm.Theimpactsofclimatechangewillbefeltdirectly(weatherrelatedandsea-levelriseevents),indirectly(throughtheknock-onconsequencesofreducedaccesstobasic needs as critical infrastructure is damaged or employment lost) and assystems perturbations (the local implications of impacts on global commoditypricesor internationalmigration).Adaptation thereforeneeds to insert itself toamelioratevulnerabilitycausedbyeachlevelofimpact.However,asonemovesfrom direct through indirect to systems perturbations, climate change impactsinteract with other systems features such as development policy, demographyandculturalnorms.Thismakesitincreasinglyhardtoidentifyandcommunicate

theconsequencesofclimatechangeinisolationsothatadaptationbecomesbothaclimatechangespecificandmoregenerichumanprocessofdevelopment.Thevastnessofclimatechangeandthemultitudeofpathwaysthroughwhichitcanaffect life and wellbeing for any individual or organisation make it almostimpossiblefor‘climatechange’inaholisticsensetobethetargetofadaptation.Incomparison,internationaltargetsformitigationarerelativelysimple.Rather,peopleandagenciestendtoadapttolocalexpressionsofclimatechange–floodevents, changing crop yields or disease vector ecologies, often withoutattributing impacts or adaptation to climate change. This again makesidentification, communication and ultimately the development of supportinggovernance structures for climate change adaptation a challenge unless sucheffortsareintegratedintoeverydayactivitiesandstructuresofpolicy-making.

Theantecedentsofadaptation

Thenotionofadaptingtoenvironmentalstressandshockhasbeenthefocusofprevious rounds of academic investigation from fields outside climate change.Tovaryingdegreestheideasgeneratedhavebeenrecognisedandincorporatedinthe development of the ideawithin the climate change community. Jeffry andMcIntosh (2006) identify relevant literature dispersed across economics(industry sector dynamics, innovation processes and risk-taking behaviour),psychology(characteristicsof inventorsandrisk takers),philosophyofscience(roles of innovation/invention), sociology (population dynamics, sociology ofgroups and networks), anthropology (collapse of complex societies) andevolutionarytheory(roleofdiversityandadaptationinsurvival).Despite the rich inheritance of contemporarywriting on adaptation to climatechangethisisrarelyexplicitlynoted.Fourstreamsofthinkingonadaptationareexaminedinthissection;thefirsthistorical,theothersstillinuseandinteractingwith the climate change adaptation discourse, but all largely outside themainstreamofwritingonclimatechangeadaptation.First tobe reviewedhereare those perspectives on adaptation that have drawn from the ecologicalsystems (cybernetics and coevolution). This strategy has its roots in earlysustainable development theory building with efforts to overcome the falsedualismofnatureandsociety.Secondisabodyofworkthatusesthelanguageof adaptation and learning todescribepolicydevelopmentover time (adaptivemanagement).Thirdarethoseapproachesthathavecomefromtheinterfaceofinternationaldevelopment,governanceanddisasterstudies(coping).Together these antecedents of the contemporary debate on adaptation in theclimatechangecommunitymakeupaconceptualbackdrop,onewithwhich to

contextualise contemporary literature on adaptation to climate change, and toidentifygapsandrepetitioninthedevelopmentoftheideaanditscritiques.

Cybernetics

Academicgeographyhasa longhistoryofengagementwithadaptation. In the1970sand’80sthiswasfirstexplicitlyformulatedaspartofanexperimentwithcybernetic theory.Cyberneticsdrewonevolutionary theory toconnectanalysisofsocialandnaturalsystems.Itwasinpartaresponsetotheprecedingschoolsof regional geography and human ecology studies that tended to present theenvironmentaslittlemorethanbackground,assumingitsmalleabilitytohumanintervention. Cybernetics sought to provide a more integrated approach tohuman–environment relations, and one that could be engaged with in aquantitative manner and so exploit the new computer modelling capacitiesemergingatthattime.Naturaldisasters,includingslowonsetdroughtandfoodsecurity events, were used to exemplify the need for the more integratedapproach offered by cybernetics. Given that the cybernetic approach andcontemporaryresiliencyschool(seeChapter3)havesimilarroots inecologicaltheory, the criticisms levelled at cybernetics are especially worthy ofconsideration.In 1975, Vayda and McCay first advocated adaptation as a bridging conceptbetweenculturalecologyandnaturalhazardsresearch.Theyconceptualisedtheinteractionofsocialandnaturalsystemsthroughbackwardandforwardflowsinenergy and material. This helped to provide some quantitative modellingpurchase but was not further developed. But many elements of adaptationintroducedin thisperioddoreoccur incontemporarydebates.This includesaninterestinthetemporalstagingofadaptiveactions,onthepossibilityofmal-orsub-optimal adaptation, and in laterwork on social context as a root cause ofadaptiveactions.Withitsbaseinecologicalunderstandingsofsystemsdynamicsthis perspective used parsimony (rather than equity) as a measure ofeffectivenessinadaptation.Underthisrubricadaptiveactionsshouldnotrequireany unnecessary or excessive commitment of resources. Should initialadaptations prove insufficient additional actions would be taken so thatadaptationunfoldsinasequentialandrationalpatternofincreasinglyresource-intensiveinterventions(SlobodkinandRappaport,1974).Theecologicaloriginsof this approach to adaptation inspired this rationalist logic and also removedanydiscussionofvaluesorjustice.Theaimofadaptationwastomaintainstasisin thefaceofenvironmentalperturbations,not toenableprogressivechange in

socialor socio-ecological systems.Acontemporarycritic,Morren (1983), alsoregardedthecyberneticapproachasbeinglimitedbyfocusingonlossreductionnotprevention.Under the cybernetic approach, adaptive capacitywas approached through thenotionofflexibility:‘uncommittedpotentialityforchange’(Bateson,1972:497).Theprincipalofparsimonymeantthatlossofflexibility(opportunityforfutureadaptiveactions)wasseenasaparticularlysignificantcostofadaptation.Mucheffort was put into developing typologies of flexibility and adaptation andcomparing this with specific environmental pressures. Counter to the rule ofparsimony, great variationwas observed in the actions taken by people facingsimilar hazards (Morren, 1983). By supporters of this approach such findingswereconsideredas irrationalactionsby thoseat risk.Criticsargued thatwhilethe cybernetic approach had made progress in providing a framework thatrecognised social context as amediatingpressureon theenvironment, shapingrisk and adaptation, it did not have the conceptual tools to analyse theserelationships. Analysis of adaptation was trapped at the level of informationaccess,transmissionanddecision-makingapparatuses.Deepersocialrelationsofproductionandpowerwerenotincluded.One outcome of this failing of the cybernetics approach, which continues toinfluence work on adaptation and vulnerability to disaster risk today, was toprovidetheinspirationfortheself-styled,alternativeschool(Hewitt,1983).Thealternative school sought to reveal the structural root causes shaping risk bydrawing from neo-Marxist dependency theory. Within this tradition, Wattsarguedthat:theforcesandsocialrelationsofproductionconstitutetheuniquestartingpointforhumanadaptationwhichistheappropriationandtransformationofnatureintomaterialmeansofsocialreproduction.Thisprocessisboth social and cultural and it reflects the relationships to and participation in the production process.(Watts,1983:242).ForWatts,adaptationwentbeyondhumanresponsestoenvironmentalchangeornaturalhazardtoincorporateallprocessesofenvironmentaltransformationandinteractionwiththenaturalworldincludingextractionforwealthcreation.Thiskey conceptual contribution continues today with the realisation that climatechangeadaptationisbutapartofdeeperandbroaderprocessesofsocialchangeandinertia.Inanalyticaltermsthekeycontributionofthealternativeschoolwastoopena theoretical frameworkgrounded in critical theory for theanalysisofthestructuralconstraintsthattheyargueddeterminedhumancapacityandactionin response to external environmental shocks. This critical view expandedanalysisfromthetechnicalattributesthatsurroundspecificadaptationdecisions,tothesociallifeinwhichtheyareembedded.Contributionsincludedcritiqueofthe structures of humanitarianism and international development that it was

argued allowed vulnerability to persist and did not support progressiveadaptationinthefaceofenvironmentalrisk(Susmanetal.,1983).Thiscritiquehas particular salience given the influence of ecological and systems inspiredtheory on the conceptualisation of adaptation within climate change sciencetoday.

Coevolution

Drawingmetaphoricallyfromthelanguageofevolutionarybiology,coevolution,as proposed by Norgaard (1995), extends the cosmology of adaptation bybringinginvalues.Italsoexpandsthetime-horizonandscaleofwhatmightbeconsideredadaptiveactionfromthelocalandimmediatetoglobalandlong-terminteractions. Adaptation in the context of climate change similarly extendscoevolution, by including inanimate natural elements as well as biotic andhuman ones as subjects and forces for change (Adger and Brooks, 2003). Inshort, coevolution is found in the reciprocity of interacting components(including human, technological, physical and bio-chemical elements andsystems)withinevolutionarysystems.Norgaard(1995)includesknowledgeandvaluesalongsidetechnology,socialorganisationandthenaturalenvironmentascategories, sites and drivers for adaptation. Norgaard also moves from amaterialist(adaptationcanbedescribedthroughtechnicalchanges,forexample,in engineering or farming practices) to a relational and constructivistepistemology (where adaptation includes changes in identity and wellbeingincludinghumanity’srelationwiththenon-human)sothat:atechnologicalinnovationorintroductionfromanotherregionwillaffectthefitnessofvariousaspectsofsocialorganisation,perhapsfavoringadifferentmixofindividualandcommunityrights,orfavoringmoreor less hierarchicalways of socially processing information.The changes in social organisation, in turn,might feedback on the fitness of other components in the technological system, or favor some types ofvaluesortypesofknowledgeoverothers.(Norgaard,1995:486)Adaptation seen through the lens of coevolution is not an end point. It is atransitional and relational episode in history; one that is open to back-sliding,distortion and amplification as outcomes interactwith other subsystems in thecoevolving whole. Coevolutionary processes change structure and interactionrules. They typically preclude the possibility of previous system statesreoccurring. This is a distinction from the dynamic characteristics of non-evolutionarymodelswhereonly status canbechanged,notguiding rules.Therules in ecological systems are fixed (until our understanding of nature andphysics changes) – in social and socio-ecological systems rules of culture andlawaremutable.Coevolution emphasises change. Innovations drive the coevolutionary process,

but their drivers (disaster events,macro-economic cycles, household collapse)areoftennotamenabletoplanning.Thismakesitdifficult,perhapsimpossible,topredictwithhighconfidencewhatwillworkbest intheothersubsystemsasadaptationsandtheirconsequencescoevolvewiththewholesystempotentiallynever reaching a new equilibrium (Klüver, 2002). This challenge argues for ashiftfromseekingtopredictandcontrolsubsystems,andthroughthisthewhole,to a framing that argues for adaptive planning. This is achieved through themaintainingof diversity tokeepoptionsopen and apreference formonitoringrather than a presumption for managing or resisting changes. Consequentlydiscourseand theflowof information,decision-makingcapacityandprocessesandability to implementdecisionsarehighlightedas subjects for researchandpolicyifadaptationistobeunderstoodandsupported.Norgaard(1995)alsoreflectsontherelationshipsbetweenhumanity,natureandhydrocarbons.Under thecoevolutionaryepistemologyheargues thathumanityhas coevolvedwith hydrocarbons, not nature/ecosystems (Norgaard, 1995). Inthe short–medium term this has been possible because hydrocarbons haveshielded (and alienated) us from nature, but the consequences of a failure toselectproductionsystemsandinstitutionsthatcoevolvewithnatureisnowbeingfelt (Norgaard, 1995). At this scale of analysis living with climate changeincludesactsthatarenotsimplyadaptiveormitigative,butthatunderpingenericcapacity, such as a movement frommaterial consumption to community as asource of identity including the (re)building of communities of place andpersonal relationshipswith nature. Coevolution, then, points to a large gap incontemporaryclimatechangesciencewhichhasonlyrecentlybeguntoconsiderthedeeperculturalneedsofanddrivers foradaptation(O’Brien,2009). Italsooffersaframingforthinkingthroughthisproblem.The abstract nature of coevolution makes for difficult translation into anempirical research framework. While coevolution has been successful at thelevel of metaphor to frame accounts of adaptive behaviour within complexsystems (Pelling, 2003a) and economic-ecological systems interaction at theglobalscale(SchneiderandLonder,1984)ithasmorelimitedapplicabilityasatoolforlocalanalysis.Oneusefullineofanalysishighlightedbythislensistherelationshipbetweenintention(policies)andemergence(self-organisedactivity)inpolicysectors,thelatterinlargepartaccountingforobserveddivergencefrompolicy during implementation (Sotarauta and Srinivas, 2006) and so revealingtensions between the actions and values of competing adaptive strategies orotherbehaviour.JeffreyandMcIntosh(2006),inareviewofthecoevolutionofland use and water management, argue that ‘noise’ from the range ofinterconnectionsinanysystemmakesitdifficulttodistinguishcoevolutionfrom

state-baseddynamicchange,andatamoregeneralleveltheyaskwhatitisthatcoevolutionbringsthathasnotalreadybeenproposedthroughcomplexsystemstheory.MorecontestableisCostanza’s(2003)criticismthatthisapproachofferslittle potential as a planning or predictive tool. To be sure, coevolutionaryapproachesaremoreabletocapturebackwardthanforwardlookingassessmentsofadaptation,butmethodshavebeendeveloped,inparticularintegratedscenarioassessments, that allow some purchase for forward looking analysis of theinteractionbetweensubsystemsandconstraintsonadaptation(Lorenzonietal.,2000).

Adaptivemanagement

Like cybernetics and coevolution, adaptive management draws from systemstheoryandrecognisestheinterdependenceofthesocialandecological.Itsfocusis alsoon large andcomplex socio-ecological systemsdynamics; for example,watershedor forestrymanagement. Itsmajor contribution is in takingus fromabstract, modelling or conceptual work to that based firmly in the empiricalreality of decision-makers who wish to mainstream adaptation into changingsocio-ecologicalcontexts.Firstdeveloped in the late1970s tosupportdecision-makingunderuncertaintyfornaturalresourcemanagement(Holling,1978),adaptivemanagement ispartof a wider body of literature on organisational management that sees social/organisational learning as a key attribute for systems survival (Argyris andSchön 1978) (seeChapters 3 and 6). This is often explained as the spread ofsuccessful innovations from individuals to become common practice; forexample, where a new agricultural or management practice is copied until itbecomes the norm.Under adaptivemanagement individual and organisationallearning is both encouraged from planned actions (such as change in theregulatory environment) and in response to unplanned environmental surprises(natural or technological disasters). While not specifically formulated withclimate change in mind, the aim of providing a conceptual framework andsubsequent management guidance for decision-making in contexts whereinformation is scarce and contexts are dynamic is analogous to the challengefacingforwardlookingclimatechangeadaptation(Pellingetal.,2007b).Learning is enabled in adaptive management through ongoing policyexperiment. This usually takes the form of centrally developed managementinnovations that are piloted locally. If successful they may be replicated orupscaled across the management regime. Underlying hypotheses explaining

relationshipsbetweenmanagementactionsandenvironmentalsystemsareinthisway compared and adapted to over time.This should produce continuous andanticipatory adaptation (Kay, 1997); indeed as the environment changes inresponse to social adaptations this would demarcate a coevolutionary systemovertime.Arangeofinterpretationsoftheadaptivemanagementapproachexist.Learningisframedasanactivityat the interfaceofenvironmentalandeconomicpolicy,through to wider questions of democratic principles, scientific analysis andeducation (Medema et al., 2008). Walters and Hilborn (1978) distinguishbetweendifferentdegreesof formality in learning,betweenpassive andactiveadaptivemanagement,withactiveapproachesusingformalscientificmethodstoevaluateexperimentsand,itisclaimed,providingmorereliableinformationfordecision-makers. Medema et al. (2008) describe active approaches asexperience–knowledge–action cycles. In all cases high levels of stakeholderinvolvementare requiredfor thesurfacingofhypothesesand the translationofexperimentalfindingsintopolicylearning.Evidence from existing experiments in adaptive management offer an earlyopportunitytoobservethechallengeslikelytopresentthemselvesifadaptationtoclimatechangewere tobecomemainstreamed intodevelopment.Someverysignificantchallenges toadaptivemanagementhavebeen identifiedbyWalters(1997),Lee(1993)andMedemaetal.(2008).In a review of 25 adaptive management regimes in riparian and coastalecosystemsoftheUSA,Walters(1997)foundonlytwothatwerewellplannedwith programmes being distracted by focusing on the process of modeldevelopment and refinement rather than field testing and application.Waltersargues that failure in the take-up of adaptivemanagement by senior decision-makersiscausedbyacombinationoftheperceivedshort-termexpenseandriskof undertaking experiments, concern that the acknowledgement of uncertaintyand acceptance of experimentation inherent in adaptive management mayunderminemanagementcredibility,andlackofparticipationfromstakeholders.Lee(1993)alsoanalysesthebarrierstotake-upandaddsthatthehighcostsofinformation gathering and monitoring and associated difficulties in acquiringfunding have also inhibited the implementation of adaptive managementapproaches.Medemaetal.(2008)summarisethesechallengesintofourbarriersfor implementation of adaptivemanagement, eachwith an associated researchagenda.ThesearepresentedinTable2.1.Theirmostimportantcallisforlong-term research on the outcomes and challenges of adaptivemanagementwhichunfold slowly and very differently in individual contexts; a proposal that fitswellwith theneed toshift fromindicatingadaptationcapacity toverifying the

outcomesofadaptiveactions.The institutional and economic constraints identified in Table 2.1 are allamenable to policy that can support experimentation andmake learning fromerror an acceptable method for living with change. Where climate-change-associateduncertainty is increasing, theefficiencyargumentmayalsomove infavourofamoreadaptivemanagementapproach.Adaptive management also helps to provide insight into a key element ofadaptation to climate change – multi-stakeholder collaboration for sociallearning. Evidence suggests that many of the challenges to this aspect ofadaptivemanagementarecommontootherdevelopmentapproachesthatseektoincorporate or be led by community actors. Such challenges are most wellstudiedininternationaldevelopmentcontexts(forexample,Mungaietal.,2004)and often revolve around the distribution of power between local andmanagement actors worked out through the division of labour andresponsibilities,andcontrolof informationanddecision-makingrights (Pellinget al., 2007b). In a study of seven community-based forestry managementorganisations supported as part of adaptive management programmes in thewesternUSA, Fernandez-Gimenez et al. (2008) found that the best outcomesmeasured by benefits in social learning, trust and community building, andapplicationandcommunicationofresultscamefromprojectswherelocalactorshad been given an opportunity to participate, not only in data collection andmonitoring but also in design and objective setting, and where projects weresupportedbycommensuratelylargebudgets.Ofthoseprojectswithmuchmorelimitedfinancialsupportthebestresultswerefoundwherecommunitymembersparticipatedinmultipleroles.Table2.1BarriersfortheimplementationofadaptivemanagementChallenge BarrierforadaptiveManagement ResearchagendaInstitutional Rigidinstitutions(culturalvaluesand

moreformalrules).Lack of stakeholder commitment toshareinformationoverthelongterm.

What institutional arrangements are best suited toimplementingadaptivemanagement?

Evidenceofsuccess

The use of ‘soft’ conceptual andqualitative modelling makes itdifficulttocommunicateoutcomes.The boundaries between adaptivemanagement and backgroundprocesses can be difficult todistinguish.

Methodologiesareneededtogatherevidenceforandcommunicate theoutcomesofadaptivemanagementtostakeholders.

Ambiguityofdefinition

Multiple,ambiguousdefinitionsmakeit difficult for resource managers tounderstand how they can apply this

Isambiguityapotentialstrengthindicatingdiversity?Refining the typology of approaches associatingthemselveswith thisadaptivemanagementwillhelp

approach. addclarity.Complexity,costs andrisk

Experimentation can be ecologicallyandeconomicallyrisky.Adaptive management is slow andplanning costs are high compared tocentralisedmanagement.

Anhonestdialogueisneededontheappropriatenessof concepts from complexity science such as sub-optimality,uncertaintyanddiversity.

(Source:basedonMedemaetal.,2008)

From this more bottom-up perspective the key challenges for adaptivemanagement – and by implication for integrating adaptation into developmentplanningmoregenerally–canbeidentified:•theneedforhigherlevelorganisationstobereceptivetolocalviewpointsandundertakelearninginresponse,•thechallengesofmaintaininglocalengagementoverextendedtime-spans,and•determiningandsecuringtheneededleveloftechnicalassistanceandsciencecapacitytoensurethevalidityandcredibilityofcommunity-ledefforts.Fernandez-Gimenezetal. (2008)alsopoint to theopportunities thatadaptationcan open. They note that community-led approaches to adaptivemanagementcan be a source of local skill training and employment generation in theestablishmentofanecologicalmonitoringworkforce.Thesecouldinpartoffsetorhelptojustifythefinancialcostsofadaptationindevelopment.

Copingmechanisms

The notion of coping has acquired a sizable and well developed literature. Itdescribes the strategiesusedby those livingwith rapidonset disasters such asflash floods, and chronic disasters, including drought and food insecurity(Wisner et al., 2004). This matches well the dual interests of adaptation toclimate extremes and base-line change. Coping has also been used to exploresocial change in relation to wider impacts of social violence and personaltragedy(Leeetal.,2009).Despitethiswealthofknowledgeofdirectrelevanceto climate change adaptation, learning has been limited (Schipper andPelling,2006). This makes it important to identify what, if any, are the similaritiesbetween coping and adaptation, andwhat adaptation could usefully take fromthis literature; and also to make clear the boundaries between these twoconcepts.Within the natural disasters and food security literature numerous models forcopinghavebeenproposedsincethe1970s.Thesehavevariouslybeenframedby entitlements (Sen, 1981), human ecology (Hewitt, 1983), game theory(Uphoff, 1993) and livelihoods analysis (Leach et al., 1997). Across these

theoretical realmsmodels tend tobeagency focused, themajorityoperatingatthehouseholdlevelandtodifferentiatecopingeitherbystageorsectorofaction.Burtonetal. (1993) isoneof themostencompassingmodels,connectingslowculturalchangewithrapidadjustments.Thisfour-stagemodelcommenceswithloss absorption where hazard impacts are tolerated, absorbed as part of theongoing coevolution of socio-ecological systems with no tangible impacts orobserved,instrumentaladjustments.Stagetwo,lossacceptance,isreachedoncethe negative effects of a hazard are socially perceived but losses are bornewithout active mediation. The third stage of loss reduction commences oncelossesareperceived tobehigher thancosts formitigation; this is the focusofmost disaster reductionwork.A final stage of radical change is reached oncehazard impacts canno longerbemitigated andmajor socio-economic changesareexperiencedeitherthroughimpactorattemptstominimisedisasterloss.Thisbroadviewofcoping isuseful in identifyingcopingassimultaneouslya long-term (cultural) and short-term (economic) process of realignment to changingenvironmentalconditions.Thismodelalsoflagstheimportanceofperceptiononaction.Theimplicationofatemporaldimensionopensthepossibilityoftippingpoints where one stage flips into another through changes in vulnerability orhazard.Alternative categorisations of coping offer typologies of action; for example,Wisneretal.(2004)identifyfourkindsofcopingaction:disasterpreventionandloss management (for example, hazard mitigation schemes, early warningsystems), diversification of production (for example, the promotion of mixedcropping, livelihood diversification), development of social support networks(forexample, informalreciprocityorstatewelfare)andpost-disasteractions tocontain loss (for example, opportunistic livelihoods, insurance, novel socialorganisation).ThisapproachhastheadvantageofprovidingtechnicaldetailbutisrestrictedtoBurtonetal.’sstageoflossreductionandpossiblyradicalchange.While these models are designed to accommodate action at multiple spatialscalestheylesseasilyrevealthetrade-offsandinteractionsofcopinginteractingacross scale. Livelihoods models are one response to this challenge andexplicitly situate agents (normally households) within an institutional context.Copingresponsesarelocatedattheinterfaceofactorsandinstitutions(Leachetal.,1997).While a successful concept, coping is ultimatelymisleading as ametaphor forsocialresponsestoenvironmentalchangeatitimpliesthatactorsaregettingby,doingokay.Thiscanbe thecase,withagriculturalists, for example,deployingcopingmechanisms to get through the low-productivity periods in the annualagriculturalcycle(Davies,1993).Butoften,acts labelledascopingrequire the

expenditure or conversionof valuable assets to achieve lower-order outcomes,undermining current capacities and future development options. This ratcheteffect (Chambers, 1989) is socially amplified when multiple individuals,householdsorbusinessesdeploysimilareconomicstrategies–sellingassetsorchanginglivelihoods–andsounderminingmarketvalue.Competitioncanturninto collaboration with virtuous magnifier effects through the use of socialcapital, which can be built up and whose impact can be extended throughmultiplesimultaneousactions.Thereare,however,limitseventoindividualandsocietalstocksofsocialcapitalsothatcontinuingenvironmentalstressorrepeatshocks can lead to a cascade of failure as social and economic assets areexpended. Figure 2.2 indicates a sequence of coping acts that can lead tocollapseasassetsaredepletedinthefaceofunrelievedstress.Swift(1989)arguesthathouseholdcollapsebecomesinevitableoncecoresocialand economic assets are lost and is observed even when macro-economicconditionsimprove,revealinghowindividualvulnerability,orcapacitytocope,operateswithadegreeofindependencefromstructuralconditions.Households,especiallypoorhouseholds, livewithmanykindsof riskaswellasadesire tofulfil unmet needs and wants. So it is that households have to play offexpendituresonimmediatehouseholdmaintenanceagainstinvestmenttorecoverlost resources or offset anticipated risk, and this canmake itmore difficult toreplace savings or productive assets once they have been expended throughcoping. The potential for social capital to be undermined through ever moredestructiveroundsofcopinglinkshouseholdcollapsetothatofcollectivelyheldassets such as social cohesion or notions of community. Commencing with ashift in investment and use from bridging to bonding capital that amplifiescultural difference and competitive group behaviour (Goodhand et al., 2000),subsequentcopingdetractsfrommorefundamentalaspectsoflocalsocialcapitalthrough a withdrawal of investment in short-term (health) and long-term(education)socialcapital,andfinally in fragmentationof themostbasicsocialunit – the household. As with the economic cascade, cultural contexts willdeterminetheordermovement.For

Figure2.2Thecopingcascade:copinganderosionofhouseholdsustainability(Source:basedonPelling,2009)example,childsharingisawell-developedcopingmechanismintheCaribbeanthatneednotsignifyapproachinghouseholdcollapse.Heretheextendedfamily,not the household, is the basic unit of social organisation (Pelling, 2003b).Broadly, though,asahouseholdapproachescollapse subsequentactsaremoredifficulttoreverse.The delicate balance between the terms coping and climate change adaptation(seeTable2.2),andthenegotiationoftheintellectualdivisionoflabourbetweenthemcanbefoundinsomeearlywritingonadaptation.KellyandAdger(2000)define coping capacity as the ability of a unit to respond to an occurrence ofharmandtoavoiditspotentialimpacts,andadaptivecapacityastheabilityofaunit togradually transform its structure, functioningororganisation to surviveunderhazardsthreateningitsexistence.Thisdistinctionbuildsonearlierwork;for example,working on food security,Gore (1992, inDavies, 1993) offers adistinctionbasedon the actor–institution relationships.Coping is themeans tosurvive within the prevailing systems of rules; adaptation is indicated wheninstitutions (cultural norms, laws, routine behaviour) and livelihoods change.Thisdistinctionisbecomingincreasinglyaccepted.Underthisrubricanexampleof copingmight be selling cattle during drought,with adaptation signified bymigration or a change in livelihood to supplement or replace dependence onlivestock. Critics of this division argue that, on the ground, the distinctionbetweencopingandadaptationintermsofthedepthofconsequenceforactorsis

Table2.2DistinctionsbetweencopingandadaptationCoping Adaptation SourceTheabilityof aunit to respond toanoccurrenceofharmandtoavoiditspotentialimpacts

The ability of a unit to gradually transform its structure,functioning or organisation to survive under hazardsthreateningitsexistence

KellyandAdger(2000)

The means to survive within theprevailingsystemsofrules

Change to the institutions (cultural norms, laws, routinebehaviour)embodiedinlivelihoods

Gore(1992)

The range of actions available torespond to the perceived climatechange risks in any given policycontext

Change to the set of available inputs that determine copingcapacity

YoheandTol(2002)

The process through whichestablished practices andunderlying institutions aremarshalledwhenconfrontedbytheimpactsofclimatechange

The process throughwhich an actor is able to reflect uponand enact change in those practices and underlyinginstitutions that generate root and proximate causes of risk,frame capacity to cope and further rounds of adaptation toclimatechange

Pelling(2010)

greatly influenced by the viewpoint of the observer. This blurs the practicalutilityof theempiricalboundariesbetweencopingandadaptation,producingapotential lack of analytical and policy clarity (for example, Saldaña-Zorrilla,2008).Yohe and Tol (2002) offer a nuance on the distinction between coping andadaptationdescribedabove.Theyseeadaptivecapacityasdescribingthesetofavailable inputs that determine coping capacitywhich itself ismanifest in therangeofactionsavailabletorespondingtoperceivedclimatechangerisksinanygiven policy context. Adaptive capacity is determined by underlying socialfactors: resources, institutions, social capital, human capital, risk spreading,information management and awareness. Their availability is context specificand path dependent. Coping capacity is defined by the range of practicalmeasuresthatcanbetakentoreducerisk.Therange,feasibilityandefficiencyofthese measures is determined by adaptive capacity. This logic reveals someinsightfuloutcomes in therelationshipsbetween inputsandactions(adaptationandcoping).Enhancedinvestment in the‘weakest link’componentofadaptivecapacityhas theadvantage of raising coping capacity across the board – or atleast until the next weakest link emerges to limit coping. By the same tokeninvesting in one component in isolation need not increase coping capacity.Addingtotheresourcebasemay,forexample,havenoeffectoncopingcapacityifinstitutionalprocessesordecision-makingstructuresblockimplementation.The distinction being made by these authors reflects other attempts todisentangle distinct relationships between actors and their environment. Thishelps provide some depth to the more narrowly focused challenge of

coping/adaptationinclimatechange.TheinterestofFreire(1969)wastomaketransparent the potential role of education in society – much like the climatechangeproblem,hisconcernwastoseedevelopmentasaprocessthatcontainedwhatthepoorknewandwhattheyimaginedtheycoulddowithknowledge.Thedistinctionbetween‘adaptedman’(thatis,someonewhohaslearnttolivewiththe current system) and ‘critical consciousness’ has parallels with coping andadaptation.Adaptedmancorrespondswithcoping–wheresuccessiveroundsofcoping, that is, of accommodatingone’s life to livewithhazard,describewellthe ratchet effect undermining assets and human wellbeing. Criticalconsciousness–theabilitytoseeone’spositioninsocietyasafunctionofsocialstructuresasaprerequisitetoseekingwaysofmakingchangeinthosestructures– has great parallels with the institutional dimensions of adaptation describedabove. The difference is that climate change has to date been drivenpredominantlybyaconcernformaintainingefficiencyintheoutputofeconomicsystemsandlivelihoodsratherthaninthebalanceofpowerbetweenactorsorasembodiedininstitutions.Thusthecurrentmodesofdefiningadaptationgoonlyhalfway tomeetFreire; theyacknowledge theaction tochange institutionsbutdo not emphasise the potential for emancipation that this could bring – norindeedthatthiscouldbeaparallelandevenmotivatinggoalforclimatechangeadaptation.Thesystemsworldviewthathashadagreat influenceonrecentthinkingabouthuman responses to climate change also recognises the potential for moreprofoundchange (forexample,FloodandRomm,1996;Pellingetal.,2007b).ArgyrisandSchön(1996)identifiedthreekindsoflearning,termedfirst,secondand third loop learning. Only the first two are encompassed routinely in thedistinctionbetweencopingandadaptationinclimatechangeliterature.Firstlooplearning correspondswith coping – learning to improvewhat you already do.Second loop learning corresponds with adaptation – learning to change themechanismsusedtomeetyourgoals.Thirdlooplearning–learningthatresultsfromachangeintheunderlyingvaluesthatdeterminegoalsandactions–islessclearlyexpressedwithincurrentadaptationtheory.The lack of emphasis in climate change literature on adaptation as criticalconsciousness or third loop learning is likely a reflection on the difficulty ofmakingclearempiricalassociationsbetweenclimatechangerelatedimpactsandsocialchangeofthisorder.Chapters5and8aimtoprovideonestepforwardinopening this discussion. There is also the possibility that the climate changecommunity–whichhasitseyestightlyfocusedontheIPCCprocess,andwhichinturnisaproductofnegotiatedcontentbetweenscienceandgovernments–hasnot found analysis of power as part of adaptation to be a priority. It risks

alienating the political and technical decision-makers for whom the IPCCendeavourisdesignedtosupport.Another areawhere coping is still a predominant term, and onewhere furtherdevelopment could prove insightful for work on climate change, is thepsychologicalliterature.Thisworkviewscopingasaninterioractiondeterminedby the interaction of cognitive and emotional process, but acknowledginginteraction with socialised values, access to information and social–historicalcontext. Individual ability to cope with stress associated with catastrophe hasbeendescribedaspsychologicalresilience(Walsh,2002).Thisliteratureismostdeveloped in the USA, with Hurricane Katrina stimulating many studiesincluding Lee et al. (2009) who identified psychological resilience as anoutcome of survivors’ perseverance, ability to work through emergingdifficultiesandabilitytomaintainanoptimisticviewofrecovery.Amongstthisgroupthosewhosufferedhumanlosswereleastabletocope,withpropertylosshaving only a minor impact on capacity for psychological recovery. Otherhurricane events in the US have shown that survivors who reported moreresource loss also reportedhigher levelsof active and risk-reducingbehaviour(Benightetal.,1999).Thishasimportantimplicationsfortheappropriatenessofmainstream methodologies for measuring disaster impact and for disasterresponse and recovery efforts which predominantly focus on economic andphysicalratherthansocialandpsychologicalaspects.Psychologyhasbeguntooffersomeinsightintothefactorsleadingtoindividualwellbeingandempowermentpost-disaster,althoughthelinktomaterialcopingactions is as yet lesswell defined. Psychological traits associatedwith copingfollowingHurricaneKatrina includedaheightenedsenseofcontroloverone’sdestinyandofpersonalgrowth.Thesein turnwereattributedtosurvivorswhowere problem-focused, accepting of loss, optimistic and held a religiousworldview(LinleyandJoseph,2004).Inthegeneralpopulationtalking,stayinginformed and praying enabled coping, emerging as predictors of decreasedpsychological stress during post-disaster relocation (Spence etal., 2007),withspiritualityparticularlysignificantforolderAfricanAmericanKatrinaevacuees(LawsonandThomas,2007). In a comparisonofpsychological resiliencepre-andpost-Katrina,Kessleretal. (2006) found reduced thoughtsof suicideafterthedisasterinsurvivorsexpressingfaithintheirabilitytorebuildtheirlifeandarealisationofinnerstrength.Thisisimportantinprovidinganempiricallinkforadaptation, between internal processes of belief, identity and self-worth andexternal actions, in this sad case illustrated through suicide rates. Outside theUS, following the 2003 earthquake inGuatemala, feelings of self-control andself-assurance were also found associated with adaptation outcomes of

‘successful survivors’ who reconceptualised the crises as opportunities foracquiringnewskills(Vazquezetal.,2005).Thisworkprovidesoneapproachforpromotingaprogressiveresponsetoclimatechangethroughacknowledgingtheinterplayofsocialandpsychologicalrootcauses(Moos,2002),butthishasyettobesystematicallyapplied(Zamanietal.,2006).Itprovidesaninitialevidencebasetobeginacharacterisationofspecificpsychologicalorientationsassociatedwith adaptation and linking interior and exterior expressions of adaptation,takingusclosertogainingsomeleverageonthewaysinwhichindividualsandsocial collectives might move between different cognitive, emotional andpotentially intellectual states; the latter opening scope for the study of shiftsbetween‘adaptiveman’andcriticalconsciousnessorfirst,secondandthirdlooplearning.Inordertoincorporatedeeperlevelsofchangewhileretainingcloselinkstotheexisting literatureadaptation toclimatechange isdefinedhereas:Theprocessthrough which an actor is able to reflect upon and enact change in root andproximatecausesofrisk.Thisformulationseescopingastherangeofactionscurrentlybeingenactedinresponse to a specific hazard context. These are made possible by existingcopingcapacity(whichmayextendbeyondtherangeofcopingactsobservedatanyonetime).Adaptationdescribestheprocessofreflectionandpotentiallyofmaterial change in the structures, values and behaviours that constrain copingcapacity and its translation into action. Coping then is an expression of pastroundsofadaptation.Bothadaptationandcopingwillunfoldsimultaneouslyandcontinuouslyinshapinghuman–environmentrelations,theywillinteractandonthe ground they may be hard to separate as reflection and application occurhand-in-hand. Still, from an analytical perspective and for policy formulationthereisavalueindistinguishingthesetwocomponentsofhuman–environmentrelations.Thecoproductionofvulnerability/securitybycopingandadaptationbrings thepossibilitythatadaptingtoclimatechangecanundermineaswellasstrengthencapacities and actions directed at coping with contemporary climate relatedrisks. Copingmay be limited for longer-term gain or a result of ignorance orinjustice in the implementation of adaptation. This can be seen in the loss ofincomeacceptedby low-incomefamilieswhoareable toprovideaneducationfortheirchildren.Thisisanadaptiveactionthatconstrainscontemporarycopingcapacity,butwiththeaimofprovidingfuturegainsthatwillprovidethemeansfor better family wellbeing including capacity to cope with uncertainty andshocks associated with the climate change. More likely, the immediacy ofpolitical life will produce a tendency for coping that distracts from or

underminesthecriticalreflectionandlong-termviewofadaptation.Thedangeristhatcopingisfelttobesufficientsothatthepotentiallydifficultquestionsandchangesindevelopmentthatadaptationmightbringaretemporarilyevaded.Atthe scale of large social systems, this tension is illustrated by the trade-offbetween short-term social disruption and the long-term easing of socio-ecologicalfrictionproposedbyHandmerandDovers(1996)(seebelow).

Adaptationasacontemporarydevelopmentconcern

Theprecedingdiscussionon the antecedentsof adaptation reveals the framingbehindcontemporaryunderstandingsofadaptation.Thisisnotalwaysexplicitlyacknowledgedintheclimatechangeliteraturebutcanbefelt,forexample,inthepervasiveinfluenceofsystemsthinking.Systemstheoryhashadafar-reachinginfluencewithitspromiseofprovidingamechanismtointegratethesocialandnatural.Itisusedincybernetics,adaptivemanagementandtoalesserextentincoevolutionaswellas incontemporaryadaptationstudies,particularly throughworkonresilience(Folke,2006).Theaspectofadaptationgivenprominenceineach application reflects fashions in social scientific research as much as theunderlyinguseofsystemstheoryineachcase.Cybernetics,developedatatimewhen positivism was seen as providing new scope for generalisable theory,soughttoapplyavalueneutral,technicalepistemology.Itisreductive,openingscope formathematicalmodellingofbehaviourbutnot able to incorporate thesignificance of competing values and power asymmetries in shaping action.Adaptive management acknowledges the role of difference in access toinformation and decision-making capacity in shaping adaptive processes andoutcomes,butdoesnothavepowerasa focusofanalysis; likecybernetics thefocus is on technical aspects but in this casewith a view to informing policylearning. Coevolution orients adaptation less towards the search for ways inwhich to manage risk and change and is more interested in adaptation as aprocess, a state of living with uncertainty. It stands back from technical andmanagementanalysis toexamine thebiggerpictureofhistoricalchangewherecontesting values are included as a driver for change alongside knowledge,technology, organisational forms and the natural environment. Coping is theoutlierinofferingalegacyforadaptationthatisgroundednotinsystemstheorybutindevelopmentstudies.Connectionsbetweennatureandsocietyarecontextspecific and hard to generalise from, although a common language has beendeveloped throughworkonvulnerability (partlyoriginatedasa critiqueof thecybernetic school) that acknowledges both the roots of coping in political-economy but also the influence of values and social viewpoint in shaping

decisionsandoptionsforadaptation.Thesefourapproacheshighlightatensionin understandings of adaptation which persists today. This is between policyfriendlybutreductiveanalysisontheonehand,andholistic,valuesensitiveandcriticalbutpotentiallyunwieldyworkontheother.The antecedents also offer guidance on the qualities that promote adaptivecapacity.These includeparsimony (that the best adaptive choice is thatwhichexpendsleastresource);flexibility;diversity;monitoringtofacilitateappropriatechange (as distinct from managing to maintain stasis); learning as a facet ofpolicy systems and organisations aswell as individuals; and a realisation thatobservedadaptation,whileapositiveattribute,isalsoasignofstressandaplay-off that can signify approaching collapse and reduced wellbeing. These ideashave been taken up by resilience thinking and have a strong influence oncontemporaryframingsofadaptation(seebelow).Theyalsosetadaptationapartfrom other logics for assessing development, perhaps most important that ofeconomicmaximisation, a cornerstone of economic globalisation. This argueseconomies should invest in what they do best, leading to a concentration ofassets and closing off options for diversity and flexibility in the productivesectors(PellingandUitto,2001).The aim of this section is to examine the contemporary conceptualisation ofadaptationindetail.Wereviewatypologyofadaptation,discusstheinfluenceofresilience on the conceptualisation of adaptation and the significance of socialthresholds as tipping points for adaptive change, and compare economic andethicalframeworksforevaluatingadaptivechoices.Thissetsthecontextfortheproposal of the three adaptation pathways – resilience, transition andtransformation–thatarethendevelopedthroughouttheremainingchapters.

Atypologyofadaptation

Followingthe technocentricbiasof itsantecedents,muchof theearlyworkonadaptation was theorised as a technical act of adjusting economic or otherfunctions to a changing external environment. This bias has gradually beeneroded. An important literature in this regard has been that focusing onadaptation in developing country contexts (Adger et al., 2003; Nelson et al.,2007) including urban (Satterthwaite et al., 2009) and rural (Tanner andMitchell, 2008) contexts. Contributions have also been made from workdemonstrating the need to include values, feelings and emotions in decision-making(O’Brien,2009).AssummarisedinChapter1,asizableandfundamentalliteratureonadaptation

is directed towardsdifferentiating adaptations (seeSmitetal., 2000;Smit andPilifosova, 2001). Table 2.3 presents a typology of adaptation to be takenforward in this framework, and also distinguishes between the impacts ofdifferent adaptive actions. These include actions that respond to perceivedpositiveaswellasnegativeimpactsofclimatechange;thosethatarefeltdirectly(heatevents),indirectly(thepriceoffoodorwater)orthroughperturbationsinsocio-ecological systems (political instability). They are acts unfolding withinmany sectors (urban planning, water management, agriculture development,transport planning and so on) and using a range of vehicles (technicalinnovation, legislative reform, market adjustment, professional training,behaviouralchange).Theydescribeboththenatureofanadaptiveactionanditsscopeofimpact.Table2.3AtypologyofadaptationCriteria OptionsNatureofAdaptiveActionDegreeofcollaborationDegreeoffocusDegreeofforethoughtPhasing

individualorcollectivepurposefulorincidentalspontaneousorplannedproactiveorreactive

ScopeofImpactTargetTimescaleFuturewellbeingSocialconsequencesDevelopmentalorientation

proximate,intermediaryorrootcausesofriskimmediateordelayedclimate-proofingormaladaptationregressiveorprogressiveautonomousorintegrated

Adaptation is purposeful when directed towards a recognised hazard oropportunity (retro-fitting of a building) and incidental when undertaken inresponse to some other pressure that has consequences for exposure,susceptibilityoradaptivecapacity(economicopportunitiesleadingtomigrationout of a flood-prone location). Proactive adaptation is that which takes placebeforeariskmanifestsintohazard(disasterriskreduction);reactiveadaptationtakes place during or after an event (disaster reconstruction). The scope ofadaptive action can be distinguished between that which seeks to changematerial assets or practices set against less direct institutional change (seePelling and High, 2005). This is reflected in the potential targets of climatechange which may be proximate (crop variety), intermediary (local decision-makingsystems)orrootcauses(political–economicstructuresanddevelopmentvisions).Timescaleacknowledgesthatadaptationcanhaveimmediate(changingbuiltforms)ordelayed(investinginhealthandeducation)benefits.Theimpactsofadaptationonthefuturewellbeingofothersareindicatedbyactsthatcouldbe

termed as climate proofing (the integration of mitigation) or maladaptation(adaptation that increases vulnerability); socially regressive or progressivedepending on redistributive consequences, and autonomous to (isolated andcontained) or integrated in (undertaken with awareness of and aiming atsynergieswiththeactionsofothers)development.

Resilienceandadaptation

Resilience is popularly understood as the degree of elasticity in a system, itsabilitytoreboundorbouncebackafterexperiencingsomestressorshock.Itisindicatedbythedegreeofflexibilityandpersistenceofparticularfunctions.ThatresilienceisnotsimplysynonymouswithadaptationhasbeenwelldemonstratedbyWalker et al. (2006a) who argue that adaptation can undermine resiliencewhen adaptation in one location or sector undermines resilience elsewhere,where management focus on a known risk distracts attention from emergenthazardandvulnerability,andthatincreasedefficiencyinadaptation(throughriskmanagement,forexample)canleadtoinstitutionalorinfrastructuralinertiaandlossofresilientflexibility.Resilience has been contrasted both with stability and vulnerability. Stability,according toHolling (1973), is anattributeof systems that return toa stateofequilibriumafteradisturbance.Thiscompareswithresilientsystemsthatmightbe quite unstable and undergo ongoing fluctuation but still persist. Stability ismore desirable in circumstances where environmental perturbations are mild;resilience is most useful as an attribute of systems living with extremes ofimpact andunpredictability.Within the disaster risk community, resilience hasbeen interpreted as the opposite of vulnerability. The more resilient, the lessvulnerable.Butthisbeliesthecomplexityoftheconceptualrelationshipbetweenthese terms which have also been constructed as nested – with vulnerabilitybeingshapedbyresilience(Manyena,2006)whichforsomeinturnincorporatesadaptive capacity (Gallopin, 2006). Stability and vulnerability provide usefulbounding concepts for resilience. They suggest that resilience is about thepotential for flexibility to reduce vulnerability and allow specific functions topersist.What it does not tell us is how these functions are identified or whodecides(Lebeletal.,2006).Thisrequiresamorecriticalengagementwithsocialprocessesshapingresilience(seeChapters3,6,7and8).Workingwiththeideaofresilience,andespeciallyeffortsthatseektomeasureitare made difficult because of its multifaceted character. The processes andpressures determining resilience for a unit of assessment change with spatial,

temporal and social scale – a community may be resilient to climate changeassociated hurricane risk (through earlywarning and evacuation, for example)butlessresilienttothelong-terminflectionsofclimatechangewiththelocalandglobal economy.The subjects of analysis are alsowide, bringingdiversitybutalsofragmentationtothestudyofresilience.Cutteretal.(2008)identifystudiesattributing resilience and related metrics to ecological systems (biodiversity),social systems (social networks), economic systems (wealth generation),institutional systems (participation), infrastructure systems (design standards)andcommunitycompetence(riskperception)(Folke,2006;PatonandJohnston,2006;Rose,2004;Perrow,1999;ValeandCampanella,2005).One of the first critical engagements with resilience from the perspective ofenvironmental risk management came from Handmer and Dovers’ (1996)proposal of a three-way classification of resilience. This insightful frameworkhas echoesofBurtonetal.’s (1993) classification for coping and still offers agreat deal. It highlights both the contested and context specific character ofadaptationthatthisbookarguesfor,andisworthdescribinginsomedetail.Thethree-wayclassificationpresentedresilienceas:(1)resistanceandmaintenance;(2)changeatthemargins;and(3)opennessandadaptability.Resistance andmaintenance is commonplace, particularly within authoritarianpoliticalcontextswhereaccesstoinformationiscontrolled.Itischaracterisedbyresistancetochange;actorsmaydenyariskexistswithresourcesbeinginvestedtomaintainthestatusquoandsupportexistingauthoritiesinpower.Whenriskisundeniable these systems typically delay action through a call for greaterscientificresearchbeforeactionispossible.Vulnerabilitycanbeheldatbaybyresource expenditure; for example, in food aid or through containing localhazardriskthroughhardengineering‘solutions’.Butthiscangenerateadditionalrisks for other places and times throughglobal flowsof energy, resources andwaste.Thistypeofresilienceoffersaneasypathforriskmanagement,thereislittlethreattothestatusquoandconsiderablestresscouldbeabsorbed.However,whenovercomethesystemwouldbethreatenedwithalmostcompletecollapse–Diamond’s (2005) thesis on the collapse of ancient civilisations reminds us ofthispossibility.Changeat themargins isperhaps themostcommonresponse toenvironmentalthreat. Risk is acknowledged and adaptations undertaken, but limited to thosethat do not threaten core attributes of the dominant system. They respond tosymptoms,notrootcauses.Advocatesarguethatthisformofresilienceoffersanincremental reform,but it isasormore likely todelaymoremajorreformsbyofferingafalsesenseofsecurity.Preferencefornear-termstabilityoverradicalreform for thewellbeing of future generations provides a strong incentive for

this form of resilience. This approach is well illustrated by the HyogoFramework for Action on Disaster Risk Management, which sets forth aninternational agenda agreed by nations for managing disaster risks includingthose associated with climatic extremes. Not surprisingly given the vestedinterestsofdominantvoices in the internationalcommunity for the statusquo,theframeworkis limited.Itcallsfortheintegrationofriskmanagementpolicyintodevelopmentframeworks,theincreasingoflocalcapacityforriskreductionandresponse,andfornewsystemsofdisasterriskidentificationandinformationmanagement(ISDR,2005).Social systems displaying openness and adaptability tackle the root causes ofrisk,areflexibleandpreparedtochangedirectionratherthanresistchangeintheface of uncertainty. That thismode of resilience is so rare is testament to thehugeinertiatheresultsfrompersonalandcollectiveinvestmentinthestatusquo.Largefixedcapitalinvestmentsmakechangedifficultasdoinvestmentsinsoftinfrastructure – preferences for certain types of education or cultural valuesmakingshiftspainful in industrial societies.Dangersalso liewith this formofresilience: instabilitywill lead tosome ineffectivedecisionsandmaladaptationwould need to be prepared for within individual sectors as a cost of widersystems flexibility. These are both worries that decision-makers have cited inmaking it difficult for them to commit to adaptive management strategies, asdescribedabove.Handmer andDovers prefigure their account by a caution thatwhile the threeclassifications are designed to cover the full range of policy responses to theadaptationchallenge,mostactorswilloperateinonlyasmallpartofthisrange.This points to a central dilemma for progressive adaptation– that the comfortzoneforadaptiveaction is relativelysmallbecauseboth thosewithpowerandthe marginalised are wary of the instability they fear from significant socialchange (seeChapter5).Resilience then has the possibility of both identifyingthescopeforflexibilitywithinthesociallyacceptedboundsofstabilitybutalsomaking transparent for all social observers the range of choices foregone.Mappingthecharacteristicsofsocialsystemsthataremoreorlessamenabletothesethreeformsofresilienceisakeyfoundationfortheanalyticalframeworkdevelopmentinthisbookwhichplacesemphasisontheprocessesthroughwhichsystemsundertakeorresistadaptivechange.More contemporarywork on resilience and its relationshipswith vulnerabilityand adaptation have also applied critical reasoning. This has focused on theadvantages of inclusive governance. This, it is argued, facilitates betterflexibilityandprovidesadditionalbenefitfromthedecentralisationofpower.Onthedownside,greaterparticipationcanleadtolooseinstitutionalarrangements

that may be captured and distorted by existing vested interests (Adger et al.,2005b; Plummer and Armitage, 2007). Still, the balance of argument (andexistingcentralityof institutionalarrangements)calls foragreateremphasis tobeplacedontheinclusionoflocalandlayvoicesandofdiversestakeholdersinshaping agendas for resilience through adaptation and adaptive management(Nelsonetal.,2007).Thisisneededbothtoraisethepoliticalandpolicyprofileofourcurrentsustainabilitycrisisandtosearchforfairandlegitimateresponses.Greaterinclusivenessindecision-makingcanhelptoaddrichnessandvaluetogovernancesystems incontrast to thecurrentdominantapproacheswhich tendtoemphasisemanagementcontrol.Wheninevitablefailuresoccuranddisastersmaterialise this approach risks the undermining of legitimacy and publicengagementincollectiveeffortstochangepracticesandreducerisk.ThistakesusbacktoHandmerandDovers’(1996)analysisoftheproblemofresilienceandshowsjusthowlittledistancehasbeentravelledintheinterveningyears.

Adaptationthresholds

Acts of adaptation are stimulated by the crossing of risk, hazard and/orvulnerability thresholds. Each threshold is socially constructed, a product ofinterveningproperties including identification, informationandcommunicationsystems,politicalandculturalcontextandtherelative,perceivedimportanceofotherrisks,hazardsandvulnerabilitiesthatcompeteforattention.Theexistenceofsocialthresholdsexplainsthe‘lumpiness’ofhumanexperience,wherehistorydoes not unfold as a gradual story but in fits and starts. Forward lookingadaptation,or the impactsofclimatechangeresultingfroma lackofsufficientadaptation,maybecatalystsforthebreachingofthresholds.Risk is ever present in society. The level of risk that is accepted by differentsocial actors determines the first threshold (see discussion on coping) and isshapedbywhosevaluesandvisionsforthefuturecountinsociety(Adgeretal.,2009a).Foranysocialgroupthelevelofacceptableriskcanchangeasscientificinnovation,mediainterestandpubliceducationinfluenceawarenessamongstthepublicanddecision-makers.Communicationbetweenscience,decision-makers,themediaandthepublicisdeterminedbynormsoftrust.Trustisbuiltovertimeby theeverydayperformanceof scientificorgovernmentbodiesbut is easy tolose (Slovic, 1999). Where there is a confidence gap in advisory bodies, thegovernment or science, popular regard for new risk announcements will begreeted with scepticism (Kasperson et al., 2005), with a preference for self-reliance or fatalism amongst those at risk and potentially resistance to any

coordinated adaptation. It is here that dedicated intermediary organisations orindividuals that can translate climate science into the language of targetaudiences (such as agricultural extension agencies) play a significant role inshaping people’s willingness to reduce risk (Huq, 2008). Indeed part of thechallenge facing adaptation to climate change is the need to communicatewithout confusing, and the science community that has championed climatechangeresearchthusfarhasnotfoundthiseasy(Hulme,2009).Climatechangeisfeltlocallythroughmanyenvironmentalindicators.Figure2.3representshowjustone–sayprecipitation–isinfluencedbyclimatechangeandhowthisisrelatedtothetimingandscopeofcopingandadaptation.Inthiscaseclimatechangeproducesreducedhazardousnessatminimumextremes(drought)butincreasedhazardousnessatmaximumvalues(flood).Inthiswaynewhazardthresholdschallengeexistinghazardmanagementstrategieswhicharebreacheduntil the changing hazard threshold is recognised (E1) and responded to (E2).The distance between these two points reflects the risk acceptance andcommunication thresholds described above. A final threshold that determinesadaptationcomesfromchangingvulnerabilityprofiles.Demographic and economic change in particular influence the likelihood ofadaptation.This is often not integrated into accounts of adaptive capacity andaction(seeFigure2.3)butisparticularlyimportantinrapidlychangingcontextssuch as rapid urbanisation, economic restructuring or where social tensionsmight lead to armed violence. The vulnerability threshold suggests there is acriticalmassofassetsorpeopleatriskandofriskmanagementcapacitythatareneeded for adaptation to be likely.This also has consequences for the kindofadaptation undertaken. Thus a small coastal settlement may undertakeindependent, spontaneous adaptations to protect livelihoods in the face of sealevelrise,butshouldthisareabesubjecttoinvestmentbythecorporatetourismsectorandsubsequenthighlevelsoflabourin-migrationadaptationmaybecomemorecoordinated,collectiveandplanned.Figure2.3,althoughstylised, isuseful indemonstratingseveralotherattributesof adaptation (Füssel, 2007). It shows the disproportionate ability of extremeover average climatic conditions to stimulate adaptation, the need to considernatural climatic variability and anthropocentric climate change together inplanningadaptations,andthecontinuousprocessofreviewandresponseneededofadaptationtoclimatechangeashazardthresholdschange(E3).Thefuzzynessinherent

Figure2.3Adaptationthresholds(Source:basedonFüssel,2007)in labellingadaptationas reactiveorproactive is revealedwith thedecision toadapt being both a reaction to the preceding extreme event and a proactiveanticipation of future risk. A reactive motivation can lead to a proactiveadaptation. This said, the time needed to make decisions to adapt to climatechange and complete adaptivemeasures such asmajor infrastructureworksorthe reform of housing stock is often several years if not decades so thatincremental adaptationmay be dangerous and costly (Reeder et al., 2009). Incontrast, planning over extended timeframes opens decision-making touncertainty.As the limits of scientific knowledge are reached so decisions arebased increasingly on value judgements. These in turn are shaped by thestructuresandnormsofgovernancesystemsandcultural–historicalexpressionsof acceptable risk that inform and legitimate adaptation (Paavola and Adger,2006). Ultimately this directs scrutiny to questions about who it is thatdeterminestheprinciplesuponwhichadaptivechoicesaremadeasmuchasthenatureofthedecisionsthemselves.

Evaluatingadaptivechoices:economicsandethics

There are two bases for evaluating between adaptive choices: economic costsandhumanrights.Attheglobalscalebothapproacheshavealreadybeenusedtoargueformitigation(Stern,2006).Lackofagreementonglobalresponsibilities

forthedistributionofcostsofadaptation(whichhavenotbeenfullycalculatedbut likely far outweigh those ofmitigation)mean the case for adaptation hasbeen less forcefully argued using either approach, although human rights hasbeenusedtoframeaccountsofclimatechangeimpactsasunjust,forexamplebytheUNHumanRights Commission in its resolution 7/23 (UNHumanRightsCommission,2009).Attheregionallevelandwithincountriesthereissomeexperienceintheuseofcost–benefit analysis (CBA) as a tool for adaptation decision-making (Splash,2007).CBAtriestoestablishthecostsofalternativeadaptivemeasuresandhowmuchdamagecanbeavertedbyincreasingtheadaptationeffortgivenaspecificclimate change scenario. CBA works for individual sectors where costs andbenefitscanbederivedfrommarketprices;itisharderwhenmultiplesectorsareincluded andwhenmarket prices are unavailable – for example, in placing avalueonhumanhealthorwellbeing–andwheretheitemsbeingcomparedareincommensurable (Adger et al., 2009c). Despite such limitations, somesophisticated methods are emerging which can at least show clearly what isknownandprovidealogicalframeworkforpoliticaljudgement.Forexample,ithasbeensuggestedthattherangeofchoicesforadaptingtoheatstressintheUK(though not their social and environmental costs, including potential formaladaptation)islikelytobemaximisedinfutureglobalcontextscharacterisedby active free markets and entrepreneurialism, but more limited if strongenvironmental regulationbecomes thenorm (BoydandHunt, 2006).CBAhasalsobeenusedeffectivelytoargueforproactiveadaptationthroughinvestmentin disaster risk reduction as an alternative to managing disaster risk throughemergency response and reconstruction. TheWorld Bank and US GeologicalSurveycalculatethataninvestmentinriskmanagementofUS$40billioncouldhavepreventedUS$280billioninlossesduringthe1990salone,aCBAratioof7:1.Inhighrisklocationsadvantagesofproactiveriskreductionareevenhigher,OxfamcalculatesthatconstructionoffloodshelterscostingUS$4,300savedasmuchasUS$75,000arationof17:1(DFID,2004a).Thesearecompellingratiosbut do not allow estimation of costs for specific investments before disasterstrikesandinthisrespecttheirweightindecision-makingislimited.Giventhemethodologicalconstraintsoneconomicassessmentforthecostsandbenefitsofadaptationoptionscanethicshelp?Caney(2006)arguesthatpeoplehave a moral right not to suffer from the adverse effects of climate change.However,acentraldilemmafor investing inadaptationbasedonhumanrightswhenresourcesarescareiswhoserightstoprioritise.Whatisthebasisonwhichto decide? Is it fairer to target interventions to reduce risk of climate changeimpactsandaidadaptationamongstthemostvulnerable(asRawlswouldargue),

or aim to generate the maximum collective good (following the utilitarianphilosophyofBentham).Thelatterapproachmaywelltargetthosewhoareonlymarginallyvulnerable.Itisjustifiedbytheassumptionthattheoverallincreasein wellbeing would provide a resource for compensating those negativelyimpacted by this decision. The utilitarian approach is one origin of economiccost–benefitanalysis.There are many strands to systematic thinking on justice that could informdecision-making for adaptation. The dominance of OECD countries ininternational policy and the academic literature positions the Westernphilosophical tradition closer to the existing intellectual core, and the relativepotencyofjusticeargumentsthusframed.Thisisnottodenythatnon-Westernphilosophies, many perhaps not formalised, will shape local decisions andactions.Indeedtheirinteractionwithtop-downpolicybasedonWesternideasofjusticemaybeasourceoftensionormisunderstandings.Therearealsoinspiringand profound differences that can inform questions of sustainability andadaptation from non-Western sources. For example, the Buddhist aim todecrease suffering (including unmet desires) through individual control of thebirth of desires (Kolm, 1996) presents a radical departure from dominantWesternlogicswhichaimtoaddressperceivedneednotthroughindividualself-knowledge,chosenrestraintandarevelationofhappiness,butthroughthesocialrights of access, distribution and procedure; orworse through imposed copingandrestraint in theworstformsofadaptation.MeetingtheseWesternelementsofjusticehasfurtherbeenconstrainedbyaframingofthesolutionindominantliberal political-economies that assumesneedsmust bemet through increasingmaterialwealth and energy consumption – an error identified bymanyGreenphilosophersandlyingattheheartofNorgaard’s(1995)observationofthelackof sustainability and risk produced by humanity’s dangerous coevolutionwithhydrocarbons.Returningtothequestionofhowtoprioritiseresourcestosupportadaptation,areviewofWesternphilosophicaltraditionssuggeststhereisnosimpleorsingleanswer. Justice theories distinguish between logics of equality, priority,sufficiencyanddesert.Egalitarianprinciplesdemand that justicebe concernedwith equality of some relevant distributable elements. Prioritarian principlesclaimtheimportanceofsupportingadaptationfortheleastadvantagedsubjects.Sufficientismholdsthateverysubjectmusthaveasufficient,yetnotequal,shareofsupportinadaptation.Thejustnessofasocietydependsonitscapacitytogivepeople the support they deserve (Grasso, 2008). Theories are furtherdifferentiatedbyfeministandcommunitarianargumentsthatjusticeiscontextual(Konow, 2003) and over the nature of equality. With respect to egalitarian

principles,Sen (1987)differentiatesbetweenequality inoutcomes (equalpost-adaptationvulnerability),themeetingofneeds(somebasiclevelofsecurityforall) and command over resources (equality in adaptive capacity). Individualprinciplescanbereinforcingstrengtheningarguments.Forexample,prioritarianlogic is supported byShue’s ‘guaranteedminimum’ principle of equity (Shue,1999)which, fromasufficientarianstandpoint, states that thosewhohave lessthanenoughforadecenthumanlifebegivenenough.Thisgeneralprincipleofjustice has been applied to climate change adaptation to support the argumentthat interventions prioritise the most socially vulnerable first (Paavola andAdger,2006;Paavolaetal.,2006,Adgeretal.,2009c).Of the approaches outlined above, it is worth spending somemore timewithRawls who helps add clarity to the different realms within which justice forclimatechangeadaptation ismanifest.Rawlsargues that foranysocial systemjustice requires both the application of distributional and procedural justice.Rawls made these two elements of justice the cornerstones of his Theory ofJustice (1971). Procedural justice talks to the institutions and behaviours thatframe decision-making, distributional justice talks to the outcomes of thesedecisions. Under Rawls, a just society is one where procedural justice isembodiedinanegalitariansocialcontractbasedonreciprocity,sothatindividualor sectional interests are given les weight than the overriding drive fordistributive justice (Chapters 5 and 8 develop the importance of the socialcontractforestablishingjusticeinadaptation).Thisunderstandingofproceduraljustice placeswith individual citizens the responsibility for producing specificdeclinationsofequalityanddefiningthebasicstructuresfortheirsociety.Withthisresponsibilitycomestherighttocraftandargueforalternativedevelopmentandadaptationvisions.Theclimatechangeliteraturehighlightsthreeaspectsofprocedural justice that it is argued determine the quality of procedural justice(Paavola,2005;Paavolaetal.,2006):• Recognition demands acceptance of minority perspectives in planning anddecision-makingprocesses,implyingthattheviewsandaspirationsofthemostmarginalisedandvulnerablebeacknowledged.• Participation requires access to knowledge so that all affected parties canformulateinformedviewpointsandbeinvolvedinthedecision-makingprocesswithengagementrangingfromconsultationtolocalautonomy.•Distributionrelatestowhomholdsandusespowertoensureequalparticipationandrecognitionoftheweakestindecision-making.This triad can be applied across scales fromglobal negotiations on adaptationregimes to local planning for adaptation in development and together withdistributionaljusticeisnecessarytounderpinlegitimacyandpopularconsentfor

international,nationalandlocaladaptationstrategies(Adgeretal.,2006).Aswitheconomicanalysis,ethicsdoesnotprovideaneasyanswerbutratheralogicaroundwhichoptionscanbediscussedwithmoretransparency.Experiencefromthedisasterriskreductioncommunitysuggeststhatwhileethicalargumentsmay be useful in the shaping of priorities, once political attention is gainedeconomicbasedargumentsaremorepersuasiveinadvocacy.

Threevisionsofadaptation:resilience,transitionandtransformation

Adaptationoffersauniquelensforunderstandingandinfluencingdevelopment,andoperatesatdifferentlevelsofengagementwithspecificsocialsystems.Table2.4 identifies three levels atwhich adaptation can intervene in development –throughenablingresilience, transitionor transformation.These three levelsareintroduced below to provide a framework for assessing adaptation aims andoutcomesandthendevelopedinthefollowingchapters.Nolevelofadaptationisintrinsicallymoredesirable than theothers;everythingdependsoncontextandviewpoint.Verylittleinsociallifeisuncontested,soitisunlikelytherewillbemany caseswhere there is an easy consensus onwhich form of adaptation isrequired.Indeeddifferentactorsmaybeworkingtobuildcapacityandactionforadaptation at different levels simultaneously; for example, when localcommunityactorsorganise tochallenge localpowerasymmetriesaspartofanagenda for transformative adaptation in a locale which is also the target ofgovernmentsponsoredtechnicalreformstolivelihoodorinfrastructureprovisionseekingtobuildresilience(andpossiblymollifylocalactsoftransformation).Adaptation to build resilience acts at the most contained level, seeking onlychangethatcanallowexistingfunctionsandpracticestopersistandinthiswaynot questioning underlying assumptions or power asymmetries in society.Transformation is the deepest form of adaptation indicated by reform inoverarching political-economy regimes and associated cultural discourses ondevelopment, security and risk. Transition acts at an intermediary level ofengagement, focusing on the governance regime but through acts that seek toassertfullrightsandresponsibilitiesratherthanmakechangesintheregime.Inassertingrightsorundertakingresponsibilities thatmightpreviouslyhavebeenneglectedordisallowedincrementaltransformationisapossibility.Eachformofadaptation can include changes to values, institutions, behaviour and assets sothatitisthescopeandrange,ratherthandepthofchangethatdistinguisheseachadaptiveform.While it is possible to distinguish individual ideal types theoretically andempirically, for a specific policy domain or social group different levels of

adaptation may not be clearly bounded and can influence one another.Transformative adaptation will at a minimum include a critical reflection onexistinginstitutionsTable2.4Attributesofadaptationforresilience,transitionandtransformation Resilience Transition TransformationGoal Functional

persistence in achangingenvironment

Realise full potential through theexercise of rights within theestablishedregime

Reconfigure the structures ofdevelopment

Scope Change intechnology,managementpractice andorganisation

Changeinpracticesofgovernancetosecureproceduraljustice;thiscaninturn lead to incremental change inthegovernancesystem

Change overarching political-economyregime

Policyfocus ResilientbuildingpracticeUseofnewseedvarieties

Implementation of legalresponsibilitiesbyprivateandpublicsector actors and exercise of legalrightsbycitizens

New political discourses redefinethe basis for distributing securityand opportunity in society andsocialecologicalrelationships

Dominantanalyticalperspectives

Socio-ecologicalsystems andadaptivemanagement

Governanceandregimeanalysis Discourse, ethics and political-economy

and practices working at the levels of transition and resilience. Over time,resilient and transitional adaptations may highlight wider challenges, buildcapacities and weaken barriers for reform and so feed the adaptivetransformationofregimes.Itisalsopossiblethatapparentsuccessatonelevelofadaptation may hide problems at other levels so that resilience can inhibittransitionortransformation.Thepowerofresiliencetosuppressdeeperchangesin the institutions and values that shape development and riskmanagement isreinforcedby itsattractivenessasasolution toclimatechangerisksfordonorsand government precisely because it does not challenge thewider status quo.Thetechnicalandorganisationalinnovationsrequiredbyresilientadaptationareless politically challenging, oftenmore visible and quicker to implement thantransitionalandtransformativeadaptations.

PartIITheresilience–transition–transformationframework

3Adaptationasresilience

Sociallearningandself-organisation

Theabilityofasocialorecologicalsystemtoabsorbdisturbanceswhileretainingthesamebasicstructureandwaysoffunctioning,thecapacityforself-organization,andthecapacitytoadapttostressandchange.

(IPCC,2008:880)TheIPCCdefinitionofresilience,presentedabove,isforwardlooking,placingemphasis on capacities rather than outcomes of self-organisation and sociallearning.Within this, adaptation is positioned as a sub-set of resilience (alongwith functional persistence and self-organisation). Following from thisdefinition, the framework suggested uses the idea of resilience to capture thefirst kind of adaptation to be discussed in detail in this book. In our use,adaptationasresilienceisaformthatseekstosecurethecontinuationofdesiredsystems functions into the future in the face of changing context, throughenablingalterationininstitutionsandorganisationalform.Elsewhere (Olsson et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2007) the need to recogniseadaptationas includingmore fundamental shiftshas led authors to include theareas of transition (Chapter 4) and transformation (Chapter 5) as sub-sets ofresilience.Thesearenotproblematicarguments,buttheframeworkpresentedinthisbookfindsthedistinctionssocentraltothenatureofadaptationthatseparateidentities are proposed for these three forms of adaptation. This convictioncomesfromempiricalworkwhereimposingresilienceinthefaceofgreatsocialinequalityisveryproblematic(seeChapters7and8).The IPCCdefinition, and ours, both point at the influence of socio-ecologicalsystems(SES)theoryontheunderstandingofresilience.Thethreecornerstonesof theSESconstructionof resilienceare included: functionalpersistence, self-organisation and adaptation (if seen as an outcome of social learning) (Folke,2006). The contribution of SES theory to understanding resilience will bereviewedhere and also in following chapterswhere the elements of resiliencedescribed in SES theory contribute to understanding transitional andtransformativeadaptation.Thedefiningqualityofresiliencethatdistinguishesitfromtransitionandtransformationisadesiretomaintainfunctionalintegrity.This chapter begins by presenting a vision of adaptation as resilience. Thecontribution of SES theory to this construction of resilience is then examinedwith a detailed assessment of social learning and self-organisation. This

frameworkis thencombinedwithorganisationalmanagementtheorytobuildaframeworkforexaminingadaptationasresilience.

Avisionofadaptationasresilience

Resilienceseekstoprotectthoseactivitiesperceivedbyanactortobebeneficialfor human wellbeing and ecological sustainability but threatened bycontemporaryorfuturepressuresassociatedwithclimatechange.Thevisionofadaptation as resilience is to support the continuation of desired systemsfunctionsintothefuturethroughenablingchangesinsocialorganisationandtheapplicationof technology.Such changes are facilitated through social learningand self-organisation (see below) to enable technological evolution, newinformationexchangeordecision-makingprocedures.Morethanthis,andwithinthe limits of bounded systems, such as development policy for a singlewatershedoradairyfarmingbusiness,achievingresiliencemayrequirechangeinvaluesandinstitutionswithinmanagingorganisations,andthiscanincludethechallengingofestablishedprioritiesandpowerrelationsandpotentiallyleadtoaredistribution of goods and bads (Eakin and Wehbe, 2009). In this way,adaptationasresiliencehasthepotentialtocontributetoincrementalprogressivechange in distributive and procedural justice within organisational structures.When individual cases that build resilience through internal value shifts areupscaledthroughgovernmentactionorreplicatedhorizontally,realopportunitiescanopenforcontributingtotransitionalortransformativechangeinsociety(seeChapters4and5),thoughoutcomescanberegressiveaswellasprogressiveforsustainabledevelopment.Adaptationasresiliencecanalsoallowunsustainableorsociallyunjustpracticestopersist (Jerneck andOlsson, 2008).This is perhaps easiest to understand insocialcontextswhereentrenchedpowerasymmetriesandexploitativeeconomiesare manipulated by the elite to maintain power, even when this underminessustainability. Such outcomes are less likely when local or national decision-making is held to account, but resilience can still undermine long-termsustainability while appearing to meet the demands of adapting to climatechange.Thiscanhappenwhensustainabilitychallengesare recognisedbut thetransactionscosts(includingpoliticalcosts)ofchangeareperceivedtobehigherthan doing nothing, with the least bad option being to adapt within availableconstraints until perceived thresholds of sustainability are breached, forcingchange.Forexample, in theuseofdesalinationplants tocompensateforwaterdemand,theproximateneedismetbutatacostofhighenergyuseandpollutionof the marine environment. The dynamism of climate change and the

unpredictabilityof local impactsprovide theadditional rationaleofuncertaintytojustifyresilienceasthepreferredformofadaptation.TheSESsciencebasethathascometoinfluencethinkingaboutresilienceintheclimatechangeliterature(GundersonandHolling,2002)iscloselyconnectedtotheadaptivemanagementliteratureoutlinedinChapter2.SESoffersarichandeleganttheoreticallandscapeandonethatcontinuestoexpand(Liuetal.,2007).Some have pushed resilience theory towards a recognition of transitionaladaptation(forexample,Olssonetal.,2006)butinthischapterwefocusonSESresilience theory contributions to understanding how valued functions can behelpedtopersist.SEStheoryemphasisesthatecologicalandsocialsystemsareinextricably linked and that their long-term health is dependent upon change,includingperiodsofgrowth,collapseandreorganisation(Walkeretal.,2006b).In addition to space and time, sociological conceptions of scale also considerhow humans symbolise and make sense of reality at different organisationallevels(PritchardandSanderson,2002;Cummingetal.2006).BothastrengthandweaknessofSESis itspresentationasanapparentlyvalueneutral,realistepistemology,aproductofitsoriginsinsystemstheory.Thishasproduceda rationalandstructured framework forunderstandinghumanaction,one that is particularly attractive to climate change research in offering anapproach for integrating human and environmental elements into quantitativemodelling of futures scenarios under climate change (Jannsen etal., 2006).Aparallel literature thathasmorerecentlybeenbrought intoanunderstandingofresilienceisthatfromorganisationaltheorywhichsharesarealistandapparentlyvalue neutral epistemology, but is otherwise a much looser body of worksometimes reflecting individual views without being explicitly grounded in aphilosophical traditionofenquiry.Organisational theory is reviewedat theendof this chapter, and both literatures are combined in Chapter 6 to analyse theproductionofadaptivecapacitywithintwocontrastingorganisationalforms.In thinking through a framework for examining adaptation as resilience builtfromSESandorganisationalmanagementtheorytwolimitationsinherentintheepistemologies of both approaches must be considered. First, while power isacknowledged,inparticularbySES,bothliteraturesareinfusedwithasenseoftechnicaloptimismthatcandownplaythecontestedcharacterofsociallifeandsocio-naturerelations.Themessinessofdecision-making(O’Brien,2009)isnoteasilycaptured.Apparentvalueneutralityinbothcasesconspireswithtechnicaloptimism to emphasise technological innovation and efficiency over criticalanalysisthatmightplacemoreweightonthepolitical-economyandculturalrootcausesofriskanditsperception.InthiswaySEStheoryhasbeencriticisedforaweak integration of social science theory and a tendency to allow for an

oversimplificationofcomplexsocialphenomena(Harrison,2003;Jannsenetal.,2006).Second,andrelated,bothapproachesfocusonrelationalsocialspacebutlimitanalysistotheouterworldofinteractionsbetweenindividuals,groupsandinstitutions. Innerworldsofemotionandaffect–value, identity,desire, fear–that give shape or meaning to, as well as being drivers for, public actionsincludingadaptationchoices(GrothmannandPatt,2005)aredifficulttoinclude.

Framingofresilience

Thinking on resilience within climate change has been influenced by twoschools:disasterriskandSES.Disasterriskitselfincludesvariedinterpretationsof resilience including as a capacity for absorbing disturbances and shocks(Birkmann, 2006) and as theopposite of vulnerability, capturing all those actsand capacities that seek to reduce vulnerability to risk (Adger et al., 2005c).More recently both disaster risk and climate change have been influenced bySES theory so that an additional reading of resilience in the face of naturaldisasters and climate changehas become associatedwith systems regenerativeabilities and capacity to maintain desired functions in the face of shocks andstress(Birkmann,2006),themeaningusedhere.InthiswaySEShasactedasabridge between climate change adaptation and disaster risk theory (and withwiderliteratureonnaturalresourcemanagement).Bothinterpretadaptationasaprocessaswellasaproductofsocialrelationsandasadynamicpropertysuchthat adaptive capacity can change over time in response to shifting risks andcapacities(Pelling,2003b;Youngetal.,2006).Arguablyanothercommonalityis a failure to question the framing values and political context of decision-making and fall short of addressing adaptation as transformation (Manuel-Navarreteetal.,2009).Adaptive capacity then is best indicated not by goodness of fit to current orpredicted future threats but by flexibility in the face of unexpected aswell aspredictedhazards,vulnerabilitiesand their impacts (Janssenetal., 2007).Thisopensquestionsabout the trade-offs tobemadebetweenflexibility,adaptationandwelfare(Nelsonetal.,2007).Walkeretal.(2006a)arguethatadaptationcanundermine net resiliency by shifting resources and so decreasing capacity orincreasingriskinanotherplaceorsector,andthroughover-adaptationandlock-insuchthatasystembecomesunabletoadapttonovelthreats.Forexample,insoutheasternAustraliaroundsofengineeringbasedsolutionshavebeenusedbygovernmenttorespondtoarisingwatertableandsalination.Thishascreatedastateof lock-in,making it increasinglydifficult for themanagement system toconceiveor invest inanon-engineering response.Ahighlyadaptedbut fragile

system is the result – one that is vulnerable to collapse through dependentcoevolution(Anderiesetal.,2006),anexampleofHandmerandDovers’(1996)accountofresilienceasresistanceandmaintenance.SES theory on resilience applies thresholds to describe movement from onesystemsstatetoanother(seeChapter2).Thishelpstheorisewhatitisthatleadsone system to respond to the local impacts of climate change risk throughresilienceandanotherthroughtransitionoreventransformation.Empiricalworkshows that identifying the location of thresholds before change is difficultbecauseofthemultipleandnon-linearfeedbackmechanismsactivewithinSES,so that the ways discourse, institutions and practical action interact are notalwaystransparentorpredictable(Nelsonetal.,2007).However,evidencedoesindicate that to activate adaptive capacity requires a social or environmentaltrigger (a change in attitudes, policy,market conditions or environmental riskandimpact)andtheappropriateinstitutionalframework.Nelsonetal. (2007) contrast deliberate and inadvertent crossing of thresholdsfrom resilience into transition. They argue that deliberate crossing is anindicationofbothgreateradaptivecapacityandhigherlevelsofresilience.Twocase studies are compared to reach this conclusion.Deliberate transition fromagriculture to tourism is exemplified through the actions taken by a localauthority in Arizona, USA, in changing its development strategy and supportfrom local agriculture to tourism base. Inadvertent transition is noted in theabandonmentofanagriculturaleconomyinJordanprecipitatedbyunsustainableresourceuse.TheArizonacaseshowsanactorovercomingtheinertia inherentinanestablishedsystemtomoveintoamoreadvantageouseconomicposition.No clear point of movement is identified, however, to mark the change fromresilience to transitional adaptation, although it is suggested that while bothresilienceandtransitionaladaptationrelyonthesamekindofadaptivecapacitiesit is social systems with greater intensity of vertical organisation (such as afunctioning system for information exchange andparticipation in developmentplanningfromlocaltoregionalandnationallevelsofgovernment)thataremorelikelytobeabletocrossthresholdsintotransitionaladaptation.Two elements of SES resilience theory that deserve closer attention are sociallearning and self-organisation. These ideas have been paralleled in otherliteratures – for example, self-organisation in social movements, participatoryand communicative planning (Pugh and Potter, 2003) – and much of theemphasisontrustandrelationshipsthatunderliessociallearningechoesworkonsocial capitalwhichhas also been applied to adaptation (Adger, 2003;Pellingand High, 2005). To this extent these ideas represent widely accepted socialphenomena key to the understanding of any collective dynamic. They are at

workwithin transitionalandtransformativeaswellasresilientadaptations; thedistinction between these levels being the subject and context rather than theobjectofanalysis.

Sociallearning

Social learning isapropertyofsocialcollectives. Itdescribes thecapacityandprocesses through which new values, ideas and practices are disseminated,popularisedandbecomedominantinsocietyorasub-setsuchasanorganisationorlocalcommunity.Theoutcomesofroundsofsociallearningarethecommonvalues,beliefsandbehaviouralnormsthatshapetheinstitutionalarchitectureofsocial life (Wenger, 1999). Social learning is also ascribed to the socialisedprocess of learning and associated change. This is clearly seen in differencesoverscalewherelocalworldviewsorvaluesystemsfituneasilywithindominantdiscoursesofdevelopmentorculture(ArgyrisandSchön,1996).Suchdiversitycanbearesourcewhenalternativebehaviouriswellsuitedtomeetthechallengeofchangingenvironments,butalsoacompoundingfactorininstitutionalinertiaandpotentialbarriertotheflexibilityneededforresilience(Olssonetal.,2004).Attheheartofthecontributionofsociallearningtostudiesofadaptationliesatension between dominant and alternative or novelways of seeing and being,and thepotential this opens for individual social actors to shape the trajectoryandcontentofcollectivelearning(challengesfortheuseofsociallearningasananalyticaltoolarediscussedinthecasestudiespresentedinChapter6).Muchoftheliteratureonsociallearningisinterestedinimprovingtheefficiencyofestablishedpracticesratherthanseekingnewpracticestoresolveunderlyingsustainability challenges, and in this way it meets the goals of resilience(Armitageetal.,2008).Asmallerliteratureexaminestheroleofsociallearninginenablingtransitionalandtransformationaladaptation.AccordingtoDiducketal. (2005) suchchanges that focuson reformof institutionsandorganisationalframeworksarecharacterisedby:•highlevelsoftrust,•willingnesstotakerisksinordertoextendlearningopportunities,•transparencyrequiredtotestandchallengeembeddedvalues,•activeengagementwithcivilsociety,and•highcitizenparticipation.Transformativeadaptation thatbuildsonalternativevaluesconnects individualto social learning – personal beliefs to culture. In thinking through therelationshipbetweenlearningandpoliticalchange,Freire(2000[1969])callsfor

criticalreasoning.This,Freireargues,isnotthedefaultorientationforproblem-solvingheldbythemarginalisedorpowerful–bothprefertomakeadjustmentswithintheconfinesofestablishednormsandstructures.Freiretermsthiskindofproblem-solving adaptive ingenuity – finding newways to fitwithin and gainadvantage from dominant structures without challenging them. Thus criticalreasoningisanecessaryfactorintransformationaladaptationbutwillbeabsentormarginalised into silence in resilience.There are significant obstacles to beovercomeinpromotingcriticalreasoning.Thepowerfulaswellasmarginalisedandvulnerablecanbefrightenedbytheuncertaintyofchange,andchangeitselfcanbecapturedbyvestedinterests.TooffsetthisFreirecallsfortransformationtocomefromadialoguebetween themarginalandpowerfulandalsobetweenideas and practice (Freire, 1970). Notions of transformation that have shapedparticipatory development and specific tools including citizen’s fora, citizen’sbudgetsanddeliberativedecision-makingandpolycentricgovernance(Bicknelletal.,2009).Responding to the novel hazards of climate change requires social learningsystemsthatcanrespondtothemultiplescaleandsectorsthroughwhichriskisfeltandadaptationsundertaken.Notleasttoaddressthechallengeofintegratinglocal community level and scientific knowledge andbalance strategic thinkingwith local needs so that decisions are taken at an appropriate level in theorganisationalhierarchy(CashandMoser,2000).Bringingtogetherandmakinguseof localandscientificknowledges isnoteasy. It isdifficult for individualsandorganisationstohandlebothkindsofknowledgeandthisisexacerbatedbyinbuiltpower imbalances that tend togivegreaterweight toscienceover localknowledge(Kristjansonetal.,2009).Inresponse,Wenger(2000)hascalledfororganisations,individualsortoolsthatcanworkacrossthisepistemicdivide–socalledboundaryobjects.

Self-organisation

Self-organisation refers to thepropensity forsocialcollectives to formwithoutdirection from the state or other higher-level actors. This can include newcanonical (formal) organisational forms such as registered communitydevelopmentgroupsor tradeassociations,andshadow(informal)organisationssuchasnetworksoffriendsandneighboursthatworkindependentlytoorcross-cut canonical organisation. Most research on organisations and adaptationfocusesoncanonicalformswhicharevisibleandeasytoaccess,exemplifiedbythe literature on adaptive management outlined in Chapter 2. However, the

generationofnovelideasorpracticesthatareinconflictwithorundervaluedbycanonicalorganisationoftenfirstemergesfromtheunmanagedspaceofshadoworganisations. Shadow systems are supportive of innovation because they aretypically rich in trust, cut across canonical organisational structures and arehidden from formal oversight, allowing experimentation and risk-taking withnovel ideas and practices (Shaw, 1997). Successful experiments in shadowsystems may in turn become coopted and formalised within the canonicalsystem. This can provide opportunities for the replication of adaptations, butthroughformalisationof individualrolesandrelationalcommitmentswill limitflexibility and change the social relationswhich led to the original innovationand potentially undermine long-term sustainability. Alternatively, shadowsystems can remain marginalised and informal, operating in parallel withcanonical systems. This is especially so under transitional and transformativeadaptationwhere emergent forms are a site for the challenging of establisheddiscursiveandmaterialpower(Pellingetal.,2007).Self-organisation can evolve slowly in response to changing social values andorganisational forms driven by demographic shifts or changes in popularideology, but also more rapidly. This latter opportunity has been observedfollowing disaster events when new forms of social organisation emerge asdominantformsfail(PellingandDill,2009).Emergentorganisationrangesfromspontaneous solidarity as neighbours undertake first response, to coordinatednetworks of NGOs and state agencies in recovery (see Chapters 5 and 8).Capacity toself-organise, likesocialcapital, isparticularlydifficult tomeasurein society for this reason –much capacity is hidden and latent, its emergencedependentuponwidersocialandpoliticalcontextandthenatureofthreatsandopportunitiespresentedtosociety.Itisnotpossibletomeasurecapacityforself-organisationfromexistingorganisationalformsalone.Berkes(2007)notesthatbecause social capital can remain latent in society, social relations that mighthavebeenused in thepast canbe reinvigorated asnew threats orneeds arise.ThiswasthecaseinTrinidadandTobagowhennetworksoriginallyestablishedtodealwithcoralreefmanagementinTrinidadandTobagohavealsoplayedakeyrole indisasterpreparedness (Adgeretal., 2005b).Existingorganisationalformscanalsoservetohindertheemergenceofnovelself-organisationthroughinstitutional inertia so that observedhigh levels of organisationmaynot aloneindicatehighlevelsofcapacityforself-organisationtorespondtofutureclimate-change-relatedpressures.Sociallearningandself-organisationreinforceeachothersothatasocialsystemexhibiting rich capacity for social learning is also likely to have considerablescope for self-organisation. The extent to which social learning can be fixed

through self-organisation is tracked through three elements of capacity tochange:consciousness,institutionalisationandimplementation.Consciousnessisthecapacitytoreflectontheoutcomesofandalternativestoestablishednormsandpracticesandsetsthelimitsforsubsequentalternativevisionsordiscourses.Bateson(1972)described thisasdutero-learning–making learning to learnanact of adaptation. There is no normative assumption on the scope or depth oflearning so that this can include adaptive ingenuity and critical consciousness.Institutionalisation is the capacity to move from recognition of constraints toaffectchangeintheinstitutionalarchitecturethatframesimplementationthroughthereproductionofexisting,orinsertionofnew,valuesandpractices.Allthreeprocessescanunfoldwithinthecanonicalandshadowsystems.Theirinteractionprovides reinforcing or contradictory realms for experimentation and learningandfornovelvaluesandpracticestoemerge(Pellingetal.,2007).

Organisationsassitesforadaptation

Organisations operate at scales from the household to firms and national andinternational bodies. They are often seen as agents in the construction ofadaptation for subsidiary actors – for example, by enforcing environmentalmanagementregimesorregulatinglandmarkets–butinthisandthesubsequentchapters we also focus on the ways in which internal social relations shapeinformationflow,agencyandthedirectionanorganisationcantakeinadaptingitselftoachangingexternalenvironment.Animportantdistinctionistobemadebetweenorganisationsandinstitutions.FollowingNorth(1990),institutionsaredefinedastherulesofthegame(formalandinformal)thatinfluenceadaptivebehaviour.Organisationsarethecollectiveunits,embodyinginstitutions,thatarevehiclesforadaptation.Organisationsarenotmonolithic; theycontainpotentially competing agents and interests so thatinternaladaptivechangebringsnewrisksaswellasopportunitieswhicharenotexperiencedevenlywithinorganisationsevenwhenthestatedfocusofchangeisontheexternalenvironment.Internaldifferentiationalsomeansthatadaptationsundertakenbyindividualsarenotalwaysreplicatedthroughouttheorganisationwithconsequencesforefficiencyaswellasequityinadaptation.Thisisthecaseforhouseholds,firmsandpublicorcivilsocietyorganisationsalike.If organisations and individuals or social groups within them can learn, howmight learning be observed? At a surface level, learning is observed throughchanges in behaviour (signifying implementation and assuming consciousnessandinstitutionalisation).InadditiontothisbehaviouralistGross(1996)focusesonexternallyvalidated,physicalbehaviour,andfollowingMaturanaandVarela

(1992) and Ison etal. (2000), internal actions are also interpreted as learning.Thatis,wecanlearninrelationtodifferentmodesofinteractingwiththeworld:emotional and conceptual as well as physical. Our learning corresponds todifferences in theway thatweact (consciouslyorunconsciously)within thesemodes, which in turn arise in response to our ongoing experience. Thejudgementofwhatconstitutesbehaviourlieswiththeobserver inquestion,butthedefinitiondoesnotruleoutinternalandtacitactivitiessuchasconsciousorunconscious cognition, emotional affect or the formation and operation ofpersonalrelationships,forexample.Identifyingdifferentrealmsofbehaviourisimportant in sharpening our focus on the site(s) where adaptation can beobserved;notonlyinmaterialactions,butincontrastingattitudesorviewsthathavenotbeenallowedtranslationintoaction.InthiswayPredandWatts(1992)identifythebehaviourofmarginalisedactorswhoneedtokeeplowvisibilityinthefaceofsurveillancebymorepowerfulactors,andthepotentialimportanceofprivate language as a mechanism for resistance that could form a potentialresource for adaptation when organisational relationships or external contextschange.Constructingthelearnerasanindividualorsocialentitylinksindividuallearningto social processes of change that emerge at the collective level. Thus socialadaptationcanbeseenascollectivelearning.Thisisnotaclaimthatindividualand collective behaviour are qualitatively the same, but recognises theinteraction of learning and adaptive behaviour at these different levels. In thisway,adaptationtoclimatechangeandvariabilitycanbereadatdifferentlevelsoflearningoperatingasarangeofsystem-hierarchicscales–thebehavioursofcomponentsandsubsystemsof thesystem,aswellaschanges to theemergentproperties of the system – and this can be used to unpack different adaptivetrajectories: international, national, local. It may be that adaptive behaviouremerging at one scale – say the local – is the result of learning that has beenongoing amongst a range of actors networked across a range of scales.Additionally, adaptation at one spatial (or temporal) scale can imposeexternalitiesorconstrainadaptivecapacityatotherscales.Inshort,thesystem-hierarchic scale where adaptation is or is not enacted is a socio-politicalconstruction(Adgeretal.,2005a).Organisations are spaces of engagementwhere learning and adaptive capacitycan be constrained as well as enhanced (Tompkins et al., 2002). A usefuldistinction is between organisations and communities of relationships actingwithin or across them in supporting, antagonistic or ambivalent ways.Communities describe those collectives through which close relationshipsreinforce shared values and practices; although reinforcement may not

necessarilycontribute to theorganisation’s (oreven thecommunity’s)adaptivecapacity, it can lead to closed thinking and the suppression of questioningestablishednorms– a property referred to as groupthinkby Janis (1989). In aless formal context a similar phenomenon is described by Abrahamson et al.(2009)whoobservedhowclosedsocialnetworksamongsttheelderlyledtotheself-reinforcing of myths of personal security regarding vulnerability toheatwavesintheUKasnewinformationorideasweretreatedwithcaution.ForWenger,learninginacommunityarisesthroughparticipationandreification,the dual modes through which meaning is socially negotiated. Participationrefers to ‘the process of taking part and also to the relations with others thatreflect thisprocess. Itsuggestsbothactionandconnection’(Wenger,2000:55).Participationisthusanactivesocialprocess,referringtothemutualengagementof actors in social communities, and the recognition of the self in the other.Reificationistheprocessbywhich‘weprojectourmeaningsintotheworld,andthenweperceivethemasexistingintheworld,ashavingarealityoftheirown’(Ibid., 58). Thus reification can refer to the social construction of intangibleconceptsaswellasthemeaningsthatmembersofacommunityofpracticeseeembeddedinphysicalobjects.Communitiesofpracticeareoftennotofficiallyrecognisedbytheorganisationsthey permeate (Brown and Duguid, 1991). Their official invisibility in theshadow system can be thought of as being made up of constellations ofcommunitiesofpracticeheldtogetherbybridgingtiesofsocialcapital.Thelinkbetween communities of practice, informal networks and unofficial activity inorganisational settings is an important association to make in tracing theworkings of the shadow system in building adaptive capacity.Wenger (2000)usesthelanguageofsocialcapitaltohelpdefinethecharacteristicsofindividualcommunitiesofpractice,which,heargues,canbedefinedbyashared identityandheldtogetherbybondingcapital.Theinfluenceofpersonalitytraitsandtheroleofpersonalandprofessionalsourcesoftrustinbridgingacrosscommunitieswithin the public sector are discussed by Williams (2002). It is the quality,quantityandaimsofindividualsconnectedtogetherincommunitiesofpractice,andtheirlinkingofboundarypeopleandobjects,thatdeterminetheinfluenceoftheshadowsystemonadaptivecapacity.

Pathwaysfororganisationaladaptation

Figure 3.1 summarises the preceding discussion by identifying five pathwaysthrough which adaptive action can be undertaken by individuals or discrete

subgroups within an organisation. These actions are a consequence ofinteractionswiththeinstitutionalarchitecture,adaptivecapacityandfacilityforlearning held by an organisation. The host organisation can be any collectivesocialunit,fromalegallymandatedgovernmentdepartmentoragencytomoreflexible but nonetheless restrictive private sector organisations or looseassociationsofactorsfromcivilsocietyinorganisednetworks.Feint arrows indicate the direction of conditioning between these aspects oforganisationallife,suchthattheinstitutionalarchitectureconditionsthetypeandscope of learning and adaptive capacity (either directly or through prescribedforms of learning) and adaptive agency through the setting and policing offormal objectives, structures and guidelines for practice in the organisation.Adaptivecapacityconditionsadaptiveactionsbysettingconstraintsonwhatcanbe thoughtanddoneaswellas thegoodnessof fitofexistingresources to theidentifiedexternalpressure.Theorganisationdrawsresources,opportunitiesandthreatsfromtheexternalenvironmentandexertsadaptiveactionsuponit.Only two of the five forms of adaptation are visible from outside theorganisation. This not only flags the need to examine interior life oforganisationsbutalsotheoverlappingofresilience,transitionandtransformationwiththelattertwomodesofadaptationpotentiallybeingfoundoperatinginsideanorganisationwhichitselfappliesonlyresiliencetotheexternalworld;indeedtransition or transformation might be necessary internal motors for externalresilience(seeFigure3.1).The five adaptive pathways are characterised in Table 3.1. Adaptive agencyreferstothatheldbyindividuals,sub-divisionsorcross-cuttingcommunitiesofpractice below the level of the organisation. Such agency is made reflexivethroughlearning(pathway1)whichisitselfanadaptiveact.Reflexivityimpliesstrategic decision-making (of an entrepreneurial individual, advocacy coalitionandsoonwithintheorganisation).Thiscanbefocusedonsymptomsleadingtoadaptive ingenuity, or consider root causes indicating to critical reasoning.Learning throughcritical reasoningor adaptive ingenuity can lead to lobbyingfor change in the institutional architecture of the organisation (2). This can inturnforcereconsiderationofaimsandbehaviourinformingtheselectionanduseof resources that form adaptive capacity (3) (a key concern given a dynamicexternal environment). Feedback from capacity and institutional architecturethenpotentiallyreshapesadaptiveagency.Oneimportantmessagefromthisapproachtoadaptationisthatonlytwomodesofadaptationareobservablefromoutsidetheorganisation.Theseareefforts toshapetherelationshipbetweentheorganisationandoperatingenvironmentmadeeitherbytheagent(4)ororganisation(5).Thisisastrongargumentforstudies

ofadaptationtoclimatechangetoextendtheiranalysisfromtheexternal/publictomoreinternalandprivatelifeoforganisationsofallkinds.The

Figure3.1AdaptationpathwayswithinanorganisationTable3.1FiveadaptivepathwaysPathway Summary Example1 Agent-centredreflexiveadaptation

Adaptation informedbydutero-learning– reflectingonpastactions.Thiscanleadtochangesinthepracticeoflearning,management of adaptive capacity, the institutionalarchitectureordirectlyontheexternalenvironment.

A manager decides thatexisting work guidelinesundermine sustainabilityandsoimplementsreform.

2 Agent-centredinstitutionalmodification

Theagentundertakestoaltertheinstitutionalcontextwithinwhichitoperatessoastoshifttheinstitutionswhichcontrolitsscopeforfutureadaptivecapacityandaction.

Ascientificadvisor lobbiespolicy-makers to changepolicypriorities.

3 Agent-centredresourcemanagement

The agent unilaterally changes the selection or use ofresourcestoundertakepredeterminedadaptiveaction.

Whilenoguidelinesexist,amanager adjusts workroutinestomeetachangingenvironment.

4 Agent-ledexternalaction

The individual agent undertakes adaptive action oriented tothe external environment either in compliancewith existinginstitutionsoraspartof theshadowsystem; that is,withoutinstructionfromtheorganisation.

Local agents makeexperimental orspontaneous modificationstophysicalinfrastructure.

5Organisational

Theorganisationtakesactiontomodifyitsrelationshipwiththeexternalenvironment.

The organisation changesits external communication

externalaction

strategy.

modelexcludesroutineresponses toexternalstimuliwhichareconsideredpartof the legacy of past rounds of adaptation already integrated into existingmanagementandculture.Ashas been argued above, self-organised (agent centred), reflexive adaptationtargeted at the external environment (4) or institutional architecture (2) arearguably the most significant indicators of resilience. An organisation thatenablesreflexiveadaptationthroughinternalcriticalreasoningismorelikelytobeabletorespondtoabruptandunforeseenthreatsandopportunitiesassociatedwith climate change. Reflexive adaptation, especially that which seeks tochallenge existing canonical institutions, is strengthened by a strong shadowsystem. The key challenge for organisations is how to support – but not tomanage–theshadowsystem.ThisisaquestionweturntoinChapter6.

Conclusion

Adaptationasresilience ischaracterisedbyactions thatseek toprotectpriorityfunctions in the faceofexternal threat. In thiswayresiliencedoesnotdirectlyseektorealigndevelopmentrelations.However,withinindividualorganisationsprotecting priority functions can require internal transitional or potentiallytransformationalchange.Existingliteratureonresiliencehasattachedarangeofmeaningstothisterm.Mostdevelopedisthesocio-ecologicalsystemsliteraturethat characterises resilient systems as those that exhibit capacity for sociallearningandself-organisationaswellasdisplayingfunctionalpersistence.Sociallearningdescribes thepathwaysandsocial relationships thatshapeinformationexchange and can lead to newways of thinking or acting; self-organisation isattributed to novel and un-directed collective action. Both are generic socialphenomenon that can be used to examine the shaping of transitional andtransformativeadaptation.Thedistinctionbetweenthese levelsofadaptation isthe focusand intentionbehindsocial learningandself-organisation rather thanthemode.Organisational theory is complementary to SES in providing a framework toexaminethewaysinwhichrelationshipsbetweencanonicalandshadowsystemswithinandbetweenorganisationsshapeinformationexchange,providingscopefor learning and innovation. Shadow systems provide a key resource forexperimentationbecauseideasandactionsarehiddenfromformalscrutiny.Theycan also be a challenge for formal management and so represent a source ofconflict between the imperatives for flexibility and transparency. This is an

especially difficult problem to resolve in public sector organisations andcorporate civil society organisations. Wenger’s concepts of boundaryorganisations and individuals that can work to transfer information betweenepistemic communities helps to identify a key resource in adapting to climatechangewhereconversationsbetweenscienceandpolicyarerequiredtopreventmaladaptation.Theycanalsohelptoovercomethelimitedconceptualisationofclimatechangeadaptationwhichcontinuestobeframedasaprimarilytechnicalratherthanasocialandpoliticalagenda.Thisframingisinpartanoutcomeofprofessionalspecialismand thedivisionofdevelopmentpolicy intoministerialsilos, andalsoof the short-termdecision-makingenforced throughbudget andelectoral cycles. Working to support boundary organisations and to betterunderstand theshadowsystemsare twoways inwhichresilienceasadaptationcan be supported and potentially allowed to contribute towards widermovementsoftransitionalandtransformativesocialchange.

4Adaptationastransition

Riskandgovernance

When special efforts are made by a diffusion agency, it is possible to narrow, or at least prevent thewideningof,socioeconomicgapsinasocialsystem.Inotherwords,wideninggapsarenotinevitable.

(Rogers,1995:442)Because socio-ecological relations are embedded within economic, political,socialandculturalrelations,adaptationwilltoucheveryaspectofsociallife,notsimply an actor’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. This willincluderelationswithdistantothers,tofuturegenerationsaswellasthoselivingin geographically far-away places, now connected by the time–spacecompressions (Massey, 1994) and teleconnections (Adger et al., 2009b) ofglobalisation and global environmental change. Rogers’ (1995) openingobservation reminds us of the intimate connections between the spreading ofnewideasandpracticesinsocietyandsocialcontext.Evenplannedinnovationand adaptation in society can exaggerate existing inequalities or generate newones. Without care, those with most assets and freedom to adapt to climatechangewillgainadditionaladvantageoverthosewhodonot.Rogers’workontheinteractionofsocialandculturalcontextwiththediffusionofinnovationsinsocietyhaswiderrelevancetostudiesofadaptation(Atwelletal.,2008).ThesearereturnedtoinChapter9.Theaimofthischapteristoprovideabroadconceptualframeworktoexamineadaptation as transition. This is incremental change to social (includingeconomic,politicalandcultural)relationsaspartofadaptingtoclimatechange.Transitionalactscandescribeboththosethatdonotintend,ordonotresultin,regime change (see Chapter 5), but do seek to implement innovations andexercise existing rights within the prevailing order. Transitional adaptation istherefore an intermediary form of adaptation. It can indicate an extension ofresilientadaptation to includeagreater focusongovernance,oran incompleteformof transformational adaptation that falls short of political regime change.From an empirical perspective intent is as important as outcome in indicatingtransitional, resilientor transformationaladaptation.Notall transitionalactionswillachievetheintendedoutcomesbuttheynonethelessrevealcriticalcapacitythroughintention.Theassociationofinnovationmakingwithrightsmakesthesocialdimensionof

adaptationexplicit,evenwhenthereisnoobservedchangetoregimeform.Thisisespeciallytrueinthosesocialcontextswhererightsmayhavebeendormantorsuppressed under the prevailing social system. Where this is the case, theirinvocationcangeneratetransitionalsocialchange.Therearemanyexamplesofthis from the environmental justicemovementwhere the asserting of existinglegalrightsisseenasamethodforreducingvulnerabilitytoindustrialpollution,and at the same time reinforces these same rights (as well as building othercapacities in local social organisation, confidence and so on) (Melosi, 2000;Agyemanetal.,2003).Themultiple scales atwhich social systems operatemeans that transition cantheoretically be implemented and observed operating at the levels of local,community or regime systems, and inmore complicated analysis across thesescales.Whereadaptationsandassociatedrightsclaimsinvolvemultiplelevelsofactor (for example, a squatter community and municipal government)transitional adaptation demonstrates the importance of multi-or cross-scaleanalysis(seebelow).In thischapterweare interested in thepotential foradaptationassociatedwithclimate change to open space for wider and connected reform within theconstraintsofexistinggovernanceregimes.Thisprovidesadriverforactors toassert rights or claim entitlements to participate in development and riskmanagementandenableprogressivetransition;thatis,improvedactiononsocialjusticeandenvironmentalintegrityaspartofeverydaydevelopment.Thischapterextendstheframeworkofsociallearningandself-organisationputforward in Chapter 3 by considering two additions. First an actor-orientedapproach to regime theory is offered. This is then developed by literature onsocio-technological transitions toexamine inmoredetail thepressuresshapinginnovation and the dissemination of alternative visions and practices throughgovernance regimes. The combined framework is then illustrated through ananalysisof theopportunitiesfor transitionaladaptationinasinglemanagementregime rising to prominence in climate change adaptation: urban disaster riskmanagement. This also helps to prefigure the detailed analysis of urban,primarilytransitionaladaptationpresentedinChapter7.

Avisionofadaptationastransition

Transitionalactionistargetedatreformintheapplicationofgovernance.Itgoesbeyond the aim of functional persistence but falls short of aiming directly torealign political structures. Both transition and transformation indicateadaptation in governance systems. For transitional adaptation reform is

incremental, undertaken at the level of individual policy sectors or specificgeographical areas. There is the potential for bottom-up, aggregatetransformational change through, for example, the promotion of stakeholderparticipation in decision-making, leading to the inclusion of new perspectivesand values in emerging policy. By contrast adaptation as transformation iscomposedof adaptive acts that consciously target reform in or replacement ofthe dominant political-cultural regime as primary or secondary goals (seeChapters5and8).

Governanceandtransition

Governancesystemsarecomposedofmultipleactorsincludingpublic,privateorcivilsocietyorganisationsheldtogetherthroughformalandinformalinstitutionsthat reproduce thebalanceofpoweranddirectionofdevelopmentpathways insociety.Governanceoperatesatmultiplescaleswithoverlapping influence; forexample, a local water management regime including user groups might beresponsible forday-to-daydecision-makingbutgiven legitimacyby,andmadeaccountable to, national regulators. The nested and overlapping quality ofgovernanceregimesprovidesopportunityforadaptationstospreadhorizontallyand vertically through communication networks and also for the top-downsupportordisseminationofadaptivecapacityandpractices.Whereprogressiveadaptation as transition challenges established practices, or those of othercompeting emergent adaptations, overlapping administrative responsibilitieswith internal interactions, alliances and linkages can generate resistance tochange (Foxton, 2007). Some degree of institutional inertia is healthy forgovernancesystemstoprovidestabilityandsoapredictablepolicyenvironmentfordevelopmentactorstoinvest.Thefocusofadaptationastransitionisontheshifting balance between stability and reform in the organisational structureplayedout throughmovement in thesocialdistributionofexercised rightsandresponsibilities motivated by perceived and felt pressures associated withclimate change. This is articulated through the degree of informationdissemination, inclusiveness and influence in decision-making withingovernancesystemsandconstituentorganisationsandsectorsofpractice.The role of governance in determining the speed and direction of innovationdisseminationis illustratedbyAtwelletal.’s (2008)studyofadaptationwithinthenorth-centralUSCornBelt.Theyobservedthatindividualfarmers’decisionstoacceptorrejectenvironmentallyfriendlyfarmingpracticeswereinfluencedbythree scales of governance: individual, community and overarching regime.

Interactionbetweenthesethreelayersisfurtherelaboratedintransitionstheory(seebelow).Thedisseminationofnewinformationwasmostlikelytoresultinthe uptake of new practices when communicated to a farmer by a neighbour.Trustembeddedinpersonalrelationshipsandthesharedchallengesneighboursface was more persuasive than government initiatives and also acted as asanction on individual actions that might not have been locally sociallyacceptableasrespondentschosebetweencompetingstrategiesintheexercisingoffarmingrights.All governance systems require actors with varying degrees of power,transparency and legitimacy to undertake at least some limited form ofnegotiation,causingYoung(1999)todescribegovernanceregimesasbargainingprocesses.The outcomes of negotiation are a product of the relative power ofactors during bargaining and the implementation of agreed rules.Change in agovernancesystem‘involvesthealterationoftherulesanddecision-making,notof norms nor principles’ (Krasner, 1983:5). This is an important distinction tomake and points research to the possibility that difference and changeswithinnormsorprinciplesovertimeandspacemaynotbemirroredinchangesintherules and decisions made in the regime. This allows for adaptive changes inadministrativestructure,technicalinnovation,landuseandsoonatthelevelofgovernance and its subsequent policy framework without challenging theoverarchingregimeofnormsandprincipleswithinwhichgovernancerests.Overtime – or as a result of sudden changes in the operating environment or ininternalrelations–discontinuitiesbetweennormsandprinciplesontheonehandand governancemechanisms and practices on the other can potentially triggertransformative change in the regime or top-down pressures for transitionalchange in the governance system. The extent to which dominant norms andprinciples and governance rules are antagonistic or complementary may be agood indicator of the resistance of both the governance system and thewiderregimetoreformincludingthatofprogressiveadaptation.Asenseofthescopeforaspectsofgovernancetoenableprogressiveadaptationto climate change can be indicated by the relationships between actors andinstitutions.Actorsincludeindividualsandorganisationswithstakesinapolicydomain; institutions are for formal (legislation and guidelines) and informal(cultural norms) rules that determine how actors interrelate (North, 1990).Institutions constrain the aspirations and behaviour of actors but can alsofacilitate change by legitimating processes of critique and reform (Seo andCreed, 2002). Much of the literature on governance change privilegesinstitutionsoveragency(forexample,Krasner,1983);itfocusesonthepowerofdecision-making procedures, rules and cultures to determine scope for reform.

The focus is on understanding the persistence of institutions over time ratherthan how they may be changed and the role of actors in this. For example,Gunderson and Holling (2002) refer to rigidity traps where people andinstitutions try to resist change andpersistwith their currentmanagement andgovernancesystemdespiteaclearrecognitionthatchangeisessential.Emerging actor-oriented approaches offer scope for exploring how institutionscome to be changed – a central question in studies of adaptation.Work herefocusesonnetworksofsocialrelationsandinformationflowwithingovernanceregimes and their capacity to surface new ideas that may generate individualpolicyentrepreneursand theevolutionofepistemiccommunities,whereactorsfromacross agovernance regimecome to sharea commonviewpoint andcancollectively promote change through purposeful advocacy or as a result ofcollective changes in practicewhere governance systems aremore resistant tochange(Hasencleveretal.,1997;Warner,2003).Thepoints atwhich change in the institutional architecturemight be expectedarises from internal contradictions inherent in the institutional systems ofgovernance. Seo and Creed (2002) propose four contradictions which helpidentify pinch points, where challenges to existing institutional arrangementsmightbeexpectedtoarise.First,whererulesandnormsareencompassingandgeneral theymay confer reputation rewards but constrain other organisationalaims such as efficiency or rent-seeking. This tension encourages selective-decoupling where ritual conformity hides deviations. As the gap between thedemandsoflegitimacyandotherbehaviourexpandssopressureforinstitutionalchange grows. Second, path dependency (Arthur, 1989) suggests thatincrementalinvestmentsinphysical,humanandsocialcapitalleadorganisationstoprefer investments toprotectestablished functionsandpracticeseven in theface of environmental change, until a crisis point forces institutional change.Third,wherethewiderangeofinstitutionswithinsocietycanleadtoconflictsorinconsistencies generated by the interactions between the institutionalarrangements of different levels or sectors within a regime forcing change.Fourth, assuming institutions reflect and protect the interests of the moredominantpoliticalactorsinsociety,institutionalchangecanarisefrompoliticalrealignment and also when previously passive or marginal actors becomeconsciousof the institutional conditions that leave their needsunmet (Benson,1977).Thecapacityforcriticalconsciousnessandactorreflectiononestablishedinstitutions is arguably the most fundamental element of any actor-orientedgovernancereform.TheextenttowhichcriticalconsciousnessisabletogenerateactormobilisationandcollectiveactionisexploredinmoredetailinChapters6,7and8.

The actor-oriented approach is also useful in avoiding simple, causalexplanationsforsocialorganisationoutcomes.Thisincludesassumptionsaboutthehegemonyofstatepower,thesubordinationofthelocalcommunitiesandthesuperiority of the laws of the market (Booth, 1994). In this way one of thesignificant features of the actor-oriented approach is that it places explanatoryvalueontheagencyofevenapparentlyweakormarginalactors(ZimmererandBasset, 2003). This has encouraged work that has placed emphasis upon theimportance of marginal actors (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993) – such assmall localNGOsorpeopleatrisk.Italsoallowsamoredetailedtreatmentofthestateandhowitinteractswiththenon-stategroupsthanwaspossibleundermorestructuralinterpretationsthatsawthestatebluntlyasahomogeneousentityand also as a tool of the most powerful classes to protect their best interests(Watts,2000).Thecontextspecificnatureof the interactionbetweenactorsandinstitutions iswell illustrated by Warner’s (2003) comparative analysis of politicalentrepreneurship in floodmanagement forBangladesh and theNetherlands. InBangladesh rigid governance and a conservative administrative cultureconstrainedopportunitiesforchangefromwithinsothatgovernancerespondedbest topressureexertedbypowerful, externalactors; in thiscasedevelopmentaid donors. In the Netherlands a flexible governance form fostered politicalentrepreneurship and allowed interdepartmental alliances to form andcollectively push for reform from within, although the participatory Dutchadministrativecultureactuallyslowedthisprocessthroughdrawn-outroundsofconsultationwhichalsoactedasanopportunityforthoroughreviewofproposedreforms.Where might alternative visions and practices be fostered within existinggovernanceregimes,andhowmightsuchinnovationsbetestedanddiffusedtothewidersociety?WherecanonicalsystemsresistchangeChapter3shows thescope for shadow systems to act as a place of experimentation and learningwithin organisations. Can shadow spaces exist at the level of the governancesystems in collaborationsbetween social organisationsonprojects that are notsupportedbyorruncountertothedominantgovernanceregime?Ifyes,cantheyoffer a place for building diversity in thinking and practice that can beformalisedifnewproblemsarise(Cohenetal.,1972)?TheevidencepresentedinChapters7and8suggestsstronglythatshadowsystemsoperatingasinformalnetworksareapowerful influenceofcapacity for transitionaladaptation.Suchpolycentricformscanbothspreadandreduceriskinsociety,andcompensateforfailuresinotherlevelsofgovernance(Ostrom,2005).Anexampleofthisistheprovisionofservicesorinformationthatarenotavailableformally–information

on how to undertake local adaptive measures or by providing post-disasterlifelineswhenstateagenciesarecompromised(seealsoIFRC,2010).Workonsocio-technicalsystemsofferssomeinsightontothesequestionsanditistothisliteraturethatwenowturntoaddsomedetailtothebroadframeworkofactor-orientedanalysisofregimes.

Socio-technicaltransitions

Socio-technical transitions work has sought to examine what it is that directsindividual development pathways. Reminiscent of coevolutionary theory,transitionsinpolicyoreconomicdomainsareexplainedthroughchangesinandinteraction between technological innovation, cultural preferences, industrialproduction processes, government incentives and demography (Seyfang andSmith, 2007). Insight from this literature is helpful in refining a framework tohelpunderstandprocessesof transition inadaptation,althoughtheemphasisofenquiry moves from delineating histories of socio-technical change toidentifyingthosecharacteristicsofsocietiesthatcaninfluencetheemergenceofopportunities for transition as part of adaptation, the consequences of whichmightbeprogressiveorregressiveforsocialjusticeandenvironmentalintegrity.The socio-technical transitional literature, which draws broadly from systemsscience,iscompatiblewithourexistingframeworkinsofarasitacknowledgestheroleofpower(RipandKemp,1998)andagency(SeyfangandSmith,2007)of competing interests, embodied in innovations, established practices andinstitutionsinteractingoftenacrossgovernancescalesinshapingtheinstitutionalarchitecture of development.One confounding limitation of this literature is afailure to distinguish adequately between transitional and transformationalchange. Both are used, sometimes synonymously. At root this is a failure toseparate governance systems from the overarching socio-political regime. Theformer is taken as a sub-set of the latterwith transitional change an aspect oftransformationandnotidentifiedasagoalinitself.Thus,drawingonRotmansetal.(2001),JerneckandOlsson(2008:176)areabletoclaimthat‘Transitionsand transformation processes in societies, or subsystems thereof, changeprofoundlyintermsofstructures,institutionsandrelationsbetweenactors.Afteratransition,thesociety,orasubsystem,operatesaccordingtonewassumptionsandrules’.Whileonthegrounditmaynotalwaysbeclearorhelpfultodistinguishbetweentransition and transformation, it is nonetheless important to identifytransformationasanextremecasewhereprofoundchangealtersthedistribution

of rights and responsibilities and visions of development across society (seeChapter 5). Individual transitions fall short of this and describe incrementalchangestotheaimsandpracticesofgeographicallyorsectorallyboundactivitiesthatpushbutdonotoverturnestablishedpolitical regimes.For this reason thetransitionsperspectiveisusedbelowtohelpidentifypathwaysforchange.Thesecanthenbeappliedtoanalysecapacityfor,orpasttrajectorieswith,transitional(claimingrightswithinexistingregimes)ortransformational(replacingregimeswith new rights compacts) outcomes. Empirical work presented in Chapter 7applies this framework to examine transitional adaptation and its messyconnectionswithresilienceandtransformationintheMexicanCaribbean.From its origins in industrial history, the transitions literature has expanded tocritiques of sustainable development, arguing that not only contemporarypractices but the solutions they generate for development challenges areunsustainablebecausetheyfailtoaddressfundamentalvaluesdrivingdominantdevelopment paths (Rotmans et al., 2001). Transitions framings have mostrecently been applied to climate change mitigation – through, for example,researchon transition to low-carbon living in theUK (Haxeltine andSeyfang,2009).Bothagendasdemonstrate thepotentialutilityof transitionsframingforcontributingtounderstandingsoftransitional(andtransformational)adaptations.This is particularly so in the context of poorer societies at risk to the localimpacts of climate change where adaptation is a more pressing priority thanmitigation and extremes in social inequality and access to human rights andbasicneedsdemandadaptationconfrontfaileddevelopmentpolicyregimes.Like the socio-technical transitions proposed for sustainable developmentchallenges,analysingopportunitiesandoutcomesforaprogressive,transitionaladaptation benefits from a lens that can examine technological innovation andevolutionasasocialprocess.Geels(2005)describestheprotectedspaceswherenew technological or management innovations develop as socio-technicalniches,suggestingthatinnovationoriginatesfromlocalexperimentation.Nichesare set in contrast with the dominant socio-technical regime operating at themeso-level, and the larger macro-level contextualising political, economic,culturalandenvironmental‘landscape’.Berkhautetal.(2004)alsoobservethatchange in the regime may be driven top-down by perturbations in the widerlandscape. Amongst the most useful findings of this literature are proposals,supported by case study work, for specific pathways and strategies thatdetermine how far a socio-technical innovation is able to escape from itsprotectivenicheandoverturnthedominantregime(GeelsandSchot,2007),andtheidentificationofthebarrierstoregimechangethatpromotepathdependence.These barriers include the repetition of cognitive routines that blind

professionals to developments outside their focus (Nelson andWinter, 1982),regulations and standards that enforce rigidity (Unruh, 2000), lock-in ofadaptation to technical systems so that the costs of transition relative toresilience increase over time through fixed investments in machines,infrastructures and competencies – until systems thresholds are crossed byexternaldriverssuchasregulation,marketchangesornaturaldisaster(Tushmanand Anderson, 1986). These drivers and constraints have suggested to someanalyststhatactivityatthenichelevelaloneisnotenoughtogeneratetransitionsandratherthisisanoutcomeofmulti-levelcollaborationandintheprocesslocalexperiments and regime practiceswill bemutually adjusted and compromised(SeyfangandSmith,2007).TheclosestempiricalfocustoadaptationhasperhapsbeenmadebySeyfangandSmith(2007)whorecalibratedsocio-technologicaltransitionstheorytoexaminethe emergence and diffusion of ideas and practices from grassrootsenvironmentalism in Europe including social businesses, cooperatives andinformalcommunitygroups.Thisishelpfulindrawingoutdifferencesbetweenentrepreneurial innovation, where risks and rewards are managed through themarketwithmodestgovernmentsupport;andinnovationinthesocialeconomy,wherelocalgroupsandindividualsinvestsocialaswellaseconomiccapital ininnovationsandwhere rewards tend tobemoredissipatedandmotivationsaredriven more by ideology than economics. Grassroots niches are found to becatalysts for participation where individuals and communities can buildconfidence,asharedsenseofvaluesandambitionforchange,skillsandcapacityfor further rounds of learning and innovation. Some of these very assets thatmake communities adapt at innovation can also be barriers for diffusionincludingthegeographicalspecificityofexperiments,strongidentityandvisionsfor the futurewhichmaybe antagonisticwithoverarching regimes suggestingthat some degree of translation and compromise is required for bottom-upreform,orthatthereissignificantchangeaffectingtheregimefromthetopdownto motivate the search for alternatives (Church, 2005). This is precisely theopportunitythatclimatechangebrings.Haxeltine and Seyfang (2009) identify three modes through which localinnovationscancometoinfluencethewiderregime:•Replication:horizontalreproductionthroughmultiple,smallinitiatives• Scaling-up: the expansion of individual initiatives as they attract moreparticipants• Mainstreaming: the absorption of innovations into dominant policy andpractice.Experience from attempts at spreading disaster risk reduction from local

community initiatives shows just how difficult grassroots socio-technicaltransitions can be. This is the case especially when the dominant regime isambivalent, sceptical or antagonistic, and where innovation is perceived tothreaten local or national established interests. Challenges arise when bothseeking to support local innovation without disrupting preferred local socialrelations, and inpromoting thewider influenceof successful innovations.Box4.1summarisesareviewofexperiencegeneratedthroughaworkshopdiscussionwith community-based disaster riskmanagers including international agenciessuchTearfund,Box4.1Lessonsinmakingtransitionsfromcommunity-baseddisasterriskmanagementCommunity-based disaster risk management fosters inclusive approaches todisasterriskreduction,withaspecialfocusonlivelihoodsustainability in lightofdisasterrisk,andcallsfortheutilisationoflocalknowledgeandskills.Ithasbecome a popular strategy for international and local development andhumanitarianNGOsseekingtofindwaysofempoweringthoseatrisktomanagetheir own vulnerability. Despite such enthusiasm there are relatively fewexamples of long-term success. Participants in the workshop identified ninereasonsforthis:• Ineffective translation and communication of climate science withincommunities.• A lack of long-term financial support for local capacity-building and thelongitudinalapplicationofcommunity-baseddisasterriskmanagement.•Localabuseofpowergrantedbycommunity-baseddisasterriskmanagementtolocalactors,whichcanleadtocommunityfragmentation.•Resistancefromlocaleliteswhencommunity-baseddisasterriskmanagementisperceivedasathreattothestatusquo.• Difficulties for implementation in unstable communities facing economic orpoliticalstress.• Difficulties for implementation on a larger scale, and related limits on theanalytical and policy applications generated by community-based disaster riskmanagement.•A failure to linkwith broader and/or longer-termdevelopment priorities andactivities.•Thegenerationofinequalityassomeneighbourhoodsbuildresiliencethroughcommunity-baseddisasterriskmanagementwhileothersremainvulnerable.• The lack of local success stories to act as examples for scaling-up andreplication.These challenges to the repeating of success are likely to apply across policy

fields, to other contexts where progressive external actors seek to build localadaptivecapacitythroughempowermentmethods.Specificchallengeswerealsoreportedfromthoseactorswhohadattemptedtosupportorleadmainstreaming,scaling-upandreplicationoflocalsuccesses.Mainstreaming ingovernmentsandcommunities faceddistinct challenges.Forgovernments, seeking support for community-based disaster risk managementanditsoutputsledtocompetitionwithotherprioritiesandrequiredaframeworktolinkeffortsbetweenlocalandnationalactors.Localcommunitiesneeded institutionalchannels toestablishdialoguewith thegovernment,particularlyabout riskperception,diversitywithin thecommunity(socialandeconomic)andlegalentitlementstoriskreduction.Scaling-up required a functioning institutional infrastructure and so wasmostlikelytobefoundwithinasupportive,inclusiveandopengovernancesystem.Replicationwasalsobefoundwherecentralinstitutionsweresupportivebutdidnotrelyonthis.Itcanprovideameansofreproducinggoodlocalpracticewhengovernancesystemsareunableorunwillingtosupportscaling-up.Inurbanslumsettlements and isolated rural communities beyond the reach of the state,expansion through horizontal replication was undertaken where existingnetworksofcommunityactorsandorganisationscouldprovidetheinstitutionalframeworkforreplication.Community-based disaster risk management was found to bemost successfulwhenlocalactors,localleadersandgovernmentrepresentativesledandworkedtogether. Where this was possible, it maximised opportunities for mobilisingjoint action. Furthermore, partnerships led to additional benefits from theextensionoflocalresourcesandthebuildingofgenerichumancapacityaslocalactorsturnedfrombeneficiariestoplannersandadvocatestakingonrightsandresponsibilityforlocalriskmanagement.Wheretherewasaninstitutionalframeworktosupportbottom-upinitiatives,thisenabledlocalactors tofeedintoanalysisandinterventionsdesignedtoaddressstructural issues related to national-level vulnerabilities. These plans wereotherwisebeyond thereachofcommunity-baseddisaster riskmanagementandat times conflicted with it. The major challenge for reproducing community-based disaster riskmanagement was how to successfully encourage sustainedgovernmental involvement set against competingbudgetarypressuresandwiththe potential that bottom-up innovation may challenge existing norms andpractice.

Source:ProVentionConsortium(2008)Oxfam and the Red Cross, and networks of local development organisationssuch as GROOTS and local NGOs. All had experience of attempting to

reproduce the success of pilot projects that had asserted the rights of localmarginalised actors (predominantly the poor and women). All were also theproduct of local action inspired from the outside and top-down (albeit fromprogressivecivilsocietyactors)andwerenotinitiatedlocally.Thelackoflocalinnovationisakeyaspectofvulnerabilityindicatingalackofadaptivecapacity.It isalsoachallengeforexternalagencies thatseek tofacilitate localactors inthe building of capacity. Experience indicates this is a long process requiringgenerational shifts inattitudesand individual identity.Butextremesofpovertyandnowalsotheurgencyofclimatechangeputpressureonprogressive,externalactorstoacceleratethisprocess.An importantmessage fromBox 4.1 is the difficulty experienced by externalactors seeking to stimulate innovation and diffusion. In low-income countrieswherethemarkethaslimitedreachonlythestatehasthescopeandresourcestospreadinnovationsthroughoutsociety,butisresistanttochange.Inthiscontext,transitions unfolded over time and with uncertain trajectories, themajority ofinnovationsneverextendbeyondlocalimpact.Forthosethatdid,atsomepointtransitionsbecamecoordinatedeitherstrategicallythroughaleadactor,likethestate agency, or as a convergenceof the visions and actions of diverse groups(GeelsandSchot,2007)analogoustoasocialmovement.Theinteractionoflocalinnovationwiththewiderregimeinshapingtransitionisa repeated theme summarised by Geels and Schot (2007) into five transitionpathways(seeTable4.1).Eachisaspecificoutcomeoftheinteractionbetweenlocal innovations and the wider regime. The pathways have been renamed inTable4.1tobetterdrawoutthesalientcharacteristicsfortransitionsinregimes.Climate change acts as an external pressure on the regime through changes inmarkets, international regulation, aidand trade flowsaswell as environmentalrisk.Localadaptationscan thenpotentiallybe inserted into theregimetomeetthese new challenges as a means of strengthening the status quo followingmoderate impacts (weakcooption),oraftercatastrophicchange inasearchforthe realignment of the regime to a new external environment (innovativesubstitution and innovative competition), until a new round of challengesemerge.Theframeworkwasdesignedtoaccountforchangeinbroadpatternsofproductionandconsumption.Insodoingitarguablyover-emphasisestheroleoftop-downpressureandexternaltriggersandunderplaystheinternalcompetitionbetweenTable4.1TransitionpathwaysPathway CharacteristicsStability Intheabsenceofexternalandinternalpressuresthereislimitedscopeforlocalinnovations

toaffectchangeintheregime,thoughtheycanactasaresourceagainstanuncertainfuture.Top-downreform

Moderate external pressure is acted upon by regime actors rather than local innovators tochangethedirectionofregimepolicyandpracticefromwithin.

Weakcooption

Unchallenging local innovationsare incorporatedby the regimebut their adoption triggersunforeseenadjustmentstotheregime.

Innovativesubstitution

Catastrophic external pressure shows the regime to have failed. A single innovation hasalreadybeendevelopedandcanbeinsertedintotheregime.

Innovativecompetition

Catastrophic external pressure shows the regime to have failed. Multiple innovationscompetefordominanceuntilanewstabilityisachieved.

multiple viewpoints on development that persist even during periods ofperceivedstabilityandcanrisetochallengeexistinginstitutionsandregimes.There are parallels between transitions theory and the resilience framing ofadaptation as discussed in Chapter 3. Both identify critical moments foradaptationas a tensionbetween innovation in sheltered spaces,be it nichesorthe shadow systems; and subsequent efforts to influence across the system ofinterest,beittheorganisationorgovernanceregime.Thisisnotsurprising:bothapproaches draw on system theory differing in the scales and contexts ofapplication. In organisations and in wider society potential for capacityinnovationisindicatedthroughlearningprocesses,socialnetworks,communitiesofpracticeandadvocacycoalitionsthatseektomodifyinstitutionalstructurestoallowwiderdiffusionsof innovations(Pellingetal.,2007;Smith,2007).Bothpoint to a creative optimumwhere top-down resources such as political will,financialandtechnicalsupportareavailablebutwithoutundueoversightsothatlocal actors canbe left to experiment, even to take risks indoing so,with thebenefit to thewider systemof generating an arrayof ideas andpractices.Thenecessityforacoalitionof localandhigher-levelorganisationsandinterests toenable diffusion is a centralmessage from these literatures, demonstrating thelimitsofautonomousandspontaneousadaptations.

Urbanregimesandtransitionaladaptation

Thissectionaimstoillustratehowspacesfortransitionmightopeninadaptationprocesseswithinasinglegovernanceregime:urbanriskmanagement.Thereareasmanydifferentmodelsofurbanriskmanagementasthereareexamples(see,forexample,UN-HABITAT,2007),butsomegeneralobservationscanbemadethat are also illustrative of the interaction of actors, structures and visions ofdevelopmenttobefoundinothertypesofregimeandthisistheaimhere.Thestartingpointforassessingscopeandbarriersfortransitioninadaptationistorecognisethecontestedsocialconstructionofthevision,associatedprioritiesand subsequent practices that give substance to the regime, and also describe

thosefaultlinesthatarelikelytocomeunderpressureandmayberealignedastransition unfolds. Competing visions of the city are underlain by ideological,material and economic interests (Kohler and Chaves, 2003). The balance ofinfluence accorded to individual visions determines what urbanisation means,whothewinnersand losersare–andunderadaptation toclimatechangewhataspects of urbanisation are to be protected or are dispensable for any onesettlement. Indeed in different places across the city different visions andassociated actionswill havemore or less traction evenwithin a single policysector.Thisprovidesopportunitiesforalternativeexperimentsthatmaycometodominanceoncegovernancespaceisopenedfollowingadisasterevent,politicaloreconomicchangeormacro-administrativedecisionsuchasdecentralisation.Arangeofvisionsthatcanprovidenarrativesforthedirectionofdominantriskmanagement decisions in a city are shown in Table 4.2. Different visions ofurbanisationincludethecityasamotorforgeneratingmacro-economicwealth,Table4.2LinkingvisionsofthecitytopathwaysformanagingvulnerabilityVisionofthecity Vulnerableobjects Pathways for managing

vulnerabilityLiterature

An engine for economicgrowth

Physical assets andeconomicinfrastructure

Insurance, businesscontinuityplanning

Econometricsofbusinesscontinuityandinsurance

An organism or integratedsystem linking consumptionandproduction

Critical/life-supportinfrastructure

Mega-projects connectingurban and ruralenvironmentalsystems

Political-ecology,systemstheory

Asourceoflivelihoods The urban poor,households,livelihoodtools

Extending and meetingentitlementstobasicneeds

Livelihoods analysis andmedicalsociology

A stock of accumulatedassets

Housing andcritical/life-supportinfrastructure

Safe construction andland-useplanning

Political-economy andurbansociology

Apoliticalandculturalarena Political freedoms,cultural andintellectualvitality

Inclusive politics and theprotectionofhumanrights

Discourse analysis andpublicadministration/politicaltheory

(Source:PellingandWisner,2009)

an organism turning raw materials into products and waste, a source oflivelihoodsforurbancitizens,anhistoricalaccumulationofphysicalassetsandinfrastructureoraplaceforculturalandpoliticalexchangeanddebate.Visions and associated risk management preferences need not be mutuallyexclusiveandmoreoftenvisionsprovideonlya rationale forprioritisation.Asclimate change and other development dynamics interact in the city existingnarrativeswill be tested.With this comes the possibility of opening space for

renegotiatingprioritieswithinasinglepolicyareaandalsomorebroadlysothatresourcesandpoliticalwillmaybedrawnintoorawayfromriskmanagement.Thecomplexityofriskmanagementmeansthattherearemanypotentialactorswithastakeintheexistingregime,andwithaninterestinanyrenegotiationofthebalanceofprioritiesinriskmanagementthatadaptingtoclimatechangemayoffer – whether through replication, up-scaling or mainstreaming. Table 4.3summarises the kinds of actors likely to have a direct stake in adapting urbanriskmanagementsector.Thekeymessagetotakefromthisisthewiderangeofurban actors that canbe engagedwith through even a single sector, extendingfrom applied emergency and riskmanagement to development regulation andplanning.ThisindicatesboththenumberofopportunitiesthatcanexistforTable4.3Urbandisasterriskreduction:multipleactivitiesandstakeholdersProfessionalcommunity

Developmentplanning Developmentregulation

Riskmanagement Emergencymanagement

Coreactivities

Land-use, transport,criticalinfrastructure

Buildingcodes,pollutioncontrol, trafficpolicing

Vulnerability and riskassessment, buildinglocalresilience

Early warning,emergency responseand reconstructionplanning

Primarystakeholders

Urban planners, cityengineers, criticalinfrastructure planners,homeowners, privateproperty managers,investors, transportationusers, taxi drivers’associations, otherprofessional associations,academia

Environmentalregulation,lawenforcement,contractors,factoryowners,drivers’ andtransporters’associations

Primary health care,sanitation and watersupply, communitydevelopment, localeconomic development,infrastructuremanagement, wastehaulers’ association,water users’representatives

Environmentalmonitoring,emergency services,civil defence,disastermanagementcoordination, firefighters, police,military, RedCross/Crescentsociety

(Source:PellingandWisner,2009)

insertingprogressivepracticessuchasinclusivedecision-makingordownward-accountability intopolicy reformin this singlesectorbutalso thechallengeofovercominginstitutionallock-inandinertiathathasoftenbeenfoundinsectorswithmultipleactorswhereexistinginter-organisationalalliancesacttomaketheexistingregimeresilient.Opportunitiesexistforinnovationnicheswithinprivate,publicandcivilsectorsandthroughcommunitiesofpracticethatcrosstheseboundaries.Throughlocalbranchesorbyadvocacyatthelandscapelevelinternationalagenciesandothergovernmentsmayalsobe active in shapingnicheor landscape led innovation.Whereinnovationisfosteredandhowitisevaluatedanddiffusedthroughouttheregimeintransitionwillalsobeafunctionofthebalanceofformalandinformalorshadowsystemsinthecity.Socialnetworksandcommunitiesofpracticethat

cross-cut formal organisational boundaries will influence scope for thedevelopmentofnoveladaptations,andthespeedanddirectionofdiffusionandreform. In urban contexts local government should play a pivotal role as amediatorandfacilitatorofdevelopmentinadditiontoanydirectregulatoryandmanagementroles.Thattherealityoflocalgovernmentissooftenasanunder-resourced actor, lacking in human capital, popular legitimacy and politicalinfluenceisagreatconstraint.ThisisillustrativeofJerneckandOlsson’s(2008)observation that the regime level tends to be resistant to change and thatinnovation comesmore often from local niches or thewider landscape and isacceptedonlywhentheregimeisstressed.

Conclusion

Opportunity for transitionopenswhenadaptations, or efforts tobuild adaptivecapacity, intervene in relationships between individual political actors and theinstitutional architecture that structures governance regimes. Transitionaladaptation falls short of directly challenging dominant cultural and politicalregimes,butcansetinplacepathwaysforincremental,transformationalchange.Both actor-oriented regime theory and socio-technological transition theoryprovideways forward fordrawingout theconnectionsbetweenadaptationandsocialevolutionshortofregimechange.Theyshareanemphasisontheroleofagency in the dialectical relationship between actors and institutions thatconstitute governance systems; agency that if fostered by a supportivegovernanceregimecanbearesourceofalternativeideasandpracticesavailablefor implementation following changes in the wider physical and economic–politicalenvironment.Existing regimes can block progressive adaptation at the level of transition,especially when change threatens established power relations. Marginalisedactorscanalsobereluctanttoundertakechangewhenthereisuncertaintyoverthe outcomes of reform or where short-term transactions costs are high,comparedtoadaptingthroughresilience.Wherelocaladaptationsaresuccessfulandopentransitions,diffusionintothewidersocietyisalsochallengingwithoutgovernment support. Fragmented transitions run the risk of exacerbatinginequalitiesassuccessfuladaptationsnotevenlyappliedacrosscommunitiesorsectors.Externalshocksthatshowtheexistinginstitutionalarchitecturewantingcan potentially provide the impetus needed to generate political will fortransition, and potentially also transformation. This is the opportunity thatclimatechangebrings.

5Adaptationastransformation

Risksociety,humansecurityandthesocialcontract

Insteadofdestroyingnaturalinequality,thefundamentalcompactsubstitutes,forsuchphysicalinequalityasnaturemayhavesetupbetweenmen,anequalitythatismoralandlegitimate,andthatmen,whomaybeunequalinstrengthorintelligence,becomeeveryoneequalbyconventionandlegalright.

(Rousseau,1973,original1762:181)ForRousseau,ajustsocietyisonewherethosewithpowerareheldtoaccountover their ability to protect core and agreed-upon rights for citizens. As anormative theoretician,Rousseauargued that the idealsocialcontract,one thatconfersuponrulersthelegitimacytoretainandexercisepower,wouldultimatelybegrantedbythecitizenry,notassumedorgod-given:anagreementratifiedatthelevelofcultureaswellaslaw,andonethatcanbetransformedifeithersidefails in its part of the contract. But Rousseau also recognised that the socialcontractcouldbeundemocratic,imposedwithforceorthroughthemanipulatedcomplicity of citizens themselves.When prevailing social relations are a rootcause of vulnerability and a target for adaptation, this observationmeans thatchangewillnotbeeasy(Williams,2007).Theclassicalformulationofthesocialcontract,suchasthatofferedbyRousseau,isalsorevealingforwhatitdoesnotinclude.Rightsareextendedonlytocitizens.Theglobalisedandteleconnectedimpacts of climate change and adaptation decisions require that futuregenerationsandthose livingbeyondnationalboundariesalsobeconsidered,aswellasthenon-human.Thischapterbuildsontheprecedingdiscussionsaroundadaptationasresilienceandtransition.Theseintroducedthenotionsofsociallearning,self-organisation,actorsinregimesandpathwaysforsocio-technologicaltransition.Thenotionsofrisk society, the social contract and human security are offered as theoreticaldevisestohelprevealthefault-linesofdominantsociety.Thesearebynomeansthe only theoretical lenses that could be brought to help examinetransformational adaptation. They have been selected because together theyprovide a continuum for transformational adaptation that stretches fromconceptualisationsofdevelopmentundermodernitytotheapplicationofpolicyfornationalandhumansecurity.Inthiswaytheyprovidealandscapeofideastohelp position and understand adaptations that seek to address root causes andleverage transformation. Like resilience and transition, transformation can be

seenasanintentionorasanoutcomeofadaptation.Italsooperatesatallscales,fromthelocaltointernational,oftensimultaneouslyandinwaysthataredifficulttoperceive.Inidentifyingtheassumptionsthatunderliemodernityasapotentialfocusforadaptationtransformationisalsodirectedtowardsinternal–cognitivechange; for example, through the production and reproduction of dominantcultural perspectives that emphasise and justify individualism and underminesocialsolidarityandcollectiveaction:afrequentlyidentifiedkeycomponentoflocaladaptivecapacity(Smithetal.,2003).

Avisionofadaptationastransformation

Thenotionofasocialcontractisnotonlyabstract,itcanhelpintheanalysisofcrisesoflegitimacythatprecedepoliticalregimechange,andpotentiallybeusedto avoid such crises.Disasters associatedwith climate change triggers are butone driver of crisis, and do not guarantee transformational change (see Table5.2). In such cases lossof legitimacy is tobe expectedwhenobserved riskorlossesexceedthose thataresociallyacceptable.Beneath this theconsequencesofclimatechangeareacceptedasaplay-offagainstothergains.Ofcoursenoteveryone in societywill hold the same tolerance to risk or loss and bothwillchangeover timeasculturalcontextsevolve. In thisway thesocialcontract iskeptinatensionbyriskandloss(aswellasopportunity)associatedwithclimatechange,andalsobywhosevaluesareincludedinthesocialcontract.Inadditiontotheestablishedsocialdivisionsalonglinesofclass,gender,cultural identity,productive sector, geographical association and so on, climate change alsorequires the recognition of future generations and distant interests in localdecision-framing (O’Brien et al., 2009). The inclusion or exclusion of thesevoices will determine the extent to which climate change is perceived tocontribute to individual disasters or crises, and the points at which differentactors are held responsible for the management of climate change and itsconsequences. This in turn shapes priorities for social responses to climatechange risk and loss. That the interests of future generations or citizens ofsecond countries should be allowed in this conversation fundamentallychallengesestablishedsocialorganisationbaseduponthenation-state.Canadapting to climate change incorporate thisdynamicandbeamechanismforprogressiveandtransformationalchangethatshiftsthebalanceofpoliticalorculturalpowerinsociety?Evidenceforthepotentialoftransformationalchangewithinnationalboundariescanbe found in theslowand limitedacceptanceofinternationalaidbythegovernmentofMyanmarfollowingHurricaneNargis.Inlargepart this behaviourwas a result of fear of thedestabilising influencesof

internationalhumanitariananddevelopmentactorson theregime,apolicy thatanalysts have also attributed to the need for the ruling military elite todemonstrate itscontroloversociety–especiallyata timewhentheimpactsofthehurricanemeantitspopularandinternationallegitimacywasatcrisispoint;andthepotentialforusurpingrichagriculturallandfromKarenethnicminorityfarmersintheIrrawaddydeltawherethehurricanemadelandfall(Klein,2008).Distrust by the Myanmar regime of international and especiallyWestern andcivilsocietyactorshashadabyproductofcatalysingorganisationalreformattheregional level. The leadership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN),aregionaleconomicgrouping,inrespondingtoHurricaneNargishasresulted in tighter regional cooperation for disaster response. This is animportant regional adaptation, one based on a principal of political non-interventionand soa formof adaptation that adds resilience to the statusquo.Thedurabilityofthispositionamidstcallsforamoreengagedapproachof‘non-indifference’(AmadorIII,2009)anditsconsequencesforbottom-uptransitionalortransformationalcapacityareyettobeseen.Where transitional adaptation is concerned with those actions that seek toexerciseorclaimrightsexistingwithinaregime,butthatmaynotberoutinelyhonoured (for example, the active participation of local actors in decision-making), transformational adaptation describes those actions that can result inthe over-turning of established rights systems and the imposition of newregimes. As with adaptation as resilience or transition, any evaluation of theoutcomeof transformational adaptationwill bedependent on theviewpoint oftheobserver(Poovey,1998).Effortsundertakentocontainorpreventscopefortransformational adaptation are as important as the adaptive pathwaysthemselvesinunderstandingtherelationshipsbetweenclimatechangeassociatedimpacts and social change. For example, it is very common for the socialinstability that follows disaster events to be contained by state actors. This isachievedthroughthesuppressionofemergentsocialorganisationandassociatedvalues halting the growth of alternative narratives or practices that mightchallenge the status quo, and lead to transformation as part of post-eventadaptation(PellingandDill,2006).Thesocio-ecologicalsystemsliteraturehaslesstosayabouttransformationthanresilience and transitional change. Nelson et al. (2007:397) describetransformation as ‘a fundamental alterationof thenature of a systemonce thecurrent ecological, social, or economic conditions become untenable or areundesirable’. But formany people, especially the poormajority population ofmany countries at the frontline of climate change impacts, everyday life isalreadyundesirableandfrequentlyoftenchronicallyuntenable.Herewecometo

a central challenge for systems analysis which places the system itself as theobject of analysis. Resistance in a social system can allow it to persist (beresilient)inthefaceofmanifestlyuntenableorundesirableecological,socialoreconomic features for subsystem components. Theoretical work on nestedsystemsallowssomepurchaseonthis(Adgeretal.,2009a),butisverydifficulttodevelopempirically.Thepointsatwhichthesefailuresleadtochallengesfortheoverarchingregimeserveastippingpointsfortransformation.TippingpointsthatNelsonetal. (2007) point out can be driven by failures that are absolute(untenable)orrelative(undesirable),sothatculturalvaluesplayasmucharoleas thermodynamic, ecological or economic constraints on pushing a systemtowardstransformation.Thereisscopefortransformationtoarisefromtheincrementalchangebroughtaboutby transitions(seeChapter4).Subsequentclaimson theexistingsystemresultsinmodificationsatthesubsystemlevel.Overtimeandinaggregatethisforcesanevolutionarytransformationintheoverarchingsystemunderanalysis.Itisthispathwaytotransformationwhichexistingclimatechangeliteraturehasfocused upon.With an interest in practicalways inwhich productive systemsmighttransformunderclimatechange,Nelsonetal.(2007)describethisprocessas systems adjustment and include the implementation of new managementdecisionsortheredesigningofthebuiltenvironmentasexamples.ThisaspectisconsideredinChapter4.Classifyingtransformationaladaptationissharpenedbyidentifying:(1)theunitof assessment – subsystems and overarching systems may be undergoingdifferentkindsofadaptation,ornoneatall–aswellastheirinteractions;(2)theviewpointoftheobserver,whichcanplacealogicforanormativeassessmentoftransformation;and(3)distinguishingbetweenintention,actionandoutcome.Asingle type of action, for example greater local actor participation in riskmanagement decision-making, can promote resilience, transition ortransformation– it is theoutcomethatcounts,andoutcomescannotalwaysbeplannedfor.Itisthefearofsurprisesandincrementalchangeinsocialrelationsthatencouragestightcontrolofemergentsocialorganisationforriskandimpactmanagement and forces many actions into the shadow system of informalrelationsandorganisation.Where should one look to reveal the challenges and potential directions fortransformative elements of adaptation? Most practical work on adaptationfocuses on addressing proximate causes (infrastructure planning, livelihoodmanagementandsoon).Transformation,however,isconcernedwiththewiderandlesseasilyvisiblerootcausesofvulnerability.These lie insocial,cultural,economic and political spheres, often overlapping and interacting. They are

difficult to grasp, yet felt nonetheless. Theymay be so omnipresent that theybecomenaturalised, assumed tobepart of theway theworld is.They includeaspects of life that are globalised as well as those that are more locallyconfigured.Theformerdonothaveidentifiablesitesofproductionandrequireindividualandlocalaswellashigherorderscalesofactiontoresolve(Castells,1997).Thelatteraremoreamenabletoactionwithinnationalandlocalpoliticalspace. Table 5.1 identifies three analytical frames that each reveal differentaspectsofdominationandtheassociatedproductionofvulnerability.Eachpointstospecificindicatorsfortransformationaspartofadaptation.TheindicatorsoftransformationidentifiedinTable5.1requiredeepshiftsintheways people and organisations behave and organise values and perceive theirplace in theworld. Together they help describe the features a sustainable andprogressivesocialsystemmightbeexpectedtoexhibit.Theyoperateatthelevelofepistemology:thewayspeopleunderstandtheworld.Surface–transitional–changesarealreadyobservable; for example, in theuptakeof socio-ecologicalsystemsframinginadaptationandmorewidelyinnaturalresourcemanagement.Buttransformationspeakstomuchbroaderprocessesofchangethatencompassindividuals across societies, not only specific areas of professional practice,thoughsuchenclavesmayyetprovetobethenichesthatleadtoTable5.1AdaptationtransformingworldviewsAnalyticalframe/thesis

Rootcausesofvulnerability Indicatorsoftransformation

Risksociety Modernity’s fragmentedworldview;dominantvaluesandinstitutionsarecoproducedatallscales from the global to theindividual

Holistic, integrated worldviews including strongsustainable development and socio-ecological systemsframing of adaptation and development; adaptation thatdrawstogetherthevaluesystemsofindividualswithsocialinstitutions

Socialcontract

Loss of accountability orunilateralimpositionofauthorityin economic and politicalrelationships

Local accountability of global capital and nationalgovernments, to include the marginalised and futuregenerations and not be bound by nationalisticdemarcationsofcitizenship

Humansecurity

Nationalinterestsdominateoverhumanneedsandrights

Human-centred approach to safety, built on basic needsand human rights fulfilment, not onmilitarisation or theprioritising of security for interests in command ofnationallevelpolicy

profound societal change (see Chapter 4). More tangibly, transformation thatmoves beyond intention also unfolds at the level of political regime.Here theroot causes of vulnerability aremademost visiblewhen latent vulnerability isrealised by disaster. The post-disaster period is an important one forunderstanding the interplay of dominant and alternative discourses andorganisationfordevelopmentandriskmanagementandisexaminedbelow.

Followingthisinitialdiscussionofthenatureoftransformationaladaptationthischapterexaminesrisksociety,humansecurityandthesocialcontractaslensestodirectanalysisoftransformationwithinadaptation.Theinfluenceofdisastersasmoments in national political life that can catalyse regime change are thenreviewed.

Modernityandrisksociety

ForWesternscienceandpolicydiscourse,fearofsurprisesfromclimatechangehasbeenpredominantlyinterpretedthroughadaptationasrequiringactionsthatcanhelptomanageriskbygreatercontrolof theenvironment.Thisconfoundsproximate with root causes of climate change risk (Pelling, 2010).Environmentalhazardunderclimatechangeisanoutcomeofthecoevolutionofhumanandbio-physicalsystems,notsimplyofexternalenvironmentalsystemsactinguponhuman interests. In thiscontext,perhaps themostprofoundactoftransformationfacinghumanityasitcomestolivewithclimatechangerequiresaculturalshiftfromseeingadaptationasmanagingtheenvironment‘outthere’to learning how to reorganise social and socio-ecological relationships,procedures and underlying values ‘in here’. This in turn demands a strongcomponent of conceptual and social reorganisation. How far this mightprecipitatepoliticalandeconomicregimechangeisunclear.UlrichBeckhaswrittenextensivelyonthenexusofmodernity,technology,theenvironmentandhumansecurityinwhathecallsrisksociety(Beck,1992).Histheory of reflexive modernity posits that transformations in the nature ofrationalityare thebasis forcontemporaryenvironmentalandsocialchallenges,anditisatthisdeeplevelthatchangemustariseforriskstobeavoidedatrootcause. Beck argues that modernity has produced a simplified model tounderstandtheworld,onethatfragmentsandisolatesdifferentcomponents.Thisapproach has led to the application of sector specific technologies fordevelopment and risk management. There are undeniable successes with thisapproachbutclimatechangeimpactsrevealthelimits.Thecomplexityofsocio-ecological systems dynamism exemplified by climate change and adaptationcannot be captured by individual sectors or sciences. The influence of socio-ecological thinking and systems theory in the sciences is one response to this.Policy actors have been slower to respond with administrative structures andpolitical regimes, stickingwith increasingly inappropriate structures.Thesearestructures – in administrations includingMinistries of the Environment, CivilDefence, Central Banks and Foreign Affairs – that need to work together toadapt progressively to the risks of climate change.Beck’s analysis is striking,

suggestingthattheisolatedandfragmentednatureofmanagementandpracticaltechnologiescreatedwithinthismodelofrealityallowuncontrolledinteractionsinbetween.This results in unforeseen and catastrophic consequences includingclimate change.Moreover, due to the closed nature of the system, alternativetrajectoriesareblocked:Risksocietyarisesinthecontinuityofautonomousmodernizationprocesses,whichareblindanddeaftotheirowneffectsandthreats.Cumulativelyandlatently,thelatterproducethreats,whichcallintoquestionandeventuallydestroythefoundationsofindustrialsociety.(Beck,1992:5–6)Whiledevelopedwithrich,industrialisedeconomiesinmind,Beck’sbasicthesisistransferabletothosepoorercountriesthathaveusedindustrialisationtodriveagriculturalandurbandevelopment(Leonard,2009).Foreigndirect investmentandtheconditionalitiesofaidthatpromotemarketledindustrialisationfromtheoutsidebroadenresponsibilityandperhapsunderminethereflexivityoflocalandevennatioanlactors.Buttherootcausesoftheclimatechangechallengeandtheconsequentneedtosituateadaptation(andmitigation)withindevelopment,notastechnicaladjuctstoit,remainsthesame.Beckchannelshishopeforrecoveryin the formulation of a radically alternativemodel ofmodernity, but finds thetools and insights needed to challenge the socioeconomicpolicies that leadustowards disastrous outcomes within society. He believes that risk society isinherently reflexive and perceives the contradictions between its originalpremises(humanadvancement),andtheoutcomes(environmentaldisaster),butarguesthatradicalchangemustcomefromsocio-politicalinterventionsdesignedtotransformdevelopmentdrivenbyindustrialisation,goingwellbeyondtheriskmanagement agenda, including that being associated with climate change.Progresshasbeenslow;fiveyearsafterpublishinghisthesisoftherelationshipbetween risk society and modernity, Beck observed that consumption hadbecomeakeydriveralongsideindustrialisationintheproductionofhazardsandvulnerabilities. This suggested that neoliberal economic policies are anincreasingthreattohumansecurity–reflexivityhasnotyetledtotransformationbut rather an acceleration of the root causes of crisis (Beck, 1999). In thesucceedingdecadelittlehaschangedbeyondtheincreasingpaceandintensityofconsumptionandassociatedriskproduction,andthedepthofinequalityinriskat scales from the global to local. A slow but growing concensus for thereorganisation of technology and finance was given a brief and short livedstimulacebythe2008–10globaleconomiccrisis.Intheexistingpolicylandscape,thechallengesofattainingamoreholisticandreflexive approach to living with climate change and its impacts can be seenplayingout in thedisaster risk reductioncommunity–acritical componentofadaptation.Thiscommunityhaslongarguedfortheadvantagesofconceivingof

environmental risk as embedded within development and of confrontingdevelopment,nottheenvironment,inseekingtoreducerisk,buthasalongwaytogo inembedding thiswithindominantpolicyframeworks.Someprogress isbeing made and is reflected, for example, in sections of the guiding HyogoFramework for Action 2005–15. This international agreement is non-legallybindingbutcompelssignatorystates towork towardsfiveareasofaction.Thefirstofthesepromotesinstitutionbuildingandcallsfortheintegrationofdisasterrisk management within development frameworks such as poverty reductionstrategies (see http://www.unisdr.org). Reflexivity, though, is ultimately aboutchangingvaluesand requiresapolitical andculturalprocess inaddition to thesectoral-technicalonedescribedabove.

Thesocialcontract

The idea of a social contract is the foundation of contemporary liberalism,underwritingbothitsKantianandUtilitarianstrains(Hudson,2003),andhashadan enormous influence on the construction of liberal political ideologies andinstitutions (Pateman and Mills, 2007). The social contract is useful for ananalysisof transformationaladaptationandits limitsbecauseitdrawsattentiontothecompactinsocietythatdeterminesresponsibilityforriskmanagementaspartofdevelopment.Morethanthis,ithelpstorevealthebasisoflegitimacyofthisunderstandingandsothepotentialfragilityof theexistingstatusquo.Thiscanbeexamined, forexample, throughexposing thebalanceofmarket,publicand social pathways throughwhich security is framedandmediated. Issuesofresponsibility and pathway are open for contestation as failures in the socialcontractarerevealedduringdisasterand itsaftermath(PellingandDill,2006).Recently,forexample,concernshavebeenraisedabouttheincreasingroleoftheinternational private sector in disaster reconstruction and subsequent loss ofaccountabilitytolocalactorsatrisk,andalsotothosecitizens,oftenofsecondcountries, who provide funds through tax payments of charitable donations(Klein,2007).The social contract is a product of Western liberal philosophy. However, thegenericideaofcollectiveunderstandinginwhichpartiesagreetocooperatewithoneanother,seedingpoweraccordingtoasetofrules,isnot.Thiscanbeseenintraditional human understandings of rules concerning socio-cultural andbiological reproduction, exchange, reciprocity and respect (Osteen, 2002),recognisingtheparallelstothesocialcontractoperatingatdifferentscalesandincontrastingcultureswherethestateisnotthedominantactoropensusefulscope.Thiscanhelpinextendingthefocusofthataspectofsocialcontracttheorythat

explores the often tense and sometimes dynamic distribution of rights andresponsibilities in society to other interactions than those between the nationstateanditscitizens.InthetraditionofWesternpoliticalphilosophythenotionofasocialcontracthasnotbeenbuiltonobservedcustomarypracticebutratheranabstractsetofideasabout the nature of political authority and popular consent (Gierke, 1934;Buckle, 1993) stretching back to the work of Thomas Aquinas (circa 1250).Hobbes,Rousseau,andLockeeachdevelopedversionsofsocialcontracttheory.They shared some similarities in approach, drawing from the idea that eachhumanisbornintoastateofnatureandendowedwithabsoluteequality,butwithnoprotectionswhatsoeveragainst theunregulatedviolenceofanarchyexistingwhereeachhumancompeteswithallothers.Theytheorisedthesocialconditionsunder which people might engage as stakeholders in a political society tomediatetheviolenceofananarchicsociety.Thesocialcontractwasthebasisforthe creation of political societies in which all could secure their basic needs,exercisecreativityandenjoyindividualautonomyinpeacefulsociality.Butsincethe trade-off involved ordinary people forfeiting all or some amount of theirfreedom/power to the dominant social actor (the state) in order to ensurepersonal security, the derivation of state authority (previously understood asdivine right) was suddenly understood as originating in a consensus of thepeople. These were deeply radical ideas conceived during a period whenabsolutist governance and feudalism were destabilising in Europe. Socialcontract theory constituted the philosophical counterpart to the political andeconomicchangesoccurringduringthetransitiontomodernityinEurope.Theseearly theoriesof stateandsocietypaved theway for thecreationof theliberal political tradition spearheaded by Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham.Ironically, itwas the theoretical descendents ofHobbes rather thanLocke thatargued most forcefully for a restricted state. Jordan (1985) explains that likeHobbes,theUtilitarianbranchofliberalthoughtviewedessentialhumannatureasseekingpleasureandavoidingpain,buttheHobbesianstrongstate(designedtoamelioratetheconflictsthatthesemotivationswouldinevitablyprovoke)wasrejected. Instead, Bentham and James Mill subscribed to the view that sincegovernmentsweremadeupofhumanswhowouldattempttoenrichthemselvesand seek to increase their power over their subjects, the power and reach ofgovernmenthadtoberestrained.Debate on themost appropriate balance of power between the state and civilsociety (including the market) continues to this day (van Rooy, 1998). In aprecursor to postmodern thinking, Gramsci (1975) argued that the divisionbetween political society and civil society was artificial. Just as hegemony

captures the state and civil society, and associated fields of culture andeducation, so too the counter-narratives of belief systems can be found cross-cutting the divides of the market, state and civil society. Consequently, forGramsci, while the benefits of the social contract extended only as far as thebourgeois periphery, its universalist language is produced and disseminatedacrossallsocietysothatthosesubservienttothesocialcontractarealsocaughtupinitsreproduction.Thisaccountsforsomeoftheinertiainpoliticalregimeswhereinequalityismademanifestthroughdisasterandreconstructionyetwherepressuresforchangeinthesocialcontractfailtoattainpopularsupport.Gramscibelievedthatbyofferingmarginalisedpopulationsthetoolsofcriticalthinking,andthestructureoforganisedgroupstobringtheirdistinctiveculturestobearinthe production of counter-hegemonic discourse, transformational change couldbeachieved,atleastatthelevelofdiscourse(Urbinati,1998).Habermas(1976)offersasecondpossibilityfortransformationthroughacrisisoflegitimacy.Thisfollowsthefailureofthedominantactorinthesocialcontracttomeetitsownresponsibilities.Inthisunderstandingnewcriticalawarenessisnot required tomake the failures of the social contract visible.ButHabermasdoes argue (1985) that collective action is a necessary condition for realisingsocial and political change once the failings of legitimacy are revealed. BothGramsciandHabermasplacegreatemphasisontheroleofcultureandidentity,andtheinfluenceofeducationonthis,indemarcatingthefault-linesalongwhichthe social contract is vulnerable to transformation, and also its resilience.Identitythatisascribedtosocialmarkerssuchasraceorethnicity(Hite,1996),butwhoselogicalsoextendsto includeidentity throughassociationwithplace(Wagstaff,2007)issignificantforunderstandingthetransformationalpossibilityof environmental crisis which has the power of physical destruction. It is thepotential for disaster to destroy social life (Hewitt, 1997) and the culturalmeaningsinvestedinthephysical,aswellasphysicalassetsthemselves,thatinturnopensscopefornewunderstandingsofidentityandsocialorganisationthatoffer an alternative to established structures in the social contract whenlegitimacyislost(PellingandDill,2010).The application of social contract theory to questions of climate changeresiliencedrawsoutthesignificanceofshiftingpoliticalandeconomicrelationsbetweennationstates,citizensandprivatesectorinterests.O’Brienetal.(2009)showhowthedominantglobaltrendinliberalisationhasgeneratednewformsofvulnerability to climate change (and wider losses in human wellbeing) inNorwayandNewZealand,where comprehensivepublicwelfareprovisionhasbeen retrenched. This same research also used social contract theory to helpidentify social groups that are currently marginalised from national political

decision-makingyetnonethelessimpactedbyit.ThisincludedPacificIslandersin New Zealand displaced by climate change, food security for Inuitcommunities in the Canadian Arctic and in Norway responsibility for futuregenerations whose wellbeing is ever more closely linked to the legacy ofNorway’soileconomyoftoday.Given its range of application it is not surprising that criticisms have beenlevelled at the social contract theory. Communitarians challenge its atomisticnotion of humans; feminists and post-colonial scholars argue against itspropensity toexclude;postmodernistsdislike its relianceonabstractuniversalsratherthanthesituatedhereandnow(Hudson,2003);andfromresiliencytheorycomesthewarningthatclimatechangecannotbeanalysedatanyonescalealone(O’Brien et al., 2009). Using social contract theory to frame studies ofadaptation to climate change requires rights and responsibilities that can beclearlydefined,andthisisnotalwaysthecaseparticularlyforfuturegenerationsand distant populations connected to local events and decisions through theglobalisedeconomy.For climate change adaptation, the most important critique of social contracttheoryisarguablythedifficultywithwhichcurrentworkcanmovefromastatetoamulti-scaled/multi-actoranalyticalperspective;onewheredominantnormsand their reinforcing institutions are coproduced at all scales from the globalthroughnationaltotheindividualandwherepowercutsacrossandworksinsidenationaladministrativeboundaries. In this sensesocialcontract theorybenefitsfromworkingalongsiderisksocietyaspartofananalyticalframe.Ifprogressiveadaptationistoaddressrootcausesaspartoftransformationaladaptationsthenthisisanessentialareafortheoreticalandempiricalresearch.There has been somemovement to extend social contract theory to the globalpolitical-economy and acknowledge global capital as the dominant centre ofpower through global corporate social responsibility as a contract betweenprivatesectorandtheconsumer/producer(Zadeck,2006).Butmoreproblematicare those growing caseswhere lines of influence and associated responsibilityaremadeincreasinglyindirectundereconomicglobalisation(White,2007).Herethesocialcontractcanofferastartingpointandhelpcharacterisethenatureofinterrupted or unclear responsibility. But global consumers, unlike nationalcitizens, have little capacity for attributing responsibility, ascribing legitimacyand retrieving power. Here dominant power is footloose, beyond the directcontrol of individual nation-states. The globalisation of civil society andcollaborationbetweengovernmentstoregulatebusinessattheregionalorglobalscaleprovidesomescopeforaction,butsofarwithlimitedeffect(White,2007).

Humansecurity

Thesocialcontractandrisksocietyallowustoseeadaptationtoclimatechangeas embedded within ongoing development struggles for rights and power.Human security provides a closer lens on our specific domain of interest: theplay-offstobemadeinbalancingrightsandrisksbetweenactors,andoverspaceand time in the shaping of security. That human security is a product of theunderlyingculturalassumptionsofrisksocietyandinstitutionalrulessymbolisedbythesocialcontractisneatlyindicatedbythedefinitionofhumansecurityusedby the Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS)programme. This group has a special interest in the interactions of humansecurityandglobalenvironmentalchange;theydefinehumansecurityas:a state that is achievedwhenandwhere individualsandcommunitieshave theoptionsnecessary toend,mitigateoradapttothreatstotheirhuman,environmentalandsocialrights;havethecapacityandfreedomtoexercisetheseoptions;andactivelyparticipateinpursuingtheseoptions.(GECHS,2009)Human security is then a counterpoint to national security as an objective foradaptation surroundingcatastrophiceventsandclimatechangemoregenerally.National and human security can be reinforcing, but as Ken Booth (1991)argues, states cannot be counted on to prioritise the security of their citizens.Somestatesmaintainatleastminimallevelsofsecurityforcitizenstopromoteregime legitimacy, but are unmotivated to go further; others are financially orinstitutionallyincapableofprovidingevenminimalstandards;whilestillothersare more than willing to subject entire sectors of society to high levels ofinsecurity for the economic and political benefit of others who then use theirpower to support the regime.Adaptation to climate changewill be framed bysuch contexts and can offer both policy justification and practical vehicles forpromoting the status quo, regressive or progressive change in human securityandtherightsandresponsibilitiesinthesocialcontractthatitisbuiltupon.The UNDP’s 1993 and 1994 Human Development Reports advanced humansecurityasaperson-centred rather thanstate-oreven region-basedapproach tosecurity.Itpresentedaholisticandglobalversionofhumansecurityassecurityfrom physical violence; security of income, food, health, environment,community/identity;andpoliticalfreedoms(Gasper,2005).AccordingtoPinarBilgin (2003) theUNDP’spositionwas that the concept of security shouldbechangedintwofundamentalways:(1)thestressputonterritorialsecurityshouldbe shifted towards people’s security, and (2) security should be sought notthrough armaments but through sustainable development. In 2003, theCommissiononHumanSecurity (CHS)developed thisagenda throughabasicneedsapproach.According to theseniorresearcheron theproject: ‘thegoalof

humansecurityisnotexpansionofallcapabilitiesinanopen-endedfashion,butrathertheprovisionofvitalcapabilitiestoallpersonsequally’(Alkire,2003:36).Gasper(2005)assertsthatwhiletheconceptofhumansecurityelaboratedbytheCHSisessentiallyawidelyconceivedyetprioritisedarrangementofbasicneedsfulfilment, thediscourse thatarises fromthepolicyframework isembedded intheconceptofhumanrights.Hearguesthattheintegrationofthetwopreviouslydisparate frameworks is the critical contribution of the human securityperspective,witheachframeworksupportingtheother.Thebasicneedsmodelissupported and enhanced by its associationwith a human rights framework asmuchofneeds-basedplanninghasinthepastadoptedmoney-metricapproachesto aggregate across people (which can lead to perverse, unintended outcomes)whereas from a human rights perspective, no individual can be sacrificed(Gasper,2005).Moreover,unlikebasicneedsapproachesthatfocusonspecificclaims for and by the needy, human rights discourse and practice is gearedtowards generating duties and seeking accountability through legal structures.Conversely, the human rights framework is supported and enhanced by itsassociationwithabasicneedsmodel.DrawingfromtheworkofJohanGaltung(1994),Gasper reminds us that a human rights framework tends to direct ourattentiontowardsindividualsratherthanstructures.Thedrawingdownof analytical andpolicy lenses from the state to individualthroughhumansecuritycomplementswelltheobservedneedforsocialcontractstoworkbeyondthestateasnation-statesbecomearguablylesspowerfulthantheglobalising international superstructure populated by private sector and civilsocietyinterestsandunelectedintergovernmentalorsuper-nationalbodies.Manyperceive the emerging global institutional structure of governance to be aspotentially threatening (or as potentially unresponsive) as the states it has sorecently marginalised. As Duffield (2007) points out, the consolidation ofsupranationaladministrativebodieshasnotsubsumedthepowerofmetropolitanstates,butratheralignedthemalongsidesupranationalpowersincontrapositionto the weak, underdeveloped and thus potentially dangerous states of thepolitical periphery.From the perspective of global powers, themajor threat tothe security of the North is not from aggressive states, but from failed ones(Hoffmann, 2006).Thus the stage is set for unprecedented amountsofNorth–Southinterventions.Nevertheless,itisthedepthoftheseinterventionsratherthanthenumberthatisworryingtosomeanalysts.Thereisanassumptionthatnewformsofgovernancearenolongerprimarilyconcernedwiththediscipliningofindividualsubjectsasdocilecitizensofparticularstates(thoughthatcontinues)butnowarecombinedwith unprecedented levels of coordination and penetration (from supranational

organisationstovillagecommittees)toproducedesperation-freezones, therebydiminishingthethreatoftheSouthtotheNorth.Humansecurityisoneofthoseframeworks.Thisisaseriouswarning,butinbringingtogetherneedsandrightsapproaches human security has the potential to bridge the public– privatedichotomythatunderthegloballiberalconsensushasseenamarginalisingofthestateinfavourofprivateactors.Theimportanceofregulatingprivatebehaviourandtheneedtobuildcapacityinlocalandnationalgovernmentissupportedbyhumansecuritybutheldinconstructivetensionwiththerightsofindividuals.Aswith thesocialcontract,context,historyand theviewpointof thoseat riskarearguably the most significant features in judging legitimacy and determiningwhosesecurityisbeingprioritisedandatwhatcostthroughadaptation.

Disastersastippingpointsfortransformation

We have seen through risk society the dangers of a naturalised modernworldview operating across all scales. The social contract has described thedistributionofrightsandresponsibilitiesinsocietyandshownthistobeheldinplacethroughabalanceoflegitimacyandpower.Humansecurityaddstothisanunderstanding that the rights and basic needs of individuals do not alwayscoincidewith thoseof thestateand thatplay-offs inrightsandriskarepartofeverydaydevelopment. In thisdiscussion ithasalsobeenasserted thatdisastereventsassociatedwithclimatechangerelatedhazardsprovideadistinctmomentofchallengetoestablishedvaluesandorganisationalformsthatembodypowerrelations. This section reviews existing secondary evidence to support thisassertionasaprecursortodetailedcasestudyanalysisinChapter8.Theaimisto establish the extent towhich disaster events provide leverage for academicstudy and also for practical movement that might be described astransformational. This should not be seen as suggesting that developmentalperiodsoutsideofdisasterareanylessimportant,butsimplythattheirreviewisoutsidethescopeofthisbook.Theliteraturerevealsthatscholarsandpractitionershavelongobservedthatthesocio-politicalandculturaldynamicsputintomotionatthetimeofcatastrophicnatural disasters create the conditions for potential social (Carr, 1932) andpolitical (Pelling and Dill, 2010) change, sometimes at the hands of adiscontentedcivilsociety(Cuny,1983).PellingandDill(2006)reviewanumberof studies showing a government’s incapacity or a lack of political will torespondquicklyandadequately toadisaster representingabreak in the socialcontract, while simultaneously revealing a provocative (albeit temporary)absence of instrumental state power. The destruction/production dynamic

triggered by disaster creates, temporarily, a window of opportunity for bothnovel and traditional socio-political action at local, national, international andnow supranational levels. This interpretation does not derive from anenvironmentaldeterminism:itisnotclaimedthatdisasterscausesocio-politicalchange but rather that the instability generated by development failuresmademanifest at thepoint of disaster open scope for change. Indeedover the long-term there is ample evidence that human societies survive dramatic shifts inenvironmental conditions through a range of culturally specific adaptations(Rapparport, 1967;Waddell, 1975; Torry, 1978;Zaman, 1994).Hiddenwithinthis, though,aremomentsofshort-termdisruption,with thepotential for long-termconsequences.Political change has been most comprehensively studied from drought eventsand related food insecurity crises (Glantz, 1976). These tend to unfold slowlyandconsequentlyaremoreclearlyaproductofdevelopmentfailuresthanrapidonset events which continue to be conceptualised as outside of humanresponsibility.AclearexampleoftheinteractionofenvironmentalandpoliticalchangecomesfromEthiopia. In1974,EmperorHaileSelassieofEthiopiawasoustedbyaMarxist insurgencyledbyGeneralMengistu,whointurnoversawhisowngovernmentcollapse in1991.Both regimesweredestabilisedbecausetheir leadersfailed toadequatelyaddress thedeepeningandprogressivespreadof drought,which in both cases originated in the drought-vulnerable northeastbutmoved southwards to envelope vast regions of the country in famine andsocial unrest (Keller, 1992; Comenetz and Caviedes, 2002). Violent conflict,blockades and the purposeful rerouting of supplies for political reasons havebeenidentifiedastriggersindroughtassociatedfamine.Evenwhenfoodisnotused as a weapon, delays and mismanagement in the early stages of droughtmakeit increasinglydifficult tomitigatethefullsocial impact(SenandDreze,1999). Moreover, researchers have shown that international aid has in somecasesexacerbatedratherthanalleviatedsuffering(deWaal,1997).To add some breadth to this discussion, Table 5.2 summarises a number ofnationallysignificantrapid-onsetdisastereventsandtheirpoliticaloutcomes.Itincludes geophysical alongside hydrometeorological hazard contexts todemonstrate the range of interactions between political change and disaster.Casesareorganisedaccordingtothepoliticalcontextofthepolityinquestion:post-colonial security: modernising nation-states; Cold War security: politicalstability; international economic security: liberalization; and global security:advancedprivatisation.Eachperioddescribestheoverarchingpoliticalcontextsandsourceofpressure.Tensionsinearlycontextsaredominatedbyideologicalcompetition between state and counter-state ideologies from neo-colonial

control,tonationbuilding,proxytensionssponsoredduringtheColdwar;morecontemporarycontextsincludegreaterinfluencefromorganisednon-stateactorsinnationalandinternationalcivilsocietyandtheprivatesectorbutalsoareturntointernationalpoliticalinfluence.In Table 5.2, there are examples of regime change opening democratic spacefollowing disaster (East Pakistan/Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Mexico), but alsocaseswhereneo-colonialornationalautocraticpowerstightentheirholdonthenational policy (PuertoRico,DominicanRepublic,Haiti). Elsewhere disastersserve as political capital in ongoing competitions within the political elite(China) and between competing ideologies (Guatemala) including those witharmed struggles (Nicaragua). The most recent events show the complexity ofcivilsociety-staterelationswithcivilsocietydemonstratingbothregressiveandprogressive impetus for change (Turkey, India), the influence of internationalcivil society and intergovernmental actors (Sri Lanka). However, even wherecivilsocietyisstrongandorganisedthepowerofdominantpoliticaldiscoursesto maintain the status quo and provide opportunities for exploitive capitalaccumulationinthefaceofdevelopmentfailureisimpressive(USA).Comparative analyses of disaster politics show political change ismost likelywhere disaster losses are high, the impacted regime is repressive and incomeinequalityandlevelsofnationaldevelopmentarelow(DruryandOlson,1998).Albala-Bertrand(1993)alsoobserves that thepolitical, technological, socialoreconomiceffectsofdisastersareexplainedprimarilybyasociety’spre-disasterconditions, and a government that immediately marshals what material anddiscursivepowersithasmayberewardedwithimprovedlevelsofpopularpost-disaster legitimacy regardless of culpability. This final point emphasises thedepth of the cultural underpinnings in the social contract, recognised by bothGramsciandHabermas,thatcanallowdiscoursestobemanipulatedbythoseinpower.WorkbyPelling andDill (2006) confirms this analysis but also showsthatcompetingdiscoursescanestablishacritiquewhenbuildingonpre-disasterpoliticalmomentum.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to make a claim for transformation as alegitimateelementofadaptationtheoryandpractice.Indoingsothechallengesofescapingthefragmentationofmodernity(Beck,1992),thealienatinglossofpowertotheglobal(Castells,1997)andneedtore-asserthumanrightsandbasicneeds in an increasingly unequalworld (Gasper, 2005) have been revealed asarguably the most fundamental challenges facing development and the social

relationsthatunderpincapacitiestoadapttoclimatechangerisk.The extent towhich adaptation to climate change can embrace transformationwilldependontheframingoftheclimatechangeproblem.Wherevulnerabilityisattributedtoproximatecausesofunsafebuildings,inappropriatelanduseandfragiledemographicsadaptationwillbeframedasalocalconcern.Thisismoreamenable to resilience and transitional forms of adaptation. However, ifvulnerability is framed as an outcome of wider social processes shaping howpeople see themselves and others, their relationshipwith the environment androleinpoliticalprocesses,thenadaptationbecomesamuchbroaderproblem.Itisherethattransformationbecomesrelevant.How vulnerability and adaptation are framed have clear implications forapportioningblameandthelocusofadaptationanditscosts.Wherevulnerabilityisanoutcomeoflocalcontextthenitislocalactorsatriskwhowilllikelycarrythe costs of adapting (for example, through transactions and opportunity costsincurred throughchanging livelihoodpractices).Wherevulnerability isseenasan outcome of wider social causes then responsibility for change becomesbroader,possiblymorediffuseandlesseasytomanageandcertainlymorelikelyto touch those inpower.These twoapproaches to the framingofvulnerabilityand subsequent adaptation are akin to the distinction between treating thesymptomsandcausesofillness.Transformationdoesnotcomewithoutitsownrisks, inherentinanyprojectofchangeisuncertainty.Historyisrepletewithexamplesoftransformationsocialchangebeingcapturedbyvestedinterestedornewelites.Asnotedwithregardtohumansecurity,boththepoorandpowerfulareawareofthecostsofchangeandprefertheknownevenifitisageneratorofrisk.Asclimatechangeproceedsandmitigationpolicyfailsthepotentialfordangerousclimatechangeincreases.Thisforcesustoreappraisethepotentialcostsoftransformationsetagainstbusinessasusual.HandmerandDovers(1996)warnedagainstthesuddencollapseofTable5.2DisastersascatalystsforpoliticalchangePost-colonialsecurity:modernisingnation-statesAffectedcity/country

Year Pre-disasterstate civilsocietyrelations

Hazardandloss

Local/regionalgovernment/civilsociety response

Nationalgovernmentresponse

Internationalresponse

Socio-politicalimpact/change/legacy

PuertoRico 1899 Recentpoliticalindependencefrom Spain;rising USeconomic

HurricaneSanCiriaco;28 daysof rain;hugecrop

Municipalities:distributedrelief; assesseddamageproposedfinancial plan

Cooperateswith actingUS militarygovernor toreceive aid;popular

US useshumanitarianaid tounderminenascentnationalism

State ‘Anglicised’;social hierarchyadapted to economicmodernisation; elitesfunded; ‘deserving’poor become

interests;emergentlabour unions;localmunicipalitieskey politicalactors

damage;estimated3,100–3,400killed

forrecovery resentmentand finallyacquiescence

movementand tosolidifynationalinfluence

workforce; uniongainsreversed;cross-class bid forindependencethwarted

DominicanRepublic

1930 US-groomeddictatorTrujillo inpower;coopting ofcivil societyandsuppression ofpoliticalopposition

HurricaneZenondestroysmost ofcapitalcity;estimated2–8,000killed

Unknown Immediaterequest forinternationalaid;reconstructionfunds used tobuild city assymbol of amodernnation-stateandpresidentialpower;renamedCiudadTrujillo

US supportsregime andreconstruction

Entrenchmentofnewdictatorial (right-wing populist)regime; nation-statemodernisationcontinueswithethniccleansing of Haitianlabourmigrants

EastPakistan(Bangladesh)

1970 Deep politicaltensionsbetween Eastand WestPakistan witheconomic andethnicunderpinnings;an organisedindependencemovement inEastPakistan

CycloneBholaestimatedto lead to500,000deaths

Localgovernmentoverwhelmed;with no helpfrom centralgovernment inWest Pakistan,citizen supportof localleadershipswells

No disasterplan; stateparalysis;post-electionpoliticalrepression

Chaotic: USarms (West)Pakistan;humanitarianeffortsdirected torespond tomassiverefugee crisisinIndia

Complex politicalemergency; EastPakistan leadershipdeclaresindependence;Bangladeshestablishedasstatein1971

Coldwarsecurity:frommodernisationtopoliticalstabilityAffectedcity/country

Year State/civilsociety

Hazardandloss

Local/regionalgovernment/civilsociety response

Nationalgovernmentresponse

Internationalresponse

Socio-politicalimpact/change/legacy

Haiti 1954 Predatory state;landedpeasantry;relativeopenness(labour unions);majorinfrastructuremodernisations

HurricaneHazeldestroyscashcrops;estimated1,000killed

Unknown No disasterplan;corruptionsoars withinternationalaid

Internationalfunds flow;CatholicRelief andCAREbeginfirst work incountry

Regime corruptionsparks cross-classprotests; US-trainedmilitary takescontrol; Papa DocDuvalier cuts dealwith military leadingto a long lasting andentrenched violentdictatorship

Managua, 1972 Dynastic Earthquake Extended No disaster International Corruption provokes

Nicaragua dictatorship;civil societyrepressed; elitesdisenfranchised;vocaloppositionmovement

destroysmuch ofcapitalcity;estimated10,000killed

families providerelief;thecityisevacuated

plan;focusonphysicalreconstructionof capital andrepression ofcivilsociety

funds flow;grosscorruptionby elite;militaryappropriatesdevelopment

anger; liberationtheology andSandinismo provideoppositionaldiscourse; socialcapital developedduring recoveryperiod feeds intocross-classrevolutionarymovement leading toregimechange

Guatemala 1976 20 years postCIA-coup; amilitary state;technocraticpresident; slightopening forhumandevelopment;activeopposition

Earthquakedestroysparts ofcapital andvillages ofcentral andnorthernhighlands;estimated23,000killed

Municipalitiesinadequatelyfunded; peasantgroups andChurchrespond

No disasterplan;focusonphysicalreconstructionof capital andrepression ofany non-stateorganisedactivities

Internationalassessmentteamsremain onlyin capital;fewforeignershavefirsthandknowledgeof highlosses inruralindigenousvillages

Military threatenedby post-disasterpeasant organisationin context of activeinsurgency; staterepresses indigenousearthquakereconstructionprojects; guerrillasuse earthquake asoppositionaldiscourse (time forchange) fororganising purposes;counterinsurgencyescalates; insurgencyescalates

Internationaleconomicsecurity:liberalisationAffectedcity/country

Year State/civilsociety

Hazardandloss

Local/regionalgovernment/civilsociety response

Nationalgovernmentresponse

Internationalresponse

Socio-politicalimpact/change/legacy

Tangshan,China

1976 Notheoreticaldistinctionbetweenstate/civilsociety; aperiod ofpoliticaltransitionduring thelast days ofMao and theculturalrevolution

Tangshanearthquakedestroysimportantindustrialcity;estimatedup to655,000killed

Massive self-help campaign;cityrequestsandreceives fundsand relief fromregionaladministrations

Nationallysignificantdisaster plan(prediction)fails:reconstructiondistorted bymassivepoliticalstrugglebetweenMaoists andreformer HuaGuofeng

Internationalaid refused;West deniedaccess andinformation

Earthquakeappropriated aspolitical symbol forloss of ‘Mandatefrom Heaven’(oppositionaldiscourse); CulturalRevolution ended;return to previousplan formodernisation andliberalisation ofeconomy

Turkey 1999 Authoritariansecular state,democracy,

Marmaraearthquake;estimated

Limited, failureto regulateconstruction a

State slow torespond,localand national

Constrainedby statefailures to

Civil societydemonstratedcapacity to provide

strongreligiouscivil societyseen asthreateningsecular statetraditions

17,000killed

major cause ofloss

civil society(religious andsecular) filledvacuum

coordinateresponse

social support; stateresponded by closingbank accounts ofreligious groups inparticular

Gujarat,India

2001 Democraticsystem withastrongcivilsociety;hierarchical

Earthquakein Kutchdistrict;estimatedover20,000killed

Limited incontrast towidespread civilsocietymobilisation

Initialresponseslow, ad hocandchaotic

Widespread;support forparticipatoryreconstructionschemes frommultilaterals

Response reinforcedthe strength of civilsociety in India;reconstructioncriticised forexacerbating socio-cultural inequalities;some associate thiswith subsequentreligious riots inGujaratin2002

Globalsecurity:advancedprivatisationofnationaleconomiesandservicesAffectedcity/country

Year State/civilsociety

Hazard andloss

Local/regionalgovernment/civilsociety response

Nationalgovernmentresponse

Internationalresponse

Socio-politicalimpact/change/legacy

Nicaragua 1998 Electoraldemocracy;free press;active civilsocietypoliticallypolarised

HurricaneMitch;2,000die whenentire townburied inmudslide;estimated3,800 killedintotal

Following adecade of statedownsizing,civil defence,fire and policepoorly staffed,resourced, anddisconnectedfrom centralgovernment andscientists,unable tofunctionproperly

Governmentscientistsreport onimpendingstorm;Presidentdeniescrisis

World Bankand UNDPsponsor thedevelopmentof a nationaldisasterreductionsystem;internationalmediation toopengovernanceinreconstruction

Brief opening ofdiscourse betweenstateandcivilsocietydevelopment actorsunder internationalmediation; jointdevelopment of areconstruction plan;retrenchment and re-imposition of pre-disaster politicalculture withstrengthenedleveragefor global economicinterests; a lostopportunityforsocialreform

Morocco 2004 Authoritariankingdom;failure ofpoliticalliberalisation;civil societyweak

Earthquakestrikesmarginalisedregion; killsmore than560

Concentratesaidin port town;refuses toextendappropriate aidtovillages

Spendsalmost equalamounts ofaidmoniesonreconstructionandrepression

US andEuropeancountriescompete tocome toMorocco’said

First politicalmobilisation in Riffmountain region formany years; youthsprotestfailureofstateresponse; neoliberalpolitical economy;staterepression

Affectedcity/country

Year State/civilsociety

Hazardandloss

Local/regionalgovernment/civilsociety response

Nationalgovernmentresponse

Internationalresponse

Socio-politicalimpact/change/legacy

SriLanka 2004 Entrenchedpolitical andarmedconflictbetweenSinhalesemajorityandTamilminority;Muslimminoritymarginalisedfrom both;an electoraldemocracywith limitedbut freepress

Tsunamidevastates⅔coastline;35,322killed

Civil society inrebel held areasespeciallyprepared foremergencyresponse

Concentratesresources ingovernment-held andeconomicallyimportantregions

Massivesupranationalandinternationalhumanitarianandgeopoliticalresponse;swampslocalcapacity andreignitespoliticaltensions

Internationalinterventions fail tosupport transitionfrom ceasefire topeace accords;fishermen worstaffectedsector;manybarredfromreturningto home site whilehotels acquire land;civil societycontinues to operateinawarzone

NewOrleans,USA

2005 Electoraldemocracy;free press;strong civilsociety andprivatesectorinterests;voteralienation

HurricaneKatrinafloodscity andregion:1,836confirmeddead;morethan700 inNewOrleans

Mayor does notwant to alienatebusiness leadersby calling formandatoryevacuation; actstoo late;governorfailstoconvey urgencyofneeds

Federalgovernmentfails to acton warningsthat leveesmightbreached

Someinternationalaid acceptedbut alsopoliticised,e.g. offers ofaid fromVenezuelaandCuba

Nation undergoesintense but briefanalysis race/classrelations; impact ofneoliberalpoliciesondisaster reductionnow under scrutiny;maladaptivedevelopment underscrutiny; real estatespeculation andinvestment soars infloodedregion

socialsystemsthatrespondtothreatswithonlylimited,transitionalchange.Theprospectthatwithouttransformationaladaptationundertakenwithsomemeasureof planning and inclusivity dangerous climate changemay force uncontrolledand more anarchic forms of transformation onto societies is worthy ofconsideration.

PartIIILivingwithclimatechange

6Adaptationwithinorganisations

Whatmattersisnotstructures,butrelationships

ScientificAdvisortotheWelshAssemblyThis comment,made by a scientific advisor to theWelshAssembly, is a veryclear acknowledgement of challenges facing managers having to consider theorganisationalchallengesofclimatechangeriskmanagementalongsideexistingimperatives including efficiency and transparency. Here our respondent wasclearthatwhileformalinstitutionalstructuresarenecessarytogiveorganisationsshapeanddirection,whenadaptationisrequiredtoprotectcorefunctionsthisisnuanced – potentially championed – by the contingent, shadow world ofinformalrelationships.Thischapterpresentstheviewpointsofactorswithintwodifferent kinds of organisationwho reflect on the interplay of social relationswithin canonical and shadow systems that characterise adaptive capacity.Communitiesofpracticeandnetworksofloosertiesareconsidered.Theaimisnotsimplytoillustrateadaptationasresiliencebutrathertogivesomesubstanceto the complexity of social relations that give rise to adaptive capacityoriginating fromwithin organisations.As noted inChapter 3,while resiliencemay be the dominant external outcome of the social agency described withinorganisations, internalacts thatcouldbeclassifiedas transitionalandarguablytransformationalarealsoobserved.TheempiricalevidencepresenteddrawsfrominterviewsheldwithmembersoftheUKEnvironmentAgencyactiveinWales,andadairyfarmers’cooperativefromCarmarthenshire calledGrasshoppers. Earlierwork (Pelling et al., 2007)hasprovidedasynthesisoftheseinterviewsandalsowiththosefromscientificadvisorgroups to theWelshAssembly.Theaim in thischapter is toprovideadetailed examination of the viewpoints of key informants reflecting on theirrelationshipswithorganisationalstructuresandotheractorstouseoropenspacefor social learning and self-organisation. Such internal acts of adaptationtargeting institutionalmodificationare identified,asareadaptationsdirectedattheexternalenvironment.The following section provides policy and methodological context for theempiricaldata,whichisthenpresented.

Context:policyandmethods

IntheUK,statementsbyDFID(2004b),GNAW(2001)andMAFF(2000)havehighlighted the dual role of public sector agencies needing both to adapt theirowngoalsandpractices to takeaccountofclimatechange,whilstalsoshapingtheenablingenvironmenttosupporttheadaptivecapacityofprivate,publicandcivilsectoractorsandindividualsoperatingwithintheirspheresofinfluence.Inthiswayitisdoublyimportanttounderstandthewaysinwhichthecapacityanddirection of adaptation within such organisations is shaped. Despite this onlylittle thought has gone into planning how adaptive capacity to climate changeand variability might be built as a policy imperative alongside efficiency,transparency,accountability,legitimacyandequity.Mostworktodatehasbeenundertakenwithintheadaptivemanagementschoolandthereareparallelswiththeanalysispresentedhere (seeChapter2).This is importantbecauseexistingbases for organising and implementing policy are challenged by the complex,dynamic, ‘trans-scientific’ (Weinberg, 1972) cross-epistemic problemsassociated with climate change. In responding there is a need to developorganisationalcapabilitiesthatreflecttheuncertainnatureofknowledge.Centraltothistaskisabetterunderstandingofthewaysinwhichorganisationslearnandadapt.Thisisespeciallysowhenadaptiveinnovationschallengedominantwaysofthinkinganddefininggoalsandresponsibilities.As Chapter 3 demonstrates, research on learning and adaptation to climatechange has focused primarily on the influence of formal institutions and onreactiveadaptation.Empiricalworkhasshownthatadaptationcanbeasourceofcontestation forpolitical actorsoperating acrosshierarchiesof scale (Iwanciw,2004), and with contrasting ideologies; for example, with tensions emergingthrough the interplayof top-downcommandandcontrol riskmanagementandlocal self-organised adaptation (Tompkins, 2005). From the viewpoint ofproactiveadaptation,GrothmannandPatt(2005)acknowledgetheimportanceofpsychologicalfactorsindeterminingtheadaptivecapacityofindividuals.Thischapterpresentsevidenceforadaptivecapacityasarisingoutofcognitiveprocesses (ongoing social learning) embedded in the social relationships oforganisations (which are given shape by both formal and informal institutionsandtheirpractices).Suchgenericsocio-cognitiveattributesoforganisationscancontributetothebuildingofrobustadaptation,respondingnotonlytosurprisesassociated with climate change but also the uncertainties of future economic,social and political change (Schneider, 2004; Willows and Connell, 2003).However,researchincrisismanagementhaspointedtothedifficulties thatcanbeassociatedwith thesecharacteristics.Organisationalculture,communication

practicesanddecision-makingprocessesgeneratetheconditionsinwhichcrisisevents occur (Reason, 1990a, 1990b, 1997; Smith, 1990, 1995; Turner, 1976,1978). At the same time, this research has sought to push the boundaries ofcontingency planning by encouraging managers to start ‘thinking theunthinkable’(Smith,2004)asameansofconsideringtherangeofproblemsthatcan arise and how organisations might be structured to anticipate such risks.Preparing organisations for the unimaginable as well as planning for theunexpected is enhancedwhere there are diverse social relationshipswith openinformalspacebeyondcorporatecontrol.Thesespacesallowindividualsorsub-groupswithinorganisationstoexperiment,copy,communicate,learnandreflectontheiractions.Perhapsonereasonfor thelimitedliteratureonadaptationwithinorganisations(comparedwithresearchonadaptationwithin localcommunities forexample),andinparticularonthewaysinwhichsocialagencyandinstitutionsinteract,isthe difficulty of surfacing respondent viewpoints. Much of the experience ofsocial learning and self-organisation happens as part of the routine practice ofworking within an organisation with the distinctions between canonical andshadowspacesoftenblurred.Elsewhereworkingintheshadowsystemisonthefringes of professional good practice and seldom disclosed publicly. Theapproachtakentogeneratethedatapresentedbelowwastoengagerespondentsin a three-stage conversation. First, respondents from each organisation wereself-selecting, having responded to an open invitation to attend a workshopframedasanopportunity to reflecton theorganisation’sadaptivecapacityandpotential future strategy.Second,workshopdiscussionswere followedupwithindividual interviews, or in some cases researchers were invited to follow-onmeetings. Finally, summary data and analysis that had beenmade anonymouswerecirculatedamongstrespondentsforcommentandasaverificationtool.Theinitialselectionoforganisationswasbasedonexistingcontactsandadesire toengage with respondents working in different organisational forms withresponsibilityforsettingthepolicyorinformationenvironmentforotheractorsandbusinesses.In the framingworkshops respondents were presentedwith a low probability,high-impactclimatechangescenarioforwhichnocontingencyplanningexistedintheorganisationsunderstudy.TheUKscenariowasforstrongwarmingover20 years to reach a climate similar to that of contemporary southern France,followed by a collapse of the north Atlantic thermohaline circulation systemsand a rapid cooling over a subsequent 10 years to reach a new climaticequilibriumclosetothatofsouthernNorway.Togenerateconcreteexamplesoftheroleofsocialrelationsinadaptationrespondentswerealsoaskedtoidentify

past analogues for the climate change scenario. The analogues chosen byrespondentsdiffered,butcommonexamplesofexternalsurpriseswerethefoot-and-mouth outbreak in 2003, ongoing changes to European CommonAgricultural Policy and the European Waters Directive: stressors which theorganisationsactedtomediateandwerefelttobewide-rangingand,tovaryingdegrees,unpredictableintheirramificationsforrespondents’organisations.TherangeofclimatechangeimpactsconsideredinoneworkshoparepresentedinTable6.1.Therecognitionthatnotonlywereclimatefuturesuncertainbutthedevelopment impacts of any one climate future multifaceted and potentiallyreinforcing was key in justifying the focus of discussion on the relevance ofgeneric, fundamental adaptive capacities built on social learning and self-organisationratherthanasearchformaterialadaptationpolicies.Table6.1WarmingandcoolingscenariosforWales Warmingscenario CoolingscenarioWeatherregime

IncreasedwinterrainfallandfloodingHighertemperaturesoverallHotter,driersummersAsimilarclimatetothatofBordeaux

Increased flooding in spring due to snowmeltLowertemperaturesoverallColder winters with one in seven winters‘extreme’AsimilarclimatetoOslo

Ruraldevelopment

DiversifiedeconomicopportunitiesIncreasedruralpopulation

New opportunities for secondaryemploymentRuraldepopulationTransportdisruptionandlessaccessibility toservicesduringwinter

Publichealth

Increased respiratory disease in wetterwintersNewdiseasesHeatstressPollutioneffects?

Increased respiratory disease in colderwinters

Agriculture SoillossduetofloodingNewpestsanddiseasesLate summer grazing reduced but may becompensated by increased grass productionoverallMoredifficulttouselandeffectivelyCrop diversification possible, especially onthecoasts,butsoilqualitymaylimitthis

SoillossduetofloodingReduction in stock or capital spending onwinterhousingLossofwintergrowingseason–lessgrazingimplieslessproteinproduction

Forestry TimberproductivityupwhilequalitydownUseoftreesforwatermanagement?

Timberproductivitydown,whilequalityupPressure on forestry management Moreforestryonmarginalruralland?

Biodiversity Links between habitats forming wildlifecorridors gain importance to allow speciesmigrationMore active management of speciesmigration needed under warming than

Links between habitats forming wildlifecorridors gain importance to allow speciesmigrationEco-restoration possible as climate coolsfromaprecedinghigh?

coolingscenarioLoss of key species like sphagnum mossPollutioneffects?

Warmingscenario CoolingscenarioTourism Higher volumes anticipatedNo extendedwinter slow season

ImprovesincomparisontocompetitordestinationsStormandfloodrisktoinfrastructureLossof‘GreenHills’image

Lower volumes anticipatedPossibility to develop wintersports Seaside market indecline

Otherindustries

Less vulnerable water supplies than in England but may beindirectlyimpactedbyEnglishextraction

Shellfish production crashesPossible loss of high-tech andfootlooseindustries

Note:Additionalempiricalanalysisisavailableontheprojectwebsite,http://rcc.rures.net

Casestudyanalysis

The aim of this section is to reveal the interplay between institutions andindividual action that construct the relational space for adaptation withinorganisations.Thedominantformofadaptationconsideredisresilience.Thetwoorganisations included in the discussion allow two different sides of adaptivecapacity tobeexamined.First, in theEnvironmentAgency, responsibilities forsetting the operating environment for more local organisations to adapt areexplored.Secondweuseeffortsofafarmers’supportgrouptofacilitateaspectsofadaptationforindividualfarmers.Inbothcasestheassessmentofcapacitytoadapttoclimatechangeisforwardlooking.Thatis,wedonotseektodescribeassetsusedinpastroundsofadaptingtoclimatechange.Ratherweexplorethesocial relationshipsandactorbehaviour thatconstitute theseorganisationsasawayofmappingoutcapacityforadaptationbasedonthetheoreticalargumentsmade in the preceding chapters. This frees analysis of capacity to adapt toclimate change from a historical determinism which would skew and limitresultswherefutureeventsassociatedwithclimatechangemaybeverydifferentfrompastexperience.Inbothcasestheaimsoftheorganisationsaretopromoteadaptation as resilience. There are though examples of individual actorsattempting to change thedirectionof theorganisation; this is especially so fortheEnvironmentAgency.Theseservetoexemplifytheskillsandstrategiesthatcanenabletransitionaladaptationwithinanorganisation.Thediscussionforeachorganisationispresentedaroundaseriesofquotations.Thisgivesvoicetotherespondentsbutalsoprovidesacontextualrichnessthatwouldbelostifasummaryalonewasprovided.Themesofsociallearningandself-organisation help to structure the accounts. Self-organisation is unpackedfurtherbystatementson the interplayofshadowandcanonicalsystemsandof

social communities and networks acting within and across the organisations.Data emerged inductively and act to verify these attributes of adaptation thathave so far been described largely in theory. Respondents and in some casessecondaryorganisationsarenotnamedtomaintainconfidentiality.

TheEnvironmentAgency

TheEnvironmentAgencyisakeymediatorforclimatechangeadaptationintherural sector in the UK. It is charged with protecting and improving theenvironment and promoting sustainable development including flood riskmanagementinEnglandandWales.Itactsbothtoregulateandadviseonruraldevelopment.Respondents discussed capacity to adapt to possible future impacts of climatechange through focusing on their personal and professional experience ofconstraints in the canonical system, the role of the shadow system and howtogether they form an institutional architecture for adaptation. Many of theobservations are not tied directly to experience of climate change associatedeventsorpolicybutspeakto thegeneric interactionbetweenprofessionalsandinstitutional structures within the organisation. The uncertainties that climatechangebringsandtheknowledgethatpasteventsareincreasinglyinappropriateas guides to future crisesmakes such knowledge central to understanding andpotentiallysupportingadaptationtoclimate.Whatfollowsisnotanassessmentof adaptive capacity across the EnvironmentAgency but rather a reporting ofviewpointsfromkeyinformantsworkingasprofessionalscientistsfromdifferentpointswithintheorganisation.

Institutionalconstraints

Taking or designing adaptive actions is facilitated or constrained by existinginstitutions,whichhave theirownlogic,historyand transactionscosts ifbeingreformed or dismantled. Thus an important type of observed proactiveadaptation was institutional modification: efforts to reduce conflict betweenadaptive possibilities and existing social realities, and so create enhancedopportunities for adaptive actions to arise as needed.The impetus for this cancomefromwithoutorwithinthepolicysystem,forexample:Inasense,we’redoingthat[institutionalmodification]throughourseminars,butwearealsoworkingintheWelsh Assembly and the Environment Agency, and everybody else.We’re trying to get theWelshAssemblytoleadonaWelshclimatechangecommunicationsstrategy.It’snotapriorityforthem,butwearetryingtolobbyforthat.

Institutions affecting adaptive capacity and action were found to have a fluidquality. They were renegotiated as circumstances changed, as differentindividual and organisational actors became involved and as existing actorsreadjustedtheirinternalpriorities.Forexample:Itissetintheircontractthattheyhavetodoaworkshopandthatitneedstohavetheseoutputs,butthereisnothinginitthatsaysyouhavetodoitinthisway.Butifoneofusweretosaytosomeone,lookwethinkyououghttodoitthisway,thenthey’renotgoingtosayno.Theymightcomebackandsaythatthey’vehadabetteridea.Negotiationisanassetforfacingtheuncertaintyinducedbyclimatechange.Butthis has financial and other costs. Considering how institutions do or mightchangenecessitatesananalysisofthepowerconfigurationsthatconserveoractagainstparticularinstitutions.Powerrelationscanbegivenexpressioninmanydifferentways,butinanorganisationalcontext,thedirectionofresourcesisanimportant one. As the respondent notes, though, agent led external action ischallenging:Politics isdifficult. Ihavecertainly tried to fosterclose relationswithDEFRA,DOE,DETRwhatever ithappenstobe,butyouaredealingwithaculturethatisfairlyrigidthere–theypaythebills,wedowhattheysay.Institutionscanbothconstrainandenableadaptation.Forindividualsseekingtoinfluenceorganisationalbehaviouranddirectionthisrevealedatensionbetweenpersonaland/orprofessionalagendas.Thiswasparticularlydifficultwhenitfeltas though institutions originated hierarchically, and the costs of renegotiationwereexorbitantfortheindividual:In the day job there is a day job. I have objectives to do. What I do outside of that is my affair socorporately the culture is quite thick – quite hierarchical,which is frustrating because ifwe aremovingfrommanagingsimplicityinregulatedresourcesthroughtomanagingcomplexity–environmentalsystems–oneofthefirst tenetsisdevolutionofdecisionmakingandyetwearegoingdiametricallytheoppositewaysoIfinditfrustratingintellectuallycertainlypersonally.Sociallearningiscentraltoadaptivecapacity.Itcanbeindicatedbychangesincapacity to act arising through experience – for example, through institutionalmodification creating an atmospherewhere learning is promoted is part of theshaping of adaptive capacity – and can be the difference between importantexperiencesbeingoverlooked,forgottenortranslatedintoenhancedcapacitytodealwithfutureclimate-change-relateduncertaintyandthreats:Thereclearlyhasbeenalotoflearning:Enquiriesetc.,andpeoplepresentinginformationbacktous.It’shad a big impact on how we organize ourselves. It’s created new areas of work and funding to tacklegaps…. The lessons are quite general and cross-cutting: How do you get bad news up the line quitequickly?Howdoyourampupresourcesquickly?…Thatcannowhappenveryquickly.Notonlyarethereplanstoshowushowtodothat,butwehavepracticesimulations.Opportunities for learning arise throughout organisational life, and can befostered:‘Wehaveinformallunchtimesessions,andpeopleaskquestionsaboutit.Thequestionswillbemoreinformal.Peoplearesittingthereeatinglunchandaskingquestions.It’sinformalinthatrespect.’

On the other hand, not all learning is positive. One respondent warned aboutuncriticallyacceptingthelessonsofpastexperience,withoutcontinuingtoprobetheirrelevancetonewsituations;akeylessonforclimatechangeadaptation,butonethatisdifficulttoinstitutionalise:I think one issue that is quite difficult is learning from experience. One has to be very careful that theexperienceyouhadisrelevanttotheproblemthatyounowhave.Weoftencomeupagainstthesituationwherepeoplewho’vehadlongexperiencesay‘Ohyeah,wetriedthat,anditdidn’twork.That’sit.’Itcutsofftheoptionsandonehastoverycarefulthatoneissayingthatwastheexperience,butwasthecontextandtheproblemthesame?Good communication skills are a necessity for institutional modification,somethingthatanumberof intervieweesdemonstrated, includingstrategiesforformalisingandaddingvaluetoknowledgethroughexternalcollaboration.Thiswas a particularly effective – but time consuming – method for influencinghigherupthehierarchyoracrosssectoralandprofessionalbarriers.Relevantforslow onset and long-term adaptation measures this strategy for crossing theinternalbarrierswithinorganisationsistooslowtorespondtorapidandextremeevents:ThatiswhyIwritesomuch.Ifitisoutthereinthewhiteliteraturethenitisinthepublicdomain.Apeerreviewpaperhasmoreweightthanmyopinion–particularlywhenIbringinco-authorswhohappentobelawyers.Successful communicators had cultivated linkages across different epistemiccommunities and saw themselves as conduits of information and points ofinfluence shaping spaces of adaptive capacity within and between bothcommunitiesandtheirrepresentativeorganisations:TheXXX,which isanationalorganization…hasdonea tremendousamountand insome instances theAgencyisbeingperceivedasanobstacleandinsomewaysitisbeingperceivedasanally,butthereisariskofthatrelationshipbeinglostandbecauseIamontheboardofvariousothercharitiesandI’mgivingakey note at the XXX meeting on Tuesday. I’ve got a very direct personal relationship there and I’mpublishingpapersinmyownname,notusingworktimewhatevertogetthelearningfromthat,putitintheright literature so I can go to the policy people in theAgency to say LEARN, you don’t have to trawlthroughgreyliterature,unpublishedsourceshereisalltherightliteratureputtogether–APPLYIT,DOITplease. So yes, I’mkeeping doors open, but that is a personalmission and I don’t expect thatwill be aparticularlycommonoccurrencethroughouttheorganization.Learningwithwiderstakeholders,andespeciallythepublichaditscostswithadifficult balancing act between efficiency and building adaptive capacity; forexample, by protecting staff so they might undertake their work without toomuchinterruptionfromotherstakeholders.Thefollowingcommentsrespondtoarecentlyestablishedtelephonecallcentre:IntermsofthegeneralpublicwhatishappeningcorporatelyiswallsarebeingbuiltsoIthinkwearegoingin thewrong direction.You know if you are re-engineering an organizationwhere your front line, yourregionalandareastaffaredeliverymerchantsthenyouwanttostopthen‘wastingtime’indialoguewiththepunters.Youwantthemtobedoingstuff,nottalkingaboutstuff.…a lotof thepublic trust that theAgencydoesengender, itdoesnotengendera lotbut,a lotof that issimplybecausethelocalofficersknowthelocalpeopleandthelocalissues.SoactuallyIfearthatwhatweare doing is losing the connection. I think the call centre is going tomake us become a big impersonal

monster…Itisapersonalviewthis,Ithinkwearelosinganimportantpartofourrelationshipwithpeople…thepersonal relationshipwith the regulator isvital…Thatsortofdeliveryofservicemodel [thecallcentre]iswhattheAgency’sreorganizationisabout,soitissuccessfulinthoseterms–but,youknow,notintermsofbeingintouchwiththeenvironmentandpeoplewhoareactiveintheenvironmentalsense.Communicationthatcanhelpbuildcapacitytoadapttoclimatechangerequiresskillssuchasknowingwhotocommunicatewith,howtofindthemandhowtocommunicate effectively, and designing acts of communication which areappropriatetothetask.Communicationisnotaneutralact,andtherearemanyconventionsthatapplytothewaythatcommunicationiscarriedoutindifferentrelationshipsandcontexts.Becausetheappropriatecombinationoflearningandcommunication strategies available to actors is determined by the culturalcharacteristicsoftheorganisationalsettinginwhichtheyoperate,itmakessenseto speak of the knowledge culture of an organisational setting. That is thecharacteristicsofanorganisationorothersocialbodythatmakeparticularformsoflearningandcommunicationpossibleornot.Thesenseofapervasivewayofbeing that both influences the individual and that results from the collectiveactionsofindividualscamethroughclearlyinoneinterview:SotowhatpercentageamIattributable?Idon’tknow.Towhatextentisculturechangingaroundmeandtheseideasbecomingmoreandmore?Idon’tknow.Ican’tmeasurethat,butinmyownheadI’mprettywellconvincedthatIhavebangedonatcertainpeopleforlongenoughthatwehavegotanunderstanding.An important aspect of adaptive capacity revealed by looking at learning andcommunication in termsof aknowledge culturewas that the informal and thetacitare justas important forknowledgeas formalandexplicitchannels,evenfromtheorganisation’sperspective.Forexample,inthecaseoflearning,formallearningwasinsomecasesidentifiedwithtraining,butitwasclearthatthiswasjustoneaspectoflearningfromtheindividualviewpoint.Thus,throughouttheinterviews a range of evidence referred to informal channels of learning andcommunication, and the ways these were rooted in both formal and informalactivitiesandinstitutions.Soyeah formally, in the formal email, telephonewhateveryouplay thegamebutyou still carryout thelearningstuff.IfIseetheheadofxxxwhoIknowverywellandformanyyearsI’llsay‘Haveyouseenthispaper?’.‘NoIhaven’tactually.’‘OhI’vegotafewontheline,haveyougotaminute…?’‘I’vegotthisoneoncommonlaw’,youknow,‘I’vegotthisoneoneconomics’.‘YeahOK,let’stalkaboutthat,that’sreallyinterestingblahblah’.

Adaptationandtheshadowsystem

Thissectionprovidessupportfortheclaimthatshadowsystemsareanimportantsource of adaptive capacity. Most interviewees could identify an informalshadowsystem,andarguedthattheinformalisanessentialpartoforganisationallife: ‘Theway I think is that the day job is largely definedby the delivery ofregulationandtheinfluencingstuffhappensthroughtheinformalroutesbyand

large.’Shadow systems are unobserved by the canonical and allow risk taking.Adaptive management has the ability to experiment and take risks as a coretenet. The benefit to the canonical organisation of the shadow system arisesthrough a degree of alignment between actors’ formal roles and their informalskills and capacities. Thus the personal capacities of individuals to wieldinfluenceandtoworkwithknowledgebecamepartoftheorganisation’scapacitytoadapt:‘IknowthatstatementsIhavemadeanddiscussionsI’vehadwithverysenior people have later turned out in more or less verbatim in strategydocuments.’While individual initiativewithin the shadow systemcannot beplanned for, itcouldbeincentivised,openingupamajoradaptiveresourcefortheorganisation:Theorganizationthreeyearsagohadatokenisticapproachtothesocial,butnowhassocialpolicy.Thisismovingmoreandmoremainstream,andarguablythereissortofachangeinpoliticaldirectionanyway,butanindividualmoverandshakerwhoIhappentotalktoquitealothasbeensingularlyeffectiveinraisingthatasapolicy.Conversely,thisallowedindividualstoenacttheirvaluesthroughtheoperationoftheformalorganisation,uncoveringcontrastingtypesoflegitimatebehaviour:Thatitdependswhoyouaskthesequestionsto.Therearethosewhoworkhardtogetthejobdone.Thereareother[s]whohavemovedbetweendifferentorganizationsandhavesomeweirdideatotryandchangetheworldandmigratearoundtheplacetotryanddothat.Myprivateactionhasfeedbackintotheorganization.There-alignmentofformalandinformalknowledgenetworksinthiswayisanexample of agent-centred resource management. This helps the organisationlearn about its environment, improving adaptive capacity, even when thecanonicalstructuresbuildbarrierstocommunicationandflexibility:AndthenwegetbackinourboxesandIdon’tcommunicatewithhimbecauseheisnotpartofmysection.Managementtendstoperceivethat[personallobbying]asrockingtheboatsoIhavekindofgivenup.This suggests that an important area for working with adaptive capacity ispositioningtheroleofcanonicalmanagementwithrespecttotheshadowsystem.Thisisnotstraightforward.Theshadowsystemisalmostbydefinitionresistanttomanagementeffort.Butwhileitisnotnecessarilymanageable,thereisscopeformanagementactivitywithrespecttoshadowsystems.Thesimpleststrategyis perhaps to recognise the role of the informal and to accept a degree ofimprecisionandfailurewhenrisksaretaken,allowingsparecapacityinplanningincluding providing time and flexibility for individuals to work around theformalsystemwhererequired.Thisisnotstraightforward,andakeyproblemisprovidingexamplesofoutcomesfromworkingtheshadowsystemwheretheseareoftenindirect:Howdo Idemonstrate thatbygoing to thismeeting rather than thatone that aparticularoutcomecameabout? It’sallabout influencing,butonlysometimescanyoupoint toa reportorapolicydocumentandshowthatthey’veusedyourwording.

Thusamorepositivestrategywithrespecttotheshadowsystemmightbetofindwaystoreportonitandtoincentiviseindividualstousetheirskillsincreatingandmaintaininginformalrelationshipsforthecorporategood.Aboveall,itisamatterofmaking sure that the individual skills are available in the firstplace.Thiscreatesademandforindividualswithcompetenciesrelevanttotheshadowsystem. Interviewees produced a range of examples of skills they utilised inskilledinformalinteraction:Learningthewaysthattheorganizationworksistheonlywayyouareevergoingtobeabletoinfluenceitatallbecauseifyoutrytoinfluenceitfromadifferentdiscourseordialogueyoujustbounceoffit…Iwritebooksaswellandaskpeopletotellmewhatiswrongaboutthem–thisisawayofropingpeoplein.Itreatpublicationsasawaytointegrateviewswithsomeclarityandcommonsense.In terms of playing the corporate game, it is about knowing to put the right, copy the right, people onemails,don’tjumplevelsoverandabovebosses,allthebasichierarchicalthings;thatisthewayitworksformally. The way it works informally – having been around the organization for a million years andknowingall theotherpeople thathavebeen in theorganizationamillionyears,youknow– that iswhatwatercoolersandcoffeemachinesarefor.

Institutionalarchitectureforadaptation

Understandingorganisationsandtheinstitutionsthatshapethemisakeypartofbalancingcanonicalandshadowspaceandfacilitatingadaptivecapacity.Inthissectionweexaminerespondentviewpointsoninstitutionalarchitecturesintermsofcommunitiesandnetworksthatcross-cuttheformalorganisation.Communitiescomprisegroupsofpeoplewhoshare identityexpressed throughsimilarinterestsandcommonvalues:SoIamnotinterestedprimarilyinacommunitythatwant[s]peopletoplaybytherules.Iaminterestedinpeoplewho,forwantofabetterword–althoughitisashittyoldphrase–‘wanttomakeabetterworld’.Inotherwords,ifsomeonereallycaresaboutsocialfactorsandsustainabilityandtheyhavesortedoutajobinanorganizationthatcandosomething,Iwillfeelsortofattractedtospendtimewiththem.Intermsofmycommunityitispeoplewhoarelookingtomakethestepchanges.Community boundaries do not necessarily reproduce those of the formalorganisational contexts in which they occur. Thus communities tend to arisethroughmutualengagementratherthanmanagementfiat,andareverymuchoftheshadowsystem.Butalthoughtheyhavetheirownrhythmofdevelopmentitispossibletogivethemspacetogrowbymakingtimeforindividualstointeract.From the individual’s perspective, communities can be a significant resource,opening up opportunities for action though links with others with similarinterests: ‘There are other trouble-makers out there that I tend to gravitatetowards.Mycommunityispeopleoftendressedasveryestablishmentbutwhoarebasicallyintheorganizationfortheirownagenda.’Shadowcommunities are a natural unit for adaptive action, as shared interestsand similar worldviews make negotiating and endorsing plans and reactions

quickerandeasier.Forexample, there’sagroupoffarmers inmid-Waleswhoare lookingathowtheycanmakeagriculturemoresustainable,lookingathowtodealwithfloodcontrol,withsoilquality.That’slikeaself-motivatedgroupof10farmers,actingasacommunitybecausetheyseeparticularenvironmentalthreats.You’dhavetolookatgroupslikethattogetthatcoreofadaptation.Aswithanyformoforganisation,communitieshaveinternaldifferentiation,andtherecanbedisagreementwithintheirmembershipovertheirsharedidentityandboundaries. Also membership is not necessarily mutually exclusive, andcommunities overlap, giving a dense texture to social architecture –Wenger’s(2000) constellation of communities. Because shared interest is assumed andmaybebeyondchallenge,theycanalsoclosedownopportunitiesforchange.Amore open social form is the network. Networks arise in social life acrossboundaries of difference. Thus, unlike communities, common interest is notassumed,butinsteadisnegotiated.Aswithcommunities,intervieweeswereabletopoint toexamplesofnetworkswith significance for theirprofessional lives.Networkswere a site of bridging social capital, linking together organisationsand communities. The encounter with different values and worldviews thatoccurred through networks made engagement in networks a significantopportunityforlearning:Yes,there’sanetwork.Ifyoucanidentifywheretoimplementdifferentpolicies…youcanidentifycertainpeople,youcanseewhohasdonethisandbeenquitesuccessfulatit.Youbuildalittlenetworkofpeopletogoto.Alittleexpertgroupinasense.It’simportanttolearnfrompeople,ratherthanstartofffromablanksheetallthetime.Thusnetworksprovidedopportunitiestobuildandoperateadaptivecapacity:The[Welsh]Assemblywouldneedtobaseitscaseforchangeonreasonableevidence,andthat’swhereitworkswithnetworking.Networkingwith the likesof theEnvironmentAgency inorder tosay ‘This isacurrentsituation’,andbeabletomakepredictionsintermsofwhatislikelytohappen.Itmaybethatoperatingasanindividualinanetworkrequiresadifferentskillsetfrom working within a community. With their basis in relationships betweenindividuals,thereisadangerthatforcingnetworksintoexistencewillresultinapaperexerciseoralocusofdiscontent.However,thereismuchthatcanbedonefromamanagementperspectivetofosternetworks:Whenyou’redealinginacross-cuttingissue,whichthis[adaptingtorapidclimatechange]wouldbe,thenyouhavetotrytopullthepeopletogetherinsomesortofprojectgroup.Thedifficultyismakingsurethatthathappensmorethaninname.Youcangetpeoplealongtomeetings,butitrequiresissuestobesorted,actionstobetaken,sothatitpermeatesoutintoadditionalaction,withalltheresourcethatrequires.Whatbothnetworksandcommunitieshaveincommonisthattheyarefoundedin relationships of trust. Within communities, trust was shown to arise fromsharedinterest:You tend to know certain people, certain groups, and they establish a track record ofwhether they candeliverornot,becauseyouareclearlytryingtofindtheoneswhoaremosteffective,ratherthanspendalotoftimesayingyouwantthistostartfromgrassrootssortofthing.Inanetwork,trustwasrequiredinordertonegotiateamutualinterest,andarose

throughongoingengagement.Trustcanbeinvestedinindividualsandexpressedin personal relationships.However, it can also arise through institutions, fromthe social contracts embedded in formal organisational forms. Trust wasimportant in adaptive capacity, because it enabled social action and decreasedtheamountofeffortinvolvedinmaintainingcommunitiesandnetworks.Thatisnottosaythatcreatingandmaintainingtrustdoesnothavecostsofitsown:Ifyoupullthatleverandnothinghappens,thenyouloseallcredibilityforwhatitisthatyou’redoing.Itmakesitclearthatyoudon’tunderstandwhatyou’redoingandpeoplewillthereforetakenonoticeofyou.Sothere’sacredibilityissuehereinactuallymakingthingswork.

Grasshoppersfarmers’group

The Carmarthenshire based dairy farmers’ support group, Grasshoppers, hasabout20membersandwasestablishedsixyearsbeforeourstudy.Itsaimistoexplorewhatbecameknownas theNewZealandgrazing system.This systemdiffers from dominant dairy practices in the UK through a combination ofconservinghayfor thewinter, turningcattleoutearlier in theyearandcalvingonlyonceayear.Thisresultsinlittleornospendingonwinterfeedandreducedlabourcosts.Thusalthough lessmilk isproduced thanunderamore intensiveregime the profits are greater, and the farmer has more time to pursue otherinterests. The intention of Grasshoppers’ members is to maintain their rurallivelihoods and quality of life by changing farming practices: a case study inresilience.The members of Grasshoppers are well positioned to discuss the genericattributesoforganisationalrelationsthatshapeadaptation.Asagrouptheyhavealready demonstrated an ability to adapt proactively to changing economicconditionswithin the dairy sector. Their currentmode of practice is probablybetteradaptedtoclimatewarmingthanconventionaldairyproductionintheUK.Nevertheless, under an extreme climate change scenario there would besubstantialchallengestobefaced.Exploringtheprovenadaptivecapacityofthegroupoffersanopportunitytoexploretheroleofinstitutionsandsociallearninginshapingorganisationstosupportindividualfarmersinplannedandproactiveclimatechangeadaptation.Group activities centred aroundmonthly, rotating farm visits.Meetings had asharplycriticaltonewhich,overtime,haddevelopedacultureofmutualrespect,trust, fostered social learning and encouraged innovation. As with theEnvironment Agency, the themes of community, network, trust and exclusionarosefromdiscussionsandprovidethemesforunderstandingtheproductionofadaptivecapacityandsociallearningwithinGrasshoppers.

Seen as a community, Grasshoppers appeared to have a strong and well-developed shared identity. Grasshoppers was created intentionally with newmembers being recruited through invitation only, reinforcing this shared anddistinctgroup identity. Importantly,membershipdidnot focusdirectlyon jointcommercial activity.Members were more concerned with sharing knowledge,improving practice andmutual support inmeeting the challenges of the NewZealand system than in striking business partnerships or joint commercialadvocacy: ‘Sharing information is really key, something I realise from theseotherfarmergroupscomparedtous.’Onememberlikenedthisfeelingofbeingina learningcommunitytoadaptation:‘Opennessandsharinginformationisamajorpartofadaptation.’ExaminingGrasshoppersintermsofnetworkshighlightsexternalrelationships,and once again the focus is on information and learning. That is, throughGrasshoppers members were able to manage their access to informationresources.ThestrongestexpressedlinkswerewithdairyfarmersoutsidetheUK,drawingoncontactsmadefromarangeofcontexts,because:‘Overseasisbest.TheUKistoomainstream[indairyfarming]–andwe’renot!Alsothereisnobasic/market research in thisareabecause there isnocommercialbasisso it isnot picked up on.’ In this case, it was clear that a wide base of informationsources was a valued resource for adapting to future climate change. ForGrasshoppers, thisenabledboth improvements inexistingpractices, aswell aschallengingadaptations,withshiftsinlivelihoodandlifestylegoals.In terms of adapting to a different climate, you could go and look at places in theworldwhere peoplealreadylivewithit.NowwehavelearntfromNewZealand,butiftheclimatecooledwewouldlearnfromotherpartsoftheworld.InGrasshoppers,trustwascloselytiedtothedutyofconfidentiality,identityandmembership, indicating that it arose first and foremost as a function ofcommunitybuilding:Trust is very important to the group’s functioning and this has taken time to build up. For example,Grasshoppersstartedwithmemberssharinglimitedinformationonthepurelyfinancialaspectsofthegrasseconomy.Wenowshareeconomicandotherinformationonallaspectsoffarmers’livelihoods.Trustwas described as having built up over time to extend beyondmembers’professionalaffairstofinancesandevenfriendship,thelattereffectivelyblurringthe boundaries between the canonical and shadow relationships and roles ofGrasshoppersmembers:‘Other thanmywifeandthenucleusofmyfamilyI’dtalk with group members first [about a problem].’ As a result, members ofGrasshoppers felt they could rely on the information they received from oneanother(incontrasttoothermembersofthewiderfarmingcommunity).Withinthegroup,trustalsoenabledhonestcriticismofoneanother’sbusiness.Thiswasessential for Grasshoppers’ ability to fine-tune and adapt the New Zealand

system,andatthesametimeinthiscaseithelpedtoavoidthetrapofgroupthinkwhere trust and community can lead to theuncritical reproductionof a sharedwayof seeing theworld,akeyasset inadaptivemanagement (seeChapter2).Instead,thevaluesthatareconservedthroughthissupportivecommunitywereatolerance for risk taking and innovation, and an openness to new ideas, eventhose that challenged individual perceptions and led tomodified practices, theessenceoforganisationaladaptivecapacity.Thiswasperhapsbestshownintheexpressed willingness of members to move from the New Zealand system toother solutions if the economic or environmental consequences of climatechangerequiredit.Thereciprocaloftrustisexclusionsuggestingthesociallimitsofadaptation.Inthe case of Grasshoppers, exclusion was particularly strong around alignmentwith the culture of open criticism of farming practice. This could result in apersonalchallenge.Thecostofmembershipismaintaininggroupstandards,anddealingwithgroupdynamics:I’d have to admit that at somepoints I’ve had to ask ‘Is thisworth the extra hassle?Do I need to be amemberofthisthing?’.Butifyoulookatitinthelongerterm,Isupposeeverybodygoesthroughpointswhenthey’reextremelykeen,andthennotsokeen.Inanetwork,wheredifferenceispositivebecauseitenablesexchange,exclusionismorelikelytoariseexternally.Intheworkshop,therewereseveralreferencestocommunicationinitiativesbythegroupintheUKthathadnotfaredwell.It should not be assumed that trust is an unalloyed asset, and exclusion aconstraintonadaptivecapacity,orvice-versa.Whileit iscertainlytruethatthelearning culture within Grasshoppers had arisen through close ties of trust, itclearlyalsodependedonexclusion.Afterall,potentialmemberswhocouldnotcopewith thegroupculturewereexpected to leave.Similarly,whileexclusionenabledtrustandlearning,thequestioniswhatopportunitiesforlearningandforwider social equality are being passed up in the name of maintaining groupcohesion?Duringtheworkshop,thegroupwasoptimisticabouttheirabilitytoadapttothechallengesofclimatechangeandvariability,asandwhenneeded.Whenpressedaboutthisconfidence,theyascribedittosuccessfulchangeinthepast:‘Havinginitiatedchange,itwouldn’tbotherustochangeagaininwhateverdirection,ifitmadesense.’The adaptive capacity of Grasshoppers seems to be founded in a learningculture. The group fostered learning amongst its members, and this broughtsignificantrewardsfortheeffortofremaininganactivemember:Discussiongroupsarethebestwayoflearning–youcangettoknoweachother’sbusinesses,betterthanalecturetheatre.It’slike20headslearningatonce,andsharingthatinformationback.Itwouldhavetakenmealotlongerto

getwherewearetoday.Thelearningcultureresultedinandwassupportedbyasetoflearningpracticesonthepartofindividualmembers,reinforcedbythegroup’svalues.Thesehadalreadybuiltacultureofresilientadaptationtoclimatechange:Wemeasuregroundtemperatureandclimatealotmorethanotherfarmers.Whenweseechangewechangeourpractices.Thedatawehaveseenisgettingwarmer.Theresponsetothisistowithdrawfertilizerandputcattleoutearlier.AnotablefeatureofthecultureofGrasshopperswasthewillingnessofmemberstochangeembeddedpracticestoachieveimportantlifeobjectives,eventoleavedairy farming.This seemsa strongcontrastwithmanyother farmerswho feelstuck,unabletomakeorevenseethechangestheyneedtoremainviable.Thisalso suggests that success in applying adaptation as resilience providesconfidencefor transitionalandpotentially transformational formsofadaptationatthelevelofindividualbusinesses.ThemembersofthegroupwerehappytoviewtheGrasshoppersorganisationassomething transitory. The formal organisational structure was useful for themoment, but not necessary of itself. Seen asmore important, and likelymoreenduring,were the informal relationships thatgroupmembershiphad fostered.This suggests that the shadow relationships that thicken the social ties withinGrasshoppers now also prove a flexible social resource for forming newcoalitionsasfutureclimatechangeandotherchallengesarise.Whilecanonicalorganisation provides structure to help resolve defined adaptation challenges,shadow systems are the raw resource that should be strengthened to providecapacitytoadapttofutureuncertainthreatsandopportunitiesofclimatechange.That shadow systems are developed around and as a response to canonicalorganisation suggests a symbiotic relationship. This also points to a policyopportunitywhereshadowsystemsofrelevancetowidersocietycanbefosteredthroughcanonicalorganisations.

Conclusion

These two organisational case studies both show the idealised nature ofresilience as a form of adaptation. Over time and facedwith new challenges,policy directives or sources of information organisations are in a constantprocess of reinvention. Those that are not will likely not survive long in theeverydaycutandthrustofmarketandpoliticallife.Giventhisrealitythereisadangerthatratherthanorganisationsbeingtoolsforprotectingvaluedfunctionsthey strive to maintain their own longevity: resilience being transferred fromfunctiontoform.Neitherorganisationstudiedherefellintothistrap;membersofGrasshoppers in particular observed that they valued the social bonds made

through the group more than the group itself and that these were a resourceshouldfuturechallengesrequirenewcoalitionsandcommunitiesofpracticebeformed. The close ties of trust in Grasshoppers also provided a key qualitycontrol mechanism that was less easy to observe functioning in the shadowsystemoftheEnvironmentAgency.Inthelattercasenewideassucceededbetterwithexternalvalidation– throughacademicpapers, forexample.Theneedforaccountability and measured decision-making in public sector bodies is aparticularchallengetothosewhowouldargueforembracingtheshadowsystemtobuildadaptivecapacity.Respondents in both groups described their social relations in terms ofcommunities and networks. Communities provide a powerful focus of socialidentity, but without the linking function provided by networks they riskedbecoming isolated from the broad pool of human learning. Networks, on theotherhand,canbetoodiffuse,failingtoprovideanadequatebasisfororganisedaction,exceptincircumstanceswheretheneedtodosooverridesthetransactioncostsinvolvedinnegotiatingdifferentinterests.The empirical observations made in this chapter support arguments fromadaptivemanagement for the contribution of relational qualities such as trust,learning and information exchange in processes of building adaptive capacity.Theyalso caution that socialnetworksor communitiesofpracticewill alwaysexclude some actors and ideas and should not be seen as a panacea. Fororganisational management concerned with adapting to climate change fourquestionsareraisedbythisresearch:•Cantheinformalsocialrelationshipsoftheshadowsystembeembracedinsidepublicsectororganisationsorarepotentialconflictswiththeneedforefficiency,transparencyandverticalaccountabilityintolerable?• To what extent can investments in local formal organisations, likeGrasshoppers, foster and maintain independent but linked shadow systemsprovidingasecondarylocalsocialresourceforclimatechangeadaptation?• To what extent might contingency planning to manage climate change riskcompromise or complement efforts to build adaptive capacity to manageuncertainty?• What management, training and communication tools exist to facilitate thebuildingandmaintainingofconstructivesocialcapitalandsociallearningwithinandbetweenorganisations?Modifyingformal institutions tosupportmotivatedprofessionals indevelopinginformalsocialtiesandexpandtheirmembershipofcommunitiesofpracticetocrossepistemicdividesisonewayofaddressingthisfinalchallenge.Atalargerscaleinvestmentinboundaryorganisationsandindividualswillhelpthickenthe

socialresourceforadaptation,andbettercopenotonlywiththedirectimpactsofclimatechangebutthemoredynamicorganisationlandscapethatmaywellbeanoutcome of the economic aswell as environmental instability associatedwithclimatechange.Scopeforadaptinggovernanceregimesthroughtransitionalandtransformationalchangeisthefocusofthenexttwochapters.

7Adaptationasurbanriskdiscourseandgovernance

InCancunthemostcommonideaisthat‘itisnotmyproblem,ifthingsgobad,Icanfleetoanotherstate’.

(Ex-memberoftheQuintanaRooStateCongress)The population mobility that enables and characterises rapid urbanisation hasconsequences also for discourses of responsibility, and finally the willingnessandcapacityofofficialsandthoseatrisktotakeactionandreduceexposureandsusceptibility to climate-change-associated hazards in a specific place.Mobileurbanpopulationsandthedynamiceconomiesandsocialsystemstheyarepartof present both a context for climate change adaptation and, through theinequalitiestheygenerate,atargetfortransitionalandtransformationalreform.Thischapterusesurbancasesbecause the socialandpoliticalconcentrationofurbanisation brings to the surface competing visions and practices ofdevelopment. But the key argument of this chapter – that as discourses ofadaptation begin to emerge worldwide they can either challenge or furtherentrench development inequalities and failures – is applicable across alldevelopmentsectors.Evidencefortheinteractionofadaptationwithdevelopmentnormsandpracticeispresented from four rapidly expanding,but contrasting,urbancentres in theMexicanstateofQuintanaRoo:Cancun(populationin2008approximately1.3million),PlayadelCarmen(100,000),Tulum(5,000)andMahahual(1,000)(seeFigure7.1).Quintana Roo is amongst the most rapidly urbanising places worldwide.Urbanisation is driven by state-sponsored and globally-financed internationaltourism in an area exposed to hurricanes and temperature extremes. Nationalpolicy to exploit the environment ofQuintanaRoo for tourism attracts over 2million tourists a year alongside large numbers of labour migrants fromneighbouring states as well as international capital, and so generates risk toclimate-change-associated hurricane hazards and more indirect impacts ofclimate change on the global economy and subsequent tourist numbers. Ascapitalinvestmentintourismincreasessotheenvironmentalattractorfortouristshas changed from reef diving to beach tourism and now golf coursecondominiums. At each stage capital has inserted itself ever more forcefullybetweennatureanditsconsumer.Insodoingcapitalhasgeneratedandextracted

greaterfinancialreturnswhile

Figure7.1QuintanaRooandstudysites(Source:adaptedfromCuéntame…deMéxico,2009)alienatingtheconsumerfromherecologicalfoundations.Theprocesshasshiftedeconomic reliance from a natural to an increasingly artificial ‘second nature’(Smith, 1984). The result is a bifurcation in development strategies betweenthose that exploit residual ‘natural’ spaces and the growing, capital intensiveexploitation of second nature with greater environmental and social externalcostsaswellaswealthgeneratingpotential.Capitalinsertionandtheimpositionofasecondnaturehaveoccurredatdifferentpacesandcanbefoundexistingtovaryingdegreesalong theCaribbeancoast.Cancun is themost intensive,with

PlayadelCarmenalsopresentingamaturecapitalisedurbansystem.MahahualandTulumaresmallurbancentresatthebrinkofrapidcapitalisation.Thefocusofthisstudyistoexplorethecharacterofcivilsocietywithineachurbanformandsotoexaminethewaysinwhichtheurbanprocesshasgivenshapetoandbeen influenced by this aspect of governance with a view to applying thisknowledge to assess capacity to copewith current and adapt to future climatechangeimpacts.Layered on top of the impacts of capitalisation on the root causes ofvulnerability and adaptive capacity is a more superficial but nonethelessimportantpolicyrealmofhurricaneriskmanagement.Thisisthemosttangibleexpression of hazard liable to be influenced by climate change on the coast.Records for hurricane activity inQuintanaRoobegin in 1922with a categoryoneevent(149kilometresperhour).ThefirstcategoryfoureventwasCharliein1951 (212 kilometres per hour), and it has been followed with increasingregularity by four additional category four hurricanes, andGilbert (1988) andDean (2007) both making landfall as category five hurricanes. These eventsreveal underlying vulnerabilities.Hurricane riskmanagement succeedswell incompensatingforproximatecausesofvulnerabilitythroughevacuationofthoseat risk. But discourse around risk stops here, masking underlying root causedriversofriskandunsustainabledevelopment.This chapter contrastswith the empirical analysis of organisational adaptationpresented in Chapter 4 both in terms of the scale of analysis but also theanalytical lens. This shifts from one that stays close to the systems-basedanalysis of social learning and self-organisation toone that deploys aspects ofdiscourseanalysisand regime theory tohelpemphasise thepoliticalandvaluerich contexts that, alongside capacity for self-organisation, help determineinnovation and dissemination of new ideas from the base and how far thesemight re-shape local governance regimes for adaptation and development inthese sites. Different actors are shown to hold contrasting and sometimesconflictingvisionsofdevelopmentthatinturnleadtopreferencesforresilience,transition or transformation in society when faced with climate change.Followingthisintroductionashortcontextualsectionprovidesgeographicalandmethodologicalbackgroundtothestudy.Eachsettlementisthenanalysedusinga common framework with a concluding discussion drawing out contrastingrelationsbetweenadaptationanddevelopmentineachcase.

Context:policyandmethods

In 2007, the federal government launched a National Strategy on Climate

Change and is now preparing a Special Programme on Climate Change toimplementidentifiedreforms.ThankstotheseeffortsMexicohasjumpedfrom14thin2006to4thin2008outof56countriesrankedaccordingtotheirclimatechange performance in theGermanwatch,ClimateChange Performance Index(Germanwatch, 2008). At the state level, while Quintana Roo’s rapiddemographicgrowthandinfrastructuralexpansionopenexcitingopportunitiestobuildclimate-proofingintodevelopment,andatthesametimeprovideamarketedge around notions of climate friendly tourism, regional government andprivatedevelopershavebeenslowtorecogniseclimatechange.Inthelanguageof transitions theory (see Chapter 4) this is an example of landscape(national/international) changemeeting resistance at the regional (state) level.This begs the question: have any niche (local) level innovations emerged thatmightprovideimpetusforchangeattheregionallevelgiventheopportunityforchangeopenedbyperturbationsatthelandscapelevel?Localimpactsofclimatechangearefeltalreadythroughperceivedincreasesinthe frequency of hurricanes, creeping sea-level rise, coastal erosion and hightemperatures.Thesehazardsareinterrelatedandcompoundedbylocallandusewhichhasledtoacceleratedmangroveandinteriordeforestation,pollutionanddamage to in-shore reefs and the neglect of green and blue space in urbandesign.Incontrast,stateandfederalagencieshaveagoodrecordincontaininghumanlosstohurricanesthroughtimelyifreactivestrategiesofearlywarning,evacuation and reconstruction of critical services. The most recent event,Hurricane Dean, 2007, caused limited economic impact across the region butmadelandfallclosetoMahahual,whichwasseverelydamaged.To reveal the values, capacities and actions of political actors in each urbancentre an action research methodology was employed. In each settlementinterviews were conducted with 12–15 leaders of social, environmental andbusiness associations, and where formal organisation was absent amongstinformal leaders.Following interviews, respondentswere invited to town-levelworkshops to discuss results. Workshops provided an opportunity to verifyreported views and interpretations, and also a vehicle for social actors tonetwork.Thiswasoften the first timesocial actorshadmet todiscussclimatechange. A final workshop brought selected respondents from each settlementtogether to undertake a participatory comparison of town-level findings andagain to provide a networking forum. Interviews and workshop texts weretranscribedanddataextractedandorganisedaroundthethemesofdevelopmentnarrative, climate change, social-learning and self-organisation. Results havebeenfedbacktocivilsocietyandgovernmentactors.For additional material and analysis see:

http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/geography/research/epd/projects/hslgmc

Casestudyanalysis

For each case development pathways and perceived interactions with climatechange are described. Innovations – from nuance to outright alternative – areidentified and the capacity of civil society actors to promote such innovationsassessed.

Cancun

In1974,CancunbecamethefirstintegrallyplannedcentreformasstourisminMexico and it continues to act as a centre for mass tourism, providing asignificant foreign currency source to the federal government and generatingsignificant employmentopportunities.Thepopulationhasgrownexponentiallyfrom88,200in1970to1,135,300in2005,creatingahugepopulationpotentiallyat risk from climate change associated hazards. Since 1970 Cancun has beendirectlyaffectedbyHurricanesGilbert(1988)andWilma(2005).Vulnerabilityis aggravated by the exclusion of burgeoningworkers’ colonies developed oncommunallyownedejidolandswhichlieoutsideofthelegaljurisdictionoflocalgovernments toprovidebasicservices.Dominantdevelopment iscontrolledbytheinterestsofnationalandinternationalcorporatecapital,withmanypoliticianshaving backgrounds as leading local entrepreneurs. Environmental legislationand urban plans are in place but frequent amendments and the slow pace ofbureaucracyallowbusinessinterestsgreatflexibilityandresilienceinthefaceoflegislative, economic and environmental pressures –while increasing the timeand transactions costs for environmental and social actors seeking to questiondevelopment proposals. For example, the sensitive Nichupté Lagoon is underconstant development pressure; despite an Ecological Zoning Program, hotelsandsquattersettlementshavebeenallowed.ThevisionofCancunasacentreforextractivecapitalbuiltinapreviouslyunoccupiedzonedisconnectssocialactorsfrom a commitment to place and long-term planning. Reflecting on hisexperience, a PezMayaReserve fundraiser noted that ‘thosewho participatedthe leastwere local entrepreneurs;more than 70 per cent of funds came fromoverseas’. For hotel workers Cancun society is described as fragmented withtraditional values of neighbourliness and a strong family replaced byconsumerism and undermined by drugs crime, alcoholism and extremes ofinequality. Set against this, migrant workers maintain close links with source

communities;forexample,bysendingchildrentoschooloutsideCancun.Respondentswereclear thatclimatechange impactswereexacerbatedbypast,and ongoing, development: deforestation was associated with increasedtemperatures and reduced humidity and the development of dunes for hotelscontributed to beach erosion. Hurricanes were also associated with climatechangeandseenasintegraltothedevelopmenthistoryofthecitywithspecifichoteldevelopmentsbeingcitedashavingtakenadvantageofHurricanesGilbertandWilmatoextendlandclaimsintoprotectedmangrovesandprivatisebeachfronts.The commentbelow froman independent journalist shows thevariablenature of disaster management and the long-term psychological and culturalimpactswhenthestatedoesnotfulfilitsresponsibilitiesforcivilprotectionandsecurity.I remember that when Gilberto came Cancun was going to celebrate the Miss Universe contest – thisfocusedtheattentionofthegovernmentinCancun.WithWilma,however,thepeopleofCancunwereleftcompletelyontheirown.Untilthearmycametohelptwodayslater,thecitylivedincompletechaos.Westayed15dayswithoutelectricityorwater.Themostincrediblewasthecontrastbetweentherapidrecoveryofthehotelzoneandtheslowrecoveryof therestof thepopulation.Wilmabroughta lotofdespairanddemoralized thepopulation.Wehavenot still recovered from that.People stopped tobelieve.Still todaythereisnotthehappinessthatusedtobe.Allthishappenedbecausewewereleftalone.More positively, after Hurricane Wilma a Climate Change Association ofQuintanaRoobasedinCancunwasfounded.Thissmallorganisationhasworkedto promote recycling and lobbies against deforestation within existingdevelopment narratives. Elsewhere, actors seek to promote climate change inprimary school syllabi. Business associations see climate change in economictermswithhotelassociationsneedingtorespondtotouroperatorsthreateningtolower tariffsorbusinessvolumesdue to thepoor stateof thebeaches.For theengineeringandarchitecturecommunity, climatechangepresentsopportunitieswithrecentprojectsincludingsemi-permeableparkingsurfacesbutwithlimitedsupportfromgovernment.Overallcivilsocietyactorsseetheirscopeforactionas limited compared togovernmentwhichhaspower to reviseurbanplanningguidelines,orsimplyenforcethosethatalreadyexist,andthisunderstandingofthedistributionofpoweractstosuppresscivilactionandlimitoutrightcritiqueorconfrontationofthedominantcapitalintensivemodelofdevelopment.Thisisdespitecivilsocietyactorsrecognisingthatanemergingdevelopmentparadigmthat takesclimatechangeintoaccountcanbeanopportunity toenhancesocialdevelopment, with this being a particular concern in Cancun with its highinequality.Civil leadership faces powerful opposition, as an environmental lawyerexplained:‘Itisdangeroustolitigateagainstsomepowerfulgroups.Wehavetobeverycautious’.Forlocalactorstheeverydayexperienceoflivingwithcrime,

including organised protection rackets, governs people’s ability to voicecomplaintsorinstigatechange.CivilsocietygroupscitedthisandthecultureofCancunsociety,whichisdescribedasapathetic(causedbyacrisisofcredibilityin the authorities), lacking in identity (with a diversemigrant population) andcommunityspirit(withindividualsworkinghardwithlittletimeforsocialworkor volunteerism), as themain barriers to organising critical alternatives.Massmediaispoliticisedandcommercial.Individualcivilsocietygroups,lawyersorengineering companies might be competent and independent but they workalone, and often in competition, preventing the formation of a coherent socialbodyandvision.Onerespondentdescribedthisashavingalackofinstitutionalinfrastructure to promote learning and new practices for adaptation andmitigation,arguing thateven ifpeoplewerewilling,without this infrastructurechangingbehaviourwouldbeslowifnotimpossible.While the institutional framework for strategic innovation and adaptationwaslackinginCancuninformationalresourceswereinplace.Federalstateagencies(the Ecological Gazette of SEMARNAT was twice mentioned) providedscientific data available for scrutiny and that had been used by civil actors inlocal litigation or lobbying.TheSupremeCourt judgement that all documentsand studies related to a development should be in the public domain had alsobeen used by local groups to challenge developments. The Universidad delCaribe,Cancun, is a local sourceofpromotion for sustainable tourism region-wide. Collaboration with local government has been achieved by Amigos deSian’ Kaan in the preparation of a good practice guide for hotels that coversplanning and use. In this way technical and management reform have beenachieved by civil society groups to support vulnerability reduction, but social,economic, political and cultural systems remained outside discourse andunchallenged.

PlayadelCarmen

PlayadelCarmenhasasuccessfulandgrowingeconomybasedoninternationaltourism and in 1994 became the capital of the newly createdMunicipality ofSolidaridad. Since then, Playa has been amongst the fastest growing urbancentresofLatinAmerica(above20percentannually)andattimesthefastestinthe world (Campos Cámara, 2007). In 2005 its population exceeded 100,000inhabitants. Playa has experienced direct hits from hurricanes. The worstchallenge came in2005,withEmily andWilmaa fewmonths later.However,therewere no fatalities and the town recovered very rapidly. In fact, the local

tourist economy benefited from the relocation of tourists fromCancun,whichhadbeenhitevenharderbyWilma.In Playa, the dominant development narrative emphasised personal economicadvancementandreflectedthecontroloverthelocaleconomyheldbycorporateprivatesector.Respondentsreportedonadisjuncturebetweenpeopleandplace.Residents felt theywerehere to ‘makemoney’,not to settle.The resultwasalackofpopularcommitmenttolocaldevelopmentandforholdingprivatesectorandgovernmentactors toaccount,asonesocialdevelopmentactivist reported:‘thereisalackofcivicprideandidentitywithplace–peopledonotcareaboutthe city or even their house and street’. Respondents described Playa asembodying an extreme version of the American Dream, celebratingindividualismandmaterialism,andshort-termgainoverlong-termdevelopment.Some described climate change as a symptom of a larger problem ofconsciousnessandthealienatingeffectofrapidurbanisation;asonerespondentput it, ‘We increasingly behave like machines – we need to go back to ourcommunityandour roots’.Morebroadlyclimatechangecouldbeavehicle toholdthegovernmenttoaccountifcitizensbecamemoreengagedingovernance.Adaptation(andmitigation)wasseenasaleveragepointforexistingsocialandenvironmentalagendaswithprogress reported in specific sectors; forexample,the Sustainable Coastal Tourism Plan, believed to be the first in Mexico,includes guidance on beach and mangrove management. Huge scope formitigation in the hotel sector was recognised with minimal current use ofalternative energy, water recycling and waste management. The Small HotelsAssociationofPlayadelCarmenandtheMayaRivieraexplainedthat thehighproportionoffamilyrunhotelsinPlayamakesthesectorresponsivetocallsforenvironmentally sustainable practices. Strategy for future adaptation includedreinitiating local food production as a local livelihood resource as well as ameansofmakingsomeindependencefromglobalmarkets.Externalknowledgeand expertise was accessed by NGOs through supporter networks andcommercial links and had been instrumental in successful legal challenges todevelopments made on environmental grounds including X-Cacel, X-CacelitoandtheUltramarDoc.Thesewereimportantsymbolicsuccesses,demonstratingthat enforcing environmental controls need not jeopardise local economicgrowth.Civilsocietygroupstendedtooperateastop-downadvocatesorsatellitestothegovernment–corporate-business policy-making core. One social developmentleader observed that ‘organisations are closed – they inform only staff andfamilies,thereislittlepubliccommunicationaboutplansoropportunities’.ThisreflectedthelackoftrustandindividualisednatureofPlaya’ssociety,onewhere,

asonerespondentputit,therewas‘noculturefordonations,publicparticipationor volunteerism’. Perhaps because of a lack of local embeddedness, thepersonalised character of civil society organisation and its orientation towardsgovernment, therewerefewexamplesofcollaborationacrosssectors.Thisisaparticularchallengeforbuildingcapacityforprogressiveadaptation.Individualactshadsuccessfullychallengeddominantculturalandsocialnorms;forexample,throughtheprovisionofcivicamenitiesincludingtheCeibaParktoshowlocal residents that they too,andnotonly touristsor the locallywealthy,wereworthyofahealthylocalenvironment.Speakingupinpublicconsultationswas claimed to have symbolic as well as instrumental significance throughdemonstratingtheexercisingofalocalvoice.Thefacilitatingofneighbourhoodtalking groups aimed to strengthen families. Still many residents did not seethemselvesascitizensofPlayabutof theirhometownsandstates,makingthebuildingofanygrassroots-ledcallforchangeverychallenging.Greatercapacityforadaptation,albeitofaresilientkind,wasobservedwithcivilsocietygroupsoperating close to the private sector: innovation included dive companies thatopened inland cave-diving sites in response to deteriorating coastalenvironments. The importance of local and global ecosystem services to thelocaltouristeconomyalsoprovidedanarrativeforcurrentdevelopmentplanningandregulationandonethatcouldbeadaptedtoincludeclimate-proofing.

Tulum

Tulumwas until the 1970s aMayan ejido of subsistence farmers. The ejido’ssettlementwasestablishedabout2kminland,andthusprotectedfromhurricanesbyagenerousstretchofmangrovesandforest.Drivenbyin-migration,Tulum’spopulationgrewexponentially following the constructionof a highway and inthe1980s,as lowdensityhotelsproliferatedalongitsoutlyingbeachfront.By2004 there were 53 hotels in Tulum offering 1,235 rooms and a permanentpopulation of around 1,000. Hotel designs range from concrete three-storeybuildingstoverybasicthatchedcabins,andoftenincluderenewableenergyandothereco-friendlyfeatures.Althoughsomeof thehotelsareownedbyexternalactors (Mexican and foreign entrepreneurs), the majority are owned andmanagedbylocalorpartlylocalentrepreneurs.AsinPlaya,ejidatariosbenefitedfrom selling land and some of them are nowwealthy even if still preservingsomeoftheirtraditionalwaysoflife.InApril2008thestategovernmentgrantedtheindependenceofTulumasanewmunicipality.Today, Tulum is at a crossroads with two competing development narratives.

The dominant narrative portrays Tulum as an opportunity for speculativedevelopment. This is symbolised by the ‘Downtown Tulum’ development, aproject forged and implemented by Yucatecan entrepreneurs in concomitancewith thegovernorof thestate.Theworksfor thefirstphasestarted inJanuary2008andcontemplatetheurbanisationof77hectareslocatedbetweenthetownandthebeach.Thesecondphasecomprises450hectaresincludingamegagolfcourse that would extend up to the beach and a grid of water channelsresemblinganinlandmarina.An alternative narrative is oriented more towards local Mayan values andecologicalandcommunitysustainability.Thisvisionwaschampionedbyasmallgroup of well-educated local businesses leaders and civil society groups, butoptimism for the future of Tulum as a sustainable tourism centre is limited.Respondentspresentedstrikingvisionsforanalternativedevelopment,butfeltinrealitysmallgainsthatcanbuildresiliencyintodevelopmentareallthatislikelytobeachievedinresistingthecorporatetransformationofTulum.WealreadyhavefailedmodelssuchasAcapulcoandCancunandwedonotwanttofallintothesameinTulum.Itisalmostimpossibleforlocalpeopletoaffectthemodelordirectionofdevelopment.However,therearelocalpressuresto,forinstance,makewidersidewalksorguaranteetheconnectionofdrainagetoawastewatertreatment.Wewantthattheybuilddrainagebeforepavinganystreet.(Formerpresident,TulumHotelAssociation)Alternative economic vision is provided by community (ejido) owneddevelopmentattheDosOjoscavesystemandatabio-regionprojectatJacintoPat Ejido. Most ejido lands and individual owners have sold to speculativecapital and subsequently left Tulum but these examples show an economicrationale for development led by and for the benefit of local people with aconcernforenvironmentalintegrity.Somemedium-scalemigrantentrepreneurssupport this vision, with the Chan Chay Ecological Shop providing greencleaningproductsforthehotelsectorbutalsoorgansingworkshops,andaGreenExpoinTulumtopromotethissiteasa‘greenspotontheMayaRiviera’.Local consequences of climate change are recognised, most significantlyassociated with increased hurricane activity and higher temperatures, bothexacerbated locally by deforestation of mangroves and coastal forest andintensiveurbanisation.Climatechangeisimpactingthroughhousingdevelopment.Theareasthatwereforconservationarenowbeing urbanized and this is generating disequilibrium.There have been protests against theAldeaZamaprojectandnowwehaveanenvironmentaldepartmentintheMunicipalCouncil,butthistypeofprogressisscrewingusup.(Manager,ZeroWorkshopFoundation)Tourist occupation as well as local quality of life is reported to be affecteddirectly, with concerns on a shift from high-to low-end tourists at periods ofhurricaneactivity, and indirectly; forexample, through the lossofa sectionofcoast roadwith every passing hurricane. For other civil actors climate change

presentedanopportunitytopressdominantdevelopmentprocessesandlobbyforchange. For the Centro Ecológico Akumal ‘climate change can slow downdevelopmentduetotherecurrenceofhurricanes.Thiswouldgiveusachancetoshift the dynamics’. Similarly, the Chan Chay Ecological Shop saw climatechange and its media coverage as contributing to ongoing efforts tomotivateindividuals andbusinesses to becomemore ecologically responsible. Formostcivilsocietyactorscapacitytorespondwaslimitedtoraisingawarenessthroughpublic workshops and school visits. Coastal reef management has generatedsomelocalresearchandconservationworkreceivesinternationalcoveragebutisnotframedbyclimatechangeadaptation.Social leaders identified considerable barriers to organising for adaptation andchange. Therewas no culture of active resistance inTulum, but rather one ofsilence and compliance; at the same time new migrants were less concernedabout Tulum’s environment than economic opportunities and so supported thedominant vision of development. For the local and migrant populationscompliancewas underwritten by a lack of educational opportunities,with TVbeing the primary source of information and opinion forming. Severalrespondentssawthepromotionofanalternativedevelopmentnotasachallengeof providing information but of working with partners to raise criticalconsciousness–adeepshiftinlocalmindsetsthatareaccustomedtomediatingdevelopment through adaptive ingenuity, to use Freire’s terminology; anambitious aimandonemademore soby theweaknessesof the civil sector inTulum,whichwasacknowledgedtobesmallwithisolatedorganisationseasilycooptedbydominantbusinessinterests.Middleclassesandyoungprofessionalsthat might be at the forefront of organising local social movements wereoverworkedandhadlittletimeforpublicwork.ThecrisisinleadershipwassuchthatsomerespondentslookedhopefullytointernationalNGOs.Whileundermininglocalvisionsfordevelopment,theurbanisationprocessitselfalsoofferedopportunitiesfororganisingalternatives.Developmentincreasedtheexternal visibility of Tulum, and provided opportunities for accessinginformation; for example, through technical support from the federal agencySEDESOLand theFrenchEmbassy,whichofferedknowledgeexchangeswithFrenchMunicipalities.DraftingoftheUrbanDevelopmentPlanincludedcitizenconsultationbutwithlimitedimpact,withthemostpositiveconsequenceofthisexperiment inparticipatorygovernancebeing its slowingdowndevelopment–providing time for alternative discourses to assert themselves outside of theformalplanningprocess.ThenewmunicipalauthorityexpressedconcernaboutthelossofTulum’sexistingculturalandecologicalcharacterinthetidalwaveofapproachingdevelopment,but looked to the federalgovernment for leadership

andcapacity.

Mahahual

Mahahual is a pioneer settlement with a population of about 500, largely in-migrantsfromMexicoandinternationally.From2008Mahahualwasconferredthe status of Alcaldía and administered through a local council withresponsibilityforthetourismcentrewithitsbeachproperties,modernresidentialproperties,cruiseshipterminalandseveralsmallsatelliteresidentialandfarmingcommunities, including an informal settlement located two kilometres awayfromthemaincentre.Astheeconomicbaseshiftedfromfishingtotourismrapidin-migrationandlandspeculationhavechangedthephysicalandsocialstructureof the town. Few original families remain and these are a small minoritycompared to the immigrant population. The local economy has experienced aboom since the construction of the cruise ship terminal,with land speculationdriving a healthy virtual economy. Hurricane Dean made a direct hit onMahuhual in August 2007, with the subsequent closure of the cruise shipterminalstallingthelocaleconomy.As a pioneer settlement there was a feeling of excitement and opportunitydirected by a desire to build Mahahual without being dominated by cruisetourism. Itwas an ‘open frontier’where local residents had a central stake inshapingthefuture.Here,theneedtobuildcommunitywasacommonaspirationwith some working towards this, but mistrust in social organisation andleadershipwaspervasive,inbusiness,socialandlocalgovernmentorganisationalike.Environmentalconcernsweremarginal;forresidentsdevelopmentmeanttheimprovementofcriticalphysicalandsocial infrastructureandpromotionofthe local economy. However, one leader of a social development groupsuggestedthatfollowingHurricaneDeanaslowprocessofculturalchangemayhavebegun:‘afterDeanoneisstartingtofeelmoresolidarity.Itishappeningasin Cozumel, people there are building solidarity as a result in part of facingmanyhurricanes’.The commonconstructionof climate change in termsof hurricane riskplayeddownlong-termthinking.Acceptinghurricaneriskasadevelopmentexternalityalsocontributedtoindividualbusinessesandtheregionalandfederalstatebeingcastastheactorswithprimaryresponsibilityforrespondingtoclimatechange.The local council,which shouldbe adriving force for adaptation, hadnot yettakenthisrole.Practicalactionwaslimitedtoassociatedenvironmentalagendas;forexample,theTourismEntrepreneursAssociationofCostaMayacampaigned

to clean the village with the participation of the authorities, and lobbied toprevent trucks coming into the village and for investment in waste recycling.Information networks were extensive stretching to other parts of the state,Mexicoandoverseas,and led, forexample, tocalls fora localcivilprotectionbodyinlocalgovernment.BeforeHurricaneDean,lowlevelsoftrustwithanyformofsocialorganisationwas aggravated by Mahajual’s diverse and atomised society, with manyimmigrantsandasmallpopulationbasethatconstrainedtheleapfromindividualtocollectiveaction.Theleaderofafishingcooperativereflectedontheimpactof low trust on the formation of his group: ‘We had to make three meetingsbeforewecouldelectapresident.Peopletendtoattackthosewhostandoutfromthe rest. They think one is looking for his own benefit.’ The combination ofeconomicandgovernanceconstraintswasexemplifiedwellby the residentsofKm55,asatellitesettlementwithformalandinformallandholdingswhereoneleader reported that ‘only 36 of 400 plots are occupied, the rest are heldspeculatively; thismakes it hard to organise’. Another noted that ‘uncertaintyaboutlandtitlingisdelaying;forexample,peoplewillnotputelectricityintheirlotsuntilthisissolved’.After Hurricane Dean, reconstruction opened a window for building commonidentity (as temporary labour migrants and uncommitted investors left) andpotentialforcollectiveaction.Abusinessmanreportedthat:BeforeDeanItriedmanytimestocreateanassociation,butwithoutDeanandallthiseasymoneynobodypaidmuchattention.AlltheideasthatIwasproposingturnedouttoberightafterDean.Nowpeoplearestartingtobuildcommonculturebecausetheoneswhohavestayeddonotseethisplaceonlyintermsofmoney.Some individuals also took advantage of governance failures post-Dean withexamplesofmangrovesbeingillegallycleared,butforthoseseeingpotentialincollective action reconstruction served as a commoncontext for organising.AsensethatlocalcivilsocietyactorshadastakeinshapingthefutureofMahahualwas reinforced by a search for alternative tourist markets following thetemporary closure of the cruise terminal. This was driven by individualcompanies with minimal state support. Still many respondents felt thatMahahual’s recent Alcaldía status would also open new opportunities forcollaboration with local government and the Alcadía was also concerned toprojectitselfasseekingtobuildpartnershipswithlocalcivilsociety,providingrealscopeformainstreamingclimatechange.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis presented dominant and alternative discourses on

development, climate change and scope for adaptation in each study site fromthe viewpoint of local civil society actors. Here a comparative analysis ispresented todrawoutdifferences in theways inwhichadaptationwasused topromote resilience, transition or transformation within the particulardevelopment contexts of each site. Table 7.1 summarises this analysis. As acaveat, it is important to note themethodological challenges in capturing andthenrepresentingthediversityofviewsondevelopmentandclimatechangeinareductivebutTable7.1Adaptationasanopportunityandnarrativefordevelopmentdiscourseandaction

Cancun Playa Tulum MahahualDominantdevelopmentvision

Intensive, large scale,corporate extractivecapitalism

Corporate andlocal extractivecapitalism

Transformenvironment intocommodity forspeculativeinvestors

Smallscalepioneercapitalism

Perceived climatechangerisk

Translated into achallenge for tourismmarketing,insuranceandengineeringdesign;notaconcern for local socialand environmentalintegrity

Risk ofmarginalconcern in theplanninghorizon ofbusinesses andgovernment

Risk denied orassumed to beplannedoutinthefuture so of littleconsequence forfutureinvestments

Climate changethreatenseconomicbase throughdamage to cruisetourism

Adaptationopensscopefor:

Resilienceasdiscourse

Improve coastalengineering and touristbuildingdesign

Maintain beachand coastalwaterquality

An opportunityfor greeningbusiness andpromotingmitigation

Generate newmarketsindependent ofcruisetourism

Resilienceasaction

Beach replenishment,artificial reef design,hotelretrofit

Beachreplenishment,dive companiesmarket interiorsites

Marketing andinformingbusinesses

Individual acts ofmarketing

Leadactors

Municipality,engineeringconsultants

Municipality,SMEs

SMEs SMEs

Transitionasdiscourse

Assert rights to policedominant vision byexercising entitlementsfor environmentalsustainability

Assert rights tochallengedominant visionby exercisingentitlements fordevelopmentcontrol

Economicgrowthis welcome ifcontrolled

Assertion ofidentity throughnew council statusand followingDean to leveragefunds for localdevelopment

Transitionasaction

Engage in developmentconsultation and takelegalaction

Legalchallengespreventdevelopments

Engage incitizensconsultation forUrbanDevelopment

Collective acts ofreconstructionafterHurricaneDean

Plan

Leadactors

Environmental NGOsandlawyers

LocalenvironmentalNGOs andCancun basedlawyers

Some local civilsocietyorganisations

Local council,SMEs

Cancun Playa Tulum MahahualAdaptationopensscopefor:

Transformationasdiscourse

Call for extension ofbasic needs and riskmanagement tomigrantworker colonies; putsdistributional equity atthe heart of alternativevision

Building self-worthand criticalconsciousnessamongst migrantworkersasafirststepforreclaimingavoiceindevelopment

Raise criticalconsciousness ofenvironmentalandculturalcostsof extractivedevelopment

None

Transformationasaction

None Symbolicacts,e.g.LaCeiba Park reclaimsquality green spaceforlocals

Populareducation

None

Leadactors Independent journalists

and social developmentNGOs

Social and culturaldevelopmentNGOs

CulturalNGOs None

meaningfulwayarenotinsubstantial.Table7.1seeksonlytorepresentthemostinfluentialnarrativesandassociatedactionsandkeyactors linkedtoresilience,transitionalandtransformativeadaptations.Resilienceis indicatedbyefforts tomaintainbusiness-as-usualdevelopmentpaths;transitionexercisesexistinglegaland governance rights to confront unsustainable development, andtransformation uses adaptation to promote fundamentally alternative forms ofdevelopmentfromthosedescribedforeachsiteasdominant.Across the sites some commonalities emerge. Local government and businessinterests are prominent in responding to climate change through buildingresilience,whichisalsothepredominantformthatadaptationtakesineachcase.Incontrastcivilsocietygroupsandenvironmentallawyersaremostprominentintransitionalacts,usingadaptationtopushforgreatertransparency,participationand accountability within the existing governance system. Cultural actors,includingNGOsandjournalists,emergeasleadingtransformation,whichexistslargely at the level of discourse, with some acts of popular education andsymbolic initiatives aimed at promoting popular critical consciousness. Giventhestrongvoiceofgovernmentandbusinessinshapingthelimitsofadaptationit is perhaps not surprising that ecological modernisation is the dominantoverarching worldview within which adaptation is being constructed asresilience (from coastal engineering in Cancun and Playa to the greening ofbusinessinTulum),andtransition(theuseoflegislationtoregulatedevelopment

inCancunandPlaya).For individual workers coping with risks, including those associated withclimatechangebutdrivenmorebyasearchforeconomicopportunity,isplayedoutwithintheuseofmigrationasalivelihoodstrategy.EmotionalcommitmenttolocalesinQuintanaRooisspreadthinandlegitimisedthroughculturalnormsthat accept local residence as temporary and extractive. In contrast migrantworkersmaintaincloselinkswithplacesoforigin,evensendingchildren‘home’tobeeducated.Thisoffersanopportunityforindividualandfamilialresiliencewith low social transactions costs – without the need to engage in social orpoliticalcollectiveactionintheplaceofresidence.Given the general acceptance that climate change is already impactingnegatively throughbeacherosion,high temperatures andhurricaneactivity thelevelofproactiveplanningisminimal.Thismaybeafunctionofthelinkingofclimate change with environmental management and subsequent policymarginalisation,butpossiblyalsopointstoadenialofrisk,especiallybythosemost vulnerable. The common tendency amongst the poor and vulnerable toprioritise economic opportunity over risk reduction is heightened through amajoritymigrantpopulationthathaslittleassociationwithplaceorcommunity.Corporate interests in Cancun and Playa have access to engineering solutionsand international insurance, and beyond this possibly view their investment inQuintanaRooastemporary.Forsmallerbusinessesandtheresidentpopulationscopetoadaptismorelimited,andaswasmostkeenlydemonstratedinTulum,formanymigrantsrapidtransformationoftheenvironmentintoaformthatcanbeexploitedbycapitalhasattractedthemtothecoast.Climatechangeispushedto themarginsofpeople’s imaginationaswell as their actions.Theonemajorexception is Mahahual where Hurricane Dean caused the loss of the town’seconomic base.While Mahahual’s population is almost entirely composed ofrecent migrants, the effect of Dean as well as the recent awarding of towncouncilstatushasbeguntobuildasocialidentity.Theaimofthischapterhasbeentorevealthemessinessofanalysingadaptationwherepoliticalvaluesandactionsarebothcontestedandtightlycircumscribedby a rigid political and economic framework. In the language of transitionstheorythecasesalldisplaystrongtendenciesforstabilitywithlimitedscopeforlocalinnovationstoaffectchangeinregimesthroughadaptation,partlyaresultof the limited rangeof innovationsobserved (examples included theLaCeibaPark inPlaya,whichprovided thedual functionofmeetinga serviceneed forurban green space but also potentially inspiring critical consciousness, andmaterial alternatives such as ejido controlled development and theChanChayEcological Shop in Tulum). This is compounded by a lack of a supporting

institutional architecture (including values and a legal–administrativeframework) to aid the dissemination of innovations; and a strong dominantexisting political-economic and administrative regime. Even where disasterevents have been experienced, revealing failures in the dominant regimes anddevelopment pathways, pre-disaster political, economic and cultural structureshavechangedlittle.Resilienceremainsthedominantmodeofadaptationacrossthis region. It remains to be seen how far this will be true as increasingpopulation, physical and financial assets are exposed to climate changeassociatedhazardsinthefuture.

8Adaptationasnationalpoliticalresponsetodisaster

…momentswhen underlying causes can come together in a briefwindow, awindow ideally suited formobilizingbroaderviolence.Butsucheventscanalsohaveextremelypositiveoutcomesifthetensions[…]arerecognizedandhandledwell.

(USAID,2002)This description of post-disaster political space highlights the possibility thatpoliticaloutcomesarenotpredeterminedbyhistorybutopentoinfluence,inthiscasebytheinterestsofaninternationalpoliticalandeconomicactor.

Context:policyandmethods

Thereflexivityofsocio-ecologicalsystemsallowsustoenvisionclimatechangeimpactsasunfoldingwithinongoingsocio-politicaltrajectories.Disasterevents,and especially reconstruction periods, open space for change in dominanttechnical,policyandpoliticalregimes(PellingandDill,2010).Veryoftensuchchanges are best classified as adding resilience to pre-disaster socio-technological systems. New technology to improve the resistance ofinfrastructure,orpolicyreformsuchastheenforcementofbuildingregulations,allow political and economic business as usual. Sometimes, however,unacceptablefailuresinthedominantregimetomeetitsresponsibilitiesforriskreductionandresponsecanactasacatalystforpoliticallevelchangeandopenscopefortransformationaladaptationthatgoesbeyonddisasterriskmanagementtoinfluencesociallifeandthedistributionofpoliticalpowerinsociety.Chapter7 identifies the most likely pre-conditions for such changes, which includeeconomic inequality, a pre-existing and organised alternative to dominantpoliticsandasufficientlyhighimpactevent(Albala-Bertrand,1993;DruryandOlson,1998;PellingandDill,2006).It is not only natural disasters that provide sufficient shocks to destabilisedominantpoliticalregimes,buttheseareperhapsthemostdirectlyrelatedtotheinfluenceofclimatechange.Inthefuture,climatechangewilllikelybeafactorof growing significance in many other kinds of shock, especially thosecompoundeventsfeltlocallyfromtheconjunctureofmultiplefactors.Themostrecent example of this was the 2008 global food crisis. A combination ofchangesinlocalplantingregimes(ashiftfromwheatandmaizeforconsumption

tobio-fuels), increasingdemand(forexample, fromChina’s rapidlyexpandingmiddleclass),exceptionaldroughtand thefailureofkeyregionalharvests (forexample, the Australian rice harvest), and instability in the global financialsystems(commodityspeculationatatimeofhighcarbonfuelprice)destabilisedwater-food systems resulting in increased hunger and malnutrition for thepoorestwithcrisesin37countries.Atplacesthishasfedbackintothepoliticalsystem throughviolentprotests in suchdiversecountries asCameroon,Egypt,Haiti,Indonesia,Mexico,Morocco,Pakistan,SenegalandYemen(FAO,2008).In this context, natural disaster events provide early insight into the ways inwhich specific political systems respond to shocks and what we mightreasonably expect if failure to adapt to reduce risk leads tomore frequent andsevereevents(SchipperandPelling,2006).

Casestudyanalysis

Thischapterpresents threecasestudies.Each issummarised inTable8.1.Thefirst case study from Bangladesh unfolds in a period of post-colonial nationbuilding; the remaining studies from Nicaragua and the USA occur in thecontemporary period of globalising capital where political dominance is notsimplyconcentratedinthestatebutmorediffuselyspreadamongstnationalandinternationalprivatesectorandcivilsocietyinterests.Eachcaseisbuiltarounddirectquotationsfromeyewitnessesorobserverswithcommenton thepre-andpost-disasterpolity.Thecases serve to illustrate thatadaptation ismore thananarrowtechnicalactivity,andcanencapsulatethepoliticalaswell.Indoingsoadaptation becomes a contested space that competing social actors attempt tocaptureatthelevelofsymbolanddiscourseaswellasthroughmaterialactions.Thefinalimpactsofdisastereventsaredifficulttodescribeaswithpassingtimeneweventsplacetheirinfluenceonpoliticaltrajectories.Twopossibilitieshavebeen hypothesised: a critical juncture (Olson and Gawronski, 2003) describesthosemomentsthatwhenpassedcannotbereversed;incontrastanacceleratedstatusquo(Klein,2007)isfeltwhenpre-disastersocialandpoliticalrelationsarefurtherentrenchedthroughdisaster.Thecoredistinctionbetweenthesemodelsisbetween change as an outcome of the successful concentration (acceleratedstatus quo) and contestation (critical juncture) of established political andassociatedeconomicandculturalpower(PellingandDill,2010).

1970,EastPakistan(Bangladesh):theBholaCycloneandthepoliticsofsuccession

TheBholaCyclonedevastatedEastPakistan (nowBangladesh).The failureofleadershipfromWestPakistan(nowPakistan)enabled thedisaster to feed intoan already popular successionmovement and is a prime example of a criticaljunctureevent.FollowingtwohundredyearsofBritishrule,EastPakistanwasformedin1947,governed by Western Pakistan, some 1,000 miles away. Despite their sharedMuslim religious heritage, the populations of Pakistan’s two territories hadsignificant cultural differences with the predominantly Bengali population ofEastPakistanenjoyingclosecultural relationswithIndianBengalis livingneartheir border (Washington Post, 1971). Differences between East and WestPakistan became politicised during the nation building process; for example,throughWest Pakistani leaders insisting that Urdu (the lingua franca ofWestPakistan) be instituted as the state language (Oldenburg, 1985). Against thisbackground, a popular movement for cultural autonomy had existed in EastPakistan since 1947 and was given a political dimension by the political andeconomicdisadvantagesexperiencedbytheEasternprovince.In 1970, Bengalis were living in what would soon become one of the world’s most densely populatednations. Land scarcity forced Bengalis to build homes in areas subject to recurring floods. IncreasingnumberspushedsouthwardtoclearandsettletheSunderbanForest(whatusedtobethehometotheBengaltiger),anddeepintothesouthcoast,whichexposedthemtothevagariesoftheBayofBengal.(SommerandMosley,1973:120)In1970,amassivetyphoonhit:On 12 and 13Nov 1970, a cyclone and tidalwaves hit Eastern Pakistan (nowBangladesh) resulting incolossaldamagestobothhumanlivesandproperties.Some10,000squaremiles,coveringanumberofoffshoreislandsintheBayofBengalwereaffected.Totalpopulationaffectedwasapproximately6.4millionandestimateddeathtollwasintheregionof2million.(MINDEF,1970)Soon after the catastrophe, a medical team from Dacca (Dhaka) interviewedsurvivorswhodescribedeitheragradualincreasingoffloodwatersoveraperiodofhoursorconversely,asudden‘thunderousroarfollowedbyawallofwater’.Theteamreported:Wherethewaterrosegradually,peoplescrambledontoroofsoftheirhousesorscaledtrees.Butthehousesfrequentlygaveway,andonlythestrongestcouldmaintaintheirgriponthewetandslipperytreetrunksinthefaceofthe90mile-per-hourwinds.Inareaswherethetidalborestrucksuddenly,therewasevenlesshopeofwithstandingtheforceofthewaves.(SommerandMosley,1973:122)Onewitnesstothedevastationdescribedthesceneincredulously:FlyingouttotheBayofBengal2–3dayslateronpersistentreportsofmassivecasualties,theriversflowingintotheoceanseemedcloggedbythecarcassesofanimalsanddebris.Nobodybelieveduswhenwesaidthesewerecorpsesofhumanbeings,inthethousandsandthousands.TheIslandsofHatiyaandSandiplostpartof theirpopulation.BholaandManpura (and tensof smaller Islandsandcoastalareas likeKuakata)weresweptalmostcleanofhumans,animalsandhouses.(Sehgal,2005)ThecentralgovernmentinWestPakistanwaseitherunableorunwillingtoact.CommentatorAmirAyazsuggeststhatbothphysicalandsocialdistancestayedthehandofthecentralgovernment:Whileatidalwaveofdeathanddestructionsweptovertheeasternwing,themilitarygovernmentwasslow

to respond,paralysedbywhat Icanonly thinkofasasenseof remoteness.EastPakistanand itscoastalpeoplewerejusttoofaraway.WhichisabitliketheBheelsofTharandtheKoochisandothernomadsofBalochistan.MainstreamPakistan passes themby. Imagine if thewater supply of Islamabadwere to beclosed for two or three days running.The howls of anguish rising as a resultwould touch the heavens.(Amir,nodate)When thegovernmentdid finallyact, itsmeasureswere limited tohelping theleast affected population, leaving theworst hit areas virtually abandoned. ThemedicalteamfromDacca(Dhaka)reportedthat:Whiletheminimalamountsofbamboodistributedbythegovernmentwereadequateforrepairingtheroofor sides of a house in the more northerly areas, they were wholly inadequate for rebuilding the entirestructure,whichwasnecessaryinthemoredevastatedcoastalregions.Theresultswerepathetic:tinygrassandstrawhuts,threeoffourfeetwideandhighandperhapssixfeetlong,eachhousingafamilyoftwotoeightpersons.(Sommer&Mosley,1973:125)Consequently,villagers inlessaffectedareasweresoonbusyreconstitutingthefabricofsociety,butthiswasnotthecaseintheworstaffectedcoastalregions.Theteamobservedthat:Therethemenwereusuallyfoundsquattingdespondentlyinthecentreofthevillage.Theylackedalltheimplementsbasictoachievingself-sufficiency,andtheyhadnomoneywithwhichtobuythem.(Sommer&Mosley,1973:127–28)ThePakistanigovernment’s failure toadequately respond to thedevastationofthe typhoongaveEastPakistan’smajorityparty, theBengaliAwamiLeague,astronger position from which to negotiate. The UNDP supported SustainableDevelopmentNetworking(SDN)projectexplains:[T]he regimewaswidely seen as having botched (or ignored) its relief duties.The disaster gave furtherimpetustotheAwamiLeague,ledbySheikhMujiburRahman.TheLeaguedemandedregionalautonomyforEastPakistan,andanendtomilitaryrule.InnationalelectionsheldinDecember,theLeaguewonanoverwhelmingvictoryacrossBengaliterritory.(SDN,nodate)In December 1970, just one month after the disaster, national elections wereheld.TheAwamiLeaguetookallbuttwoNationalAssemblyseatsreservedfortheeasternregion,andwassuddenlylaunchedasamajoritypoliticalforceonaparwithWestPakistan’sPeople’sParty(Sen,1973).IkramSehgal(2005)arguesthat the popular moral outrage over the government’s poor response to thedisastercatalysedtheindependencemovement:TheFederalGovernmentremaineddistant,seeminglycoldandunfeelinginIslamabad.Theperceptionoflittleornoreliefsetthestageforfarreachingadverseconsequences.Thecyclonebroughttheanti-PakistanantagonismbuildingupovertheyearstoaheadinsuchcircumstancesitwassheermadnesstogothroughwiththescheduledNovember30elections.Thepoliticalresultwasaforegoneconclusion,amassiveprotestagainsttheFederation,asitexistedthen,laterbecameamandateagainsttheverycontinuityofPakistanasanation.(Sehgal,2005)TheelectiondemonstratedBengaliresistancetothecontinuationofmartiallawandsupportfordemocracyandregionalautonomyhadcoalescedintoapowerfulpoliticalmovement.Butsecessionwasapparentlyanactofdesperation.PhilipOldenburg(1985)assertsthattheAwamileadershipwouldnothavebeenaversetotakingaleadershiproleinaconsolidatedPakistan.Hepointstothefactthatthe Awami League did not announce secession until the central government

reacted to the election results with massive violence. Robert LaPorte (1972)writes that theWest Pakistani reaction to the election was to conduct ‘ethniccleansing’. He explains that in order to crush the autonomy movement, thecentralgovernmentactedtoridtheso-called‘misguided’Bengalisoftheforcesthat were breaking up the nation. Thus the state proceeded to arrest or killAwami League leaders leading to amassive exodus of Bengalis to India, andultimately to India’s decision to engage its army to back the Bengali war ofsuccession.InApril1971theexiledgovernmenttookoathwithTajuddinAhmadas thefirstprimeminister.Sadly independencedidnot freeBangladeshis fromexploitative government, political violence or natural disaster. Nationwidefaminestruck in1973and1974(Sen,1981).Coups,assassinationsandclaimsfor one party states have distorted national politics. Bangladesh is nowconsidered to be one of the countries most at risk to the impacts of climatechangeandherpopulationishighlyvulnerabletoriverineandcoastalfloodingaswellasdroughtandfoodsecurity.Interestingly, the authors cited here whose work was published in academicjournalsmake nomention of the catastrophic typhoon in their analyses of theeventssurroundingBangladeshindependence.Whereastheauthorspublishedinpublic forums (NGO report and OP Ed, respectively) write as though theconnectionbetweenthefailureofthecentralstatetoprovideforthepopulationfollowing the typhoon, and increased resistance to West Pakistan rule waspatently self-evident. It is likely that the relative newness of treatingenvironmental crises as politically significant events, combined with anacademic avoidance of anything that could be perceived or misunderstood asenvironmental determinism, explains why the disaster did not figure in theanalysesoftheformer.In summary thedisaster, set intomotionby socio-politicalpolicies that forcedBengalis to live in conditions of high vulnerability, swelled the ranks of thediscontented and radicalised many. Pakistani state violence against Bengalis,linked to the dominant ideology of the homogenous nation-state, effectivelyclosedspaceforBengalimanoeuvrability.Thedisasterpushedpopularsentimenttowardssupportforawarofsecession.

1998,Nicaragua:HurricaneMitch,amissedopportunityfortransformation

HurricaneMitchexemplifiesresistanceinthesocialcontractbeforeandafteracatastrophic event. Political interests both generated vulnerability and risk inNicaragua and diluted the promise of the reconstruction period which was

presentedasanopportunitytobreakfromthepastandturnreconstructionintoatransformative development moment. Despite transformational rhetoricincludingthedecentralisationofdevelopmentgovernanceafterMitch,material,progressive change has been limited: a missed opportunity for adaptation toenhanceprogressivedevelopment.ThecontemporaryhistoryofNicaraguaiseventfulanddramatic.MichaelPisanineatlysummarisessomeoftheextraordinarysocio-politicalshockssustainedbyNicaraguaoverthecourseofjust25years:It is difficult todiscusspresent-dayNicaraguawithout describing the astounding transformation that hastakenplaceinthecountryoverthepastgeneration.Inbrief,theseextraordinaryeventsandchangesinclude1)insurrectionandpopularrevolution,2)counter-revolutionandlow-intensitywarfare(theContraWar),3)100,000deadasadirectorindirectresultofarmedconflict(2.5percentofthepopulation)andahalvingofnational output, 4) a period of hyperinflation that reached an annualized 33,000 percent in 1988, 5)socialisation of the economy, 6) privatisation of the economy, 7) debt crisis including a 1990 per capitaforeigndebtfigureof$2,867inwhichpercapitaGDPwas$469oraforeigndebt-to-incomerationof6.1to1,8)sevennationalleaders(1979–2002),and9)threedebilitatingnaturaldisasters(theomnipresent1972earthquake inManagua and two destructive hurricanes,HurricaneMitch in 1998 andHurricane Joan in1988.(Pisani,2003:112)Given the role that Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s mishandling of the 1972earthquake reconstruction played in preparing the Nicaraguan population forpopular insurrection (see Table 8.1), it is not surprising that the Sandinistasmoved quickly to improve the national system for disaster mitigation andresponse after gaining power. The Nicaraguan Institute for Territorial Studies(INETER) – which currently houses state scientists in geology, meteorology,geophysicsdepartments,producesthenations’maps,registerslandandprovidesdata for land use policy –was created by legislation signed by the Sandinistagovernmentin1981.In1982thegovernmenttransformedtheNicaraguanCivilDefence into a nationwide network of civilians dedicated to promulgating therevolution amongst the Nicaraguan populace while the US funded Contrasattempted to topple thegovernment throughlowintensitywarfare:aclearcaseofadaptationcombininga technicalandpoliticalambition.However, theCivilDefencewasnotmerelyapropagandamachine;bythelate1980sNicaraguaforthefirsttimehadacadreofatleastrudimentarilytrainedemergencymanagers(Olsonetal.,2001).In1990apeacefultransitioninpowersawalandslidevictoryfortheneoliberalNationalOppositionUnion.ThenewgovernmentallowedtheCivilDefencetocontinue its functions proving effective during the Pacific Coast tsunami of1992,and,afterEuropeanUnion fundinghelped link theorganisationwith thescientists of Nicaragua’s Institute for Territorial Studies (INETER, 1998), itperformed especiallywell duringHurricaneCesar (Ibid.). Thus, inNicaragua,three of the basic elements fundamental to effective disaster mitigation were

ostensibly already in place when Hurricane Mitch battered the isthmus: 1) anational institutionhousingearth scientists andproviding earlywarning;2) anestablished national network of civil defence; and 3) an organised citizenryaccustomedtoworkingwithcivildefence.Whathappened?WhatturnedMitchfromanaturalhazardintoahumandisasterwasachainreactionofsocialvulnerabilitiescreated by long-term climate change, environmental degradation, poverty, social inequality, populationpressure,rapidurbanizationandinternationaldebt.(Rodgers,1999)MultinationalcompaniesfinancedmanyofthecoffeeplantationsneatlyterracedintothemountainsidesofNicaragua and the banana plantations cared out of the lush coastal regions of Honduras. Both types ofplantationswereviewedasbeneficialeconomicenterprisesbuttheyhadthesecondaryeffectofdisplacingsmall farmers further into the mountains where they in turn cut down forests to grow subsistencecrops[…]Butthelongtermenvironmentalconsequencesofclear-cuttinglandforagriculturalpurposeswereneveranticipatedintheregion’sdevelopmentplans.Potentialeconomiclosseswerenevercalculated,norweremitigatingactionstakentoreducetheharmfuleffectoferosion.(Comfortetal.,1999:40)Comfortetal.(1999)identifyausteritymeasuresrequiredbyexternallyimposedstructuraladjustmentprogrammesastheimpetusforcutbacksinpublicservicessuchashealthandtransportation,whichareinturnresponsibleforreductionsinthe capacity of local and national governments to respond effectively to thedisaster. Olson et al. (2001) provide evidence of how these policies affectedCivilDefencewhere almost half of the 58 officer positions distributed acrosssevenregionalofficeswerenotfilled.FromOctober21–311998thewesternandnortherncoastsaswellasthecentralregion of Nicaragua experienced from three to five times the rainfall everrecorded.According to theNicaraguangovernmentHurricaneMitchdestroyedor damaged 151,215 homes, 512 schools, 140 health centres, 5,695 roads and1,933bridges.Thegovernmentconfirmed3,045peopledeadasa resultof thedisaster (Olson et al., 2001). These human and material losses occurred in acountry with a population of only 4.5million people. Two thirds of the totalfatalities associated with the storm occurred in one ghastly ‘disaster within adisaster’:The singlemost horrific event occurred inNicaragua onOctober 30, 1998,when the side of theCasitavolcanocollapsed.Loosevolcanicashaccumulated fromcenturiesoferuptionsbecameadeadly flowofmudanddebrisknownasalahar.Duringthenight,ithurtleddownhillatspeedsofupto60milesanhourfor sevenmiles, burying 2,000 people in the villages of El Porvernir andRolandoRodriguez. (USAID,2005:4)Themagnitudeofthenationaldisasterwasnotduetoalackofanearlywarningsystem.MeteorologistsfromINETERtrackedanddulyreportedthelocationandaccelerationof the storm (INETER,1998), providing thegovernmentwith theinformation it possessed in a timely and efficient manner. But this was notsufficient:knowledgeof thehazardousgeologyandpopulationat riskwasnotavailableandhadcertainlynotbeenactedontoreducedevelopmentofthisarea(USGS,1999).Riskwasproducedasaresultofacombinedlackofappropriatescientific knowledge and an underlying political economy that allowed, or

forced, thepoor tocoloniseahazardous location.Political inactionaggravatedthe impact ofMitch. Despite the enormity of the environmental phenomenontakingplace, and severaldays intowhatwasbecominga regional catastrophe,PresidentAlemán failed to act ongovernmentministers’ advice that a stateofemergencyshouldbedeclaredandevacuationsandrescuemissionsorganised.Inan essay published shortly after the disaster, the Director of the NicaraguanCentre of International Studies, Alejandro Bendaña, suggests that one reasonPresidentAlemánrefused to initiateamassive,organisedemergencyoperationto mitigate the effects of the storm was that this sort of action would bereminiscent of the populist campaigns conducted by his political nemesis, theSandinistas: ‘No he said, such a mobilization would be something that theSandinistaswoulddo–andhecertainlywasnoSandinista’(Bendaña,1999).Thepresident’srefusaltorespondappropriatelytotheneedsoftheNicaraguanpopulation before and after the stormwas judged by international analysts aslikelytoresultinpoliticalfallout:Assessmentsofthepoliticalimpactofthehurricanearenecessarilyhighlytentativeatthisstage.However,earlyindicationssuggestthatinthemediumterm,thedisastermayleadtoanincreaseinpopularoppositionto the government of PresidentArnoldoAlemánLacayo. For severalweeks before the hurricane struck,producers had been calling for government assistance to help them copewith the impact of higher thanusual rainfall through October. However, the government did not call a state of emergency until earlyNovember,afterthehurricanehadstruck.Thisislikelytoreinforceagrowingsenseamongthepopulacethat the current administration is indifferent to popular sentiment. (EIU, 1998:7, cited in Olson andGawronski,2003)ThepartisanpoliticsofNicaraguawerenottheonlyhazardfacingAlemán,whowas also conscious of the need to conform to the expectations andconditionalities imposed by international financial institutions. His biggestconcernwasmaintainingtheapprovaloftheInternationalMonetaryFund:The fact that thegovernmenthesitatedgreatlybefore evendeclaring a stateof emergencyafterMitch isevidenceofadesire toavoid the responsibility forallocatingmassive resources toemergencyassistance,thus increasing public spending and violating the conditions imposed by the structural adjustmentprogramme.Anotherpossiblereasonfornotdeclaringastateofemergencywasthatafailuretomobiliselarge-scalehumanresourcesforthereliefeffortwould(anddid)exposetheextremelylimitedcapacitytorespondtosuchsituationsbythescaled-downcivilservice.(RochaandChristoplos,2001:249)Indeed, what led to Alemán’s political downfall and eventual conviction onmultiplecountsofcorruptionwasnotthelossofpopularsupport,butthelossofsupportfrominternationalfinancialinstitutions.InNicaraguaauthoritarianismisthe norm and corruption is extremely high, but these issues have typicallyremained low on the list of popular concerns (IDESO, 2001). PresidentAlemán’stop-downandpersonalisedapproachtogovernanceandhisstunninglyhigh level of corruption before and after Mitch (Walker, 2000) failed tosignificantly change pre-existing popular opinion of regime legitimacy.However, carrying out theWashington consensus required that the leadership

maintain international legitimacy.When thiswas lost and it became clear thatinternational players favoured Enrique Bolaños it set off a chain reaction asAlemán’s support network realigned itself to accept the new internationallyapprovedleader,andabandonedAlemántohisfate.Achangeinpresidenthadbeen affected, but this served to strengthen the neoliberal orientation ofgovernmentsothatideologicalregimechangewasnotachieved.Human security has not prospered under neoliberalism. Effective riskmanagementhasnotmet expectationspost-Mitch inElSalvadororNicaragua(Wisner, 2000) despite receiving international aid and adopting a nationalrhetoric of ‘learning the lessons of Mitch’, neoliberal state restructuring hasprecluded their implementation. Comfort et al. (1999) use the Honduran andNicaraguan cases to support their argument that risk and hazard mitigationstrategies should be integrated into social policy, especially developmentschemes. They point to ways in which the shift in the social contract underneoliberalismfromlocaltoglobalinterestsisgivenmaterialexpressionthroughlanduseandultimatelythedistributionsofriskinsociety.HurricaneMitchwasremarkablebecauseof the tremendous lossof life,socialupheaval and economic devastation that it wrought but also because of thevarious local, national, regional, international and especially supranationalresponses it engendered. The restructuring of Central American states toconform to theUnitedStates’politicalandeconomicagenda for thepost-ColdWarperiod,which is sometimes referred to as theWashingtonConsensus, didnot of course begin with Hurricane Mitch. However, this disaster gave theUnitedStates, theWorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFund,andtheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBankaplatformfromwhichtofurthertheirvisionsforregion-wide transformation. Indeed thenameadoptedby thegroupofadvisorswas the Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation ofCentral America, and its logo states that ‘reconstruction must not be at theexpense of transformation’. The second meeting of this group, held inStockholm25–8May1999,resultedinthe‘StockholmDeclaration’inwhichsixgoalswereelaborated:•Reducethesocialandecologicalvulnerabilityoftheregion,astheoverridinggoal.• Reconstruct and transform Central America on the basis of an integratedapproachoftransparencyandgoodgovernance.• Consolidate democracy and good governance, reinforcing the process ofdecentralisation of governmental functions and powers, with the activeparticipationofcivilsociety.•Promoterespectforhumanrightsasapermanentobjective.Thepromotionof

equalitybetweenmenandwomen, the rightsofchildren,ofethnicgroupsandotherminoritiesshouldbegivenspecialattention.•Coordinatedonorefforts,guidebyprioritiessetbytherecipientcountries.•Intensifyeffortstoreducetheexternaldebtburdenoftheregion.These were exciting times. Disaster management – in other words, proactive,integrated climate change adaptation–hadbeen explicitly tied to thegoals ofinclusive governance, decentralised power, citizen participation, the promotionofhumanrightsanddebtreduction.Anumberifassessmentsofprogresshave,unfortunately,notfoundthesegoalstohavebeenmet(Christoplosetal.,2009).Even shortly after the declaration Rocha and Christoplos (2001) observe thatwhile some conceptual advancesweremade at the national level, such as therecognition that more appropriate agricultural practices and soil conservationmaymitigate future disasters, and that environmental concerns such as forestfires and extensive clear cutting for cattle ranchingmust be addressed, not allpost-Mitchinitiativeswereworkingtoreducerisk.Forexample,theWorldBankproposed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry that they establish apublicly financed scheme of ‘rainfall insurance’, which would reimbursefarmers’lossesduringtimesofdroughtorflooding:Theeconomic justification for suchaprogramme is toencourage farmers toadopthigher riskstrategies.Agro-ecological risk-reduction practices, such as inter-cropping, are described as obstacles to achievingmaximumpotential production.Theargument is that if farmersknew that theywouldbe reimbursed forlosses they would take the risk of abandoning agro-ecological production techniques in order to obtaingreaterprofit.(RochaandChristoplos,2001:243)As with other areas of political life, discursive competition was decisive inshapingpolicy.FeedingtheStockholmDeclarationgoals throughthedominantneoliberallenshadsomecuriousbutperhapsnotsurprisingresults.Inthenameof improving state performance, while some advances were made in citizenparticipation and corruption, more marked was support for large scaleprivatisationofstateassetsincludingsaleofthestate-ownedtelephonecompany,the restructuringof the electrical company, theprivate administrationofwatersupply and the opening of the petroleum sector to private investors (IADB,1999).Rocha and Christoplos (2001) conclude that any impact on policies or theirimplementationisdoubtful.Thisisforstructuralreasonsthatextendbeyondthestateand the influenceof international institutions: ‘The isolationofNGOs,aseliteinstitutionswithlittlebaseintruecivilsociety,mustbebrokeniftheyaretobecome a vehicle for the integration of disaster mitigation and preparednessconcernsinnationalpoliciesandinstitutionalpractice’(RochaandChristoplos,2001:250).Demeritt et al. (2005) argue that international financial institutions fostered

government policy in post-Mitch Nicaragua have promoted the liberalmodernising of the state through the legal creation of a disaster preventionsystem(SINAPRED).Thisstructurallylinksvirtuallyallstateministries,whileat the same time privatising key state services converting Nicaragua into alucrative site for transnational disaster prevention agencies. The continuingtransnationalisation of security in Nicaragua has resulted in the creation of acohort of high level bureaucrats who are ostensibly responsible for designingand orchestrating a national disaster prevention plan; however, their primarywork consists of middle-managing foreign projects and their work product ismonitored and evaluated byWorld Bank officials, not the Nicaraguan people(Demerittetal.,2005).

2005,NewOrleans,USA:transformationdeniedbypoliticaldilution

HurricaneKatrinahasbecomea touchstoneevent in theUSA. Itdemonstrateswellthedeepsocial,andinthiscaseracial,determinantsofindividualadaptivecapacity and vulnerability and the ways in which successive administrativesystemsfailedfirsttomediateintheurbandevelopmentthatgeneratedexposureand then to respond to thedisasterand recovery.Thedisasterbroughtscrutinyandquestionsoflegitimacyforlocalandnationalpoliticians,leadingtoreformin technical and administrative systems but limited indication oftransformationalreform.Thelackoftransformationisnotforwantofalternativevisions or discourses but the failure of these to overcomepopular rejection ofpolitics and the dilution of political power through privatisation, whichsimultaneouslyremovespublicaccountability(seebelow).Michael Dyson (2006) found racial inequity in New Orleans an importantenoughfactorintheKatrinadisastertobeginhisbookwithadiscussionofsomeofthesocialconditionsthatreproduceit:NewOrleanshasa40percentliteracyrate:over50percentofblackninthgraderswillnotgraduateinfouryears…Louisiana expends an average of $4,724 per student and has the third-lowest rank for teachersalariesinthenation.Theblackdropoutratesarehighandnearly50,000studentscutclasseveryday.Whentheyaredonewithschool,manyyoungblackmalesendupatAngolaPrison,acorrectionalfacilitylocatedona formerplantationwhere inmatesstillperformmanual laborandwhere90%of themwilleventuallydie.NewOrleans’semploymentpictureisequallygloomy,sinceindustrylongagodesertedthecity,leavinginitsplaceaserviceeconomythatcaterstotouristsandthatthrivesonlow-paying,transientandunstablejobs.(Dyson,2006:8)PartoftheshameofNewOrleansthatcastdoubtonpoliticaljudgementswasitspredictability.InSeptember2004,justshyofoneyearbeforeHurricaneKatrina,JonElliston published an article entitled ‘Disaster in theMaking’. The articlecarefullydetailshowwithinmonthsofgainingthepresidency,GeorgeW.Bush

presided over the dismantling and privatisation of the FEMA. Criticalprogrammes developed over yearswere dropped, the agency’s budget slashedand by 2004FEMAhad lostmuchof its capacity to fundmitigation projects.Meanwhile, following the11September2001attacks, theburdenputoncash-strapped states to pay for anti-terrorism projects made them increasinglydependentonFEMAforhelpwithdisastermitigation.Butby2004theagencywasforcedtoturnmanyaway:InNorthCarolina,astateregularlydamagedbyhurricanesandfloods,FEMArecentlyrefusedthestate’srequest to buy backup generators for emergency support facilities.And the budget cuts have halved thefunding for amitigation program that saved an estimated $8.8million in recovery costs in three easternN.C.communitiesaloneafter1999’sHurricaneFloyd.InLouisiana,anotherstatevulnerabletohurricanes,requestsforfloodmitigationfundswererejectedbyFEMAthissummer.(Elliston,2004)After failing towin the bid for a floodmitigation project for Jefferson Parish(whichoneyearlaterwouldrepresenttogetherwithNewOrleanscityproper89percentofKatrina-affectedpopulationinthemetropolitanarea)(TheBrookingsInstitution, 2005), Flood Zone Manager Tom Rodriguez told Elliston, ‘Youwould thinkwewouldgetmaximumconsideration for the funds.This iswhatthegrantprogramcalledfor.Weweremorethanqualifiedforit’(Elliston,2004).Elliston’s interviewswith FEMA employees aswell as unaffiliated academicsrevealthatthe‘consultantculture’ofprivatisationhadguttedwhatusedtobeahighly effective national service. States and communities now had to bid formitigationgrantsfromadiminishedfundandinasystemthatmadeitharderforless affluent cities and communities to compete. Privatisation eroded theagency’s institutional memory, effectively disregarding years of agencyexperience as disaffected staff joined the ranks of consultants. But as bothscholarsandpractitionersobserved,thelowestbidderdoesnotnecessarilydothebest job, and private consultants do not necessarily accumulate and convertgenerations of experience into institutional memories that support effectiveaction.Inanessaysubmittedto theNewYorker, JohnMcPhee(1987)couldn’thave made the connection between business interests and maladaptivedevelopmentanyclearer:In thenineteen-fifties,afterLouisianahadbeenmadenervousby theSt.LawrenceSeaway, theCorpsofEngineers built theMississippi River-Gulf Outlet, a shipping canal that saves forty miles by traversingmarsh country straight fromNewOrleans to theGulf.The canal is known asMr.Go, and shipping haslargely ignored it. Mr. Go, having eroded laterally for twenty-five years, is as much as three times itsoriginalwidth.Ithasdevastatedtwenty-fourthousandacresofwetlands,replacingthemwithopenwater.Amileofmarshwill reduceacoastal-storm-surgewavebyaboutone inch.Wherefiftymilesofmarsharegone,fiftyinchesofadditionalwaterwillinevitablysurge.TheCorpshasbeenobligedtodealwiththisfactbycompletingtheringofleveesaroundNewOrleans,thuscreatingNewAvignon,awalledmedievalcityaccessedbyaninstatethatjumpsoverthewalls.(McPhee,1987)The Army Corp of Engineers has been severely criticised for its lack ofunderstanding of ecological systems, leading them to engage in

counterproductivedevelopmentandmitigationwork.Nevertheless,itshouldbesaid thatasengineers they recognised that the leveesystemmightnotholdupagainstacategory fouror fivehurricaneorevenacategory three if ithoveredoverthecity.Indeed,oneyearbeforeKatrina,theCorpproposedtostudyhowNewOrleans could be protected from a powerful hurricane, but according toindependent journalist Sidney Blumenthal (2005), the Bush administrationorderedthattheresearchnotbeundertaken.Blumenthalmovesupthechainofcommandtoidentifytheadministrationasresponsibleforthepolicythatallbutguaranteeddisaster:TheBushadministration’spolicyofturningoverwetlandstodevelopersalmostcertainlyalsocontributedtotheheightenedlevelofthestormsurge…Bushhadpromised‘nonetloss’ofwetlands,apolicylaunchedbyhis father’s administration andbolsteredbyPresidentClinton.But he reversedhis approach in2003,unleashing thedevelopers.TheArmyCorpsofEngineersand theEnvironmentalProtectionAgency thenannouncedtheycouldnolongerprotectwetlandsunlesstheyweresomehowrelatedtointerstatecommerce.(Blumenthal,2005)Againstthisbackdropofmaladaptationintheearlymorninghoursof29August2005,meteorologists trackingthe trajectoryofcategoryfourHurricaneKatrinareportedthatithadshifteddirectionawayfromthecityofNewOrleansandwasheading into theGulfofMexico.Manythought thatamajordisasterhadbeenavoided.Thenreportscamein thatsomeof the leveesprotectingNewOrleanshadbeenbreachedandthatvastareasofthecitywereflooding.Soonafterwards,televised images began to appear. Though the storm affected awide swath ofGulfCoastandkilledat least1,300people inLouisiana,Mississippi,Alabamaand Florida, Americans were transfixed by the spectacle of a humanitariandisasterunfoldinginamajorcityintheUnitedStates.The videos of mostly African-Americans struggling to survive in the hellishconditions of NewOrleans’ Superdome and Convention Center, in swelteringheat, with no electricity or running water, while basic supplies and transportfailedtoarrive,werejuxtaposedinAmericanconsciousnesstothoseseenadayearlier: tens of thousands of cars leaving the relativelywhite suburbs towardssafety.Asreportscameinthattheelderlyresidentsofseveralnursinghomeshadalsobeenabandoned,analreadyalarmednationunusedtoconfrontinginequalityin such stark relief ignited a national level search for blame (Frymer et al.,2005).Shockalonehasnotbeenenoughtodislodgedominantculturalattitudestowardsrace and class in the US. Indeed some elements of the television media inparticularhavebeencriticisedforresortingtopresentingthedisasterthroughalens of cultural stereotypes that moved close to blaming the victims of thedisasterfortheirownvulnerability(TheBrookingsInstitution,2005).Moreover,interpretations of the government’s response to the crisis fractured along clear

raciallines.AccordingtoaWashingtonPost-ABCpoll,nearlythreeoutoffourwhite Americans did not believe that the government would have respondedmorequicklyifthecitizenstrappedintheSuperdomewerewealthierandwhite,whereas the same proportion of blacks disagreed; and more than six in tenAfrican-Americansbelievedthatthepoorreliefeffortreflectedcontinuingracialinequity,whilesevenintenwhitesrejectedthisview(FletcherandMorin,2005).A second narrative in post-Katrina critique focused on administrativeincompetence and had an overtly political dimension. The Democratic Partygalvanised partisan anger through a mailer and email blitz focusing on theadministration’s incompetence; ‘throw the bums out’ urged the on-lineorganisation MoveOn.org. The mass media fuelled the campaign by firstattacking Michael Brown, the head of FEMA, characterising him as a Bushcronywhowasawardedthejobdespite,itwasclaimed,beingunqualifiedfortheposition.Evenrepublicanswantedtoknowwhythefederalgovernmentwassoslowtoact.MichaelBrown’sresignationshortlyafterthedebaclecausedatemporarylullinpublicfuror.Butthiswasrevived in early March when the Associated Press distributed a videotape of Federal Disaster officialswarningthepresidentthatthestormcouldbreachlevees,andrecordedBrownvoicinghisconcernthattherewerenotenoughdisasterteamstohelpevacueesattheSuperdome.Therecordedbriefingoccurredonedaybeforethehurricanehit.Thevideotape,alongwithsevendaysofbriefingtranscripts,raiseddoubtsabouttheadministration’sclaimthatthe‘fogofwar’blindedthemtothemagnitudeofthedisaster,anddirectlycontradictedthepresident’sstatementmadefourdaysafterthestorm,‘Idon’tthinkanybodyanticipatedthebreachofthelevees.’(FletcherandMorin,2005)Amorenuanceddiscoursehasarisenfromacademicandthinktankcommentarythathastendedtoviewthedisasterfromtheviewpointofthoseinvolved.Oneoftwo post-Katrina reports commissioned by The Brookings Institution (TheBrookings Institution, 2005) demonstrates how the once racially mixed andvibrantcityofNewOrleanswastransformedafterWorldWarII,andhowthesechanges affected the contours of the 2004 disaster. Jim Crow laws,deindustrialisation and white flight into suburban neighbourhoods, combinedwith a host of federal housing and absurdly dangerous growth and land usepolicies. The result was the creation of a deeply segregated population ofhighland dwelling middle-class whites and increasingly marginalised lowlanddwelling African-Americans, racially distinct communities existing in twodifferentuniverses,withthelatterlivingonborrowedlandandborrowedtime.Areport from the Institute for Women’s Policy Research observes that theestablishment of three historically African-American colleges in the citysupportedthedevelopmentofahighlyeducatedAfrican-Americanmiddleclass,and that recovery projects should tap into this extremely valuable resource(Gaultetal., 2005).AnotherBrookings report is careful to observe that somemiddle-classwhites suffered great losses, and not all of the poor areAfrican-

American (Berube and Katz, 2005). Yet all of these reports demonstrate thatrace, gender and poverty contributed separately and in combination withenvironmentally unsustainable policies to create particular citizens andcommunities significantly more vulnerable to hazards and crisis than others.They propose a radically different vision for the reconstruction of themetropolitan area, and offer concrete suggestions on how to integrate socio-economicdiversitywithecologicalsustainability.DouglasBrinkley’s(2006)tomeontheKatrinadisasterprovideshistoricaldepthandpresentsanimpressivebreadthofknowledgeofthesocio-political,culturaland environmental factors leading up to the disaster. Though most actors arepresentedaspeoplecaughtupinlargerprocessesbeyondtheirfullunderstandingor control, there is no shortage of villains in this narrative. Yet he reservesspecialrancourforthemayorofNewOrleans,C.RayNagin.Makingpainfullycleartheracialtenorofthecritique,heobservesthatthepro-businessmayorhaslong been called an ‘Uncle Tom’ by his detractors. Brinkley asserts that thereasonNagin failed toorder amandatoryevacuationofNewOrleans,when itwouldhavesavedlivesandpreventedthousandsfromsuffering,wasbecausehewas afraid to anger his patrons in the business community whose wealth ismaintainedwiththeprofitsfromtourism.As the post Katrina political repercussions continue to unfold, the partisan battles become increasinglyshrill, and themainstreampressdutifully reproduces thebattles forpublic consumption, it remains tobeseen if the voices that link disaster to wider socio-economic and environmental policies that increasevulnerabilitiesandreducehumansecurity,forsomemorethanothers,willbeheardoverthedin.(Brinkley,2006:23)Despite the range of critical discourses following Katrina, tangible adaptiveresponsesremainconstrained.Birkland,inastudyofpolicylearningfollowingdisaster events, undertook a review of the Library of Congress’s Thomasdatabasetwomonthsafterthedisaster.Hefound:Ofthe293itemsthissearchreturned,40percentofthebillsmentionedHurricaneKatrinainthetitle,24percentincludedthework‘relief’inthetitle,andtheitems‘recovery’and‘reconstruction’werementionedin9and5percentoftitles,respectively.Theword‘preparedness’appearedinthreebills(1percent)andtheword[hazard]‘mitigation’didnotappearinanybill.Clearly[hazard]mitigationorevenpreparednesswasnotamajorconcernofCongressinthetwomonthsafterthedisaster.(Birkland,2007:178)Why is it that an event with demonstrable impact on popular, political andlegislativeconsciousnessfailedtotranslateintoprogressive,proactiveformsofadaptationbuiltonhazardmitigationanddisasterpreparedness?Birkland(2007)arguesthatthiswasaresultofthelackofanorganisedadvocacylobbyaroundhurricaneriskmanagement,inturnaproductof‘confusionoverwhatittakestoimprove policy performance and of political constraints that prevent officialsfrom adopting effective policies’ (Birkland, 2007:178). He argues that, in theUS, incremental learning has brought improvements in risk regulation such as

the Flood InsuranceReformAct (transitional adaptation) but that the politicalleadershiprequiredformoretransformationalactssuchasthebanningofhomeconstruction on the coastline which would need a rethinking of developmentpolicyremainsabsent;anabsencemadeallthemorestarkwhencomparedtotheimpactsofthehomelandsecurityagenda,whichindeedhastakenresourceandpoliticalattentionawayfromhurricaneandotherdisasterriskmanagement.ThisisperhapsalsoexplainedbythemodestlevelsofpopularengagementwithdirectdemocracyintheUS.LevelsoftrustingovernmentandthegovernanceofbasicneedsandsecurityprovisionweredentedbyHurricaneKatrinabutalreadylow(Nicholls,2009)andasensethatitisthesystemitselfthatisrottenratherthanindividual politicians or even parties, as one local newspaper commentatorsuggests:Somepolitical‘experts’believethattherecenthurricaneswillcreateademandforbiggergovernmentandareturn to a New Deal-style of economics. This view is rooted in events that took place after the 1927MississippiRiverflood.Butunlikethe2005storms,governmentplayedasmallroleinthestormof1927.Businessmen in New Orleans, who sacrificed St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes to save their owninterests,wereviewedasthevillains.(Mainlybecausetheyneverfollowedthroughwiththeircommitmentto reimburse the people ofSt.Bernard andPlaqueminesParishes for the damages they incurred.) In theaftermathofHurricaneKatrinathe‘villains’appeartobetheinflexibleanduncaringbureaucracyofFEMA,and the indecisiveness andoftenbickering localpolitical officials, and themanyproblems related to theadministrationof theRoadHomeprogram. In starkcontrast to the stormof1927,many individuals andcorporationswereclearlywillingandabletohelpthoseaffectedbyprovidingfood,shelter,andevenjobs.Therefore, we see Hurricane Katrina creating further disgust against the ‘business as usual’ politics ofLouisiana.Historyhasshownus thatpoliticalshenanigansare least toleratedin timesofsufferingand/orblatantcorruption.(PoliticsLA.com,nodate)AssignificantforsomewillbetheimpactofdemographicchangeswroughtbyKatrinawith the residents of predominantly poor, black neighbourhoods beingdisplaced through evacuation and redevelopment. A final reminder of theresilienceofincumbentpoliticiansintheUSandespeciallyNewOrleanscomesfrom the 1966 floods of the city which were also precipitated by poorgovernmentplanningandleveefailureduringahurricane.Theincumbentmayorused disaster relief to bolster his public image and was re-elected to office amonth later despite being personally responsible for the reallocation of cityfundsoriginallydestinedtoshoreupthelevee(AbneyandHill,1966).

Conclusion

What can these case histories tell us about adaptation and transformation?Certainly they show that decision-making for risk management is not only atechnicalmatterbutframedbyandinvestedintheroughandtumbleofpolitics.Importantly this isnotonlypolitics in thenarrowsenseofelectionsbut rathermore broadly refers to governance: the balance of private sector, state and

voluntary sector provision of goods and services including the upholding ofhuman rights. In each case this balance, which lies at the heart of the socialcontract, was challenged by disaster, and in particular by failures in theestablished regime to both reduce risk and prevent avoidable losses as part ofeverydaypracticebefore theevent,andbeseen toact justlyandeffectively inresponseandreconstruction.The most dramatic political outcome, the only example of regime change,unfolded in East Pakistan, when electoral politics failed to meet popularexpectationsforchange.Thisisaprimeexampleofdisasteractingasacatalystforpoliticaltrajectoriesalreadyentrainedpre-disaster.Thesuccessionmovementsuccessfullypresentedthedisasterasasymbolforstatefailureandprovidedtheorganisationalbaseforpropellingpopulardiscontentintothepoliticalarena.Table8.1Lessonsforadaptation EastPakistan(Bangladesh) Nicaragua NewOrleans,USASocialcontract

Pre-disaster contract lackedculturallegitimacy

Social contract held inplace by internationalfinancialactors

Popular denial of inequalities insocialcontract

Disasterimpact

Slow and limited stateresponse fuelled successionmovement

Opened regime tointernational scrutiny andpressure

Revealed chronic administrativefailuresatalllevelsofgovernance

Humansecurity

In the long-run,basicneedsand human rights wereenhanced followingindependence

Lost opportunity to buildcapacity throughgovernancereform

Evacuation, speculation andredevelopment have changed thedemography of the city; the cityremainsatrisk

Lessonsforadaptation

Electoralpoliticsissensitiveto popular discontent butwhen not heeded armedviolencecanresult

International agendas forreform need to be built onlocal capacities andwillingnesstochange

Overreliance on the private sectorcaused gross inefficiency, loss ofknowledge and human resource inthepublicsector

Thesymbolicsignificanceofdisasterandfailureinresponseandreconstructionis shown in each case. Following Mitch international actors sought to openNicaragua’spolitical-economytothevaluesofinclusivedemocracy.Butbattleslost at the level of discourse allowed distortions to appear in policy thatundermined this agenda. The reinterpretation of decentralised governance asprivatisationbyinternationalfinancial institutionsisacaseinpoint.ReflectingthescaleofshockgeneratedbyHurricaneKatrina,thiseventhasledtomultiplecompetingdiscourses,therewasthoughonlymarginalimpactinthedeliveryofresponse.Giventheadministrativefailuresthatprefiguredthedisasteronemightexpectagreaterdegreeofinternalreflectionbutthiswasnotclearlypresentinthe federal regime so that the impacts of the disaster were in many casesexacerbated by the exploitation of reconstruction opportunities by private

contractors,largeandsmall.Thelackofanadvocacycoalitionandpossiblyalsodeeprootedpopulardisengagementfrompoliticsatthetimeweakenedoversightandreflexivity.Table8.1summariseseachcasestudy.Contextiscriticalinjudgingthecapacityforadaptation toopenscopeforprogressive transformation.Adaptationcanbechampioned through instrumental policy but also as part of a more diffusecultural reaction to risk. It is at the conjuncture of cultural and instrumentaladaptations that discourse is most influential, shaping the transfer of popularcomplaintintopoliticalprioritisingandpolicy.Technicalanalysisispart,butnotthewhole,orevennecessarilyadominantelement,ofthisprocessofdiscursivecompetitionwhichencompassesemotionalaswellasintellectualreasoningatasocietal level. The narratives and metaphors that give collective shape toindividual emotionshold thepower to challengeor reinforce the statusquoasadaptationtoclimatechangebecomesinternalisedasasocialprocess–partofhistoryaswellasatechnicalandpolicydomain.

PartIVAdaptingwithclimatechange

9Conclusion:adaptingwithclimatechange

Toofrequentlyadaptationstillreflectsanarrowframing,whichassumesthatclimatechangeisanultimate,ratherthanaproximatedriverofchange.

(Nelson,2009:496)Thepotential,andevenlikely,implicationsofclimatechangeforecologicalandphysical systems are profound and disturbing. Social systems that deliverspecific management functions and organise governance serve to mediatebetween these impacts and people at risk. In thisway understanding adaptivecapacity and action requires a lens that can examine organisational behaviourand governance regimes, as well as the feelings, values and actions ofindividuals.Perhapsmostimportantaretheinteractionsbetweendifferentlevelsofsocialactor(individualsandorganisations)andtheinstitutionsthatgiveshapeto social systems.Research andpolicyon adaptation to climate change is justbeginning to recognise the full contribution of values and governance tobehaviourandaction.Workonadaptationisemergingfromanearlyperiodinitsevolution as an intellectual domain where adaptation has, as Nelson (2009)rightlyobserves,beennarrowlyframed.Untilnowtheoverridingneedhasbeenforanarticulationofadaptationasafunctionofclimatechangeimpacts(andforsomeasub-setofvulnerability).UndertheinfluenceoftheUNFCCCandIPCCthis has in turn required but not quite achieved a clear definition.Adaptation,though,hasintheprocessbeenseparatedfrommitigationanddevelopment.Aswehaveseenthroughoutthisbook,climatechangeisaffectingsocio-ecologicalsystemsinmanyways.Themajorityarecompoundandindirect,andmanyquiteambiguous,sothatitisdifficulttoimaginesciencewilleverbeabletoidentifytheproportionofanexpectedorpasteventthatisattributabletoclimatechangealoneandsopreciselywhatclimatechangeadaptation,narrowlydefined,shouldbe.Asourtechnicalunderstandingofclimatechangeadaptationisaccompaniedbyamore nuanced view that can include governance as a field of adaptation, aswellasacontextwithinwhichtechnicaladaptationsunfold,sotherelationshipbetween humanity and climate change shifts. Sites for adaptation becomeinternalisedwithin socio-ecological systems.We turn fromadapting toclimatechange, towards adaptingwith climate change. This is quite a leap and alsorequiresanadmittancethatanthropogenicclimatechangeiswithusnow,andis

likelytobewithusfortheforeseeablefuture.Adaptingwithseesclimatechangeas internal (aproductofhumanity’svalues,decisionsandactions),butalso itscoevolution with the environment, so that neither environmental nor socialchange is independent (Castree and Braun, 2001). Once the social, andgovernance in particular, is given more emphasis so the opportunities arisingfromadaptationtoenhancesustainabledevelopmentbecomemoreapparent,theaim of adaptation becomes not one of defensive but progressive riskmanagement as part of a renewed sustainable development. To be sure, theefficiencybasedengineeringandeconomicdebatesthathavetendedtodominatetechnologicaladaptationthusfarwillremaincentraltothematerialexpressionsof adaptation. But they will now be positioned as part of a wider social andpolitical agenda, so that understanding our capacity for adaptation and whichadaptiveoptionsarepreferablebecomesasocial,culturalandpoliticalaswellasatechnicaloreconomicjudgement.The following discussion outlines the consequences of this perspective onadaptation for future research and policy and provides a synthesis of theargumentandevidenceforadaptingwithclimatechangemadeinthisbook.

Howtoadaptwithclimatechange?

What are the consequences ofmoving from seeing climate change risk as anexternalthreattodevelopmenttoacceptingthatitisbothaproductanddriverofdevelopment?Beck’s seminalwork on risk society provides some insight intothe shape that future research and associated policy directions might take; inlightoftheproposalsmadeinthisbook,twolessonscanbetaken.First, groups in society compete not only for material wealth but also forsecurity. In societies where wealth is achievable, security can become anoverridingconcern.Riskanditsmanagementisthereforeapoliticalaswellasatechnological concernandonewhere thepoorare at riskof carryingadoubleburden when competition leads to their being marginalised frommechanismsproviding security as well as wealth, or indeed where such burdens areinterpretedasunfortunatebutnecessarycostsfortheproductionofsecurityandwealthforothers,elsewhereorindifferenttimes.Thisisapoliticthatneedstobe critiqued from the perspective of social justice, leading to a vision ofadaptation as a potential tool for progressive development, not one thatuncriticallydefendsthestatusquo.Second, the risk society thesis contends that increasingly the most importantrisks are hard to detect and require technological innovation to make themvisible.Forclimatechangethisiscertainlythecaseandincludesthechallenge

of making future risk and the carbon costs of risk reduction tangible andactionable in thepresent.The advancesmade in climate sciencehave recentlybeen applied to questions of adaptation through techniques like scenarioplanningthatseektoprovidedecision-makerswitharangeofpossiblefuturesasabasisforplanninginfrastructureinvestments.Thisisusefulbutlimited.Livingwithclimatechangemeansaccepting futurehazardscannotbeplannedout,orevennecessarilypredicted.Ratherthanseekingevermoreprecisetechnologicalguidance and solutions the urgency of climate change adaptation suggests weneedtolearnhowtolivewiththefuzzinessofclimatechange.Indeedwhatneedto bemade visible are not only the physical forcingmechanisms but also thehumanprocessesdrivinganthropocentricclimatechangeandthedistributionofits impacts. This lesson has already been learned at the sharp end of climatechangeadaptationpractice.Herelocalvulnerabilityassessmentsplaceatleastasmuch, ifnotmore,emphasisonactingasa tool tofacilitate localreflectionongovernance and underlying development processes as they do in providingtechnical accuracy on climate-change-associated vulnerability and risk (vanAalstetal.,2008;Pelling,2007b).Theneedtoconfrontclimatechangeriskbymovingfromaraceforaccuracytoamechanismforstudyinggovernanceaspartofriskassessmentisspreading,andhasalsobeenencompassedinmethodsfortheparticipatoryassessmentofnationalcapacitytomanagedisasterriskacrosstheAmericasbytheInterAmericanDevelopmentBank(IADB,2005).How might research and policy development on adaptation move forward?Building on the discussionsmade in this book four priorities for research areproposedthatcanhelptobetterframeadaptationasadevelopmentproblem:

Diversifythesubjectandobjectofadaptationresearchandpolicy

Earlywork on adaptation has rightly focused on a tightly bounded object forresearch and in so doing has succeeded in contributing to a clearly defineddomainforpolicy.Butifweseeadaptationasasocialaswellasatechnologicalphenomenonthenthereisaneedtoextendfromthiscore.Theobjectofanalysisnecessarily broadens from the behaviour of individuals and their constraininginstitutions to include organisations, governance systems, national andinternationalpolitics. Inparallel the subjectof analysis extends fromeconomyand technology to include cultural, social andpolitical opportunities, play-offsand costs of adaptive options. Importantly it is in the interaction of differentworldviews and priorities established from viewing adaptation through thesecontrasting lenses that the richness of adaptation policy, potential conflict and

scopeforcoordinatedandprogressive,sustainabledevelopmentcouldemerge.

Focusonsocialthresholdsforprogressiveadaptation

Thresholdsmarkthetippingpointsfromonesystemsstatetoanother,andhavebeenrecognisedinclimatescienceandalsothroughtheconcatenatedimpactsofclimatechange.Lessworkhasbeenundertakenonthresholdsbetweendifferentstages of adaptation. Research on coping has long recognised the staggerednature of household responds to risk as economic pressures cause first non-productive and then productive assets to be expended and finally see thedissolution of households and migration as hazard impacts and vulnerabilityincrease. The parsimony rule in cybernetics presents a similar guidance; thatactionrequiringtheleastexpenditureofresourceswillbeundertakenfirst.Butboth coping and cybernetics focus on ex-post-adaptation; less is known aboutstages in proactive adaptation, which is curious given the volume of writingpresentingthisasthepreferredadaptiveform.But focusing on a single adaptive choice or mechanism will be increasinglydifficult,andmissthebiggerpictureofinteractionsbetweenadaptationsandthewider development agenda, as climate change impacts are felt through everincreasing multiple, direct and indirect pathways, often without beingrecognised. In this context critical thresholds will be those that set the broadscopeforwhatispossiblethroughadaptationandherethedistinctionsbetweenresilience,transitionandtransformationarepotentiallyhelpful.

Recognisemultipleadaptations:thevisioneffect

Theinteractionofmultiplesimultaneousadaptationshasbeenrecognisedacrossscalewhen,forexample,householdadaptationsareunderminedorenhancedbylocalgovernmentaction.Butthisisonlyoneaxisaroundwhichadaptationandefforts to shape adaptive capacity can interact. The competing values thatunderpinadaptationasresilience,transitionandtransformationindicatea‘visioneffect’operatingalongside thescaleeffect.Thispoints tohorizontalaswellasverticalcompetitionandcomplementaritiesinadaptation.Thisaxisinlargepartexplains the observed divergence between policy intention (policies) andemergence (self-organised activity) identified (Sotarauta and Srinivas, 2006)during the implementationof policy to support or enact adaptation; a gap thatrevealstensionsbetweentheactionsandvaluesofcompetingadaptivestrategies.The vision effect also helps explain difficulties in replicating, scaling-up and

mainstreaminginnovationsthatmaybesetwithinwider,contradictoryvisionsofadaptation – local efforts at transformation will have most difficulty beingmainstreamed if higher levels of governance construct adaptation as an act ofresilience.

Linkinternalandexternaldriversofadaptation

Shiftingofthinkingonclimatechangefromanexternalprocesstooneunfoldingas part of the coevolution of humanity and the environment makes it moreimportanttounderstandinternal–cognitiveandcultural–driversforadaptation.Thesearenolongerfringeinterestsbutpartofthenexusofinternalandexternaldriversthatshapethewho,whereandwhenofadaptivecapacityandaction.Thepossibilitythatdifferentadaptiveinitiativescouldbeincompetitionandleadtoriskshiftingbetweensocialgroupsandtonon-humanlivesorfuturegenerationsmakes it all the more important to understand the deep psychological andcultural pressures that shape the propensity for different social groups toundertake particular adaptive strategies (including those that to the outsideobservermayappeartobeself-limitingordetrimentaltoindividualwellbeing).Two final aspects of adaptation that researchers and policy-makers findespecially difficult to grasp and that cross cut all of these emerging areas forpolicy and research are contingency and chance. What we do is no longerinfluenced only by local or even national processes and policies but also byincreasingly unforeseen connections between systems, be they ecological,economicorpolitical,worldwide.Scopeforadaptation,aswithanycapacity,isexposed to such tele-connected linkages and this will bring surprises.Anticipatingriskinthiscontextbecomesmoredifficultandconsequentlyplacesgreater emphasis on the core beliefs and capacities of a society – the genericattributes that can be applied to novel and unforeseen pressures. These lie incultureandgovernance,therootsofadaptation.

Asynthesisoftheargument

This penultimate section provides an overview and synthesis of the maindiscussionpointsmadeintheprecedingchapters.

Theageofadaptation

Climatechangepresentstheearlytwenty-firstcenturywithagrandopportunity

to reconfigure themeaningand trajectoryofdevelopment.Firstmitigationandnow adaptation provide global challenges that call for a rethinking ofdevelopment goals, visions and methods. This is not the first time such anopportunity has arisen: in the 1980s and 1990s sustainable developmentpresenteddominant global and local political and economic systemswithnewchallenges and promised to open space for progressive, internationaldevelopment. These opportunities have not yet been realised, and have ratherbeen captured by and come to reinforce the established political-economy.Sustainable development has morphed into ecological modernisation. Thefalteringpaceofinternationalnegotiationsaroundclimatechangemitigationandadaptationindicatetheenormityofthestakesand,ifagreementcanbereached,alsothepotentialscopeforrevision.Butjusthowcanadaptationopenspaceforrethinkingdevelopment?Inlookingforward to help answer this question Chapter 1 sketches the existinginternational intellectual and policy landscape within which reforms can takeroot.ThoughnotpresentedinChapter1,Bangladeshisanearlyleaderinstate-sponsoredadaptationplanning that acknowledges thecentralityofgovernance.Withsupport from theUK’sDFID,Bangladeshhasproposedseveral technicalprogrammesforadaptation.Eachoftheseprogrammesissupportedbyalayerofsocial policy that at once indicates the social justice lying at the core ofadaptation: distributional justice is supported through investment in a socialprotectionschemeandprocedural justice throughpartnershipwithcommunity-based adaptation, though the extent to which governance reforms areimplementedremainstobeseen.Importantly, thesemost fundamental arenas for adaptation are also targets formuch ongoing development work by local communities in partnership withinternationaldevelopmentNGOsandhumanitarianorganisationssothatalargeproportion of what might be considered generic investment to build adaptivecapacity is being undertaken now, but in an ad hoc way, without large scalecollaboration. It is through coordination, as much as financial and technicalsupport,thattheemerginginternationalarchitectureforadaptationcanbemadetocontributetotheeffectivenessoflocalactionstobuildcapacityandadapt.Butasadaptationmaturesasapolicydomainsoitsconstructionthroughthelensof leading international institutions like the IPCC andUNFCCCmust also berevisited.TheoriginalimperativefortheIPCCtomarkoutclearlywhatclimatechange adaptationmight be, as an additional or separate act tomitigation andeveryday development, is useful in policy terms, but in the long-run counter-productive.Adaptation on the ground is seldom an activity that can be neatlyseparatedfromothers,makingitdifficulttosingleoutsupportforactivitiesthat

adapttoclimatechange.Acceptingthecultural,socialandpoliticalelementsofadaptationonlymakesthismoredifficult.Thesolutionproposedhereistomovefrom adaptation defined only as a specific policy domain, to one that alsoacceptsadaptationasanactivityandaspiration thatcross-cutsalldevelopmentactivities, so that we accept the reality of adapting with climate change. Theprovisionofdirectbudgetarysupportinsteadoftargeteddevelopmentadaptationaid (that may well draw money from existing development budgets) is onepractical step that supports this vision of adaptation. The result is that in thefuture adaptation may need to hold multiple definitions depending upon itsapplication,inthesamewaythatpovertyisdescribedinverytechnicaltermsforgovernment poverty alleviation targets (for example, indicated by education,accesstonutritionalrequirements,dailypercapitalincomeandsoon),butalsomorebroadly in thedevelopmentofpoverty alleviationprogrammesand localpro-poor practice (for example, livelihoods, wellbeing and entitlements). Thisraisesachallengeofsynthesis.Buttheworseriskisthatadaptationistrappedasatechnicalconcernandmissesanopportunitytocontributetotherethinkingofcurrentunsustainabledevelopmentvisionsandpaths.

Theadaptationtapestry

Awidevarietyofadaptiveactionshavebeennotedbytheadaptationliterature(see Smit et al., 2000; Smit and Pilifosova, 2001). Chapter 2 identifies ninecontinuumsalongwhichindividualactsofadaptationhavebeenclassifiedintheliterature,accordingtothenatureoftheadaptiveaction(degreeofcollaboration,focus, forethought and phasing) or scope of impact (target, timescale, carbonawareness, social consequences, developmental orientation). Together theseactions, potentially unfolding through different actors in response to the sameclimatechangeassociatedpressureorevenonthesameobject,makeforarichadaptationtapestry.Analysing the conditions that determine adaptive capacity and action and thecoproduction of adaptation with risk and development is the core task forcontemporary studies which build also on previous attempts to theoriseadaptation.FourantecedentsofcontemporaryadaptationstudiesaredetailedinChapter2.Eachofferslessonsforcontemporarywork.Cybernetics,coevolutionandadaptivemanagementsharerootsinsystemstheory,atheoreticalperspectivesharedbycontemporaryworkonresiliencethathascometoinfluenceadaptationthinking (Janssen et al., 2006). Work on cybernetics offers caution for thesystemsapproachingeneralwhichsurfacesatensionbetweentheimperativesof

parsimonyfor individualadaptations(promotingasinglebestadaptationbasedon that which causes fewest resources to be expended) and the need forcollectiveflexibility (adaptivecapacity isenhancedbydiversity).Watts (1983)further argues that the interpretationof systems theory in cyberneticsmakes itdifficult to include values in analysis, and to consider the adaptive agentchangingthesystemitself–excludingtransitionandtransformation(seebelow)as adaptive possibilities under cybernetics (Morren, 1983). Coevolution(Norgaard,1994,1995)isespeciallyusefultoourargumentbecauseitprovidesaframeworkforplacingadaptationwithinhistory,ratherthanseeingitasanendpoint in its own right, and also warns that adaptive actions can form criticaljunctureswithnopossibilityofreversal.Thelessabstractnotionsofadaptivemanagementandcopingalsoofferlessonsfor adaptation. Adaptive management has been designed to guide resourcemanagement with studies highlighting key challenges to the development ofmanagement systems where adaptive learning is built in (Walters, 1997;Medema et al., 2008). These include perceived high costs in the short-term,discomfort at implications for credibility of managers that deliberatelyexperiment in the knowledge some experimentswill fail, and the difficulty inmaintaininglocalstakeholdercommitmentoverthemediumtimespanneededtofollow and compare experiments. Coping has been explored through anextensive range of writing and policy in the last 30 years with considerableoverlap and lessons for adaptation. For example,Burtonetal. (1993) proposefourperiods in the escalationof adaptive action,which in turn canbeused tosignify tipping points in systems behaviour as thresholds into each stage arebreached:themovementfromriskabsorption(itisnotfelt)totolerance(itisfeltbut not acted upon); risk tolerance to risk reduction (risk management isimplemented); and finally risk reduction to radical changewheremanagementpractices are unable to cope and risk manifests as unacceptable andunpreventable loss. Each of these thresholds could be breached by increasinghazardousness,butalsoreducedadaptivecapacityandincreasedvulnerability–forexample,throughdemographicoreconomicchange.Theliteratureoncopingalsomakesitclearthatmultipleactorswillhaveviewpointsonwhattoprotect,enhance or expend through adaptive actions and these may not be easilyresolved, their origins being in values and beliefs so that a key challenge foradaptationinheterogeneoussocietiesistorevealthesedifferentvaluesasafirststeptoinclusiveplanningforclimatechangeadaptation.

Theresilience–transition–transformationframework

Theantecedentsandcurrentworkonadaptationprovidearichbasisforanalysis,buttheydonotyetcapturethefullsignificanceofadaptingtoclimatechangeasadynamic in socio-ecological coevolution.Besides the technical inefficienciesofoverlappingadaptations thathavebeen identified in the literatureasa scaleeffectofadaptation,therearedeeperpoliticalandevenepistemologicalfrictionstobeidentifiedandaddressedinadaptationplanningandresearch.Itisherethatthe proposed framework of adaptation as resilience, transition andtransformation aims tomake its contribution. These three levels of adaptationstandasdistinctcategoriesofintentionandaction.Thetheoryusedtomakeeachaspect visible and assist in analysis accumulates so that, for example, sociallearningandself-organisation(thecoreofresilience)canalsobeappliedtohelpunderstand transitional and transformational adaptation. No one form ofadaptation is preferable,with any judgement being dependent upon viewpointandcontext.Theaimofmaking these formsofadaptationvisible is tosurfacethetensionsbetweenpoliciesandactionsaimedatmaintainingthestatusquoorseeking broader change in relations of social and political power throughadaptation.

Resilience

Drawing from socio-ecological systems theory (Gunderson andHolling, 2002;Folke,2006),theIPCCidentifiesthreeattributesofresilientsystems:functionalpersistence, self-organisation and social learning. From the perspective ofadaptation, resilience ismadedistinctbecauseof the aspirationofmaintainingfunctionalpersistence.Thiscanallowunsustainableorsociallyunjustpracticestopersistaswellasprotectingcommongoods(JerneckandOlsson,2008).Self-organisation (the ability of the components of a system to organise withoutformal,hierarchicaldirection)andsocial learning(thecapacityfornewvalues,ideas or practices to be disseminated, popularised and become dominant insocietyora sub-set suchasanorganisationor localcommunity)canbe foundacrossallformsofadaptation.Ofthesetwo,arguably,sociallearningisthemostcritical. Social learning is as important for transitional or transformationaladaptation.Itrequiresahighleveloftrust,awillingnesstotakerisksinordertoextend learning opportunities, the transparency required to test and challengeembedded values, active engagement with civil society and a high degree ofcitizen participation. The advantages for social learning where there is closeinteraction between social actors is clear, with social learning and self-organisation reinforcing one another, so that a social system exhibiting rich

capacity for social learning is also likely to have considerable scope for self-organisation.

Transition

Transition is an intermediary form of adaptation (seeChapter 4) that seeks torealise full rights under existing political and governance regimes.Where thegapbetweenlegalrightsandtheirapplicationislarge,transitionwillalignitselfclosely with transformational adaptation, requiring significant efforts toovercome entrenched vested interests in the status quo. Where governanceregimesfunctionfullythisgapandtheneedtoaspirefortransitionaladaptationwill be absent. Most likely transition will be felt as a series of incrementaladaptationsasrightsclaimsareasserted.Asrightsturnfromdejuretode factothe effect is to open space for new rights to be won so that over timetransformational change may be observed. Young (1999) describes this as abargainingprocesswithdepthofchangebeingdistinguishedbetweenthatwhichtakesplaceatthelevelofrulesfordecision-making;ormoreprofoundchangeofthe transformational kind that unfolds at the level of norms and principles(Krasner,1983).Analysingpotential for transitionaladaptationplacesfocusonexaminingthepersistenceofinstitutionsovertimeasmuchashowtheymaybechanged, and the role of actors in this. For example, Gunderson and Holling(2002) refer to rigidity trapswherepeople and institutions try to resist changeandpersistwiththeircurrentmanagementandgovernancesystemdespiteaclearrecognitionthatchangeisessential.Literatureonsocio-technologicaltransitionshasrecentlybeenappliedtoclimatechangemitigation(HaxeltineandSeyfang,2009)andoffersscopeforhelpingtounderstand where and why adaptive transitions can be found. Applying thisliterature to transitionaladaptationasconceivedherecomeswithacaveat–sofar this literature does not distinguish adequately between transitional andtransformational change. Both pathways for change are used, sometimessynonymously. The former is taken as a sub-set of the latter,with transitionalchangeanaspectoftransformationandnotidentifiedasagoalinitself(JerneckandOlsson,2008).Thissaid,theframeworksemergingfromsocio-technologicaltransitions remain useful and more positively serve to show the closenessbetween transitionandpoliticalaspectsof transformationwhichon thegroundmaybehard todistinguish.Forexample,GeelsandSchot (2007)observe thatnew ideas or discourses emerge from local protected spaces but theirdissemination and capacity to change established values and practices in the

regime is often determined by the extent to which higher-level (for example,international) actors and institutions support change. This is relevant fortransitionalandtransformationalchange.

Transformation

Chapter5arguesthatforadaptationtobetransformativeandprogressiveitmustprovide scope for the revision and reform or replacement of existing socialcontracts and the meaning of security and modes of development, as well asdefending social gains already won. This is a call to tackle the causes ofvulnerability at their roots. For adaptation to be concernedwith changing theassumptionsandstructuresofhowwethinkaboutandorganisedevelopment,itmustaddressthecausesratherthanonlythesymptomsofvulnerabilityandrisk.The social sciencesoffermany lenseswithwhich tocritiquedevelopmentandderive alternatives. Here we outline three theses that have clear relevance toclimatechangeadaptation:risksociety,thesocialcontractandhumansecurity.Beck’s(1992)risksocietythesisisacritiqueoftheatomisingandfragmentingnature of modernity. This has led to dominant modes of contemporarydevelopment that too easily produce and do not compensate for or seek toprevent complex environmental and social harm. Risk society is reproducedthrough established values and assumptions about development andwellbeingheldbyindividualsaswellasbeinginstitutionalisedthroughtheorganisationofthemarket,governmentandindustry.Ifthisthesisisaccepted,thenadaptingtothe risksassociatedwithclimatechangeneeds toconfront theway individualsperceivetheworldandtheirplaceinit,aswellaschallengingtheorganisationofdevelopment.Thisisbothdauntingandempowering–signallingasitdoesthateachofusisasiteforadaptivescrutiny.Thesocialcontractdescribestheprevailingbalanceofrightsandresponsibilitiesin society and may be held in place by legitimate government or the rule offorce. The social contract is determined by the balance of power in society.Culture,identityandthecontrolofknowledgethrougheducationarefrequentlyidentifiedaskeyforrealisingpoliticalchangebypolitical(Habermas,1985)andeducational (Freire, 1969) theorists. Perhaps the most pointed cases ofchallengestothesocialcontractarethosefollowingshocks–economic,politicalorenvironmental–thatmanifestfailureinthesocialcontracttoprovidesecurityfromdisaster.Whenclimatechangeisassociatedwithextremeevents,thenitisthepotentialfordisastertodestroyplaceaswellassociallife(Hewitt,1997)thatopens scope fornewunderstandingsof identityand socialorganisationandan

alternativetoestablishedstructuresinthesocialcontract.The notion of human security provides some substance to this argument. Itplaces emphasis on the responsibility of the state to facilitate the meeting ofhumanrightsandbasicneedsforitscitizens,andsogoesbeyondanarrowstate-centricsecurity(Gasper,2005).Workondisastershasshownthefrequencywithwhichalternativesocialorganisationarisespost-event,andalsotheeffectivenesswith which democratic-market- and authoritarian-state-centred regimes closedown opposition, sometimes violently (Pelling and Dill, 2010). Examples oftransformativeandprogressive regimechangeshavealsobeenobserved.Theyare most likely when a pre-existing alternative provides a discursive andorganisationalbasewithwhichtoframeanddisseminateacritiqueofthesocialcontract(Albala-Bertrand,1993).

Sitesofadaptiveaction

Most empirical work on adaptation thus far has studied local communities ofplace, justified by the location specific qualities of climate impacts, especiallythose associated with natural hazards. But as the theoretical framework ofresilience–transition–transformation explains, adaptation unfolds within allsocialcontextsfromtheinternaltotheglobal.Threeimportantbutasyetseldomstudied contexts are used in this book to illustrate the resilience–transition–transformation framework for climate change adaptation: the organisation, thecityandthenation-state.FollowingWenger(2000),Chapter3arguesthattheboundedspacesofferedbyorganisationsprovideespeciallyusefulcontextswithinwhichtostudyprocessesof social learning and self-organisation. Five pathways are proposed throughwhichadaptiveactioncanbeundertakenby individualsordiscrete sub-groupswithin an organisation: agent-centred reflexive adaptation, agent-centredinstitutional modification, agent-centred resource management, agent-ledexternalactionandorganisationalexternalaction.Onlythelattertwoarevisiblefrom outside the organisation as it acts to change its operating environment,which can include interaction with other organisations to effect regime levelchange, or acting as intermediaries in the transfer of knowledge to allowadaptive action to be taken by the most appropriate organisations. Chapter 6presentsananalysisofadairyfarmer’sNGO,Grasshoppers,andoneoftheUKstate agencies that regulates and advises on dairy farming, the EnvironmentAgency. Both are examples of good practice with organisational form, asobserved, not being maintained at the expense of function. Both also

demonstratetheinteractionofcanonicalandshadowsocialsystemsasvehiclesforsociallearning.InGrasshoppersthesesystemsareintertwinedanddifficulttoseparate. The Environment Agency, with its more formal structure, hassuppressedshadowsystemactivitybut this isstillcritical for thoseactorswhoknowhowto‘workthesystem’.Inthiswaytheimperativesofapublicagencyfor transparency and efficiency are to some extent in tension with those foradaptation, which is enhanced by diversity and where formal observation islimitedtoallowforexperimentation,evenwherethisfailsorrunscountertotheobjectivesofthecanonicalsystembutmeetslocalneeds.Anycityisasocialconstruction.Competingvisionsofthecityareunderlainbyideological, material and economic interests (Kohler and Chaves, 2003). Thebalanceofpowerbetweensuchcompletingvisionsdeterminestheprioritiesandactions of political actors and organisations affecting the city. This providesscope forexamining theextent towhich formaland legal rightsareexercised,how far different interest groups – those on the margins of society, businessinterestsandsoon,areabletoorganisetodefendandclaimrights.AsChapter4argues,forclimatechangeadaptationthiswilltakeinthosewithstakesinbothriskmanagementanddevelopmentpolicyandpractice.Chapter7assessesandcomparesgovernanceregimesfromfoururbansettlements inMexico’s rapidlyurbanising Caribbean coastline state of Quintana Roo, and finds evidence forresilience, transitional and transformational adaptation. Resilience is indicatedby efforts tomaintain business-as-usual development paths including those oftheprivatesectormainstreambutalsomigrant labourersdrawnto thestate forwork with little organisation or affiliation to Quintana Roo. Transition isdemonstratedbythosecivilsocietyorganisationsthatexerciseexistinglegalandgovernance rights to confront unsustainable development with successes inpreventing a small number of coastal developments, but little success inextending participation from consultation to meaningful engagement with theviewsoflocalactorsinformulatingurbandevelopmentplans.Transformationisleastvisible,but found in thepromotionof fundamentallyalternative formsofdevelopmentbuiltaroundstrengtheningcitizens’self-worthandassociationwithlocalplaces.ThisechoesFreire’scallforcriticalconsciousnessasaprerequisiteforinformedsocialchange.Nation-states have largely been left out of discussions on adaptation, beyondtheirrolesasaidclientsordonorsorasregulatorstosetthepolicylandscapeforlocal actors to adapt. But the political space of the state is also a site foradaptationandofcompetitionbetweendifferentvestedinterests,theirvisionsforthe state and its social contract with citizens and other private actors in thefuture.Risksociety,thesocialcontactandhumansecurityprovideaframework

foranalysingtheinfluenceofadaptationonsocialrelationswithinstates.Centralto this is the extent to which legitimacy is maintained by political actorsfollowing disaster events and subsequent reflection on the production of andresponses to risk and loss. Chapter 8 presents lessons fromCycloneBohla inEast Pakistan (Bangladesh), Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua and HurricaneKatrina in the United States. Each of these events had local impacts withnational consequences – despite this only Hurricane Bohla is associated withregime change, in this case secession from West Pakistan. Hurricane Mitchstimulatedprogressivediscourseattheinternationalandlocallevelsbutthiswasnottranslatedintoaction,withsomereformagendasbeingreformulatedthroughthe lensofneo-liberalrestructuring–decentralisationbecameprivatisation,forexample. Following Hurricane Katrina, a number of discourses offeredchallenges to theBushAdministrationandnodoubt thedisastercontributed toregimechangeatthefollowingnationalelections,butthemostprofoundimpactseemstohavebeenadeepeningdistrustinthepoliticalprocess.Thehighdegreeofprivatesectorinvolvementinmanagingriskandreconstructionalsoservedtodistancethestatefromdirectblameinthiscaseandleftcitizenswithoutacleartargetforopposition.

Fromtheorytoaction

Theaimof thisbookhasbeen toofferaconstructivecritiqueof thedominanttrends in thinking about adaptation and climate change.Considerable progresshasalreadybeenmadeindelineatingavisionforadaptationthatisamenabletothepolicyprocess.Butsuchclarityasthereisonadaptationisindangerofbeingwon at the expense of tackling wider questions of development through theadaptation lens. Inbuilding a case for a deeper interactionbetween adaptationanddevelopment,materialpresented in thisbookhas tried to stayclose to theclimatechangeadaptationdebate.Atthesametimeithassoughttobroadenthedebate by drawing on foundational social science works that point us in newdirections for questioningwhat adapting to climate change should be for, andwhoshouldcontroltheprocess.In closing,Box9.1 brings together the opening quotations from each chapter.Together theyoffercompelling ‘highlights’of theadaptationstorymappedouthere,astorythathasalongwaytorun.From high beginnings framed by theUniversalDeclaration ofHumanRights,Freirequicklyremindsusof thechallengesaheadforaprogressiveadaptation.Not only are external structures likely to resist change, but those at riskthemselvesareapt tochoose tosupportandadapt to thestatusquofor lackof

access to the tools and opportunities to develop and apply critical awareness.TheIPCCformulationofadaptationtodateaimstoprovideclarityforthepolicycommunity.Box9.1OthervoicesmakethecaseChapter 1: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.’(UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,Article3)Chapter 2: ‘The adapted man, neither dialoguing nor participating,accommodates to conditions imposed upon him and thereby acquires anauthoritariananduncriticalframeofmind.’(PauloFreire,1969:24)Chapter3: ‘Theabilityof a socialor ecological system toabsorbdisturbanceswhile retaining the samebasic structure andways of functioning, the capacityfor self-organization, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change.’ (IPCC,2008:880)Chapter4:‘Whenspecialeffortsaremadebyadiffusionagency,itispossibletonarrow, or at least prevent the widening of, socioeconomic gaps in a socialsystem.Inotherwords,wideninggapsarenotinevitable.’(Rogers,1995,442)Chapter 5: ‘Instead of destroying natural inequality, the fundamental compactsubstitutes,forsuchphysicalinequalityasnaturemayhavesetupbetweenmen,anequality that ismoraland legitimate,and thatmen,whomaybeunequal instrengthorintelligence,becomeeveryoneequalbyconventionandlegalright.’(Rousseau,1973,original1762:181)Chapter6:‘Whatmattersisnotstructures,butrelationships.’(ScientificadvisortotheWelshAssembly)Chapter7: ‘InCancun themostcommon idea is that“it isnotmyproblem, ifthings go bad, I can flee to another state”.’ (Ex-member of theQuintanaRooStateCongress)Chapter8: ‘…momentswhenunderlying causes can come together in a briefwindow, a window ideally suited for mobilizing broader violence. But suchevents can also have extremely positive outcomes if the tension … arerecognizedandhandledwell.’(USAID,2002)Chapter 9: ‘Too frequently adaptation still reflects a narrow framing, whichassumes that climate change is an ultimate, rather than a proximate driver ofchange.’(Nelson,2009:496)Itdoesthiswellbutshouldnotbeconfusedwithahandbookforcriticalclimateconsciousness. In making its contribution the IPCC has stayed close toadaptationasresilience.Insodoingthishassofarboundedoutmuchthatcanbeachieved by transition and transformation.Amongst a range of social activistsand thinkers, Rogers and Rousseau remind us of the need for criticalconsciousness to prevent the loss of hard won social gains and for social

progresstobeattheheartofdevelopment.Takentogether,commentsfromthosefacingclimatechangeimpacts,fromascientificadvisortotheWelshAssembly,an ex-member of theQunitana Roo State Congress to USAID, show the richpolicy landscape of relevance to climate change adaptation and the need tomainstreampolicyandresearchintotheconcernsofeverydaydevelopmentforany aspect of resilience, transition or transformation to succeed. Finally,speaking from the climate change literature, Nelson succinctly captures theframing challenge for climate change adaptation, which the argument andframework presented in this book have sought to face. Climate change is anexpression of deeper and often harder to grasp socio-ecological relationships.Adapting to climate change then requires strategies that address these rootcauses as well as the more proximate concerns. The linkages are there to bemade – between livelihoods and governance, or choices on how to spend andinvestsurpluswealthandconnectedvaluesystems.Weneedtomakethemsoon.

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Index

NoteonIndexPageHyperlinksThis Index retains the “Print Book Page Numbers” as links to embedded targets within the content.Navigatingfroma“PageNumber”linkwilltakeyoutowithinthreeMobipocketReader“PageForward”clicksoftheoriginalIndexreferencepoint.ThisstrategyretainsthefullvalueoftheacademicIndex,andpresentstherelativepositionsanddistributionof Index references within this book. The Index Page Numbers are hyperlink pointers and have norelationshiptotheMobipocketReadersoft-generatedpagenumbers.Note: Page numbers in italics are for tables and those in bold forfigures.Abrahamson,V.63acceleratedstatusquo143action86;collective84,91;seealsoadaptiveactionactors:adaptive20–1;andinstitutions,relationshipbetween71,72adaptation:antecedentsof25–39;lexicon20–5;limitsto15–18;thresholds45–7,165–6;typologyof41–2adaptedman37,39adaptiveaction21,22,46,64,163,168–9;global28;long-orshort-term15,28;scopeofimpact41–2;sitesof172–4;temporalstagingof26;typologiesof15adaptiveactors20–1adaptiveagency64,65adaptivecapacity5–6,7,14,15,19,36–7,42,59,70,77,163,168–9;communicationskillsand114–16;communitiesand118–19,121,167–8;cyberneticsand27;defined35;demographyand46;economicchangeand46;equalityin49;exclusionand122;flexibilityand40,58;institutionalconstraints112–16;

networksand119–20,121;inorganisations63,64,107–25;qualitiesthatpromote40;shadowsystemsand64,73,107,116–18,123,124;sociallearningand107,108,109,113–14,124; trustand120,121–2,124;vulnerabilityand11,21–2adaptivechoices,evaluationof47–50adaptiveingenuity60,62,65adaptivemanagement26,30–3,40,44,56,108,116,122,124,168,169;barriersforimplementationof31,32;community-ledapproachesto31,33;keychallengesfor32;passiveandactive30Adger,W.N.35,41Africa:adaptationcosts11;seealsoCameroon;Egypt;Morocco;Senegalagency71,73,82;adaptive64,65;ofmarginalactors72agent-centredinstitutionalmodification66agent-centredreflexiveadaptation65,66,173agent-centredresourcemanagement66,117,173agriculture14,16,34,70;seealsoGrasshoppersfarmers’supportgroupAhmad,T.146aid88,96Albala-Bertrand,J.M.96–7AlemánLacayo,A.149,150Alkire,S.93alternativeschool27–8Amir,A.145anarchy90anthropology25anticipatoryadaptation15,30Aquinas,Thomas90Argyris,C.37AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)85Atwell,R.C.70Australia16,58,143autonomousadaptation15aviation,emissions-trading13AwamiLeague145,146backwardlookingadaptation6,7,10,29BaliActionPlan9Bangladesh72,96,98,143–7,159,167,174bankingsector11;seealsodevelopmentbanksbasicneedsmodel6,25,49,90,93–4,95,97,172Bateson,G.27,62Beck,U.88–9,97,164,171behaviour62,63Bendaña,A.149

benefits:ofadaptation16,47–8;ofclimatechange14Bentham,J.48,90,91Berkes,F.61Berkhaut,F.74Berube,A.156BholaCyclone98,143–7,174Bilgin,P.93biodiversity43Birkland,T.A.157Blumenthal,S.154–5Bolaños,E.150Booth,K.93boundaryorganisations/individuals60,67,124–5Brinkley,D.156,157BrookingsInstitution155,156Brown,M.155–6BrundtlandCommission(1983)4Buddhistphilosophy48Burton,I.13,15,33,34,169Bush,G.W.153,154Cameroon143Cancun126,128,130–2,138–9,140Caney,S.48canonicalsystems61,62,67,107,109,111,123,173capital:human36,72;privatesector13;seealsosocialcapitalCARE(CooperativeforAssistanceandReliefEverywhere)23,99Carter,T.P.15Castells,M.97CatholicRelief99CentralAmerica:andWashingtonConsensus151;seealsoElSalvador;Guatemala;Honduras;NicaraguaCentroEcológicoAkumal135ChanChayEcologicalShop134,135,141chance167change28;demographic46,169;economic46,79,169;atthemargins43–4;reversibleandirreversible21;seealsopoliticalresponse/change;regimechangeChina11,96,143;Tangshanearthquake(1976)100Christoplos,I.150,151,152

civilsociety170;globalisationof92;stateand90–1,96;andurbandevelopmentstrategies128,131–2,133,134,135,136,140Clarke,D.A.20CleanDevelopmentMechanism13climatemodelling14climateproofing22,42,128–9climaticcycles14coastalecosystems31coevolution26,28–9,40,168,169collectiveaction84,91Comfort,L.148,150CommissiononHumanSecurity(CHS)93,94communication45;informalchannelsof116;skills114–16communitarianism49,92,124community/communities:and adaptive capacity 118–19, 121, 167–8; and adaptivemanagement programmes 31, 33; disaster riskmanagement75–7;learningin63–4;ofpractice64,65,79,81,107,124;assourceofidentity29;transitionbasedin69;trustwithin119–20conceptualdevelopment13–18concurrentadaptation15ConferenceoftheParties(COP)9consciousness62;critical37,39,62,72,173,175–6ConsultativeGroupfortheReconstructionandTransformationofCentralAmerica151consumption4–5,29,89contingency167CooperativeforAssistanceandReliefEverywhere(CARE)23coping15,21,26,33–9,40,165–6,169;andadaptation,distinctionsbetween35–6;capacity35,36,37,39;failureof16;typologiesof33–4corporatesector,investmentdecisions11corporatesocialresponsibility92corruption150,152cost-benefitanalysis(CBA)16,47–8,48Costanza,R.29costs:ofadapting10–11,13,16,47–8;ofclimatechange14,24Creed,W.E.D.71criticalconsciousness37,39,62,72,173,175–6criticaljunctureevents143criticalreasoning60,65,66criticaltheory27Cuba6culturalcontext68

culturaldevelopment3culturalecology26culturalnorms25,71culturalpreferences73culture91,172Cutter,S.L.43cybernetics26–8,40,165–6,168,169CycloneBhola98,143–7,174dairyproductionseeGrasshoppersfarmers’supportgroupdecision-making14,29,31,41;participationin45,69,70,81,85,86;short-term67;underuncertainty30,47Demeritt,D.152demography25,46,73,169DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID),UK108,167dependencyratios11dependencytheory27developingcountries11,41development163,164,165,167–8;economic4;international 26, 27, 31, 167;mitigation strategies and 88–9, 150; risk and, coproduction of 22–3, 168;social3;sustainable4,9,13,16,17,26,56,74,93,164,167;urban126–41,173developmentbanks11;seealsoInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank;WorldBankdevelopmentpolicy25,67developmentstudies40Diamond,J.43Diduck,A.60Dill,K.95,97disasterprevention33disasterriskidentification44disasterriskmanagement9,10,44,89;community-based75–7;urban69,79–82disasterriskreduction42,44,47–8,89disasterrisktheory57–8disasterstudies26,33disaster(s)14,26;impact38(costsof10,24);opportunitiesarisingoutof24;socio-politicalresponse/changeand95–7,98–102,172discourseanalysis128distributionaljustice49,50,56,167diversificationofproduction33–4,40DominicanRepublic96,98Dovers,S.R.39,43,58,97,103drought24,26,45,95–6dynamismofclimatechange7Dyson,M.E.153

earlywarningsystems6,33earthquakes:Guatemala(1976)99;Guatemala(2003)38;Gujarat,India(2001)100;Managua,Nicaragua(1972)99,147;Marmara,Turkey(1999)100;Morocco(2004)101;Tangshan,China(1976)100EastPakistan96,98,143–7,158,159,174EasternEurope11ecologicaladaptation14ecologicalsystems25–6;seealsosocio-ecologicalsystemsecologicaltheory28economicbenefits14economiccapacity11economicchange46,79,169economiccosts10–11,13,14,16,24,47–8economiccrisis(2008–10)89economicdevelopment4economicgrowth14economicmaximisation40economics25;neoliberal89,150–1economy,preservationof3education34,37,91,172Egypt143ElSalvador150Elliston,J.153,154emissionsallocations13emissions-trading13entitlements33,168entrepreneurialinnovation75EnvironmentAgency,UK107,111,112–20,124,173environmentalcapacity11environmentalgoals4environmentaljusticemovement69equality48,49,90ethics48–50Ethiopia96evolutionarytheory25,26,28exchange90exclusion122experience-knowledge-actioncycles30exposure22famine96Fankhauser,S.13,17farmingseeagriculture;Grasshoppersfarmers’supportgroupFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA),US24,153,154,155,158feminism49,92

Fernandez-Gimenez,M.E.31,33Fletcher,M.155–6flexibility27,40,43,58FloodInsuranceReformAct,US157flooding24,45,72foodinsecuritycrises95–6,142–3foodsecurity9,26,92foreigndirectinvestment88forestrymanagement14,31forwardlookingadaptation6–7,29Freire,P.20,37,60,172,173,174,175functionalpersistence18,19,55,67,170Galtung,J.94gametheory33Gasper,D.97Gault,B.156Gawronski,V.143GDP10,11Geels,F.W.74,78,171gender156geography,regional26Germanwatch,ClimateChangePerformanceIndex128Germany16globalagendas7GlobalEnvironmentalChangeandHumanSecurity(GECHS)Programme93GlobalEnvironmentalFaculty14globalisation68,92Gore,C.35governance26,163,164,165;community-based70;globalinstitutionalstructureof94;inclusive44–5governanceregimes18,19;transitionand69,70–3GovernmentoftheNationalAssemblyofWales(GNAW)108Gramsci,A.91,97Grasshoppersfarmers’supportgroup107,111,120–3,124,173GrassrootsOrganisationsOperatingTogetherinSisterhood(GROOTS)77Gross,R.62Grothmann,T.108groupthink63,122Guatemala16,96;earthquakes(197699;200338)Gunderson,L.H.71,171Habermas,J.91,97,172HaileSelassie,Emperor96Haiti96,99,143Handmer,J.W.39,43,44,58,97,103Harvey,D.14Haxeltine,A.75hazardmitigationschemes33hazardthresholds45–6

health14,15,34hegemony91Hewitt,K.33Hilborn,R.30Hobbes,T.90–1Holling,C.S.42,71,171Honduras150householdcollapse28,34–5,165humancapital36,72humanecology26,33humanresources11humanrights5,6,47,48,94,97,151,172humansecurity5,6,18,83,87,88,93–5,97,172,174;andnationalsecurity93;andneoliberaleconomics89;statesand93humanitarianism27hunger24,143hurricanes6,38,126,128,136;Cesar(1996)148;Charlie(1951)128;Dean(2007)128,129,136,137,141;Gilbert(1988)128,130;Hazel(1954)99;Joan(1988)147;Katrina(2005)10,24,38,102,159,174;Mitch(1998)101,147–52,159,174;Nargis(2008)84–5;SanCiriaco(1899)98;Wilma(2005)130–1;Zenon(1930)98hydrocarbons29,48HyogoFrameworkforActiononDisasterRiskManagement44,89identity91,172;communityassourceof29implementation62incomedistribution11India96,100,146individualism84Indonesia143industrialisation88,89INETER(NicaraguanInstituteforTerritorialStudies)148,149information:disseminationof70;informalprovisionof73;lackof17;managementandawareness36infrastructure14,43innovation69;diffusionof68,70;mainstreamingof75,76–7,166;rightsand68–9;seealsotechnologicalinnovationInstituteforWomen’sPolicyResearch156institutionalfailures17institutionalsystems43institutionalisation62

institutions:andactors,relationshipbetween71;affectonadaptivecapacity112–16;changein71–2;modification,agent-centred66;andorganisations,distinctionbetween62insurance9,11,34integratedscenarioassessments29intention68,86Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(IADB)151,165Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 8–10, 11, 21, 37, 38, 163, 168, 170, 174, 175;AssessmentReports8–9;conceptualisationofvulnerability22;definitionofclimatechangeadaptation20;definitionofresilience55internaldriversforadaptation166internationaldevelopment26,27,31,167InternationalMonetaryFund150,151InternationalStrategyforDisasterReduction(ISDR)21Inuitcommunities92investment:corporatesector11;indisasterriskreduction47–8;household34irreversiblechange21Ison,R.L.62Janis,I.63Jeffrey,P.25,29Jerneck,A.73,82Jordan59Jordan,B.91justice5,26,48–50;distributional49,50,56,167;procedural49–50,56,167;social4,73,164,167Katz,B.156Kelly,P.M.35Kessler,R.C.38Klein,N.143knowledge28,172knowledgeculture115–16Krankina,O.N.14Krasner,S.D.70Kruse,S.16Kuhlicke,C.16landuse29LaPorte,R.146Leach,M.33learning26,40,62–3,122–3;andadaptiveingenuity65;collective63–4;andcriticalreasoning65;

dutero-62,66;first,secondandthirdloop37,39;informalchannelsof116;organisational30,64;socialseesociallearningLee,E.K.O.38Lee,K.N.31legitimacy95;crisesof84,91Leichenko,R.M.7liberalisation92liberalism89,90–1limitstoadaptation15–18literacyrates11livelihoods33,34,168localagendas7localgovernment81–2,94localtransitions69,74–9,82Locke,J.90López-Marrero,T.15loss:absorption33;acceptance33;management33;reduction33,34McCay,B.26McIntosh,B.S.25,29McPhee,J.154Mahahual126,128,129,136–7,138–9,141mainstreamingoflocalinnovations75,76–7,166maintenance,resilienceas43,58maladaptation15,26,42,44Managuaearthquake,Nicaragua(1972)99,147Marmaraearthquake,Turkey(1999)100Maturana,H.62Medema,W.30,31Mengistu,H.M.96Mexico143;industrialagriculture16;NationalStrategyonClimateChange128;politicalchangefollowingdisaster96;urbandevelopmentdiscourseseeQuintanaRoomigration165;aslivelihoodstrategy140Mill,J.91MillenniumDevelopmentGoals24–5MinistryofofAgriculture,FisheriesandFood(MAFF),UK108MississippiRiverflood(1927)157–8Mitchell,T.41mitigation7,13,16,42,74,157,163;costs10,33;anddevelopment88–9,150;internationaltargets/negotiations25,167;assubsetofadaptation22modernity83,84,97,171;reflexive88–9;

andrisksociety87–9morbidity10Morin,R.155–6Morocco101,143Morren,G.B.Jr.27mortalityrates10,98–102Moseley,H.144,145MoveOn.org155multipleadaptations166Myanmar84–5Nagin,C.R.156Nairobiworkprogramme8nation-states:marginalisationof94;responsestodisasterevents95–7,98–102,142–60,172,174nationalgovernments94nationalsecurity93naturalhazardsresearch26needs,basic6,25,49,90,93–4,95,97,172Nelson,D.R.41,58,85,86,163,175,176neoliberalism89,150–1,174Netherlands72networks61,64,73,81,107,124;andadaptivecapacity119–20,121;trustwithin120NewOrleans,USA159;HurricaneKatrina 10, 24, 38,102, 152–8, 159, 174;political response to disaster in102, 152–8; racialinequity152,153,155,156NewYorker154NewZealand92NewZealandgrazingsystem120Nicaragua96,143;CivilDefence148–9;corruption150,152;earthquake,Managua(1972)99,147;HurricaneJoan(1988)147;HurricaneMitch(1998)101,147–52,159,174;NationalOppositionUnion148;neoliberalism150–1;politicalresponsetodisaster101,147–52,159;privatisation152;Sandinistas148,149NicaraguanInstituteforTerritorialStudies(INETER)148,149NichuptéLagoon130non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)23non-stationarity,problemof10Norgaard,R.B.28,29,48,169Norway92O’Brien,K.7,41,92Oldenberg,P.146Olson,R.148–9Olson,R.S.143Olsson,L.73,82

openness43,44opportunities24OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)48organisationallearning30,64organisationaltheory57,67organisations:adaptationwithin62–6, 107–25, 172–3;boundary 60, 67, 124–5; canonical forms 61, 62, 67, 107, 109,123;institutionalarchitectureof118–20;andinstitutions,distinctionbetween62;knowledgeculture115–16;powerrelationsin113;self-organisedadaptationin107,108,109,111;andshadowsystems61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 72–3, 107, 109,118,123;sociallearningwithin107,108,109,113–14,115–16,172–3outcomes86overseasdevelopmentassistance(ODA)11,13Oxfam11,48,77Pakistan,politicalresponsetodisaster98,143–7;seealsoBangladesh;EastPakistanparsimony,principleof27,40,165,169participation43,44–5,49,60,63;indecision-making45,69,70,81,85,86passiveadaptation15Patt,A.108Pelling,M.95,97philosophyofscience25Pisani,M.147plannedadaptation15PlayadelCarmen126,128,132–3,138–9,140,141policy:developmentof26;andself-organisedactivity29politicalresponse/change,disastereventsand95–7,98–102,142–60,172,174PoliticsLA.com157–8positivism40post-colonialists92postmodernists92poverty89,156,168power73,95;state72powerrelations3,5,17–18,27,82;inorganizations113;state-society90–1PracticalAction23precipitation7,13,45Pred,A.63prioritarianprinciples48,49privatesector15,94,96,143,158,159;capital13;anddisasterreconstruction90,174;investmentdecisions11;socialresponsibility92privatisation,Nicaragua152,174

proactiveadaptation42,47,108proceduraljustice49–50,56,167production:diversificationof33–4,40;relationsof27psychologicalresilience38–9psychology25publicgoods5PuertoRico15,96,98qualityoflife5QuintanaRoo173;ClimateChangeAssociation131;hurricaneactivity126,128,129,130–1,136,141;touristeconomies126,130,132,133–4,135,136,137;urbandevelopmentdiscourse126–41racialinequity,NewOrleans152,153,155,156Rahman,M.146Rawls,J.5,48,49reactiveadaptation15,42,47,108reciprocity49,90;informal34recognition,ofminorityperspectives49RedCross77reflexiveadaptation65,66,173reflexivemodernity88–9regimeanalysis5regimechange24,84,96,98–102,142–7,172regimetheory18,128;actor-oriented69,70–3,82regionalgeography26reification63,64replicationoflocalinnovations75,77researchpriorities165–7resilience3,5,17,18,23,24,40,42–5,50,51,55–67,79,111,123–4,173,175;aschangeatthemargins43–4;anddevelopmentdiscourse138,140;andfunctionalpersistence18,19,55,67,170;multifacetedcharacterof43;asopennessandadaptability43,44;psychological38–9;as resistanceandmaintenance43,58;andself-organisation55,56, 61–2, 67, 170; social contract theoryand91–2;andsociallearning55,56,59–60,67,170;andsocio-ecologicalsystems(SES)theory55–6,56–7,58,59,67;andstability42–3;andvulnerability42–3,58,97resistance,resilienceas43,58resourcemanagement,agent-centred66,117,173resources36;human11;lackof16–17respect90

responsibility89,90,92,95,172reversiblechange21rights68–9,83,90,92,94,95,170–1,172;seealsohumanrightsrigiditytraps71,171riparianecosystems31risk16,27;acceptable45;anddevelopment,coproductionof22–3,168riskabsorption169riskidentification44riskmanagementseedisasterriskmanagementriskperception43,57,77riskreduction42,44,45,47–8,169risksociety5,83,87–9,92,93,95,164,171–2,174riskspreading36risktolerance169Rocha,J.L.150,151,152Rodriguez,T.153Rogers,E.M.68,175Rotmans,J.73Rousseau,J.J.83,90,175Sandinistas148,149Satterthwaite,D.41scaling-upoflocalinnovations75,77scenarioplanning164Schön,D.37Schot,J.78,171sea-levelrise7,14,25seasonalcycles14SecretaríadeDesarrolloSocial(SEDESOL)135security164;national93;seealsohumansecuritySehgal,I.146self-organisation18,29,59,66,128,172–3;withinorganisations107,108,109,111;resilienceand55,56,61–2,67,170Sen,A.K.33Senegal143Seo,M.G.71Seyfang,G.75shadowsystems61,62,66,67,72–3,81,109,111,173;andadaptivecapacity64,73,107, 116–18, 123,124Sharer,R.J.16shipping,emissions-trading13Shue,H.49SistemaNacionalParalaProtectión,MitigaciónyAtencióndeDesastres(SINAPRED)152Smit,B.15Smith,A.75,90socialcapital34,36,59,61,64,72,124;bonding34,64;bridging34,119

socialcohesion34socialcontext26,27,68socialcontract5,18,49,83,84,87,89–92,93,94,95,97,147,172,174socialdevelopment3socialjustice4,73,164,167social learning 18, 30, 61–2, 128; and adaptive capacity 107, 108, 109, 113–14, 115–16, 124; multi-stakeholdercollaborationfor31;inorganisations107,108,109,113–14,115–16,172–3;andresilience55,56,59–60,67,170socialresponsibility92socialsecurity9socialsupportnetworks34socialsystems43;opennessandadaptability43,44socio-culturalreproduction90socio-ecologicalsystems28,30,86,163socio-ecologicalsystems(SES)theory55–6,56–7,58,59,67,85,88,170socio-politicalresponses/changeanddisasterevents95–7,98–102,142–60,172,174socio-technologicalsystems18,19,142socio-technologicaltransitions69,73–9,82,171;grassroots/local74–9sociology25Sommer,A.144,145Somoza,A.147SouthAmerica11SriLanka96;tsunami(2004)102stability42–3,70Stanton,E.A.14state(s)72;andcivilsociety90–1,96;failed94;andhumansecurity93;marginalisationof94;restricted91;weak94;seealsonation-statesStern,N.10StockholmDeclaration151,152strategicadaptation15sub-optimaladaptation26sufficientism48,49suiciderates38supranationalpowers94susceptibility22sustainabledevelopment4,9,13,16,17,26,56,74,93,164,167SustainableDevelopmentNetworking(SDN)project145–6Swift,J.34systemsanalysis85systemsperturbations25systemstheory5,28,29,30,39–40,88,168–9Tanner,T.41Tearfund75

technologicalinnovation6,28,57,164;seealsosocio-technologicaltransitionstemperature7,13temperatureshocks24thermohalinecirculationsystem,NorthAtlantic7thresholds,adaptation45–7,165–6time-spacecompression68timimgofadaptation15Tol,R.S.J.36TourismEntrepreneursAssociationofCostaMaya136touristeconomies,QuintanaRoo,Mexico126,130,132,133–4,135,136,137transformation3,5,17,18,23,24,50–1,56,61,64–5,69,83–103,170,171–2,173,175;anddevelopmentdiscourse139,140;disastersastippingpointsfor95–7,98–102,142;asextremecase74;andhumansecurity93–5,172;andrisksocietythesis87–9,171–2;andsocialcontracttheory89–92,172;andsociallearning60,170;socio-ecologicalsystemstheoryand85–6;assubsetofresilience55;transitionalchangeasaspectof73transition3,5,17,18,23–4,50,51,56,58–9,61,64–5,68–82,97,170–1,173;anddevelopmentdiscourse138,140;governanceregimesand69,70–3;inadvertent59;pathways78–9;sociallearningand60,170;socio-technical69,73–9,82,171;assubsetofresilience55;urbanregimesand79–82TrinidadandTobago61trust45,59,119–20,121–2,124tsunami,SriLanka102Tulum126,128,133–6,138–9,140,141Turkey96;Marmaraearthquake(1999)100UN-HABITAT79uncertainty6,14,31,39,40,56,97,113;decision-makingunder30,47UnitedNationsConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopment(UNCED),19924,8UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)25,101,145;HumanDevelopmentReports93UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)4,8–10,11,13,22,163,168UnitedNationsHumanRightsCommission47UnitedNationsInternationalStrategyforDisasterReduction(ISDR)21UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)175UnitedStates(US)9,59,96,143,151;adaptivemanagementprogrammes31;CornBelt70;FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)24,153,154,155,158;homelandsecurityagenda157;hurricaneevents6,38;politicalresponsetodisaster102,152–8,159;seealsoNewOrleansUnitedStates(US)GeologicalSurvey48UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights174,175Uphoff,N.33urbandevelopment126–41,173urbanriskmanagement69,79–82utilitarianism48,91

values6,26,28,40,59,163Varela,F.62Vayda,A.P.26visioneffect166vulnerability9,10,25,27,40,58,83,86,97,163,169,171;adaptivecapacityascomponentof11,21–2;globaldistributionof12;IPCCconceptualisationof22;resilienceand42–3,58,97;rootcausesof87;threshold45,46Wales:adaptationwithin organisations case study 107, 111–25;Grasshoppers farmers’ support group 107, 111,120–3,124,173;warmingandcoolingscenarios110–11Walker,B.42,58Walsh,F.38Walters,C.J.30,31Warner,J.72WashingtonConsensus150,151WashingtonPost155watermanagement9,29Watts,M.27,63,169wealth14,164well-being6,48,168Wenger,E.60,63,64,67,172WestPakistan143,144,145,147Williams,P.64wind7,24Wisner,B.33WorldBank48,101,151,152WorldResourcesInstitute(WRI)23WorldwideFundforNature(WWF)23Yarnal,B.15Yemen143Yohe,G.36Young,O.R.70,171