a test of seamanship

7/29/2019 A test of seamanship

1/8

The report provides a useful insight into the

decision making process of the Master and

where it failed. As in many such cases the

consequences of anchor dragging were

catastrophic but fortunately, on this occasion,

only in financial terms and not in terms ofloss of life, personal injury or pollution.

The UK Marine Accident Investigation

Branch (MAIB) report into the fouling of the

vessels anchor on the Central Area

Transmission System (CATS) Everest gas

pipe line criticised the shore-side

authorities and government departments

roles in relation to nomination of the

anchorage areas, communications and

response to the incident.The reportidentifies few failings on the part of the

ship owner.Nevertheless it was ultimately

the Masters seamanship which was lacking

and in this respect the report makes

valuable reading for navigators.

Regulatory update7 US Authorities reminded to show

respect to seafarers

7 Declaration of defective navigation

equipment: US Port State Control

issue a clarification

Navigationand Seamanship

1 A test of seamanship

5 Risk management on the bridge

5 MAIB publishes report on MSC Napoli

Miscellaneous8 53ft containers: suitable for

carriage by sea?

8 Publications

Volume 15: Number 2

May 2008

The Britannia Steam Ship

Insurance Association LimitedRISK WATCH

A test ofseamanship

Following the last edition of Risk Watch, in which we

considered the growing number of grounding claims

arising from anchor dragging, we now highlight the

circumstances of another vessel dragging anchor as

described in an official government report.

Containers and Cargoes6 Canola

6 Richards Bay high value ores

6 Revised guidelines for container securing

manuals and compulsory training ashore


2/8

A test of seamanship continuedThe vessel, an aframax tanker, arrived in ballast

off the mouth of the River Tees and let go her

port anchor at 22:00 hours on the 24 June.

The Master had previously contacted Tees

Ports VTS requesting a designated anchorage

and was advised that there was no

designated anchorage in Tees Bay but that

ships of similar size normally anchored in the

vicinity of two spoil ground areas to the east

of the entrance.The VTS advised the Master to

keep well clear of the pipelines in an area

adjacent to the spoil ground. After anchoring

the Master received confirmation from Tees

Ports VTS that his positionwas fine. The vessel

anchored with seven shackles on deck, the

windlass was taken out of gear and the

manual compressor bar left over the cable but

not secured in position.

By midday the following morning wind

speeds were in excess of 30 knots.The Master

had previously received forecasts of this as

well as a recent forecast that wind forces

would be increasing.The Master subsequentlyslackened the anchor cable so that there were

8 shackles on deck.

Shortly after 20:00 hours the wind speed

increased to 40 knots, gusting to 48 knots.

The Third Officer, on watch, had been diligent

and was checking his position by several

methods. At 22:00 hours the Third Officer

noted that the vessel was lying outside her

swinging circle and informed the Master.The

main engine was ready for use relatively

quickly - at 22:16 - but by that time the vessel

had dragged a distance of 0.8 nautical miles

at a rate of 3 knots towards the Everest gas

pipeline. At the same time the Chief Officer

and two seaman had commenced heaving

the port anchor cable.

At this time the vessel was pitching heavily

under a northerly swell estimated to be in

excess of 5 metres and was yawing in excess

of 70 from north-west to north-east.

Predictably the Chief Officer reported that

heaving was very slow because of the weight

on the cable.

The first engine movement,dead slow ahead,was recorded at 22:23, at which time the ships

head was recorded as swinging between 068

and 320 and seas were breaking over the

forecastle.The vessel continued to drag in a

southerly direction. At 22:28 hours the engine

was put to slow ahead and shortly thereafter

the vessel started moving over the ground in

a northerly direction. It should be noted that

at this stage the Master was reluctant to use

greater engine power as he feared the vessel

might run over the anchor cable. By 22:40

hours the drift had been arrested but the

vessel had now dragged a total of 1.3 nautical

miles and lay only 2 cables north of the

charted Everest gas pipeline.

At 22:50, with the main engine set at half

aheadand three shackles in the water, the

Chief Officer decided that there was too

much weight on the cable and to apply the

brake and hold on. As the brake was being

applied, whilst still in gear but with the

control lever in a neutral position, the

hydraulic motor unit suffered a catastrophic

failure.The cable ran out immediately and the

brake lining disintegrated, giving off smoke

and sparks, and high pressure hydraulic oilsprayed over the forecastle.

2 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 15: Number 2: May 2008

Above Profile of CATS pipeline in relation to sea bed.

Left Position of anchor and its location with reference

to harbour limits,spoilt ground areas and pipelines.

Navigation and Seamanship


3/8

3

The Master was aware of the Admiralty Sailing

Direction and of the deteriorating weather

conditions. Nevertheless he chose to remain

at the anchorage. He was unaware that the

quality of the holding grounding was at best

moderate.The Master elected to use seven

shackles on deck though he later increased

this to 8 shackles.There are two commonly

used formulae for calculating the number of

shackles required.

1) Number of shackles of cable =1.5 x Depth in metres, or;

2) Length of cable in metres =

6 to 10 x the depth in metres.

As the depth was approximately 36m the

formulae required the Master to utilise 9

shackles or 8-13 shackles respectively. He

underestimated the length of cable necessary

in the weather conditions. If, as in this case,

less cable is used, the effects of yawing caused

by the wind and the effect of pitching caused

by the swell greatly increase the risk of snatchloads being applied to the anchor and that

the cable will be lifted off the seabed with a

As the port cable paid out to the bitter end, a

total of 12 shackles, the vessel drifted quickly

south, over the gas pipeline. The drift was

stopped only when the anchor fouled the

pipeline.The vessel was still yawing in excess

of 100 degrees and at the extremity of one

yaw the anchor freed itself from the pipeline,

10 minutes after being fouled. She then

began to drag towards the lee shore.

Luckily as the vessel passed over a shoal area

the anchor held in a position 2n.m. off the lee

shore at 23:28 hours.The Master attempted to

slip the anchor but, because of the weight on

the cable, could not do so until the damaged

windlass hydraulic motor had been replaced.

It took in excess of 12 hours to slip the anchor.

Choice of Anchorage/Seamanship

The Admiralty Sailing Direction for this area

(NP57) advised against anchoring in north or

easterly gales and prohibited anchoring

within 2.5 cables of the Everest pipeline. BA

chart 2567 reiterated this message.Thecharted depth at the anchorage was 32m and

the height of tide was 4.5m.

resultant pull causing the anchor to trip.

The fact that the vessel was in ballast condition

and had a considerable windage resulted in

the sailingeffect being significant.

The report states that ultimately the most

seaman-like approach was to weigh anchor

and ride out the storm at sea (this was the

approach followed earlier that evening by

other vessels in the anchorage).The report

further states that the Master had failed to use

the main engine in a positive and committed

fashion. It was 29 minutes after dragging was

first identified and 16 minutes after the main

engine was available to him before the first

positive,slow ahead, main engine movement

was ordered.When the Master usedhalf

ahead, the AIS recordings indicated that the

rate of drift was reduced considerably.

In the circumstances, since the windlass was

clearly struggling, the more seaman-like

option would have been to secure the anchor

at the time 3 shackles were in the water andthen attempt to dredge the anchor

northwards using the main engine.

Anchor shank

Anchor head (1.63m)

Anchorfluke(2.0

7m)

Cats pipeline

Cats pipelineAnchorfluke(2.07m

)

Anchor shank (3.345m)

36

0.9

14m

Plan view and elavation diagrams representing

vessels anchor snagging the CATS pipeline.


4/8

Navigation and Seamanship

At that time however, the Master continued to

manoeuvre with massive loads on the

windlass machinery.With 3 shackles in the

water there was no catenary (curvature) on

the cable to absorb those massive loads and

ultimately the hydraulic motor suffered

catastrophic failure and the cable ran out to

the bitter end.

Windlass Operating System

The vessel was fitted with KAHC-14 stockless

Bower anchors of 8.7 tonnes each.This

anchor has 2.5 to 3 times the holding power

of a standard stockless anchor of equal

weight. Each windlass was rated at 34.5

tonnes at 9m per minute (the hydraulic

system was fitted with two-in-line relief

valves but there was no relief valve fitted to

the hydraulic motor itself). Prior to the

incident the windlass and the break linings

were all in good condition.The report

stressed the importance of the Classification

rules in respect of anchoring equipment

which states:The equipment required is theminimum considered necessary for

temporary mooring of a vessel in moderate

sea conditions when the vessel is awaiting

berth and tide etc. The equipment is

12

14

10

8

6

4

2

0 5

Angle of Scope(degrees)

10 15 20

HoldingPullRatio=

HoldingPull

AnchorWeight

A test of seamanship continuedtherefore not designed to hold a vessel off

fully exposed coasts in rough weather or for

frequent anchoring operations in open sea.

In such conditions the loads on the anchoring

equipment will increase to such a degree

that its components may be damaged or lost

owing to the high energy forces generated.

Classification requirements are based on

current speeds of 2.5m per second, wind

speed of 25m per second and a scope of

chain (the ratio between length of chain paid

out and water depth) of between 6 and 10.

Anchoring equipment,as required by the

rules,is designed to hold a vessel in good

holding ground.Inspection of the vessels

windlass showed that it suffered massive

shock loading in the region of 800 bar, nearly

4 times the normal operating pressure.

The report found that the Master had failed

to adequately address the risk of windlass

failure, noting that the provision to the Master

of meaningful ship-specific data for theanchoring equipment might have helped

him recognise earlier that the weather

conditions were becoming marginal for the

design limitations of the equipment.

The report went on to draw attention to the

OCIMF guide, Anchoring Systems and

Procedures for Large Tankers, which provides

excellent guidance to Masters of larger

vessels. The report encourages Owners and

Masters to develop a contingency plan that

allows the cable to be slipped safely whilst

the bitter end is under tension.

It is recommended that navigating officers

read the full report of the MAIB into this

incident;it can be found at: www.maib.gov.uk

(Report Young Lady)


The effect of scope angle on an anchors holding power.

Damage to the port windlass hydraulic motor unit.

Angle of scope

Seabed

Anchor

AC14 Bower anchor trial number 1*

AC14 Bower anchor trial number 2*

*Trials conducted in two locations which show the

relationship between loss of holding power and the

angle of scope.


5/8

The incidence of casualties where a pilot is

onboard is attracting ever increasing attention

and a recently released report by the USCG

provides useful insight into one such casualty.

In February 2008, whilst under pilotage,

departing from Baltimore, the bulk carrier

MONTROSE ran aground in the Chesapeake

Bay.The USCG report of investigationconcluded that the main reasons for the

grounding were inattention and fatigue on

the part of the pilot, and failure to follow good

Resource Management by the ships

navigators.What was of more concern was

the observation that the pilot refused to sign

the pilot card because of his apparent

extensive experience of the local area, and

that the duty officer was subsequently

hesitant in challenging the pilots actions prior

to the grounding because of the latters

strong personality.

This, unfortunately,is not an uncommon

problem, as mariners around the world are

only too well aware. A pilot is supposed to be

on board to provide navigational guidance,

subject to the Masters overall command, but

this directive is often ignored by pilots and

the bridge team. Watch keepers, especially

junior officers, are not always confident

enough in their own abilities to be able to

challenge an order made by the pilot. Even an

experienced officer can be slow to challenge

a pilot if unsure of the planned route, or if the

pilot responds negatively or aggressively to

any queries.

As it happens, the Master of the MONTROSE

had been on the bridge until about 45

minutes prior to the grounding, and although

the duty officer suspected that the ships

course and position were doubtful, he did not

question the pilot or notify the Master.

The pilots communication with the bridge

team had been restricted to issuing helm andcourse orders.

All went well until the pilot sat down in the

pilots chair, and is believed to have lost

attention.

The vessel was supposed to alter course to

starboard after passing the CR buoy, at about

0548, but the pilot gave no order to do so.

The duty o fficer then went to the chart tableto plot the position, but the vessel ran

aground at about 0600.

It should have been obvious that an alteration

of course was required after passing the buoy,

and the duty officer should have been aware

of this fact without having to refer to a

charted position.

Accidents are expensive. A seemingly minor

problem in communication can lead to a

vessel hitting a dock or running aground.

Apart from the time lost whilst freeing and

repairing the vessel, an accident can give rise

to claims for pollution, criminal liability, repair

bills, loss of hire, cargo transhipment, salvage

and wreck removal.

A responsible vessel operator will have

effective policies in place to man and operate

a vessel efficiently. All too often however,

simply having and implementing policy is not

enough. A Master needs to know that his

genuine efforts and actions are going to be

backed by his shipowner. A bridge watch

keeper needs to know that he can, if in any

doubt, question a pilots actions, with his

managers full support.This is where effective

bridge team management comes in.

One of Britannias Members has specifically

instructed and trained ship staff to challenge

pilots if they feel that the ship is being put

into danger.This is positive action (and can

only be applauded), however in order for this

to work, all ship staff must be given adequate

training by means of role play and practicaltraining ashore. It is not easy for a second or

third officer to countermand the pilots

actions, but if he has to wait for the Master

to get on the bridge before questioning the

pilot, it may well be too late.

Risk Management is a process of analysing

events that may disrupt a business and

determining how best to handle these risks,

whilst still achieving targeted goals. In otherwords, ANALYSE MINIMISE REALISE.

Risk assessment in bridge team management

should include:

the duty officer verifying that the berth to

berth passage plan remains relevant to the

voyage, with current hazards identified and

the potential danger minimised;

a bridge team pre-arrival and pre-departure

meeting, where all participants are made fully

aware of the likely deployment of pilots, route,

lines, tugs, and weather conditions.

Every day brings a different combination of

challenges, so each new or routine task needs

to be adequately risk assessed.

MAIB publishes report onMSC Napoli

The UKs Marine Accident Investigation Branch

(MAIB), has just published its report on the

investigation of the structural failure of the

container vessel MSC NAPOLI in the English

Channel in January 2007.The report highlights

problems in the design and construction of

the vessel and the overloading of containers

which contributed to the casualty. The full

report can be found at:

www.maib.gov.uk/publications/index.cfm

Risk management on the bridge

5


6/8

Canola (Canadian Oil Low Acid) is a variety of

rape distinguished by the lower acidic content

of its oil. Canola is becoming an increasingly

important cash crop in North America,

especially Canada.There is nothing especially

unusual about Canola, except perhaps some

unfamiliarity with the name, and how it should

be carried. It is, however, worth noting that

Canola is not in the BC Code.

While Canola seed is not specifically listed in

the BC Code as a dangerous cargo,expellers,

rapeseed cake and pellets,which also have a

tendency to spontaneously heat,are listed in

the Code. It is advisable to refer to the relevant

section of the BC code for all these cargoes

before carrying Canola seed as a cargo.

Canola cargo is particularly susceptible to

excessive moisture content: the risks involved

are two-fold;

Should the moisture content of the Canola

seed cargo be excessively high there is a risk

that over the duration of the voyage the seed

could develop mould and be rejected on

quality grounds at the receiving port; and

There is a potential risk of spontaneous

heating: at a temperature level of just 15C,

with a seed moisture level of 12% or above,

the cargo can become very unstable, leading

to spontaneous heating.Excessive waste or

trash, (as waste material in grain cargoes are

often called) contained within the cargo andthe presence of live insects, can exacerbate

the problem. Should the cargo sit on top of

heated fuel tanks,there is a real risk of any

potential overheating problem becoming

greatly enhanced.

Members operating bulk carriers will be familiar

with Richards Bay as one of the leading coal

export ports.The port is, however, increasingly

used for the export of higher value ores such as

chrome and copper concentrate. Similarly, there

is an increase in export of mineral sand such as

Rutile and Zircon. We have been reminded by

Captain G A Chettle & Associates, Richards Bay,

that all products should not be treated in the

same manner as coal or iron ore with regard topre-loading hull cleanliness.These specialist

ores are very sensitive to contamination,

especially by rust scale,and standards of de-

scaling which would satisfy many bulk coal and

iron ore cargoes would not be acceptable to

shippers of such specialist ores. Even higher

standards may apply to some of the mineral

sands, especially Zircon sand, where it even may

be necessary for areas of rust to be wire brushed.

Captain G A Chettle & Associates has drawn up

a brief guide to highlight the standards of hull

cleanliness required for the carriage of the ores

and mineral sands exported from Richards Bay.

The guide is available from the Association.

Containers and cargoes


Ideally the moisture content of the cargo

should be kept between approximately

7.5% and 8%, and the temperature of the

Canola seed cargo be kept at around 20C, to

ensure no risk of quality deterioration or

spontaneous heating.

It is recommended that the moisture levels of

cargo upon loading are checked to ensure

that these are below 8%.The cargo should

also be ventilated on the trip, especially when

the cargo is being transported from a

temperate climate, for example Canada, to a

more tropical climate,for example Pakistan. It

should be remembered that the principal

origins of the cargo are Canada and the

United States,and the principal destinations

of the cargo are Japan,China, Pakistan and

Mexico. It is therefore probable that in most

instances the cargo is being transported from

a temperate zone to a more tropical zone.

Slip Hazard

The Canola seed is very small, between

approximately 1 and 2 millimetres in diameter,

and is extremely hard; indeed the Canola seed

can be considered as being similar to a ball

bearing.Should a seaman inadvertently walk

over some loose seeds on the deck, there is a

risk of slipping,which could result in a serious

injury,especially if the vessel is at sea.

It is suggested that any spillage on deck,

irrespective of amount, be swept clean at the

earliest convenient time.

Canola Richards Bay high value ores

Revised guidelines for container securing

manuals and compulsory training ashore

Members and their crews will recall a previous

article in Risk Watch (Volume 14 : Number 4

October 2007) which featured the loss of

containers from the ANNABELLA and the

subsequent UK Marine Accident InvestigationBranch (MAIB) investigation. A draft IMO

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) circular

giving Revised Guidelines for the preparation

of the Cargo Securing Manual was agreed by

the IMO Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods,

Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC) at its

meeting in Autumn 2007.

At the same meeting the reducing incidence

of deficiencies in cargo transport units (CTUs)

carrying dangerous goods in the 2007

consolidated report on container inspection

programmes, compared to the previous years

consolidated report, was noted.The DSC agreedthat the mandatory training of shore-side

personnel and future work on revision of the

International Convention for Safe Containers

(CSC) in the context of container examination

programmes were both positive measures that

would further improve the situation.


7/8

Regulatory update

Declaration of defective navigation

equipment: US Port State Control

issue a clarification

Port State Control Branch USCG Sector

Houston Galveston has issued clarification

concerning the requirement to report

inoperative navigation equipment by vessels

arriving in Houston. Some vessels have been

placing a statement on their Electronic Notice

of Arrivals (ENOAs) to the effect that certain

navigation equipment is not functioning.

Whilst this is a requirement under 33 CFR

164.53 it is not sufficient to meet the

requirements of the USCG. Under the terms

of 33 CFR 164.55 a written request

(application) for an approveddeviation

effectively permission to enter the port

without fully functioning navigationequipment must also be made.Vessels

found in port with a navigation equipment

deficiency and without a Captain of the Port

approved deviation, are liable to civil penalty

action by the Coast Guard.

Most seafarers are familiar with the heavy

handed approach of some coastguard and

other authorities when boarding vessels.The

increased vigilance of the US Coastguard

since 9/11 has perhaps resulted in an attitude

towards seafarers by US Coastguards which is

inappropriate.This has been recognised by

the US Coastguard Commandant Admiral

Thad Allen in a circular dated 29 February toall US Coastguard offices and unit

commanders.The circular reads as follows:

Subject: Commandants expectations for

interaction with maritime industry

USCG activities involving US and foreign

professional mariners and maritime

organizations will be conducted with utmost

professionalism and respect. Licensed and

documented mariners are professionals who

share our interests in a safe, secure, and

environmentally compliant industry. Alexander

Hamiltons charge - to keep in mind that our

countrymen are free men, and as such,are

impatient of everything that bears the least

mark of a domineering spirit - applies as much

today as it did in 1790 and equally to

international mariners and our trading partners.

Unfortunately I have received reports from

highly respected professionals recounting

Coast Guard boardings, inspections, and

investigations not displaying professionalism.

Additionally, some have said they lost the

complete trust they once had in the Coast

Guard and are fearful of retribution if they

challenge the Coast Guards conduct.

We must change this perception. Americas

position in the global economy,public and

environmental safety, and post 9/11 security

are at stake. The need for maritime industry-

government cooperation and partnership has

never been more important.The Coast

Guards obligation to the safety and security

of America is shared by the maritime industry

and enhanced by working cooperatively withindustry at all levels.Openness and

transparency will be the hallmarks of our

maritime interaction.

Boarding team members, marine inspectors,

port state control examiners, facility examiners

and their supervisors shall encourage open

communication with mariners and other

members of industry.

Disruption in the normal flow of commerce

impacts many parties in the supply chain. We

have clearly established appeal procedures

when we make a decision that could have

negative impacts on a licensed mariner or onthe maritime industry.The exercise of appeal

is a right we strongly support. Questions,

differences of professional opinion, and

appeals are normal and improve the conduct

of business. We must be as accepting of these

as praise. Attempt to resolve problems at the

lowest level possible and be resourceful in

doing so.

In instances when decisions are appealed, unit

commanders and supervisors must act with a

neutral common sense attitude; timely

resolution is of utmost importance to

facilitating legitimate commerce.

As commandant, I actively engage the Captains

of the maritime industry in round table

discussions to uncover what is good and bad

with our current practices so improvements

can be made. I expect similar maritime industry

engagement at every level of the Coast Guard

followed by aggressive action to address

problem areas. Follow ethics, rules and

standards of conduct in your interactions.

As soon as possible, USCG sector commanders

shall solicit candid feedback from the individual

mariners, industry association reps, and facility

operators who have a significant stake in

marine safety, security, and stewardship. This

feedback shall identify pending issues needing

action,best practices, and recommendations

that can be acted upon. Districts shall hold a

sector conference to include COTP/OCMI,

prevention and response reps to discuss the

feedback, determine a course of action for

those that merit action and then close the loopwith industry on actions taken. National level

recommendations shall be vetted through area

commanders and forwarded to the assistant

commandant for marine safety, security and

stewardship (CG-5) by 1 June 2008 for

consideration in the Coast Guards marine

safety improvement efforts.My goal is to purge

the past and reset for the future.Open

communication, critical self-examination, and a

willing transparency are hallmarks of great

organizations, including the Coast Guard.

I also expect USCG sector commanders and cutter

commanding officers to ensure boarding teams,

inspectors, and examiners provide the units seniorleader contact information, if asked, to vessel

Masters, port engineers, and facility operators.

Effective immediately, Coast Guard requirements

that limit vessel movement (such as no sail

orders, major CGg-835s, actions that would delay

arrivals and departures) are to be affirmed by

the sector CID and reported to the prevention

chief, as many already do. At a minimum, a Coast

Guard supervisor shall engage, by phone, radio,

or in person with the Master, port engineer,or

facility manager to discuss the requirements

and expectations for resolution.As soon as

practicable, USCG sector commanders, MSU

commanding officers, and cutter commanding

officers shall be informed of all such discussions.

7

US Authorities reminded to show respect to seafarers


8/8

53ft Containers: suitable forcarriage by sea?

Earlier this year, whilst conducting a routine

inspection of the containers on deck during

heavy weather,the Master of a Members

vessel observed that there were apparent

signs of distortion and structural failure to

some 53containers.

The 53 containers in question were

stacked on top of 40units, in a manner not

recommended by the manufacturer, and this

had resulted in excessive stresses on the

unsupported ends.The 53 containers were

clearly marked Type Domestic Container

which would indicate that they are not

constructed for the carriage of cargo on

ocean transit.The 53 unit is commonly used

on USA rail and road transport networks.

There are no conventional container vessels

currently specifically designed for the carriage

of 53 units, and there are many container

vessels which could not accommodate the 53

units. Allowable stacking is three units high,

but on this vessel many units were stowed

four high on top of two 40 containers. These

containers are also over width at 8.5 wide,

which means that additional adjustments

have to be made to stow them. Lashing bars

have to be fitted to the corner castings to

counteract additional racking stresses,

particularly in heavy weather.

Editors message We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articleswithin Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: [email protected]

8 Britannia RISK WATCH RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam

Ship Insurance Association Limited, and can be

found at www.britanniapandi.com/publications

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association

Limited is happy for any of the material in Risk

Watch to be reproduced but would ask that

written permission is obtained in advance from

the Editor.

Tindall Riley (Britannia) Limited

New City Court

20 St Thomas Street

London SE1 9RR

Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588

Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942

www.britanniapandi.com

Miscellaneous

PublicationsNew environmental compliance guidance

This new publication from the ICS and ISF is

a response to the continuing incidence of

prosecutions for MARPOL violations especiallyin the USA.Entitled, Shipping Industry

Guidance on Environmental Compliance,

the guide acts as a template for ensuring

adherence to the IMO MARPOL Convention,

in accordance with ISM Code requirements.

The Industry Guidance has been designed

to link with the US Coast Guards new

Voluntary Disclosure Policy. Under this policy

if environmental incidents are reported by

a company which can demonstrate a fully

documented environmental compliance

system such as set out in the guidance

this will be taken into consideration.

The Industry Guidance is being distributed

free of charge by ISC/ICF national associations

but can also be downloaded from

http://www.marisec.org/environmental-

compliance/index.htm

IMO publishes new GMDSS manual

The new manual, published by the IMO, is

a complete revision of its comprehensive

handbook on the global maritime distress

and safety system (GMDSS).The intent of the

new GMDSS Manual is to provide a single

comprehensive publication containing an

explanation of the principles on which

GMDSS is based, the operational performance

standards and technical specifications to be

met by GMDSS equipment and the procedures

and method of operation of that equipment.

The manual is available from most authorised

distributors of IMO publications and the IMOs

on-line bookshop www.imo.org

The vessel in question had encountered

heavy weather conditions enroute, and the

stresses from the weight on the overhanging

ends of the 53 units coupled with the racking

stresses from the lashing bars and the heavy

weather, had resulted in considerable

structural damage to a number of the units.

The fact that the containers were loaded with

considerable weight at the overhanging ends

certainly contributed to the damages.The

Master and Chief Officer acted in a prudent

manner, adjusting speed and course to

alleviate the vessels rolling and pitching.

As conventional container vessels are unable

to accommodate 53 units under deck, the only

stowage possible is on deck, and there are a

limited number of vessels capable of stowing

them on deck.The safest stowage position

would be directly on top of the

hatch covers so the full length of the container

is supported, but the construction of many

container vessels would not accommodate

this stowage as the ends of the containers

would invariably overlap adjacent bays.

Members are reminded of the importance of

checking containers being loaded on their

vessels, and in particular, out of gauge or

oversize units. Another relevant stability issue

is that the onboard stability computer is not

configured for these special containers, which

means that the calculated stresses are, at best,

a good guess.

a test of seamanship

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