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Accountability

in the

Digital Age

Social, Technological, Political, and

Commercial Implications

Angelina Bishman

Submitted to the 2016 Robert Davies Commemorative Essay Award

Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship

University of Oxford

A consideration of the challenges of digital

accountability and a theorisation of potential solutions

that combine the public and private sectors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary Page 1

Introduction Page 2

Chapter 1) Accountability in the digital age Page 4

1.1) The three properties of accountability: transparency, standards and liability

Chapter 2) Analysing accountability in four domains of the digital age Page 6

2.1) Social domain: personal privacy

2.2) Technological: the regulatory gap

2.3) Political domain: cyberterrorism

2.4) Commercial domain: monopolisation

Chapter 3) Potential solutions and policy implications Page 11

3.1) Extrapolating Patterns

3.1.1) Technology is a human, not a technological issue

3.1.2) Fostering accountability in the digital age requires the respective and

combined efforts of the public and private sector

3.2) The “Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma” Model for evaluating accountability decisions in the

digital age and their ethical implications

Conclusion Page 16

List of Works Cited Page 17

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this essay, I will challenge the popular assumption that increasing accountability irrespective of

the context always proves beneficial. Specifically, I will argue that accountability in the digital age is

a concept that involves tradeoffs and implications for different stakeholders. My argument is

structured into three chapters. First, I define accountability as a relational concept that must satisfy

three properties: transparency, standards and liability. I proceed to transpose this definition of

accountability to the digital age such that each property reflects distinctive demands of the digital

age. Second, I evaluate the current climate of accountability in four domains of the digital age:

social, technological, commercial and political. I largely restrict my analysis of each domain to an

explicit issue, chosen based on its contemporary resonance. Third, I extrapolate two patterns about

accountability in the digital age that can influence policy prescriptions. I conclude the third and final

chapter by introducing the “Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma” model, which is borne out of my findings. I

propose that the model helps to facilitate analysis of accountability decisions in the digital age and

their ethical implications.

2

In recent decades, accountability has transformed from a “culturally innocuous term” to a “cultural

keyword” (Dubnick, 2014: 23). Evidence of this transformation is prominent. Forgotten are the days

when uttering “accountability” conjured up banal images of a financial audit where companies’

ledgers were examined for ill-‐considered postings according to objective criteria. Today,

accountability broaches many contexts, from healthcare reform to business ethics. This essay seeks

to transpose accountability to yet another context: the digital age. When defining accountability in

the digital age, it is insufficient to invoke a de-‐contextualised dictionary definition of accountability

or trace its etymological roots. Rather, a plausible definition should heed how the concept is

currently being used.

When one uses accountability, it is typically used in conjunction with modifiers– one speaks of

political or financial accountability where accountability is “surrendered to its contextualized

meanings” (Dubnick, 2014: 27). Whatever substantive meaning accountability might have is

therefore “overwhelmed and subordinated to the demands” of the digital age’s specific task

environments (ibid). At a cursory glance, there are two demands that accountability in the digital

age necessarily considers: practical and ethical. Both demands imply the importance if not urgency

in formulating a well-‐considered and operational definition of accountability in the digital age.

Practically, defining accountability in the digital age can provide us with a useful instrument “to be

pulled” from the policy toolbox to manage specific problems (Dubnick, 2014: 25). Though we have

already felt the immense impact of the digital revolution, we are only just beginning to understand

its implications. This is exacerbated by the inherent difficultly in our current regulatory systems

staying attuned to the rapid pace of technological development. Defining accountability in the

digital age could advance discussions about how we can be both proactive and reactive in the face

of novel technologies and their risks.

Ethically, defining accountability in the digital age is closely tied to efforts to bring about change and

reflects the view that current governance of the digital age is not sufficiently ethically robust. Today,

accountability has “become narratively intertwined” with the promises of justice, efficiency and

greater administrative performance, signifying the way that the term has become “discursively

associated with what are perceived to be higher public values” (ibid: 33). Defining accountability in

the digital age could stimulate discussions about whether or not fostering accountability in this area

INTRODUCTION

3

makes our relationship with technology more (or less) sensitive to public values and ethical

commitments.

I will now define accountability in the digital age by taking a fundamental definition of accountability

and adapting it to the demands of the digital age. Mostly, there is profound agreement that

accountability is a relational concept that satisfies three properties: transparency, standards and

liability. Accountability is organised around a relationship between an agent, who owes an account,

and a principal, to whom the account is owed; the properties of transparency, liability and standards

function to sustain that relationship. Accountability’s main objects are individuals, businesses,

national governments, public–private partnerships, non-‐state actors and international institutions.

Importantly, accountability does not have to be a relationship between two objects exclusively: a

threefold relationship is possible when national governments and international institutions

collaborate to keep a certain agent accountable. Moreover, individual objects are not confined to

being either an agent or a principal; they can in different circumstances be both.

4

As previously defined, accountability is a relation that satisfies three properties: transparency,

standards and liability. I will now outline each property in two ways: first, as it has been

traditionally conceived, and second, as it is adapted to the demands of the digital age.

Agent-‐principal relationships intrinsically involve asymmetry of information: the agent knows more

about its own behaviour than anyone else. Increased transparency clearly reduces this asymmetry,

enabling the principal to examine the agent's behaviour and hold it accountable.

Transparency can be adapted to the digital age in two ways. First, the digital age sees data being

more easily acquired and shared. Therefore, intuitively, the digital age is a more transparent one.

However, the deluge of data has also made discerning relevant information more difficult. Second,

technological innovations have allowed for data encryption, which clearly reduces transparency by

rendering information inaccessible.

Accountability differs from coercion in that it appeals to previous standards– formal and informal.

These standards offer predictable measures designed to mitigate potential harm or promote

compliance.

Accountability standards can be adapted to the digital age in one way: devising appropriate

standards involves considering important trade-‐offs between control and innovation: overbearing

standards can potentially stifle technological progress.

Property Two: Standards

Property One: Transparency

CHAPTER 1: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE

The Three Properties of Accountability

5

Without liability, accountability processes are empty because they are unenforceable. To be

accountable is also to be liable for one’s actions. The type of standards that an agent breaches

determines the agent’s liability: breaching mandatory standards typically has more severe

repercussions than breaching voluntary ones.

Liability is adapted to the digital age by considering the fact that various industries have introduced

new and unpredictable risks. The prospect of being liable or punishable can incentivize agents to

harness opportunities of the digital age more responsibly.

Property Three: Liability

6

“The digital age” is a broad term referring to all the phenomena that characterise the historical

shift from traditional industry to information computerisation (Shell, 2007). To achieve a

manageable yet comprehensive analysis of the digital age, I will compartmentalise it into four

explicit areas: its social, technological, political and commercial implications. Each area will be

explored via a key issue, followed by an assessment of its current climate of accountability.

The Four Domains of The Digital Age and Their Key Issues

Issue Area: Personal Privacy

In the digital age, governments have amassed private information on their citizens with

unprecedented efficiency. Businesses have behaved similarly, acquiring information on consumer

“spending habits, magazine subscriptions, web-‐surfing activity and credit history” (Solove &

Rotenberg & Schwartz, 2006: 163). Often, consumers are unwittingly complicit in their own privacy

breaches by signing away terms and conditions. The threat to privacy worsens as governments and

businesses increasingly share information with each other.

Appraising the current climate of accountability

Transparency: We often know little about the use of our personal information. Roberts (2006: 18)

highlights that “disclosure laws have been carefully tailored” to ensure that certain government

enclaves, like the security sector, operate in secrecy. Whilst there are pragmatic reasons for limited

governmental transparency here, the right to privacy, once eroded, is difficult to recover. We require

The Social Domain

CHAPTER TWO: EVALUATING ACCOUNTABILITY IN FOUR DOMAINS OF THE DIGITAL AGE

7

that the knowledge gap is bridged by an effective and ‘tech-‐savvy’ media, who inform the public as

to how their data is being used.

Standards: Imposing standards on governments through democratic expectation of government

transparency is always rational, especially if they render the intelligence services null. More rigorous

standards regulating the private sector’s use of customer data would, however, be welcome. A

requirement for more accessible terms and conditions would be a useful first step to bridge the

knowledge gap between consumers and data-‐monopolists. Furthermore, standards should be

updated to better acknowledge the fact that governments and businesses now partake in

information sharing.

Liability:

Trust-‐based accountability can possibly be relied upon when consumers keep companies

accountable to established norms for data collection. This is enabled by the possibility of a consumer

boycott, as long as the knowledge gap is bridged by an effective and ‘tech-‐savvy’ media. However,

the fact that companies can seek to excuse and, perhaps, even cover-‐up their misuse of consumer

data means that a deterrent through sanctions may be necessary. This is particularly true in complex

domains which are not easily understood by the public. While the government cannot be kept

completely accountable by statute, the public should continue to pressure governments not to

overstep their boundaries.

Issue Area: The Regulatory Gap

It is widely acknowledged that the "tech industry" is the dominant entrepreneurial force of our age.

Whilst software advancement reaches incredible heights, our legislative systems lag behind. This

‘regulatory gap’ can lead to impotent governance and moral hazards where technologies are used

with no expectation of potential punishment.


Transparency: The explorative nature of technological progress means that the tasks performed by

these companies are very difficult to understand. However, the difficulty in understanding how a

company is harnessing new technologies has no bearing on the importance of companies upholding

The Technological domain

8

transparency in their use of these technologies. For instance, the use of artificial intelligence raises

ethical questions and is also highly complex (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2011).

Standards: Using standards to close the regulatory gap will stifle innovation to some degree. The

alternative is companies catering to the whims of consumers whilst regulators are rendered

impotent, as agents use new technology to evade accountability by exploiting the regulatory gap.

However, an early imposition of light regulation followed by gradual increments in standards is likely

to be the best approach. This requires those forming the standards to collaborate with ‘thought

leaders’ in the relevant technological fields and seek to establish the likely risk areas and how best to

deal with them. The alternative is a knee-‐jerk legislative response which harms technological

progress as the longer-‐term as companies refrain from innovation.

Liability: There are certainly cases where sanctions-‐based accountability should be preferred to trust-‐

based accountability. Artificial intelligence (AI) is an area which needs to be dealt with carefully,

particularly when it is required to answer questions of morality (Bostrom and Yudkowsky: 2011).

Areas such as this should be involve the potential for sanctions, as the costs of not doing so may be

too great.

Issue Area: Cyberterrorism

The emergence of cyberterrorism– “politically motivated attacks on computer systems for achieving

violent outcomes”– attests to the fact that the digital age is “altering the nature of conflict” (Arquilla

& Ronfeldt, 2001: 1). Nearly every institution and individual is tied to a virtual network to some

extent, making us vulnerable to cyberterrorism in various forms. Moreover, while cyberterror tactics

cannot replace conventional terrorist tactics, they do have the distinct advantage of serving as a

“force multiplier”: they can create more effect when executed in concert with other traditional

terrorist activities (CEDAT 2008: 73).


Transparency: Whilst cyberterrorism operates on the basis of opacity, there are measures to create

more transparency. At the international level, this occurs via intelligence-‐sharing amongst countries.

At the national level, governments can use their own technological prowess (aided by the private

The Political Domain

9

sector) to infiltrate cyberterrorist networks. Private firms, such as Palantir Technologies, have also

aided governments in their efforts to identify perpetrators amongst the mass of online data.

Standards: Cyberterrorism can arise "anywhere in the world”, making “investigation, producing

evidence and taking the offenders to court an immense task that can only be achieved through

international cooperation” (Cottim). However, there are currently significant deficiencies in the

international standards for combating cyberterrorism. As laws are instituted or revised according to

new trends in cyberterrorism, more discussion is necessary to make clear what the national and

international procedures should be in terms of handling cyberterrorism.

Given that technology companies’ products are being used by cyberterrorists, companies are now

also being held responsible for destructive use of their products. The capitulation of MasterCard and

PayPal to political pressures in the WikiLeaks saga demonstrated how private sector ‘inaction’ is

considered increasingly indefensible (Greenberg, 2011).

Liability: Given the detrimental effects of cyberterrorism, the notion that governments should leave

internet-‐communities to self-‐regulate is quickly abandoned in favour of instituting legal sanctions

against cyberterrorists. Scholars maintain, however, that legal measures are insufficient for

containing cyberterrorism and liability needs to be cultivated elsewhere. This has already occurred

via public and private sector advocacy of responsible use of virtual platforms.

Issue area: Monopolisation

There is much talk of the "digital divide": the inequalities that arise from differences in the access to,

use of, or benefit from information and communication technology. It is also apparent in the

commercial realm, where certain businesses’ superior use of technology leads to them achieving

monopoly status. Silicon Valley provides an awesome hub for entrepreneurship but breeds

monopolies which justifiably concern anti-‐trust regulators (Fairless & Drozdiak, 2015). Overregulation

of these firms may stifle innovation but the concentration of economic power within these firms can

have detrimental effects.


The Commercial Domain

10

Transparency: Many commercial initiatives rely on monopolisation and, therefore, privatisation of

data in order to make profit. As such, it is often difficult to obtain the relevant data which would

allow the public and government to establish whether or not a company is engaging in

anticompetitive practice.

Standards: Determining appropriate standards of accountability practice among businesses with

monopolistic intentions involves delicate trade-‐offs. Pro-‐competition regulation should, in terms

of free-‐market theory, encourage the efficient provision of any given good. However,

Schumpeterian economics indicates that stripping companies of their monopolistic power will

stifle innovation (Magnusson, 1962).

Liability: Antitrust law already exists, but the emerging regulatory gap means that there is a strong

likelihood of government increasing sanctions on monopolies.

11

CHAPTER THREE: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Upon evaluating four climates of accountability, two patterns can be extrapolated about

accountability in the digital age with important policy implications.

1. Accountability in the digital age is a human, not a technological issue

The speed of technological developments complicates efforts to operationalise accountability in the

digital age. Although it is important to acknowledge that the tools at our disposal may be

insufficient in regulating technological developments, we should be cautious about consigning

ourselves to ‘technological determinism’: a view that underlines the unintended consequences of

the digital age in which technology constitutes an autonomous, exogenous force shaping society

(Smith & Marx, 1994). The major problem with technological determinism is that it absolves us from

responsibility for our “making and use of technology” (Wyatt, 2008). Such a view should be

displaced by the more plausible view of “interplay” between society and technology where each

“responds dynamically to the moves of the other” (Cranor and Wildman, 2003: introduction).

By recognising that there is a dialectical relationship between society and technology, we better

understand the fundamental role of human agency, willpower and innovation in rendering the

digital age a more successful, equitable and benevolent project. Instead of fixating our gazes to the

speed of technological development, we should be more attentive to how the ‘stickiness’ of our

institutions has also contributed to various regulatory gaps where existing legislation proves defunct in regulating novel technologies. Just as humans have designed technologies with far-‐

reaching capabilities, humans can also effectively reform the institutions in which these

technologies are utilised. More thought is needed however about reforming our institutions

strategically. We should begin by questioning various established views about what constitutes

strategic reform; in this essay, for example, we have analysed whether increasing accountability in

the digital age always proves to be beneficial as it is popularly assumed.

In Chapter Two, we saw how operationalising accountability in the digital age involves conducting

difficult trade-‐offs: between control and technological innovation and between personal privacy

and security. Just as it can be misleading and dangerous to equate technological change with

progress (Wyatt, 2008), it can also be misleading and dangerous to conceive of accountability in the

Extrapolating Patterns

12

digital age as only conferring benefits on society. Accountability is a value-‐laden term with different

implications for its diverse stakeholders. We can recall that, vis-‐à-‐vis the issue of personal privacy,

increasing accountability could result in increased symmetry of information between individuals

whose data was being collected and data collectors. However, increasing accountability could also

undercut national security and potentially foster unhelpful distrust between the two parties.

Awareness that accountability is not a one-‐dimensional phenomenon can lead to strategies for

reforming our institutions that pay greater attention to the benefits of incremental change. Given

that citizens have an inherent difficulty managing their affairs in the absence of stability and

predictability in law, piecemeal and ad hoc institutional change could prove more beneficial than

reactive, hurried forms of legislative change. Most importantly, incremental change could give more

room to public debate, moral reasoning and education for ascertaining the costs and benefits of

increasing accountability in the digital age on a case-‐by-‐case basis.

2. Fostering accountability in the digital age requires the respective and combined efforts of

the public and private sector

The public and private sector can serve to counter-‐balance each other in accountability terms. We

have seen how governments can exploit technological advances to amass information on its citizens

more effectively. Even though some businesses have collaborated with governments in information-‐

sharing, other companies have sought to counteract these processes: the market for privacy has

flourished. This market paradoxically complements the growing market for personal information–

there is a counter-‐demand for individuals wanting to keep that information private.

Differently, the public and private sector can also constitute mutual aids to better uphold

accountability terms. For example, the fight against cyberterrorism has seen an outsourcing from

the public to the private sector. This is exemplified by the establishment of Cyber Fast Track (CFT) by

the U.S. Homeland Security, which awarded short-‐term contracts to private entities for targeted

network-‐security projects. CFT was part of a government-‐led shift towards “democratized, crowd-‐

sourced innovation” (Schmidt & Cohen, 2014: 168).

13

The "Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma" model below is used as a basis for answering and evaluating the following

questions:

1. Would a change in the level of accountability in the principal-‐agent relationship be

accepted by the principal?

2. Would a change in the level of accountability be ethically permissible?

It must be stated, however, that this model is not empirically grounded but rather is used to

consolidate the analysis performed thus far into a single construct. Therefore, it is borne out of the

earlier analysis performed, rather than formulated independently and then applied. The assumptions

which it rests upon prevent it from being wholly realistic but it is nonetheless a useful analytical

device for considering these questions.

The diagram shown below illustrates a single possible principal-‐agent relationship within the context

of the model. The notation within the diagram, however, applies to all potential accountability

structures.

The "Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma" Model

New Ethical Codes for the Digital Age

14

Key

As explained below, α, β and γ are calculated in the same manner but are distinguished for the

purposes of this model as follows:

-‐ “α” relates to the primary principal-‐agent relationship.

-‐ “β” relates to all other accountability relationships which both are affected by and affect the

Principal. This is illustrated within the diagram by existing as part of a closed loop of accountability

relationships, which “α” is also a part of.

-‐ “γ” relates to all accountability relationships which do not affect but are affected by the Principal,

i.e. those which do not satisfy the criteria to be an “α” or “β”.

𝛼!, Any 𝛽!" and Any 𝛾!" The value of each variable is the net benefit of the level of

accountability of this relationship to a particular party, “I”.

N.B. Accountability is itself a function of transparency, standards and liability, as previously defined.

The 'i' subscript is used to differentiate between different betas and gammas.

1. Because the principal is self-‐interested, its desire for increased accountability is governed by the

following function (with the subscript "P" representing the principal):

∆𝑓 𝛼! ,𝛽! = ∆𝛼! + (∆𝛽!")!

!!!

Where:

∆𝑥 Represents the change in 𝑥

Decision rule:

The principal accepts the increase in accountability where: ∆𝒇 𝜶𝑷,𝜷𝑷 > 0

2. To account for the effect of a change in accountability in ethical terms, the effect is

expressed in relation to all existing parties (with "A" representing all parties affected by a

change in the primary accountability relationship):

∆𝑓 𝛼!,𝛽!, 𝛾! = ∆α! + (∆𝛽!")!

!!!

+ (∆𝛾!")!

!!!

Decision rule:

The change in accountability is ethically permissible where ∆𝒇 𝜶𝑨,𝜷𝑨,𝜸𝑨 > 0

15

The model is developed from the perspective of the principal because it is considered to be the

primary driver of the level of accountability. This is presupposed as, based on the examples

discussed, they typically wield the ability to alter the accountability relationship. The principal is

assumed to be self-‐interested and rational but there are various different incarnations of self-‐

interest. If the principal is the government, self-‐interest translates into political self-‐preservation and

pleasing the electorate. If, however, the principal is a company, then self-‐interest is restricted to the

success of the company and satisficing key stakeholders.

The decision rule for the first question encompasses the primary principal-‐agent relationship and any

relationships which, if affected, would in turn affect the principal. The “γ” relationships do not affect

the principal and therefore are not included in the decision rule. Take an example where the principal

is the government and the agent is a "tech monopolist" providing a popular service to consumers.

Increased accountability benefitting the government may be accompanied by a backlash from

consumers, if it restricts the ability of the company to provide the service. In this case, the net effect

of the change in accountability may result in a localised net gain (∆𝛼! > 0) but an overall net loss

(∆𝑓 𝛼! ,𝛽! < 0) for the principal, so the change would be rejected.

The decision rule for the second question incorporates all of the human effects of the change in

accountability. Thus, we are assessing the effect of the decision on all direct and indirect

stakeholders. The decision rule therefore qualifies as an ethical one by considering the welfare of all

parties. As such, the model produces both an incentive-‐based and ethics-‐based outcome. The use of

ethics here is distinct to the digital age because it incorporates the interconnectedness which defines

the digital age.

There are, however, clear limitations to the model. It makes the assumption that no “γ” relationship

affects the principal, which in practice may not be the case. There is also no explicit

acknowledgement of the interrelation of the accountability links, which are seen instead as a series

of single bilateral interactions. Furthermore, the ethics-‐based decision-‐making rule is fairly simplistic,

though there is scope for nuances. One option would be to require Pareto-‐optimality, whereby a gain

to society cannot be accompanied by a net loss for any individual group. This could perhaps be

softened for the sake of pragmatism to allow small net costs for some parties in order to benefit of

society as a whole. In any case, this model hopes to enable principals to incorporate an ethical

calculation into accountability decision-‐making processes.

16

CONCLUSION

I began this essay by defining accountability in the digital age as a relational concept based on

three properties: transparency, standards and liability. I employed this definition to evaluate the

current climates of accountability in the social, technological, political and commercial domains of

the digital age. Various striking findings ensued. First, it was apparent that accountability in the

digital age proved to be a human, not a technological issue. Specifically, within each of the four

domains of the digital age, accountability is clearly a value-‐laden term, with different meanings

and implications for the different stakeholders involved– whether it be cyberterrorists or

businesses or public-‐private partnerships. Second, it was apparent that fostering accountability in

the digital age involves the respective and combined efforts of the public and private sector. This is

because they can act as beneficial counterweights or mutual aids in accountability terms. In order

to understand the policy implications of my findings, I proceeded to use the “Alpha-‐Beta-‐Gamma”

model to evaluate accountability decisions in the digital age and their ethical implications.

Word Count: 3,999 (excluding title pages, table of contents and list of works cited)

17

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