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L~s Ma~thiessen
A STUDY IN FISCAL THEORY AND POLICY
~, .,., '• .~- I
Part One. Stabilization Policy.
With an Addendum on
N 73D584 Ek'. 8
Personal Income Taxation and Inflation
FORORD
Lars Matthiessen
A STUDY IN FISCAL THEORY AND POLICY
Akademisk avhandling
som for avlaggande av ekonomie doktorsexamen vid Handelshogskolan i Stockholm framlagges till offentlig granskning onsdagen den 30 maj 1973 kl. 10 i sal 205 a hogskolan, Sveavagen 65, Stockholm.
Stockholm 1973
Lars Matthiessen
1 er samlede i
ved Handels
r til Finans
har varet pub-
saledes tidli ...
6); sidste afsnit
m stabiliserings~
mit bidrag til
praktik (Aldus/EFI
or okonomisk teori
ogsa af Assar
kten med dem varet
det i den finans
kraft. At afhand-
blir muligt at
julpet mig. For
g takke bl.a.
Peter Dohm, Karl
og synspunkter.
aget udskrivnir~-
et praktiske stemte.
t dataa~bejde i £or
forskellige delpro
fra Financpolitiska
~ke en varm tak.
ns ovrige medlemmer.
A STUDY IN FISCAL THEORY AND POLICY Cit U DIIIF':II =::a:s-=z:a--==a-=r==========
CONTENTS ··======
Part One. Stabilization Policy. With an Addendum on Personal Income Taxation and Inflation
I Introduction
II Measuring the Income Effects of Fiscal Policy. A Review and Comparison of Alternative Approaches
III A Note on the Haavelmo Theorem
IV Finanspolitiken som stabiliseringspolitiskt instrument. Svenska erfarenheter 1946-72.
V Index-Tied Income Taxes and Ec0nomic Policy
Part Two. Corporate Taxation and Economic C·:owth
VI Depreciation Allowances, Capital Growth and the Effective Tax Burden
VII The Nordic Investment Funds Systems. A Brief Outline
VIII An IF-model for a Growing Firm
IX Simulltions with the Model. The Tied Sector
X Simulations with the Model. The Free Sector
XI Comparisons Between Investment Funds and Other Tax Systems.
XII Some Concluding Remarks to Par~ Iwo
Appendix I Statliga skattepolitiska atgarder m.m. 1945-72 i kronologisk ordning
Appendix II Metoder anvanda vid berakning av autonoma budgetforar~ringar
Appendix III Mathematical Appendix to Chapter VIII
•
CONTENTS OF PART ONE
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II• MEASURING THE INCOME EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY. A REVIEW AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
1. Introduction
The Combi9~ Income Effects of Discretionary Measures and Automatic Budget Changes
2. L. Matthiessen 196i
3. B, Hansen 1959
4. The two definitions further compared
5. Musgrave 1964
6. B. Hansen 1969
The Full Employment Surplus as an Indicator of the Effects of Fiscal Policy
7. A crude model
8. Financial saving as an indicator
9. The full employment surplus as an indicator
10. A generalized analysis
11. Some conclusions
Budgetary Effects as Determined by the Swedish Ministry of Finance
12. Int.roduction
The proposed model 13.
14.
15.
Discussion of the Ministry of Finance measure
Conclusions
References
r CHAPTER III. A NOTE ON TilE HAAVELMO THEOREM
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Summary III:l
Introduction III:2
Some contributions to the discussion on the Haavelmo theorem
The Haavelmo theorem in models with budget flexibility
The Haavelmo theorem in models with indirect taxes
The Haavelmo theorem in a larger multiplier model
Conclusion
Appendix
References
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CHAPTER IV. FINANSPOLITIKEN SOM STABILISERINGSPOLITISKT INSTRUMENT
2.
Inledning IV:l
De anvanda analysmetoderna
Stabiliseringspolitisk kronika for ett kvarts sekel
1. Den forsta efterkrigsinflationen 1946-49
2. Koreaboom, avmattning och balans 1950-53
3. Invea·teringsboom och avmattning 1954-59
4. Hogkonjunktur och "minirecession" 1959-63
5. Boom, strukturomvandling och avmattning 1964-68
6. Konjunkturer och ekonomisk politik 1969-73
7. Den ekonomiska po1itiken infor 1973
Efterkrigstidens konjunkturpolitik i sammanfattning
Konj~tturpolitikens flexibilitet
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Exkurs IV:74
Referenser IV:76
CHAPTER V. INDEX-TIED INCOME TAXES AND ECONOMIC POLICY
A 1. Introduction
3 2. A Brief Outline of the Swedish Tax System
C The Working of the Tax System. Equity Aspects
3. The average tax rate
4. Real disposable income
5. Over-all measures of distributional unevenness
D Index Tied Income Taxes
6. Discussion of concepts
7-8 Formal analysis
9. Taxes tied to a market price index
10. Taxes tied to a- factor price index
11. Taxes tied to an index of per capita income
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V:S
V• "7 • I
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E Some Implications of Index Tying
12. Equity aspects
13. Stabilization aspects-.. The wage multiplier
14. The wage factor
15. Other stabilization aspects
16• Alloeation aspects
F Concluding *emarks
17. Summary
18. Concluding comments
RefeTences
Tables and Di!$tams
Table V:2
Table V:3
Marginal housing allowance rates 1973 irl Greater-Stockholm (%)
Marginal tax rates 1973 (%)
Table V:4 Average tax rates 1973 (%)
Table V:5 Percentage change of real disposable income when nominal income increases by 10% and prices increase 4.5% according to the 1973 tax and allowance rules
Diagram V:l The marginal tax rate - the average tax rate as a function of (assessed) income 1973
Diagram V:2 eDY as a function of (assessed) income 1973
APPENDIX I. STATLIGA SKATTEPOLITISKA ATGARDER M.M. 1945-72 I KRONOLOGISK ORDNING
3.
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A 1:1
1:1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. The post-wat peri~ h~s witnessed impressive advances in that part of
economic theoty which is relevant for macroeconomic poliCies. N'o attempt
will be made here to re\riev this development but a few important contd.
butions should be meilti~n~. Psthaps the tnost far-reachin.g innovation as
far as stabilitation poiieies are concerned has been thla replacement of
the siinple Keynesian consWn.pt:i.on function by the functions basad on Fried
man's permanent ldcome hypothesis arid Ando-MOdigliani's life-cycle hypo
thesis. AS is we11-knbWb a common implication of these two theories is
that discretionaty tak or transfer changes working through households'
c~rerit disposab1e in~ome will have relatively small effects on current
consumption expenditutes (since the permanent inccme or the expected
average fu,ture it1ClotDe trill chahse relativ~ly little). This is true hoth ' when the effects are compared with the effects obtained with a traditional
Keynesian consumption function and when they are seen in relation to the
demand impact of an equally large change of public expenditures on goods
and services. Another iinplication is that if the autonomous tax or trans
fer changes are of a temporary nature the effects may be more or less
negligible (cf. Eisner's article about the surcharge in AER 1969 and the
ensuing discussion) .. These properties of the consumption function do not
imply, of course, that fiscal policy is useless for stabilization purposes.
If a certain change of current demand is seen as necessary it is clearly
possible from a technical point of view to let an income tax change do the
job but this tax change will have to be fairly large and lagged primary
effects in subsequent periods will have to be taken into account. In
practice psychological and/or tactical obstacles to lar~e income tax
changes may evidently limit the usefulness of the income tax instrument for
demand management policies. In that case public consumption and investment
expenditures would still be powerful fiscal instruments and in most situa
tions it may be entirely sufficient to vary the rate of increase of these
items. That even the third major fiscal instrument or general indirect
taxes can be assumed to be a rather effective tool for demand management
is due to the fact that temporary changes involve not only income effects
but also intertemporal substitution effects at least as far as durable
1:2
consumer goods are concerned. These substitution effects could of course
be greatly increased if even uegative indirect taxes or subsidies were
used.
Another important theoretical contribution with implications for economic
policy is of course the Meade-Tinbergen-Hansen analysis of the relation
ship between ends and means with either fixed or relative targets. Also
Theil's work on optimal decision rules should be mentioned here. Recently
Lei£ Johansen has extended this analysis in papers on targets and instru
ments under uncertainty and on the optimal use of forecasts in economic
policy decisions. Even Mundell's celebrated article on the appropriate use
of monetary and fiscal policy and the ensuing assignment discussion can be
seen as an extention of the ends-means analysis. A problem with Mundell's
Principle of Effective Market Classification is of course that as soon as
we have left the simple model he used to explain the working of his prin
ciple, it may be hard to rank the chosen instruments with regard to the
size if their relative impact on the targets considered.
In more recent articles Christ in addition to Ott and Ott has emphasized
the importance of the government budget constraint and they have de
monstrated how policy and other multipliers are affected when this con
straint is considered. The relevance of the government budget restriction
for short-run analysis will of course depend upon the speed of the adjust
ment processes in the economy.
Despite the improvements in economic theory and in our knowledge of the
working of industrialized economies it is a fact that full-scale and re
liable econometric models are still not available in most - if not all -
countries. This means evidently that policy-makers will have to face large
margins of error for a long time to come but as plenty of evidence shows
short-run policies are nevertheless worthwhile.
2. The basic theme of the present study is economic policy. The possibi
lities of varying this theme are of course unlimited. Three main variations
are distinguishable in the study. In the following three chapters we shall
deal with some theoretical and empirical aspects of stabilization policy.
Chapter V is devoted to a discussion of the working of the present personal
income tax system in Sweden and some important implications of index tying
I:3
for distribution, allocation and stabilization policies. In the remaining
part of the study our concern will be the functioning of the corporate
tax system in a growing economy. Let us briefly summarize the analysis
in each chapter and add some comments.
3. The demand for simple measures of the effects of fiscal policy is based
on at least two considerations. The first is of course the unavailability
of complete and reliable econometric models and the second is the natural
desire of policy-makers and the general public to have simple measures
which may be used to assess different policies. The amazing vitality of
the conventional budget balance and the use of the full employment in the
United Stat~s surplus illustrates this point very well. Or to quote Marina
von Neuman Whitman:
"• •• she likelihood that decision-making rules will be adopted by 1 policy-makers increases in direct proportion to their simplicity." )
In Chapter II the usefulness of the full-employment surplus and the simple
measure used by the Swedish Ministry of Finance since 1969 is discussed.
It is shown that even though the full employment surplus (FES) in a sense
is a better indicator than the conventional budget balance it is still
conceivable that a certain change of FES may be associated with expansio
nary, zero or contractionary effects of fiscal policy. Or conversely a
given income effect of fiscal policy may be associated with an increased 7
unchanged or decreased FES.
The theoretical framework behind the ministry of finance measure has not
been fully explained by the constructor. It is shown in the last part of
Chapter II that rather restrictive assumptions are needed in order to ge
nerate the formula used by the ministry of finance. This is true whether
the underlying model is assumed to be a static or a truncated dynamic
multiplier model.
Related to the discussion in Chapter II is also the presentation in
Chapter IV of the methods used in that chapter to analyze the impact
effects of fiscal policy in Sweden since 1946. It is indisputable that
even that approach is highly simplified. Especially regrett~ble is that
1) See Marina von Neuman Whitman: Policies for Internal and External Balance. Special Papers in International Finance,No. 9. Princeton 1970, p. 44.
1:4
it has been ne~essary to disregard the effects of fiscal (and monetary)
policy on private investments and to abstain from a separation of the effects
on GNP and on imports. The reason for this is of course lack of precise
knowledge about the investment and import functions. The same weaknesses
characterize the ministry of finance approach.
In Chapter II we have finally returned to a discussion about the appropriate
way of defining the total effects of fiscal policy when the effects of built
in flexibility is explicitly ~aken i~to account. In a 1959 article Bent
Hansen suggested a-measure which implied that the actual total effect of
exogenous changes wauld ~.b~ the same as the effects of fiscal policy
even though one assume~ that only fiscal parameters ate changed. In an ar
ticle two years later the present writer proposed art alternative measure
without the unpleasarlt implication just mentioned. thte~ years after that
(1964) Musgrave used the same measure of total effects which was suggested
as an alternative to Bent Hansen's. When in 1969 Bent Hansen returned again
to these problems of measurements in connection with his work for OECD he
abandoned his original measure and made use of the alternative measure. 1)
4. During the early post-war years the discussion of balanced budget changes
-or the Haavelmo theorem as Schneider named.it- was very intrusive. The
great stir that accompanied its introduction in the 1940's was by no means
surprising since the theorem demolished the grounds for the older assumption
that balanced budget changes are neutral in their income effects. This
also rendered the budget bala~ce suspect as an indicator of fiscal policy
effects. To arrive at these important results it was quite sufficient to
establish the multiplier effect of a balanced budget change in a simple
multiplier model where it,.ae it happened, appeared to be unity. One could
say that the discussion of the theorem largely has been an attempt to
specify conditions under which the unity version is not valid and to gene
ralize the assumptions without invalidating the unity version of the theorem.
After having discussed the theorem in a series of models it is concluded
in Chapter III that that the interesting thing about the theorem (which
of course vanishes if the government budget constraint is taken into
account) is not that the multiplier in very special cases may be unity
1) In his 1969 book Bent Hansen did not refer to the 1959-61 discussion, instead he referred to Musgrave's article from 1964.
I:5
but that it in general differ from zero. It is also suggested that if the
1948 fiscal study by Gelting (who formulated the theorem as early as in 1941,
4 years before Haavelmo) had been translated, a part of the following dis
cussion would have been superfluous.
5. In the field of economic policy, Sweden has bQen a forerunner in many
respects. The evidence of this is riot only the ingerluity with which a ser:i.es
of instruments for economic poiicy has been developed but also the bold spirit
in which new tools have been tried in ~ctual economic policies. Illustrating
examples are the active labour market policies outlined by Rehn and M~idnet, the investment fuhda, the ATP~system and other parts of social policies.
Included in the list should alSo be the budget propo-sed by Ernst Wigforss
in 1933 when the first, albeit reluctant, steps towards a compensatory fiscal
policy were taken aariiet than in most other countri~s. It was therefore hatdl"
surprising that tha group of OECD-experts, Who had studied fiscal ~olicies
in seven industrialized countri~s 1955-65 in their final report conclude:i
that"··· short-term demand management lin Sweden! shows a hetter record
than in any of the other countries we have examined • ,,i)
During the post-war years Sweden has experienced six business cycles which
roughly may he located to the periods 1946-49, 1950-53, 1954-58, 1959-63,
1964-68 and 1969-73. In Chapter IV an attempt has been made to outline the
interplay between anticipations, conjunctural development and actual economic
policies during each of the six business cycles. MOreover, an attempt has heen
made to assess the impact of fiscal policies by the method described in the
chapter. There is no need to recapitulate this analysis here. Concerning the
period 1953-63 our conclusion is that with a few minor exceptions stabiliza
tion policies appear to have been not only counter-cyclical but also appropriate
taking the conjunctural developments into account. The same conclusion does
not apply to the years 1964-73. That economic policies in the later period was
far less successful than earlier was primarily due to the fact that restrictive
measures to control the developing boom 1964-65 and again 1969-70 were taken
1) See Fiscal Policy for a Balanced Economy, OECD Paris 1968, p. 59.
1:6
about a year too late. The restrictive poli¢ies were even maintained
after the passins o( the peaks and contributed without doubt to the
severity of the ensu~ng recessions. This is especially true with re
gard to the last recession - the deepest of all during the post-war
period - since the aijtonomous tax increase in 1971 amounted to a
nearly incredibie 1.8 per cent of GNl? ~ It is true that a vast ntimber
of stimulating measures have been taken during 1971 and 1972 but it
is equally true ~hat they were entirely inadequate to restore full
employment in Sweden~ on the other hand foreign exchange tesetves
have been accumulating at an unprecedented rate since 1970.
Chapter IV also contains a discussion of the possible flexibility of .. · ....
fiscal policy in Sweden but it will take us too far astray to summarize
the arguments here. A ru1e to which econondc policy in Sweden has ad
hered strictly since the early Fifties implies that restrictive actions
should be mostly general whereas stimulating measures should be se
lective. This policy is very much influenced by the ideas and re
commendations of COsta Rehn put forward some 20 years ago. Considerin~
the prolonged stagnation in the Swedish economy 1971-72 and the recent
insufficiency of stabilization policies, a less mechanical application
of old rules of thumb seems to be called for in the future.
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6. For many years the unevenness of the ihcome distribution in Sweden
shared the fate of the weather that much was said about it but very little
was done about it. In the late Sixties and early Seventies a chan~e seems
to have occUrred as far as the income distribution is concerned. The forces
behind this change are of course neither few nor simple. No attempt will be
made here to characterize the changes of attitudes which might have taken
place. It may be noted, however, that in a number of respects economic con
di tion.s in Sweden have in recent years been developing in ways which pro
bably have facilitated poiicies aiming at changes of relative ~age rates.
To exemplify one may here mentio~ the prolonged and high unemployment
1966-68 and 1971-73, the increased rate of structu~al change since 1965
and the development of a pronounced excess supply of "white-collar workers"
and most categories of university educated wage earners. These f~ctors (and
all those not mentioned) are of course interrelated and in addition part~y
influenced by actual distributional policies (e.g. the solidaric wage po
licy).
The increased concern about the income distribution - which has focused on
relative wage rates and apparently disregarded the welf~re implications of
large-scale unemployment - has lead to a greater emphasis on income de
pendent transfers. An important example of this is the shift from general
housing subsidies to the present housing allowances. This development anJ
the more or less continuous increase of the public sector has lead to
strongly increased marginal income tax rates. In its turn this has re
sulted in an impressive number of suggestions about possible alternative
tax systems without some of the properties followin~ from high marginal
rates. It has also given rise to some actual changes of the tax and trans
fer system. Thus the income concept on which housing allowances are based
has been changed (from 1973) from taxable to assessed income which means
that the reduction of the basic exemption does not any longer increase the
marginal housing allowance rates. In addition the housing allowance r.'ltes
have been lowered somewhat (given the size of the maximal housing allow
ances this means of course that higher incomes than before qualify for
these allowances). The combined results of these changes have been that
the maximal tax and housing allowance rate, which was 97-93 per cent - ' according to the 1972 rules, was lowered to 92 per cent. More important
than that is that the length of the densely populated income intervals
where the maximal marginal rates apply has been reduced significantly.
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It iS quite clear that there is no simple solution to the "marginal tax
rate pro~lem" (some may not, of course, see. it as a l?roblelXl at all) which
~t the sam~ time satisfy desires for low marginal rates, strong redistri
butive effects. large revenues etc. In Chap~er V we shall therefore refrain
from discussing alternative tax systems which are radically different frolXl
the present one. The main purposes of Chapter v are instead firstly to
illustrate the working of the present Swedish personal income tax system
arid secondly to discuss. the inqnications of index tying. To indicate the
functioning of the tax system tables showing the marginal and average tax
rates With housins. and child allowances taken into account are presented.
Moreovet the ~hange of real disposable income restiltin~ from a nominal
income increase of io per cent and a price rise of 4.5 per cent (the swe~
dish average i9t')o-1i) are shown for it large number of cases~ These tables
show the strongly ~edistributive ·effects of the present system in the ab
sence of tax shifting. aut they also teveal that it is virtually impossible
for very large groups of families with children to obtain improvements of
their real disposable income unless transfer payments are increased dis
cretionarily every year. In a sense it may appear paradoxical that a tax
/policy which is strongly redistributive at the same time rules out that
• the benificiaries by themselves can improve their lot (nevertheless de-
\ termined efforts by these income earners will be necessary - disregarding
discretionary increases of transfers - to limit the inescapable reduction
of real disposable incomes). These properties are not paradoxical, how
ever, but follow from the structure of average and marginal tax rates.
An introdu~tion of index-tied income taxes and allowances would evidently
not involve any change of the tax system compared with the initial situation
but it would prevent increases of the tax burden (decreases of real dis
posable incomes) which are due to inflationary developments. In Chapter V
we have in turn considered the tying of income taxes to a consumer price
index measured at market prices and factor cost and to an index of nominal
per capita income. The latter scheme would of course be the most far
-reaching since in that case income taxation would be neutral, not only
as far as inflation is concerned but also with regard to productivity
changes. It is shown that the distribution of income - measured by e.g.
Lindahl's maximal redistribution ratio or the concentration ratio - is
invariant to uniform nominal income increases matched by equally large
., ~.•
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price increases under an index tied tax system. In the absence of such
a system groupe wi~h children and relatively low incomes would inste:1.d
see their shares of real income reduced.
tn Chapter V it has also been shown, using Lundberg's wage multiplier,
that the nominal income increases necessary to secure a given rise of
real d~sposable incom~ w~il be smaller with index tying than under a
nominal talt system~ Itide:ic tying nlay therefore d~pen cost-push in
flation. At the same time both automatic stabilizers and the automatic
grcwth of central government taxes will be reduced by index tying. Need
less to say, a political decision is invol~ed in a simultaneous evalua
tion of these and other implications of index tying.
7. · In two pioneering articles Domar atid Eisner have shown that the right
to accelerated depreciatic;n results not only in a parti.al tax deferral for
all firms but also a permanent tax reduction for expanding firms. Domar
4nd Ebner, however, did riot introduce an explicit measure of the effective
tax burden in their analyses~ Instead they studied the ratio !letwe'en normal
and al:ctH4rated depreciation allowances under different sets of assum;:tions.
In a 1963 paper (see note 2, p. VI:3) ta~en introduced the effective tax
rate into the discussion but without presenting a formal analysis. The pur
pose of Part TWo of the study is to present a formal analysis of the re
lationship between depreciation allowances, the Nordic investment funds
and the effective tax rate (that is the actual tax payment or liability
as a ratio of profits in the economic sense). In Chapter VI different typc:s
of depreciation allowances for fixed capital and inventories are taken into
\ account. It is shown that the effective tax rate will be smaller the hi:I,h-.::r
l are the rate of growth and the rates of depreciation. Further it appears
that the higher are the profit rate and the coefficient of wear and tP'lr,
the higher the effective tax rate will be. If the rates of depreciation
are changed the effective tax rate will, during a period of transition
converge towards a limiting value.
In the remaining chapters of Part TWo the same type of analysiJ as was
used to analyze depreciation allowances in Chapter VI is applied to in
vestment funds (IF) as known in Sweden and the other Nordic countries.
Since already three studies have been devoted to the Swedish IF-system
a few words may be in order to explain the differences between these
I:lO
studies and the one undertaken here. In the two survey investigations
made within KONJUNKTURINSTITUTET by Eliassen and Rudbetg-Ohman (see (1c) and (31)) the aim was to measure the macroeconomic effects on investment
activity and employment of the releases made in 1962 and 1967-58. Some
of the results of these surveys are mentioned. in Chapter VII. TI1e purpose
of Johanston-Edenhammar's study was~ on the other hand- to measure pro
fitability effect of a given allocation or of financing a single given in
vestment project with released funds instead of with internal funds. It
is thus evident that the analysis presented here is significantly diffe""'
rent from the three other studies. We investigate how large the effective
tax rate is if a firm With a given growth rate makes yearly allocations to
investment funds while releases are granted regularly by the authorities~
It is in other words not a question of individual investment projects but
of a growing flow of such projects.
In Chapter VII the most important features of the various systems are pre
sented as well as the development of the Swedish system. It appears that
the Swedish and the Danish systems are the extreme ones since the Swedish
system par excellence is an instrument for counter-cyclical and regional
policies whereas the Danish variant is designed with the exclusive aim of
promoting industrial growth. According to the Danish rules it is entirely
up to the firms to withdraw the funds when they are needed (which means
that the size of the free sector is 100 per cent). In pweden, an the ather
hand, nearly all funds are released with the authorities' permission. In
Norway and Finland all funds are transferred from the government controllel
"tied" sector to the free sector after 4-5 years.
Chapter VII also contains a discussion of two possible inter~retations of
the investment funds. According to the first, allocations are seen ns 1e
preciation allowances in advance of the purchase of the asset to be written
down. This is the interpretation used in the Swedish law and one important
implication is that an immediate depreciation of an asset financed with
released funds is ~ deductible. According to another interpretation
allocations are viewed as sterilization of profits. It seems as if these
two interpretations of the IF-provisions in some cases might hav . .:: been
mixed up in the literature as is shown in Chapter VII. This chapter finally
also contains a brief survey of the actual utilization of investment funds
in Sweden and the other Nordic countries.
I:ll
In Chapter VIII tb,e IF-model for a growing firm is deVeloped. to keep the
analysis as simpleas possible a whole series of simplifying assumptions
i$ used. Among these is the ~saumpt~on that .the firm's grow.th rate is
exogenously given and this rules out, of course, that the investment de~ ·. - '
cisions of the firm are deterUdned by, among other things, the tax in-
centives ~ffered thtough the It-system. !n this respect the present ana
lysis of inveatdent fUnds is similar to t~e one made by, Johansscn-EJen
hammar. In the last instance we ate ol course interested in the poSSible t ' . ~
effeets ·of the IF-system_ori capital formation in the private Sector. At
the end of Chapter VIti it h shown that an increased level of irtv~st'"'
menta in release years will lower the a~erage effective tax rate whether
or not the increased. investtaerlt acH~ity teshlts in an unchanged or in
creased rate of a\?etage growth, the tF ... system provides in other words in
centives to change the time p~tketn in accordance with the wishes of the
authorities arid to increase the grawth rate.
8. The dUmericai si~ulations ate presented in Chapter IX for the tied
-sector system and in Chapter X for the free-sector systems. In Chapter XI
certain numerical comparisons are made with various depreciation systems.
Since the number of parameters is relatively large these simulations cannot
be very exhaustive and they are also rather difficult to summarize~ Under
the tied system the average effective tax rate seems to be rather insensi
tive to changes of the growth rate. This is not true of the investment re
striction (implying that releases cannot exceed current gross investments)
and a higher growth rate will thus make it possible to release more funds
without violating the investment restriction. In its turn this would re
duce the firm's tax burden.
By nearly all writers on investment funds it has been pointed out that the
tax benefit obtained is smaller the higher the wear and tear rate is. In
Chapter IX it is shown that with a large wear and tear rate it becomes
possible for the firm under certain conditions to obtain a lower tax ~urden
than with a small wear and tear rate. The reason is of course that in the
former case the investment restriction is less likely tn be violated. As
is seen in Chapter X the covariation between the effective tax rate and
the growth rate under the Norwegian system is strongly positive.
I:12
In Chapter XII, finally, the usefulness of investment funds compared to
other tax devices is discussed ~riefly. It is stressed that positive or
negative investment taxes in certain respects seem to be more useful than
investment funds.
II: 1
CltAPTER II
MEASURING THE iNCOME EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY. A REVIEH AND CO~IPAr.ISON
OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Introduction
1. Although our knol-Tledge about the workine of industrially advanced
economies has increased tremendously duriri.g the post.:..w~r pedod, we stiil
cannot claim to "see the light at the end of the turtnel". ~t is also a
fact in most - if not all - countries that comi>lete and reliable economet
ric models of the economy useful for pbiicy purposes ate not avaitable
today. Since economic policy c4nn~t be Pdstpbned until such models ha~e
been constructed, estimated and tested a large number of ''second"'best"
approaches to the measurement of the effects of @corto~ic po1icy has appear
ed, especially since the middle of the Fifties. In Sweden, interest iri
this field was greatly stimulated by the publication in 1955 of Bent
Hansen's penetrating and influential book The Economic Theory of Fiscal
Policy and Assar Lindbeck's pioneering empirical study of the effects of
fiscal policy in Sweden made in 1956, the same year as Cary Brown published
his equally important study of American fiscal policy in the Thirties.
The aim of this chapter is not to present an exhaustive review and evalua
tion of all important contributions in this area. We shall instead discuss
a limited selection of alternative and mostly Swedish approaches to the
measurements of income effects of fiscal policy. In the following 5 sections
the measures suggested by Bent Hansen, R.A. Musgrave and the present writ~r
will be presented and compared. Then follows a discussion of the full em
ployment surplus and the chapter is completed with an evaluation of the
policy effect measure which has been used by the Swedish Ministry of
Finance since 1969. The presentation in Chapter IV of the methods used to
analyze fiscal policy in Sweden during the post-war period should be
seen as an extention of the discussion on mc..asurement in this chapter.
II:2
the !;embined Income Effects of Discretionary Measures and Automatic
jpdg!t. Gh.4nges
2. The hhilt-in stabilizer has for a long time be.en a standard notion in
macroeconomic literature but nevertheless it has been very common to ab
stain from discussing the precise meahing of the concept. As Lusher has
pointed out
"Sucht-etmsas 'budget flexibility' and 'built-in stabilizers' have come to be accepted currency in economic discussions •••• As often as not, however, the currency engraving is fuzzy and ill defined. And, most generally, the currency circulates without established values."l)
In this part of the chapter we shall return to some attempts to define the_
effects of fiscal policy when the effects of built-in stabilizers are seen
as a part of fiscal policy.
In a 1959 article Bent Hansen proposed a way of defining the effects of
fiscal policy and two years later Hansen's approach was criticized by the
present writer who suggested an alternativ definition. Let us restate
this discussion as briefly as possible.
Within a given model the effect on for instance real national income Y
of an exogenous change dA is normally measured as the differential
dY • (3Y/3A)dA. The total change of Y may be due to exogenous changes
in the private sector of the economy, d~, or to discretionary government
measures, dAG. We may thus write
(1)
where
(2)
and
(3)
dYG indicates the effect of fiscal policy in the case when the effects
of automatic budget changes are ~ taken into account explicitly. We now
want to consider these effects explicitly. To begin with it should be
1) See [ 17] p.
II:3
pointed out that the fact that effects are imPuted to automatic budget
changes evidently makes no difference as far as the total effects are con
cerned, given the model and the exogenous changes considered. To attribute
a certairi effect dYM to automatic changes simply means that the total
effect cit ' is divided into
w M . H w dY • (dY + dY ) - dY • dY - dY (4)
dYH is the hypothetical (or potential) effect of exogenous changes or the
effect in the absence of built-in-stabilizers. And the effect of built-in·
stabilizers is that part of the potential effect of exogenous changes which
is not realized due to the presence of built-in stabilizers in th~ economy.
The effect of budget automatics is in other words the difference between
the effects of exogenous changes in the actual model and the effects in the
hypothetical model without built-in stabilizers or
(5)
If for instance the income tax system is the only important built-in
stabilizer in an economy, then it is only the income tax funtions which are
different in the actual and the hypothetical model. The effect imputed to
budget automatics will then depend upon the nature of the hypothetical tax
function on which the comparison is based.
Now it is clear that exogenous changes in both the private and the public
sector will result in automatic changes of tax revenues etc. Combining (1)
and (4) we may therefore write
dY = (d~ - dY;) + (d~ - dY~) (6)
In equation (6) the total change of Y has been split in the following
four components: the potential effect of exogenous changes in the private
sector (dY:) and in the government sector (dY~) respectively, and the effects
of budget automatics due to exogenous changes in the private sector (dY;)
and in the government sector (dY~) respectively. It now appears arrrorriate
to define the income effects of fiscal policy in this way
(7)
The relationship between dYF and dY is consequently
dY • dYF + d~ (8)
II:4
3. In his article Bent Hansen defined the income effects of fiscal policy
differently. With the notation used here his definition would be~
tt __ H tt tt dY' = dY - dY = dr~ - 2 dY - dY 1!' G G G P
(9)
The difference petween (7) and (9) is, as appears, that the first term in
(7) is the hyPO~h~~ic-1 effect of fiscal parameter changes whereas the
first term in (9) is the actu41 effect of fiscal parameter changes. What
is the relationship bet~en dY ~nd dYF? As is easily seen we get
dY • dYF + dY~ + dY~ (10)
If the effects of fiscal policy is defined in accordance with (9}, dY
will not be divided into a component expressing the effects of fiscal rolicy
and a residual referable to the private sector as was the case when defi
nition (7) was used, cf. equation (8). Instead we have got in (10) a third M
component dYG.
If we assume that no exogenous changes occur in the private sector it arpears
reasonable - in fact necessary - to ascribe the total income change rlY to
fiscal policy so that dYF = dY. This result also follows from the use of
definition (7). If, on the other hand definition (9) is our starting point
we get the less than plausible result
dY "" dY' + dY" F G (11)
4. The determination of the effects of budget automatics is, as alreaGy
pointed out, only fcrmal as long as the norm of comparison has not been
specified. Different specifications of the hypothetical tax function :>.rc
of course conceivable. Following Musgrave, absence of built-in stahiliz2rs
would imply that all marginal tax rates are zero (cf. [22] p. 508-0Q),l) If
Musgrave's norm of comparison is accepted, if the effects of fiscal policy
are defined in accordance with (7) and if, finally, ~regressive income
taxes but not indirect taxes appear in our model, it follows that
1) the income multipliers for discretionary and automatic tax chan~es
will be identical and
2) this tax multiplier will be independent of the (macr0economic)
marginal tax rate.
1) According to Lusher the hypothetical tax function is a pronortional one and the tax rate equal to the actual average tax ratio in the initial position. In that case only a progressive tax system would be a huiltin stabilizer. See [17].
..
II:5
If, on the other band, Bent Hansen's definition (9) is used, the two tax
multipliers will be different and the marginal tax rate will appear in the
multiplier eexpression for autonomous tax changes.
5. In an article from 1964 Musgrave has discussed different measures of
fiscal policy effects. What Musgrave calls 'fiscal lever,,e• 1 is defined
in this way
L • Kd(G + R + R. + 0.9R + 0.3R. - O.ST - 0.9T ) (12) s -0 p 1 c 0
Kd is the income-government expenditure multiplier without tax leakage.
The multiplicand is the sum of the impact on demand of all major budget
items. G • public expenditures on goods and services, R = transfer pay
ments to states (s), business (b) and households (p), R. = interest pay-1
ments, T • corporate taxes and T • other taxes. In the analysis, effects c 0
of fiscal policy on private investments are not considered. The personal
income tax seems to be the only eTdcgaous budget item in Musgrave's analysis.
With a MPC (with respect to GNP, not disposable income) of 83 % and a
marginal tax rate of 30 % the multiplier with tax leakage will be equal
to 2.4 while Kd = 6. Using different assumptions concerning time lags
Musgrave calculates for different recession periods 6L/(6L - 6GNP)
"which gives the percentage of GNP decline which is prevented due to the
leverage change". For expansion periods is calculated 6L/(6GNP - 61)
which indicates "the percentage boost in the rise of GNP due to change in
leverage". Here we are not concerned with Musgrave's con~lusicns regard-
ing American fiscal policies 1957-63. What instead is of great interest here
is the nature of the measure used by Musgrave. And our conclusion is that
Musgrave's 6L is in principle the same measure as that which was suerest
ed in EKONOMISK TIDSKRIFT 1961 and reproduced here as equation (7). Mus
grave stresses that "changes in leverage as here estimated, include both
built-in and discretionary changes, not only the latter, as would re the
case if 61 was measured against a fixed (e.g. full employment) level
of income" •1 >
1) See [23] p. 214.
II:6
6. In connection with his work for OECD on fiscal policy in seven countries,
Bent Hansen returned to these problems 9f measurement. In 1969 Hansen used
this definition of the effects of fiscai policy:
(13)
A comparison with (7) shows immediately that Bent Hansen's new definition
of the total (or combined) effect of fiscal policy is the safue as the one
suggested by the pr~sent writer in 1961 and thus also the same as Musgrave's
AL from 1964. Hansen has in other words abandoned his 1959 definition.
Ransen•s division of the total effects into effects of disctetionary and
automatic changes is on the other hand not the same as that in (7). (Since
Musgrave only measures the total effect, Hansen and Musgrave cannot re
compared in this respect.) As appears Hansen's 1969 definition of the effects
of discretionary measures is the actual effect and thus the same as his
1959 definition. The effects of automatic budget changes is equal to the
effects of "extra budgetary automatics" and thus different from his older
definition. One implication of the new definitions is that the multirlier
for autonomous and automatic tax changes will be different. An argument in
favour of Hansen's splitting of total effects is perhaps that "intra
budgetary automatics" may be predicted fairly accurately and that dis
cretionary measures will be designed with regard to this automatics.
II: 7
The Full Employment,S~tplu~ as an Indicate! .of th¢ Effects of Fiscal Policy
1. since the introduction in 1962 of the £tilt empldymefit surplus by the
Kennedy administration this concept has played an important role in policy
discussions and analyses. Therefore the maih purpose of this part of the
chapter is to analyse the full employment surplus concept. Even the con
ventional surplus (financial saving of the public sector) will be considere1.
To keep things as simple as possible we shall employ the following crune
model
Y • C + I + G
C • a + b(Y-T+R)
T • tY - T 0
(14)
(15)
(16)
where Y • GNP, C = private consumption, I = private investment, G = govern
ment expenditures on goods and services, T = household income taxes, R = • transfer payments to households and t = marginal tax rate (in a macro
economic sense). I is exogenously given. The fiscal policy instruments
are G, R, T and t. We further assume there is unused capacity in the initial 0
equilibrium and that prices do not change. For that reason we need not bother
about the difference between measurement in nominal and real terms.
' Consider first actual government financial saving B = T - G - R as the impact
measure. Differentiation of the model yields:
dY • dC + dG
dC • b{dY - dT + dR)
dT • tdY + Ydt - dT0
dB • dT - dR - dG
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
The solutions for the changes in national income and the budget surplus are:
dY = k(dG - bYdt + bdT0 + bdR)
dB = k(l-b) (Ydt - bdT0 - dR - (1-t) dG)
where
k - 1 1-b(l-t)
(21)
(22)
(23)
II :8
We may regard Ydt and dT0 as the autonomous tax <1hanges while tdY is the
automatic change. As is normally the case in simple Keynesian models,
changes in public purchases affect income ~re strongly than tax or trans
fer changes. In terms of the income multipliers it is true that
~ • k > ~ • [dY ] • bk dG dR ffi (24)
This is, of cours~, related to the fact th~t the primary effect of increased
public purchases i.s to rais~ Jncome by an equal a.Diount whereas a tax in
crease (or transfer reduction) primarily causes a decrease of ptivate con
sumption;which is. only the fraction b of Ydt (dR) because private saving is
also affected. With tax revenues changing automatically in response to in
come changes the bUdget multipliers will of course be functions of the in
come multipliers. We have
dB --dG
dB --Ydt
t!!- 1. -(1-t)(l-b)k dG
~!t + 1 • (1-b)k
(25)
(26)
Since it is reasonable to assume that the marginal tax rate (in a macro•
economic sense) is less than unity, it follows that jdB/dGj<dB/Ydt. These
elementary properties of the model are basic to the following argument. Taxes
and transfer payments enter evidently the model in much the same way and we
might as well assume that G and t, but not R and T0
, are changed.
8. Now all combinations of the measures dG and Ydt which satisfy the con
dition
dG • bYdt (27)
will leave the national income unaffected as equation (21) shows. Similarly
all combinations of measures which imply that
1 dG •- Ydt 1-t (28)
will not change the budget surplus, cf. equation (22). The budgetary chan3es
are in other words balanced. The two strai3ht lines (27) and (28) are shown in
the following diagram and have been denoted Y1Y2, respectively B1B2• All com
binations of dG and Ydt lying above (below) Y1Y2 entail an increased (or de
creased) national income. In a similar way combinations of dG and Ydt above
(below) the line B1s2 result in a decrease (an increase) in the budget sur
plus. This means that all combinations of parameter changes within the sections
II:9
indicated by the unfinished circle imply changes in opposite directions of
national income and the budget surplus. Combinations within the angles
Y1os1 and Y2os2 will, on the other hand, result in changes of Y and B in
the same direction - in the first case the changes of Y and B will ~e po
sitive, in the latter case they will be negative. Finally, combinations of parameter changes located on Y1Y2 (or B1B2) will of course leave Y (B) un
affected and change B (Y).
A necessary and suffi~ient condition to obtain non-opposite changes of
national income and the budget surplus when public purchases G and the tax
rate t are changed is in other words that
b<~<....L • Ydt • 1-t
(29)
It is thus quite clear that the change of the budget surplus is not a re
liable indicator of the direction in which fiscal measures change r.ational
income.
The same point can also be made with the help of the lines MP and RP. The
line MP is parallell to B1B2 and is thus the locus of all combinations of
dG and Ydt which will lead to an increase in the budget surplus equal to
k(l-b)(l-t)(OM). The combinations represented by the points S, Nand Pre
sult thus in a decreased, unchanged, respectively increased national in
come although the budget surplus change is the same in these three cases.
The line RP parallel to Y1Y2 is similarly the locus of all combinations of
dG and Ydt which result in an increase in national income equal to k times
OR. The combinations indicated by the points R, Q and P thus give rise to
a decreased, and unchanged, respectively an increased budget surplus even
though the change in national income is the same in all three cases. 1)
1) A diagram of this type can of course also be used to indicate the policy choices open to the authorities if a certain target value for income and perhaps the budget surplus are to be attained. Assume it has been decided that the instruments G and/or t should be used to reach the desired income level and that this requires an increase in income given by the line RP. In this case any combination of dG and Ydt on the line RP will do the job. One possibility would for instance be to increase G by OR and not change t, another would be to recuce t so that Ydt = OV and not change G. The further to the right we move along RP the greater the increase in the budget surplus associated with the given income increase since in this case we have
dB • (1-b) (Ydt - k(l-t) (OR)) If for some reasons B is also a target variable with the desired value already attained in the initial position, then obviously only the measure cm-r.bination represented by the point Q will lead to the attainment of beth ain· . .:;.
.-dY > 0 dB< 0 dBf< 0
Figure II: 1
dG
'
--l-·. ··----~~"' '{ (~t
dY < 0 dB > 0 dBr> o
II:ll
The reason why the change of the budget surplus is not a reliable indicator
of the income effects of fiscal measures is of course that the budget sur
plus itself is an endogenous variable and th~ multiplier dY/dB would thus
with Samuelson's terminology be a ps~udd~ultipliet. Alternatively it may
be said that the budget surplus is an unweighted sl.itn of incotne creating and
income destroying budget items. As we have se~n, changes in different budp:et
items have different impacts on demand and it is therefore rtot sufficient to
consider the~ of budgetary changes (that is the budget surplus change).
It is instead necessary to take the cO!PositiQn or budgetary changes into
account and weight the different chanses according to their impact as g,iven
by their multipliers~
If, on the other hand, a restriction implying for instance proportionality
between dG and Ydt is imposed on fiscal policy, then - as is evident from
the diagram - the connection between the directions in which income atrl the
budget surplus change will be unambiguous. Assuming dG = aYdt - and still no
exogenous changes in the private sector - dY and dB will in fact be pro
portional, the factor of proportionality being given by
dy • a-b dB (30) (1-b) (1-a + at)
With for instance b • 0.90, t = 1/3 and a = 0.60 we get dY = -5 dB. If in
stead a • 15/16 with b and t unchanged we get dY • dB.
9. Let us now introduce the full employment surplus (FES) in the analysis.
We want to see if the change of the FES can be considered a better indicator
of the effects of fiscal policy than the actual budget change dB. The budget
surplus at full employment is
(31)
where Yf is national income at full employment. In the following we do not
take into account that Yf grows over time, to consider that would complicate
the analysis somewhat without significantly changing the conclusions. From
(31) follows that
(32)
II:l2
Let u denote the degree of capacity utilization in the economy in the
initial pdsitioh so that Y • uYf. Now the straight line
dG •.! Ydt u
(33)
in thQ locus of all combinations of fiacal measures which lea•e the FES un
ch8ngad. This line has been shown in the diagram as Bflnf2• Combinations
above (below) the line give rise to a decrease (an increase) in the FES. With the analysis based on Bf instead of B we thus see that dG and Ydt will
not cbarige inc~ ahd the budget surplus in opposite directions if this con
dition is fulfilled!
dG 1 b ~ Ydt 'u (34)
It is realistic to as9ume that the marginal tax rate is larger than the share
of unused capacity so that b < 1/u < 1/(1-t). The slope of Bfl3f2 is in other
words, greater than the slope of Y1Y2 but smaller than the slope of B1B2• From
this we can draw two conclusions. In the first place it is in a sense true that
changes in FES are a better indicator of the income effects of fiscal policy
than the actual budget surplus change. This is true in the sense that the
area with combinations of measures implying non-opposite changes of income
and the budget surplus is smaller if Bf is used as our bud6et surplus than if
we let it be B. The former area is defined by (34), the latter is determined
by (29). In the diagram the difference between the two areas is n1oBfl +
+ B2onf2• Alternatively it is perhaps possible to argue that an opposite sign
variation is somewhat more probable for dY and dB£ than for dY and dB.
This leads us directly to the second conclusion. Not even knowled3e of the
change in the FES enables us to determine unambiguously the direction of the
impact of fiscal policy. In the diagram the combinations of measures repre
sented by Q, T and P lead to the same change in income while the full employ
ment surplus decreases, is unchanged, respectively increases with these three
combinations.
II:13
That: the FES change is an imperfect measure of budgetary impact has of course
been pointed out by the CEA economists who have introduced and made extensive
use of the concept. 1) ln his book Okun mentions briefly some of the drawbacks ..
of the .FES and then puts his conclusion this way:
"We ci:J.n adjust the full employment surplus for these (flaws) to a degree, but we need better quantifications or fiscal impact. Still, for all its flaws, the full employment surplus is a shining jewel compared to the actual surplus (or deficit), which makes it appear that fisc$1 po1icy 2) has shifted whenever a swing in private demand alters federai revenues."
10. In the previous ahaly$is • go'\ferntnetit purchases of goods and ser11ices and
the tax rate were the policy instruments to be used. Clearly a fair numbet of
other instrum~nts could have been used as well. Let H. and H. denote two un-1 J
apecified paraflleters of action available for policy purposes. If these para-
meters are changed, national income, the actual budget surplus and the full
employment surplus will be changed so that
dY = Y.dH. + Y.dH. (35) 1 1 J J
dD • B.dH. + B.dH. 1 1 J J
(36)
dB£ • Bf.dH. + bf.dH. 1 1 J J
(37)
(35) - (37) correspond, of course, to equations (21), (22) and (32), andY. 1
andY. are income multipliers of the usual sort. Similarly B., B., 0f. and J 1 J 1
Bf. are budget multipliers. For the combinations of measures dH. and dll., J 1 J
which will leave Y, B and Bf unchanged, it must be true that
Y. dH.
1 • - -1 dH.
yi J (38)
IL dH.
1 • - -1 dH.
ni J (39)
nf. dH. • - _!J. dHj
1 Bfi (40)
1) See e.g. Okun(25)p.121 and "Statement of Gardner Ackley, Chairman, accompanied by Otto Eckstein and Arthur M. Okun, member of the Council of Econumic Advisers, before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, July 20, 1965." See also Hansen (12) pp. 25-26 and ~3ator (1) pp. 406-407. The full employment surplus was presented for the first time in.Eco· nomic Report of the President, January 1962, pp. 78-81, reprinted in (3eJ PP· 47-so.
2) See (25) p. 121.
II:l4
(38) - (40) are generalized expresaions corresponding to the three straight
lines Y1t 2, B1s2 respecti~ely BflBfl in our diagram. The slope of each line
is thus the ratio of the two multipliers. If (38) should happen to coincide
with (39) the sign variation for dY and dB would be unambiguous in accordance
with the oldu and oversimplified;idea. The condition for this is obviously
that Y./Y. • D./D •• It is not difficult to think of pairs of instruments J 1 J 1 '
which satisfy this condition. one such combination would, of course. be income
taxes and transfer payments provided the consumption function looks like (15). 1)
It can also be shown that the lines (l8) and (39) will coincide in the case '\
where public purchases and a consumption tax is changed if private consump-
tion is a constant proportion of disposable income. 2) But these are special
cases and in general the three lin~B cannot be expected to coincide.
11. It should be stressed that the analysis in the last four sections has
been concerned mainly with the directions in which national income and the
budget surplus change and not with the size of these changes. As we hav~ seen,
this sign variation is not unambiguous in general. From this follo•.rs, of course,
a fortiori that the size of the budget surplus change cannot be used as a re
liable indicator of the size of the income effects of fiscal policy. Instead
such an evaluation should be based on the precise parameter changes responsible
1) If the relevant consumption function is C = a + b1Y - bzT + b3R the condition would not be fulfilled even though t and R were the instruments.
2) The consumption function is
c C • __! ,. b Y-T+R
p p m m
where Pm is the price level and m denotes market prices. This consumption function is of course free of money-illusion. We assume that the factor price level is constant and equal to that of the base period, i.e. Pf = 1. With no indirect taxes in the base period and complete shifting we have Pm • 1 + ti (where ti is the indirect tax rate applied on the price before tax so that Ti = tiC). With these assumptions, the distinctions between market and factor prices and current and fixed prices coincide. Assuming finally that T is exogenous we can calculate the following income and budget multipliers:
dY • 1 + ti . dY = _ 1 dG 1 - b + ti ' Cdti 1 - b + ti
dB (1-b) (l+ti) dB 1 -= ; - -dG 1 - b + ti Cdti 1 - b + t· 1
The slopes oftle(38) and {39) are of equal size since
dY/dG dD/dG dY/Cdti • dB/Cdti • - (l+ti)
II:lS
for the budget surplus change. That it makes a significant difference
whether the measure of fiscal policy impact is based on budget surplus
changes or on parameter changes has been demohstrated empirically by 3ent
Hansen. In his recent book oil fiscal liolicy Hansen has correlated actual
budget surplus changes and the total e'ffects of budgetary changes as de
fined in his study. For the U~ited States - but not for the United Kingdom,
Western Ger~ny, France, Italy and S~eden - the relationship between these
two entitietJ 1955/65 was in fact nearly a proportibnal one, the factor of
proportionality beins approximately equal to the simple u.s. multiplier
used by Hansen. Iianseit concludes • hct~ever, that
"if the change of the budget balance can be used at all as a satisfactory proxy for the estimated effect, this may only be due to a lucky coincidence qf circumstances' ••· There is nothing inherent in the economic systeli which would tend to conserve such a relationship in the future ••• we should not rely on the changes of the budget balance as a proxy for the estimated budget effects."l)
The previous analysis was deliberately based on a very simple expenditure
model since that was sufficient to reach our conclusions above. In a more
complete model it would have been possible to take into account also fiscal
policy repercussions on e.g. private saving, labor supply and the com?osi
tion of private consumption via relative price changes (substitution effects)
and the effects of changes in the wealth and liquidity position of the private
sector caused by fiscal changes (asset effects). Clearly, a policy-maker woul1
have to consider not only income effects but also substitution and asset
effects, at least in a rough way. It seems safe, however, to argue that if
our negative conclusions concerning the usefulness of budget changes as a
measure of fiscal impact are valid in a simple model, they will hold good
a fortiori in more complex models. 2)
1) See (12) PP• 80-81.
2) In recent articles Christ and others- see (a), (9) and (27) -have analyzed how the traditional expenditure and tax multipliers are influenced if the government budget restraint is taken into account explicitly. The restraint implies of course that all government expenditures must be financed either by taxes, borrowing from the private sector or money-printing. This approach is, in fact, a denial of the traditional multipliers analysis as far as fiscal instruments are concerned. Instead only balanced budget changes in a generalized sense are considered. In final equilibrium, expenditures must always equal taxes and there is virtually no budget balance to use as an indicator. In short-run quasi-equilibrium this is not so but although the multipliers differ from the traditional ones our conclusions concerning the budget balance will in all likelihood still hold good.
II:l6
Similarly it can be shown to be of no importance in this context whether
the bud&et concept used is' the nat~onal income account budget (as above),
the current budget, ~he administrative budget, the consolidated cash budget
or the most recent• the unified budge.t. 1) Also it makes no difference whether
we consider the central government (federal) budget alone or the budgets of
state and local governments are included. Or to quote Bator:
" ••• the beginning of wisdomin these matters is that no deficit, hovever measured, is an indicator o~ the expansionary or contractionary effect of the budget on total demand~n2}
Budgetary J:;ffects as Determined by· ~he Swedish Ministry of Finance
12, In the Preliminary Natio!;l4tl3Wiget (PNB) published by the Swedish
Ministry of Finance (Mf) in January 1969• a new ~ay of measuring the effects
of budgetary changes was tri&d for the fir,t time. Since th~n the same approach
has been used·in the Revised Nation~~ B~dget (RNB) from April 1969, and
in the PNB ·and RNP for 1970-73. The reports do not ~ontain a complete de•
scription of the underlying theoretical fra~work. Therefore it is somewhat
difficult to evaluate the numerical results presented.
This note is aimed ar presenting a conventional expenditure model which is
probably rather similar to the one used by the MF to determine the impact nf
fiscal policy. The model can be used to see what implicit assumptions the MF
may have made in order to arrive at the simplified determination of budgetary
effects. This nole shows that a number of the necessary assumptions are verJ
special indeed and the usefulness of the MF-measure is therefore limited. It
should be added that a numerical evaluation of the possible bias involved ~n
the MF-calculations of budgetary impact will not be attempted here. An
evaluation such as this would require consideration of alternative appr.Jaches
to the measurement of fiscal effects and this is far beyond the scoJ1e of th~
present note.
1)
2)
For explanations of the different budget concepts see, for instance, Scherer (28), Lewis (16) pp. 1-12 and Hansen (12) pp. 473-75.
See (1) p. 406.
II:l7
13. The proposed model is as follows:
e • e + g + x(•y+m) (41) p
YD 13 (42) e =a-+
p p p
m• lJ(e-g) + lllf + y (43)
y -D YDH + 5B (44)
YDH ~ yf - TB - (SB-D) - (T -R) H (45)
yf + D + Ti • eP - mP (•Y ) e m m (4f)
T • T. + TB + TH - R (47) l.
Small letters have been used to indicate variables measured in fixed
prices while cepital letters denote nominal values or prices (the P's).
Index H, B, and p refer to households, business and the private sector as a
whole. The symbols are used in a traditional way as can he seen from the
comments on the equations.
The MF wants to measure the real effects of fiscal policy, not on the de
mand for domestically produced goods (GNP) but on total demand. The reasons
for this choice have not been explained.
Equation (41) thus defines total demand e - in terms of fixed market prices
and measured gross - as the sum of private consumption and investment de
mand ep, government demand g and exports x.
In equation (45) corporate gross saving is denoted ry SB, capital depre
ciation by D and households' direct taxes and transfer payments hy TH
and R, respectively. The Household sector's nominal disrosahle income
YDH is what remains of the total factor income Yf after corporate taxes
TB' net corporate saving SB-D and net household direct taxes TH-P
have been deducted, cf. equation (45). When corporate gross saving is added
to the households' disposable income we obtain the total private disposable
income YD as shown by (44).
II:l8
Equation (42) shows that private demand is assumed to be a linear function
of the private sector's real disposable income. Orte possibility would he
to regard this demand function as the sum of the consumptJon function
c • at(YDH/Pc) + B1 and the investment function i = a2(SB/Pi) + 82· Pre
cluding a fixed proportion between private consumption and investment it
would then be necessary to assume that the marginal spending propensities
of the household and business sectors are of equal size (a1aa2=a) and that
price changes for ebnsumption and investment goods are equal (Pc=Pi=Pp).
Use of an investment function of the kind implied here is, of courae, an
enormous simplification but it is necessary in order to arrive at the MF
measure of fiscal effects shown in Section 14.
According to eqUation (43) real imports m are as usual determined by real
de.und. Total demand, however. has been split up into puhlic demand with a
marginal import content of Pl and private and foreign demand with a mar~
ginal import propensity of p.
Equation (46) states that the vaiue of factor incomes Yf plus depreciatiorl
D and indirect taxes T. (that is, GNP at current market prices) must t-.e 1
equal to the value of total demand less demand for imports. Equation (46)
can therefore also be regarded as the equilibrium condition. for the market
for goods and services, the only market explicitly included.
Equation (47) defines net taxes T as the sum of indirect t~es and direct
corporate and household taxes less transfer payments.
Equations (44)-(47) combined simply imply that private disposable income Y0
t is equal to the value of domestically produced P-Oods less net tax oayments.
When the model is solved for total real demand we o~tain
e • 1 l p (T G) : p P , · a(lJ-lli)~ + (1-a)g-a P - "Pj 1-r&[r- llpmj p p g
. p p
(48)
The term g • G/P has been added to and subtracted from the multiplicand g
inside the brackets. The effects on total real demand of changes in taxes
(including employers' wage taxes and investment fund deposits at the Central
Bank) and changes in real public demand (including residential housin~ con
struction) may now be determined as
II:19
6e • 1 - a(l-p+~l) 6g a 6(T ; G] 1 - a(l-p) - 1 - a(l~) J y
(49)
T-G is evidently the nominal financial saving of the public sectcr or the
national accounting budget surplus. To get from e~uation (48) to {49) it was
assumed that P • P = P = P • This would, of course, imply that all e p g m
prices are changed in the same proportion as the implicit GNP-deflator Py.
Needless to say this is a very strong assumption but it is also a necessary
part of the MF-approach. Since all taxes have been treated as exogenously
given, 6e according to equation (49) may be interpreted as the net effect
of discretionary fiscal measures and budget automatics.
14. As becomes clear from the quotation below the MF has determined the
budgetary effects according to the expression
M (T - G) 6e •6g-6 P J y
(50)
,. The difference between 6e and 6e is obviously that in equation (50),
but not in equation (49), the two weights (which are not multipliers in the
normal sense) are equal to one. This particular choice of weights is ex
plained in RND 1970, in the following way:
"The direct effects of changes in the volume of activities in the public sectors have then been totalled with the indirect effects frore the change in disposable income in the non-puhlic sectors that arises through flow displacements in the financial savinp. Here it has reen summarily assumed that these two types of chap~es are equivalent with respect to their effects on activity in the national economy and hence can be combined by simple addition. The influence exerte~ via chan~es in the flows of income in the non-public sectors is admittedly curred by leakages as saving etc., but also gives rise to chain reactions. Here it is presumed that in these cases one can insert a multiplier of 1. This, means, in other words, that a chanpe in the expenditure surplus of the composite public sector is assumed to ~e accompanie1 by an equally large change in the other sectors' demand for ~;ods and services. The combined effect on total demand is thus e~uate1 with the sum of changes in public real demand and demand genetat~d via the nurlic expenditure surplus.
According to this model the effect of bud~et chan~es is thus ortained as the sum of the changes in the pu~lic sector's purchases of goods and services and, with a negative sign, the change in financial saving, both terms being given a multiplier of +1."1)
1) See RND 1970, in The Swedish Economy, 1970:2, pp. 109-10.
II:20
In other words equation (50) - but in general not equation (49) - represents
a case where the balanced budget (change) multiplier is one.
A natural question at this point is Whether it is possible to make 6e and
6e" · correspond to each other through a proper selection of numerical values . .
for the marginal spendine and import propensities. One combirlation of para-
meter value• which would make the weights in e~uation (49) e~ual to unity is
evidently U • ~~ • 0 and a = 0.5. Assuming thAt ~ = ~ 1 = 0 i~lies, of
course, that the volume of Swedish import is cdrtsideted independent of the
voiume of production and this is hardly a reasonahle assumption. Furthermnre~
in this case it would be meanintless to make a distinction hetween bunsetary
effects on GNP and on total demand since the two are identically equal with
imports exogenously given. 1)
The "problem" of reducing equation (49) to (50) may also he "solved" if it
is assumed that ~1 • : .. 2> while at the same time a = 1/(2-ll). Let us
discuss these two assumptions and start with the second one.
It is difficult to indicate a "reasonable" size of a since a is the marri
nal propensity to spend of the entire private sector. We may point out that
if the marginal import pro~ensity p is positive and less that one a will
have to vary between 0.5 and 1.0 in order to satisfy the condition a = 1/(2-p).
Even though these intervals may be realistic a and lJ-values lying within
them may, of course produce values for the second weight in equation (49) which
differ from one. Assume for instance that p=0.4 and let a increase from
0.5 to 0.9. In this case the weight for the budget surplus chan~e would rise
from 0.71 to 1.96. Alternatively if p=0.3 this weight would instead vary
between 0.77 and 2.43. The assumption that the second weight in equation (49)
is unity is thus a very special one.
1) The budgetary effects on real GNP (y) which corresponds to 6e accordin~ to equation (49), may be written
6y • 1 - a(l-~) - ~1
1 - ~(1-p)
g ____ a~(~l~-p~)--- 6(T ; G) 1 - a(l-p) y
2) MOre than 15 years ago Baumel and Peston pointed out that the balanced budget (change) multiplier cannot be unity if public demand has an import content, see ''More on the Multiplier Effects of a Balanced '!:udget", American Economic qeview, 1955, p. 143.
11:21
Moreover a rough approximation results when the marginal import cont~nt of
public purchases is desregarded. Public investments in particular but even
residential housing construction (considered a policy parameter ~y the MF
and thus included in g) probably depend on imported parts and materials to
a not unimportant extent. Assuming a=0.9• ~=0.4 and ~1=0.1 the weieht
for g in equation (49) becomes 0.78.
Indirect repercussions on the volume of import caused by hudgetary chanres
are probably even more important. During the postwat period the Swe~ish ~conorny
has been operating at or rather close to full capacity. If real public deman~,
say, for military equipment is increased con.siderably in a situati0n with
more or less full employment and the other sectors maintain (or increase)
their real demand, the most likely outcome in the short run is a sharp rise
in imports, not only to make up the direct import content in public purchases
but also to meet private demands which can no longer be satisfied by domestic
producers. Even if unused capacity were available, bottlenecks caused ~y low
factor mobility may produce the same result.
The situation just described is obviously an extreme one. More often than not
expansions in the Swedish public sector have been accompanied by tax increases.
But stabilization policies in Sweden as elsewhere cannot be assumed tc secure
permanent balance in the economy and the possibility that changes in public
demand influence imports via the capacity restriction in the economy remains.
When measuring budgetary effects it therefore seems ~uestionacle to assume
that budget changes can alter imports only via the private sectnr's dis~vs
able income. To the extent that e.g. an expansionary fiscal ,olicy increases
imports in other ways as well, the degree of expansiveness of this policy
would of course be misjudged. On the other hand it probably has to be admitted
that in order to take the capacity restriction irto account a mere or less
full-scale econometric model would be needed.
15. In this note we have indicated a number of simplifying assumptions which
are required in order to measure budgetary effects in the same way as the MF.
It has been shown that the treatment of e.g. private investments and prices
is unsatisfactory and likely to imply considerable errors in the effects mea
sured. It has also been pointed out that the MF-measure may he less useful in
situations with full capacity utilization. Finally, it has heen argued that
the choice of numerical values for the marginal spendinp and import prorensi
ties is quite arbitrary.
11:22
It might be added that it is less reasoriable to assume, as the MF apparently
does, that the full multiplier effects are obtained in the same year as the
budget changes occur. Moreover, instead of m~a~uring budgetary effects on
total.demand it would of course he desirable to separate the effects on ~~
from those on imports.
In a recent IMP-paper (7] by Calogero the technique of analysis used by the
Ministry of Finance has been di~cUssed once more. Accordirtg to the inte~pre
tation suggested in that paper the theoreticai framework which generates the
MF-formula (so> should be a trurtcated dynamic multiplier model and not the
static multipiier model proposed above. Such a dynamic model is not formulated
explicitly in the IMF-papet but it appears likely that this can he done. It
is, however, important to note that neatly all the critical points made earlier
about the MP-procedure remain valid even if the dynamic interpretation is
accepted. It may finally be pointed out that some explaining passages (in
RNB 1969, p. 119) lend support to the dynamic interprctatiort. On the other
hand, a MF-economist (H. Hjalmarsson) who used to be directly involved in
this MF-analysis, has stated as his view that the analysis is supposed to
be static.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[u]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[11]
[18]
... ''""" . ·~ '·· . .
II:23
F.M. ~tor, "Budgeta}:'y Reform: Notes on Pri~ciples and Strategy", Re\7iew of Etonomicsand Statistics supplement 1963• pp. 115-120, reprinted 1.n J. Llndauer Macroeconomic Readings, New York 1968, pp. 406-411.
Elias T. Balopoulos, "Fiscal Policy Models of the British Economy", Amsterdam 19.67.
Elias T. B4lopoulos,, "Measuring th~ Effects of the Budget on Ag~regate Demarld. lind/or Balance of Payments", parer presented at, the Round Table Conference on "The Use of Quantitative Analysis in Public Finance", Turin 1968.
E. Cary Bl:-own, ''Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A Reappraisal';, Alm 1956, pp.BSl-79.
E. Cary Brow, "the Static Theory of Automatic Fiscal Stahilization11,
The Journal of Political Economy 1955, pp. 427-40.
J. ~rglum Jens~n, "Statsb\ldgettets overskudshegr(;.b.ar" ("Central Govettunent Budget Surplds Concepts"), National~konomisk Tidskrift 1965, pp. 145-54.
Robert (;. di Calogero, "Technique of Fiscal Analysis in Sweden", IMF Decembe~ 1972 (mimeographed).
Carl F. Chtist ~ ''A Short-run Agg~egate-demand Model of the Intet'dependende and Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Policies with Keynesian and Classical Intereat Elasticities", Atnerican Economic T?evie\V May 1967, pp. 434-43.
Carl F. Christ, "A Simple Macroeconomic Model with a Go'\rernmeht Budp;et Restraint", Journal of Political EconomY 1968, pp. S3-67.
Bent Hansen, The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy, London 1958. (Swedish edition 1955.)
Bent Hansen, "Statsbudgetens verkningar", Ekonomisk Tidskrift 1959, PP• 128-45.
Bent Hansen, Fiscal Policy in Seven Countries, OECD, Paris 1969.
Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Pclitical Economy, Cam~ridee 1966.
Walter W. Heller, Assar Lindbeck and others, Fiscal Policy for a Balanced Econo!Y, OECD, Paris 1968.
Leif Johansen, ~~'()ffentlig -'konomikk" del I,· Oslo-1.~-6~: .. ·. · '
Wilfred Lewis Jr. (ed.), Budget Concepts for Economic Analysis, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 1968.
David W. Lusher, "The Stabilizing Effectiveness of Budget Flexibility" in National Bureau of Economic Research: Policies to Com~at Depression, New York 1956, pp. 77-89.
Lars Matthiessen, "En uot om statsbudgetens verkningar11, Ekonomisk Tid
skrift 1961, pp. 231-46 •
...
[19]
[20]
[21)
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
{27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
II :24
Lars MatthiesS!!Ii, "A Note on the Haa~elmo Theorem11, The S~edish Joutnal
of Economies 1966, pp. 261-80.
Lars Matthiesseti, ''Nogle bemaetkninger om indbyggede stabilisatorer" 1966 {mimeographed).
Lars Matthiessen, "A Cla~sro~m Note At>out the Budget Surplus11 1970 (mimeographed).
R.A. Musgrave, "The Theory of Public Finance", New York 1959.
R,A, Musgrave, "On Measuring Fiscal Performance", Review of Economics and Statistics 1964, pp. 213-20.
R.A. Musgrave & M.H. Miller, "Built-In Flexibility", American.Econotp.ic . Review 1948, p~. 122-28. Artikeln ingar ocksa i R~adlngs in,fiscd Bolicy, selected by a Committee of the American Economic Association~ Lorldon i955, PP• 379-86.
Attitur M. Okun, ~,;,Political. Ecohomy of Prospcrrity, New York 1970.
Arthur M. Okun, i'Measuritig the Impact of the 1964 Tall: Reduction11, Sept.
1965 (mimeographed).
D.J. Ott and A.F. Ott, "Budget Balance and Equilihrium Income\~, Journal of Finance 1965, pp. 71-77.
Joseph Scherer, "A Primer on Federal Budgets", in J. Lindauer (ed.) Macroeconomic Readings, New York 1968, pp. 391-402.
Arthur Smithies, "The Balanced Budget", American Economic :Q.eview, Papers and Proceedings 1960, pp. 301-309, repr1nted 1n J. L1ndauer (ed.) Macroeconomic Readings, New York 1968, pp. 365-69.
Lester C. Thurow {ed.), American Fiscal Policy, Englewo0d Cliffs, New Jersey 1967.
James Tobin, "Deficit, Deficit, Who's Got the Deficit?", National Economic Policy, New Haven 1966, pp. 49-55.
CHAPTER III
A NOTE ON TIIE I-IAAVELl\10 TI-IEO REl\I
Summaryt
III: 1
During the post-war years the discussion on the effects of balanced budget changes (the Haavelmo theorem) has been very extensive. J n retrospect it may appear somewhat cmious !.hat it hecamc and have remained quite common to identify the theorem with its 1 : 1 variant which is based on much simpler assumptions than othcnds~ arc usual in llHH'TO·
~conomic analysis. One could say that the dlscussivn of the theorem largely has been an attempt to specify condilicns tinder which Cw 1 : 1 version is not valid and to generali:?.C the assumptions wiiiwut invalidnting the 1 : 1 version.
In this note the aim is not to expl::dn how and why this fixation with the 1 : 1 variant developed. Rather om purpose is briefly to review and comment on some of the arguments that were put fonvard in the discussion and to submit some additional viewpoints. The g;-cater part of the note is concerned with the effects of balanced budget changes in mo(I.Js with budget flexibility, indirect taxes or liquidity preference (or other extentions beyond the simplest Keynes-model). And it is shown that in such models the Haavelmo multiplier will generally not be one. That the 1 : 1 case is based on exceptionally rigid assumptions thus emerges clearly from the account .of some of the contributions to the discussion and from the analysis in the note. Clearly this point has been stressed by a num~Jcr of writers. Against this background it is concluded that the interesting aspect of the thcorem of balanced budget changes is not that the multiplier (in real terms) can be one hut rathcr that in general it is not zero. Formulated in this way the Haavelmo theorem may appear Jrss "nice" hut on the other hand the theorem will he much more generally applic::...hi£~. It is therefore proposed to construe the theorem in this manner and more or less consider the discussion on the 1 : 1 variant closed. This would not, of course, preclude, the continued use of the important pedagogical services of the 1 : 1 case.
• ·Lecturer, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden_ 1 I wish to thank professor Richard A. ~.!usgra,·e and professor P. X~rregaard
Rasmussen for hl"lpful comments and sugge3lions.
III:2
Introductiou
1. In r~lrospecl, the extensive discussion on the Ha.avelmo theorem'
has a rather curious thn"J.d running through it. Th~ great stir
that accompanied its in!roductioa in the 1940's was its:!lf by no
means surprisinG. For the theorem demolished the grounds for the
older view th~t taxes and public expenditure for goods and services
have income generating effects that a1e equal but opposite in direc
tion. But this was not the "·ho!e talc. As Dent Hansen has observed,
it was the discovery of <;the multiplier of balanced budget expenditure"
that clearly reridered the budget balance suspect as an indicator of
the effect of fiscal policy on the level of business aclivity.2 In order
to arrive at these results, with th~ir important theoretical and practical
implications, it was quite suffici12ni (and therefore pedagogically
more efficient) to establish the multiplier effect of a balanced budget
change in a simple multiplier model-in which the HaaYelmo mul
tiplier as it happened, \vas one.
The curious feature of the discussion is that it beeame, and re
mained, quite common to identify the theorem with its 1 : 1 variant,
\vhich is based on assumptions which are quite rigid in comparison
to the usual assumptions of modern macroeconomic theory.a The
fixation with the 1 : 1 variant is clearly related to the fact that the
authors introducing the theorem arrived at a balanced budget mul
tiplier of one, without simultaneously strongly emphasizing the highly
restrictive assumptions upon which such a result was based. On the
other hand, Ah-in Hansen has suggested that "At the time when this
idea was first hit upon the exact magnitude of the expansionist effect
1 For practical rc-asons this name (given to the throrem by Schneider) is used instead of the more precise designation, the multiplier effect of a balanced budget change. As is well known, the theorem was formulated by Gclting as early as 1941 (see Gelling 19-!1, and ~prre;;aard Hasmussen's note in The Economic Journal, 1!158) and hy several other authors in the immediately succeeding years. (Compare Vogt's bibliography.)
' n. Hans~:n 1958, Ch. III: 1, and 1959, p. 128. 1 It can be instructive to quote Samuelson, "Thus the balanced-budget ex
penditure has a multiplier of exactly one; with nut recognizing this quantitative fact, we miss the kernel of the theoJ'C•m" (p. 142). Similar formulations can he found, for example in Sclmcid.-r 1961, p. 266, and in Frisch-Johanscn-Krcybcrg, p. 19.
III:3
was not the primary matter under disrussion".4 It is not our inten
tion to altclllpt in this article to establish 'vhether lh~ discoverer (o!·
popularizer) of the theorem has been misint~rprclcd Oi' whether ihe
criticism of the 1 : 1 va.riant has involved more than the tearing down
of a "straw man". Rather our purpose is briefly to review and com
ment on some of the arguments that 'vcre put forward in the discus
sion and to submit several additional viewpoints. This is done in
Sections 3-7 and provides us with a fairly large hut certainly not
exhaustive collection of reasons why the 1 : 1 variant is not generally
valid. Against this background it is then proposed in Section 8 that
the theorem explicitly is given a more general and therefore less
controversial intc:rprclation than that which it traditionally has
received.
In Section 2 the theorem is set out to provide a foundation for the
subsequent discussion. In the appendix we treat the case of a budget
with built-in flexibility in somewhat greater detail than would be
reasonable to do in the note itself.
The method of approach in this note is comparative static. In a
dynamic analysis, additional complications would naturally arise (lags
of varying length etc.). Furthermore we suppose that there are un
employed resources to begin with and disr~gard the case cf full
employment. Introduction of dynamic andjor full employment as
sumptions ·would not alter our conclusions in Section 8 but rather
strengthen them.5 It should finally be stressed that we do not intend
to give a complete account of the discussion in static terms since
that is not necessary for our purpose.
2. To set out the theorem the following symbols are used: Y = na
tional income; C=private consumpti~m; /=private investment; X=cx-
• A. Hansen, p. 157. In a note reference is made to llansen-Perloff 1944, Samuelson 19-13, and ,V. A. Salant. Hansen continues " ..• various writers (including Haavelmo, Haberlcr, Goodwin, Samudson and others), who Inter developed econometric models characterized l1y a unit balanced budget multiplkr, based this outcome on certain very rigid assumptions .. They therefore did not assert that in the actual world we can count on a balanced budget multiplier of one."
1 In a dynamic context the theorem has been discussed liy, among others, Goodwin, Hnhrrlrr, and Hagen, cf. Vogt's Jliblio~raphy. The full employment case has been discussed by Gehrcls; Musgrave (pp. 452-55); Vogt, pp. 74-79, and several others.
ports; .ll!=imports; G=public consumption and inwstmcnts while lV
is the sum of indirect taxes T, and direct taxes T rl less transfers. \Vhcn
models with indircet taxes arc discussed index 1!1 aad f indicate
whether the variables arc measured at current mar!<ct prices or at
factor cost. In the note it is assumed (unl~ss so111ething else is said)
that factor price levels arc conslanl and equal to tl1e levels in the
base period, i.e. PI= 1. If there arc no incllrcd lax<'S in tbe base pci'iod
and if there is complete shifting, the mal'ket price level P"' = 1 + t1;
where the indirect tax rate t, is applied to the price before taxes.
Given these assumptions, the distinction hctween mnrket and factor
prices coincides "·ith that between current and fixed prices.
FollOVi'ing SamuelsonG the equilibrium condition can be rewritten
dYm-dW=dCm+ dim+ dX -dJI+ dG -dW.
If now dG = dH1, as Vogt has obscrved,7 clearly
dC"' + dJm + dX- dJf = 0,
is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
dYm := dG = dH'.
Assume that the following consumption function applies:
em ym_ w ---- =a+b----. pm prn
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
As is apparent ( 4) contains no money illusion. If the indirect tax
rate remains unchanged, we get
dCrn= b(dYrn- dW). (5)
If we further assume that I, X and M arc exogenously determined
and constant, (1) can be rewritten
dYm-d\V = b(dYm-dW) + dG- dW. (6)
If dG = dW and b + 1, (3) must apply.
The discussion of the Haavelmo theorem has largely been an at
tempt to pinpoint the conditions under which equation (2) cannot be
fullfilled and to generalize the assumptions without (2) ceasing to
apply.
• See Samuelson, p. 142. ~ Vogt, p. 57.
III:4
Some Contributions to the Discussion on the Haavclrno Theorem
3. In the literature it has been observed that the theorem is based,
inter alia on the following assumptions :s
1 o There are uncmplo;yc(l resources to begin with.
2° The balanced budget change cannot occur through a change in
direct taxes, combined with a change in transfer payments.9
3° 1\IPC for the groups that re~eive changed incomes due to changed
public expenditures shail be equal to the MPC of tax payers (the
recipients of transfer payments).
4° The volume of investment is exogenously given.
5° The analysis concerns a closed economy (or alternatively that
the halauce of the current account is exogenously given). 6° The analysis concerns national inc.ome at market prices.
7° The vricc level is constant.
Of these assumptions 4 o and 5° will he discussed in Section 4 while
6° and 7 o will be treated in Section 5. Even at this stage it can be ob
served that 4 o, 5o and 7" are neither necessary nor sufficient condi
tions for the 1 : 1 variant.
Dming the 1950's, the 1 : 1 variant of the theorem came in for a
round of criticism from, among others, Turvey, Daumol and Peston,
and Bo\ven. This criticism asserted, infer alia, that the Haavclmo
multiplier in general was not one \verc (any one of) the following
conditions to he taken into account:
8° Business savings occur and arc endogenously detcrmined.1
go Public demand for goods and services applies partly to purchases
on capital accounts2 and import goods that are not income
generating within the economy.s
• Sec e.g. Baumol & Pcston, pp. 141-42; Schneider 1956, p. 303, and Musgrave, p. 432.
• It is clearly possible to conceive of other combinations of measures that can leave the budget balance as well as nalior.al income unaffected. A general formulation of the precondition is offered in the Appendix (equation (41)).
1 See Turvey, pp. 285-86, and Baumol & Peston, p. 146. Sec also Brems pp. 8-11. 1 If the theorem applies to the operating budget (suitably ddined), this condi
tion is of course insignificant. • See Turvey, Jl. 284, and Baumol & Pcston, pp. 143-46.
III: 5
III:6
10° Different types of taxes have differing income effecls.4
11 o Over and above income effects, lax changes give rise to greater
or lesser changes in relath·e prices and hence to substitution
effects.5
12° Income tax changes affect individuals' incentives to earn in
come.5
\Ve can readily sec that the multiplier as a rule will not be one if
business savings Sn occur by considering in (6) a case where the
change iu (nominal) disposable income is (dYm- dSe- dW). Turvey
docs not explicitly indicate the Haavelmo multiplier for this case.
If we disregard foreign trade and indirect taxes in his model, a
balanced increase in G and 1V will bring about an income increase
of the order of
l-h d Y = l _ bh dG < dG, (7)
where h is the .l!PC of households and 1-· b is the MPS of firms. If
b = 1, then dY = dG. As Salant has shown, (3) can apply even in this
case. (Compare the following section.)
In addition to points go and 10° Bowen supposes lhat the volume
of private investment is influenced hy public expenditures (which
means that assumption 4 o is discarded) .6
It is worth noting that Gelling, for example, in his analysis of
the effects of balanced budget changes quite explicitly treated most
of these critical points. In his 1948 hook he clearly distinguished be
tween puhlic expenditure (revenue) which was and which was not
income-creating (destroying). He emphasized, too, that the classifica-
' Turvey, pp. 284-85, and Baumol & Peston, pp. 142-43. 5 llaumol & Peslon, p. 143.
• Bowen assumes that t:.C =at:. Y- g!!. Td, that t:.G = p!!.E (wl1ere E is public expenditure of which G is income-generating) and that t:.I = d.b'. Inserting in t:. Y = t:.C + t:.I + AG, will give (if t:.Td=LlE)
p-g+e LlY=--- t:.Td.
1-a
If e~O, p=1 and g=a, we get LlY=Il.Td, cf. p. 226.
tion could not he used with great exactitude.7 He expressly maintained
that he had studied only the income effects of public finance and had • disregarded the substitution effects of taxes.s
4. In a 1957 article, Salai1l studied the implications for the llaavclmo
theorem of cases 'vhere variables other than private consumption were
endogenously determined. The variables Salnnt treated v>ere direct
taxes, public expenditures, ]'>rivnlc investments, imports and company
savings. The cnse of a budget ,vlth built-in flexibility is discussed in
the following section. Salnnl showed that the Haavelmo-mulliplier
would be one even when I, M and SB were endogenous, given that
the new dependent variables were functions of disposahle income
(l'm-W) or of private expcndilures (1'm-G).9 This can easily be
demonstrated by reformulating (1) to obtain an expression analogous
to (6). This result too can }Je extracted from Gelting's Hl48 analysis.
In Gelting's model, G has been brooken down into a goods component
V and a wage component L. The model (without indirect taxes) 'vitl1
our symbols would appear to be the follmving:
• l=n(X+J + C + V -M)=n(Y -L),
M=a(X+l+C+l'=-1
a (Y-L). -a
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
If taxes and public wages are changed so that dT d = dL, we get
dYfdL=V
Naturally, the "Salant" vie·wpoint entails a cedain weakening of
the "traditional" assumptions of the 1 : 1 variant. The extent of the
' Gelting 19·18, pp. 42-43, 48. 1 Ibid., p. 41. Gelting uses the terms "circulation effects" and "discriminating
effects". 1 Salant pp. 158-60. Vibe-Pcdersen's assertion (pp. 240, 219) that the 1 : 1 variant
of the theorem docs not apply to an economy engaged in foreign trnde is therefore not entirely correct.
1 Cf. Case I: 4, p. 50. If, however, we set dTd = dl', we obtain o < dY fdV < 1, cf. Case III: 4, p. 51. Gelling's modc:l (which docs not deal with company savings) reappears on p. 49, while the symbols arc clarified on p. ·12.
III:7
weakening '"ill depend on the relevance of the assumptions that I, M and S8 are functions of disposable income or private expenditures.
This latter question has not been discussed by Salant.
The Haavelmo Theorem in Models with Budget Flexibility
5. \Ve shall have cause to return subsequently to the significance
for the Haavclmo theorem of the fact l.hat certain budget Hems arc
endogeneous variables. First, h~wever, a delineation of the distinction
between "basic" multipliers and "pseudo" multipliers appears war
ranted. As is well known, a common or basic multiplier is the total
derivative of an endogcneous variable v;i~h respect to an exogenous
quantity. A pseudo multiplier, in contrast, is the ratio between the
tota! changes (the differentials) of two endogenous quantitics.2 It has
previously been shown-perhaps most clearly by Bent Hansen-that
while the effects of a parameter change arc conceptually well defined,
it is meaningless to discuss in general the effects of a change in an
endogenous variable. The reason for this is rather simple. A giYen
change in, say, the public demand for goods and services G can he
achieved by a number of different parameter changes, each of which
can have different effects on, say, national income Y. From this it
follows that the pseudo multiplier dY fdG in general cannot be an
unambiguous measure of the effects of changes in G; rather it is
necessary to start with the parameter changes themselves. The mul
tiplier models used in the analysis of fiscal policy are commonly so
simple that the pseudo multipliers arc not ambiguous (the number
of actio_n parameters arc minimal and the possible budget components
are entered in a similar way in the modcls).3 As will he evident from
the following, some authors tend to start with the idea that the
Haavelmo multiplier can readily be a pseudo multiplier while others
consistently work with basic multipliers. In the event there has
developed an ambiguity that warrants clarification. The contents of
the Haavehno theorem are obviously far more special where it is a
• See Samuelson, p. 144 (where the terms "basic multi]Jlirr" and "pseudo multiplier" arc used), and D. Hansen 1953, Ch. II:*·
1 In Gellil•g's model, the value of dY fdG is dependent on whether the wage componrnt L or the product component l' changes, cf. p. 267, n. 1.
III:8
basic multiplier of one, than where only the requirement that (3)
shall he satisfied is imposed.
In 1955, Bent Hansen wrote that the Haavelmo theorem "in itself
is less interesting, inter alia, because it assumes that government ex
penditures and government income arc parameters".4
Two years later, however, Salant concluded that "the treatment
of taxes as a dependent variable instead of an independent parameter
does not alter the value of the balanced budget multiplier. Similar
conclusions apply if government expenditure is tre~ted as a dependent
variable" .s Let us examine these two conclusions a bit more closely.
If we tal>e the Haavelmo theorem Lo ;ncan quite simply that (3) is
satisfied, then it is clear that the autonomousncss of budget items
would not he a necessary condition for the theorem's validity. In
that event, Bent Hansen's (latter) assertion is incorrect and Salant's
correct. Bent Hansen's assertion would also be untenable were one
to maintain that a basic Haavclmo mulliplicr could not be one if a budget
contained endogenous components. That this can occur is evident from
the earlier literature in the field. In Gelling's Hl41 model, in which
government income is income tax receipts while government ex
penditure is autonomous, a balanced budget change 'vill give
dY fdG = 1.6 The same result can be found in Bishop's article in 19487
and in Salanl's analysis al a much later date.
In the above mentioned models, only one of the two budget Hems
that were changed was endogenous. In fact Salant docs not discuss
the case 'vhere both Ta and G arc endogenous. Assume that G = G0 + gY
and 7'a= T 0 + tY. If the changes in G and Td are balanced, we obtain
(under the traditional assumptions):
• B. Hansen 1958 (Swedish edition l!J55), p. 48. Src also Peacock, p. 364, and Tin bergen, p. iO. The reason why Tin bergen's "Haavdmo multiplier" dY fclG =
(1- b) j(l- b + bt) is less than one is that he did not analyze changes in the size of the budget that left unchanged the surplus or deficit existing in the original equilibrium position. Tinbcrgcu instead calculated the multiplier we would obtain if the autonomous component in the tax funchon were to change by as much as (autonomous) public expenditures.
' Salant, p. 158. • Sec also p. 267. 7 Bishop, pp. 331-35. Sec also Robinc 1 !J62, p. 726 n. 75, Musg~a\'e, pp. 432-34,
and Vogt, pp. 61--63.
!11:9
dl:' = dG = dG0 + gdY + Ydg = dTd ~" dT0 + tdY + Ydl. (12)
The Haavelmo mulliplicrs will then he
dY dY 1 . - =----- = ----·--· > 1 dG0 Ydg 1-9 '
(13)
dY dY l -=----=-->1 dT
0 l'dl 1-l '
.(14)
lf one views the content or the thcor~m as a basic multiplier of one,
then it is immediately clear lh:-tt the lhco:rem cannot apply, as a rnle,
where hoth budget items are endogenous. And in that event Be~1t
Hansen is right and Salant wrong. It is most probable, lw•ve•;cr, that
Bent Hansen-along with Gelling, Tnrvey and Peacock-lias simply
construed the contents of the theorem rather narrowly while Salant
along with Vogt among others-has taken a wider view of its con
tents.s
The Haavclmo Theorem in Models with Indirect Taxes
6. In rec.cnt years, the question of the implications of indireet. taxes
for the Haavelmo theorem has bccJI much disr.usscd. For our purpose,
the essential thing is not that indirect taxes arc present in the model
used hut rather whether the balanced budget dw.nge involves among
other things a change in the indirer.t tax rate •vhieh results in a change
·in the }Jrice levcl.9 Another iwportant issue is •vhether the indirect
lax is merely a tax. on consumer goods or a more general turnover
tax levied also on, say, private investmcats.
\Vhen Schneider Hl5G 1 discusses the Haavelmo theorem in models
with indirect taxes, he concludes that (under the traditional assump
tions):
8 Peacock's Haavclmo multiplier of dYfd1'0 = 1/Cl··- t) JJas hc<'n criticized by Vogt: "Dcr Irrtum, dl'n Pl'acock dabci bcgcht, ist, class <'r t. Y mit der false hen Grosse, niimlich mit /',.1'0, vcrgleicht. /I.T0 ist ja nur dn Tcil der Budgelcrhohung, die dnriibcr hinaus noch aus den indnzict·tcn zusiitzlichl'n Steuercinnahmcn besteht. Dcr glciche Irrtum findct sich :\Uch in dcm Arlikel von TurYey" (p. 62), Vogt dves not gh·e any further evidence why he considers the autou0mous tax chanzc !l1'o to he a "false" quantit~··
• In the simple Haavdmo case when dT.=dG,thc result would be dl""=dl''=dTd independently of whctlwr there arc indirect taxes, since in all events clCI =dT, = 0.
1 Sclmcider 1956, pp. 304-05. Sec also Schneider 1959, pp. 253-54.
III: 10
dYm= dG=dTd+ dT,,
d Y' = dG- dT1 = dTd.
(15)
(16)
·In other words Schneider argues that if ,..,.e start from national
income r.t current mark.et prices, the multiplier cf a balanced budget
change will be one even if lhe increase in expenditure is partly or
entirely financed by indirect tax receipts. This, however, 'vould not
be the case were we to stal't with faetor incomes. In the special case
where Ttl is constant and dG ,_~-dT1 national income at factor cost will
not he affected hy the balanced budget change and the increase in G
will be made possible by a decrease in private demand (CI+l'). If,
however, dG = dT"a and dT1 = 0, 1'1 will increase as much, as G and
(Ct +It) will remain unchanged.
Vogt has shown that Schneider's result is valid, if one assumes
either _that consumers and investors fall prey to the money illusion
or that the indirect taxes are not subject to shifting. 2 If '"e assume
that private consumpl ion is determined by the function em= a+ b
(Ym- \V), containing money illusion, then equation (5) will apply
even if the indirect tax rate and hence the market price level change.
As far as investment is concerned, the existence of the money illusion
entails that dim= 0 and lhat. the lew! of real investment will decrease
with a rising rate of indirect tax. In that event, equation (3) will
apply.· If, instead, the change in the indirect tax rnte does not affect
the market price level (but only the factor price level) then dCm will
be as indicated in equation (5), while d/"'=0 if the level of real in
vestment is fixed. In that event, equation (3) will also apply.
Yet, equation (15) and (16) may be valid 'vilhout iiwoking the
additional assumptions that the consumption tax is not shifted or
that the consumers are prey to the money illusion. This will be the
case if consumption and disposable income are proporlional3 which
can readily he demonstrated hy setting a= 0 in equation (4).
Above we have seen that Schneider's result may be formally correct
in different cases. l\Iorc interesting, however, are the implications in
• See Vogl, pp. i0-i2. The latter obsen·ation has also been made by Vibe-Pcdersen (p. 217).
• Gclting works with his model under this assumption, cf. his Case 1\': 4, p. 52. See also e.g. Brooman, p. 205.
III: 11
real terms of balanced budget changes involving a change of indirect
taxes. It is easily seen that if (15) and (lG) apply the real Haavelmo
multipEer will he one in the absence of shifting and lie in the interval
between .zero and unity if shifting occurs. If there is no money illu
sion and shifting occurs the real Haavelmo multiplier will again lie
in the interval between zero nnd unity if the indirect tax is a con
sumption tux. If, on the other hand, tbe tax is levied on private
demand (Ct +- J!) it can be shown that dY fdG ~ 1 depending upon
whether b Sp;§,Jm.
In an 1958 article, Nrlnegaurd Rasmussen alTived at a result some
what different lo that of Schneider.4 If complete shifting and absence
of money illusion is assumed and if the increase in puhlic expenditure
is financed only through indirect taxes, then, according to Nprrc,ga:nd
Rasmussen, national ineome calculated at current market prices will
increase by twice the tax increase, while national income calculated
in factor }>rices will increase lJy as much as the indirect taxes, i.e.
dYm=2dT1=2dG,
dY'=dT,=dG.
(17)
(18)
In that case, real private demand will not be affected nnd the real
Haavehno multiplier will be one. This result assumes that the effcet
of a giyen tax change on real national income is independent of
whether the change is one of direct or indirect taxes. Nprreguard
Rasmussen's analysis has been penetratingly discussed by Vibe-Pcder
sen and Vogt.
Vibe-Pedcrsen has shown that N¢rrcgaard Rasmussen's result will
be valid if direct and indirect taxes are included in the consumption
function in a similar way, if T 11 is not endogenous and if the tradi
tional assumptions are applied. Vibc-Pederscn stresses, howc\'er, that
such a consumption function "·ould also include a money illusion and
that it would therefore not be a satisfactory hypothesis.5
• Nprr<'gaard Rasmussen 1 !J58 I. 1 See \'ihc-Pcdcrsen, pp. 217-21. The indicated consumption function can he
written (cf. equation (2) at V.-P.):
III: 12
Vogt has shown that (17) and (18) can apply even if Nprregaard
Rasmussen's assumptions (that there is no money illusion and shifting
is complete) arc accepted. In that event, however, other special as
sumptions will be necessary. As is apparent from Vogt's example, it
is sufficient to assume that the indirect tax is levied on private ex
penditures (C + 1) and that the budget is balanced not only marginally
but also totally (G = T, + Td).O Given these assumptions, real disposable
income (and hence the level of real private consumption expenditure)
will he invariant for changes in the size of the bndgct (with no change
in surplus or deficit). As well, in this model, the multipliers for direct
and indirect taxes will be equal.7 There is liUlc ground for assuming
that this will be true as a rule. It may be reasonable 'vith a few
remarks on this point.
In the literature the case of taxes on consumption expenditure has
been treated by several aullwrs.8 It has been shown that the effect
of consumption taxes on real national income is greater than that of
income taxes (given tax changes which are equal in size) assuming
that private savings SP are positive. In an unpublished memorandum,
Bent Hansen has shown that if the indirrct tax is also levied on private
investments and public demand for goods (which are both assumed
to be autonomous in real terms) then
dY1 -d . ~ 0 to the extent that I 2 Sp. t - -
I
(19)
Ia has been determined endogenously so that dTd = - dT, and dYI fdt,
is a Haavclmo multiplier. In a closed economy, when I= SP tbe budget
The indirect tax (following Nprregaard Rasmussen) is a tax on consumption expenditure and we have
dY1
dY1
b [dY1
] dTd = Cdl~=- 1-b+b t, =- dG-l .
• Sec Vogt, pp. 65-74. ' \Vc consider G as endogenously determined by the condition G = T, + T1 and
have that
dY1 dY1 -=----=1. dTd (C + 1) dt1
8 Sec e.g. C. Brown, B. Hansen 1958, Ch. VIII: 5, and ~lusgrave, pp. 447-52.
III: 13
is balanced (public financial savings arc zero) and we have an ex
ample of the case discussed by Yogt. Naturally, in an analysis of the
effects of a tax on inYeslments it is less satisfactory to assume an
exo£cnously given level of real investment. If an inn'slment function
-is introduced into the model, then more complicated conditions than
(19) will most likely determine the relative effectiveness of tax
changes. From this it should follow that in general one can calculate
that d}'l jdt, =f- 0.
From the discussion in this section it seems clear that the cnses
discussed by Schneider and Nprregaard Rasmussen must clearly he
considered as rather special and we can conclude that the Haavelmo
multiplier will not be one as a rule if the indirect tax rate changes.
Musgrave's assumption of a constant price level should be seen against
this background.9
The Haavclmo Theorem in a Larger l\1ultiplicr l\Iodcl
7~ Finally, let us examine the IIaavclmo multiplier in an expanded
multiplier model of the following kind:
Y=C+l+G, (20)
C=C(D,i), (21)
I =l(D, i), (22)
L=L(Y, i), (23)
M=L, (24)
D= Y-W . (25)
.M and L denote respectively lhe autonomous supply of and demand
for money while i is the rate of intercst.1 For the sake of simplicity G .._ ____ _
• In Sclmeider 1961, pp. 267-GB (as weB as the three fo11owing editions of his textbooli, sec e.g. Schneider 1 !JG5, pp. 203-85) the presentation has been influenced by \'ogt's and Nprregaard Hasmusscn's articles. From the pedagogical stand-point, ltowcvcr, it is Jess satisfactory that the assumptions underlying Nprregaard Rasmussen's conclusion have not hecn discussed in greater detail. It is not sufficient to assume, as the reader can readily understand, that shifting is complete in order for (17) and (13) to be applicable.
1 The significance for the IIaavclmo theorem of an assumption of interest-elastic _ investments has been discussc•l by, e.g. Schneider 1!)39, p. 265. Musgrave has
discussed the case where investment varies inversely with the income tax rate, PJ>· 465-67.
III: 14
.and lV shall he assumed to he autonomous and there are no indirect
taxes. As is rendily apparant, this is an extremely simple model in
which among other things the production side, the labour market and
foreign trade have not been expli_citly ccmsidercd. If the model is
.differentiated and then solved with rcspeet to dY ,..,.e obtain
dY= 1-_!-
1 (dG-adW+ bdJJ),
-a+ JC
b ~ oC/oi~~Ifoi .. aLjai '
aL c=oy·
The Haavclmo multiplier will now be
1-a }' GW = ------.
1- a+ be
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
As is evident, y GW =' 1 if be= 0. This will he: the case if at least one of
the following three conditions is satisfied:
(31)
oL -=oo oi •
(32)
oL . oY=O. (33)
In other words, if private demand for goods and seHiees is inelastic
with respect to the rate of interest andjor the speculative demand for
money is infinitely elastic andjor the transaction demand for money
is inelastic vdth respect to income, then Yew= 1.2 As is apparent from
• If (31)-(33) do not apply, oue would naturally ohtain dl' = dG = dW if the rate of interest is tept unchant:cd hy credit policy measures. Open marl•ct operations
III: 15
(2G), these are the same conditions that give the usual G~mnltiplicr
the simple form Ya= lj(l-a).
It is of course possible to expand the simple multiplier model in
another way than that attempted aboYe. Thus it is not at all n~cessary
to assume that investments arc cndogenousls determined. lf, say~
private consumption expenditure were a function not only of dis
posable income hut also of one or more other quantities which are
endogenous variables andjor budget items, then the Haavelmo mul
tiplier as a rule would not be one even were the traditional rigid as
sumptions to he accepted. Curiously enough, one finds that much of
the discussion on the Haavelmo theorem has largely disregarded the
possibility that private consumption expenditure can be dependent on
variables other than disposable income. Yet, as is well known, this
possibil~ty has not been ignored by the recognized theory of consump
tion spending.a
Conclusion
8. That the Haavelmo theorem's 1: 1 variant is based on excep
tionally rigid assumptions should have emerged reasonably clearly
from the summary account of some of the contributions to the dis
cussion and the additional viewpoints submitted in Sections 5-7.
Clearly this point has been stressed by a number of participants in
the discussion: Turvey, Bamnol & Pes ton, Bent Hansen, Peacock.
Bowen, Musgrave, Hohine, etc. 'Vhether by the Haavelmo multiplier
we mean a basic multiplier Yu or a pseudo multiplier dY fdW and
whether th_e national income is measured at market prices or factor
prices arc questions of ancillary importance in arriving at this con
clusion. On the other hand, Schneider and Salant have maintained
that the theorem is of interest despite its rigid assumptions because
it gives a better approximation of reality than the earlier prcsenta-
adjusted so that d.V •= cdY has this effect (.lf is changed by as much as the demand for transaction halancPs while the spcculatiYe balances remain unchanged). It is, however, clear that if such "complementary" measures are accepted, the result dY = dG = dlV will he trivial; for with a suitable comhination of measures such a result can always he obtained in principle.
1 Sec e.g. Ackley, Ch. XII.
lll: 16
tion of the effects of changes in goyernment receipts and expenditures
on total income.1 In other words, on the whole the discussion has
tended to focus on the relcYance of the theorem rather than its
objective content.
By way of summary, it can be said that the interesting aspect of
the theorem of balanced budget changes is not that the multiplier can
be one but rather that in general it is not zero. Alternatively, as ap
pears in equation ( 41) in the -appendix, "·e can say that the ratio
between the income and the budget multiplier in general varies with
different action parameters of fiscal policy. Formulated in this way
the HaawJmo theorem may 'appear less "nice" than in the strid
1 : 1 version. On the other hand, the theorem will be much more
generally applicable. \Vould it not therefore be reasonable to construe
the theorem in this mannrr and consider the diseussion on the 1 : 1
variant "closed. Of course, this v:ould not preclude the continued use
of the important pedagogical services of the 1 : 1 ease.
An unavoidable obserYation that flows from a comparison of the
different contributions to the diseussiou is that communication he
tween the partieipants in certain instances has been Jess than good.
What is particularly deplorable in this context is the fact that Gelt
ing's book in 194.8 was never translated. It is more than likely-as
perhaps has become evident in this note-that such a translation
would have affected the extent and direction of the subsequent dis
cussion.
Appendix
In this ·appendix we shall take a closer look at the case with built-in flexibility in the budget.
Let II, and II1 denote two action parameters of fiscal policy. Jf the govern. mcnt simultaneously applies two measures (ll/i and dlf;o the national income Y and the budget surplus 13 = W- G will he affected in the following way:
dY= Y1 dH1+ .Y1dll"
dB= B 1 dll1 + Bi dll1.
(34)
(35)
Y, and Y1 arc common income multipliers and B, and 131 can by analogy
• See Schneider 1956, p. 304, and Salant, p. 161.
III: 17
be viewed as budget multipliers. lf the budget change is balanced (i.e. dB= 0) we get
(36)
The basic IIaavelmo multiplier Y1;= dY /dll 1 can now be written:
y = Y 1B1 - Y1 B 1
'' n, . (37)
Had we calculated 1';1= dY /dlfp we would have ohlained
(38)
The relation between Yii and Yit is thus
(39)
The condition for Y11 = 1 is
(.fO)
If we assume that the budget does not contain endogenous components on either the income or the expenditure side·, IJ1 and ll1 are budget items, and we obtain B1= 1 if II, is an income item and B;= -1 if I!1 is an expenditure item. In that event, Y,i= Yi1 and }'1i= Y1+ Yr
The condition for Y11 9= 0 is
(41)
(41) can be said to he a generalization of assumption 2•, cf. Section 3. The pscudo-111ultiplier in the IIaavclmo case can be expressed in the fol
lowing way:
dY __ Y 1 B1--Y1 B,_ B1 y dlV- W
1 B
1- W
1 JJ
1- W
1 B
1 --1\'
1 B
1 ,,.
(42)
The condition for clY/dW= 1 is
(43)
If the budget contains no endogenous components and II, and 1!1 arc assumed to he respectiYely an income item and expenditure item, then B1 =
W,=1, B1= -1 and W1=0. In that case, conditions (43) and (-10) will naturally coincide. Tlle condition for dY/dW t 0 is obviously (41).
III: 18
III:19
References
The following list includes (with .a few exceptions) those sources to which reference bas been made in this note. A more exhaustive bibliography on the discussion of the Jinavelmo theorem is offered in Yogt's and H.obine's articles cited below.
ACKLEY, G., J!acroeconomic Theory, i\ew York 1061. llAU.MOL, \\', J. &: PESTOX, :\I. If., "}.fore on the ~Iultiplicr Effects of a Balanced
Budget", The American Economic Review Hl55, pp. 140--18. BISHOP, R. L., ''Alternative Expansionist Fiscal Policies: A Diagramatic
Analysis" in Income, Employment and Public Policy, Essays in Honor of AL\'IX H. HAXSEX, ~ew York 1D!S, pp. 317-40.
BowE:-:, \V. G., "The Balanced-Budget ~1ultiplier: A Suggestion for a :-.rore General Formulation", The Review of Economics and Statistics 1D;:i7, pp. 225--27.
BREMS, H., "Das Budget und die ::-.Iultiplikatoren, Wcllwirlsclwftli.::hes Archiv Hl57, pp. 1-1G.
Bnoo~L-\.X, F. \\'., ,lfocroeconomics, London 1!JG2. Bnowx, E. G\HY, "Analysis of Consumption Taxes in Terms of the Theory
of Income Determination", Tltc American Economic Review 1950, pp. 74-8!l.
Fnrscn, R., JoiiAXSE:-:, T. & KREYI!EHG, H. J., "Ovrrsikt over Keynes-::\!odellene", Memorandum [ra Universilelcis Socialpkonomiske Institull, o~Jo 1961.
GEJIIIELS, F., "Inflationary Effects of a Balanced Budget under Full Employment", Tlze American Economic Review 1!).19, pp. 1276-78.
GELTING, J ., "Nogle Bcm::crkninger om Finansieringen af offentlig virksomhcd", Nalionolfikonomisk Tidsskrifl 1941, pp. 293-99.
-- Pinansprocessen i del ~>konomiskc Xredslub, Kcbenhavn 1948. HAXSE:\', AI. VI:\' H., "..\lore on the ..\Iulliplier Effect of a Balanced Budget:
Comment." Tile American Econoz;zic Review 1956, pp. 15i--160. HAXSE:-<, BE:-iT, The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy, London 1958. -- "Slatsbudgctens vcrkningar", Ekonomisl: Tidskrifl 1959, pp. 128---15. MusGHAYE, H. A., The Theory of Public Finance, Xew York 195~1. Npmmo.unn HAS)Jt:SSE:"\, P., "..\[arkcdspl'isrr l;ontra fnktorpriser ved dct ba-
lanscrcde budget", Fcslskrifl til Frederik Zculhcn, 1\pbenhavn 1958, pp. 310--14 (I).
-- "A Note on the History of the Balanced-Budget ..\[ultiplier", The Economic Joumal 1958, pp. 15-1-56 (II).
PEACocK, A. T., "A Note on the Balanced-Budget :\Iulliplier", The Economic Journal 195G, pp. 3G l-G5.
PESTOX, M. H., "Generalizing the Balanced Buclgct :\[ulliplicr", The Review of Economics and Slalisiics 1 9;:)3, pp. 238-91.
RomxE, M., "Effct ?llultiplicatcur ct Budget en tquilihrc : Le Hole des 'Fuilcs' dans Ic Theoreme de Ilaan~lmo", Rel'lle de Science Financii:re 1962, pp. Gll2-73().
--· "De la Decomposition des Qnanlites Globales aux ~Iulliplicateurs du Budget Equilihrc", Revue de Science FiJI(uzcicre 1964, pp. 203-<14 and pp. 4.72-520.
III:20
SALANT, ,V. A., "Taxes, Income Determination and the Balanced Budget Theorem", The Review of Economics and Statistics 1957, pp. 152-61, 1·cprinted in Gonno:\, H. A. and KLEI:\, L. R. (ed.) Readings in Business Cycles, Selected by a Committee of the American Economic Association, Homewood lllinois· 1 !lG5.
-- "Comment" (to PES TON 1958), The Review of Economics and Stali5iics 1958, pp. 291-93.
S.UIUELSON, P. A., "The Simple ~Iathcmatics of Income Determination", in Income, Employment and Public Policy, Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen, New York 1948, pp. 133-55.
Scnxmmm, E., "Zur Frage der Zllul!iplikatorwirlmng cines ausgeglichencn Budgets" in 25 Economic Essays in Honour of Erik Lindalll, StockJwlm 1956, pp. 302-05.
-- Einfiihrung in die Wirlsclwflsthcorie, III Teil, 5. Auflage, Tiibingen 1959, 6. Auflage, Tiibingen 1961, and 9. Auflage, Tiibingen 19G5.
TJNDEHGEN, J., Economic Policy: Principles and Design, Amsterdam 1956. TUHVJ>Y, H., "Some Notes on iiiultiplier Theory", The Amuican Economic
Review 1953, pp. 275-95. · Vrm:-PEDEHSEN, J., "Multiplikatorvirkningcn af indirckte skattcr", Nalional
pkonomisk 'l'idssl:ri{t 19GO, !)P· 21·~-50. VOGT, W., "Einigc Unklarheiten in der Diskussion iiher die Multiplikator
'"'irlmng cines ausgeglichcnen Budgets", 1V eltwirfsclzaftliches /1rchiv 1960, pp. 55--89.
IV:l
KAPITEL IV
FinanspoJitikcn som stabiliseringspolitiskt instrument
E11 av cftcrkri_<;stidnzs fyra fiHurzw!ir:i.<l·
rar till "hvrrulautisl;" LO-t'/:onom: ''Du
tror viii il:lc ja:; iir ui rh m J•i j•'f!. tror ott t'i .lriiJcr c;z ri!:!ig J•v!iiil.-: jag ftir 11iijn
mcj meci ;.'Clli ribdag~·~~ tiizs g1i uzcd Jlli.'' 1
Pa cb: ckcnomi·,~>a ;;0Etikens omrade har Sve ..
rir· utt:r. tvivcl \'arit ctt fUrt6;ings1and i m!hg:~ ;,\'~c·:!:<lcn. Dctta har konnnit till ut
t•·yck intc 0::ra i en hctyd:•ndc up;•finning~ri
kcdom vir! utvcckling~n av I'P instwmcnt
fOr d('n ('\onlHni:.J~."\ politik.,·n t'tan ocksl i or:>.cld!Jcl ,;;l dct har g:>Jlz. :ltl prii\'a 11y:t red
~:.:.~p i den IY:t1;.ti~1·:;t pnl:~ikt'n. :~t:lysandc rxCl!lpcl lir ruiris•n:u ~·:uad.,Ful!tihn (i a I !a dcss
for:nrr), invcsccrin:~sfcmdema, ATl'-systcznct
och d:! fria a\·:::Lrivning:\rna. Jiit hur ocksrt Ern~t Vvi:~i-ors$ kri:<bud:.;ct i !!33 med \'ilk~n det
fu:·sta trc.-:llldc ~trgrt mol en l:o!ljnukturut
j:iJ:m~mdc bucl~ctpolitik to>;s tidig:~rc iin i de
flesta and:·;, Unclcr.~ At t Svcrig~ ocks:1 under
cf:crkrig~: idcn ktr varit ctt av de Linder &ir
budgctpo1::.:::c1: mcst konsrb·cnt har utfor
mats mcd knsyn till konjtmkturliigct har framgatt :!\. den studie av fin:lllspolitikcn i sju l:indcr 5<>1:1 nyE:;cn !Jar utforts inom
OECD. Twts a.t man i O~~CD-swclicn finner
att den ckozlOHliska politikcn i S\'crigc \'ar for
np:.ns:v t.ex. l!?C 1-Gj (de si~ta av c!e ll ar ~o!n •u:dt•Jsi~kni!~·~,.!l o:!lf:\U:lr} s5. anser r~~-~.!1
.:1tt ~.},r;rt~(r·nn dctll:tnd 1n~l'~~gen1c~1t
~hn,,·s a hr:ff<·r record t~J.tll in ~'ny cf ti:e o:~'r:r
C0'1Utrics \ve have cx.nni!Jed:·'~ Or11 clti.::-~. 01~ ..
d01ne furtfarandc kan ans~s rin:!i~.,.~ 0!:1 l~rr.:n.
1%6-71 medtas s:..:all vara o~azt l1:i•. Swr.
kommcr att frl!mgi't av dct fOlj:Jrl!.:c syt·e~ <let dock oveders:igligt att den svensh st;tbili,c
ringspol:tikcn l%!-71 h;tr \'i\rit v;istnlli~t
1nindrc franJgf1ngsrik lin falle~ var undtr de .. ccnuict dessfiirinnan.
])etta l~apitc:} ~iguas rJt en ~\lw.!ys H\' cll~l"'
ck•'t~rJnli~ka po~itikul sedan 19-!G. Son! kap!t..!,;,·,.r,kriftt:n anger koncentreras intresset tiil
de-n i-.ort=--lktiga st:tl,i1iscringsp'1lil~kcn. l)c~ ir..nrb:ir en v:ist·zHiig hegr:insn!ng :lV pcrspe'kti
VC'I, dtc1som ckonomisk po!iti!: n:tlwli:;tvis
tH:b:t h:mdlar om ~!',cl:lll:t ting 5(>111 inl:olllst
fiinklning, rc,msallohring 1 och tilldixt. Att
Jli::',J:;onflikter (J[ta ktr npps!ltlt och ~·.lt dr.s<::>.s
losning lt1ngt ifz :m alhid bar tillgcJc!osetl h1itl-
1 Citerad eftcr Rchn, I !l'.iil, ~. 7G. 2 Ih!\'Uclakti.ircns rek.tpitulation 20 ar eftc::ttcrfinJJS i \Vigfors~ 1~~~)~1, s. 7--'15.
3 Sc Undbcck-~Hellct, m.!l., s. 5!'. De mec~::z,na 1Hnt!e.rna iir J3c!g:en, E,,glanc.!, J'rankr;!.::c, ltd.lien, Sverigc, US.\ o .. :·Jt \.riisttysLb.nd. 4 De!l o!.fentlig:t .Sl'k'.orns ut,·e:-.:k!ing diskut~r3s
i bpitel :5.
syn till den ~amhallsekonomiska balanscn ar
darfor inte fo:rvanande. (Ett klassiskt excmpel
pa detta var borttagandet av omsen 1947.) Det 1ir vidarc fi:1anspolitiken (i vid ucmarkcl
s:) som vi framst kornmcr att intrcsscra oss for. Di't dct sjiih-bllct intc 1ir rimligt att bort
se fr£tn krcd:tpolit;l;cn u];pm:irks::unmas mcra
ovcrsiktiigt iiven atgiirdcrn::t pi't Jctta Ollll:",de.
Yttcrlig:ue en Legr:i!'snill~ lir att rc;:;ionalpo
litikrn mer eller mia<irc furhi~~.~.s. Undc.:r cfterkrigst it! en l>:u· kulljm~kturbilden niistan som
rc~el \'<1rlc:·at ;;:r:-:.ftigt 1nc1lan clika rc~ioncr
och ~~t!a:! slu!ct av 50-talct bar diirfi.ir rc
gionalv,litiken byggts ut hiizst viiscntligt. Fur
en na•.·mare ciskussi•Ja av rtgion:tlpolitikcn
hanvis:~s til! kapitrl 2. Ett :r•: syftcna mcd dcita bpitd ar att so
ka bcdema Iin:~n~politikcn~ rim;!ghct sctt i rcbtion till de s!ahili~cringspoli~isk:! m!'tlen
och konjnnkt.erlagct. Dct fOljcr av sakcns na
tur att en ~!1(!an bcdomning iir tiimligcn vansk
lig. En S\·!trig!Jel ~ir att de flcsta fin::nsminis~
rar av t:pp~rJbara sk;i! :ir yttcl s~ o~;cn~igil:l
att fl:rs·_: onl\·;irldcn n1cd k\'~nt~~~tiva prl'ci ... scrin~;!r ;t\' s:!~a !:1,.,tlf.:~:ktio:1cr. Fii:· n~. <ii~kn~
sion ZV clt·~l cLonOi11i.):~a politikcns :u:"d i S .. ·c~
rigc t:nder cit'·rkri:;stid~n h;iuvis:JS Jibledcs
till Kapitd 2. Fir d<:t andra :i:- ckt sj:ih·
fallct niid\'andigt att ta h:insyn till all den
ekonomiska politiken all tid mi'tsl'; utformas Wl·
der o~-:~ktrhct otn [;-;.!tntid:-t Ut\·cck.!ing'itcilclcn ...
ser. F<ir m eftcrh:mclsbcdiimarc iir diirfl"ir ris
ken fur otillbi.irlig cftcr~lokhet ov~rhiingandc.
1-Ilirav fi.ilj•:r emt:l!crtid ocksi't r1tt eftcr:dokhct
·kan vara av dct lcgitim:t sbgct. En kiilla ti.ll
osakr::rh<:i: vid llcclarnnir.gen av den ckonon!:ska
pojitil;cn li•: sj:ih·fallct ocb:! clct faktum att
st<Jrkt fOrt'l!kl;o.dc an:tlysmetodcr l1ar mwiints
(jf:· avsnitt B). De:: k~n doc:< framh:\.llas J,elt
IV:2
allmant att den hclhetsbild av stabiiiscrings
poli:ikcn som ar.a!yscn kdcr fra:n till syncs
vara rclativt okanslig for variationcr i de an
vanda forutsattning::~·n~. L'ctta {;-~~mg?•.r bl.a.
vid en Fimfijrc!se ntcll;~n ar:a1ysen j cictta ka
pi:ci L'Ch clt:>n so1.; ):ar ut1"i:irts ino:P OECD. \ 1ac1 ~:illrr det s~~ t.istls~:a r.~atcri<~t.:~t ;ir dct att lxki:tr;:1 att {kt l:2.r va;·it ni.idv;:_ndig:t att
b::sc1a ;malyst:n pi\ iir:<dat~·-· Dcssa t~uJj,:r utan tvivd intn·ss:mta ~,::illn;~dc!· ino.:l de olika
ttn:n. S!~;.1ttc.:~0
t!g;t1·dcn~~t i i\p;)c!ldix C iir cntellcrt;d halvi'mfurdcl<v.;c.
K.~pitcl 5 har <:ispon~:,lts <o;n fiSljcr: I
niista m·;nit~ (oc!1 i ::p:wt1clixct) lii111:1~.s en
Ovcl:~iktE; rcdcgl;n~L,:.; fi)!· de 8.~1ta:;:u-:dcr.. n1. m. sotn ltgbt~r tib gr~t!l\1 filr n1~:.tnin~;en nv fin~.'l:-:politik\:ns r.:fi,:!:tcr~ ])::r(;fter fOlj~r den st:::hi1ls('!"it:L~SP~'1itii~.~:1 kri~n~i 1(8.n fi;:· ci't:··!'Lrig~~
t!,Jen ( tnl vii~·:-:a <.!t~n k~ or,o1;:~~;);:.~, rc~zt~.-:k
ning•:n i Appct:d:x C iivc; viLi,_:<r:: ~t~.tli:;7
skattc!ttg:irdcr n-;.1:1. 19·l5·-il ;;_r tl.i. J:orn~~l·>·
1ncnt). I h.r()n:J~:Jn bc.!.i~nr~1as cft(·r~·.rj~~-~tjdcll.s
sex hnjt:nl:.tmc;kk~·- d'·s. !S :c- :(\ E;;,(;-52-, 1 !J).;-!";U, 19j9-6~}, 19G i-53 (•C;t 1~~(/~-71 (?) \'J.r fOr sig i tur och ol·f:n.iqg. Er:. str::.v~u
har y::rit :nt prcs(:ntcra tlt urva! ."..? d<Ji;, oc!1
andra t:ppgiftcr s0n1 LOr \';ll"ti rc.:lr.-. ... :J.ntn vid en hcc!i)rnning CtV sL1L~r~c:·i:H_·f.poii; jL,~:~.s ~n·
d:un~.!~cnlighc~ l!ac!('r olil::j. ln·. J)~t bchOvcr jnt~ s~lrs~dit tt:tdct~tryk~:\ att krOnii\a!l trots
sin ti:1gd ar tli.;n!~:;cn SU!,lll!~j·is;;. <..'··.:L ;~!lt rna
tcri::ll =;cn1 h11r lf6~lt :.:!1 (f'JlH.l I~i~· df! gjord2. bcdl•u1c.!ng~rna h:Jr 67v~~\·j~ .;r,fc kun~·at redo·· visa~ .. 1'--ap:t:ct av:Jut:-!s e1cd en kn1 t s~nnnlan
fattnin~ s::mt synpnnktcr pet fin::Ul'FOlitikens flexiuilitct.
II. De anvanda analysmctodema
En fu:1damental bcgransning da det g:lller
att undcrsi.;ka den svcnska finan~politikens
stabiEs~rin;spoliti.ska eifckter ?..r att ,,i intc
foriof:ar over en fd!st;indi,; och tillforlitlig
c:;onomctrisk modcll feir Svnh;c, <Hr alb v:i
scntli;;a makrockonon:::.ka s::unband Jik.:om al
la vikti:;a finanspolitiska imtrumcnt l1ar spe
cificcrat~. Lars Jacoh~sons och Konjnnkturinstitutcts nya r•:odcl! har ttlan tvivcl i.ikat
vara insi:-:tcr pii en c!d punl;tcr llll"ll en rad
omsniml:ghclcr giir modcllcn n:inrlre w·mpad
for en analys av finanspolitikcns d!'ckt<:r. S;"t
leclcs fUr('kommcr inC:irckta skattcr och ::trbcts
giv::ravgiftcr intc cxrlicit i moclclkn och det
ar s!dcdcs intc mojli~t alt dirckt E! fr::tlll dfckte.rna :~.v \'ari.:!tiol~cr j dcss:t viktiga jnstru .. n:e:1t. Vid::ue bctra!ztas privata investning;tr
som en cxogcnt given ''ari:cbcl i moddkn och
dannccl :ir det giv::lvjs utcslutet att man ~bll
kunna mllta (;~[(':,tcma av finans;)olitH:a pa
ranlctcrftlri~ndrii~f;~.r ptt dtnna s!ratcgi~l\a va-
riabd.
Ut::m tillgim; till en Ia:nplig ckonomctrisk
model! Liir dct uppcnb~rlifit'n n(\dvlindigt att
anvanda mycket schcmatiska metodcr for att
kunna ar1:::lyscra den svc•Jsb finanspo!itikcn under cfterhigstiden. De tmtlersok:tit~gar som
tidigarc hQr utfi:irts ptt dctta omdde byggcr
alia pa samma insil:t. Den fUljandc oversikt
liga rcdo:-;i:irehen for de anvlinda analysmc
toderna bor gora det mGj!igt' fi:ir llisaren att
ovcrblich tillvagagang~s;.ittct och analysens bcgr:inming:u.
Fin:mspolitii;cn paver:<ar den privata sck
torn p~ olika satt. Traclitionellt brukar man
tala om inkomst-, substitutions- och fiirmo
genhctscffckter. Variationer i myndighelcrnas
IV:3
efterfragan pit (inhemskt producerade) varor
och tjanster p:i.verkar inkornstbildningen di
rckt med:m an<iringar i skattcuttag och trans
fereringar L'ir motsv;:~.rande cffekter via hush:l!lens och Wrct:1ger~s disponijJa inkO!TJster.
I dt:s:;a fall ;ir clct frt,ga fJI'l in!''JI1lsteffcktcr.
Fiir~it1t1Iingar a\.' puni(tsklltter :indrat· kons~m .. tiousv::~rom:•s rel:tti\·a pri:,, r och lcdcr d2rWr
till en :tnnorh!nda fiirc:<"hing av hushtt!lC'•:s ko:lstnntionsu~giftcr p:1 oli!:a \'ilrtlonu-:t<lcn. Ptt. satrlll13 ~~itt p~lverkar e~1 ~tndrad sk:··.ttcprogrcss;on !Ju~b.\llws a\·vlign;t:,; mcl:::~n :n:Jetr: och
fritiu lllnbn linchint;ar av exempclvis iJ:ve
stering."<n·.~;ift,~r, bo!ags~.:.altcrcgieru:\ och ~r
bctsgi\·:•::l\'g:ftcma gel' fiirct<•gcn in;:itamcnt att ;:ndra proportionerna me!lan arbets- of'h
kr~pi~:Jl!!!S~o.tstula i pruduktionen. 1I:ir Hr det
~111tS~0
! fr;o:ga O!ll snh~t~tutionsr::fftk!:tr. Shalig~_~n
p~tver~ar givt·tvis v:trje in~H;talnin~ till oc.h
utbet~'llli'l~-~ fr:u1 det offt"rttliza· ~.t(1de~en ~~v
dc:1 pri\';tta St ktoms fiirmii;;rn!,ct likso1n dcss
fi)rdcl:.ing p~t mer clle:- tninclre !ikviua till
g:ing:•r. Eftn>Oill hus!Jiillcns och fOretag:eus kcip av J.:onsnmtions- oc:1 invcstering-w:tror
(alit annat Jika) sJ.nnolih pr\vcrbs i \'i~s
m:m av scktorernas formiigrnhet~stalluhg blir
de: rimligt att tala om den c!wnomisl,a po
litikens fUrmiige:thctscffckter. I c1en foljanue ~chcmatiska analysen kornnH'r vi hdt all bort
se fr;in substituti•)llS- orh fi)rmo;;mhetscff.:!;,
tcr av <!r:n en~la anied!~ingcn att d~~s~. efft·ktcr knappast kan kvantifinas fOr n:in·:trandc.
Beriikningarna av finanspo!itikeas effektcr a\·
scr ~aledcs cndast verkninga!na via inkomst
bildningen. For staLiliscringspoliti~'en i Jlorl
iir cles,:a senare effekter uum tvivcl av hclt
domincr;;nde kvaHtit::~tiv !Jetytlrlsc.
Da d·:t g;iller inlwmstdl't:1aerna !tar clet ~o
refallit n(idviintEgt att acceptcra bcgransni:::g-
ar i analyse:-~s rackvidd i framfOr al1t tre av
secmien. For det fi.irsta gors inget fursok att
kv;tntificra finanspolitikcns dfektcr pa inve
str::-i;;gr.:Jkti·:i~cten i den privata ~rktom be
ro~-m~c i)i't briste:-~ p1 prccica kuns::::;xr om
c]t• L·:k~OlT!" $0!TI bcst~l~nrncr ro~ct~.zs;n\·(·s~cring ..
~W;J i S\-crigc. I st:iikt kcmn1cr den m:meris
ka ;ma.lysrn att Flllktvis komplc! teras mcd kvJlitativa orndi)rr!cr;. o!n in:r fin~n:~rolitiken
k;:n Jm iHflttcrat forct:zg,·ns invtsterin;ar. l'ur <.let a;1r.h·a o:1~L~tra!" rr::·~tn::::;,:n :\.\' jl~kon1:i~t:f ..
fcktern:l cr::Jast tle pri :r.:~! :l. s.k. in~ r~ac! c ac~\: ..
ter:l~ l~!C(i:)_!! sc:k::nd~il.]. ~.k. llPl!t~p!i!;:l.toref ..
fck:er i:1lc k•mmwr mcd. Vi bo:·t~:cr m;:d
and:·a ord ifdn :1\t en genom cxp~tmi,·a fi
nanspoli:iska ilt:;:ilr!cr' astadl:ommcn dtcrfr:"t
gc- och pro<hl~<.tio~l<~\11in~ S;{ap::tr 1:yZ! . .inko:~1S
ter som i sln tur o:-.ar cftcrfrf~g~.n yt~crlig~r~
i en kumulativ process. 1\loti,·ct till dt:nn~
bcr:r~i!1Snhlg' Er ~lh.rj~en ln+st ntniga kun~kapcr mn ~;:nnll:illsc1wnomin, i dt:>!ta fall l'nl de tids
efu .. ·r~t~p!Iin~:tr cllcr l:!ggar rn~~n har att r:ikn:t m~·d i ;_,tt :~\;:]t1;;1ik:~:orfi:irlopp. I ca t:,onoa~i ~orn de~: s\·cn€,ka tncd en i10g n1:trginrll
b1portbcn:ic,;cnhct oc·h ctt furh:,)brde,·is start m;t!·ginclit s!,attcutt:\g blir 1 c·aiinl:rnLllliUit;pli
k:?.ton·rr.a rc1ativt sm~1 och clct b;jr min'b bctyddsen av att bortsc fr;":n nmltiplibto~dfcktcrna.
For dct trcdje m~ltcr vi cffc:-.tcr:-J:•. pt~ to!al
red cfterfd;an ocl: !r::e p2. real D:\P och
import.volym var for si~. Dct scnarc hade i och for sig varit unskvart cftcrsom dct skullc
gora dct mujligt att s);ilja p:i. finampoliti!.;ens
effektcr pft den inhemska ckono!":li>ka 3ktivi
tclen och ptt den extema halansen. I OECD's
s Se Hans~n 1968, ~. 16
IV:4
finanspolitis!-:.a ur.dcrsoknin;; antD.s den margi
n.:lla irnportbcn:igcn:1clrn \·arD. konstant 1955
-65 och lib mcd 0;i0' och p!i. s.i Satt k.:Ll
buclget}loli~ikrns cffel~~c:- :~! J?.>:P och i!nport ..
Yolymr!1 bcr:ikn:ts Y:!r fijr ~j;. So~:1 bc~on~s i Ur!dcrsi..~k!liPgcn fi:· det p:·oLlel~t~:ti~~k~ li1CJ.
· dennJ. ltns~t.':\ naturli~!tvjs att n:tra ~11cr vicl
fullt k:•;>:lcitclsut;~yttj~.n0c i ckonumi:1 blir
antag~'.lH~ct on1 ea 40-tJroccut!.:; !·onstant im ..
porLbC11iigt~nhct o::~alistis!~. 1 ctt s:~c:ar~t l:lgr~
konHJrer s~tnno!ii:t ca sto: de! c.:: clt.:n cftcr ...
produrcnu:r a:t lcda. till lj!,:;·(l in:p::::'t cch den
Ina,·gitv~Ila itYJportbcl~Z:.gcnlictcn ~.:~\n n:~nn:)_ sib
v~irdct 1. rf~tnkO:lrt J.r d·~t oc:·:s:t att C); porv:n
bn komm~ <ltt prcs~<<JS cillbJka. Viib cifd-·.tt·.r
en vis.: n~'!~D?j)0~tt~k Etr pa ~:~:,~P, sy5:~~:-~::_tt
n:~ig o~b ut:-!kc.<:L::-·ilc.~cl l~lir a1l·l·~: •. i ;1i.i~ r;r.·:d
bero~nr1c p~t gr.1cJ.:.:r~ : .. v k:tp8.ci~~t.~'-.lt':;·t.tj;~:·:d~
i ut:;rt!l~:stiget. l~·ur ~f.t k1nH-:a t:-t l1~~nsy1~ t!H dcnna konlp1H:ation p:'t c:t }H.::t ti!lfP~'<~:_·:-:~i!la:.1 .. clc slitt ~ku1Jc en ckouo.rn,_:tr.is~~ D!OdcH lY:l:tir;as.
Ut~n en ~:td:1n f?tr vi r~l)j;t O'::·> ;~~~~~.l ~..l.t L!;;_t:-t
cffrktc:-~1:1. p.~ tler: total~t tf~crf:-t£(~!!1.
On1 den a\';:;r:i11S1~ing ~L' lif'n uffentliga S!"_·k
torn sou1 fOrcf:~!h:r ritnli:; IUr ,.-ttra 5yft~r1 ~kaa fOl j~nc~c ~:i;as. FL;r Gr.:t fi.l:·:-;~a ii.r stz.~]iga cell kc;nin~u:ab. myn(l.i6I:c:cr i:)kh:dc!-2dc. Bctr:.l[ ..
famk uc offcEt!i:;a aff:<:·:,(!~i\·;::.n::L: v;:r];cn be
tr~1.~\1 as clrs~:-ts !nvc:sl '-~r!1~~;.:: \ c:d~::a~1h·~ t sotn en
del av fi:l:tnspe> liti':cn I!Kd:m den lup:tncl.:: vcrks:1!:ahctcn lizgcr ut~nf0r. Ut;Ir.fijr l:g'1cr
oc.ksft rlc offcntliga bo1<'.:;,:n son h1i:- lii:~:t:tlls
:ned pri·;ata foretag. ViJarc r:il:n.~> bos:adsbyg;il;~dct som ctt fin::!nspsli ~i:~kt j1:s~ rui~:c.nt
cftersonl cicss otufattaing har }.1_:nr~~t styr;;s
av 1nyndighctcrna gcno1n Ittner~ :~~1r, by~;; .. naclsrcg!cring cllcr igr~ngs:~ttnir.;;~til]s~:1nd :t~1 ..
ckr hcb cftcrkrig,pniodcn. i\vcn soci<~lfiir-
s5krinpscktom scs h:ir som en del av den
offmtlip scktarn. Dctta bl.ir naturli:;~vis sar
~k!lt bctydd~cfullt fr.o.m. 1960 ;;mom till
komstcn av ATP-systcmct och den kraftign
fom!uppby;;g1:ad so•n h;1.r agt rum sedan
dcss.
I~r..t oss h~lrcftcr berOra uppde1ningen av budg~tfllr;indr.inr;::--.r i budsct~tg~ird(~r oc!l bndgct:Juto:n.:!tik. I)is~in~\:!ior'.cn b:l.S'?CtS p~t dct
vii1k?inda fi_irhi'dlancct att clet melbn det of-
fer!tE:;::~ bt.:.(.~gc1er och ~axnhli.l~sckonot1'in i Qv .. rib: racier Clt tiJWCs:<.Jigt be, 0'.'!1<1<-. \'icl C1!
bcdl)nn:::r:g av l~u1· v!Janr~~s~!d 1i;l g:\'r~:~ xn~1l
oci1 r:tc!:1nC:e ko:!jU!"!;.;~ur!~igc ~n ~;j~s f!nanspo
li.tik ~lr, ii:- clet ~" stort int:-cssc att kunna skiJj:1 rncll:!n hu(!;;r·t[i)r:tYidri:1gar .so:11 l-wror p~t viclta~~I~a pl!.r::ttnr:·h~rf~)r:~!Hlr:ng .. ~r ()Ch ~~otd:!na
budzct)(i::(::dringar ~om - \id ofii!:tndr;J.clc
\'~1rdcn p!t skattt~sat~·;.~r och 0\'rlr~a fi . ..:~.;:;!la nor
mer- au:om:1ti~:1;t ft:,Jjcr :tv v:ni:Himv.T i t.f"x.
ir1kornstcr och t~ci:.Jjcm~:ittnir·~ i den privata
srktorn. I c.icn nu!ncris~\.a an;1ly~.e!1 bctra1zt;tS
a112 .. rc:1la fOr~ir:dringar tl\' offcnilig konsunl·
tion och irscstcring (in;;}. bost;J.dsbyggamk)
S0!1l vidt2.gna rd:;::r~::..·r. Upl)d(.:!niugcn i :-tnto
m~.tik och !t~g:i:·clcr anv:inds s.'dcd<:s enthst
p!'t skattcr orh tr:•nsfrrcrin:~ar. Att Uir:;nclringar i d'-·:1 offc:::!ig:1 scktorns cftcrfr;\g:111 in
te h:>.r tudclats - vi!ht i och fiir si~ l•adc v~rit O!Istvart - s~ntn1auh;ln:;cr ;nc<l ~vtlt i~·
hctcrna att i prak~ikm geno:nfi.ira en s~.dan
uppdclnio::~. Bcr:i:~:1ir~:;:1.nn :w de antonoma
bt.:d:,~tiur:iacr:YJ:;arna i Appc:1dix C: har i t1e flcst:1 f;:ll gjorts mcd ut:;-~tngspnnkt fdn de
upp>kattai;lg:lr som h;1.r rcdovisats i proposi
tio!tcrna. I dcs:;a angcs ofta intc den auto
noma s],attcfi.ir:intiri:Jgen som den sknllc bli
om sb.acb;J.scn ant;1.s vara oHir:1n2rad utan i skattekr::ndringcn ar dea fi.irdntadc fiirand-
IV:S
ringen av skattebasen ti!l fo!jd av den \"id
tag:t~ skc~ttf.:~~tg~\rclcn cl!er clen ckonow.iska ut
veck!in~c!l i 1ntu1~~a faa ink1udernd. S?tdana autorn:1 t!.'~~-:a fC·r~ind:·ingar h~r i prjncip rcnsats bort ,.i,: ber:ikningcz~ av autonqm:>. for:ind
Jing;J.z-. Vid:ue iir 111~11 i propositioncr:Ja ofta
nlcr'~ in1rr~s('r.1d av p;ir ~~!.:~ttc~~t:.;):·der p:J.ved~ar (!C rcdoi.'i.\ade hndgc!!nkornst 1~rna llH'
d~ln dtt ur !:>ti,.l,iliscring~po1iti:-::~: S>'!lp!l!l!.:t ~ir
en hel <~cl intre~sa~H:ue 'ttt veta n:ir :"'ttg)!r .. dcrna p.
0
t\'<:rl:ar hn .... b:'tl~cn~ och fi..i!·e~:-t~l'llS L!~.:
ti-1a ~~{:tUt:hclalning~n. FUr att ftt dt? ~~·.~tOtK'
Jna bu<::.~c! ftj<in<h·ing~!rn:\ bcriiknadc en!i·;t (.'et
~r:n~tre :dttrnati\·et httr 11:i!1~yn d:~rfOr t:1~ito;
ti!l de olika upph;)n.l;.:.sy~~:.u~;ens utfortiH!~;1~.
J)ct ~:i~~tr sig ~j;i.~vt ~ttt d-...~ !t~~r Biirnl!d~t J;•jf'~
rekliu!lt'!'!1a d(·lv:s 1!1~t~~te !)i g:lnska sc:h,.,.,:-. ..
ti5k:L ;\v utryn1:nr.·~--:k:il iir det O.jU:·li~~t "~:~
rcdo· . .:i--·a t:d1\ yl~·u1a h:ir. \;"~d :~:i!lcr ~kat~rrna gi)rs i t!n:_·h·:>·~~ (:..~t
st~u kt f(.lrr:'·:d.:.iandc ~nt~:tg.1ndet '~tt dr~ i~H~ir .. ,>ta sbttt<:riJ;J. och ;J.ILc•'.3:v~r:wp;iftcrn:t p:!vcr·
k~r hu~!:.iJlcos di.'ipo;lih1a inko~nstcr r~~ s:t~n ... ma ~:iu son1 tlc dirckta s\;J.tlerna. Dct innc
b:ir lJl.::t. all de i:1rlirclta s::altema och :~r
bct~giv2 :-avg! f 1 r:·-r:1a :.tn~ ;ts ()vcrv~\:tn~dc p:t hns
h:t!!cn \"ia pris- elkr i!J~omsthi!dning:cn. Ar~
data fi;r skatlt:r och transfcreringar rcdO\·is~.s
i tabd! :2. J !:!:Jell 3 :\llgcs de !u Ji6a fi.ir:iudril!:;arna
fOr o1i!;;::. skattchtegoricr. Flirantlrinbama h;lr
utlryckts i procent :J.\' fiirr;:';:"t~nclc ~·.rs ::3?\P ocb har dessutom upptlc!ats i e•J i'tt~~~!rdso.lel
och en del hlinfi)dig till aul0ln;•tik. De visas
grdiskt i diagrammm 3 och 'L Td>cli 1 \"isar
pa rno:svaranclc s:ltt hur stora de :"triiga fiir
~indring:!rna av offcutlig komuJn!ion och invc
slcrir>g:tr, bostadshyggande och iivriga poster
i fUrs(i:'jningshala!lScn har varit i rclatio!t till
J:,~ILL Olika B~P-k,mponenters bidrag till (rcala) B:\P-ti!lr::xt0n 194.7-71.
1Exi.l. cift.:l;tliga br)}:~~
='I~.x:~t. J~ .. ~1·ma.nenta Lo;.:;t:;ctcr
IV:6
A. Prh·ata !a~ta br'J~t0-inv('~tcrin ,~~~r (exkl. bast~icter)
n. La!.:erir ... \'csterir.£:~r
C. E>:P~"t av varor och tj:C.:;fcr
D = A+D<·C
E. Total offcltl;._r; c!t'C'~·ir.t·:"~Jl <;,<;. bor.t:idcr)
Killa: Ta!.·c\1 1.
IV:7
."-'--L-~-'-'-'--.....__.._,__~._-1.-' I I • I I -5
48 50 52 5~ 5G 58 60 62 ·61 6G 68 70 72
Di:.>..gram 1. A.rliga rcala forandringar av BNP-komponenter i% cv BNPr-I 194:7-71.
H. To:>tal o!fentl'r: ~r·~rfri!.g-:tn (i.!1~l. bost!idcr) (C+F~G)
:K:Hla: Tat>elll.
IV:8
+2
+1
Diagram 2. Arliga rcala foriindringar av offentlig cfterfrcigan i )o av BNP1 _ 1 1947--71.
Tab"'l 2. Sk3tter och avguter 1~46-71 (m!!J. kr)
A. Hush1!kns B. Tr:m•fcre-1 C. Ar;ets- D. Jnd!ref.ta E. Total a direkta skr.!ter r~ng:tr till hus- giv~ravgiftt·r sk::•.tter minus skattcr{A·D+
1--+--o_c._h_a_":::.P_·r_t~_r __ -1-_h_:._l_l_c_n_ sul.Jvcntioncr C +D)
!9·.:6-1
2017 70'[[55 1P:7 30~5 Bi3 . n mg gg~g ~-~"a a 257 1 R3o ~6 2 oo3 a 503 1-!-~4_9---; ___ J_~_,D_J ___ -l ___ 1 so-1 10 _·_5 --+--·z_o_,_z ___ , ____ 3_6_G __ 3 __ _
19'-0 33-!1 2014 117 2008 34~2 1951 4713 221-1 12·1 228J ~912 19:;2 5718 23B7 1~5 258~ G05'i
11953 62ll3 2751 137 2857 6-HG 195{ 6 C75 2 ~C3 125 313:> 6 972
~..,-- f----~--1-------- 1------l
I 752{ 34:,0 213 36~5 79~2 1.,.> I 8107 3830 ,02 40H 8ti2'l
11957 9034 4201 313 427; 9-120 1CJ33 9:i~l <ri58 31·1 4!1~:J 9f.)Jfj :~::,'.) 1 10275 4U~7 s:;o ~,o.;:1 lOG~o r----+-------f-------f------ ------------1~30 1(161 l~U2 19<33
Anm. A. H!..i~~~~lkns t!ir('~!.t :.~a!!er oc~\ avr:\~t,.r !ir e:-<kl•Jsh•c e:~t·n;tv~:i!tcr tlJI ATP'. Dirri-~ta ~-:::•.ttc!"' :i.r i~·-':It.:,J:.;~ !1Wt! p·);-;ten 1C:13 1 n;.Jtic,nalr!ikca~,k;l:'c·rn;L 1>."I~) uwdan t:.:J~·ia1 it)~·:.::.krin:-:::;:-.\';·:!ti..'J' och avgifter till t:t~tt uch konum:.:.er !lr c:1ll~t KunJun~..:-b.rins.~it'J.lt-tr. dP1initie!!t'r. · ll. 'fr~:,.::!crc·rin~~~~!" ti!l hm-h1llcn ~ir fa!H1lli~·u1 ~LV po~~~c1·na ~ ... 1{ 18:8 o~h ~:r~ 18:!.'.
~~1:(;'ritJ2t~~~tfif';~~-;~~.~\.::~;~U;!f:!~L~-;,'~:~:S:~,~~H;~~~i;'2K/~~n:'f/1:WV~'~::T'~~~~~~~~,rs D. Ir:.rHrc~tl !::il~·~tc·r Lda~1s ::a:~vcn:ioncr ;;r e~.U;.~~h·e dl:!lJ!uut a!bc-tsg,lvaravgi!tcr 1ncry. bcr:ilm~s 1 Uvrit;l svm NH 2:5 + h"H 3:5 - :.:n 2:6.
IV:9
BNP. Bcriikning:una ar utfOrcla i 1959 itrs
priscr och ~ir bascradc pi't de intcrnationella nation;~lr~~keaskapsdefinitioncr smn St:ttistiska Ccntralb:-r~m numcra :m\'ander.6 Vissa a\'
dc~sa scricr prcscntcras i diagrammcn 1 och 2. T::!bell 4 och di:tgram 5 slutligen visar finanspolitikens impactcffektcr pa total re:>.l eftrrf:-~tgaa cxklu~:ve privata innstcring:~r 19-17 -71. En n:irmare rcdogorclsc for bcr:iknings{crf:tran<.lct Iamnas i appc~dixct i slutct av dctta bpi~d ctir den am·anda konsmntionsfunl-:tioncn ocksa prcscnteras.
III. Stahiliscringspoliti.sl< l-;ronika for ett lwarts scl,cl
1. Den fiirsta efterkrigsiuflationcn 19-16-49
Att historien sallan ( cller aldrig) upprepar sig ar de !Orsta cftcrkrigstuens konjunkturutveckling ett bcl:igg for. Trots alia till synes
6 Det bor beton:ts att det i bilaga B ar de aldre definitionerna som har anviints. Dct mcdfor n:tturligt\'is ;~tt en del siffror i detta kapitd skiljer sig fr!'m motsvarande ttppgiftcr i bilaga ll.
IV:lO
A. Hushiillens skatter och avgifter
B. Tr:>.nsfercrinr:ar till hushallcn
C. Ar'!J~tsgivarcvgifter
D. Indir:>kta skatter
E. TntWt
Klnta: Tabell 3.
+1
·'-
-1
51 53 55 57 59 61 53 65 G7 69 71
Diagram 3. S!o:attuitgarder i% av BNPr-I 1947-71.
IV:ll
•
% A. HusMl- +4l I I lens s:-~tter och m·gllter +S-.+ ~r\!
·:t~~L~~~~~-~lJ ~;,;;:;::;'"" J I I I I I
Ull h"h'•ll<n t N. I - I · ,J~r>oil
D. Jndtt<kta :: I I J ;\ "' J ····~· .:. 1 ~~_t· (J ~-~-r-·t
E., TotUt ;J (irutl. :~r!Jets- ·~ givara,·guter)
+3
+2
+l
KlUb: Tabell3.
Di:!gram ~. Skatteautomatik i% av BNPr-11917-71 .
IV:l2
-
IV: 13
TP.hell 4. Fb:>.n~pol!!l'tcns l.r!!pacte!fekter p! total real eftet·!ra~an (E'xkl. pr1vat 1mcsterillgsefter!d;;a:>) 1 procc.nt av DNP t-1 1347-'il
lmpa.cteffcktcr av
vlilgrur.dade profetior om en efterkrigsdepression av dct ~lag som fOljde efter fOrsta vlirldskrigP.t kom en depression som b~·bnt aldrig till st!md.7 En;igt relativt l'amst1i:nmiga bedomningar i b!.a. 'GSA, En:;l::md odt Sve· l'ige var en utveekling i tre f user s::mnoEk eftcr krigsslutet. Under den fi.1rsta skulle omstallningen fd\n krigs- till fredspwduktion ske. Den andra ~kulle bli en hvgkonjunkturperiod da de under kriget ackumu!erade J.:onsumtionsoch invcstcringsi.::choven skulle til!godoscs. Under den trcdje fasen, d:1 eftcrfr:igeforhallandena ater hade normaliscrats, ans;!gs risken for en depression stor.8 I Svcrig..: (Ii!-:som pa
:mdra Mll) lJ!ev omstii!lningsperioden relativt kort och smidigt avklarao.l och d~~efter utveckladcs en hogkonjunktur vars intensitet oeh uthallighet st:illde dc!l ekonomish politiken infO!· nya oeh S\'arbeml!strade problem. Det var intc svi'1rt att Jleka pi eftcrfragesti-
1 For en presentation av prognosern::>. smn gjordcs i Svcrige, se kap. 4 och Lundb.:rg 1953, s. 195--9i. s Konjunhturliiget hosle~t 1945. l\fl:.ddclanden fran Konjunkturimtit.utet, .Serie A: 13, s. 7-9. I forts1ittnin:;en am•iind~ fil1·kortniagen KL h och KL v fOr institute:s host- rcsp. varra:>por-ter.
Byp:gnac!~re~lcr!ngen sk!irps o-:h impor~:-e- I-avg:i!t t:'t~lningstak
By~£"na~!'re .. g!er~P.f;' atc··lnfi.)rd
t .. lkv.i.d1tct5 .. oc!l k:'!<><;~~:vot<:.·r o:h ctLmin~st:Jk in· fi.h-s
PriskontroE fl~crinFJ:o.·s glering a~cri:U6rs lniOrs ir.!ars
1 1r--1rn II mn Dolv~:;;skatt~n htijs
'Emo1·!avg\!ter uttas och ave!·.ri\'ning:sr~~·;!crna sk:i rpt.
A,·~:~tt"1;!1g:ar tilllF sti.mu~eras
LL~~ ~!:1
~·HS~~or.junktiJr
t l r1 1-skalllnfilrs
t____ _ _jt j_ __ ---l::d::J ___ _j_~ l-la.vbiJt shfl';'s LJ Gcn•.nctlJ. illH'steri:l~srond~~rilii;;Pi, 1 4 -----· t__ __ _
lJyr:.::n.h~:;r•:;.tt·rm~l~:t lly!:~:n~lrbrt·~~~~•iio~t·n Sclc};t iv J-;tvr,itt ~:!·J,lJ$ hL:r.l!iM'!'o.t~; fH\'CCk1a~:
p • • l__j ti ,f. · k II k • • t'tl~nL:~o-tak r . .s:>:on!ro!!t.>n ;!\Tt•c:.t.:s t;l~-!~:-~"l~stJ. · Bu .lJ;S~ · aUca ~.in,;~ .~tr:"p: .... 1 L-.L___!._. L----!-~_.__.._ ___ j __ t___! 1 J_ ___ _t_.L__L___l_.L.. .. l___!
~__:::_) t:.!_ __ :.:'_.J ~·:..._.:··: .... ~ :-J L:-Y ..... -~-1 L_1;~----to~--L~2 -~:-_Ltt:!__~-r~-<:-~--~·~J L_;.:..-_j\t l.2;_J H lt.\'::la\!Ht:Ht H •3.. H Tcntkn.:;er H A H A
hll A.
Kurva A: impactdfd:t a\· ~ttg:lrdn. Kun·a D: ncttoimp::ct. Kurv<J C: imp.:1<.tcfft.kt av skattcnu<omatik. I- och IF star fi.i!" inwskrings- rc::pektivc ir.vcstcringsfondcr.
Diagram 5. Finanspolitikens impacteffcl:ter pa totr.l real efterfragan ( exkl. fnit·at im:e.<tcringsefterjrcigan) i% av IJNP,_ 1 1947-71.
IV:l4
mulerandc inslag i bilden som !..unde ge hOgkonjunktt:ren den flygandc start den fick un
der hOsten 1945. I Konjunkturinstitutets (KI) hostrapport 19·16 heter dct:
"Betingdscrna for en stark expansion och darmcd fOr en snabb t:tbrcdning av hiigkonjunkturcn \'Oro uppenbarligcn myckct goda vid tidcn fOr varldskrigcts avslutanC:c. Rclativt lag rantcniv!l., hO.; Hkviditet och i al:n<'!l!!et goda vinstutsiktcr bctyddc rynnsamm:1. Wrntsattnillgar fOr okad produktion odt invcs!t'ring iuom n:iringslivet. Stor kl>;Jkraft llOs de cnski!Ja inkoms!ta~arna och cn bctyd:•ndc n:scrv av ackumuleradc koasu:ntiotbld~o\· mcdfOrdc sn:~bbt srigat!clc f:,ktisk cftcrfr:'tgan pa konsumtionsvaror och tjanster av alla sl:1g. Samtidigt bcfann sig byggnadsverksamhctcn och annan invcstcringsvcrksamhct i snabb stcgr:ng" 9
Till en borj:m kundc den starka expansio
ncn pa efterfritgcsidan - som naturllgt\·is ock
sa omfa<tade exportm - til! stor del tillgo
doses tack varc bctyd:mde sysseb:ittnings- och produktivitctsi.)kn:nza:: samt stigande import.
Under 19·16 tycks cmcllertid sp:inningrn mel
Ian kopkraft och vamtillgang Ita okat trots
en fortsatt betyd::mdc produktiomokning och
en viss minskning av den offcntliga efterfrag:m pa varor och tj:instel". Ett indicium pa detta \'ar den dr:>.stisb sk:irpningen av arbct~marknads11it;et und':r 1916.10 Antlra symptom \'ar de lagcrminskningar och orderanhopning·
ar som kunde obscivcras. Tcndenscr till pris
stcgringar forckom naturligtvis ocha men de
begransades av det tamligen konsekvent ge
nomforda prisstoppct. Genomslaget friin de stigande v1irldsmark
nadspriscrna motvcrkades dc!vis av ·kronapprecieringcn (med omkring 17 procent) i juli
1946. Ett tal::mde tcckcn pa efterfragetryckct
var ocha ombstningen i utr.ikeshandeln !rim ett cxportoverskott pa 670 milj. kr under
1945 till ctt importovers:..:ott pa 840 milj. kr under !946. Tack vare en bctyd2nde nctto
export av tjanster stannade bytesbabnsundcrskottct fi.ir 19·16 vid 90 m:!j. kr. T!'ots dnta 1ninskn.de Ril:~bankens V(!lutc.reserv under 1 9·i G frtm knappt 2 300 milj. kr till om1,ring 1 900 milj. kr,11 vilket bl.a. bcroddc pli svcnsk lfmgivn!!'g t ~ :1 utlandet.
Bur s:•g man 11\1 pj utsiLterna in fOr 1 9-1·7 och vilkcn roll ~~:1•lle den ekon0mie.~a poiitiJ,en tilldelas? E onj•.mkturinstitut~!s bediimning
vld o"ussl:iftt·t var g::msl::. entycE~: "Fi.>rcning
C!l av bcsta,:mlc starkt kostna0stryck och av
sevard Ol:ning i to:al efterfrii.gan, som ickc k::>.n v:intas fium motsva:·igl,rt i ok::~d varutill:;~ng:,
hotar salunda att v:J.lia en allv~'r1l3 s~-:;!:::ng
i den saml.:i!lsel,:onomi~ka b::lansm uror:e:· i!r 19·i7." 1 ~ }..led h:imyn till ~lc begriit~satlc va
lut:~n:sen:ema h:..de det dcssforinn:m p:!p~kats
att "man knappast bn rakna mcd ::>tt en fortsatt mer bctydnnde oknin[; av imp('rtCn
utiivcr 19·16 ars mcc:clniva i mer bcaktans
\'ard grad skall kn11na bidraga till en utjiimning av inflationstryckct." 13 KI :s import·
prognos - cnligt vilkcn importen skuLe minska med 3()() milj. krH - implic::rade uppcnbadigen en prognos hetraffande den ckonomis!:a poEtiken under 19·17. Eftersum n~!gra
skattchojningar ~ iler andra kontraktiva bud
getatglirder da inte o\·erv1igdcs, kundc prognosen knapp:.st 11ppfattas som ni!t~ot anu<.t
9 KL h 19·!-6, s. 6. 10 Sc t.ex. Lu11dberg, 1953, ~. 203. 11 Se KL v 1951, s. 12 och s. hi. 12 Sc KL h 19·H), s. 32. t3 Se KL h 1 9•!6, s. 30. 14 Se KL h 1946, s. 27.
IV: 15
r·
an ett forcbud orn ett snar:igt info::ande av
importrcstriktioner.111
Pa det skattcpolitis!<a ornradet blcv overgangen till kallskatt och bortt<:g:mdct av om
sattningsskattcn de mcst bctydelsefulla atg5xdema under 194:i. Att kallskattcrcformcn trots dctta kunde fOrbises n:istan hclt och
15 Till inncborden var s:ilcdcs Konjunkturinstitutcts prognos och h3ndc!sministcr :-.ryrdals omskrivna uttal;::m!c i :\ation;::rcko~'0n:i>ka fOrcningca i bi.irjan av dec<'rnbcr 19+G (i '·!lk•?t mojlighc:en till fortsaa fri import ifr;\,;as::tt·~s)
ganska ~n::rlika. I dct sammanhan;ct kan <kt ocks.i \'ilra av intrcs>c ::tt citcra ctt yttrandc som fin:msministt•: \\"igfurss fa!k!c i riks<h[;cn tva da~·ar inua11 :-.ty:·<:al hijll sitt anforande: "Herr 0:1lin ~tru:, unt;er importrns viild'::_.:a till"~xt ~ch v~lutornas ut~tt0iH!liug .••• ~len o:n vi ta upp fr;t;an oat en i:npor!:Tr;lcrj:tg~ \'ilka. intrcssen l.on!tner d~l au s~it ta slg i rOrt:!sc, och \·iJka poEt!skr·. L·Y6?.1!~~dcr l~onuncr !n:tn att bygga upp n:ot dcm so:n skul!c vilja g:'t den v:igcn?, Se :\:H!r.1 J::u!tin:ucns p:·otok01l h0$tsrs .. sioncn 1 ~··iti nr. 3~. s. H. tG N:tgot fiirbi,ccndc ,·ar dct i::1tc f r:tga om f0r KI :s del, sc KL h 19·16, s. 24. Oc!'s~t i Andcrsson-Oh!ins modon om om~ens slopandc 1947 !tbcrop::.dcs de okadc statsinkomsterna ~ samband met! uppbcinlsrcfonncn, sc motion i forst~. hmmam: 1946 nr 33+ s. 20. 17 Att rcformcn skullc r:, en kontr::.ktiv dfckt framg!tr intc av propositionc:1, Darcmot ::m:.:;cs noggrant det inkomstbortfal! fOr statsvcrket som eftcrsk1inkningen a\· skattcr skulle medfora, sc proposition 1945: 370, s. 268. D::t kan ocksl pa· pckas a!t hush:illens direkta s!,attcr (inkl. avgifter) mcl!an 19·1·6 och 19·%7 obde mcd 50%. En li!;a stor ukning har intc fiirckommit sedan dcss, jfr tahcl! 2. t~ l'n•;Jcdtion 19-tG: 222. 19 R:l:~d:•.;cns skrivclscr 19-16 nr. 43·1.
ballet i den stabiliseriP..gspolitiska diskussionen
tcr sig svi'trt att ~ors~it i efte~h:md.16 Bcslut ·
om kallskattcsystemets infOrancic fr.o.m. 1947 hade fattats i slutet av 19·15. Bcn'ltag~.ndtt av
den kans!:e ; Y2 ar L'utga tidsc:ftcrsl:ipnir!gc·n
mc!lan ir;kom:;tcn~as fon·arv och bcskatt:1ing
mcdforcie naturlig~vis - furutom en betycla:1de
och permanent Hirstarkni1~g av de ir..byggda
stabilisatorenw. i den svcnska ckenomin -
en kraftig cng:ingso::ning av skaacuttagct. K~ilbi~attcrcf<)n!!cn k~:~l. d;lrl;:::('nO=-:! att f!t en
p:''\t:,~lig; o:h - sv1n dct visadc sig- - \·ll1brh~h·
Jig kontraktiv ~ffckt under 19-1·7 (sa:::tidigt som sbttcn p;t 19-15 o::h 19-16 :lrs inko:n3tcr
dtcr:;k:inktcs i tlca m:':n de ~l-:uUe c:·H~:;£;aS
dtcr iirsskiftd 19!6/-}7!). Enligt en ytterst
schcmatisk k::lkyl b.n den ;<utanoma skattchiijningcn i ~amh:\nd mcd oYerg:!ngm till hilisbtt anscs nwtsPr::t. l ,5-2 % av BKPY
Ka!bkatterciormrns cftcrfr;'tgcdJ.mpaudc ,:f_ fcktrr tlfpv;i~~dcs cmcllcrtid i dct n:irm:'~'c
av siop::mdCl av den fcrnproccr..tig::- or::scn. Bcslutct h:irom mitt 11ndcr en cxtre~. hiig
konjunktur hiir till c~e m:;rkli~arc i dte:·k~:.-::~
titlens sven;;ka stabiliscringspoEtik. I en pro
position mcd anh&!lan om riksclagcns yttr~n
dc ang:i.cnde avvcckli!~gcn av o~scn f)rordadc regcringen i april 194G att slop:mdd skulle skc den l j:muari 19·1-<P~ Rcsnitatct av ri!,sdags'beham.llingen blcv cmclkr,id en re
kommcndatio:l om att omsen sku;Jc tas bert
ctt halvar fOre detta <-1<~tu:n.19 Fr:\g;m l:om
upp pa nytt under hijstriksdagcn. I propcsi
tionen om avvccklingcn Iiirt:s!ogs att derma skullc skc rccl:m den 1 janu:-..-i 19-17. Propo
sitionen innchOil oc:,sa fi.irslag om att vis~a
livsmedelssubventioncr samti<)igt ~kulle dras in.
Bada !Orslagen godtogs av en nara nog eniz
riksdag i december. Att dctta skcddc bcroddc
IV: 16
...
inte pa omedvetenhet om det minst sagt
anstrangda samhallsekonomiska lliget. Visscrli
gcn fOrcE'tg KI:s hostrapport annu inte men
i ett. bihang till propositioncn varnade insti
t\.Jlets chef i mycket bestamda ordabg mot
att slopa omsen i rad::mde Higc.2o Dct skulle
inte hcllcr droja mer an n!'tgra fa veckor in
nan oppositioncns kritik av regcringcn for
otillrackliga atglirder mot inflationen satte in.
Limgt scn:ctre skrcv 'Vigforss: "Dct fanns cn
ligt min 1~1enir.g blott ett cnda stort argument
for avveckling av skatten, men det var ~:..
starkt att dct till ~:st vagdc over alia bc
tlinklighetcr om vilka diskussionen nogsamt
vittnade. Det var dct allmlinna onskcmalet om en skattcs;inkning." 21 Ett annat motiv var
den sankni:Jg av levnacbkcstnausindcx som
skulle bli fi.iljdcn av omscns slopande ;i\'Cn
om livsmcdclssub\'entioncrea ocks:"t togs bart.
Daremot tycks rishn fOr en cfterkri~sdepres
sion inte ha i'tberopals som ~klil (vilkct givet
vis inte u~cslutcr att farh!'tgor lt1irom kan lui
funnits). Ej hel!er tycks man - va•·e sig i propositioncn ellcr i riksdagsdeba:tf'll - ha
velat rattf:irdiggora omsens borttagande ge
nom att hanvisa till kallskattcrcformcns efter
fdigcdamp;:nde verkan.
I och med omsbcslutet var mojlighet~rna att p~ sb.ttcpolitisk vag astadkomma en kop
kraftsinclragnir.g under 1947 obefintliga. For
fullstandighetcns skull kan kons:ateras att ock
sa atg?irdcrna pit cfterfr1igesidan var expan
siva eftc!·som offcntlig konsumtion och inve
stering (ink!. bostadbyggande) i.ikade med ett
bclopp motsvarande ·1,2 % av ENP. Den
statliga efterfragan var dock ofOr:indrad. T~ck
vare betydande automatiska skatteokningar i samband rncd de kraftiga inkomstokningarna
(IOnema s~eg mcd 14 % under 19·17 mot
8 % under 1946) blev finanspolitikens net
toeffekt pa total efterfritgan (sasom den bar
berliknats i tabeH 4) svagt kontraktiv.
Vad galler penningpolitiken avvisades pro
pfter om en atstramning, de!s av omsorg om
kostnads!aget (intc minst hyresnivan), dds
darfUr att de rdativt mattliga rlintchijjningar
sam kundc ifdtg<d;<•mma inte ansags kunna
begrlinsa de privata invcsteringarna ~i!lrlick
ligt. 30-talcts syn pa pcnningpolitiken levde
alltsa kvar. Fas!ltttlland<'t vld l:'lt;r:intcpoliti
kcn medflirdc at~ Riksbanken - schcmatiskt
uttryckt - fick aupassa likviditet~.:n pa kre
ditmukn:Jdcn dter vlixlingarna i l:trib.l'shan
dcl, statsfir!anscr c•~;h el:onomin< tilivaxt sit alt obli!;<Hiuusr:intan kundc kvarh<"ilbs \·id den
f!xcraJc 3 ~~·niv.''tn. (Pa marbadcn for kort
fristiga l:i.n fUrl'kom r;i.ntcvarhtiow:r diircmot
in om vissa gdiu~t'r.) Dcn:Ja politik o\·ergavs
som bekant f(irst i mitten pr1 50-ta let.22
Dt~n ut.veckling son• diircfter succcssivt kun
de registrcras under 1947 b,cle kna;:past over
raska. Impc.rti.ivcrskottet vaxte och i mitten
av mars infiiH:es kaffcn:nsonering och import
reglcringar. De senare tillampades till en bar
jan libei·;tlt och fi.ir hda :net blcv import
overskottet nlirmarc 2 miljardcr trots en kraf
tig fi.irblittring av bytesfor!tal:anclct" (7 %). Valutautfludet uppgick till 1 300 milj. kr.23
20 Se Lundberg (tillsammans med Kar!cby) 19·1'6. 21 Wigforss 1954, s. 336. 22 For en n;irmare diskussion av de penningpolitiska erfarcnheterua, se t.ex. Lundberg 1953, kap. 10, Lindbeck 1968, kap. 7 och kap. 1 i dcnna Lok. Sc ocks!t diagrannnet s. 3·L 23 Enligt KI :s prognos sblle import.,;irdct ha mimkat mcrl 9 % medan det i sj:ilva verket okade med intc mindre an 37 %! Trots fel-
IV:17
Denna utveckling sammanhanger naturligtvis delvis med apprecieringcn aret fOre. Att det
anstdingda arbetsmarknadsHiget bcstod visadc bl.a. ih·errorligheten och kraftiga lonestcgringar.24 Trots prisrcg!cringcn och 01mo::ns bort
tagande okade levnadskostnadcrna med narmare 3 % mdlan 19-i6 och 1947. Dcssutom forckom utan tv.ivcl en viss dold p:-isstcgring
i olika former. Karakt1iristiskt for 1947 Yar ocksa hcga fiirctagsvinster, omfattandc inves:eringsverksamhet (inclustriinvc~tcringarna okadc volymm:issigt mcd 23 %) och produktivitctshlimmandc fcnomcn s:tsom flaskhalsar, Einga
~~attnins;ar :w o!ika dclpostcrs W:-:indrinF;ar ga,• KI:s bcc!i.imr~i!lg av utsiktcma infi;r 19·17 dock i lntvLtd5;~k <'Il korrc~a bild av Eigct. 2·! Enligt :-reic!ncrs analys · :w arJctsmarkn;J.cb!:iget 1 ~!-; (i__;,() var 19-li topp:irct V<!d g:illcr arbets::ra~tsh:-i,;~\'n. :-kidncr lwtonar ocksa att dct \"tif !th:~ra:ri!lGarn:l p~·l cf~~rfr:i.scs:l!an SOIU var_
dct :.k:i,·:t •::cm:-ntc·t i f<i~:oi'PCL Se }.!eidner E15·1·, ~. 121. O:n l!!·i i sa!;S rlet i KL h 1 !H 9 (s. 112): "Sk:il kunna anforas fOr den uppfattningcn :ttt den ovc!·fclla sy~scisattnin(;eP.s dc>organi~at!omli.irctceiscr sagda i•r lett till produktionsfOrlustcr genom ovcrrorlighet och fr1'mvaro, vilka kna;>past varit avsevart mindre an de, som blevo resultatet av den under iiren 1938 och 1939 Ia<.hnc:le ar0ctsic>slJctcn." Spckulationcn kan nog tillskrivas Meidner. 2s Se KL h !!H7, s. 31-32. 26 Siffroraa gailcr nyinvesteringar. Da utgifterna for underhi\.11 okade, blev minskningen ink!. tonderho!ll "cndast" 25 %. Inte fOrraa 1956 n<"tddc bostadsproduktionen atcrigen 19·17 ars volym. I ett TV-program den 9 april 1971 ~a Tage :Erlander (tiilfr(ogad om t!ct fam•s beslut han nu imgrade) att dct borde ha varit mojligt att hillb 19·!8 ars bostadsbyg;andc pa en hogrc ni,·;', lin man faktiskt gjorcie.
leveranstider etc.
Da KI utarbctade sin rapport i slutet av
1947 hade en svag ti.ttnad p5. arbet:;markna
dcn kunnat konstatcras. For I 943 raknadc
institutct trots dctta med "ctt potentidlt
kiipkrafttryck av k::nske ungdiir samma stor
leksordning som rtr 1917 ." 25 Da h<:de h::insyn tagits till Jcn redan g<:n0mfiirda s!,aqmingcn
av byg_;nads:cglcringcn. Eftersom den "s;.ikerhetsvc'niil for inflatio::strycket, som fick tj:instgora under 19-P, n::imli~;en e-n vaxande import" var st:ingcJ vic.l det hget, rakn:Hle institutet mcd ckad inf:a:io:ls!·i<~ under 1948.~5 Dcnna Lecomning skul!c vi$a sig va
ra fii: pc~~imistisk, sar>kilt vad giillcr scearc ddcn av 19·18.
Viiscntliga inslag i den ckonomiska po!itiken fOr 1913 var de omfattandc rcfom:er
som skullc tr:ida i kraft fri'm och mcd ii.rcts borjan. Folkpcnsionsrcfor:nen, som mer an
fiirdubbladc utg;icnde fo;kpci~sioaer, hade bc
slutats redan under 19·1G. Arct cl:"irpa godto; riksdagcn forshgcn o:n att omliigsa 'Jc:h sanka de dirckla skatterna samt att crsatta de nat· liga barnavdragcn mcd allm~inna b::trnbidr?,g
(pa 260 kr per ar celt barn). De lt:ir n:i,1mcla atgardcrna okade bush&licns cl:sponibla in
komstcr med ett bclopp motsv:n::tmlc •1 % av BNP. Till dctta bn Eig;;'.S en - clclvis ich forutscdd - okn:ng av offcntlig konsumtion och investering:>.r ( cxkl. bostaclsby~;!iande) av storlcksordningcn 1,5 % av B.'\P. !Iur skuile dcssa koloss;\lt cxpansiva atg1irdcr kunna mot
vagas? Skarpningen av byt;gnackegleringc!l har redan n1i.mnts. Den blcv dr:>.st!sk och
drabbade framfiir alit bost::tdshyg-;andet vars volym minskadcs med omkring en trccij ~del. Raknad i fOrh;"d!nndc till BNP bkv r.~dg~.n;· en 2V4 %.~6 )\ven n1iringslivets invcstering:tr
IV :18
...
pressades tillbaka i viss man. Vidare genom
fordcs i borjan av arct betydande hojningar
av olika punktskatter som tillsammans mot
svarade nastan 2 % av B:i'lP. Vid valet av
varuomraden - bensin, vin oeh sprit samt to
bak var de tunga posterna - spelade fordelningsmassiga synpunkter en viss roll. Slut
ligm hojdcs bolagsskatten fran 32 till 40 %. Det finanspolitiska facit fUr 1948 ( enligt
har presenterade kalkyicr) blev en efterfra
gccHimpande nctloimpact a\' samma storlcks
ordning sorn 1947. Dctta var en konsekvens
av att sav;il atgardemas som skattcautoma
tikens impactcffckt minskacle med kuappt
1 % av BN'P. Hade den ekonomiska politi
kens verkan pa u:irinr;~livets invcsteringar kun
nat medtas i kalkylcma skulle troligcn poli
tiken under 1943 ha framstiitt som klart mc
ra kontraktiv an iiret dcssfOrinnanP
Under bi)sten 1948 blcv tendcnscrna till en
avspanning i ekonomin tydiiga. I KI:s host
rapport Histe man mindre avsecndc vid dess:i
tecken pa ctt omslag oeh det betonades att
''fcbcm i samh:illskroppen har s:iPkts nar;ra
tiondc!s gr<ldcr men lir fortfarande alltWr
hog" .2s Ornsbgct var emellertid ctt faktum.
Vad som mcst bidrog till dcnna utvcckling -
utover den atstram:mde ekonomiska politiken - var den ovantadc, mycket stora procluk
tionsokningcn under 1948 och den Jikaledes
ofurutseclda blygsamma okningen av den privata konsumtionen. 1 den revidcrade natio
nalbudgct-::n 1948 (RNB 48) hade man rak
uat mcd okningar av BNP och prh·at kon
sumtion p~ 1 % respektive 5 % i reala ter
mer. De !aktiska okningarna blcv i stallet
5-6 %, rcspel:tive 2 %. Hushallens reala
disponibla inkomster okade med hela 12 % cch en avsev:ird hojning av sparh-otcn maste
saledes ha skett !rim 1947 till 1948. En an
nan gynmam faktor var forbattringen av by
tesforhi'dlandet med omkring 5 %. Detta bi
drog tillsammans med importreglc!"ingen till
att rcducera importoverskottet frtm 2 till 1 miljanl. Valutautflodet under 1943 kundc
hallas under 200 milj. kr. Darmed hade bot
tcnbget vacl galler vahttarcscrvcn natts. D~ir
ernot var konsunl':ntpriscrnas stegringstakt
1947-48 (5 %) snabb:uc iin aret fore.
I Finansplanen 19-i9 - dct var den sista
\Vigforss ;msvarade for - talas om "den sam
hall~ckonomiska ba:aus som syncs !i~ga inom r:ickh:t!l" .~ 9 I l111vud~:!:; kom 1949 faktiskt att
kannctecknas av ekonomisk balans. En bidra
gande orsak h~ rtil! var clen arnerikanska konjunkturavm~.ttuingcn 19•18-49. ii.ven 19,~9
blcv produktionsukni1,gen mycket stor I Sverige. Den privata k<,nsumtions- oeh invcsteringsdtcrft-;,gan u:i11s!,adc och dct "Jediga" ut
rymmrt kum!c tliirfOr anviindas for betyd:mde
okningar av rxportcn och den offentlig;,. cftcr
fr!tgan. Pa s!'t ~iitt korn finan~politikcn att fa en ganska kraftig expausiv cffckt under 19·19.
27 Som ett indicium p;'1 att minskningcn :<v den prh•ata investeringsvcrksmnhetcn fran 1 !H 7 till 19·18 l stor utstrackning var c:tt rcsultat av den fi.irda politikcn (skarpnin:~cn av byggnadsrcglcringen) kan man nog sc del faktum att industrins nyinvcsteringar i byggnadcr mimkad•! med 6 % 1947-18 n:cdan cl:ircmot mas!dninvesteringarna okadc mcd 9 5o (se KI Nationalriikellsl;ap 1916-62, s. 20). I sak samma bedi.imning gors i KL h !949, s. 37. 28 KL h 19-}8, s. 20. En sj:ilv~riti::k gr~nskning av KI:s konjunkturbcdi.imningar hosten !!Hi och hostcn 19-!8 finns i KL h 19;19, s. 163-6·~.
Sc avcn Lundberg 1953, s. 339. 29 Finansplancn (Fl') l~J-19, s. 8.
IV: 19
Det relativt balanserade Higet kundc ocksa
avHisas i mattliga stcgringar av konsumcnt
priser och· lon-:r (i slutct av 1948 hade lon
tagarna accepterat en fOrlangning av avtalen
som kom att besti't iiven under 1950). Deval
vcringcn mcd omhing 30 % i september ha.de visserligcn mcdfort en press upplit pa pris
nivan men den motverkades dclvis av okade
importsuhventioner. Slutligen uppni\ddcs ba··
Jans i utrikcshandcln och valutarescrvcn kun
dc &kas mcd ~ miljard under 1'trct. Eftcr de
stormiga trc forsta cftcrkrigsarcn hade den
svcnska ckonom:n kommit in i elt lugr:arc skcdc som ;\\'bruts blott tii!Eilligt av uppstan
clelsen kring dcv:~lveringen. Sotn bck:lllt blcv
lugnet intc s:irdclcs Emt,'varigt.
En s:umnanfattamle bec!umning av fin:~r!s
politiken under de fi)rsta frcdsi'trcn fiirsv:'1ra_s
i viss m!'m av de myrkct spccicl!a forhallan
dcn som dddC' i fr!tga om konsumtioasmcns
t<"r, utrikcsha!ldcl, pris- och lOncbi!Jning osv. men vissa sluts::ttscr fl):·dallcr mojiiga att dra.
E•! Iorsta ytlig iaktt:1gclse ga!icr de finans
politis~a ingrrppcns drastisl:a omfattning. Som
framgitr av tabcll 1 och 3 ar 19-17 ars rccluk
tion av bostacls!.>y~;ganclct o::h iivrrgiint;cn till kallskatt liksom foH:;-:ensinns- och b:m:biclrags
rcformen i'<rct d~irpit var for sig utan motstyckc undr.r alb foljande !:r. Oclt for:indringarna av oms- och punktskattcr under des
sa tva r,r overtr:iffas kvantitativt blott av om
sens atcrinfUrandc 1960 och w..omshojniugcn
1971.
Ett vasentligt inslag i den anti-inflatoriska
politiken var vidarc str:iv:m att mcd hjalp
av direkta i'ttgarclcr hindra kostnndsstr:~ring
arnas genomslag pa konsumentptiscma. Hu-
30 Se KL h 1950, ~. 71.
vudinstrumentet har var naturli;tvis priskon
trollcn. Att den passiva ( dvs. expansi\·a) pen
ningpoiitikcn under dessa ;\r, apprccicring~n
sommarcn 1945 och omscns borttagandc 19-17 var led i en sad:m poiitik har redan framg1tt.
Prisutj;irnningsavgi!tcr ptt viss.1 cxportproduk
ter kunclc uttas i samma S)'ftc. ;·~·.-en clirei:ta
subventioncr anvat~dcs fran 19-P for att h:Ua
priscrna pi't vissa importvaror och jordbru\;s
produkter samt ltush:lllcns branslekos~n:J.dcr
nerc. Till att biirja mcd var m:dsi.!ttningcn
att l:indra prisstc~~ringar av "ovcrg.lc:1Cle natur" frau att s];, igenom. Eftcr :l.lt dca 2-::riga avtalsfiirEingningcn h::tde kocmnit till
sdnd 1 ~l.J 8 blcv m:ilsattningen sn::rast att
hindra lemadskostnadsindcx fran att uryta
igenom dct fixcracle in2~xt:lkct.30 Dcnn~. ''finanspolitik pit kostnads:;id:m" rcsultcrarlc ut:>.n
t\'ivcl .i att ko:rstm:cntpriserna J..undc !t:':l!;1s
Higre an vad som an:•ars hade \'arit mojiigt.
Att tlcn ('konomisb: j)v!itiken SOIJI la:lll~t an
d[t intc hlcv fram:.;:\ngsr;k und<"r heb perio
dcn 1946-19 bcrodd~ p£, aa eftcrfra;an inc
bcgransadrs i tiliriicklig grad. Dcnua bccii:nning g:ilkr framfur alit 19,1G-,;.7 trots d~n
stora kupkraftsminskni:1g som k:illskatterefor
mcn meclfiirdc. Bcdomningcn iir kanske uc:;s<t rimlig vad galler fiirsta delcn a\· 19·18. Scd)n blcv efftktcrna av rcduktio,rm av bostadsby:;
gandet och punktskattchujningama :nari;boxa.
Den expansiva finanspolitiken under i949 fO
rcfnller vara i Wlrt sctt valav..-~1gd ur silva!
intern som extern balamsynpunkt.
2. Koreaboom, amnattning och balans 1950-53
For Svcrigc var aren 1948-50 i stort sctt
mycket gynnsamma ur ekonomisk synvinh·l.
IV:20
Trots prognosmakarnas envisa pessimism oka
dc real BNP med 5 a SY2 % per ar (eller
mer an dubbelt s!i sn~bbt som vantat). Den
paborjadc libcralis-::ringcn av utrikesh;:.ncleln i
(dlwarandc) OEEC's rC'gi mcdverbdc till den kraftiga expansion av export och import
· som startade under 1949 och bidrog till att
hoja produktivitc~en i det svcnska folkhns
hallct. Samtidigt kiinnctccknad~s dcssa [u· av
rclativt god yttre och inrc balans. Den l<.ip;m
dc brtalningsl.Jabnsen uppvis:~dc rt~indre iiver
skott bt,tlc 19·19 och 1950 och konsumcnt
pri~ernas UIJpg:lng stannadc vid 1-1 ~ · % vart och Clt av dcssa l\'j_ ar (om lll:tll r1i!mar
mcd !mmedc!tal).
Trots en totalt sea snarast upp!tt~(tcndc
konjt:i1Lturtcndcns under forsta baJv:1rct 1950
var bildcn otnhetlig. Vissa fOrcl:tg, s1irskilt
inom exportimlustrin, kunde notera goda
vinstcr och stigandc priser mcdan iikacl im
portkoukurrcns mcdfOrde prcssat vinst- och
prisl:<gc fOr andra. Dctta var givet\'is en n::>.turEg konsekvens av dcvalvcringcn. "I och
fi.ir sig forcing dock vid mitten av 1950 i lmvudsak gocla bctingelscr for en forl~l\ttning
av dctta stabila ekonomiska framfttskridanC:e"
cnli:;t KI:s bcdomning.31 Att Koreakrigcts ut
brott i slutet av juni radikalt iindratle clessa
betingclscr blev ~nabbt uppcnbart. Av utrym·
messkal kan en mcra utforlig redogiirclse for konjunkturforloppet under Korca-boomcn inte
Jamnas hlir men vissa i och fOr sig valkanda
inslag bur betonas.3~
Utm:irk~~r!de for utvccklingen var forst och
fr?lmst clcn srahha rrisuppgangen for r!waror,
bransle och f:r..l:ltjlit1$LCr mcdan fiinligvaru
priserna okadc rclativt m:ittlir;t. Fram till
juni 1051 steg de svcnska exportprisl'rna med
74 % mot cncbst 39 % fOr importpriscrna.33
Efte~ kulminationen under sommaren var ut
rikeshandelsprisema stabila ellcr litet vikande
under res ten av a ret. Den kraftiga ( och helt
ov:!ntade) Wrbattringcn av bytesforh!'tllandct
wm detta inncbar uppg!ck for hela 1951 till 22 % och nwls\'arade s~tledcs en ~~!man pro
duktivitetsokning p!t omkring 5 %.3! De
snabba prisstcglingarna gav !Or det andra
upphov till en cxtremt uppdriven Yin~tko'1-
junktur sem n;\tnrligtvis fra!llfiir a\lt gynna<'.e
exportfOrcta~~en. Dct \'ar j ~j:il\'a verk<~l· fr:l~;l
O!H en kl·:tft!b vridning a.v inkotns~f()rdt1ningcn till fonnan fiir cxpurtse:norn och till n:Jck
del fOr s:11nb~Ulct i ov!·igt. Yinstkrmjunkturm
blev cnlcllertid myckd ojiimn bcroemle p!t att pri~stq~ringarnas storlck vaxi:tcie star;c.t,
inte bara mellan import- och cxportsic.lan ut;-.n ockstt mclbn olika C'Xpo:!\':tror (~kogsind•.l
striprodul,ternas priscr stcg i s;ir:dass mc~l).
Karala:iristisk fi;r s:irskilt 1951 var oc.ksii.
en valdig lagcrupphn·,gn:~d som ; hog grad
bascrades p!'t Hirviintning:~r om stiganJe p··~
SC'r. Vik:mde dterfr!!gan under rtrC:lS scnare del fi.ir vissa kousumtionsvarnindu5trier Li
drog octsii. h;irtill. Den stora ol-mingen :w Ja
gerinwsteril!gama 1950-51 (sum uppgick till
knappt 4 % av BNP) motsvaradcs av en
kraftigt stig:mde import. Vid mitten av 1950 hade de:1:1a till stor dd :1tcr sl:lppt:; fri. Vad
slutligcn giiller arbetsmarknadstigct s1 hade det sk1irpts undan for nndan under 1950 och
3t KL v 51, s. 79. 32 For en utfOrligarc analys sc KL v 51· oeh Lundberg 1953 kap. 7. 33 Till fOljd av d<' krahiga prisstcgringarna ar alia {;lstpri~bcrakningar for Korca-arcn fi.irhfti· !anue\'is osakra. 3~ Sc KL h 51, s. 41 oeh s. 8·3.
IV;21
..
i borjan av 1951 tycks arbetskraftsbristcn ha
varit j:imforbar med den som radde 1947 -dock var overri:irlighetcn och ovriga dcsorga
nisationsfenomcn intc sa patagliga som 1947.
Mcd h:insyn hart.ili och tili :nt loncslopps
pcrioden nys~ Yar over var clct naturligt att
IOnestcgringarna blev stora under 1951. Liineglidningen i industrin blev hda 3 % mot
endast 5 % och 3 % under de t\·a aren
nl1rm~st in:l:>.O. Totalt obdc lonema med 21 % 1950-51. Konsumcntprisema ~teg sa ~ntid!gt med 1G % oc)l hush:t1lcns rca!a <ii>po
nibla inkomster var darfUr i dct nannaste
oforand:ade. Den privata konsumtions,·olymcn
minskade med 2% mell:m 1950 och 1951.
Utovcr den ogynnsamma realinkmr.stut\·eck-
. lingcn bn dct ha berott pit ctt av prissteg
ringarna bcting:tt kopmotstrmd.
Anpassningen av dcri ckonomiska politiken
till de fodindradc bctingelscn:::l skedde succes
sivt. Redan under somm:uen 19jQ vidtog~
vissa penningpoli~iska atgan1cr. Riksbankcn
begrEnsadc sina stodkop frtm slu:ct av juli,
vilkct lrcltlc ti!J <!tt obligationsr:inian sa sm!iningom strg med o,:; proccntenhcter. Ett av
tal mdlan Riksb:mkcn och affiirsbankerna
som syft<!dc till en restrikti,·arc krcditgivning
liksom s:..arp:a kassarcse:vbr;t1immelscr kom
ocksa ti!l H:lllcl. S!utli;m anpassadcs di:;kontot i dccrmbcr till dct nya r:intcEi~ct. Dctta halvhjartadc fo:·suk till en akti\'t ittstramandc
klcditpolitik blev knappast Ycrkningsfnllt och
affiirsbankcrnas kreditcxpansion fo:-tsatte i sna
rast okad takt.35 Under hostcn hcijdcs olika
punktskatter fi.ir att gc utrymmc for den be-
3~ Sc KL v 5!, s. 61. 3G FP 51, s. 13-14.
slutade okningen av forsvarsutgifterna. For
1950 som hdhet ob.dc den offcntliga dtcr
fr:lgan och bostadsbygganJct med 1 y; % av
BNP och dctta blcv ocbtt i stort ~ct t finans
politikt'ns cxpar.siva nettoin:pact fi_ir ttrct.
Relativt ticEgL hade dct st7t~t k!art att llagon yltcrli!!;arc avtalsfurJ:;,;gning intc \';:r
tankb:Jr. Furc utgtmgm av i 950 l::ulc cmrrijr
snbvcntioncma som tillkom 19·1 G-4~) ii!l st0rs
ta c;,lclen avvcck:ats. I Fin:mspbr,c:: 1951 ~ijr
klan'.dc fjn~nsrninistcr sr~<.Jld: "\·yid 0\·-~r~::!!~~
cn me:Jan 1950 och 1951 sti\. vi in!'iir en
ounclviklig anj,J~Sfiing upp;tt av deE svcnska
prisnivfm ... Den t~onomiska politikcns an
gel:i;naste uppgift under dct fr:unWrligg:,r:cle
arct mastc d:irfor \'ara att skapa fiiruts:i;t
ning:-:- for att den anpassning av p~i;:- cch
loncniv:l.crna som 11u :igrr :um, E!r ku~kh·
rcn av eng~tug:JOrskjutning ... On1 fi)P.:iit1t
ningarna ins6!hs p:l en ~tabil utvtckli:1g cf
tcr gcnornfur:mdct av pris- och lii:1tanpass
ningcn undcrl:i.ttas den ei:onomis!;a poli likens
uppgift vlise!~tligcn." ~G InfD:- de 11)'<1, uppm
barlit;cn starka j~1fh~tionistiska tcndrnscrn~ -
som <k~sutom undcrstudclcs av "pris- och
loncslegring~cncrr;i" ackumulcrad eftcr dcv;d
vcringcn odt tmder !Onrstoppsrtrcn - valdc
man mec! andra ord att passivt acceptcra en
bctydandc eng:"m;;sinflation. De1ma tvara kurs-1indrin:; bln; btirjan pi', slulct for den cko
nomiska pol.itik som framst hade inriktats pa att hindra kostnadsstcgrir.g;trnas grnomsh>.g till
konsumen:priscma. For att ha kunnat fort
slitta mcd en sadan politik h<Jtlc dct varit
nodvandigt (men inte till.cackligt) att :.mtingcn apprecicra kron:m intc 5a litct clkr
utoka subvcntioncrin~cn i stor s;.ab. B:'tda
dessa losningar avvisades best1imt.n Da hade 37 Se FP 51, s. 13. Fr:,gan om en apprecieriug konsumentpriscrnas uppgang redan bi.irjat.
IV:22
Den skulle visa sig bli mer omfattande an
man raknade med vic! arsskiftet 1950/51. Passivitcten var naturligt\·is inte total. Den
ckonomiska politik som Skold skisscrade i fi. nansplanen 1951 riktade sig framst mot forc
tagens investcringar. Brggnadsinvcstcringarna
skullc l>albs inom ra:nca for tillglingliga re
surscr genom en fortsatt byg!;nadsrcglcring.
De fii:·lwpp::ingar som hade funnits om en
avveckling av dcnna 1q;!cring - liksou1 av
priskonlrollcn - kuntle alltsrt inte infrias, en
avvcc~ding fick st::illas pit framtid(·n. Sko!J
fi.ironladc ocks:'i en ofi.ir1imlrad cllcr cventucllt
skiirpt k~cditpolitik. N!'~gon sklirpn:1~g genom·
fi:il des cmcll<:'rtid intc under 1951. En viktig
roll i den invcstcrinpbt'gr:insandc politikm · spcl:tdc viCbrc steril1scringen av skogsindu
:,trins cxportvinster. Sedan 1945 h:1dc riks
dagen, varjc ar Himn;H rcgcrin(;Cll bcmyndi
gande att utta prisutj:in:ningsavgiftcl' p:'t cx
port\·,uor 0::1 bchov h:irfor ans:'tgs fiircligga
m pr;sstabiliscringssynpunkt. I december 1950
hade staten slutit ct~. avtal mcd s!:ogsiudus~rins
branschorganis:~tioner om avgif tcr fiir 1951.
A\·gifternas storlek bcrodde pit cxpor!prisernas
hojd och skullc justcras varjc kvartal. Av
med!en skullc 30 % tillblla skogliga fonder
nun. mcdan resten- fr;"m slut·.~t av 1951 mcd
st~tsskatt<!n anlr;ogen - skullc t~terbetalas till
forct:1.gcn 1958-63. Under 1951 inbda!adt·s
over 700 milj. kr i prisutjiimningsavgifter hu
vudsakligen frrm ma~sainch:strin. Bclopprt mot·
svaradc omkring en fjiirdcdel av okni!1gcn av
skopindustrins exportvarde 1950-51.09 Yttcr
ligarc ett syfte mcd exportavgiftcrna var att
motverka tendenscn till ·prisstcgring p:l hcm
mamarknadcn. Slutligcn fOrcslogs i finanspla
nen att en 10-proccntig invest("ringsskatt sknl· lc utgft· under 1951. Dct var i princip fraga
om att beskatta vinstreglerande rttgarder som
vidtogs fOr att oka foretagcns dolda rcservcr.
Avsiktcn var st..ledes bl.n. ntt minska fOreta
gens incit:tment att investcra i lager och att
"cffcktivisera" bob.gsbrsk:t ttningcn.
Under 1951 okadcs splittringen i konjunk
turbik:::n. Fi.>r vi:>sa kommntionsvaruindustricr
(t.ex. sko-, textil- och bekl:idmdsindustrin)
var dtcrfdgan vikamie samtidigt sorn !One··
ocl! r;•varukostn~.derna var stigandc. Inom exportindust:·in arbct,,de ma!l d:irc!llOt mcd
forb<>tt fuilt bpacitetsutnyttjandc och hoga
vinster tuJts stabiliscringen av exportpriscma
under anclra halv:tret och den m:lttliga av
s:ittning.>ii!:ningcn (fi.ir he!a i'tret blev den 1!/2
% mot 2~ % fiir 19:>0). Den invc~tcringsbcgrans;~ndc ckouomiska politikcn fortsatt<:s d:;r-
bt':·ordc~ inte i finan;planrn men vic! en r:ksdagsckbatt i uktober hade Skold sagt em fOrslagct a:t uppskriva kronan och samt!digt ska~;):l prnniug- och fin:tnspo!itikcn myckct kraft;,;t: "Dct skall int~ fi.iruekns att dar foreEggcr ctt
altcrnativ. Dct har dock intc varit n!tgon so:n i den ticligare diskussioncn h:ir stallt s;~ p/'t d·.~n
linjen och jag gor clct intc hellcr och det fin:1s ju t•uJc: S~id:tna onlst1indir,11ctcr inte !l;l~On an .. Jedning fiir mig att nwra ing;',cndc furdjupa ulig i de risker och sv:u·ighcter sotn (!etta a!tcrnativ cnligt InitL s;_itt LJ.lt sc. skulic kuu11a tneJ
fOra." Sc Andra KaHunareus pwtokoll 19~,() nr. 26 s. 53. I Stabiliscring~'1trcdningen (SOU 1961:42 s. 386-87) diskutcraJes n;i~ra tankbara skal till den utcb!ivna apprederiue;cn. Fiir en principicll di~ku:;sion av proh!em i samband mcd en apprceie.ring, se 1\!etclius 1955, s. 159-
CH. 38 Se 11ctelius 1955, s. 170. I proposition 1953: 80 lanmas en oven;ikt!i~ rcdog0re:se fOr uttaget av pri>utjamuing$avgifter 19·15-52.
IV:23
...
for under 1952. En nyhct var den 12-prncm
tiga invcsteringsavgiften som skulJe utg;"t t:n
der 1952 och 1953 i stallct fi.:.>r iavestc
ringsskatten. Investcring~r i sav:Cil maskiner
som by~gnader var avgiftspliktiga men bo
~tndsi:we~tcringar uwbntegs. Genom att en
.e!·!;;gd avgift var :n dragsgi!l bb· den dfcktiva avg:ftssatscn e11dt1st 6 ?~ runt rli!G1at.
Investeriags:wgiftt'n komplctter:lcc~ m~d en bilaccis (p<"1 !() %) s:unt en tillf:illig in,l...riiEk
niur:; i rii.tten att ncd~krjva van:!~~cr vid la
geroknirg dtrrsom invcstcrinr,savdft iute hclJcr 11t;ogs pot cl.:~~a omr:!der1. Hcis:.cn I Oj 1 ha
de nya :1\·tal s1u:its 1ncd ~kogs:ndtt!'tricrn:t 01n
Ok:tdl.! CXj10!"Ul\'~ifter f{jr l£)~•2. Il~~r~i!l korn rn sars~.:iJd k0i1jt~:Iktur-;kaa frtt~l :-t;)r!l ~~~52.
An-n pwn'n~polit;kr:n r,jordcs restriktiv i viss m:"m. ~. f:",lsiitt11i11;;n1 fur cknna an:;avs <l:t
av SkU1d :l~t \":tr,l ''s1a~·k~l5t llli}jl!ga krcdit:lt .. stra'n!r!l~8' ut~a Uverg;\';u~dc av I;tgr:intcpoliti .. ken".<J I fcbru:tri u~:u.lcs Riksbankcn od1
b:mkcr>.1a om 2tt viss::t f:~ststi!ild::t likviclitets
kvoter skullc uppnits av b:mkr:rna scn~,sl vid
halvarssk:ftct. K\·otcrna n.r sa hoga at~ b!.'ct
ett fatal b~nkcr hade uppnotlt dcm i ut::;:ings
lli~et. Ba:1kema fick cl:irfur 111in~ka sin l:tl:'tning kr att uppfylh hotcrna. FZiijc!~n bl;·v
i viss m:m kreditr;~nsoncring viJ Higa r:in
tor.40 Dctt:J. kan s5gas vara borjan till de~
aktivering av krcditpolitikcn ~01;1 v;;.r ctt r~.k
tum fran 1955.
39 Se Pwposition 1951:220, s. 4i. 40 En ingaenc!c ~n:!ly:; av kreditpolitiken 1950-52 gjordcs av Guy A'-vidsson i KL h 52, s. 77-96. Se avcn KL h 53, s. 7':1. 41 FP 52, s. 13. 42 Sckvcns~n har skisscrr.ts i KL h 54, s. 137-41 och i kap. I.
I 1952 ars finansplan betomdes mcd skar
pa att "cxportl,:onjuo:kturen och de myckct
gynnsamma bytc~rei;1tioncrna vilar pa en myc
kct labil grundval och att en o:nw:ingnir.:; i Higct sn:~bbt kan intracla".11 Dct var intc •~n
obcfogad varninf!'. Ett :dlm:\nt h·n_iur.ktu~om
sbg (som. d•Kk i·~tc c-mf:Ht::r~c :t\orr.l:n:1crika)
lcdde till SI'1l:bt sjur:~~.,~dr: i:~tcmatirmclla pri
scr fr?:n rtrCt'5 bi5rja::. Prisfa!lct b}et,.: s~rskih
h[ifti:-;t fiir c!e sv<:mb. c:-.:po,-tprori•;l-;tcrna. Del
rriedfOrdc :~tt n~:gra cxportav~ii"Lcr inte kon1 att ultas cfter liah·::rss:df:t:t. Ocba :len J:ijgt
uppdrivna cxportvnlyr.J·.:n clrP~S r'cd ;,\. orn
sh!gct. rur hcla :irtt blev neJ· ·:~n~:en ( cft('r
krig~pcriodcns cnda bctyd.•c:d,_;) 9 % . ."~-.-c:l
fOr lagerin\T~tc:·i:Jg<1rnas t~cl hicv det fr:,;a
om en kraftig min:;!:nir:g. Frt•n hah·:ir~>kiftct
~rahiiisnadcs ocks:i tOJ!S•Jmrn:prisc::·na. O•:cr
konjl:nkturen hade d:innc·d LI u:.i•.s och en ny
bal:ms l:lg i:wm rEcklt:i!l. Tili r:cn:n utveckling bidro:; ocks;t en vi:;; upr;.'t:~:; w hush;'J
lcns sparkvot under 1952. Kcnj:mkt•.Jr0:1tsh
get mildradcs toralt selt av ·att olib har.
schcr tr:iff:lr.:~s av del vid oJ:L, !d: ·,u,:::cr i en prydi!g sckvcns.~~ D·-.:t !-:t'lf!d~ l;::Jck irt~e
hindra att industrins prPJu!-.tir;n~.;·.:oJy;~::. rnt:~s
kat!c jii;nf0~t mcd 19.'i1. (Dt:t v;,r dm cnda
neclG;u,:; som !Jar fureko1:1:ni: under an!n
19?G-7t1.) TcJ::IeJ;s:'ma til! arbcts!ii;llet under 1952 motvcrkadcs c!c:o:;nttm>. ::.v en starkt
expanderandc offcut!ig cftcrfr!tg;1n som fcrt~attc under i 953. Detta f,r p;1;_gladcs i huvucl
sak ·av babns p!'~ sa \"iii varu- som :-.rbctsmark
nadcn. Ett tccken h:iq;a var att kor~sument
priscrnas stcg~ing mellan 1952 och 1953 l"ll·
clast blcv 1 Y.z % mot 8 % l1ret clessforinnan.
En hclhetsbcdi.imning av dea ekonomi;I-:::.. politiken under och cftcr Korca-boomcn ;;r
naturligtvis spcciellt vans!:lig eftcrsom den i
IV:24
sa hog grad riktade sig mot forctagens inve
stcringsvcrksamhct. Detta bor hrti!as i minnet
i det fOljande. Att man misslyckades med att
hiilla pcnningvardet stabilt 1950-52 bchovcr
inte framhallas. Kritik av politiken i dct av
secndct har inte heilcr saknats.~3 Om man
.emcllertid godtar premisscn att \'lixelkurserna
inte fick andras blir clet sv;'trare att havda att
den ekonomiska politikcn allmant sctt var d~tligt anp:mad till dct dd:mue konjuuktnrl:i
get. Som framg;'tr av diagram 5 var clc finanspolitiska atr,ardcrnas impactcff ckt s o'.\gt
cxpansiv under 1951. E:t kraftig ncddr<~:e,ning
hade alltsl skett jiimfurt mcu 1950 ocl1 Ii:.:som under 1918 var Jet s~irskilt boslarb!Jyg
gandct som hade Httt sta till tj:!nst S()!n kon
junkturcll buffert. D:'t skattca:tlot!tatikt'll na
turligt nog ocks:'t obck 1950-::il hk\· fiiJ:tllS·
polirikcns bcdknadc ncttoimpact 1951 kl:nt
negativ. Dct ar sj~i!vfallct om(ijligt art ang-e
hur myc;,r:t mer neg:'ltiv ncttoil!Jpactcn under
1951 ~kulle ha blivit om dc im·cstcringsti:int·
pan de ittgardemJ. h:nJc kunnJ.t hcakt:ts i b 1-kylcrna. Dd :ir dock ~:unwlikt att bygf_{nacl~
rcglcringcn och cxponaveiftern<! i hi>g ~racl
hade Cll aterhi'tlJ:.~nu·~ \'Crkan p:l fiiretagCi~S
invcsteringsJ.ktivitct. Dc-ttJ. oi~ldi)me stods i
viss man av den fak~is];a investcringsutveck
lingen. Industriinvestcringarna (som I !J:iO l~g omkring 15 % over forcg:tcnue iirsniva) ?l;ins
kade mcd 4,5 % mcllan 1950 och 1951 och
mcd hcla 19 % 1951-52. For de totala pn· vata invcsteringJ.rna ( exkl. bost~idcr och far
tyg) var utvecklingcn i huvudsak likarlad.
I och med avmattnings~endensem:t och den forbattrade tillgimgcn pa arbctskraft under
1952 och 1953 fick finanspolitiken cl:iremot
en starkt expansiv inriktning. EnligL de h1ir
utforda kalkylcma var atg;irdcmas impactef-
fekt i sja!va verket mer expansiv 1952 och
1953 lin r..:'tgot annat ar under efterkrigsperio
dcn. Det \'ar frar!lfOr allt den offcntliga cf
terfragan som slapptes fram. Den expansiva
cffektcn 1952 bur dock rctlt:ccras n:'tgot mcd hansyn bl.a. till den pcnningpolitiska :itstram
ningcu och inforantlet av dea til!fiilligJ. invc
sreringsavgiftcn. Under 1953 stimuler:~dcs hus
h:'tllens cftcrfritgJ.n ocksa av in!;m!t:-rskattc
slink'ni:Jgen och de hujua folkpem!oncrna.
Vi kan ~:d,~des l:onstatcra att den ckono
mi~l;a politiken \'aricradc mycket kraftigt
1!J:i0--53 och att dc~s dfektc!" darigcnom i Jt(ig
gr~td blt:v kontr~1cykliska. J,ilngt sv1rare att
hcc..!ti:na ~tr n~,_turl!~tvis orn ;ltg~rdcrnas ornfallni::r; (till skil!nad fr~n tlen:s "f;_i!·teci;cn")
km at!>c~ ha varit rimlig. :Kttgra prcciscr;-.c1e
s!msabt·r c>tn del ra k:tn vi intc komma fnm till J.:i!·. l'tir clc:n e~unomiska polirikcn ]Jade d<:t fr;'m biirjal! \'.tt it en e:,plic!t m:ds:\1 tning
art !1in(!~:~ "at~ <1L·n snl!l e!t led i ~u!passui~1gen till J:i:;<.:t utornl;mds &c:JOmfOnb pris- och
!Unestcgringen ... (Skullc) (ivc!·t;:: i en fristacndc av interna inflatioHi:;ti,.k<\ tcndcnser
nard kumubtiv proccss".~-1 Undt:r hosttn 1951
konstarcra(lc Skiild att prisupp[>~ngen "icke
... syncs ha givit upphov till sckundiira pris
rorclscr :IV intern inf:ationistisk karaktiir":15
Det ~ir 5:mnolikt att ~tr1ivanckna att oka lag-
43 Bent ll:Jnscn skrev saledes nagra ar senare: "Det torde !ti)ra rill riksbankens S\':'tr:tre syndcr mot pcnningvlirdet art den i..:ke infOr !'li'Sskiftct 1950-51 genomfordc en <~l!man appreciering mcd slinkning av vJ.Iutakurscrna; den s.k. engtm~siuflationcn skullc (Iii till sti.i:rc dclen kunna ha unlh·ikits." Se Bent Hansen 1957, s. 3'5. ~~ H' 51, s. 10. 4a Proposition 1951:220, s. 42.
IV:25
ren i viss m~m hade varit sjalvgenererande
men bortsctt harifr[m forefaller Skolds slutsats
intc orimlig. Dct ar salunda helt klart att det
aldrig uppstod nagot bestacndc ovcrtryck pa
konsumtionsvarumarkn:~den och som vi har sett
minskadcs forctagens investcringar 1951 och
·19:>2. I dcnna mcnir.g var stabiliseringspoliti
kcn under Korea-boomen utan tvivcl rnera
framg[mgs:-ik ;in 19,1-7 ars antiinfbtionspolitik.
Dct ;ir dock p.:ivct att den ekonomis;,a politi
kcn 19:i(J-52 u:tderEittadcs av "cng~mgsinflatio
ncns" bromc;anJe im·crk:m pa hush[tllcns rea
Ja ef:crfr:':;.;an. Vad g:illcr den extcrna blan·
sen ~;•v :K0:-c:t-boomcn intc ::mktlning till
nKn1ll\'~irdJ. hckynuner. Bytesbalanscn ttpp\·is2.· de ovr:r~kott varje :,r 1 ~l50<l3 och Lcm:-ctt
fran en mincJre minsknin~ u~Iclcr EF>O iikades va:utarcsnvcn I!Pdcr ck;;~a i'tr, inte 111ir:st
1951. Ork<t bytcsfurh:,l!:llldct ulvcckladcs p:'t
Ctt fJc S-. cri,;c !;)"!lllS::unt ~:itt :iv~n O!l\ 1~51
46 Se l'"P 54, s. 7-10. Skii!Js uppfattning vid denna tid om de olika instrumcntens anv:lndbarhct iir :w ctt visst intrcssc: "Ut\·eckling(:n har ..• lett till att de finanspolitiska moj!ighctcrn<t att i bcgriin.,andc riktning p;,vcrk'l ki.ip
kraft och cftcrfragan hos forct3t; och konsnmrntcr n1in~k:~t. lJt:t torCt: ligga utanfijr otnr~\det fUr en praktisk Jl01itik .:ltt genozn ~knttchOjningar cller drastiska utgiftsncdsJ..:irningar ast::tclkomma en indragni:1g av kop!,raft fri'm al!rniinheten .... I och mrd ::!.tt finampolitikcn s;tlund:J. fOrlo~at
en del av sin bctydclsc s:iso:n en ailmiint kon
junl;turcl;imp::>.nde filktor och i stort cndast anvamks fOr att reglcra statcns eget ianspr£tktagande av samhallets rcsmscr, skjutes penningpolitikcn i fOrgrunden sasom det kanske bctydelsefu:laste konjunkturpolitiska instntmentet
, ( s. 11).
ars mycket stora forb;).ttring cfter hand "av
veckladcs" till storrc dclen.
3. lnvcsteringsbcom och avmattning 1954-59
I Finanspbncn 1951 kamkteriseraclc.; det cko
notniska i~1gct vir] £.rss~{iftct 1953/.S·t som "ba
bnserad hiigkonj•.mktur". Dct bH1e d:d\)r <:nsctts 1nOjljgt aa ~.l<,pa hn·c~tcringsav::.;iftrn och bilaccisen fr.'in :·ncskiftct. Vicbrc hade ttll
stAndstvttngct fOr bost3.dsbygg~ntle i pr3ktiken. ::wskaffats och pri:-ko:1trollcns ombttning r~dt:
ccrats. I ufiir J !J:i-1 bcdiie1dcs s[\viil en avmatt
ning son1 trnclcnscr till Ovcr:conju'l!~tur sorn
mi5jliga men dct scnarc alternativct am!\gs
mer::~ sannulikt 1iu del furra. Och dc:t p\J:c:kadcs alt "Ri~k~rna fijr :~tt ramen f(;r rcs•.!r
srrna skall spr:ingas h~i11f6r sig fra:nf,Jr alit
till inws:cringsscktorn". IJ:irmcd a\·s:!g3 doc':
inte indu:;trin ty "En bcclu:::ning :w invcscc
ringsutvcckEngcn fur industricns del tydcr p:l
atl u!lgon Okning jcke korun1cr t!!l st;~nd under 195·1''. Bortsctt fr:m de fi.;rut r;;im::da
Hittnadcrna fiirurdadcs dock i:·T''ll omprii\'·
ning ::tv den ckonomi~.b. politikcn:16
rakti~kt kom 1 9:'">•1 att utm~ickas av cu.
myckct stor proJuktionsobin.~ ( G %) , hog sy:;;sclsauning och en obctydlig stcgring nv
konsumentpriscnn. 1fen bytcsb:~lanscn fors1imrades mcd en h;>.lv milj:t~d kr. Dctta var
ctt av tccknen pi! d~t n3got overra~kar,cle
konjunkt:.~rupp.>·;ing so·n blc-v :n:i.rkb:>.rt under
hostcn. Bakom npp,vingct lo\; en betyd:mde
eftcrfr~tgeijkning for expo! t, privat konsumtion
och investcringar. Industrin bid1·og i hiig grad
till den ok:.:de invcsterings:!kt!vi let en genom
att oka sin iavestcringsvolym rncd drygt 25
IV:26
%.41 Detsamma galler bostadsbyggandet me
dan nyinvcstcringama i den offcntliga sektom
i stort sett var oforandrade. Totalt blev fi
nansp:>litikcns kalkyleradc impacteffekt 1954
v1:scntligt mindrc :in 1953, jfr. diagram 5. Borttaga:1dct av investcri!tgsavgiftcn fr.o.m.
1954 verbdc ii andra sidan cxpansivt i viss
m:in. Analyscn i P:t'\B 55 ntmynnadc i kcnstate
ranclct att expansioncn hade lett till uppkomstcn av ctt efterfr!tgcoverskott (viti raclan
dc priscr och ofOdi:Jcl:at undcrskott pa bytcsba!amcl). D!'t hade man :int!:"t blkylm1i~sigt
riiknat mcd bloa e:t par procents liincstcgring
under 1955:!3 Samma syn p.i l:.igct pragladc
arcts finansplan (Skii1cls sista) nwn de ome
dclbara moti'ttg?irdcn~a son1 avbcradcs in
skranktc ~ig i slort sett till clt :itcri!tfi.iramlc
av investerit~gsavg;ftm (som denna g."lllg
kompletteradcs mcd en s1iroki ld investcrings
avgift for bilar)' en atstramning av avskrivnings- och bgerv?in.lcringsreglana, en maning
till okad alcrh!'dlsamhet i kreclitgivningen, en
bibch!Ulcn stnm byr,~nadsrcglering och hard
utf;iftsprom!ng for statliga myndigheter. Att
den flcra g:1l1;er uppskjntna sj ukfi.irsiikrings
rcformcn tdddc i kraft fr.o.m. 1955 skulle a anc!ra sidan medfora en nettookning av hus
httllens kopkraft pi'. ctt par hundra milj. kr.
I fin:msplancn tabdcs emellertid ocksa om
"de ytterlig~re ingripandcn som kan komma
att bli erforderliga". Den avvaktandc hi'lllning
cn \'ar utan tvivcl dikterad av de p:tg:'tendc
lunefurlwnd!ing:~rna .. Dessa slutfordcs under
mars och medfiirdc bctydande liinehojningar
som maste ha okat dct ri'tdande kiipkraftsover
skottct m:trkant. I RNB 55 angavs cfterfriige
overskottct 'l.'ara av storleksordningcn 1 mil
jard kr.19 Da var det inte Hin~;re fraga om
att avvakta.
SkO!d borjac!e mrd att foreslii. ett obl!ga
toriskt sparandc (motsvarande 10 % av in
komstsbtten) mot sparbcvis som skulle inlUsas 1958. Det~a var emcllrrtid oacccptabclt
fOr koalitionsp;utnern Bondcforbunclct och
fOrslaget fol!. Okade p~.l'1kskatter tycks ocks;1
ha ing:ttt i iiverv:i:;andena men avvisadcs be
stamt av LO. Utovcr en premiering av per
stniligt sparandc blev det diircfter il!te f:·:tga OIH !ttgilnJer SO!ll direkt riktade sig mot den
privata kons11mtionen trots alt ocks.i C:wna
dtcrfr::ge~wurponent hade cxpanderat i rask
takt. I stilllet hojde~ den statliga Lohgssbt
ten stcgvis over 2 ar fdn 40 till .'iO %. Dar
till kom en succcssiv men haftfull atslram
ning p!'1 kreditmarknac!cn. Recian pa hostt:n
1 95·!· h:.tde den Etn!i:t r1int:m huj ts rnec! en
halv procentcnhet (i sa:nhand met! em:tte
ringcn av ett .J-pnwcnti:;t statslan). I :tpril
hojde den nyc riblnnkschcfen diskontot mcd
en procentenltet och iivriga r1;ntesat~er foijde
med. Samtidigt upplllauadcs bankerna ntt se
nast vic! utg!'m~~en vv juli Ita uppfyllt forut rel:ommcndcraclc likvic!itetskvotcr. Slutligen in
fOrdes i september det s.k. utliiningstaket for
41 Att det er .svrert at spa, isrer om fremtiden illustrcras t.cx. av Indmtriforbundcts enk;it i augusti 1953. Enligt cnkaten sku!le industrins invcstcringar mi11ska mcd i runt tal 15% 1953 -5'1. En ny enkiit nagra I!t!inadcr senarc ga\· uts!:tg i samm:1. riktninr; fast m!ndre starkt. Xvcn om invcsteringsavgiftens slopande och den amcrikanska konjunkturuppg:,ngen frim sommaren 1954 kan Wrklara en del konstaterar KI fiir sin df'l att ";\nda 1ir det en gitta hur omkastBingen kan ha blivit stl tvar .. .'', sc KL h 54, s. 36-37. 4S Sc PNB 1955, s. 105. 49 Sc KL v 55, s. 231.
IV:27
...
affarsbankcrna.5° Foljden harav blev en kraftig minskning av afnirsban.~crnas utlaning un
der srnare delen av 1955.
I sista hand blcv den ckonomiska politikcns
jntcntioncr S~tJcdes att climinera dct radandc
efterfrl'tgeoverskottct genom att dampa vinst
konju:;kturen och cxpansionen av foretagens
invcsteringar medan loncrorelscns konsekvcn
ser Wr konsumtio:1s- och prisutvecklingen un-
&O Dct inn~kH :1tt utl:mingcn till annat :in bostadsbygg.t:~dc fi)i·c ~lutPt ~v oktobcr skul!e ha 1nins~~ats tn~~d 1 ~:0 j~i::1ft;rt Incd n!v:in i ~h:.tct
av juli. Fi.ir cr. ;tnalys av k:·cditpolitiken 1952-5i, sc .\r\'idsson 1958, bp. 4:.
. 51 Sc l:ort:plcttcrin.;~pro;·,os.i~ioncn 1!1.)5: 190, ~.
33. 52 ror E':-•5 b!C\' ~kilcn:\Jcn mr:!!an den tot:da (dv~. s:;::;::!:1 och ku:n~n~:n~b.) boi:-tg:o:sk~tt~::-::,:1t
scn oc-h d'~! I(J:~crir!~~~~:lt~t·n ~n:-tppt 12 p:·occ:J~enhct~r. l ~·S•~-5~1 \':tr a\'st:.aJet lG-1 i procentcnhcte!· J~t~·n d~ireftcr l':th:ccr:!.t!cs dct till 3 cnhcte!'. I to!np:e~!erii~~:ii>!·upos.i:ioncn fUrk~~::.r.:.H.Ic
Sko:(;: ''I <1•.·n m;·ll\ fi.in:!;tg~n ,·id sk:.irpt:t sbttcn:g!e:- \·!H i vis5 ontf.l~ln~n; HnJ~;~t de clircJ:t:t vcrkn:t!::::'.r:la h:ir .. \\~ ;c:lfH!l sk~ttcfria a\'<lttninga=- ti!l investt:dng .. :fo~ld, innrb:ir detta cndast ca ur samh:.iilsekon,:ni:<k synpunkt on'kvan! u:n·cklir:;." (l'ro;1. 1955: 1!!0, s. 3G.) Rcsollcm:lngct tycks ,·ila ptt den sv;hsm:i!t:l fi.iruts:ittnin:~cn att en deponcring av 40 ~o av en di~ponibel "·:nst h~iuunar in\-cstcringarna lika myckct ~om c:t sb.ttcuctag p!1 56 jo. F>rklarir.gcr. till att det uppstod en diskrep:,n:; vi:la f:5rre ;in den rr:m burj:m forutsatta kan helt cnkclt vara otillriickiig kooniination av rk~t
ekor.Gmish politiken i ett $\Or:nigt skcdc (: 9;,2 h:!de :11(ln fOrsOkt bronzst1 avsrittningar tHl :nve-;tcring-::for~der ntrd hjli1p :1v jn\·cstcrinr;~s:a\~h~l!), v~rfiir den stora skil!uadcn fick iinn:l:; J<•:nr i fcm r,r ar inte hc!lcr klart. Sc ~.-Iatthics
!cn 1 !:7:::, kap. II.
der aret i huvudsak accepteradcs."l D:irmcd
var dct ocksa klart :>.tt de r.btram:.mde cffck
tcrna intc kunclc gora sig g2ilblJc med full
styrka forr;in storrc dclm av iiret hade g;ttt.
Av de finampolitiska rt~g:illkr::a verbdc
investcring~a\';;iftcn f:-~::1 :h·ets Li:irjan. Att
den i motsats till avgiftcn. 1S52-S3 '.'ar cttarig bor i och for sig ha obt dcss invcste
ring£OC!;r:in::and-:: effd:t. B~,;lutct under hcisten om en forl;i.n::;:1in~; for l 9::iG b:t a andra sidan ha medfi.irt att inve'itni:l~·;<projekt so:11
hade bli\·it l1PiJ3;~jutn;1_ till lOSG kar.. h2. star .. t:::ts rcd~n m:(:c:r h03tcn 19:35. V:!d g:ciicr bo·
Iagss:-:att•.~hiijningen p:1vcrkadc den prdiminiirsk=:tllcb(·(~_:dnjng::r~1a fO:·st fr!ul !:eptrrnber. I\~t~ra
!J:illln\·:!rda cff:.'ktcr ~v sk~irpnin.~;cn av a\.·s!u·i\·
J1in;s· och lagen·;il(~Criuf'~SlTglcrn3. 1~Ltndc k:12.ppast p:tt·:iJ.!laS ltc!lcr under 1955. Atst:·:a!'l
nin;cn p:t drtta omr;'trle motvcr!,ac.l~s drss
utom i vi~s m:'ln av de ny-a rcgkrn:t om in
vestering~fondcr so111 iniiirdcs t:nder vim:n.
l\Ieningen nwcl de nya rcgkrna var bl.a. att
fOrcta~cn i Rik:.;b:tnken skullc depone;a en
::meld av avs;iE:1!ng:~ma till i:t,·cstcriT';sfor<
dcll so:l'1 v::!r n~tr;ot rnjr:.drc iin bo!:-:ss::katttsat
scn. D:'t 5cdan clcr:na htijt:cs justcrades depo· nering~satscn inte i motsv::rande g:·ad och en
betydandc diskrep:~ns uppstocl mclbn de t\'i't
satscma. Dctta gjordc n~.turligtvis avs:ittnin;;
ar till i:wrstcringsfo:Jtlcr attrc.ktivarc l:~n de
~n~1ars skullc ha v:.1rit. Att fijret:!r;cn toe; va
ra pit d::nna miijligi:~t framg:tr av att de
besl:allning.<har:.>. vi:1f.terna under (dit.cn~;];ap5-
ttret) 19~·5 hmdc n.duccras mcd 167 milj. kr genom avs;;ttningar till im·~- •.eringsfonder
mcd:'!n endast i milj. bchu\•de deponcras 1
Riksbankcn fOre £trct3 slut.5~
Att bchov:t anvar:.da etti'mperioder \'id en
analys av den ckonomi.-ka volitiken ar natur-
IV :28
ligtvis en speciell nackdel under ar da kon
junkturHiget ellcr den e:..onomiska politikens
inriktning ~indras mdiblt. Som redan har
framg:'ttt var den ckonomisk:t. politikcn sanno
likt \";isentligt mer atstramandc under am:ra
halften av 1955 an i borjan av i'trct. Dct kan
. diirfor frfm st:tbiliscrin~spo!iti~ka utgangspnnk
ter h;ivdas att inbroms:1ingen borde ha kom
mit omkring ctt halv;]r tidigarc an den gjor
dc. For att uppni't snabb:ue restriktiva effck
tcr sl:ullc dirckt kvn~umtionsbcgr;[ns:mde i'tt
garder utan tvivcl ha varit n\idvandiga men
som vi har sctt avvis:J.dcs s~dana pi't andra
grundcr. Att de restriktiva atg:irdcrna i st;i!
lct fick inriktas mot inwstc:-ingarna kan scs
som ctt avstcg frfm intc:Jtioncn att vidmakt
hftl!a cllcr 6\a invc~tcring:;kvotcn.53 Andra
oir.st;indighctcr so:n Wrsv[n aclc den ekono
miska politikcn 1951-55 v:tr gi\·ctvis plots
lighctcn mcd vilkcn i.ivcrtryckct h:tdc infun
r.i;: sig - sa sent som i KI-rapportcn fran
h6stcn 1951 hade tong:mg:una intc varit di
rckt alnrmcranck5·1 - och li.incro!clscn. Vacl
so;n gjordc den scnare problematisk ur stabi
liserin~ssynpunkt var bade ovisshetcn om dess
t:t:all och intrcssct av att undg:l l'ttgiirdcr
som kur.de "stora" fiirhandlingarna.
For 1955 som hrlhct blev finanspolitikens
(bcrakm.cle) ncttoeffckt kbrt kontraktiv, jfr
diagram 5. Dctta facit kan till storre delcn
forklaras av rcstriktivitclen bctr;iffande den
offcntliga cftcrfragan. Den st~1tliga konsum
tioncn libom statcns och kommunernas inve
steringar och bostadsbyggamkt var ofiir;indrad cller t.o.m. minskadc n!tgot mellan 195·} och
1955. Sa sent som i RNll 55 hade man r;ik
nat mcd volymi.ikn:ngar pa 2-1 % for de tre
forstniimnda postcrna.~5 Totalt obde den of
fcntli!;a eftcrfr;tgan inkl. bostulsl.Jyggande m<"d
0,3 % av BNP. Ett ar tidigare hade siffran
varit 1,7 % (jfr tabelll).
Dartill kommcr att elm investeringsbcgran
sande po!itikcn i iivrigt utan tvivcl fick en
avscvard effekt under 1955. Eftcr den kolos
sala cxpansionen under 195•1: l[lg industriinve
Steringarna volymmliss!gt kvar p~t dm upp
nadda niv:1n 1955-57. Ocksa (~C totab priva
ta in·Jest<"ring;!rna ( cxkl. bo:;tadsbyg:ganJct)
var ofii:·;indrade 1~5-}-55 ncd:m mindre i.ik
uin~llr ~U!lH.le notCl"ZlS de f(l!j:lnde tv~'i. arcn. Att ill\'t'Stning:mws tillvlixt ~kulle 11pphiira
kom ~Ulll {'11 Ol't!"!"<~~~;lli!Jg - al1i!tl jJ~ hos!C!l
195~J 1 ;i.l;!ladc E.I wed en llPl'g:!ng pa 6-7
%.~6 I tva enklitundersi.iknin:;ar har Atvidsson oc~1 \Vickman fOrsokt att mii~a cffektcrna
p;t in(:ustriinv•~steringarna 1955 av infi.iran
uet av invcstt•J illgs:•·;giftcn, riinteliojningen
och krcdit:•t~tra''''!il!gcu. Enligt V'tda cnk:it~rna skulle totakff,·ktcn ha yarit en investerings
minskning pa 1+ %. I ndnstrins investerings
planer s•Jel de r;!pporteraclcs vic! b<:l\'ars$kihct
(allts;l innan hcditpolitiken kan ha L"ttt na-
53 Se t.ex. Ski.ilJs uttalandc i prop. 195-5: 190, s. 31, och S:rangs i FP 195G, s. 11. M I rapportcn 1mc!erstri.iks " .•• aa de babnsrubbningar som hiir <liskutcrats intc b.n likstii!las med inflationspafrestningar i stil mcd dem, som uppkom i s,·el·ige vic! tidigarc tillfiillen under cftcrkrigstiden ... Dct ar intc hcllcr fr;'tga om uppkomsten av ett stort cftcrfrageoverskott i stil mcd vac! ~om skcddc under arcn 1946-19+7". (KL h ~1, s. 97.) £5 EnE~t korup:ctter.ingspropositinnens upp .. sk<tttning skulie det statliga best;i1!nin~s~loppet ha medflirt att kiip och hes:allningar till ett varde av umhing 500 milj. b-. skot~ fram:ll i tidcn (Prop. 1Sl55: 190, s. 30). 56 Sc KL h 55, ~. 65.
IV:29
...
gon storre effckt) innebar en volymokning pa 15 %. Dct faktum att den plancrac.lc investc
riP.gsaknin[;rll intc rcaliseradrs utgi.ir si'tledes
ctt visst stod feir rimlighctcn av Arvidssons
och Wickmans uppsbttningar av cffckterna.~7.
Trots den restriktiva politikcn ster; impor
tcn kraftigt under 1955 och bytesb:llansens
·unccrskott bkv 400 milj. k! eller 1;-I miljard
tncra ~itt t1rct innan. Liksoin under t!digare ( och alia ~enare) hi.i;konjunkturitr forekom
en krafti~ l::::;cntppb;·ggnad. Den privata kon
sumtioncn stc:g kraftigt men mindre an den
rcala in:;ums!en cftcr sbtt cch husit:"dlcns
sparkvct 0bcks s.ikdcs. Konsamcntpris~tr;:;
rin~cn 19:i·1-S5 blev kn~1ppt 3 ~f. l Fin:.!mjli:t:ten l ~1 jG (~·>In iulcdt!c den
'Str~ing:-~~1 cr;:n) k(l!l ..:tatcras :-tlt ~:p~lnnint;t'n i rkonomin h:tde <Eilllp:tt.; n."•got llll'll ;ttl ctt
visst ovcrtryc\: fottf:n:uid·: bnn3 h',lf. !\fed
h:inS)a kinill orh till dct an>tr:ii:gda YalutaE:grt IJkv siu!,at~en att "l~igct kr:i\·cr en
fur~s:1~t rcst:-i:,tiv c~~<..,notnis~ politik av rninst s~n~:na styd-\:1 sont hit tills" .~s I s2.k s:unn1a
bec;onmin:; gjorclcs i finansplancn ctt ~tr se
n;:re. Krcditpolitihn 5k1irptcs i april 19::>6 ge
nom kravct alt utlaningstal>et fr.o.m. scptcm
bc~ ~kullc ha s1inl;ts fran 99 % till 95 % a.v
utlr..ningcn vid utg5.:-:gen a.v juii 1955. I sam
band rued Riksbanke:1s ( cgcnitandiga) r1inte
htijning i juli 195'i slopadcs utlaningstaket.
67 Se Arvidsson 1956, KL h 55, s. 52 och 65, KL h 57, s. 67-69 och Lindbeck 1963, s. 95-97. :lo.fcu stiid av sin ckonometriska studie kom Eliasson fram till bctydligt mindre effckter an Arvidsson och Wickm~n, .se E!iasson 1967, s. 176-77. 68 FP 56, s. 10. 59 KL h 57, s. 9·1. 6° FP 53, s. 11. 7- I.uudl.,crg, Finanspolitik
Fa.ktiskt fick den ckonomiska politiken en
mindre rcstiiktiv inriktning under "mcil::.n
~trcn" 1956 och 1957 an d~n hade hdt 1955.
Det samn~anhangclc bl.a. n1cd ~,a den offcnt
liga cftcrfr:"tgan :it~r tillats e:randcra och :ned
reduccradc automatisk?. sbttciikaingar. I KI's
!Jostrapporl 1957 konkh•dcrar ma:1 att "dm svcns!'a s;nnh:illsrkonomicn t:rid,~r 1057 ln:nnit
s[t niira ctt tillstrtnd av samit:i!lsd:cno:nisk ba}:lns .son1 n1an i praktik\~n ;,:t 11 hopp~s ko:r:.G1r!.
vid de giv1~a yttre fL:rut.:.;:i t Lning2.r ... '' Oc~1
det Lctonac:'cs aH "uppn~:endet :J.V det~:J. rcia
tiva Lalansl:ir;c i hog g~:tc! f:"tr tilbhi\'as <~•::1
forda ckono:nisb. po:iti':en··.~·u
Under 1957 hade tkn <1mtrika".o,b. kor.juu;·~turrn V~int ned:!t OC~l .i Sv~~rjgc !tat~~ C:l
\'iss i>kn!ng av :1rhct;;lid1c::~n JTg;sj.:·rr::::s. I
Fin;m,pbnc·n 1 ~~:J3 hmde rr.~n l:'.-;::: ":'-.Icd
rt·serY:ttion fUr fin:t11spl:n1~n::. ~l:trkt p~·dit:Iin?..
ra karaktEr \'ill jas f0r <bg:tll dd:larcra, 2it
de uppkomna annattninplC'mlc::scn:::t Ul0til
l~nds och den n2dtoning av den s\·cns!:a !:on
juukturen ~ora hittills intr~ilt och ~otn ~kf1p~t ett klirvarc fUrc p:"t arb::tsmarknatka oc:h j
fi.irctag~!rv:irlden, i!tiC ger anlnlnir.g till en
raclikal oml;iggnint; av vare s;t; finanspoli!i
ken cllcr krcclitpolitikcn. Dct lig~cr givctvis
i sakcns natur ?.tl krr:v1;t p!t restrj:.~tivitct ...
intc fOr ogonblickct behovcr st:illas m~d fu!It sarruna sk~irpa sorn ut,der de scnastc aren".co
Dct var om~orgen om v;,lt;t:lst:illnin;cn sam
blev bcst1immandc fOr stabilis~ring.spolitikens
inriktning: "Om arbctslOshct upp:;t~tr pa vi~~a on1r;tdcn sou1 fOJjd av .avs~ittr~ingss\'ft!"Ighctrr
!Or cxportimlustriD, kan tletta inte l0s::ts t;e
nom en n.!Jm;in po"tsp'iclning av d<'a inhemska konjunkturcn ... En uppdri\·cn hcmmakon
junktur under en samtic!ig konjunkturavmatc·
ning fOr omvlirlckn skullc snabbt f0rsamra
IV:30
•
bctalningsbal:msen och forbmka valutareser
ven." 61 Rcr-cptct blev i stallct att mota cx
portcftcrfragan~ :o~v:;ntadc stagnation mcd en
selcktiv sysscls:lttninr;spolitik. ]'vied tanke bl.a.
pa den aktudl?. ciskussioncn om den fram·
ticla fi.irsvarsorganisationcn undcrstrok Striing
"att nrje yttcrlip.rc utgift kraver ett mot
s\·arar.dc inkomstti:.isl~utt" .c~
Den \!ppmju!ming av finanspolitikcn som
avs&gs var Gmligcn begrilnsad. Fiir det forsta
hade investering~avgiftcn avvecklats fr?m i'trsskiftet (bcslulet h:lron1 fattacles redan april
1957). Vida:·e ~kuilc i'tt··rbeta1•Jingen :\\' l 951
oeh 1952 i'trs exponavgiftcr till skogsinch:strin
pabi.irjas H:Hlcr 19:•S som pbnet at. lliij nin:~m
av barnbidrag•cn och tic kommunala ort<:tV<lra
gcn (till p;1ritct med de ste~tliga) s:l!ut tll
stamhrdti!Ei;g till foP:pensio:H:rna sknllc <_;;,a
hush!iU-~;~s di~_?Oi~ibl2 jnkoJns~c,· 1ned o:nkr!ng
GCO milj. kr under 1953. Till den iivf'n·i;g~n
dc dclen uppv~igdcs d~nn:1 Ki.>pkrafts{):\I:ing ~~v
krafti:;t hojda knrnmunalskatter och dc:J nya ;,)Jrniinna cncr~iska:ten. Som fiirutsl:ickat !~d
ele bcslt!tct om iikadc forsvarsutgifter rcchn
under vftrcn till punktskattthOjningar av f1n1-
forbar ~·torlck. Slu<lit;cn beseimdc man sig fiir att (for fu:sta gaugcn) frisliippa invc:sterings
fonderna i m:Jj. l maj S:inktes ocks~~ diskontot
men cnthst mrd en halv proccntc:nhct.
I den "iurny<~uc" statsverk<proj>osition som
frambclcs i bi.irja!l pa juni 1958 forklaradc
Striing p;, uytt att dct inte fanns anlcdning
att ompruv::t den ekonomiska politikcns ut
formning. D:'1 hacle man linda bakom sig mer
an ctt halvitr mecl arbct.sloshcbproccnter wrn
l.i.g 30·-·10 % over l~lO(SV:tl:tnJc fjoJ!'•rssiff
lOf_c3 Samtidigt som finansministem kh:rgjor
dc att en :ubetsWshct av denna storkk inte
kunde bctraktas som "uppsecndeviickande
hog" konstaterade han att. "en storre v:::.luta
rescrv i dagens lage hade v~rit synnerligcn
onskvard och >kulic ha skan:.t oss en stOrre konjunkturpolitisk rlire!sebhct .... " 64
Den sclek~i\·a politik som fordes irmehar
bl.a. okad sals~ling p.'t bcrcdsbp~:>.rbctcn (s:ir
skilt v~igbyggcn;, ri.>rlig~lctss~irnu lcrandc rttg-3.tder cch inclustrihcs~;u:ni:lgar. Ock<t lJost:J.ds
bygganclct och sl:ttsfiirdagcns inve~~crins,ar sti
mH!cr:~dcs. Fer 1 ()58 blcv fiu:Jn~politikt:!l3 ],,._
riiknade imp:tc~dft-kt rn:tttl:gt exp::n~iv. Baku!ll dctta netto J:,g ~:n rclativt kraftigt (ibd oacnt
lig efterfr.\.:;an IJ~i \'~~ 1-·or och tjil!l\tt:l ociL 1n:"1tt ..
Jj~a ~-u!vn1:tti~k:1 skattc()~\nil!g.Jr (~~rut ~vn~~
koutra!:ih·a ~k:tttef1.~g~irdcr!). lTtanfi5r <1cn offcnt li:~a st·ktnrn hade export en s0111 v:!nt:tl v:.
rit of()r:indr;"l Jltt·tbn <Ercmol de prival:t in
\Tsrcringarua !tade Ok:1t Ovc~:r:tsk:J!E~e st~!J kt. J)t:t g:illde ~:ir~--~;!t i!~dustrii!1\'e~tcr:n:.:~arna :-,ora
cxp:1nderad•~ mn! heLl 19 % mcli.:n 19.17 odt 1 !J:1B cllcr 11;;~t~ta dubbclt s~t Inyckct. sorn
Wr11t;·att i uatiun:d!mJgclem:t. Derma upp
g:lng kan nog till en ickc ov:isl'nt:ig del till
skrivas investcring~.avgiftcns bo1 tt::gande och
ig~ttlgs:ittning~I)o!!ti!,en i:1o:n bybg~adsrcgle ... ring~ns r~un.c:i Oc;.;.s:'t cl~n prh·ata konsum ..
tioncn steg et dd tncr li:- vlint<1t, Arbctslos
heten n;tc!cle sin stiirsta o111fattning i januari
1959 med 73 000. Redan fr.o.m. fcLruar:. var
6t FP 53, s. 15. Sa1mn;t synpunkt bctonadcs <l\'
J~ent Hansen i Kl's hi);;tra;>port 195[) (s. 97). 62 FP 58, s. 13. 63 Fi.ir pcrioc!en oktoloer 1957-npril 1953 var den genomsnitt!it~a ariJetsliishetsprocenlcn (for samtliga arudsli.idt-;tsfi:irs~ikrade) 2,9 $io. Unckr samma period ett ttr hman hacle den varit 2,1
%. M FP jnni 19:,c, s. 11. 65 Sc KL h 59, s. 12-1-.
IV:31
•
antalet lediga plat~er minclre an arct innan
och fore arcts slut var en kraftig konjunkttn·
uppg;'lng c_tt faktum. For hcla 1958 blcv arbctsloshctcn 2,5 %
mot 1,9 % under 1957. Des~a siffror unclcr
skatlar cmc!lcrtid konjunkturhaksla;cts om
r~ttn!n~ av n1!tnga sk~H. S:dcdcs lig:gcr arbcts ..
!usa st•lll Yar t:J>dcr o:mkolnin:; clicr syssdsatta i bercdskaps::rbcten utanfcir. Dctsamma g:illcr
den relativt bc:tyd:u:dc ;u Lcts!ii;-;ltcl ~om drabbade den id~c-for.-::hadc arbc:skraftcn. Dold arbetsli>shct i andra forr:HT fiirekom ock~:'t. I
~j:.iJ\'a \·c:rkrt v;~r dct und:;r 1~1 5B orl1 l<.'rjaf!. av ; :1:J~.1 [r;·,t:::• om ctl :da:·t :-t\·st:·c; fr:m dn1
ful!:t s;·s:-~··1:--;:ittl!in~cn. J)ct Jnarkl-radts ot\-c:ty
di:;t {av E·:i:jc Kr;•sh) i R:'\13 !~r.9. Enli~:t
d,_.n d~lr til.iUrd:t ~=~ pkaiLy]n! fUr at bets:nark ..
nadr!1 (~o!n by_L:t.;-('r p!t ctt :'11tag.1ndt~ en1 en "ncn11:tl'' p~··.;dukti\·itct:--t·,J.~!li:t:; p:"t 3 ~·;:) sk.._~l
le 1~ 1 ~,{3 ~·irs d(·f!:1tion~:;ap l:a 1no~sv~r:tt 2 t;·f, av ar~~ct:-:.utbta.l(~!. I >:"t b:tdc ~iJ!(El ar!Jctstid~
forl:ortnin::m, ~c•nt (Ett·t ~~~rhctun:.d) bi.irjadc
ju~t I:J:,s, reducerat arLctsntbutkt mnl 1 ~~l ';{. Pro;;n.,srn fv: 1959 pek:tdc p:1 ctt Jib stort c.!l·f~:t 1:. ':~~g:tr>.r~
En natu:n~: fr..t;a :!lt s~~il1a :ir varfOr dtn eko:v;n1i~~a puli~ikl·n 19.j8-.JCl v~r !--~l rc1ativt
litet CX!':msi·.- tn,ts all lll:ttl intc l:adc tvckat
att ge puli:ikm en kraftigt konjunkturstimulcrandc iErik tning di1 annat tnin;stcudensc:r
blc\' miirkbara 1952-53, jfr di:::gram 5. Den
forsiktiga allity(~cn 1958 bcrodclc up~cnbar
ligen intc p:·l n:'tgra vilselcdandc prog!loser.
GG Se R!\D 59, s. 83-85 ..
67 E!lligt alia prognoscr so:n gjordes hostcn 1958 och ,.:·trcn 1959 ~kullc bytc~-lJa!anscn fOr
samras u::ckr 1959 (sc KL h 53, 5. 97, PXB 59, s. 39 och R:'\1~ 59, s. 29). 1 l'P 59 (s. 11) ans:tg
•
Atminstonc pi't v:"1rcn 1953 bor arbctsmark
nadsindikatorcrn:>. ha gjort c!ct kbrt alt dct
var fraga om en kr:1ftig ncd~::ing. So:n vi har
sett prognostiur::r:cs cxportsta;-:1a~ioncn kor
rekt och hade de pcs3jmisti>ka im·cstnin;s
och konsnmtionsprognoscnn ~:<<.rit in sl;Dlk
av!lli1ttniu6cn ha kunnat bli en b~l de-l S\';t
rare :in den {;1~:ti~~~t blrv ~jfr 1):la:;:1 D). :\tt
"dct intcrnatio:1c1l:-! utryn..:rn<:l" ~;pd::..dc en av
gi.i-ranclc r"ll fiir den cJ;onomi,:::-t politikcns
utfounning 19~,·r--:)9 J1:1r recL:~1 f~~H!1.~~~t. Sc~·:1
p~"'lpck~\(S tic:i~:~n~ f<.~!·(·~~;cl-.:> dc:t c:.p:-~~!:.~v~t politikc·:t !:)·,:?-:,:; ~,. bctyd:!"tk b; tes])::!::n;
(.)\·cr~~-:o: t 1 ~;:-, 1-52. 1)~iru:-"!ot :1 :\·;~,ar~c bylc.~
ba!ansl'n lltHh.:;·:-:1-:.ett \·~!.it od1 c:tt ~i\' de f>·;~t
;.,trcn fi.}re 1~).)[~. nctraJz~~lf V~ 1:alu~~"trcser\·f:llS
u:n·ddill!; hEr s\il.iakti;hctcn vii,cnli::;~ :nix:
rc. Vid ~iutct av 1957 \'<er >.:"·k:ld~· ,·alut~-
re;c!VI_~ilS stor;c~, sett i rclat:on ~ill i1!1p:,~·t··
v~ird(:l, i Jet n~irn1:1s~c lika st~Jr S\Y:l cica h:l~
de: Yarit i ~lilll'l a·v' 1951 ('ro's !'n vi~~ tUl
dens till minsk1ti1::;). Vr dcnna synpur:t:t
fanus d";t nll:s;\ i cd1 f<Jr s!g ~ntc ~t(·)rre ~n
lcdninr; a~t v~ ra re~trikliv 1958 im t:ct hade
fn~1nits 1932. l),·t }:~tn ti1Hi~g;t5 alt •,:J.h!t~:·e
servcn fa!..::ti~kt l}k~th.·$ j viss lll;0
t:l. undtr bttda dc~·sa ~~.\·rna I lJ:i~1~·;~pc·1 ic,Uer.
J)ct iir lla~ur!igtvis ornOjligt att uttala si~
mnl bc~:;itlt<.lh•:t om hur dct skullc ha gfttt
mcc.l. valutan·slT\'Cll om den ckonon:isl:a poli
tikcn 1953-59 hade gttts en mer rxp:<.miv i:l
riktnin~ iia faJlct V<tr. Vi L111 biott k:m·>til.:c:·a
att Inan i Svcri~.~t (lik!"'rJnt i en ~ci ::~ndr~!. J:.i:-1-dcr) i .s:ort sctt avstod f;;"m att am·.~.nda \'::
lularcscrvcn som en l:uf!crt och ~·.tt ~!en bk
tiskt forda el:o:•'Jill iska pol: t::..cn { t:·ots <•tr <1r:1
var koutracykli>k) d:irigenom kmn ~ilt !:·cb tiD
ett mcdvctct av~teg frfu1 den fulla sy~scb;tu.
ningcJJ.q Dt:n cxterna balanstn pric;·it(·r:.:dt::;
IV:32
...
mcd andra ord hogre an den interna. Sam
m:mfattningen i sista akten gors av en finans
:ninistcr mcd en rclativistisk syn pa den
svcnska st:~biliscriDgspolitikcns :nojlighctcr.
"Xiir jag framhtdlcr att den hitti!ls bcdrivna
sy~seisattnin~-;spoEt ikcn varit fr::~mgangsrik, iar _ dct!a omcWme scsi fiirhalbndc till de miijlig
hctcr sorn furclegat fUr ett land av Svnigcs
storlck och mnl dcss berocml<.: av den intcr
nati0!1clla ;;rmjc:nkturcn att fi.ira en sjalvst:iu
dig ko:1jun;,: urpuliti':." 68
4. lii;gkoiljunktur och "minircccssion" 1959--63
1959 var inget gott ftr for pro~~no~~Jr;ll1sch~n.
Liksom fallct h:ldc yarit 195{ blcv konjunkturuppgttngcn unde-r 1959 f0rv:m:11m·:ird
sna!>b. Vid ing,"mgel till 19:J9 r:iknadc maa
i nationaibudgl'tcn mccl ofuraudrad volrm for
privata im·cs!eringa:·, varuexpo:·tcn och inclu
stripro:h:kt'.onrn. Fai,t:skt okadc dessa poster
mcd 6-9 %. Ocks:'t \·au g:i!Icr privat konsum
tion och invcstcrinz undcrs!;a!l:!dcs cftcrfr:'l··
gci.ikningama i bctytbnde grad. Trots den fort
s~Wt arbet~tichfOrkortningen blcv rtrcts B?\P
okning diirfi)r sa slor SO!ll 5,5 % (mot forvantade 1,3 % i l'.i.\B oeh 2,3 % i RKB). Eftcrsom konjunktmu;lpg:'l1!2/'ll hade biirjat tidigare utomlands 1~n i Svcrigc kunde bytcs
balanscn Hirbattras mcd 1/'1- miljarcl kr och konsumcn!priscrna steg cndast obctyd!igt over
1958 l'm niv!'t. Uppg:'mgen blev givctvis m1irk
har avcn p:'t arbctsmarknadcn och mot 1'11·cts
siut hade arbe~sliishctcn reduce rats till 1956
l'u·s l:'tga siffror ( cxakta j1imfi..irebcr f0rsvaras dock av den aktiva arbetsmarl;n:tc~;po!itikcn;
in om ramen for dcnna sysselsal tes omkring
15 000 pcr:,oner i bcredskapsarbetcn och um-
skolningskurser m0t slutet av 1959) .69 Finans
politikens expansiva ncttoimpact 1959 blev
1,3 % av B?\P clier lika myc~ct sam U'1cicr
1953. Den offcnt!;g«. cftcrfr:1gan v2xtc bet.yd
ligt kraftigarc 1959 an dc:l hade gjort under
19!:18 mtn den exp~nsiva cffck:t:n h:1r:tv <tim
pz•dcs till m del av bl.a. hiijnin;cn av folkpm
siom:n·~,_iftcn ( rr:m 2,5 tiil .j %) och i.ikad skatt ~a1!to:natik.
Avcn t:!ww_.n,is\-pc-!itiskt b!ev 19:";9 ctt Lli!;·
starkt ar. Den Utl!ra:~na pcnsionsstri<kll kun
de ;wg0Jas i 1w:j c!{, riksdagm (llltd minsta
mojliga majodt•.:t) bc,r:!·r-clc a~t ATl'-rdorlllt:ll ~kul!c tr:ida i haft fr.a.m. !9GO. Det1a bc.:~lut i!dlt!tr<,Jes knapp:!st 3'•/ n~.g~·a kcrtsi~-
1 iga st;1 !)i !;scrj~~gspo1itiska ()verv~lgandrt! viE.:ct Ll.a. Ir.vng!ck av att avgiftss~:sen L!stst~i11c:cs
fUr den Itiinn:1~t..: fctnrtrspcriodcn ( dr~n s!:u:!e
finans1ninistern att "En !Osning av syss~ls'.\tt
nint;ssviiriglte:em1 ... Lor ... i fiirsta Lzt:Jn si>k~s eftcr }jnjer so~~: intc prjru:irt st:.ll!er ;~nsp:·!~:·:
p~t valutarcservcn". 1 koinp~cttcrl~lgsJ)ropositio
nen (1959: 150, s. 9), cftcr dry~t ett !tr av markbar avm::~ttnii'g, kan en viss attitycfiiriinc!riug sp!tras. Det s~~r;s att "en ne<~gt~r.g av v;
0
lfrl
valutatillg."mgar ... kiln bli det pris vi m:'lstc bctala f<.lr att upppr~ltth[d~a sy!\se!s~ittn~ng-cn ...
en m!n~kning av valut:ue;crvcn (f.h:Jk) narm::~st kunua s:ig;,s innc-b~ira ett utoyr!jandc nv Jikvjdtt. till:.;!lu3ar f()r in\'estcring i nya re~lkapitaltillg:wgar ... ". N11 b!cv dct ht;:Jlct fr~lf!<l. om en kraftig fii1 b;it tring av bytesbalanscn 1959 och nttgot test p!l. bcredviiligltetcn att anvHnda.
valutarcscn·en SLI!ll buffcrt kom a!drig til! sti'tnd. G9 Prup. 1939: J:>ll, s. 10. Ett lta!v;'tr senare betonar finansn!iui~t~rn dilrernot , ... hc!-aluts~Hll·
helen atl intc lflla fi.irra vin~ems lt1iga .trbct,Jos
het up;m~pas.", sc l'NB tiO, s. 6. G9 Sc FP 60, s. G.
IV:33
...
for 1960 vara 3 % och darcfter stiga mcd en proccntcnhct per "-r) .70
Eftcrsorn p~·rislor!suthct~~~!1!!1g:-trna fC;r~t skul ...
Je borja 19(;3 och (l:"t i yttcrst blygsam skala skullc den kontrak!iva cffcktcn av Xfl'-refo::-
mrn l·li bctylbn<.!c ;[·,,·n om ett visst L,1rtfall
av privat sp::n:>.ndc kundc forviint:J.s. Jkt nya
· svstcmct kt:udc darfur ocks;t su so;n ctt Jed i s;d;van att oka dct totala spitr:\l1uct och in
\'C.Stcri!lgs~,votcn.71 FUr att i vlss In~tn kon1r
pcuscr~ fOre~a;tn f; .. :,r kostna·:ls(jla~insrn ~Din
ATP-avf;iftcr::a skullc medfura bt:~lot m:m i juni ;'l.tt fr.o.l!L 1 9GO s:inka den ~t~ttlig;l l:o
la:~~::--k::lt_:,·~:-tt~cn frtt!1 !>0 till ·10 s:·~-~= ,\lit efl<!.''''ll i ~~:i~l ::ic1; L>ln· h>njud.t•.lfllfJjl·
g!n1~~·n ~!!~~r och :ncr O~\'ct;·di~~ och t!:~dcr hij~.
t~I'. ku:n c~t ~0!.\b~ tiil tn t)!n:~~U~t:H.lc fiiL•.ns
poli:i~~ ... li:'lt.J:!l:l:::~; .. \tt ('11 ~~HL~n lJ,:blj\'(~CS
\'~r od:~:t den :;l~t::--.~b sot!\ '..illL:ef:ir s~unt~t!igt
n;1ddt.:s i Ko~ljuukturil'!'tituteis hl:·~trappn1t.-; 3
K;;man i kL.bt;ct \·~,r infor:,;:ckt a·; en all
tn~in o:::<::tnir!s~~-l.:att p:'! ·1- ~·o fr~"~n l~~GO.
iO I::t,: l:cl!er scn;trc lw.r ..-\~rP·;l\'giften an\'~ints
~01:1 konjt!n~nu··j>o!iti\~~t instrurn·~nt. 1 !l\.~3 h(!SlOt
man att a' giitcn 19Gj--GSI shJ!c \'ara 7 !l:t-9Y2 5c och 1 %:! faststi.illdes avgiftcn fur 1970-74:
ti!i 10-11 -;-;,. 71 De uti;:.~taladc pcuc;:oncrna tr.otsvaradc 19G3
2 % :l.\' de influtna oxf(ftcrna. 1967 h;.1c.l•~ ande
lcn s:igit till 10 5v. Av 1970 [m inf1utn:1. avgif
ter (som upp;!ck till G 100 !lli!j. kr.) bchovdes
19 $-o fOr pcns:onsutl.•et::!ning~.r.
72 Be:.iutct hliro:n h:,de i rcali:eten fattats fOre
195B, ~e FP :iR, s. 11.
73 Sc KL h 5i, s. 126--27. "i4 Se Lindstrij;n 19G'\ s. 26·1-72. 75 Fl' s. H-1:,. 76 I.irvkrom 1%9, s. 309-11.
77 l'~(nu<i•io:• 1~1 :>9: 150, s. 12 och 14. 7 ~ St: .; Ltt!::nius -\Virsbnd·~r·-~1olin, s. 239.
Om~cns fOrhistoria kan fO:·tjana att omn5.n~r.as j en stahilisering';)Qlitisk k:-iinika. Rccbn t:nclcr scnhi.istcn 19~·r. - dil a\'mattninge, p:\;:ck ~o:n bi;st -- var fr:'•c:a-1 o:n en ny o:;:s fiirc:11:d fiir l
1o'.ku!~sion ino!n rc.r;eringcn. ,\nleclnlngca h~ir~ill var nlir;na't ut~iktcn tiH ctt !->tort bul!t-;ctund~:rskc>tt under budgr·::·m:t l9:i~~;co. :\vsikte:1 tycks
h:1 varit aa s};altcn skellc t:·::d;l i kraft rci~~th·t
til!igt n11dcr 19.J:J. :\fotstit~H! frr~n LO:s sida
!-~jo;·de d1JC:, att de~ tkfi:--!!tiva St~~lJllit~g<qa[:l!""!l:et t:pp:.~tit~ ti:l n1:1j (d\'s. till cftcr ]~incrij:Tlscn ()\_.h
pct~:;i('ll>:}~·:·:lntet). ()1!1'>·:~1 ::-~~~:1:(~ d;·. k:.u1n;:.~ 1:::·~ ..
scras so1n en ''sy . .,~cl<itt•li:':;=--:-~:a~e'.7 ·1 Ct.\t :-.!~
tu:di\l'ra(:l~~ fL\;an on1 CI! it:kc~~ll<-;tf()rsi.~ir-knj~;r;
i fin;n~:.pl~lncr~ fr.'in jant!:l.:·i cE~~- olil~a :::katt:~hi_\j
ni'1;::--.d:~·r:l:':i\' E:l:1·n~ u~:In att u:\~.::ot Uiron::~.s.-::; I Jliitl('!l :lV arril lii")kutcr~:(_!cs Cl:n~cn ;):t r:ytt Jnt·d Ll) och rlt nj_)p~l~n\· ti:I };Us.!c!: Oe:.:i;..:ta ..
d~~s:i{. j };oi:ipl··tt:::ri!::-;..;prol,'.'.~i·~it;J:cn fr~~n dt~to::t
a\' :tpril k'.)llSt.:!let :~de r•1:'.:1·:p1i!tis~ern att ,,JUskcrna fl)!· e;·q;:tn~inni~ti:-.~'a i)\vrc~rifter ii!Oil' c.~ca
s\·en~ka l'kuno:nin unth:r fttcr.sa;~!cn :lV itr 10:'J~
iir, s:"t \'itt \"i tnt };.an se~ inte s;i.t~kil[ stor:-t". ~\fen
<.kt S~H:es C'Cks;"t att '"l)~t f;jriLlli~1~1det aa :ll"~JC:~S·
1n~:-k n~~cbE~~:e l nl:·th·~ind ;::_r~'.~)r of£en tl iga i1: ~~t ts:~r
i ~r~~ch.:ltP!ings·-;~;_·.\.~j:lnL:c. ::yftc. L.a:1 ... !n~c i och fOr sib :.a~_~:~s till i:1t:ik! fljr att a\'st3 fr~l.n c;~
f0r~t~!rk!li1lf~ ~.x bud,~cten. En p£1. I:..:.~grc sll~t
fr;:un:;~Glf':Srik sys:-;~ls}ttningspo!itik fOn~ts:ittcr
att Ludsetu!Jdcrs;~o: ten Jy';~ ~i1J$;-!:; li~rh~in~ a a d(;n inrc och yttre halc;nq~;) i v.\r eko1:o:ni id;c aventyras''.~7 Dt't onlspropo:;itiO:-J("Il Olnsid•:t i oL~tobcr 1~~2. p;l rih~dagcns bord v~r ko;1jur!k~ur
l3.gct ctt 'tnnat och ''sy~~cb:itt!l!r:ssskatten" bade forv:mdl:tts till en "infh<irJw.sl-:;-,tt''! \'id 0m
r0stning~!'na godtogs orn:~f0r~J;,~et i fOrs~a kt~'ll
marcn nwn fUll i anclra ka:L:n:crcn. ldi.ir Ut'n
avg-Or:u~r~c 0'=-'C'l~Uf)anJ:na votc:·iugci! gj(,rdes o~n.
scn tiil en kal>incttsfri'•:,;a. I del i:ic,ct a•·stod konnnunistexna (~·-on1 tjdi~;a:·c hade rO:::~~-t :nr.~t)
frt:.n att ~·()sta s!'l att o:nsf(jr:·!ag('t knncle b!fJ.llas
mcd 7 rost<~rs U\'Crvikt.•s
IV:34
...
Inforandet av den allmanua orns~ittningssbt·
t'.:n (sotn tncd yjs~:1 un2ant:lg oc!~sa g3.llde
in·;estcriq;:s\'aror) och ATP-:wgifterna i::ne·
bn en inkomstforst:~rkning :w <torlekso~dning·
en 2% % av Bl\'P. /wen em inkomsttil!s;;ot
tct rcdttccr;•dcs av den samtidtr;t gcnomforda
san!mingcn ::lV hus!)tt!kns inko;mtsb.tt och
·hOjnin;Z!~·:::-t av s!tv~q b~rnbi(1r;•.gcn ~o!n ~~11~
kc- och folkpcnsion(:rna/ 9 motsva!·adc drn
autonoma nt:ttoskattci)kn!n~cn 19GO drygt 2 % av B:\l', ch·~. mer 1in undn ni"•gut annat efta·
kr!gs:'ir (jfr Iabell 3). D;", hade iimL:i ett fiir
slag otn c11. krJ.ftig h<>jniu;_~ ~'v en,·rgisk:u.tt·n avvis2..ts av riksdt!gtn. (JcK~~l vatl g:lllt·r <.it"~n
offcntliga dtcrfr?tgan p:, v:tror oclt tjii~>-tc·
priighdcs politik~:z> av ~t::nk restrik!i\'it..:t. B..:
rcdskaps:nGdt'll:t a-.•,••·ckbdrs i snal,b t:tkt \lll·
ckr v:'trcn. Under sommar!talv."•zTI ~;:il!dc ett
fiirbud for s::~tli~;a n:ynciizl:c~cr oc!t :~ff:<:sH·rk
att st~rt~ r1ya "1Jtts!lyg;uad!;(Qret:!gH och att
utoka den kolkktiv;1lJ;t:i!Jda pr:rsoz:alm vic!
byggnad:~- och anEi~:~~~!1it'!~~=l1rlH:lcn. P1 rrgeringcns 1~ppn~aning utf;.ird:v.:1e konl!Pullf;_}rbun
den n:kommcmlationcr till konHrwm·ma om
mots\·~r<'Pdc £l~';rh:llh~cmltet.~'l Delvis som ea
rcsnltat l1:trav nt!nsk~~.de den statliga i~l\'estc
rings\·cd~s;:qe!lctca volyznnt;i.ssi[;t H-:er lin kon
sumtio:w•I Gkadc medan konz•.Jmnenws rcala
cftc:·fr;!r;:-:r: bl~v av samma storle!c som 1959.
ii.vcn bos::ldshyggar:c:ct prt:.<~:\!lc:s ned n.·tgPt
och Jcn totala offcntliga cfterfrrtgan 1960
ble\· s~t:cc!es mindre :in :"tret fvrc. Det k.dc
inte h:int sedan 1948 ( och sb.tlle inte upp·
repas scnare).
lmpactdkktcrna av de hiir n~imnda dras·
tiska bm~ge'.[ttg1irdcrna blcv st:!rkt kon~raktiva
sum framg:tr av diagram 5. Eftcrfr:tgeminsk·
n:ngcn so;n i'tst:!.dkoms \'ar av stod;:ksordning·
e-n 1,2 % av RNP. l\fcd budgetal'tom'ttikens
impactcffe!<ter indknade i.>lev cen kontraktiva
dfekten i960 on:kring 2 % av B?\P. D:'i har
yj ii.nnu intc tagi:. h~insyn till cffc;.;tc:-na p[t
privat::t i!l\'esteri!l~ar.
utover den stimulcrandc \'crkan av bolags
sbt teslhkni!lgm p[,q·rl:adcs de pr:vata innstcri!lg:trna av in\·cst,:riJ~~sfuncisprJiit!k~n. En
bronlsande cffckt upl'ntt(:c!cs Ulr dct fi)rsta <l~t
myndighcte!ll:t i sq•:cm!xr 1959 ~attc slopp
for ytlerlif~,<\rc L-isliipp fr:ln invcsterings!on·· l~crn:•. J)l t j!J'H': 1:tr ~-~n~Jlrrtid hlott att nya
pn'j('kt inte ktH!·!•.: fi!1::n:-;it!'~s !ntd fondrnc
deL IJ~iretnnt i~'j:J:~t~ tid!~!are ig;"'lng:o~atta proj~·~a utn~.ltja fon~icrn:l enE~t rethtn gi\'n;I till~t."md S'Jlil giiJ!l!t: j J-2 ar hcroe:1clc p.l pro
jc;.;_tcl ~ ::trt 01 h Sl<Jrkk. P;\ srt s~!tt kom en clel
:•\· <k und..-r ]~It~!) (och t.o.m. J9til) p;t~.(u.:n
de ir:du~aiL: g!~(·na att L~i finansi•:rad~ rnrc1 fu!~dn~cdl.·l. J)cn fi_jr~t~!. fr!~nip~)nin:~'ll av in
\·c~~t·dnv:~f()udcr f:ck. d;irfOr !ttJl!:.J,en dch·is destal>iliscr~'!H!e , .. c~·!.:nin_;;tt:.&t FOr dct andra an·.·:!nd,~s i!~\"c~tt·l jn:;~/tl!lCh~ .. ystcnH~t Jncd ~ r~n~
g;t:l::; !ill all ~c:g:t uiJP en dd :lV den rikli"~a
Eb·idi~rt i aW!rsl;:wkerna sfJ!n h:1rk Llivit rt
S~11t:,U:! itV Li.a. hctydar:tlc st~!tr::;a urf~1ft~
u,·cr:-;;.:ot t undt;r Iiera J.r. FC)~-~..~t:l:.;·cn uppxnan~
des att gUra ;·,v:<:.t~ni!!::O:~!r till in ... estcringsfo:J ..
dcr och att depc•'!t'l'a i11te ·1G utan 10() % i Riksbanl<en. Sr;tll t: .. u•t~~:irelse sku1lc holagcn fft gOra ett extra ~),vd,-,l~~ .r~.
0
tll be~k~tltningsh41r
vinst. J)et belopp so!H Overst~g den ob!ig~1to ...
79 S~andardti!l;igget till iolkpcnsionarcrna (fr:'m 1 juli) var <.let fiirst:1 av de till:igg som i enlighct med 1958 [Jrs riksdagshe~lut ~::ulic gcs vartannat /'n· 19GO-G3. so Sc l'~B til, s. 4.4-4-G och FP til, s. C. 81 Sc l'wpcsitio!l 1963: 159, s. 3:1 och KL no\'cmber 1 !J(itl, s. G3.
IV:35
..
•
riska deponeringen skulle aterbctaln.s vid ut
g!'mgen av 19Gl.f.2
Avs~ttninr;arna i enlighet med de spcciclla
reglcrna uppgic:k under 19GO till ca 770 milj.
kr.~ 3 Detta arrangcm:mg och cmitteringcn av
ctt statlir;t ob1ig:>.tior:slrm p:"t 1 100 milj. kr i Jnars Jik~a!n v~l::t:lrr:.-r:r\'cns rr~insk!1ing: var
·1~-~l.gra av de L1ktorrr ~o:n ];!:; b~tkon1 den kraf ..
tig:J. r.ccL;.\uc:m av :lff:irsb:mkt:rn::~s Jih·iditct
unt!cr I o'll1.81 I hi;rjan av ;hct hade s:l\·:il di~k(•!ltot ~o1n :-tfLir:-1 ~~:nkernas rekotnmendera
dc lihidi:•. :>knlt•-r hoj!s. Dc·t \ ar a\Jts:·t fr::r:a ont ('I! ~.rcditp:,~!tik ;~Y tr:ulitinncll typ I!lctb.n
:'Ltg:irdc:· :!\' Cct slag !'-)~11 h:tdr~~ :nl··::ints 19:,S-5G
iu!e fl.:~:·e;~ou~.
.. \veil ,_,1~1 prccis~~·!·ing~r inte Lir tntljlig:t fi.irc ..
·faller (:~·t tr(J:i.~_:L att nyss:I:it:i:HLt !tt~::trdrr h:tdc f!I vi~--; j!~\···-"tt·r::l~;·~:)c~~r:ins~~.:H.lc vcr\.an i
lint:s~:t\'Cft!in~~ !-=~_l!:l h:tdr· inh·tts 1~j58 fort
S:l.tte c::~r·l~clti<l tttHJl·r 190~) och de pri\·;~ta
in\'l'S~t' r: 1 ~~:: ru::t (ex kl. b'.):-; t:l(!~L\yg~;:lrH.!c) Ok::.des !ned 9 j£. :\tt den pri,·:tla kon~umtion~n ~trg ~~~ed JHiudrc 5n ~ ~·0 trots att de n·:l).:t
~:! D~~ CX:!·:l. 3..\'dra:;ct utgjcrdc }2 5f> i\\' a;-sntt
ningarca sc·1n f0Ict~-£"l!l1 h:d.lc gjort !Ore 1 augusti 19GO och n ~-0 av :t\'s:.ittcint:,1rn:t undc:r scpten1ber och oktobcr s;u!lnl~- [tr. D~;;satcnn bchlh·dc de.::.~a a\'s:t~u~ingar ir~t~ h:0
ll1:1. ~i; inor~1 ·10 )b a,· !t!'s\·i:1stcn (fUre sk:1tt). S·.! Proposition 10G3: 159, s. 31. 83 Likartadc at! hoc r-·;;ler g:i!1de under ISGl
men av~:ittn!n3ama !_,~e,· d:"\. embst 290 milj. kr.
Se propooition !9G3: 159, s. 32. Sc ocks:'t diagr:J!~l s. 329. ~~ Sc t.cx. KL dccen~bcr 1 !\62, s. -17 • 65 KI ~ novcrnbcr 1960: s. GG. 86 P:-\ll Gl, s. 7G c.ch s. U:i. St FP{il,s.l7.
disponib!a inkomstu11a steg mcd narmare 6
% bcrodclc dckis pi'-. hiprushm infor omscns
infi.iranclc under hi5slcn J95'J. Exporlcn ntgjor
dc ocks;t r·tt st:!:kt cxpansivt elc:ncnt 19SO
genom att v;ixa mecl 13 '?~·· Importvolymcn
strg dock i ;;_anu s:J:~bb:!:·e ta!>.t (viiJ:et till
stor del bC".!"'oddc p~\ d:~~ kr.:-tftig:~ l~.s-cntJ>phyggJndcn) s;'i. att bytcs1,~lamen fo1<ic1r~de> mcd
n~istan !l:z Jn11jard kr. 'l'ack \"'-'H~ ca po5itiv
fOrsJ~jutninz.:::p<\St blcv rL:n:~kningt.:;! ~~v valutarc
servCn '<i~cntllgt l:l_:ntlrt.
I ho~~rr~.ppor!t'lt l~~GD kor;Lh.:dt:r;J~c1c }~I:
:'1\tt ctt cfte.:-fr:~-gcUv~rsKatt t:!:.d';;l:its p:l Lun
su:-ntions~:id~tn tordc fr;:_n1st s:~ll:n1au!l~l.!-J~~2 nv:d
allmiinna y;;n,sb Ltcus infUranc1c. ]);;.rcmot Jnr
uppcnb~ri.igcn de rnot k:!pit1~varucitrrfr.~!g·:1:1
rikt:tdc ... ?tt.s;irclcrna varit ftlr S\'~.ga fUr :1tt
hjndr:t. upp!.;.olHStt·n av ctt cft(~~·IL\~;ctryck i kapitalvaru:nd:_;s!ricr~l::L I~_e.-..;t:lt::-~tct ~tr c::.rf{)~
en iivcr~pilnd :~:·:.H..:t!)tn~-:rkn:~d r;1cJ tcuGt~ns·~r
till t,kad liluc~;·liduing'~ .8:; I nation~tllJt!dgctcn
c:t p:lr tll:"•n:tcl<T scn:uc };um man Jik::kc;es
fnm till :~:r cU d!crfr!'t:~·.·()vc-:,:~ot: fa::'l~. Dct kuuck antas mots\·a;·a 1 % av IlXP och kun
dc fOn<1nL:'.:.; att fr~itnst g(J:·a Sig g:.ill;~nde ur~N
dcr fiirsla hiilften av 1%J.fG Fi.ir ~in del to!b.clc finaw.!!lini:'.tcm Eigct ~:~ "att vi mcd
ofodnt!rad fit~ans- och p::nniq~politik h'jr h:t
goda tniijlighctcr att ucn:a den fulb s)·ssd
siltti~ingcn u!an ba1:tnsn~hbning~r',_&7 I'~~.,t~ra
yttcrJigarc ~b~r~~l!lallde a~g:t:-cler av st.tirrc b~::
tydclsc vidto~s i:>tc hclkr um!er 19Gl. l.i:Zson1 under 19GO ~f.!!-!Hti:.::·:"!.dcs fiirct~gcn (sola
n5nHus) till ext1~1 ~\':;~~U.l 1 in.~:;·.r tiil jnvcs~e ..
ringsfondcrna. O::h \h:: s~F.:cicli:,_ 8.\~~i:·c!~:rn::&.
fiir att s:isongntj:imn:• b::,.;:,;nar.l,_ c·dt ~.:ili\:;;_;
ningsvcrk~au.hrt•:.:1 lll'PtTj-,:.(:cs - dclck t!~~~n
att dctta lcdd.- tiil ·r;?ins.\·nii.•f;·1' :w de statli;-;::
invcstering:mn cch tFJStad:;IJ! gganclct ~om !'trct
IV:36
mn:m.
Under 19Gl fortsatte mot feirmodan den
starka cxp:msioncn av de p~i~·ata invcsteri:'g;arna ( exkl. 1::-ost~clsbygg;andct) for fja:·dc aret i fi.iljd. Upn!'m[icn J9G0-6l hlev 11 %. Ocksi pri\·at konsumtion och offentlig efte·
·frj~an stc~ \·~i~cntli~~t Jner i!n ~!ret innan.
Dcssa sto:-~~ eftcrfrit;;•:iikning.tr kumle tillgoclo
ses tack varc ea myc;~et krafi i:,; prodnl.:tionsOknieg (5 ~~ lj~). S;<~.nnin~<·:t p~t :!1 bc:::~nar~( .. nadcn iihdc emc!kr:id n:"tgPt j:imfOrt mcd
1960 enligt tillgiiu~li.<;a indibtora.ss Dct :ir
dock viirt att not<:r;t ,\tl k<ln:;umc.:lltpr:scr;u.
trots hij:;I~onjunl:turl:i,~et uPdt:r lSGl enda't
strg In('cl 2 SiQ och Lyte~b:d:t!J~:rn ft;rL~ittr;1t:cs
mcd nar:na:-c 8C:O rni!j. krf~
I slutct a·,. 19Gl haJc dct s.k. "skattq>:-t·
ketet" godt:c;i•s av ril:scbgcn. Syftct \·;•.r at: under 1%2 L! till ~:;·::ld en vi:;s otnt!g~n;n~;
av 1csk~UI:in:;cn f:·;",t~ dirtkta till indir::Lta
s1:::-..ttf:r. J):i.:·fijr ~Enk~,_·s den st::.ttE~;a it!ko!~lst ..
~k::.acn f()r pe:rsoEcr cch orts~v(!r:~gcn hlijclt:s.
Dcss:1. I::ttn:H:n upv:::;des ;,-,; ::tt omscn hi.ij
des fr;"m + tiil 6 % oeh av hc;jch s;;;!ttt:r p:"l
bcnsin cell b<innolja. Dessut<.:·l!1 hojdcs bam·
bidragcn. I propc.s~t:onca !z.:~v fjnansr~ljnistt.:Ul
uttr)Cl( fG:· eil v:s~ t\Tt-.~a~-r1hct h~ff)r onll~!gg
nin~cn d~irfi:~r ~tt den kunclc her:tknas lnedf5ra en b::;rli:"!:::lU r.<:t:-.,:-:k~~ttcinin·J, ning.!•O ])c:n
na skul1c cmdlcrtid ~narast visa sig motsvara
ko:1ju!",kturl:ir;cts krav.
Under 190~ och 1%3 gjordc sig avmatt
ningstcnden(\c~ g~illar:.<1e i Sverlge. I)cn faktiskt rcgistrcradc :~r!)ctslO~htten obde i!Jte n.Kt~nv~irt E"!l'n av (J\·r-!ga ::!rl)~~tsma!"kn~.c!s!:ldi
katorcr att dOma n:~ddc ''!uinrr!:l:.essioncn, s:n
kulmcn i bi_;rj:m av J%3. IH hade t.cx. an
delcn industrifi.irctag med hrist pa yrkcsar
b-:tarc ~jun:,it till ca ~0 % eftcr att ha varit
65 % i mitten av 1%1.91 Den framsta an
lcdningcn till kon_:t!!1kt~n:::mp~il'gm var :~tt
n;i!"ingslivcts iP.vc:~tcrin;;s:ll:tivi~_et st:1.g!1crade
cftcr de fyra sta~kt. rxpa:1siv:t ftrC!1. l)c av
tagande bgcrim•.'c:V:rit!~:-trna bitlrog ocks~t (i
den 111~i.n ncdgt:!~~~c!~ l1~ir jnte !nr>lsvaradcs '~v
Eigrc import). ]_)<:( lt':Jlekonot:1iska ut•·ymmc
so:n upp'ltoll 6·:::11)1~1 den P'·ival:l eftc:·frt~g::.ns
ft.1r'-lv~~0.Uc cxp~:!1 ~~~on u:nyttjadt:~ till st0!" del
gc:n:.1tn ~;.tt offt.":nr~ ko1:~1.1:ntion edt in.vcstJ>
ri1:?::tr tilL!ts '~ix~: ~~:lahbaP.! ~ln fUntt. Eftcr
fr:·t~es~i,nult:r~uH.!·.: vcrk~\.c:t: O(ks:'t hl,jni~t.~~cn av
fqJk iJCt,sionri na t::~drr 1 ':lG:.! och sj't~·: ft)r~3l
ri~H~Sl cfo1 n1tn son1 tr~~Jck i kraft 1 ~.~G:L Son1
d!:.;~:L!t:) 5 vi~~~.r \'ar de £jnaEs:_>o!it!~.ka tttf~:tr
dt·~·n:ls itnpact.\~ffckter \'K~·.:ntligt rHcr f:Xl):"tn
,i,·a l:'i.i:! och Eli.i:~ :in de hade var:t 1%1.
lJnl kr~fti~:t l:nd;~ctantoln:~tiken P,:jonlt: dock att ( tl<:n l.H:r:i:.:lt:!dt:) !t('ttodf,:kten hlev s,·~gl
8S J)cn ant!e! ~v c~e :,.~..E~:::t ph~tscr!"!:-t surn kundc
tilh:;ittas !9G! \'dL' 61)4 5·0 rnot G:,,P. ~0 1060. lJen rcgi:::tre1<11~c c:u·!.Jc~ .... :li.c:h~te!t sj(:•!lk !din 1,..-1 ~·( .. til! 1 )2 ~-Q !HC~L-ul dl·'~:J. ~:.f S .. t~1lt~t:igt SO!il }(j!l
gli(iuingen inoin lndost1 in stcg frrln 3,3 ~-0 till t..~,7 )·0. Sc 1'-L dc~.:e:illJ('r 19G2, s. 39°-·10°. t-9 Efterso!n t!et lll'!.l''a!a fi.ir Svcrige :ir fiirs(imri!lgar av byte~ba!an~cn unJcr 1\r nted up;JC:ri
vcn hOgkonjunL~ur (~!iS()P1 l~H7, 195-1-5·5,
19GO, 1 !•G5 och El•.i9 :;o -- f r."m 1951 l>orlses av uppenlxtra sk:il) var Jcuna u!vecklin[; unik.
Den dirckta msakl'n \;,r all imporlvolylllcn in
te i.ikade 19GO-Gl. Dct fi.irldaras cn~;:;t Kl av
den minskatlc !ag~_·ntppbyggnatlcn ur1d'.~r 1 ~f 1
s:unt av vissa nucJra ~pccit·lla oins::i~ldi;hctc:
(sc 1'-L angusti l!.}Gl, s. 35), rnen episocio.-n k~n knappast anses fu!l: klarbgd. 90 l'rupc1sition i!'•t;l: l:.lll, s. 18. 91 I mit:en av 1 9j:J had•; andd,:n varit runt tal 2•5 %.
IV:37
•
•
•
!'ttstramandc 19G2 och svagt cxpansiv 1953.
For :1tt fa till st:1ncl en i:iknhg av foreta
gcns ir:vcstciin;::1r Li.tlZtcies krcc:~tpoliti~'cn un ..
dcr 19G2 och horj:m av 1963. Dct mcdfi:irdc
dels en 1:cdjus:ering av 6nteai·.an, me·~! 1 ~
procentenh~·t (;-.llts:'t viiscntligt mer iin 19.':·3),
· dc!s en bctycbnde likviditetsijJming i b:mksy
stc!nct. 'Cndcr 1962 frisEippt~~~ ock~Et :!:;·e~~e ..
rin~~~fn:H~t~z :~~- ~rilh::~·.r:Ucn fr[~n 111:1.j a';:;:~~ kost
tl:!dl·!· f;_ir hy::gnad.siPv(·s~c6n~~·ar h;iuf(;r]ig:l till
perio<~~:~1 f{:rc 1 rn::1j 10():). En f6rut.s:ittning
\';:r a!t pwjcktca h:ldc p:"tLi)rjats fO:··· P:J\'<'nl
LLT l~<<!. I ''Jl'il JJG·1 fiirl:in~;c.)cs fri.J;:pr:ct ti!l ~~t !,r ~.:-:·~ .·.:::ILt ~\(J_dn:'..c::!·J:a tn:dcr \':!ltcr
n~.,::~~-.. ··::::t ;: 11 :3-Ci-. I !':•net ;t\· 1~'-;2 Li-s!:i['p:~:. :-,::·~~·I::.t ;,\c;l f;Jr 11l~l"k:n:!:·.-cs~~·r:r:.~:
;n. J):t f,::·c .. ~r~ ·;-., ;:t~ Lc~i:;;inin~~:tli::~ :-;1:ul!<:
:..:ur:!S ic•!(" ::1.:j !'."·t~3 '.:1<1 ;!t~. !r·\·c::ll~~~·I:l~\ :-:kul
lc 5~~ !--:~ ~~ ... !i.:t atf ~Y~-'~·l<i;tni'!.~.~::•~·ffcL'.e!ll~~
kundr~ i·: <::...:~~:-\•; :::;cl, r l~Jt)~~.
I e:1 ~ :!::l:~·i··k: ~~··.:!r· Lir~.:~i~t·.'· Eli;c~<:-~171 l~1;!ta
r~e~~tH_.;r,·k~·-:": :1\· f: :<~ip:··eD l!'i;~~- S3. J\n\<~t~d
t~it~_::<·n :t\' fcnd~·::l:~ i~:cd:~·jnlr. c:d>.~~ d~~nn:t
U!~~;tr.\;:t:J~i::::-; :!:t ir:du-.;rrii:s h~·~sn:u~:,i~1\·c~~r
rin~.tr tq:dr-r fr!::;;;~l'Pni:::>i1;:i·!udl'n. 1 juli i~!(i2
-3r.1 ap·il !~-~~:) b!cv 0t:lS.r;::~ J:'", ~~~ s~()rrc ~~n
de :~1J:1:1!~ ~k~:n~ h:t \'a~l!. s~i ].lngt \':-tr drt :.tllt:~1 Ir:::,:.l ()n: en l~<;tyd~uH!c och tilL~tn;i::-~!gt
\'=iia\·\'I~~d ilflteeffcki. S~':t:icn ,·:~a~Jc ('!!1cller
tid ocks:t · ntt m vi~' irk:: onskacl cfkkt upp
k•Jrn Hnder somm:ucn 1963. Den gcor,~;:fi~:ka
flirdclningcn av ncttodfl'kternn syncs oc!:s:t till
en del ha \'::rit mir:<~rc .!j)'I:nsr:m c.ftcrso::1
de ~tnka~tc clfcktcr::a u:Jf>!~l;ittcs i n~;;ioncr UUtn. !~lin;nv2~rda ~y~scl<i~tnin~spro!Jlcnl. 1\etto
tff,~~ten p:t. In~lsk:nin\T~t~~rin~;arna var rc~at!\'t
sc~t mindrc bctyd;:nt!c \'allill 1:om ntt r:1 dd
av de nya ordcrn::1 piacn::dcs utnmlanjs.
So:n \"i h:tr sctt v~r J.:c:n_h,;.nl:.turon1.c.;b.gct
fr:ta 1959 till l'):i0 Kck i:>:crr:,.,;~:z,nck oc}·,
S!1abbt. O:nE; . .;soi~1gcn av den rkuno;nls1~:t po
litiken L:cv i ~iJ: t:n· i:t::[~~.r:.~~~·.:~Jr~c och sna:):)
p:"t ,,:'h<iJ r!::"~_ttc- S-)111 u:f:il~~~:idan. So1~1 fr:rr1 ...
~r:.r a~; dl~i?r~rn 5 v;~r l~C·G :.r':: fin~:i'~~:puliti<..::-r
. . . ~:.'C!~ vaLt
oc~1 inte );~;!cr de ft>1j··,.,,..l·; t...-:0
1 LU;.~.C'''~:~~r:::
tcn:n:~ L,1~·\' d1. t ft."'t;a r:>1:1 en lil>.~~ 1 ~-~;.r\i:~i .r
bi~r~g~t_t;r.;1:ti1~. o~!l jJ.rnf;~n:l~-,1.~:1 tlt~,~r~~·:!~~- ii:! ~It Clcks."t nnJau:-: ,~lt~(~:--~I~:!." :-;lc~:ld·~ r:""to~ l::.i
r!'1?~E\·'::s irP:c:;:cri!!:;~:r L;nl !:!:..-::~;~!1L_:;1 slu!s~.:..
St'r J,n;~!li,·::.-.t c!r:•s. ])?t rec~:ssit;L.~tt:~h:c:1-:cn;~:.
L·ltv ln:::Lt::tL' lllldt~l' 19():2 och J~;:3·-~ rno.-,'~'3
de 1nL·d <'rt st2rkt exp:u-:.~·iv t:l:()!H 1!Jl;.s:"' pr,li:i:~.
\.i kan c!~~rftir !:r.'I1SL1ter:-!. :!tf d(''! c~\~!"'01:1~:-:}:a
politikc;l !'YtJ('S h:'. vari! i J,;;::; f~::":.<i v~~l::t:pa~:;
s::.d till ~~c,n:u:·:.:.:t~t!iir;t~t un:ic-r 1~cnjur~ktnrcy .. k(·iu f:-:'u~ !i1~~t~n av I~!JJ t:JJ t::=·G:i. Ett l:n-
d~t:1t:1~!, ,~t_:(:'r k;~n:d~c f;~. :: 1 .• t h;!if~cn av 1 ~··~l
d~1 n1~u1 in:~: !ycl\:~dl·s tncd '~~t elir!1i~1cr-a (;\',··r
tryckt.:t h:·lt. :..h!l k·ta ll:iTi:;cn ccks·:, (~~':n
Ib;t I hn;::n) b~\nb ;<tt lc>.JJ :'u·s u:pJmi\·:t
pnlitik forts:1 tt<.:~ Pjr );ingc.!!~ FOnl~r)nl ~· .... h·:·.g
S)~'-el<~ttnin~~ k~in:1e:~-ckn:~c~cs dcs.o..;a ;''tr ockstt i lP.:\·~1~b:~~\. av lx·1;;ns i 1.~t!i~::c!:itrans~lkt~ont.::rna
cch av rcl:tti\'t LL0
~t!li~.~~l sH: . .:_:rinr:~:r av kon'"".:
tnentprislndcx e:~ rn:::r: hortser frftn on!:-:~J(~lj
niu~;lrn:ts r;~norn:-.Lt[; 19DO o.::h ISG2.
5. Boorr:, .1tmktz:ronzvm:dihzg celt at,:nattning .196-1---GS
Inftir 196·} tcdtle ::i::; de cl:u:wmiJ:;1 prrspckt!vrn t~i.r:t F,;r:1 Jj u~·a. I ,'!rcts fir~~r!spJ~n fL':khrade fil!::t!S:l~ir:istcrn ::tt "l!l~;ktcma ::.tl
tncd bc\·a:-:Hl j::nn·jkt i utt ik~.sh~nc!cln UIJprEtr ..
IV:38.
•
halla och liven hOja den intema expansions
taktcn forefallcr goda." Narmare bestamt kun
de man rakna mcd att "en produktiom5k
ning rncd drygt 4;/:1 % 196·1 skall kunna
gen'Jmfiir;:s utan ovcrhettningssymptom". Ett
svart mob pa hirnlcn utgjorde dock "den
liven i fortsiittni'1~en :m~.tr:~ngda balansen p."t
byggnadsmarkradcn". Eotemcdlen som anvisa
des var bl.a. omskoln!ng, uthildning och ror
lighetsbcfriimjandc i'ttg:irdcr. ?\led dct tilbdcs
~tt met! "de :tmbitioncr som fOrdiggcr kan
dct intc unc!vikas att kn:tpp!te:tc!l p!'t resurscr i viss:1 H~gt'rt J;onu-ncr a~t tillsp,:tsas ... ', tl~ Ett
ogynns.-•.mt insiag ans:'tgs ocb:'t indu~tli!nn:
stcri•1:;Jma vara. Enligt un\Tmhcrcnkiiten
19!13 pi:>n~r:~dc indmtrin att 111insb ~ina nyinn:stcringar mecl krnppt 20 % uudcr I %·P 1
Fer all IJ1•.t~\'Crka (kll~i:t tr:JHlcns skulk ett.
~:irskilt investcringsavclrag vid den statlig:t tax
cringc·n mcdgrs mt:d 10 % av kostnadnna
for inuus:dns 1naskinim·estcri11gar under l9GL Au en bcstiflining under 19ti·i var tillriicklig for att Li. d~nna nya forman gjorde att iuve
~teringsstimulansen k:mske till storre dclcn
kom under 1965.95 Fr!'m 1 juli 196+ sku1le
folkpcnsioncrn:>. och barnbidrag::n aler hi:.ijas. Dessutom ~kulle studiel:jalpsreformen triica i kraft. Hushi'd!cns dispcnibla inkomster sku!lc
d:irigcnom oka meci :Jl1lkrinr; 750 mi,Jj. kr
(0,9 % av 13NP) r5.knat per Ja£tr. S~n motvi!i:t hart:mot av~k::lffadcs avdrassriil ten iir cr
lagda foikpcnsionsavgifter likalnles frii l juli
1964. Dcnna skatte!Ji.ijning fick snab effekt
genom alt prdiminarskattr>t:Jbdlcrna iir ovan
lighetens skull ibdrades fr:"m halvi'mskiftct.
D.l dr:n rcvidcrade nati·Jnalbudgdcn fiircl!tg
(i april 1S6•!) hade l?G.J.. li.rs f<.i:'viintaclr: pro
clukf io!~s:)kni~:g uppj:tstc.;:~ts till 5 y; 5{,. P:L eftcddig,_zi;~;·.n -.·a·· dct kommunala och pri-
vata investering:-.r samt exporten som hade
upprliknats ratt vlisentligt. Denna utveckling
accentuerade naturligt nog babnsproblemct
p:1 arbctsmarknaLen. I den rcvideradc finansplanen undt>rstrok finansministern att "Ris
kcrna ar . . . p?ttagliga for att elt alh-arligt overtryck bn komma att l!pps:i't p;'l arbets
mar:..nadrn".?C. Orh det ko:!statcrades att ar
betsli.ishets:;iffrOI na for vintcrm:'t11aderna var de
Higsta se(l.tn EJ:iS. Darflir utLinbdes fi:iresknltcr som innd.>:tr dds att nya stalliga hu·:!Jn;g
nadsfiirct~•g in:c fick p:'.burjas under ~onur.;~r},ah<":ret ut:tn c!i~rn~s, d~:!s at~ pcrsoH~i!':yrk~n
\'id rr.:dan p~g:tenclc byggnads- och aniJ.gg .. ni:tg>athctcn intc fir:. utokas. Dessutom :!lades
Ei·l~:trbr:t>n:imuderna att vara sUtrkt rcstrikti\'a 1ned lg.
0
lngs~ittningsti1lst!ind fih· 1nindre och nledclstr.ra projckt undc: ~o:nnnr<'n orlt
hi.istcn 1%1.
Till fO!jd :tv hl.a. (lr:ss:~ :lt[;:irdl'r I:t:nshd•:s
Oknings:akten fijr st.ttE~~ J.~o~lsun~~ion C.'Ch innstrr:ng j:it!lfiirt mcu 1963. ;~ym den ;,')!1~
munala dtcrfri'tgan i.ikadt mind:·e :in aret in
nan med.m bostadsbygga:JdeL <l:iremot r:xp:lnderadc rclati\·t krafti<:;t. Fiir 19G·~ blev i!llpact
effcktt:n a\' de finanspolitiska i't:f!::irdcrna sa pass stor som J ,7 % av ~~:\P och bucget
automatikcn var inle sa kraftig att ncttoimpacten kundc bli kuntrak:iv. Till hildcn hiir
dock ocksa effekterua av den kreditpolitiska
atstramning 50111 gt:nomfiirdes odt ue selckti\·a
93 FP 6·1, s. 13-16. 94 Se Pl'-:B 66, s. 91-. 9:1 Se kutnplettctin~spropositlonen 19£4: 150, s. 12. ~fed en statli~ bulagsskattcsats pa 40 5o kan f6nntu1eu s~igas n1vtc.:vara en subve;:ntion pt\ '~ ~-d
av invcsteringskostr~aden. 96 Proposition 196'!-: 1:-,o, s. 14.
IV:39
,.
•
f risllippninr;::;rna :w invcstcrim;sfondcr. Disk ontot htijdcs mccl en hal\- prorent\'n]wt b:.tdc i
j:muari och no\'cmber och den s.k. slr;Jffr:inl;111
fijr afLirsbankcrn:t~ :Ipprtniw.!; i Riks;,ankrn
!ttcrinfUrdcs i fr!nu~~ri. H .. :·s~d~a:.·:t h:ira\· blev t~n d:itnp:1:n~ av kr,:d~i\·olytl!rns (~k!lit!g:st:~kt
och en ,-j~..; :a!n.-~ni:1:.~ a\' ;-tff~irsh:tn~~~:tn:~s fak
tiska li~\ :di~ct~kvotl'r (son1 dock fottf:t:·:t:~dc
ll\Tlstc; dn1 rck( 1tllnH:nc!erade lik\'idi:ct~i.:xotcn t:'!cd b-:.·t: Y'-' ...:~u:dc tn~rginal) .!l; K.n·dit po li tikcn :Iv:df~)rdt~ i:nc~ b:n~l en upp!.nonlslling: av aff:ir_...;L=t!:~t·tTi:~s trJt:da kredi:givning ut:'ln orks~t
en nn!f(;:-tk~:1in; fr:~:1 n::irjngs1ivct till bos.t~~c1s
!\t·~tP:·rl.~., J)e st:1f·~tiva in\'Lstcring~:fo;i(hfri
~!:ippt":l (f::,:J lllillcn av 1963 till mi•t('n av
I~~~~~'; ,.:tr <:t t h·d i rcgionalpoliti~-~en. 1 viss
lll.'t:<~ckn!!!·.: nh:df(ja!e de en rncra ~dht~~in in ..
\'c<!--U'r;:l··:-.:<i:nui:l~:$ cftt:rsonl fUrcUt~C!l i Itt:"tnga
Ldl s~,:n t;._.;(jn::1g" fi;r irn·estcr~n~~n· ino;n ~tt;d
o!:n-:H:,.~ !ic;.~ tiibt.~'I!J att :un·:inda f~nHhl!~'{~t}
ft>r i:n·c."'tl't ;:~:~~~r uranfijr dctta O!nr."tdc (jfr kap. ~ .
I m:1n:;a :n~·.:cnc 1 t'n £,1,·:· l~ll) !· rl~ lycko:.:tmt
[tr 0!11 :1::1:1 :tn\·:i:ldr:!· (k n:u!itini!tlla <:k(Hl'J-
Ini:-;kit J!!:t::stfj(k:t: '!;L Prcd J~tit>:l:.;(ikr::!n:-:<·n
(i,7 ~:;) blev eft,:rkri~>periro<!·:ns i :;:~~·kl:t~s
stUr~:a.~:~ .\\·(·n ltu:~!1:t ll,_.:ls knnsutntie:1::Uk11ing
\':J.r rt·h .. ,c!:t:iat sto:· (:ij..; ~-~) och f(',:· pri\·ata in\'cstrrin?-ar k:aa!<: ca i.ik~:d rxp;P1sionstakt
notcras. D:in::not Jl'!m:..:Hl,~ industriinvcstcring-
~i Sc KL 19Gi: 2, s. 43 3•
!•> Sc P.\"Jl 65, s. I '.!.i. ,~ lEin:J! biJrog dack mcra tillf:illiga omst:in<.!ighc!er ~;\som dt"n milda \'intern och en o\·anli;;t god ,ki.ird.
lG~ Se l'.'\B G\ s. 14-1 ,:.. HI: Fl' G:•, s. 10.
:lrn:l fast v1~scntligt mindrc an de skulle ha
gjort cnligt f,'h-ctazcns ursprunsli3a p~~e.cr.
Vad g:tl!cr utrikcshandcln stcg visscrligcn im·
portvolymcn mcd 10 % men tack \'are en
1innu stiirrc cxporlukning kuaclc bytcsbala:Jst:n
fi.irbattr:ts nwd dt·ygt J 00 milj. kr. 0:-:ningm
a\' \'alu::ucscr>cn blcv myckct st(in:c clkr
drygt HUO milj. h. Tro:s den ];\ga arbcls!tis
hclt'll sl:umack s!utl!g•~a konsun;cntpriscrnas
uppg:"u;r; fr[m 1903 till 1%1 \'id 3/~ %. lkdi)mningarl!a son~ gjorc:cc- i s:unb~nd ll1cd
nalion;:llmdg,.;arbclct i ,;.,ld av FIG-~ }h:k:ldc
mot c1 cftc'rfr:'t7t!E-.<ixt :tndc-r I 0G5 sum s~ml
lc ()v<:rst!ga produktioHsti!h·::_xten med ot-:1kri:1~
Y2 % av l3l'\P.100 I Fin~mpbnen l~G5 s;;m-
111<\llhlladc S:r:ing di~kt:~sionen av konjank
turutsiklcr och c!wr.omisk roliti!: s?tlcdcs: ''C't
g:ingsp:mktcn fijr stiil!nin~stagandct till fiaans
pa1itikcn liar ... v:crit dcis de tydlip. tclckn
scma till iivcrti")'Ck i sam!,:illsckonomin, dds
den J.~r:lftiga (jkning av dct statl!ga buc.igctun
dcrsko:.t(:t, ~onJ ~ .. ~~nllc iutr~iffa under seE~:re
dc!c:1 av 1965 d:i1rst ickc llluLhg:irdcr \id
tat;cs. Fiir all i dell<! J:igc kunn:>. fullfii!ja rc
f,;rmpolitikcn och gc utrrmme for en Jl~ir.h·:!n
clig indus I rid! och k::Hllllltl:1al i!I\'CStcring~iii,.
ning under bc\'arad b:tlans i utrikeshaY:dr:ln
har en st:•tii~ inkom~tfiirst:irkning framst:"1tt
som ofr:"mkomli;~ .... (De fiua:;~politi>ka !tt
g:irdernas) nt:ltocffckt kan for 1965 up;)~k::l
tas Lli fr:nnfi.irallt en miuskning i den pri•:ata
konsumlioncns upp;i',nz. Vcrknin:;arna hiir:w
tordc bli att cflcrfr:'igruvcrskottet rcduccras i siid:m grad att d:.:n samkillsc;;.onomiska bztlan
scn ni.ijaktigt kan bibch:illas." 101 De at~;1ir
dcr som avs:·u~s \·ar elt ":J.att<:pakct'' av ~:\111-
ma typ sum l%2 (och 19G!l) ttrs. S:"dcd•:s
J,i.ijcle~ f1~Y~ 1 juli 1S65 fo!kpensk•ncrna c:h barnbidra[jrn ( d,~ S(:narc fr!m 700 till 9CJ~
IV:40
krj med:l.n den per~onliga inkomstskatten till staten s:inktcs fr.o.m. 1966. Storre delen av
inkomstfi.irstarknix:gcn svaradc omshoj:1ingen
fran 6 ti!J. 9,1 ~'o for. Den tr:idde i kraft 1
juli 1965 men gf,llc;c inte for de invcstcri:,gs
varor so1:1 fo.-ut var omsbeiagd:!. Oms1it:nings
skattcn var s!ilcdt~ intc liinc:rc allman utan
differentirracl. Dcssutom hiijdrs skattnna pa tobak och bcllS.in frt\11 hah<'trsskiftet. Vad g)il
lcr utrikc~ha:1eleln fiiruts!'tg nnn i Finnnsp!a
ncn 1g65 i.ikningar av imporlcn och c<poncn
j;imfort med 196·1 p!'t 7 %, respcktivc cv.! %. Dctta och ctt n!'t,;ot gynn~:mttll:lr·~ b\'l<':;r;irltitl
landc fun·1intacks ,ncdfiira I'll fiit ~:imring a\'
bytcsbab.nscn p:i knappt 150 wilj. kr under
1%5.
Konj:mkturbe<iomniagen i komp!cttnings
provl>itioncn i <1pril skilde si~j intc mnrk::nt fr[m fi11ampbncns och ~:.·tgra nya mrra bc
tyda:Jdc ingrcpp fiireslogs inte ltclkr. Dct
fn:mholl~ att de "intcrn::tionclla :ws:tttning>·
forh[tibndcn:! liksom bpar.itcts- och :ubc-ts
kraftsl::i~ct . . . ar intc lika gynnsamma for en cxporti.':kning som unclcr fjol:"tret" ,1°~ En
uppjustcring av exportprogno£cn till 7 % ans:igs dock :inda vara rimlig. Den fi.irv3ntade
produktions(i!znia~cn pa 1/'2 % "syncs ...
kum:a forvc:kli:;a~ ut,m n[tgun ll1imnv1inl fOr
s\·~gn!ng av ut!·i!~~~b~1:tn~en" .10~ Efterso!n en sadan expansioa shdb i:mcb:ira "en mycket
stark press p[t prNhtktionsr!'surscrna" avisera
dcs fttg1irdcr so:n skullc cffcktivisera den forut praktiscradc sason<:mlissit(a utj1inmbgen av
den statJiga byggnads- oclt anHiggningsverk
samhetcn. Riktpunkten var att under som
marhah-aret 19G5 rcdu::era statcns eftrrfdgan
pa byg;arbt::skr:Jft med 10 % j:imf6rt med
april. Vidarc fort~:at:es den re~.triktiva kredit
politiken under 19G5 med Jikviditet,indragan-
de statlig uppl:'ming pa marknaden utanfo:
afHirsbankerna. Dessas faktiska likviditet~kvo
ter mins:-:adc diirigcnom ytterligare. Ran:cni· vrtn anpass::t<}es h:!rtill g('nom diskontohojnhg·
en fr;m 5 till SY2 % i ap~il. For att s~<'pa
finansicllt utrynHJte fOr en storrc voiym indu~triinvc~tcringar fick industria okadc moj
lighetcr all emittera obligationsL"tn.
Utvecklingen p!1 dtn svenska arbctstn~rk
n3.d ·:n \1nch·r 1065 iun~·b£-t.r alt sp~anit1sc:a
meJbn ef!t'l fr;t[:;i!l C'Ch til\gang {ibdes j1im·
fort •ned i'l(j.} <El Higet rcd::tn var anst1:ingt.
l.JJH.!::r :J!Hlr:t oo:h trcdjc kv;:rtalet 19G·1 h:td~
den t,nwmsnittli~a arJctslOshetsproccntcn va
rit 0,'!2. Under s:un:na :id 19G5 pfcs~:vles
den tilt 0,75 9:~ .. S~J:-Ittldigt nlin:-:k~.dc anta!ct ~y%•:batta vid beJ ecis:·:~psarJctcn p!'tt:-.::;I:t~t.
()v!·i!~;l a! htt~rn~!l kll:l(!-;indika!.orcr gav ~~tdag
i sannn;, rik•nin~. At:Jden .industrifii:Ttag ltH:d b! i.st p~·t ) rkc!-t~t rbet~re ni'tcldc under h~)s
tcn I %5 over (;5 % och ovcrstcg d1\r:1JCd
1%1 l'm topp~,j,,,'t,
For J 965 ~om he! !Jet blev de fiuanspoliti<ka
l'ttg:inlcmas be~iiknad'; impacteffc!;:ter vascnl· ligt mlndrc exp:tnsi,·a lin under 19'J4. Ned
dragningen motsvar:tde omkri!Jg 1 % :w B:\P
och gav upphov till en Iika stor kontr:>ktiv
ncttoeffekt, jfr diagram 5. Den okadc restrik
tivitetcn \'ar emdkrtid inte tilh~icklig fiir att hindra en viil tilltag•·n Hirs:imring av bytcsba
lansen. En jiimfiirdst~ mellan utfallen och de
optimistiska prognosnna vis«r (j f r bilaga B)
att dct var frl'tga om b;tde en kraftig undtr·
sbttning av iluporlii!;ningen och en mim.!rc
men dock lwtyt!andc i:i\'cts';:at!ning av ex?ort· okuingcn. Vid det rl'tdande efterfr!'tgt:trycket
sarskilt pa arbetsmarknaden blev m.a.o. den
102 Proposition 1965: 125, s. 8-11.
IV:41
••
inhcmska absorptioncn av varor och tjanstcr
viiscntli;t s:orre an vad so:n var forenligt
mcd den cftcr~t!·avadc l:d::tnsm i utr:kcshan-dr:h~. })c!!i~:-'. historlc~krivn:ng godtos;s avcn
::tv fin::nsn~iniYrcr:J. 103 I bl:a siffmr blc;• iik
nin~~en a\· byt~,:·sbal:uls 1:ns under::;~.:,ott 1965
1 3'}0 wi!j. i:r elicr 1,2 % av n:;?. Dct v:u
·so:·\':~:-'> i:1 1.t· dtn f<.irsi:t .si<)rn~ byt"·sb.1l~n~.;[{jr .. s:i::a:n~nl ~(·(!:n1 1017 :"11$ (~ern j ()\·d~t 0\·cr ...
!'!c~ :~ ~;; :\\' ~~:\P!) 11~tiJ det ;:pp:~o_;:n~~ ur:.
d~·!:--~:rJttct !J~l i:l 1 '!!lO~ 1 !n!lj;l:J 1::- \'.lr n·!:~
tivt ~~·a stl)nc ~~n u:akr t:diz:an· hi)_;i,o:l_it~Hk
tu::.r.1~1 I l:\(;'S:tts till vad ra;lct )J;l(]C varit
1~-:i ieddc utn·rlJi::~m 1:ndcr E'l~5 (Iii-;;, li
tct so::1 fi.i!·Io;;;)(:n l9.'Jl-5.'l orh EJ•j:)) till n~c
bOil :1vtappnin'; i stor ~·~~:d:1 i":v \\~:;t\:~rc~~-~r\·l·n.
InfUr lS'G~~ Ole\' de:! c~:o:Hl!!~:.-.;,.:1 poii1i~u:ns
hu\t:dpto:,~cm '':!lt v:in<b d<::: e.::yn:Js:t:i\Ii\:1
l!~'d.'L~:li!·..;c:1 ;t\' \'.i.r ~i!i;k~~:,!::t::,:cl CY~~it ft.ir
hindr~1 c:tt a!l!! .. ~~s efr:·:1LoL1l;f~t ,;:!:~\~\utf1C.;dc
t:rn<,t:~ t<f,_.:~~i.,·t <"ftet f:·:t_~:cd:i;nr:lr!de :d~~:ir
dc:-··.:<. 1 r~-:·~·~::.:.:·i :..:~j:..!t ~; c::irfi)!' 1;!bcci:; 1.'!1
(;n,:<l p:·~:-·.·=~;:t~\· vc:~~Ul f:."tn £;n:ts bJ\·j:u1)
~an1t ~~.:~:! ,·rn:l p~~ r.~r;·< 't i'r~·!ush·n, \in och
~p:i: . .'\:: i::tp . .~~:in!lc!J.',:;,_.t h:!r!C l'·:'''rkat varu~tn·,~ict -...·ar '..l;'pcnb.trt. lJe!'.~:-!. ~\at~t·Jtt')jning
ar J;:l ::!i,.:t:ntt:;t:is j(j5 u•:!j. l:r upp\·;igdcs till
lOJ 1 FP (;(\ (s. 13) l~t':t~r Jet "liuvu<~or~aken ti11 fU:·:<~n.li!:~;·.~a :'..V y;u· Uytc\1xl::~!i~ :~r 0 0. ctt
rncd l1:!:1."')'ll ti!! \':lr produ~:ior.:.-r~·J!l~;\;a :dltfl;r
hlig~ cfterfr:tsf~.tryc.:k inurn (!en s\·rns!\:.1 ckono· n1:n." !OI Dytcs:;al:msf(irs:lmrin~;una 1 r,;,2 edt 1 ~15·1 p;"t 1,9 S'o ~c;;:J~ktivc 1,1 ~& av 13:-\1' ledd:: intc t!ll r::i! .. ·.:l\:1:-d~t undcrskott i b:r·tc.-.1x.t!~n~cn. !~l55 oc!: 19:;() t:pp,-:ick unucrskottca tii! (',6--0,7 5'o av ;;~p for att ~cd:tn 1965 stisa ti!l 0,9 ~o av };:-; 1'.
l<· n• 66, s. 17.
en mindre del av st~ndardti!Eiggct till :,,;:~
pcnsim:crna fdn kd.,.·;"u~s':iftct. Vid:::re h·::.: den sta~Er:;a dterL.\:;z:'lS <;:~n:ngs·.a~t :Krc oc:1
b'Js~ado:;i.Jyg9::!.r..det rr:i:1·~k~d·.: t.G.:n. t:2~0~. :U:ircrnot v5xtc den korr1!"'!1U:1ai:1 eftf rir['Lg~'r i sna:;barc takt an lli~d:T 1f'G:>. Fin~l\S}'ulit:l:cns
n~ttrJimp:tct 19GG hlcv cr:rfii~ l'!~gc::ir U:a kor-1tr:1k::v so1n <L::xi lt~~cl:.: \·,~r~t 1:-JG.":, jfr di::tgranl 5. IZre<~!qx·1i~i:\t·a \';".r fnar~Lst rcstril~~iv
i bCirjan av lSGG ocl~ u:~der fO~·sunEnJ.rc:! hi.)~
Jc~ di~kon~ot til; G ~{. l~r.d·.:T :~c·;}:trc de!·.-_!'\ ~!.v ~~ret til~Itts s~:ttc:J;s ~-nccc~sivt ;.;r!g:1ndc beU
t:ett~nden·d~ott att SfJ~-~J.'!. p!t ]ik\·idit('tcn och
a f !';~: :--! 1:1! l :~.: rrl:i:; ] . l-:\-; ~:_; t •:! .:!\ ,_:, ,t C!' [)•:::·j ~td C Sti.s:l.
():~d~: :!!~ !u.ssk!ftct l~ll;:-,/GG ;~~·-c~c~ ij\·~:rLrycket
p~t .:rbct~lli: 1.tLu:1.< 1 cn l~C'a"j~ll <·.vta (jC!! i'?~~d·~n~~ca
b~·~.tud u:~t.!~-r hcl-, J ~_.:,(!. !~a tcc:.:u~ j./t. (j;:·tt:"!.
\'ar att den n:~~:~LlTitd(: ;,r::wt~lt; . ...:!,ttcn ~tcz
frtia 1,1 ~·;) 19tj:) 1i11 1,·.1· ~{. J~:GG. :\!;~-~r;t tcc
k~-n \'~lr ~~tl sy:-:1t:l:<~ttnilJZt.'n jno:!1 indus~rin
rninskadc 1ncd j!~t:r1~rJ~ :-> ~0 under 19CG och :t! t :n:<1elcn inr.; ~~:;l1·; f~):·c~;;~~ i:1ecl bri~t p;L yrh:..:crhetare full fr!'::' d,-y,.;t ·GO % t;!l cLy;t 40 c;;; llllUer l%0 . .\1clh·crbndc till dc:ma
t!t\'ccldit~t~ var at t i t;rL:tag~n,~J];i!_;~C~~cr och
drift~inskr:inkn!ng~1':.. U:rcko~n i ~i;~~d ornfaa ..
ning Iinder l91.)li, Si:h!< s upp~ick <J<1t:::lct ar
bctst~tg~\rt~ i~.101:1 l1~~,.1u~;trin SO!"rl bcr(lrl!cs .o.v Yarsel o:n <1riftsi~1s\r;\:~kninc;ar UJ~t~cr 19G6 till
19 700 mot 7 ·lC<J ctt [tr ticli~;orc. 1 C 0 :\v bctydclsc: var :utu:·1ic;lvis ocb!t att c!cn pri\·;:ta
scktorns cftnfrf,r.e(:.kr:ing l~G.'i-GG b!tv t'il.l·
ligcn m?:tt!it; cllcr cnd;:o:~ 1,2 % av n;~p
(mot !'> % aret i::n~,n, jfr ta!;cll 1 ). I Rl\.!3
l'i l:adc man ra;:nat tnecl en \·iiscnlli:;t kr:J
tis-~rc ilkr~Jng ~v de:1 ptivata cfterfr:'ig.:tn. i\tt ~NP-uLuingen ;ind;·: blcv 3 % ;;:~::;,:a 19~)}
och 19G6 5an1n1an!1i-"::1::;dc rncd att C):p~'!-t~n
sttg i .s,u;!hl>are takt En irnpor~cn. lJi!.rjgcnc:n
IV:42
,.
minsbdcs undcr~kottet i byte~baJansen nr1g0t men dct var dock fo•tfarand-:: storrc an 800
milj. kr. Trots dctt:I okacle v:~lutarr.s~rve'1
mcll 225 milj. kr unclc·r 19GG. Vad g:illcr konsumcntpriscma hade prognoscma i nat:o~Ja]-
till l 0 %) och av tobaksbcsbttningen samt
en okning- av folkpcnsionsavgiftcn (fr:!n 4 till
5%) vid halvru~~:Zifret. Totalt vr.r det fr5g:J.
om en skattc-hoj:cing p!i l 200 milj. kr av vil
ka kn<~ppt 900 m;Jj. kr g:illrle i967. Vichrc
IV:43
bud~ctcnu :~ugctt ~a;t~ma {ikuing J9G5--6G inforc!es en selekti·.- im·csterings::tvgift p!1 25 • som !!ret dcs~forinnan, dvs. 5 %. Den faktisk:~
·t,ppg;•n:~cn blcv i st:ilkt Gy2 %, Yilket delvis
k:ln Ira bcrott p<"t uc rclativt wna li>ncilc)jningar som 19GG ars trci':rs:rvtal mcdfi)ni,·.
I I':\B 67 prcsentcrades en fiirsiirjnitJ:_;sh:t
lz.n~~):·ognos son1 \'id of(~lr~lu<!rJd fln:Pl:'p~ditik
pckadc p:t en total pwdnktinn:-ij~'.ni::~ p~t ·t,2
~~0 19CG-G7. !·:n s~0
td;ut okuing :tn:';.,t~s i:tlt~ behO\·~ fr:!tn~-:alla n:"tf;Ol1 ftjrny~Hl i:l\'t~I }H~Uning
p?t arbct~m:•.d,nadcn furut~.:tll all tillv:i:-;t ~n
blcv j:imnt fijrtk!:Jd u:Hlr-r :rrd. Det hrd;im
dcs dock scin tvcks:u11t ou1 u~vcck1in~('il ~ku1-
Ic kunn~ bli j;:itnn. R.~_·~cringc·n ans~~.g !Ur ~in
cicl att de ~·'-'Yl:~:!Unin~~s~ynlptotn sotn f.n. gUr sig g:!!l:1ndc p:f. viss3 Cclar av arhetsn~:-trkna
dcn ;ir tillLlEga od1 :w~pcgbr intc ll;tgon
gencrcll tcndcs''. D:irfiir fiircslu:J:S ( och genotnfl;rdcs) en :ltstr~unning av den e~~onunii5-
ka politikcn vars syftc var alt brgr:insa den
inhcmska cftcrfrag:m fUr att d:irmrd frigora
resur~cr fur e1~ yttcrligare cxpwti.ikning. 1\[ed
anlcdning av de fljr<'s!azna fiuans!'oliliska :it .. g:irdcrna (sum stra~: ~kall n:imnas) rcvi<kr;l
c!cs n;-:~ionalbudgelens BJ:\1'-iikning ued t!!l
3,8 % mcd:m \·olyn•ijlmingarna for privat
kol~sumtion och import nedjustnadcs mrd l
proccntenhct (till 3 5·o rcspcklivc 4 !/I %) . For kommanala invcsicringar bcriibwd<:S r~t
str::unningm medfi.ira en min~lming ;l\' oknings
t~·kten pa hcla 4 %. Diiremot uppr:lknadcs intc cxportp~ognosr:n.10 7 De :i.tg:irder sum
vidtc•ss inkh:dcr2.de bl.a. hojning:u fr!in 1 mars 1967 av omscn (deana g:"mg frtu1 9,1
~:~ fOr icke pric~ri~{~rat by~~~:lnde so1n j~[u~~~
s~:tes i pcrio<.!en n1.n:.; 1S1G7-scptein1.1e!· ~968.
I mot;ats till :>0-(;, l,_•(s i:lvcsterinr;~avgiftcr
var den nya avgif1cn in:<.: av(~:·;tgsgi!l och d~n
bkv <Lnncd i pr:d.tikm ;>:·P!lliJi:ivY'" Till fina:1spolitihn E 1•.i7 h0r ocks~t sjukfi\:·s:ikringsn~fonnnt Jntd tltfiJljandc :1.\·gift:;:IOjni!lgar fijr
:,rlJt·:"~-~iv~tre och n1ed!en-!:l1a!" l!~.::~:e;n (;!.\n!u~c~l
av f(l!:qw!J~,:o:1f'I'I'a sont ti!Is;unn:ans ~kullt till
fi)~:t ]nJ~:~:tllen on~li:ring 2~>0 1~1ilj. kr U!~c1cr
1%7.
Den tJe<!Ontning ~''/ den ek()noiuiska utvcck-
1ing(·n under 1~,!!7 :;u!ll gjordes i finansp~<·.nen godtt),:.!,\ i a!lt v:ist·rn:~~t ;lvt::1 d~ot kornplet~r
ri:l~~~..;prop'.l:>itifiTit:~l fijJ~!~"tg i slt:tct av ap.-·j:.
li.m~:"1 it.Hlt: eftcrfr:rgan p:"t arbctskrdt enli;t
tillg:ingliga indib:orcr fon~att :!tl min~ka t:ll
dcr fiirsta kv:ut:~ltt 1967. l\!1;;on mer bcty-
106 Se R1'\B 67, s. 5. 1o1 Se l'I\B 67, bp. I 2. lOB En unnan nyhet i 1967 :u-s statsverkspropo ..
sition var fii,·slaget om en niirinsspolitisk fend (invcsteringd);!n:e~~n) nred en grundpli<t po~ 500 1nilj. kr. I fiuan.-;:Jlaucn k2.n :nan J;isa: "FOr att skapa tillr:kkligt finamie;J t utrymmc fi)r den n:irin3spo!it!s~a fonden har ent1ast en hOjn:~g av den a!lm:inna varu,iz.,tlen st?rtt t:!l fi\rf<>san
dc. DcnJ'a f<)n:;L'ts d;irfor hiijd ... " (s. 12). Dct iir onckligcn en {)vcrr;t$kandc mo~ivcring fi}r
ont~],{ljn!ngen eft~~rsont clet rr.tlint d~t ~u:t~:te lla st8.tt ldart att nt1gon n~i.nnt\'Linl utl~niTJg- av fc,ndens wede! inte kunde p!\r:iknas clet fo:·sta arct
c!ler si't.
..
<Jande oml:i;;nit'~ :w den ckonomisb politi
krn fi)rrslozs cl:irfur in:.c. Fur att hi!lla ~y~·scl
s:ittnim;m uppc under vintcrn 19Gi'jG8 oclt
~amtidi:~t ~timukra inclustriinvcstcringarn::t ha
de he,iut de•:;.: tr:iff::tts tmdrr \'itEn om ctt
gcnnel!t frisl:ipp av invcstcringsfonclcma.
Fonc!r:tc(:c! kundc anviinclas fUr m~skininkop fijrc ! (!~tr•!:,·r O!ll levcrans ~~'cdde fOre 1 ap
ril : 9,;<:. \'a <I gallcr hyggn:tdsinvcstcringar
knnd•: ko:::n;.rkr ~o:n ncdl::gts under sista
kv~1n:•.i~·t 1~.1 Gi 'Jrh f{)rsta kvartah.'t 1963 av
skt iY:"5 !:1t1t i!l\'t~tcrjn~sfond 0111 ig~~ugs;itt
lli::,;--:: ).;,,:(' ~~·;• :: ef:cr i9 m:1j. Den Hit tare
ha··1::i':_:!:::::;:!l f,,:;·::.:·.t~cs cc~(sa t:11dcr v~lrcn
\'ii!~r·t L~.:1. t::~~ ~i~: \!ttrrr1: i en s~inkning av
d:-..:~--·':~t-·~ f:-~·1!\ (~ ti!! j ~:~.
~~(·: ~~u:;_·t :~\· i~1 rj7 (~>!!l intc f(lrr) blcv
dct h··lt kLt:-t ~~tt konju!I~:turbcclOn:nin~(·n
S(ll:t 1~~~: till ~~:-l:!!d f,··,: dnt ckc:no!ni·.;ka poli-. t~i-..~'n 1~!~)7 :::~de f,_.;~i''(Ljz~:! lHYt·d.:fin~~~:il ::itn
li:.;c:~ ~~'J\'l. l)t·:t h1::da rii.t't fr; .. t:;:!n (i~:~Hh: il!tt:
10) Sc· Fl' CJ, s. ~~. 110 \'~l(i g:i:ler !1:l!H!:·::1s by~.t~n:,d<:.\'Crks~tnhct Jll;r~:->~:ot:!~~ iL:~~~:~~s:~~t:ti::~~cn kr~tfti~: ef1cr ~nfOr;1n·
c!e~ ~t\' :,~-.-~·~·r·:·i~ib":·<t\"~::~·-·n (1':'\B t~~~ .. :--. 111) o·~;! Jil':: 1._uJ l : 1 t~'~ o(.·h l SiG7 L!c,- \·oiyn!~led:~~~ng
cn o;::~r::~~~ 10 ~-(, el!t·r drygt 100 nl:ij. kr. i l9:l9 :~:-:;. i':-!::~_·r. Effekl·.~:l p; .. ~ kon1~:1uncrn:ts
by;,;;na(!;n~rk·:":"l:~t l.~Ji):,tles (ex ;1ntc) a\· finansc~cp~rtc::;i('!1~t't 1:1otsv:u-a C':nkring 3 ~-C av
k0::-1:·n u;1c::!:ts i~ \'C:': ~ri~!~:ar ( cxkl. bost~id ~r), dvs. ca :GO :1~::}. i;r. i ! ~·;,9 :"trs pr!::cr. II:irtill l~o:n:r~t·r inYt=<;l~~:·ings~l'-·!.;iftens broa1s:u1c.Ie cf ...
fckt p~ by~~-~a:a!·.~~ ~tv t.r.;x. kontors- och b;lnk1oka!er, 1Jt:r!~i1-1St:-t!ioner, b!h.-::rks::.idcr och parke·
rjn_:.;~~H!s. ~In: dctta ~kall stjJas den Okni!l£' av
:::i: iP~.~Ii\'cts i!l\T.·.tc:·::Jg~~r so::1 in\'Csl:Ting:-; .. fotH::;f~i.;!~~Pi);'.tH~ct [:a\' ·~ppho\· tilL E'11.;gt den :t\' l~nc:><~r~; ()1:1!::::: gjo:--d~1 u:-H:ersi.}!:n!:~scn kan
mcd progno~crnas 4· % utan blott n:cd om
kring Utiflcn J,:;,·~v. IH hade and:, mcd :tl'
l.:dning av den s\·~~g;t cftcrfrr~.~·ctith·:l:~tt!l \-;~_~·~
~timulcrandc i'tt~,:mler vidta~i:s. Bl.a. h;.;(lc Lo
stadsbygg:mdct ti!Ji',tlts ::.ttt (.;b. i en ~~~~rbnt
hii,.;rc takt ( 13Y~ '/{,) ~irl den i R:\"B G7 f;jr;~t
saua (By; j~)). Fcl p:-o;:;nostrn:1. \·ar s~;.~j 5~ fUr
pd,:ata fJ.s~a ju_yc:~:c)_-ji:~~at och la~{ .. ~·jn\-'C.)~C
rinz:tr na:u anscul;ga ~ivcn d:\ cict J.;)i.Jlt:e ex-·
pm't och priv2.t l:o;Jstn:1tion. Som en fi':j(: ;t\'
drnna utYccklleg \':lr ari)et:-.1l~~~ltctcn ~p-~der
andra halv:"•ret 1 SCi7 1n•.·r :in [>0 % ~:orr:·. ~\a
t::lct pc!·sol!er ~;y~3~:L .. -~tt~~~ j hen·d~L;':.p:~:_c·:)ctc
cllcr und..:r o!ns~:olniug (ik:tdt's k:·:..:.itlgt. l clc
cctnhcr 19G7 g:i llde c!ct ·1-:! (j()Q, rnot 2~.l crJO ctt
ar ticl::~:trc. Till dun:a utvv:klir:;· L:{;!Oj m·lz
stt den fortsatl a ~trul: 1.ln r}Jll\'J iH1i \1;~"~.~n sun1
Inedftirdc at l cl t ~! ~-j!TC ar: l~J 1 ~~r~;~~: q :; .~:-~~.r·.:: b::
r(jrdcs :1·: v:~r.~,;l cJn d~·_;[L-::i1~skr:i:1Lni:J_:_;;1r 1s:c;7
~in ~0
1n·t inn:tn.1:·:J ~.!in~t;1::lgcn ;)\-' .i.ndu~:!':ns
sy;..:seh~iitn!;~g u::dfT 1~!fji l:tc·.r o~nkring 3 ~:~.
])ct fin:nlsp~Jiiti~!~a ~i::tf:!<'it ft)r 1~--~G7 h1·;'-: ~~tt
:~1g)ird~:rn:1s c:·q)~,n~;!\'~~ ncttcinll''2Ct (·ii-::-:.de rncd
0,8 ctlltc:ter ti11 1;1 c;;, :1V n:\P. XcltniP1~~H:U·n. {)k~H.!e <.l:irigcnoi!l n:l::;ot kr:tftigarl' n1cn b!r~v
in!c cxpansi,·, jfr (E:~c;ram 5. D·~n priv;\!a in
vc~tcri!lgsaktivitctt'll t:nc~er 1967 bro:mades ;~v
cicn !'elcktiva irr-.-c~•!erin;.~~;l\:~;iftcn 11tcn sliin:dc
radcs :tv frisl;ipprl;li~_:-cn :tv !nvtstcr;:;g:;fc,nc~tn~a
och dn1 tittarc krcdi:po!itil:en. Att atr;:ir~:c~lla
koJ!l ~tl dra [tt o1::::1 I!~0t.ll s:tnun:nl11~:_;1~:dr:. u~:~n
t\·ivel rncd d{:n fcl:1!"-l;g2. kc.!-Jj~tnkt.urbedCrn.nl!!~
en. J)et :tr natur!igtvis van_-;;digt ~;(t 1;_t!ala fig
otn den troliga nc;_t_ocffclcten av dtss.:t in;'·cpp n1cn drt sy;H.:~ s:~rHJalikt ,~u de it:1.r p~jE:.~k~~t
invcst~:r!ugsvc:·k~an1hctcn _i den sJ.rnlll:'ln.~;;_;(~a
privat~ och krmmlu:Jah sc~to:·n.llO J3;·t·:,b::t-
1anscns undcrskott l!1~nskade 19G7 mrd G·JO
,.
mkr till drygt 200 mkr vilkct delvis var en
foljd av den ov:intat Ll~a cftcrfrtlgctil:v:i~;ten.
Konsu:nc:ttpriscmas s:cgriugstakt dampJ.des
jamfort mtd 19CG men blev lind:\ drygt ·~ %. Vad slutligca g::llcr m:t!v:triabeln industriin
\'Cstcrin~:u::a kom n:~.gon ijkt~iP[: intc till s::"md '1967 trots de invrster1~1g~_:stlrr.uh:ra11de :ltg~ir-
dcrna. Den f1:imsta anlcdniugen h:irti!l var troligc1: den betyd:wde outnylljatlt: k:tpadtet son1 Llnn~ j i!Hh::'trin.
Efter t\·:i :ir mcd 1·cbti\·t l:"1g tillv:ixttakt
(2Y,-3 %) fanns <let u\:1:1 tvivc! <'n ic:.Cc o\·:~sentjig !:a;)ac!tcl"·r~ ... serv i den sven~;!~;' rk(J· nomin infi.\r J9(i;3, l d('n prdil!li11:ira n~·:iu
nalbudgetcn upps~;atladcs den miijli;~a pro
duktionotillv:ixtcn uP: :trJl'!~kL,ftsutLudct ~kt:l
le tas i :msJn:"tk "i ofor:!ndrad grat!" till :IY2 }~. I\ fen dct ti1~adc:::: ~ttt HDcn p1 oduLt!ons ... 0\ning SOi~t sl'-.u11c 1~unna nppn:~s \'ld et l n1c·
ra fullst:indigt utnyttjanue m' tillg:ingli~~a ubct~baft:orcscrvcr i>.r :;ivclvis hiig!·,:" .ttl Skul
lc nu den ckonomi<'k:l politikcn g<~S en s!l
cxpa11si\' inri~(tning :lt~ arbctskraftsrcscr,·e:Jla
kom att utnyttjas clkr s!;uil~ en mer restrik
tiv linje v:ilj:::.~? Liget kon,plicer:::.d~s av den
p:lgacndc oron pa cle intcrnationcll::t valuta
markn::ulema. Eftcr de briltiska, finsb och
d:n1ska dcvalvcril~f;arna i november 1967 burjade ell ~pckulativt \·alut;!ucfiocle fr!tn Svcrigc sou1 I~i!:~'b:1nkcn sOtte .stappa gt~J~onl att
bl.a. huja di,kontot fr:m 5 till 6 % i decem
ber. Vid !lrssldftct, cl.\ utflodet upp~ti.irdc, ha
de valutor for ornkring 900 mkr strtimmat ut.
Trot$ detta var min,k:1ingcn av valu:,_rcser,·en under 1907 SCJ1!1 hclhct obctydiig.
Svarct pa den fUrut st1H!da fr!'tg<u1 gavs i Fin:msp!:men 19GS. Den ekonomi~:,a politik
som fiirmcl:1clrs d:ir siktade p:.. en total pro
cluktionsi.\!min;; l'a 3!/2 %. Att dl'lma !Orsik-
tiga linje valdes imtt·~:ar ~·.tt iin~k-:mt1!rt ;o.tt
oka sysscls:ittninz"!l fick gt- vi:,a f<>r h:i!l5\'~1 till cl(•Jl cxtcrna bal::•mtn. r fi::.•.:t::p!:\!1!'!1 ,j~_ klarcrade finansmi;!btern: "B;::awtub!•ttint;cn
i utrikc~hant!cln 1 ~:r,5 "...rar en v~u nitll:..;-.j~~ 1 :;t! sorn inU! kundc i;~non:r~s ... FiSrL<i!~:l~!:t.~r-n i byte~lJa!an~eB 1nt.~!t~ bcv:1ras grnotn ,.n ~'~: 1 ~! 1 och na·.dvttcn po1itik S0 1 ~l inger fi.J: ~~>)· ~~(:r
hos om\':irlcltn." Jt~ Fiir <•tt s!in:uler;•. kt ru
gcns invcstl~rin;~·=··.r fici\: n~idn~slivct (a~:tO::, :: 1•
te bara lndu~tiin ';~Hn under l9G-~) b~·Ll r;~
s:ir:-::~ilt. inv, st(·ri:.:~:>:!\·dr~tg pt! 1() ~~) av ir:.-t·· s:t:I !t1i~:1r:1~~ i r:l:\<~i!H;r o·~·h invcutari·:r \!c~>:
1 ~C8. I fc:1;~ u:ni gent_nnfij!·..lc:.: en hOjni1i~ ~\\'
,·in- och spritsbt~nua. ]);", ocl:s!'t den oHcnt
lir;~ cftC'rfL'"l~~~n <~~ 1 ;:u..1c 111indre ~iu ttrt:t fl1:·~
blcv de finauspuliti~~~a ftt~~irdc1nas L~ed~!·:n~~dc
inlpact<;fft~t n1in(lrc i~i~~~J ~ill l!:G7. Att i ~rte!-h.tP::hctt·tJS !.-.::1r~~ ljt~s ~~itt~ si~~ 1!1
i hur ett \·!s,t konjun::,_!tr!:igc kt!n<le \lFp!cvas och bedii:nas kr:ivtl t::an tvi\'cl en goc!
ncttocffekl~n p:t indlJs~rins Illa:·,~inhlveslt~t·ing:•.r
uppskattas ti~l 7 ~'o e!!er O!nkr1ns 130 1ni~.i. k~.
i fasta pri,er. H;ir;•,- g:il!c!e doc:, 40 % in\(ip i
utl~lnUct. Pr~ hy3gnads:~i(l~:n (l:ar en grO\'re un .. dcrsokningsJHetod ik har anv:ints) kan de: J,:,
varit frrtga om en ncttoeffckt ptt k:1ns;;c 3''0 n1ilj. kr. i 19!'">9 ~l.!-s pri~cr. J~·"ldc vl'..d g;il!~!· J:~.!·
sk~ner och Ly.~;gll~Hl,:r var cffektcrn:s. sta:lr ~.11:;.
ccntreradc till sista. kvarudet 19G7 ()ch k~· -:.l
kvarta:ct 19GB. Fondfdsl:ippet skullc ~,',\·,>\ kurma antas ha okat ut;iftt:m?.. Wr in!~t·t: .. ;.: tilh·crkade invc~tc1·ir:gs\'aror undr:r 1967 ,, .. ,! oml--rin[' 215 milj. kr (i fasta pri~cr), a!lt<• tr•.>
lig<'n n:1got tniudrc ~in ,·.ffl~l·t,;n nv jn\'c"~:c::·::_:<,.
a\'giftcn. Dct lwl•civcr kna:>IMSt [,.,-,,,;,:.:: .. -.... ·
denna cf!'elnjlintHhel~c llr ganska o<~hc·r.
m Sc 1'~!3 Ul, s. 14. 112 Fl' tiB, s. 11 o.-!1 1 :l.
IV:45
V)rtion inlevelseformaga och fantasi. Aven mcd
len rescrvationcn tcr ciet sig i cftcrhand svart
:tt Iorsta varfor en starkt rcstriktiv politik
nte gcnomfordcs pa ctt myckct tidigarc sta
lium av den extrema hiigkonjunkturcn 1961-
i5. Jamfiirelsen rncd stabiliscringspolitikcn
i960-Gl liggcr n:ira till hands. Vad var det
· ;om gjorde. att den sn:1bba och kraftfnlla in
!Jrom~llin~:;cn infor 19G(J ars :J.lll!:tlkantk o\Tf
(onjunktur intc kunclc upprepas fyr:J. ?tr se
~arc? Av de m~dtagna citatcn ur finanspb
lerna fr:"m 1961· och 1965 har khrt l!a:n;:'ttt
1tt finansministcm var medveten om och ,·ar
'ade for riskcma fOr ett inflatoriskt o\-crtryck,
~1rn sorn vi har sctt kom en mcrJ. bet)·<la:~clc
atstra:nni1!:; till st:'mc! Lirst under andr:: hah--
·an~t 1955. I vi1kcn tlt~lr:ic~~.~.~ing kan denaa
·~tirni:1g\~ hJ. hcti'1.;:lts :!\' u:sik~c!L till en kr:!f ..
t:s CJknins av i.nHl;ct~_l;Hh_!rske! tct under sc ..
n~rc ddm av 1965 vid ofiirat~drad fin:\ll~po-
na 1 FP 66 fram!tii!ls a•t den intcrnatio:1::1la f0!"$l~jutningen !r'!ot Ok~d prioriteri:1g ::!.\' prissta
b:!itct<.:t' for•s'itt~r (~. i). 1 fP G3 Us~r man: "Det Hr p:"'tt;tg!jgt hur ft>:siktigt ko:ljn:;~turpol1-
:i1:en varlt i fle!·a vastcuropcisk:! tinder i.!ndrr n(~n ~e.n:lste ~vn;.a ~tn:ngcn j:itnfi)rt Ined 19G2-63. Omsorg- u:t pri;- och l:os!n:H:,swbilitctcn har Lit!r~t;it ti!i d~::!la :-t\''.";tht:lnd~ pulit!k •••
Den ok<!dc l)r::oni::t:;•:n ::w jiimviktsm:.Jen Wr den ck0liiJHli~!;a polit:!:cn h~~=- i f~cra Ltr~clcr ta
git sig utrryc.k i en troE::_~cn n1cr:t Ll!lgsiktig strtivan att um:vikn. en Fka ho:;t uppdrivcn cftcrfragan p:1 arLetskraft och ctt Jika hcigt knpacitetsutnyttj-mdc som under 1960-talcts fi.irsta half t." ( s. 2-3) tH Till ra~~ l':'t alit innebar den preliminara utfa!Js!>er:il;n:n~ so!n fiin:I:tg i slntet av 1 S6i en l'a~entlig unckr~kattning av den ovcrskaaning av c~tcrfd\gctillv:ixt~:n 1%6-67 man hade gjort sig ~k} ldig till.
litik? Det Jigger i sakcns natur :J.tt det lir en
hcl del J:ittarc att L'i. rcda p!! vil!:a atgardcr som har vidtagits an pa de o\·crv:ig:t.'"!Cm
som Iaktiskt har va rit bcstamrnamle fi;r Folitik~ns u:formning. Vi L"tr diirfor noj::~ oss mcd
att konst3tcra att ~ttstr:1nrningcn t:r st=J!~itise
ring~po!itisk synpt.:nkt ko:n :~.trninstonc ctt ar for S~llt. BytrsbalansfLirs:imLillgcn och clca ok:tdc pris- och Wneste;ringstakten som (i\·crhett
ning~n g:tv upphov til! ko:n i h(i,:; g:·:>d ;,tr.
Jlr~i~;l:t den cho:)Ol!• i5.ka po~ i liken under :'\'!T~att
nj:1~.s~'irt-:l 1 ~-!{Ai-G~L Soul ,·i har sea var poiiti
ken undrr des~a ~tr p;:ta:;li;;t fi.Jr~1~itig i (:~n
U1t:ningen att den intc ga\'S en stt cxp~tt:<..i-...: ut
fo!·tuning so1n det intern:~ reale!~0norn!~·J:::t ut
ryn1:nct i och fOr !'it; n1cdgav. FOrsi;'.ti~~l!c~r:n
ar ocl;s:"t rx"tfal!:.ndc om man j:itnfiir m::d tkn c~:p;!l~~i\':t poJilikcn U!lUCf minircCl''"i(l!lCll
19li:.?-G3. Dct ar :Pii.P:gt att den awd.;~at:~c
p0litikcn i Svcrigc i viss l!1ftn har bcti!).r;;:~ts
av en mer ;itnl:?tlls:un attityd i andra l:in··
d~r. 113 Till den ckonomiska pulitJ,cns :r.in.d
rc gynnsamma rcs\llt:.:t ur srs~clsallni::;~:-yn
p!.!nkt biclrog ock.:·.0
L de gro,_·a ijvcrskJ. Hningar
av· dct l~onHn:-tnclc Incts tota1a cftcrfrt:.~6)~
ni!1g som 19GG och 1967 ars finansplanr:r ba~cr~.dcs p:t. 11·1
IV:46
Efter 2 1/2 ars avmattning borjade under fjarde kvartalet 1968 ett
markerat konjunkturuppsving i Sverige. Pa arbetsm~rknaden ledde detta
till en kraftig Bkning av antalet lediga platser och minskade arbets
loshetssiffror, som diagram 6 visar. Atl en expansion var pa gang stod
i viss man klart da arbetet med nationalbudgeten for 1969 pagick. Man
raknade darfor med att den tutala produktionen under 1969 skulle vaxa
med 4 %, d.v.s. i nagot snghbare takt an 1967-68. Den marginal S•Jm d~:>.:·
utover kunde tas i ansprAk utnn att allmHnna overhettningstendenser
skulle bli mllrkbara pa arbetsmark~aden uppskattades till 1 i 1,5 % av
BNP 115 s 0 •• 1 . . d 7 ., 1 l . .. . • ava 1mporten som exporten antogs st1ga me h oc~ met tjansr~-
balansen inriknat skulle en mindre 6kning av bytesbaiansens underskot~
kunna paraknas. Under de t.re a'mlattnings.1ren efter 1965 hadt: d.",:. ta und€·1·
skott nedbringats fr~n kncppt en miljard kr till drygt 500 mi1j.kr. Natio
nalbudgetens bedomningar godtogs i fina\~;p1anen dar r.eg~~-cinge:n~ sluts.1ts
var att "nagon andring av den ekonomiska politikens allmar:na inriktning
l·nte a"",.._ mot1"ve·rad". 116 Som en !"':;d,8n k ,-1 1"" ·· 1 l·...,_._r~-_·,·-,-,,1,(_;-;l ,_ .,a. __ un.J~ om aggn1ngen av cPn •..• ~ ._ ._ __
beskattningen fr.o.m. 1969 knappast dikPas. OmUi.ggni.ngen (son. hade l·e·
slutats v~ren 1968) inneb3r som bekant att den 10-procentiga omsUttnings
skatten ersattes av en lika stor mervirdeskatt. Eftersom den senare intc
drabbade investeringsvaror, vilket omsen hade gjort (med 6 %), infJrd~s
en ny loneskatt pa 1 %, den s.k. allmanua ar·Lctsgivaravgiften. Namnas kan
ocksa att den selektiva investeringsavgiftcn hade forsvunnit fr!in 1 okto
ber 1968 som avsetts fran borjan och att inkcmstprovade bostadsti1ltigg
till barnfami1jer infordes fr.o.m. 1969 i stallet for de a1dre femilje"
bostadsbidragen. Da bilaccisen samtidigt hojdes blev den expansiva effek
ten av de rtya bostadsti11aggen tllmligen begransad.
Under varen blev det uppenbart att konjunkturuppgangen var starkare an man
hade antagit vid arsskiftet. Det framgick bl.a. av investeringsenkaten i
februari som visade att industrins investeringsp1aner for 1969 hade upp-
. d t k f . '""mf"" d b k"" 117 I d . -1 d rev1 eras ra t1gt Ja ort me novem eren·aten. en rev1uera e
114A
115
116
117
Om inte annat sags ~r siffrorna i detta avsnitt baserade p! de internatione1la nationalrakenskapsdefinitioner som borjade tilllampas 1970. Likalcdcs ar fastprisber~kningar i 1968 ars priser och inte i 1959 ars priser.
PBN 69, s. 14-15.
FP 69, s. 14-15.
Se RNB 69, s. 98.
Diagram 6.
] ( . ,-.,.. -· ,) 0 :J
Lediga platser och arbetslosa
1968 1969 Killa: Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen
, ("17 f"'\ .1. ;:) • •J
IV:47a
1971 10-/"'? ¥1.. ;_; ,_
Tabell 5. Ef f 0 k ter rage omponen t
STATEN brut to-inves-
konsum- tering- tota1t Ar tion ar 1)2) 1) 2)
1961 +0.07 +0.12 +0.19
1962 +0. 74 -0.10 +0.64
1963 +0.58 +0. 21 +0. 79
1964 +0,03 +0.06 +0,09
1965 +1.01 +0.09 +1.10
11966 +0.20 +0.07 +0.27
1967 -0.21 -0.09 -0.30
11968 +0.35 +0.03 +0.38
1969 +0.14 +0.15 +0.29
1+0.37 +0.11 +0.48
( ernas
i d't k 1 e ta 1 rag t1 l b"d "11 BNP' s r ea1a tillvaxttakt 1960-72
KOMMU~"ERNA
bruttoi inves- I
konsurn- tering-!tota1t tion ar 1) . jl)
+.0 .57 +0.18 +0.75
+0.40 +0.42 +0.82
+0.79 +0.61 1+1.40 +0.62 I +o .55 1+1.17 -0.07 1 +O. 25 +0.18
I
+0.85 I +0 .21 +1.06
+1.05 +0.69 +1. 74
+0.99 l +0. 56 +1.55
+0.84 1+0.24 +1.08
+1.32 +0,50 +1.82
Bostads-investe-ringar brutto
·----+0.34
+0.39
+0.39
+0.54
+0.16
-0.09
+0.71
+0.07
+0.18
-0.19
I
Off 1ig ter gan ink 1 JO~ byg de -
en.t-ef-
fdi-
1 t. p;an-2)
29
85
I
+1.
+1.
+2. 58 I
I I
+1.
+1.
+2.
+2.
+1.
+2.
80
44
24
15
00
55
11
Privat1 JExport I
Brut to-brutto Lager- av va- natio-
Privat inves- inves- ror o. Import nalpro-konsunr tering tering tjanste itlv va- dukt tion ar 1) ar netto ror I (B~P)
I
I I +5,31 +3.07 +1.07 r-0.80 f75 ro.oa
+1,96 +0.24 ~0.51 36 +1.13 +3.86, I I
+2.68 +0.33 0.43 1+1.19 +1.22 j +5 ,07
+2.64 I +0.41 tl.41
j+l.89 +1. 77 I +6. 43
+2.59 +0.61 0.75 '+0.83 +2.17 1 +3.97
+1.38 I
+1.05 1.15 +1.09 +0.76 I +2. 83 I +1.60 I -,0 .11 r-1.08 +1.40 +0.78 +3.21
+2.33 -0.55 ~0.32 +1.81 1+1. 74 +4,25
1+2.37 +0.47 +0,95 +2.73 +3.40 +4.65
+0.19 K-1.57 +2.12 +4.74
!
I
!
I I I I
i ,1970
'1971 +0.37 -0.02 +0.35 +0.28 -0.52 -0.24 -0.18
1972 +0.16 +0.37 +0,53 1+0.42 +0.22 +0.64 +0.04
197J4) +0.23 -0.03 +0,20 1+0.54 -o. 23 J:.o. 31 -0.25
-0. 07
21 +1.
+0.26
1+2. 44 1+1.13 -0.57 +0.12 1-2.06 +1.41 l-o. ss ,-0 .46
1+1.23 +0.55 -1.04 +1.21 +1.15 +2.05 I 1 +2. 2._4--J._+_o_._5_s_3_ ..... )_+_1_._o_3-;-J_+_2_.o_4_.._1+1.86 £~o J
1.) Exk1. bostadsbyggande 3) Inkl. statliga bolag
2) Exkl. stat1iga bolagens investeringar 4) ilerakning i 1972 ars priser. Kalla PNB 73.
Anm. Annorlunda uttryckt anger tabellen BNP-komponenternas arliga reaia forandringar i procent av foregaende ars BXP. Att summar av siffrorna for de olika komponenterna minskat med siffra~ for importen inte exakt motsvarar tillvaxttakten for B~~ i sist ko1umnen beror pa att de statliga bolagens investeringar intc har inkluderats och p3 avrundning.
H <
finansplanen framholl Strang: "Tendenser till en al.ltfor snabb tillvaKt
av efterfd.gesektorer med en hog import:<1ndel, framfor allt den privata
konsumtionen, kan ••• behova mot as med e.konomisk-poli tiska atgarder ... Det framsdx darvid som sarskilt betydelsefullt att de korrigerande .h
garder, som kan behovas, vidtas i tid." Finansministern ansag samtidigt
att "De grundlaggande forutsattningarna tarde vara gada for att klara
konjunkturuppgangen med bevarad inre och yttre stabilitet." 118 Den totala
produktionen beraknades nu stiga med 4 1/2 %, dvs. 1/2 procentenhet mer
an enligt finansplanen. Exportprognosen uppjusterades med 1 procentenhet
vilket var nagot mer an revideringen pa importsidan. Darfor skulle en fi:>r
battring av bytesbalansen med ca 300 mkr kunna padiknas.
Konjunkturuppgangen fortsatte under hela 1969 och medforde en starkt okad
efterfragan pa arbetskraft som tydligt kunde avlasas i arbetsmarknads
serierna. Totala antalet lediganmlilda platser Uig s1Hedes i december 1969
mer an 50% over nivan ett ar innan och andelen industriforetag med brist
pa yrkesarbetare okade under 1969 fran drygt 40% till inemot 70% vilket
snarast lag over toppnivan fran 1965. Sysselsattningen i industrin hade
natt sitt bottenlage 1968 och steg darefter stadigt under 1969. Arbets
losheten minskade endast obetydligt under arets forsta halft beroende pa svag efterfragan pa arbetskraft i skogslanen. Nedgangen av arbetsH:ishctcn
blev darernot kraftig under andra halvaret. De atgarder som i forsta hand
vidtogs for att forhindra en overhettning var arbetsmarknadspolitiska och
kre~Jitpolitiska. Provningen av igangsattningstillstand for oprioriterat /
I .
byggande skarptes under varen, sarskilt i storstadsregionerna. Olika at-
garder vidtogs ocksa for att forskjuta det statliga byggandet fran sorm1ar
halvaret till vintern och statliga industribestallningar for drygt en halv
miljard kr. senarelades.
Atstramningen av penningpolitiken under 1969 blev sa drastisk att man far
ga tillbaka till 1955 for att finna en parallell. 119 Detta sa1nmanhangde
ocksa med den avtappning av den svenska valutareserven som skedde och med
skarpningen av det internationella kreditmarknadslaget. I slutet av februari
hojdes diskontot fran 5 till 6 %. Aven straffrantan hojdes med 1 procent-120 .
enhet. Samtidigt ersattes de tidigare rekommenderade likviditetskvoterr"a
med nagot hogre kvoter (30 % for de fern storsta affarsbankerna) enligt
119 For en utforligare redogore1se for kreditpolitiken 1969 se Sveriges Riksbanks Arsbok 1969, kap. 1.
120 Straffranta skulle liksom tidigare bcta1as pa den del av bankernas upr· 1aning i Riksbanken som oversteg 50 % respektive 25 % av de egna fondc na beroende pa om likvidi tetskvoterna var uppfyllda eller ej,
I\':49
1962 ars likvidi tets- och kassakvots lag. Valutautflodet fortsatte eme llertid
trots den restriktivare kreditpolitlken (under en majvecka forlorade Riks
banken valutor for 460 mkr) och hartill bidrog i hog grad rantestegringen
pa eurodollarmarknaden. Rantan pa denna marknad steg frZm 8 % till nara
13 % mellan februari och juni. Samtidigt ledde det inhemska konjunkturupp
svinget till en kraftig kreditexpansion och i en viss utstrackning und~r
skreds de lagstadgade likviditetskvoterna. I juli hojdes diskontot till
7 % - efterkrigsperiodens hogsta niva - och kassakvoter for affarsbankcrna
infordes. Enligt dessa skulle bankerna halla ett belopp motsvarande 1 % av
inlaningen pa rantelost konto i Riksbanken fran 1 augusti.
Vidare faststalldes individuella tak for bankernas upplaning i Riksban~~t~n.
Efter dessa atgarder kom en nedpressning av bankernas utlaning till narings
livet till stand. Det ar givetvis ytterst vanskligt att bedoma hur myck.et
naringslivets investeringar bromsades av kreditrestriktionerna 1969. Enligt
en utfBrd enkatundersokning sku11e effekten p~ industrins investeringar
(som okade med drygt 8 % 1968-69 efter att ha stagnerat eller stegvis minskat
under de narmast foregaende tva aren) ha varit re1ativt begransad eller omk)·i:·
3 %. 121 Som diagram 7 visar var finanspolitikens beraknade effekt 1969
svagt efterfragedampande. Om1aggningen i atstramande riktning jamfort n:ed
1968 var saledes ratt obetyd1ig.
Den faktiska Hkningen av BNP 1968-69 b1ev 5.7 % och saledes vasentligt
storre an forutsedd. 121A Expansionen av sava1 hushillens och f6retagens
efterfra.gan som utrikeshandeln hade kraftigt underskattats. ImportvolYJ.;len
Hkade med 14 % e1ler nagot mer an exporten. Tack vare ett forbattrat bytes
forhallande blev handelsba1ansunderskottet for hela 1969 ungefar 1ika ~tort
som 1968. Kalenderarsstatistiken doljer cmellertid o1ikheter inom aret, en
tendens till okat importoverskott var i sjlilva verket markbar under hosten.
For bytesbalansen blev 1969 ars utfall en okning av underskottet med omkring
en halv miljard kr och iute en minskning som forutsatts i RNB 69. Valuta
reservens minskning som blev avsevart storre e1ler ca 1 850 milj.kr. betinga
des till stor del av den registrerade omsvangningen fran kapitalinflode till
kapita1utflode. For att motverka denna tcndens hade Riksbanken under hasten
gjort ti11Gtandsgivningen for direkta invcsteringar i ut1andet restriktivare
samtidigt som det kravdes att dessa i hogre grad an tidigare skulle finansie
ras i ut1andet.
121
121A
Se L. Jacobsson 1973.
Siffran ar baserad pl de definitioner som anv~ndes fore 1970 medan sif rorna i tabell 5 ar enligt de DU anvanda internationella d~finitionerL.
~---:
f--- -I I
!
%. av A.lBNP l ~ -· - -
I . I
--+- . I-;
:2.0
__ , 1.0
;._1. 0
;_2.0 , '
.. l '
Diagram 7.
F;i.nanspolitikens impacteffekter. pa total efterfragan (exkl. privat investeringsefterfragan 1964-73.
A " ' ,.., ' I '-
" I ' A ' I ... , /\ ' I ' / I '\ I ' '·< I ' I
..... I ' I '~ v
/ / _____ c----- / ~
I ~ I , . .. '
64 66 68 70 72
A~ Direkta effekter av atg§rder
B. Nettoeffekt
C. Direkta effekter av skatteautomatik
lV:49a
->
IV:49b
•· Tabell 6. Fin:1nspolitikens direkta effekt:er pf, tot3l rPa1 efterfr'iP,an (exk1. privat inve.stcringseftr.orfdf!an) i procent av n:;p 1964-nn
Imp;~effe;;;:;:;----------------~
(1) fOr~~:l :i n:::r~ tg~ ~:.-:---( ~) (5) I net to-~ I I skatte- ::J.V offent 1 ir, I totalt skatte- impact
,\r d.tglirder efterf:di?,an I (1) + (2) autornatik (3) + (4) F:-- _ ___, I
11964 -0 .1!; +1. 79 -1.1+4 +0.~0 I 1965 -0.50 +1.1~5 ' +0,95 -1.43 -n.43 I
I 1966 -0.51 +1.23 +0,71 -1.!11 -0.70 I
I 1967 -0.55 +2.14 +1.59 -1.23 +0. J6 I 1968 -0.73 +1.99 +1.25 -1.21 +0.03 1
I 1969 -0.77 +1.55 +0. 77 -1.12 ·-0. 34 ' 1970 -0.72 +2 .11 +1.33 -~1. 02 +0.36 I I !
1971 -1.14 -0.06 -1.;:0 -0.62 -l.'n !
1972 -0.50 +1.20 +0.69 -0.95 -0.25
1973 -0.22 +0.2~--···-----J
+0,03 -0.66 -0.6~ )
!
I I
-- ---------'
••
IV:50
I Finansp1anen 1970 konstaterades utan omsvep att "Utgangs Uiget in for 1970
k6nnetecknas .•. av vissa sp§nningar i var ekonomi. De gor sig g§l1ande
pa arbetsmarknaden med betydande efterfdtgeoverskott ... De aterfinns 2.ven
i vart varu- och tj§nsteutbyte rued utlandet ... S1utligen har tendenser
'll 0 0 • h l d c t 0 tt " 122 ... t~ en press uppat pa pr~ser oc 'ostna er ater upps a De atgar-
der som vidto£s omede1bart var relativt begransade. Skatterna pa tobak, ol och laskedrycker hojdes fran februari samtidigt som mervardesskatten for
vissa hushallskapitalvaror steg fr&n 1.0 till 14%. Tillsammans skulle dessa
skattehojningar tillfora staten 450 mkr. under 1970. Vad galler utrikes
handeln forutsags i finansp1anen minskningar av underskotten i handelsba1an
sen och bytesbalansen med 700 mkr. respektive 1•50 mkr. Konsumentprisernas
uppgang forvantades stanna vid 3 l/2%.
Att overtrycket i ekonomin fanns kvar under varen och sommaren framgici<
av flertalet konjunkturkans1iga serier. Under forsta halvaret var ar.bets
losheten omkring 20% lagre an aret innan. Enligt konjunkturbarometern lu~
bristen pa yrkesarbetare i industrin kvar p& den uppnadda toppnivin frdm
till fjarde kvarta1et. Samtidigt resulterade utrikeshandeln i ett krafti[;t
okat importoverskott. For tolvmanadersperioden juli 1969 - juni 1970 hlev
handelsba1ansens underskott drygt 2 miljarder kr. e1ler over 1100 mkr. ~er
an samma period ett ar fore. Det var ccksa tydligt att konsumentpriserna
steg snabbare an forvantat. Mot den bakgrunden tillkom ytter,ligare en :rad
restriktiva atgarder under aret. I april beslots att industribestal1ningar
fdm ett stort anta1 statliga myndigheter "i all moj lig utstrackning" skulle
forskjutas fran 1970 till 1971. I maj aterinfordes den 25-procentiga in
vesteringsavgiften pa oprioriterat byggande. Denna avgift - som inte C~r av
dragsgill och darfor prohibitiv- skulle er1aggas till utgangen av juli 1971.
I slutet av augusti infordes prisstopp for vissa livsmedel och sex veckor
efter blev prisstoppet totalt. Slutligen foreslog regeringen i mitten pa
oktober en rad skattehojningar som - efter snabbehandling i Riksdagen -·
tradde i kraft tva veckor senare. I buketten ingick bl.a. hojningar av
punktskatterna pa vin, sprit och drivmedel och av momsen pa hushalls
kapitalvaror. Dessutom hojdes allmanna arbetsgivaravgiften liksom foretagens
sjukforsakringsavgifter fran arsskiftet. Totalt rorde det sig om en skatte
hojning pa 2.000 mkr. raknat per ar (eller l 1/4% av BNP) scm i huvudsak
skulle b1i markbar 1971.
122 FP 70, s. 10.
••
IV:Sl
For 1970 som he1het blev finanspo1itikens direkta effekter svagt expans1va
trots skattehojningarna, ett minskat hostadsbyggande och en betydande
automatisk skatteokning. Till detta bidrog framfor allt okningen av kom
munernas efterfra.gan. Finanspolitikens svagt expansiva effekt motverkades
dock av den fortsatt restriktiva kreditpolitiken. Under varen 1970 slots
ett avta1 me11an Riksbanken och affarsbankerna om utlaningstak under resten
0 123 1' d . . 0 • av aret. En 1.gt en t1.d1gare aberopade undersokn1ngen av Jacobsson
sku1le den skirpta kreditpolitiken ha medfort en minskning av industri
investeringarnas okningstakt pa omkring 5 procentenheter. Undersokningen
visade ocksa att det sirskilt var de mindre foretagen som drabbades. Trots
detta okade de totala industriinvesteringarna med 4 7. 1969-70. De totala
fasta investeringarna okade med. 3 % och inte med 5 - 5 1/2 % som f6rut
satts i nationa1budgeterna. Overskattningen av oknings takten gallde fram·
forallt kommunernas och naringslivets investeringar-. Oaktat d~tta steg den
totala produktionen 1969-70 med knappt 5 % framst beroende pa c~n kraftig
okning av lagerinvesteringarna och exporten. Vad giller utrikestransaktio
nerna skedde under 1970 en omsvangning fran ett stort import.overskot.t under
forsta halvaret till ett mindre exportoverskott under andra ha1viret. Han
delsbalansens underskott 1970 b1ev dador av sam.ma storlek som 1969. Till
foljd av kraftigt okade nettoutgifter for tjanster och transfereringar
okade bytesba1ansens underskott med 500 mkr till knappt 1600 rnkr eller
0.9 7. av BNP. Underskottet - sam enligt nationalbudgetprognoserna skulle
ha minskat - blev saledes lika start som 1965 ars, Trots detta steg veluta
reserven nagot. Det kan slut1igen noteras att loner och priser okade mar
kant 1969-70. Loneglidningen inom indust:rin steg fran 4 % till 7 %, Och
konsumentprisstegringen blev med 7 % den hogsta som har forekommit sedan
Korea-inflationen. ii.ven vid en internationell jamfore1se framst!lr den
svenska prisu.ppgangen som patagligt hog. 124
Hogkonjunkturen som borjade 1969 blev relativt kortvarig. Redan under andra
kvarta1et 1970 borjade antalet lcdiga platser att minska fran rekordnivan
som hade uppnatts i borjan av 1970. Nellan tredje och fjirde kvartalet
sjonk andelen industriforetag med brist pa yrkesarbetare fran 67 % till
52 %. Hinskningen av arbetskraftsefterfragan fortsatte under 1971 som
diagram 6 visar.
123 Avtalct innebar att bankernas utestaende krediter till annat an bost.:1d byggande successivt skulle minskas till en n£va som lag 4 % over stock en av krediter vid utgangen av 1969, se PNB 71, s. 165.
124 Av industrilanderna i Vasteuropa och Nordamerika ar det endast Norge som uppvisar en hogre konsumentprisstegring 1969-70 lin Sverige, se RNB 71, s. 16.
IV:52
Vid ingEmgen till 1971 tradde skattereformen Riksdagen hade beslutat o:n i
maJ 1970 i kraft. Reformen innebar som bekant en overgang fdm sam-
till sarbeskattning av arbetsinkomster och ett slopande av kommunalskatte
avdraget vid personbeskattningen. Skattereformen kombinerades med en
hojning av momsen fran 10 till 15 %125 vars f6rdelningspolitiska konsek
venser i sin tur motverkades av hojda folkpensioner och barnbidrag. Hus
hallens samlade kopkraft paverkades darfor inte narnnvart av de i och for
sig mycket omfattande statliga skatteatgarderna. Den kornrnunala utdebite
ringen hojd~s emellertid med 1.5 procentenheter vi1ket var efterkrigsperio
dens storsta hojning nast efter 1952 irs. De bar nr:imnda itf,~irderna (till
sammans med tidigare skattefodindringar som b1ev markbara 1971) innebar
netto en auto~ skattehojning under 1971 pa 1.8% av BNP. Bara en gang
tidigare under efterkrigsperioden bar en lika kraftig skattehojning genom
forts och det var under hogkonjunkturaret 1960, jfr. tabel1 3.
I Finansplanen 1971 konstaterades: "Vi gar 1971 in i ett lugnare kon
junkturforlopp. Det ar dock inte fraga om nagon kraftigare konjunktur
avmattning utan utvecklingen praglas fortfarande av aktivitet pa hog
niva''. 126 En genere11 littnad av den ekonomiska politiken avvisades dar-
for sasom "i dagens Ui.ge klart oUirnplig" • 127 Den restriktiva finanspol itik
som i stallet forordades motiveradt!s av "hiinsyn ti 11 utrikesbalansen och
OIDSOrgen OID pris- OCh kostnadsutvecklingen (sa.rnt) behovet att astadkOtHJ~a
1attnad pa kreditmarknaden" 127 Hed den givna utformningen av den ekono
miska politiken pekade nationalbudgetprognoserna mot en BNP-okning 1970-71
pa 2,8 % eller tva procentenheter mindre an aret innan. Den forh!Hlanclevis
Uga okningstakten forklaras dels av arbetstidsforkortningen som skulle borja
1971, de1s av ett nagot lagre kapacitetsutnyttjande i ekonomin an under
1970 128 v· · 1 1 • ·· · • · b .. · 1971 r · · • tssa st1mu crance atgarcter 1nsattes 1 orJan av • Januatl
beslot regeringen om ett 10-procentigt investeringsavdrag (vid statlig be
skattning) for niringslivets maskininvesteringar under 1971 och samtidigt
mjukades den restriktiva kreditpolitiken upp genom utHmingstakets slopande.
Under varen sanktes vidare diskontot i tva steg fran 7 till 6 %.
125 Da det galler omsen och morr:sen har i detta kapite1 genomgaende angetts de pa priset inklusive skatten tilUimr-liga satserna som natur1igtvis ar lagre an satserna raknat pa priset exk1usive skatten. Kallas de tva satserna ti respektive te galler att te = ti/(1-ti)• ti-virdena 10% och 15 % motsvaras alltsa av te-vardena 11.11 7. och 17.65 %.
126 FP 71, s. 13.
127 FP 71, s. 16 och 19.
128 Se PBN, s. 14.
IV:53
,. Efter att en fortsatt kraftig d~impning · C!'J den inhemska cfterfragan hade
kunnat inregistreras i horjan av 197:1. sk2dde en viss nedjustcring i den
reviderade finansplanen av den forvantade okningstakten for investeringar
och hushallens konsumtion (och darmed BNP). Det understroks emellertid pa nytt att "en generell efterfdigeexpansion (ar) varken pakallad eller t.ill
radlig. Den ekonomiska politiken b6r i dl!tta l~ge i stlillet arbeta med se
lektiva medel''. 129 Ett sadant medel var investeringsavgiften f6r opriori
terat byggande som s lopades fdm 1 j uni, tva manader tidigare an ~rsprung
ligen avsett. Redan i mars hade byggande for nlirmare 1 mi1jard kr. befriAts
fran denna avgift. 130 Endast relativt begr~nsade effekter hllrav kunde
paraknas under 1971.
Under sommaren och hos ten forvarrades arbetsmarknads l.aget k:r<>f :;ig t och
detta paverkade naturligtvis den ekonomiska politiken. Eftcr att lange ha
avvisat yrkanden om ett all.mlint frislappande av in1.reste:ringsfonc!rcrua131
beslHt regeringen i ju1i att medge anvHndning av fundQedel for lager
investeringar under 1971 o::h samtidiet hojdes invcsteringsavdra:_3et till
20 %. I augusti f6ljde nya li,tgarder blo.nd vilka kan namnas Hkade anslag
till beredskapsarbeten och urbetsmarknadsutbildningcn, en Bkning av bcst~ds-
ramarna med 4000 Uigenhetcr och frislappning av investeringsfonderna ffr
VLssa projekt inom storstadsomdidena. En ny bukctt av konjunkturstimulCo-·
rande atgarder presenteradcs i oktobe!7. lnvesteringsavdraget pa 20 % skt:llc
fa utnyttjas ocksA under 1972 och ett statligt lagerst6d - likalcdes p~ 20 %
fHr industrins och handelns lagerokningar under 1972 skulle ges. Dessutom fie~~
foretagcn r3tt att utnyttja investeringsfonderna fHr lagerinvesteringar ~ven
under 1972. Vidare blcv det moj ligt att selektivt r.edsatta energiskattcn sM.
tidigt som industrins utrymme for emissione!.· pa obligationsm.sLrknaden - som
1970 hade varit ca 700 tr.Lr.- faststalldes till 1800 mkr. under saval 1971
som 1972. For att stimulera kommunernas ekonomiska aktivitet hojdes stats
bidragcn till kommunala beredskapsarbeten fran 35 % till 75 % i perioden
1 november 1971 - 30 juni 1972 inom ramen for ett anslag pa 500 n1k:t. Biclraget
till kommuna1a mi1jovardsinvesteringar, som paborjades i sam.'Ua period, hojdes
fran 25 till 75 %. Den privata konsumtionen stimulcrades slutl.igen genoc ett
extra pensionstil1skott under januari 1972 och genom hojda bostadstil1Hgg
fran april 1972. Det kan ocksa namnas att diskontot sanktes i tva st~t; liven
under hosten (fran 6 till 5 7.).
129 Proposition 1971:115, s. 14.
130 Se RNB 71, s. 111. Effekten pa byggnadsverksamheten under 1971 blir dock v§sent1igt mindre pa grund av de i manga fall relativt 1anga byggnadstiderna.
131 Se t.ex. FP 71, s. 17.
lV:54
Under 1971 steg den 5ppna arbetslBsh~ten i Sverige till den h5gsta nivAn
sedan den djupa avmattn{ngen 1058. Det ~r eme11ertid knappast rim1igt
att bara betrakta den oppna arbetsloslleten. Hedr:·ilmas iiven poter.tie1la
arbets16sa som §r engagerade i beredskapsarbeten, arbetsmarknadsutbild
ning och andra AMS-akti vi teter ar det g<mska klart att arbets His he ten
under 1971 blev st5rre an under nap;ot tid:i.gare efterkrigs.1r. Detta omdome
torde sta sig Mven om hansyn tas till att en del av den tidigarc dolda -
icke-registrerade - arbetslosheten numcra framtrader som oppen arbetslos
het. Avmattningens djup t>elyses ocksa av produktionsutvecklingen. Enligt
nu tillgangliga kalkyler ~insk~~ BNP med 0. 6% under 1971. En BNP-minsk
ning har inte forekommi t nagot annat .ftr under efterkr:i.gsperiaden. A.tt
marka ar att minskningen av BNP skedde trots ett efterfragetillskott fr&n
utrikeshandeln under 1971 n~otsvarande knappt 2% av BNP, jfr tabell 5.
Ett lika st.ort efterfragetillskott fran utrikeshande1r. - "efterfdigestold"
fran utlandet med Bengt Petterssons tcrminologi - har inte registrerats
sedan importregleringsarer1 i s1utet av 40-talet. Beroende pa den svaga
interna efterfrageutvecklingen minskac1e importvolymen 1970-71 med drygt
5% samtidigt som exportvolymen steg med 4%. Hande1sbalansens undcrskott
1970 p~ 1.1 miljard kr. fBrvandlades d~rigenom till etc Bvcrskott 1971
p~ 2 miljarder kr, en f5rHndring sAledes pa 3.1 miljard kr. FBr bytes
balansen blev omslaget mot overskott nagot mindre e.ller c:a 2.5 miljarder
kr. Trots dampningen av den ekonomiska aktiviteten och det g1:i11ande pr~s
stoppet steg konsumentpriserna under 1971 med lika mycket som 1970, d.v.s.
med c:a 7%. t·:~i::·m:n:a h~ilft::n liaxav bcrc.odd'-; dot:.k pa. m;~!'l~h.ojning.cn han ilrcts
bor j.::~.n.
Hur kan stabiliseringspolitiken antas ha paverkat den ekonomiska utveck
lingen under 1971? Som tabell 5 v~sar 5kades den offentliga sektorns
efterfragan inte alls under 1971. Denna utveckling ar naturligtvis nagot
5verraskande med h~nsyn till bade de beslutade cxpansiva atg~rderna pa statens och kommunernas utgiftssida 1971 och de kraftiga 5kningarna av
den offentliga efterfragan under h5gkonjunkturaren 1969 och 1970, jfr
tabell 5. Som framgar dar minskade den kommunala investeringsaktiviteten
kraftigt (i PNB 71 hade man raknat med en mindre okning) liksom bostads-
_byggandet. Aveni den statliga sektorn minskade efterfragans expansions
takt. Da de exceptionellt stora autonoma skattehojningarna som blev mark
bars 1971 och den relativt mattliga skatteautomatiken meddiknas b1 ir -
~ sorn frarng~r av tabcll 6 - finanspolitikens ber~knade direkta effekt
Atstramande i en utstr~ckning motsvarande 1.8% av BNP. Xven om satsning
arna for att stimulera de privata investeringarna bor ha haft vissa effek
ter under 1971 andrar det inte helhetsbilden. En sA restriktiv stabilise···
ringspolitik under ett avmattningsar ar naturligtvis i hogsta grad anrlnrk
ningsvard och nAgon parallell under efterkrigsperioden finns forvisso
inte heller.
Mot slutet av 1971 tycktes en vandpunkt pa arbetsmarknaden ha natts och
svaga tecken pa minskad arQetsloshet och en okr.ing nv antalet lediga
p1atser kunde registreras, jfr diagram 6. Mot denna hakgrund och med
hansyn till de redan vidtagna konjunkturstimulerande atgarderna rJaser·.1des
1972 ars finansp1an pa forvi1ntningar om ett klart omslag vad galler dc~1
inhemska efterfragan .. For privat konsumtion rliknades med en okning av
expansionstakten jamfort med 1971 fran -1% till +4%. For kommunernas och
n~ringslivets investeringar bedomdes omslaget i expans1v riktning bli
annu kraf6gare. BNP-okningen 1971-72 slmlle d~rjgenom kunna bli 3.5%.
For handelsbalansen forutsags ett vasentligt mindre overskott ~in under
1971 och for bela bytesbalansen r~knades med en forsamring pa over en
mi1jard kr. I finansplanen aviserades vissa at~~rder som avsag att st!mu-
1era den ekonomiska aktiviteten under forsta halvaret. Dessa atg2rder om
fattade bland annat tidigarelaggniug av statliga industribestallninga:·
for c:a 100 mkr., bidrag till kommuner sam lade ut industribestallningar
under forsta halften av 1972 i stallet for 1973, utokade anslag till
industriella miljovArdsinvesteringar och en forlangning av frisl~pps
perioden till 1 maj 1972 for industrins investeringsfonder.
Under 1972 skulle storre delen av den beslutade arbetstidsforkortningen
genomforas. For sysselsHttningensutvecklingen under aret skulle det na
turligtvis bli av avgorande betydelse i vilken utstrackning foretag oc.h
myndigheter skulle kampensera sig for detta genom produktivitetsokningar
eller nyanstallningar. En Uinkbar reaktion var givetvis ocksa produktions
minskning. I PNB 72 - liksom i Konjunkturinstitutets hostrapport 1971 -
antogs arbetstidsforkortningen leda till en mycket pataglig okning av
arbetskraftsefterfrngan under 1972 sam inte bara skulle absorbera det
okade utbudet av arbetskraft utan dessutom minska arbetsli:>sheten med
omkring en procentenhet (d.v.s. med lika mycket som den Oi«J.de under 1Y71).
Redan i RNB 72 kund<.> dct kon::>tatcr:~s a_tt beoomningen av arbetstidsfor
kortningens sysselsittniagseff~kter - soill hade ifr~gasatts tidigare131A
var for optimistisk. Trots detta ansag t:i.nansministern i kompletterings
propositioncn att utsikterna for den svenska ckonomin under 1972 tedde
sig gynnsammare an de hade gjort vic.l arsskiftet. Nagon uppjustering av
BNP-prognosen for 1972 gjordes emellcrtid inte.
I mitten av aret fors~mrades arbetsmarknadslllget aterigen nagot, jfr
diagram 6. Till en del berodde uppgangen .i arbetslosheten sannolikt pl1
den tvara neddragningen av antalet syssc~lsatta i beredslcapsarbeten frlm
39.000 i juni till 19.000 i ju1i. Denna utveckling ledde till en scrie av
nya stimu1erande atgarder. I jnli gavs grc5nt ljus for ett 15kat smahus·
byggande. I augusti hcij des st atsbidrB.gen ti 11 industrins och korrununernas
miljovardsinvesteringar och ti1lstand att utnyttja investeringsfonderna for
byggnadsinvesteringar fram till l maj 1973 1amnaJes. Vidare okades ansJ.a
gen till bcredskapsarbeten i flera o:ng8nga:-. T november kom en ny bukett
av stimulansatgarder som bl. a. inncfattade en hojning till 30% och en for1:ing·
ning till 1973 av investcringsavdraget, ett nytt investeringsavdrag pR
10% for byggnadsinvesteringar, utBkade beredskapsarbeten och ett f5rl~ngt
Vad g~1ler den ekonomiska politikens effekter under 1972 m~ste det betnnas
att de utfallssiffror som kalkylerna ~r baserade p&, ~r ganska preliminijra.
Detsarr~a gal1er dlirfor om slutsatserna. Som framgar av tabell 5 , innebar
utvecklingen 1971-72 av den offent1iga efterfrAgan ett omslag 1 expans1v
riktning motsvarande l 1/4% av BNP. Omslaget var som synss mest patap:1iP.;t
for stat1iga och kommunala investeringar. Till foljd av betydande eftcr
sUipande effekter plt den privata konsumtionen av 1971 ars skattehojningar
och okad skatteautomatik under 1972 blev finanspolitikens beraknade dirckta
effekter dock svagt kontraktiva som tabell 6 visar. Till bi1den hor e,n,c:llcr-·
tid ocksa raden av atgarder som syftade till att stimulera de privata in
vesteringarna. Hade effekterna av dessa l~unnat beaktas i kalky1erna sklllle
stabiliseringspo1itikens direkta effekt under 1972 trol:igen ha blivit svagt
expansiv. Hur det an forhaller sig med detta hade det uppenbarligen behovts
en starkt expansiv ekonomisk politik under 1972 for att i stort sett .her
stiilla den fulla sysselsattnine,en och uppna ett jamfort med tidigare :h
norma1t kapacitetsutnyttjande. Som fram1-)h av diagram r~ f15rbattracies
131A Se Matthiesscn 1972.
lV:5 1
arbetsmarknadsl~get endast obetydligt unaer f6rra ~ret. Den svnga eftPr
fragetillv~xten betydde att BNP 5kade rncd bara 2% eller l l/2 proccntenhet
mindre ~n nationalbudgetprognoserna anguv. Det var framf5r allt 6knings
takten f5r privat konsumtion samt narin::;slivets och kom.rnunernas investe
ringar som hade underskattats. Daremot 6kade investeringsverksamheten i
industrin nAgot mer och i den statliga sektorn vasentligt mer ~n forut
satt i PNB 72. Denna utveckling av den totala efterfd.gan avspeglas givet···
vis i utrikeshandelssiffrorna. S~ledes tycks 5verskottet i handelsbal~nsen
ha blivi t 1. 2 mi lj arder kr. ~t5r_~ an man an tog vid 2rsskiftet. Hotsvar.:mde
siffra for bytesbalanssaldot ar omkring l ITJilj ard kr. Detta oeh en st;h-re
lAntagning utomlands ledde till en okning av valutareserven under fjo!~ret
p& 2.7 mi:jarder kr.
Avmattningcn under 1971 uch 1972 blev djupare an nagcn tidigatc recesr.!.on
under efterkrigsper:ic:J.~n, Till detta bidrog vissa speciella omstandighl:'tt::r,
framfor allt den Hverraskande starka okningen av hushallens sparkvot undrr
19'/1 men kanske ocksa os;lkerlH"t fi.h:;:mledd av avt:alsr5rcJ.sen och valut:~:•oro\1
unJ.f.lr 19'/1. Som har framgatt av de tidigare avsnitt:en har o:nfattande kre
ditpolitiska och selcktiva finanspolitiska ~tg§rder satts in under 1971
och 1972 [Cir ;,~tt IliDtvc:::!~a den htiga arbets losheten. Dessa satH1i.ngm: har
utan tvivC'l l•aft: betydande eft~rfragestimulerande effektPr, s:irski.lt under
forra aret. Vet tan salunda noteras att industriinvcsteringarna, som minsko.-·
de under forra ;r,matlningen, expanderade 1970-72 ''1:! lin i blygsa!11 takt, Ok
ningcn av de statliga inv~steringarna i fjol med 14 procent (cndast en
4-·procentit; okning forutsags i Rl\B 72) far naLurligtvis ocksa ses sora ett
rcsultat av den forda politiken. Trots detta kan vi nu konstatcra att de
efterfragestimulerande insatserna under avmattningsiiren var. kL1rt otill
rickliga och for sent insatta f6r att mer markant f6rb§ttra l~get pA den
svenska arbetsmarknaden. Vad giiller 1971 framsdi;: elf, E:xpansi.va t~tgnrdernA
som latta krusningar pa ytan av en i grunden cxccptionellt atstram::mc!::::
politik som geuomfHrdes under intryck av den fBre~~ePde hogkonjunkturen.
Uppmj uknir:~;cn av stabi lise.ringspolitiken under 197 2 var, som har framgatt,
inte sa U.ngtgliende att effekterna tota!_t sett kan ha blivit efterfrage
stimulerande i nagon ni:in:nvard utstdickning. Som vi har sctt f(5rbattrades
arbetsmarknadslliget inte heller i fjol jlimf~rt med 1971 5ven om avmatt
ningens batten nu med all sakerhet har p;.tsserats.
IV:58
~ Den faktiska ekonomiska utvecklingen och Jen fBrda stabiliseringspolitiken
. under konjunkturvih::lin~en 1969·-72 ~ . . p.:ltiunr,er 1 v5scntliga avseenJen om fUr-
lappet 1964-63, I b5da fallen var det fr1ga om synnerli~en starka konj~nktur-
uppsving som j_e f~ ti l1 ilts utveck l a sig utcver e:wnomins kapacitets
grMnser med betydande bytesbalansf~rsilrnring3r och okad prisstegringstakt sam
nagra av de omedelbara foljderna. 132 N~ir overhettningen v:U var ett L>ktur.l
genomfordes en generel1 &tstramning av den ekono~iska politiken (omshBjningen
i mitten av 1965, resp2ktive hojningarna av de indirekta skatterna och den
skirpta kreditpolitiken i borjan av 1970) som inte bara vidmaktholls utan
iven sk~rptes llngt efter att den f5ljande konjunkturnedg5ngen hade bBrjat
(omshojningen och investeringsavgiften i bBrjan av 1967 respektivc skatte
hojningarna hUsten 1970 och i borjan av 1971). Fr5n stabiliseriPgssynpunkt
kan det p~ goda grunder l1~vdas att den finanspolitiska 1tstramnin~en i b&da
fallen vidtogs minst ett &r f~r sent och d§rigenoQ kom den ekonomiska poli
tiken att forstarka den ftSlj;:md.e nedg!mgen. Under avmattningsaren 1971-·72
liksom fallet var 1966-63 fick den ekonomiska politiken en nycket ford:Ztig
inriktning fran sysselsattnings- och tillvHxtsynpunkt med det klart uttala
de syftet att minska byteshalansunderskottet och h~lla pris och kostn~ds
stegringarna tillbaka.
Man har med andra ord velat forbattra den externa balansen genom att astacl
komma - eller atminstonc acceptera - ett mindre an fullt kapacitetsutnytt
jande 1 ekonomin. Och i likhet med vad som skeddc 1966 och 1967 har myndig
heterna uppenbarligen fe1bedomt styrkan i konjunkturnedgangen 1970-72. 133 Om
de stimulerande atgarder som insattes under de blda avmattningarna {1iksom
alla tidigare sedan 1945) g~ller att de i huvudsak var av selektiv natur.
I efterhand ter det sig svlrt att f6rsta - med erfarenheterna frln Hver
hettningen 1964-65 i firskt minne - varfor en kraftfu11 finanspolitisk At
stranming inte genomfordes under andra halvaret 1969 i stillet for ett .h
132 Vad gi1ler intensiteten synes 1970 irs hogkonjunktur snarast ha Hvergatt 1965 ars. Att den registreradc arbetslosheten trots d~tta var hHgre 1970 an den hade varit 1965 kan tillskrivas den uppdrivna takten i strukturomvandlingen under 1970.
133 Att myndigheterna inte var ensamma om att bedorna konjunkturutsikterna for 1971 relativt optimis tiskt framgar av Claes-Erik Odhners anfor~.1de i Nationalekonomiska foreningen i j anuari 1971: "Vi tycks all a vara rorande eniga om - och det ~r jag glad for - att det ar bra rned en stram och stabiliserande budget. Det tycker vi ocksl pa LO-sidan ••• {Budgeten) ar ganska val anpassad till en nagot vikande konjunktur." Se Nationalekonomiska foreningens fo_}-hand ling_ar 1971, s. 22.
.. ;
IV:59
senare. I sa fall skull~ okningen ·av oytesbalansens underskott och pris
stegringstakten mcd all sakerhet ha blivit mindre, vilket i sin tur skulle
ha okat mojligheterna. att bedriva en expansiv politik under 1971 och 1972.
7. Den ekonorniska pol~tiken infor 1973
De bedomningar av efterfrageutvecklingen 1973 som har gjorts i Konjunktur
institutets hostrapport och i arets finansplan (Strings artonde i ordningen)
pekar bada pa en BNP-okning 1972-73 pa onL~ring 4 proccnt. Med hansyn till er:
forvantad produktivitetsokning i ar av knnske samma :.torlek och de:t Uga
kapacitcts~tnyttj;.:mde:t i utgangslaget fijrefaller det tllmligen klart att den
forutsatta efterfrAgeokningen inte r~cker till for att markant forbittra
arbetsmarknadsliget under 1973 och alltsa in rnindre for att atersti1la den
fulla sysselsittningen i ar. Daremot fotutses i finansplanen for tredj e
aret i foljd betydande (och vaxande) overskott i saviil utrikeshandeln som
i bytesbalansen som helhet.
I dessa bedomningar har hansyn givetvis ta~its till effekterna ~v vidtagna
och beslutade atg~rder, Starka konjunkturpolitiska skil talar d~~for for
att den ekonomiska poli tiken under 197 3 borde ha fatt en mer expansiv in
riktning an den som har angetts i finansplanen. Detta skulle ocksA ha va
rit forsvarligt med hansyn till betalningsbalausen eftersom valutareserven
har utvecklats gynnsamt anda sedan mitten av 1970. Enligt finansplanen be
raknas statens och kommunernas efterfragan oka relativt litet 1973 sam
tidigt som bostadsbyggandet minskar (se tabell 5). Det betyder- dl hHnsyn
ocksa tas till beslutade skatte- cch transfereringsandringar samt skatte
automatiken - att finanspolitikens beraknade direkta effekt i ar prelimi
nart kan uppskattas till 0,6 procent av BNPt d.v.s. n~got mer ~tstramande
an under 1972 (se tabell 6). Aven om effekterna av de investeringsstimule
rande atgarderna hade kunnat beraknas och medtas l. kalkylen skulle detta
knappast ha fatt arets stabiliseringspolitik att framsta som namnvart
efterfragestimulerande. En sa. aterhilllsam utformning av finanspolitiken
kan knappast sagas motsvara deklarationt~n i finansplanen att ett centralt
mal for den ekonomiska po1itiken ar att hoja sysselsattningen.
IV;60
r Det finns naturligtvis rn~nga olika vigar att gl om det giller att g6ra
konjunkturpolitikcn mer expansiv. En mojlighet hade givetvis varit att
skjuta pa hojningen c:..v allmanna arbetsgi.varavgiften fran arsskiftet till
en senare tidpunkt som hadl! passat bra fran stabiliseringssynpunkt. Det
ar vanskligt att precisera vilka effekter den verkstallda hojningen (som
i ar beraknas medfora en inkomstforstarknin~ pa drygt 2 miljarder kr) kan
antas fa under 1973. Enligt en (opublicerad) schematisk kalkyl utford av
Bengt Pettersson, Konjunkturinstitutet, skulle den efterfragedampande
effekten kunna antas vara av storleksorcni_ng~ 0,5 procent av BNP. Den
negativa sysselsattningseffekten skulle enligt samrna kalkyl bli omkring
15 000 perscner. Det ligger onekligen n!.ira till hands att jamfora arets
loneskattehojning med 1947 ars slopande av omsen mitt under en extrem
hojkonjunktur.
En annan mojlighet om man vill oka efterfragestimulan!>en fdin finanspolitikcn
vore att minska inbromsningen i den offentliga sektorn. Tillvaxten i saval
den statliga som den kommunala sektorn beraknas i at" bli knappt halften sa
stor som 1972 till foljd av absoluta minskningar av investeringsverks.;rnhe
ten, Samtidigt minskar som namnts bostadsbyggandet kraftigt:. Av finanspla.nen
att doma tycks det vara en Hingsikti(; m!ilsatt.ning att d1impu den of.fentliga
sektorns expansion. Fran stabiliseringssynpunkt ter det sig olyckligt att
denna inbromsning skall borja just under en besvara.nde avmattning. For
manga maste det forefalla paradoxalt att exempelvis kommunerna ti 11 fi:.iljd
av "restriktiv budgetprovning" tvingas minska sina aktivi teter i ett Uige
med betydande outnyttjade resurser. Att rnarka ar ocksa att den arbetskr.aft
som drabbas av aterhallsamheten i den offentliga sektorn inte i nagon stor.re
utstrackning kan forvantas finna sysselsattning i indu5trin om arbetskrafts
efterfragan dar skulle oka under andra halvaret. ii.ven da det galh:r den
offentliga sektorn kan kortsiktiga efterfrAgestimulanser givetvis astad
konnnas pa manga olika vagar. Ett satt vore att under i fors ta hand det nar
maste halvaret fortsatta eller utoka den statliga bidragsgivningen till kom
munernas investeringsaktivitet (utan att for den skull hoja nagra
skatter). 134
134 Under forra aret paverkades syssels3ttningen i den kommunala sektorn utan tvivel negativt av de relativt kraftiga lonehojningarna for kommunalanstiHlda. Om satnma sak skall undgas 1974, da hojda H>ner enli.gt de kommande avtalen skall utga i. ctt liige mcd i start sett fastlibt kommunal utdebitering, kan statliga bidrag till kommunerna ("revenue sharing'') bli aktuella.
'
lV;bl
De vilfirdsf6rluster som arbetsl6sheten utder den pAgaenJe avmattning~n har
asamkat det svensi<a fo1khush.lllet kan intc atervinnas. Uarutover i::ir df:t:
knappast mojligt att redan nu dra best3mda slutsatser om recession-:;ns ih£>r
verkningar och de Uirdomar den har gett oss. En hypotes med ett visst. sUid
i utvecklingen ir kanske att en djupdykning som den vi bar varit med om intc
kan klaras med enbart se1ektiva insatser.
Efterkrigs~idens konjunkturE£l~tik i sammanfattning
Da man ser tillbaka pa efterkrigstidens stabiliseringspol-i.tik med ett ftirsok
till sammanfattande bcdomning i -atanke synes det rimligt att betr.ab~8 perio
den 1946-52. for sig. Des sa ar praglades av delvis rnycket speci;:;.ll:J. £C:r~1cl L~,[
den i samband med um,;tal.lningen fran kristids- till fredsekono;ni s.:-~1<t ::~·1
Korea-boomen och satillvida ~tr de konjunk.turella och stahilL;eritiL;::;;-Joli. ti.ska
erfarenheterna fran des sa ar av begransat int:resse for de fo lj .'!nd (;~ :Jl"C:i:"tS ;:.:'-o
nomiska po1itik. Ett annat icke aterkommondc inslag var lor,estop;.'~.:·t 1~;4.3-50.
Karakt~iristisk for den ekonomiska politiken under hela period~r. var dt=:~·; aktlv;:::
stdivan at t hindra kos tnadss tegringens genoms ls.g ti 11 kor.sumentp·d s;;;rna. vi t kc ;·
bl.a. motiverade den passiva lagrant.epolitjk so'11 bedrev;~. Att stabi1i3(~d.tt,i.;,8·
politiken som helhct miss1yckades 1946-48 berodde pn att insatsern~ £~r &Lt
halla -~~terfragan ti llbaka var oti llrackliga. Kontrastcn ti 11 sen<lr£' ti.der.·s
efterfragebegdinsande men samtidigt prishojande finanspolitik ar sl&cnde.,
Under Korea-boomen syftade de vidtagna ltg~rderna i huvudsa~ till att begr~n~a
foretagens investeringsverksa~Jet som naturligt nog var starkt cxpansiv i det
radande konjunkturlaget. Daremot rackte "engangsinf1ationen'' till for att sta···
bilisera konsumtionsvaruefterfragan under 1951 soxr. vi har sett.
Den resterande de1en av efterkrigstiden kan rned fordel indelas i tva pcrioder
med 1963 sc'm skiljande ar. Under de tre avmattningar och tva hogkonjunkturer
som infoll under aren 1952-63 varierades den ekonomiska politiken mycket kraf
tigt. Som framgar av diagram 5 var "timingen" av atgarderna avpassad sa att
impacteffekternas variationer i hog grad b1ev kontracykli.ska (alltsa konj:mk-·
turutj amnande). Intrycket harav fors tarks da hansyn tas ti 11 atgarderna rikta
de mot naringslivets investeringar.
'
IV:62
Som vi har sett fick £inanspolitikee en ~-'r.:::.::k.t ;.=xpamn.v inriktning uncL'r av-
mattningen 1952-.53 genom att den offe~•tliga dterfrEigan tillats viixa kraftigt
samtidigt som hu:;n~illens efterfdig.:m stin·-,,u~r.1clc-s via skatte- och transfcre-
. , . . k 135 1) ' } k . 0 d 1 9 5 '- k .. r1ngsp0L1t1·en. en snaoJa onJunktur~ppgangen un er L ~ om som en over-
raskning for rnyndigheterna men under 1955 g~nomf\::irdes en kt"aftfull atstram
ning av saval kredit- som finanspolitiken, Att denna atstr;mr.ing i huvudsak
drabbade foretagens investeringar· och at:: de efterfraged:lmpande effektcrna
kom re1ativt sent under hogkonj ur:.~<.turen samm.:1nhiingde i hog grad med de ut
dragna avtalsforhandlingarna och de rent politiska svarigheterna som Skolds
f .. 1 . 11 k . b .. d • .. d .. 136 u l , 1 ° ors ag tl ·onsumt1ons egrar.san e atgar er motte. nuer me.~. anaren
1956 och 1957 mjukades den ckonomiska politiken upp och de beraknade iwpact
effekterna blev i dct narmaste neutrala. I och mcd avmattninzen 1958-59 fick
finanspoliliken iter en mer expansiv inriktning. Efterir~gestimulanscn var
emellertid klart otillr~icklig for att kunna hindra att en bccydande arbcts
loshe t upps tod. An ledningcn ti 11 au: en E1er ~xp:Jm:J. v satsning irn:e provd es
var tydligen att "det internation-=2lla utrymn;et" intc ans2.gs medge e:i s&dan . 137
satsm.ng. Under 1959 vande konjunkturen hastigt uppih och den exi_)ar.;,;iva
politiken kom dirigenom att fortsittas litet fBr lange. 19GO vidtog sedan
efterkrigsarens mest drastiska atstramning infor den hotande hogkonjunk.tu'=en.
Ett visst overtryck fBrekom dock under forsta hHlften av 1961 trots den fort
satta restriktiva politiken. Avmattningst~n;1en!;crna under 1962 och 1963 mot
tes med en visent1igt mer expansiv finans?olitik an 1961 ars. Trots vissa
"skonhetsf Vickar" (av vi lka viil 1958 ars patagliga avmattning forefaller
allvarligast) synes det rimligt att karakt~risera stabiliseringspolitiken
1953-63 som inte bara kontracyklisk utan ocksa som mestadels v~lavvigd med
tanke pa det radande konjunkturlagct.
135 I OECD-experternas rappor't heter det (s. 58): "Budget policy hc.p.an to be upplied vigorously and sys tcmaticnlly fro!Tl about the mid-fifties, ••• ''. Aven 9m formu1eringen ir elastisk ar denna sena datering knnppast rimlig med tanke pa den relativt aktiva och delvis framgangsrika finanspolitik som fordes 1950-53.
136 I OECD-experternas rapport konstateras (s. 58): " ••• because it \.;as thought that cycles were triggered by changes in private investment and profits government policy before 1957-58 \vas • , • generally directcC: toward keeping private investment dmm in boom periods. Subsequently with a higher priority given to growth, policy has aimed at increa:;ing investment when possible, •• ". Vad galier prioriteringen av tillvaxt ar denna datering a.tminstone ett par ar for sen. Som framgih av hi:invisningarna s. IV: 29 uppfattade hade Skold och Str1i.ng 1955 ars inves teringsbegriinse.ndc atg~irder som avsteg fr.!b en politik syftande till i!tt vidmakthiilla ell~?..r oka inves tcringskvoten.
137 OECD-experternas datering Hr d§rf6r Aterigen diskutabel di de p~stlr: "Up to that time (dvs, 196)-65) the ha lane(! of ps.yr.1•:.nts diu not pc:-:e any problems • , • Since then the balanc~ of pay!w;;nts appears ••• to have prevented expansionary action which would otherwise have been consi:;tent vitlt do<rlesti.~ considerations", (s. 55). For en Ll<:.n.';•de datering. se llhl~sen 1968, s, 3£\2.
IV:63
Detsannna kan inte ;-:;agas om finanspplirikC>n under: .!h:en 1964-72. Som vi ~ett
drojde det anda till mitten av 1965 innan en xnet betydande finanspolitisk
atstramning genomfordes under hogkonjunktur'"n 196lt-65. Som bekant ledde
overhettningeu till e~ vildig bytesbalans£Brsllmring 1965. Att den ekono
miska politiken 1966-68 inte gjordes s£ expansiv som det interna rcal
ekonomiska utrymr:1et i och for sig med8av sammanhangde utan tvivel med en
medveten stravan att forbattra utrikesbalansen geno:n att dimpa den inhemska
efterfragetillvaxten. Andra faktorer som forsvarade stabiliseringspolitikcn
under dessa ar var den starkt okade takten i strukturomvandlingen, den iuter
nationella valutaoron 1967 och overskattningarna av efterfrAsetillvaxten i
1966 och 1967 ars nationalbudgeter. Under det snabba konjunkturuppsvinget
1969-70 upprepades (mirkligt nog) monstret fran 1964-65: inbromsningen
genomfordcs pa ett sa sent stadium av hi5gkonjunkturen att en kraftig (delvis
internt genererad) konsumentprissteg:ring och en betydande okning av bytes·
ba1ansundcrskottet inte gick att undvika. Den atstramande politiken virlhol.ls
och skarpt:es sedan L'ingt efter att konjvnkturv~ndningen nedat h<:de borjat.
Delvis sor1 ett resultat av clen forda politiken har. under 1971 och 197L. han
de1sbalanr.ens underskott minskat markant: samtidigt som den reg::..strerade ar
betslOsheten bar okat vasentligt.
Den har utfHrda analysen leder alltsa fram till slutsatsen att stabiliseringE
politiken under aren 1964·-72 inte kan anses ha varit viilanpassad till d.:t r?:,···
dande konjunkturlaget, i forsta hand darfor att periouens tva kraftiga kon
junkturuppgangar inte bromsades i ett tidigt skede som fallet var- 1960. l'a goda grunder kan det havdas att skarpningcn av den ekonomiska politikf~n i
bacia fallen kom ih:minstone ett ar for seat. Det ar naturligtvis svart att
med bestimdhet utta1a sig om hur utvecklingen skulle ha format sig om kra.f-·
tiga finanspoli tiska ats tramningar hade genomforts under 1964 och 1969.
Med all sakerhet skulle dock i sa fall bytesbalansforsamringarna och pris-
och lonestegringstakten ha blivit visentligt mindre. Detta skulle i s1n
tur ha okat mojlighcterna att bedriva en mer expansiv politik under aren
1966-68 och 1971-72, di sysselsattningsgraden var £Brhil1andevis llg och
ledig kapacitet fanns att tillgi. Som framgAr av diagram 5 varierade Atgardernas impacteffekter iren 1968 och 1971 klart procykliskt (alltsa de
stabiliserande) fran intern balanssynpunkt. Och som har framgatt fick 1971
ars finanspolitiska atgirder t.o.m. kontraktiva verkningar. Nigon parnllell
under efterkrigsperiodens ovriga avmattningsar finns inte som vi har sett.
J
IV:6'.
Det ~r p&falland~ att 5tglirdernas imp~~tcflekter sedan 1964 har varierat
inom ett mycket sn~vt intervall jamfbrt: mcd tidi8,are ar trots att de ~~on
junkturvariationer som skulle utji:ilr.nas knappast kan sagas ha varit mindre
in f6rut. 138 En ofr&nkom1ig s1utsats §r dHrfBr att det har skeet en mnrkant
forsllmring av stabi1iseringspoli::.i.ken efter 1964 jarnfort med ovriga "normaL:'·
efterkrigsar, dvs. 1952-63. Nagon "learning process" (som ar vasentlie ~
verksamheter dar kontrollerade experiment lir utes lutna) synes dct inte ha
varit fragan om.
Konjunk~urpolitiken5 flexibilitet
Detta kapitel skall avslutas med nagra synpunl~ter pa flcxibi liteteu i sta-·
biliseringspolitiken. Under efterkrigsperioden har konjunktursvangningarna
i Sverige kunnat avliisas i vari3 tionerna i llNP' s .!.~ ll--::.9..~S~~kt.:_, n[>gra r;insk
ningar av BNP har darcmot inte f6rekom:ni t .!{ed utgangspunhfran tab;dl 1 och 5
skulle man dar for kunna saga att s tabi liseringspoli tikens uppgift ar att
se till .att de olika efterfrd.gekomponenternas biclrag till BNP's tillvaxt
tillsammans motsvarar den produktions6kning som maximalt kan r~<!l iseras
utan overanstrangning av tillgangliga pr.oduktionsresursc.r och tl:~~;l bil;ehilllen
extern ba1ans. Med. en framg~ngsrik s tabi liscringspoli tik blir ci i lvaxte!l ba
lanserad s den faktiska :ONP-okni.ngen motsvarar i sa fall kapaci tetsti lh,axte£:,
Att den ekonomiska politiken ytterligare kompliceras av de restriktioner pa hand landet som uttrycker malsat tningarna betraf fande b 1. a. resursalloker.ieg
och inkomstfordelning behover inte understrykas. Det llr ocks& givet att det
makroekonomiska kapacitetsbegreppet i praktiken inte ar Uitt att anvand<l.
Till gruppen av efterfr~gekomponenter med starkt varierande tillv~xt ~~r
givetvis exporten, privata fasta investeringar och lagerinvestcringarna
sasom framgar av kurvorna A, B och C i diagram 1. Vilk.en betydeh:e dessa
variationer har haft f6r utvecklingen av den inhems~a sysselsattningeH och
BNP beror naturligtvis pa i vilken grad variationerna har motsvarats av
forandringar av importvolymen. Framfor allt i lagerinvcst:eringarna finns
det anledning att rakna med ett hogt men k<mske nagot vkix.lande in;port
inneh~ll. De tre kurvorna visar for det fdrsta att variationc~ra i lager
investeringarnas tillvixt genomsnittligt sett har varit vascntl:i.gt storre
138 Att analysen bar utfHrts pa grundv31 av arsdata doljer utan tvivel intressanta skillnader inom de olika aren.
IV:65
lin f6r exporten som i sin tur lig~2r hBgre lin de privata investeringarna
i detta avseende. Denna rangordning avspeglar sjlllvfallet i viss m&n den
ekonomiska politikens m5jligheter att p&verka dessa storheter. F6r det
andra kan det noteras att variationerna i dessa tre komponenters tillvlixt
inte i n&gon p&fallande h5g grad har varit synkroniserade (d.v.s. gltt
i samma riktning). Detta faktum har givetvis underUittat stabiliserings
politikens uppgift. Som kurvan D visar bar en mycket star~ variation dock
funnits kvar trots en viss utjamning. Vi kan f6r det tredje konstatera
att for alla tre posterna var variationerna v§sentligt st6rre under efter
krigstidens f6rsta del (ungefar 1947-53) an de sedan varit. Vad gliller
den privata konsumtionen har variationerna i bidrc:.get till BNP:s tillv~xt
ocksa varit betydande (jfr tabell 1$ kol. 9).
Det ar alltsl frlimst v~xlingarna i dessa posters bidrag till BNP-till
vaxten som det har varit stabiliseringspolitikens uppgift att antingen
rnotverka rued hjlilp av bl.a. skatte- och kreditpolitiken eller kompensera
genom motsatt riktade f6dindringar av tillvaxtbidraget fran off~ntlig
konsumtion och investeringar samt bostadsbyggandet. Vi skall borj a dis-·
kussionen av stabiliseringspolitikens flcxibilitet med att behandla kredit
politiken. Som har framgltt av der1 stabiliseringspolitiska kronikan har
en aktiv kreditpolitik bedrivits sedan mitten av 1950-talet. Trots detta
kan det konstateras att utvecklingen pa kreditpolitikens omrade snarast
har okat behovet av en flexibel finanspolitik. Under efterkrigstiden har
spelrummet f6r internationella kapitalrorelser vidgats avsevart liven om
betydelsefulla regleringar kvarstlr i olika lander (t.ex. i Sverige). Detta
har bl.a. lett till uppkomsten av eurodollarmarknaden. F6r att hindra att
rlintediffercnser pa en fungerande multinattonell kreditmarknad skall leda
till o6nskade omf6rdelningar av valutareserverna har en allt mer markerad
internationell synkronisering av rantepolitiken korr~it till stand. Harav
foljer naturligtvis att m6jligheterna att anvanda rantevapnet f6r att pa
verka den inhemska efterfrlgan har mjnskat. Ur intern balanssynpunkt har
rlintan med andra ord mer eller mindre forvandlats fran handlingsparameter
"11 d . 1 139 1 . . t~ en ogen var~abe • For ett and som Sver~ge har detta var~t av
betydelse speciellt under konjunkturavmattningarna vilket utvecklingen
139 En hanvisning till rlinteutvecklingen i utlandet tillhor numera rutinen vid diskontoandringar i Sverige. Redan i KL 56 (s. 81-82) betonade Bent Hansen de okade svlrigheterna att f6ra en autonom kredit- och rlintepolitik.
1V:66
sedan slutet av 50-talct illustrerar. Act den hBga rlinteniv5n som hade
etablcrats sommaren 1957 bibeholb till r:;aj 1958 och att sankningen di:lr·
efter cndast b1ev e,·, halv proceutenhet d:ikterades - som vi har sett ·•
uppenbarligen mera av hJnsyn till va1utafttil1ningen tin sysselsittnings
laget. Ett annat och mera extremt exempel ~r givetvis den ~nprocentiga
diskontohBjningen i slutet av avmattningl1ret 1967 fBr att hejda spekula
tion i en svcnsk devalvering. OcksA 1971 ~rs kreditpolitik - scm innebar
att diskontot h6lls kvar p£ en s& pass h6g niv~ sam 6 % Hnda fram till sep
tembm: trots starka avmattnin0stendenser under halvaret dessforinnan -
passar in i. Jctta monster. Dctsamma kan d~remot knappa.s t h~tvdas om den tHm
ligen expansiva kreditpo1itiken under minirecessionen 1962-63. A andra sidan
har- som vi har sett, pltagliga sk§rpningar av kreditpolitiken genomforts
under de fy:.:1 hogkonjunkturcrna sedan 1955.
Mojligheterna att konjunkturvar.iera det off.entliga.s utgifter for~ konsm,1tion
och investeringar begrHnsas uaturliGtvis av att motivcring2n for d0ssa ut
gifter frlimst Hr att ti11godose ko11ektiva och andra behov. DHremot b5r dct
vara genomfot·bart att vo.riera ..::.:~l~.~aktcn fi5r den oftentlisa efterfdgr..n
efter konjunkturl~gcts v~x1ingar. Dctta g~l1~r i synnerhet om investerings
utgifterna. De fakt:iska variationerna i tillvaxten for den~.!_~ offent:liga
efterfragan (inkl. bostadsbyggamlet) frar.·,i)ir a.v kurvan H i diagrDm 2 och tabeU
5. Kurvan - som iven bar inlagts i diagrRm 1 - visar att cxpansi.onen
av den offentliga cfterfragan i viss man har fBljt ett kontracykliskt monster
m~!d okad expansionstakt under avmattningsaren 1952-53, 1958-59, 1962·-63 och
1967 och minskad takt under boom-aren 1950-51, 1954-55, 1960 och 1964-GS.
Ar som faller utanfor detta monster ~r t.ex, 1966, 1970 och 1971. Under
andra ar - bl.a. 1958, 1965 och 1969 -haL" cxpansionstaktew:; forandrins vari\
ganska blygsam ur stabiliseringssynpunkt.
Ser v1 paden statliga och kommunala sektorn var for &ig (jfr. kurvo:cna. A-·F
i dirtgram 2) bor det framhlllas att utvecklingen "stors" av polisv§send~ts
forstatligande 1965 och av att den kommunala sektorn 1966-67 avlOste staten
som ansvariga for gymnasieskolan och mentalsj ukv.hden. For den kommunala kon
sumtionen firmer vi en klar tendens till konjunkturutjamnande variationer av
oknings takten och detsamrna galler koromunernas inves teri ngsverksamhet om. vi
bortscr frJn aren 1950, 1958 och 1968 1iksom 1971, jfr tabell 5.
Den konjunkture1la foljsamhet som har
IV:67
f(h.·ckonunit pa kommunsidan kan sarmaiikt till Ct1 del tilbkrivas det faktu•.:
att statcns 13pande f~rskuLLDbeta!nin(ar a~ kcmmunalskattcmedel
inkomsterna tva ar tidigan•, Andra f.c;i;rur~r som h.:lr n:::dvcrkat ~ir t.ex. !\'t"Gli t-
politiken, ~yggnadsregleringen och investeringsavgiften p§ oprioriterat bygg~n
de. Ocksa den statliga konsumtionens bkningstakt har varierat kontracykliskt
,fltskilliga fir men detta var dock inte fallet 1951-52, 1958, 1963 och 1970-72.
VaJ gliller de st3tliga invcsteringsutgifL2rna ~r det anm~rkningsv~rt att d~
e:-:pa.ndcrade pa ett k1a:rt konjunkturutjiimnande satt 1947-1961 m~n att oknings
takten darefter har varit i det narmaste konstant bortsett fr&n 1972, jfr
tabe11 5. Bostadsbyggandet slut1igen h&r som kurvan G visar varit ett viktigt
instrument i stabi1iseringspolitiken. Variationerna 1 Bkningst~kten, so~ var
s&rski1t stora 1947-55 samt 1967-68, har mestade1s vad_t konjunkturutj82nand2.
Aren 1950, 1964, 1968 och 1971 utg6r dock undantag i dctta nvseenJe.
Om vi aterviinder till kurvan H kan vi ock:d1 lwnstater.:l att den i hog gr;::r1 pft-·
· d 1 · d' ~ ' f',., - ·t'tl'•·'·a ~--..,~:~J-., .. ,., .. ., 1·!·- .... mznn.;;r om en '.urva l t:-l(;l<:m :> ~;en anger ae ln,~nspo 1 '-'~"· -~-S':'c~:_:·::.::.'.:.;~c::. . a
p<>.e:.tcffekter.. Till en del beror det pA att de autoao;r,a skatte- uc11 tr.:1.1:d:ere--
ri ngsandrin);arna J. viss uts tr ~ickni n~ h<Jr uppviigt var.:Jw!ra (j fr. u:,e ll 3).
Darigcnom har de offent1iga cfterfragei.indringarna kornmit att doHtin~ra bi!.dc~n.
En bidr<1gande om:;U~ndlghet 2.r ocksa att med den hi:i.r anvJinda konsu~nti'msf•mk··
tionen sprids en skatteforandri.ngs imp&ctcffekt over en rad J!r. Det.tc. lktyt1 t'r·
ocksi att fDrstaarscffcktcn av en viss skattelindring blir fBrh!llandevis tlt~n
i j§mforelse m~d effekten av en for~ndring av d~n offentliga efterf~~G~U p~
varor och tjant.:ter. Eller annor1unda uttryc:kt: f(jl· att uppvagc: d~r: e>~p-"'n::.i,<,
impacteffekten av en okning pa 100 mkr :::tv t.cx. den stat1iga i.nvesterir',':s-. 1!:0
verksamheten behovs det sa~rm1a ar en sk:J.ttehojning pa orr.kr1ng 230 rr.kl',
Karaktllristiskt for eftcrkrigstidens stabiliseringspolitik ir att den bar
bas£rats pa Lindringar av de direkta sk<1tlerna i en yttcrst bet,ran:.:;ad omfatt
ning. Sedan 1947 Ars kll11skattereform har de statliga skatteskalorna indrats
atta gant;cr (1948, 1953, 1957, 1960, 1962, 1966, 1971 och 1973, jfr. appendix).
Hartill kommer fyra hojnin;,;ar av folkpensionsavgiften (1954, 1957, 1959 och
1967) samt fyra me.ra betydande andringar av reglerna om ortsavdrag m.m. (1952,
1956, 1958 och 1967). Om dessa reformer ha:::- i allm:inhet gallt att propodtio
nerna har framlagts 8-12 milnader innan reform>!n tradde i kraft. Tidsintervallet:
ar saledes for lingt for att man skulle ha kunnat g6ra n&gor1unda s3kra kon
junkturbedonmingar. Ikrafttradand:?.t har gcnomgiende skett vid det narmast
140 Denna problcmatik har diskuterats av Eisner med utg&ngspunkt fr&n 1968 ars amerikanska skattehojningar for att finansiera 6kadc utgifter ~5r kriget i Vietnam, Se ave.n Lindbeck 1971.
TV;68 foljande irsskiftet och dct har djrf5r inte bli~it fr&ga om att jndra preli-
minarskattetabellcrna under kaleru!er~ret. NAgra cnstaka und~ntag h~rifr~n
finns dock, SAlunda tr~dde 1960 irs och 1962 ~rs skattes~nkninBar i kraft
2-3 manader efter dct au: proposi tior>.n hod<.: framlagts. I b;_da des sa fal!.
kombincrade::; som vi har sett inko:r~stskatter:.inkninf,<lrna me(l omshojningar,
Betraffande hojningen av folkpensionsavgittcn 1967 blev tinsintcrvallet en
clast 6 manadcr. I det Ud.let andrades ocksa prelimin~irska:.:tctc::)ellcrna fran
halvirsskiftet. N!gra andringar av uttegsprocenten har intc heller f8rekom
mit sedan 1957. Det ar all tsa uppcnbart att det i. huvudsak ar Ungsikti.ga
overvaganden som har varit hestal'1!11ande for inkomstska.ttepolitiken sedan
1946. Samrna sak galler om arbetsgi.vnravgifterna. ATP-avgifterna har linda
sedan syster:wts tillkomst 1960 fastst:i~lt:s for fcm ar i t<l8f?.t och nagr.:-;
' k 1 f • ' . l h . f.. k . 14 OA , avv1 e scr ran uppgJoraa p an8r ar tnte ore·orumlt, Intc heller den all-
manna arbetsgi varavgiften har hi tti 1 J s anvants i konj i.mkturutj amna:-tde sy ftc.
Vad galler punktskattern<~ och de allmanna varuskatterna sa har dessa - sorn
vi har sett - anvants i betyJande utstdickning som stabilii:ieringspolit·:.ska
instrument. Anmarknin~sv~rt ar dock att in?,a sllnknin~ar ~v indirekta skdtLcr . - ---·-' "---har genornforts under avma.ttningarna, For att motv<:rka hamstring och i ;.;vrigt
na en snabb effekt har tidsi.ntervallet mellan propositionernds f::-an.Uiggandc
och skattehojningarnas ikr.afttradar.de i de flcsta [allen kunnat gUras (~<:nska
kort (fran nagra dagar ti 11 ett par m/:inader). Trots cletta har anvandningen
av de indhd;ta skatterna intc varit problemfri ur flexibilitctssynpuni~!.
under t.ex. den senastt:! konjunkturvib~lingen (j fr. ned an).
Hot bakgrund av er·farenheterna fran de tva senaste kcnjunkturcyklernil finns
det uppenba1·ligen ett stort utrymmc for forbattringar av den svenska stabi
liseringspolitikens anpassning till radande koujunkturlagc. I det foljande
skall vi diskutera nagr~ av de omstandir;heter som har eller kan Uinkas ha
lagt hinder i vaget?- for en flexibel kon.iunkturpolitik.
Lat oss b6rja m~d prognoscrna. E(tersom den ekonomiska politiken alltid
tnaste utf0!1:1CIS under OSakerhet om de framtida utvccklingstcncenserna,
ka•1 dess resultat (om vi bortsc1· fr.ln ren tur) natur1ir;tvis inte bli
b~ttre lln de prognoscr som politiken Hr baserad p~. ~ven om utv~rdcring
av prognos,~r :ir en delikat sak synes de i-:,:cJ::cockonomiska prognoserna 1
Sverige till en del ha var.it ~indre frruJg}n~srika de senaste ~ren. Vad
~~11cr B~P-prognoserna har dct funnits nn systcmJtisk tendens att under-
skatta styrkan av s1vtll exoansioner (1964 och 1969) sorn nedfl}n~ar (196G,
19£7, 1971 och 1972). Dctta rcflekteras sj~lvfallet ock~~ i hytesbalans-
prognoserna, som har varit fBr opt~mistisk3 under l1Bgkonjunkturar (1965
140A Ett undantag utgBr den Atertagna hBjningen frAn 10 1/2 till 10 3/4 1973.
•
IV:69
och 1970) och for v~::simi·;ti8l:a undc-::· ::-•v::l:•• r:1ir<;",s~::en (1967, 19/1 och
1972), En liknai1de fn.st:?.r: •r,indn• utt<dad· V:llcL·:;s k:m ia:'.tt:;s filr k.:.1nsu-
marginaler llr vi sj~1vfallet inte. En del b5r kunna vJnnas genohl bkad
satsning pF1 ckonom;."triskt inriktad forslzni:1g och er, uti:ikad och kvatica
tivt forbi:i.ttrad tillg.lng ;>a kortsikti(,a konjunkturdata. Ett uppslag som
kan vara vllrt att prBva tir att ued hj~1p av koujunkcurbarometerenk~ter
insamla kvartalsvis2. data om hushllh·ns n·:h kora:m:nern0.s pl;mer och
faktiska agerande vad glll1er t.ex. sparanJe, konsumtiuns- och inves~e
ringsutgifter och likviditctsutveckling. S3dana data skulle ha gjort en
del nytta under 1971 och 1972. Det ~r ockrn t~nkbart att en y1:terli~are
frist~ende prognoserande enhet (t.ex. en universitetsinstituticn) rA elt . l. k . 0 d fruktb<n:t sJtt skulle. fr:intja konkurrens och offentllg c1s ussH1n pa · d:t:J.
Det ;ir ewcl!.c·ctid o!:r?->:ckcr:ligt att vi ~iven i forts~tttJ'inr;cr: f.]r ;.::-J>n:t r,:,?c
att pro~noscrna 1 b~tyJ~nde sr3d tan sl~ fe~. F6r att b~~rHnsa de ,;pg~
tiva Hiljclerna hi.>:~·.r till etl :nini•nnrr foni1·.:s ofta tv:ira Onl1~1r;gning;,·c
a.v den ekonomiska p.:,J.it:i1·cn ~=-;;'i snat·t missta::-:ct har f.qststallts. Det sorn
i giv0t f.:11l kan kritiseras ar alltsA rnindre prognosfelet iin en ~ltebliven
anpassning av konjunkturpolitiken till den nya prognosc.n,
So:n v1 har sett t:i.lJdelacles fina;~spolitikc.n en helt passiv roll undsr
storre de1en av dcm senHste hogkonjuakturcn, aven o:n det fr:1n rent !:~tah5.·
liseringspolitiska utg.1ngspunkter hade v<n~it naturl:i.gt att fin::~nspoliti.l,en
1tminstone frAn hBsten 1969 l1a~e omJn~ts i }tstramande riktning. Det kan
vara rimligt att cliskutera n.:lgra t~lnkbar2. :nledningar hartill for att
darigenom so~a bely~:a probl~mati.l<et1 kcing stabiliscringspolitike.ns flexi.-·
bilitet, Under 1969 och 1970 sakn<1des det inte uppmaninp,ar att sk~il:pa
finanspolitiken - exempelvis genom att ta den planerade momshojningen
tidigare an forst avsett, Som skill for att inte hoja momsen :!:ore 1971
har finansministern bl.a, anfort att momshojninger. var sammankopplad
med inkomstskatteslinkningen for 11ginkomsttagarna141
och att momshBjningens
prishojande effekt skulle andra forutsattninRarna for det under 1969 och
1970 ··11 d o o t 1 142 G d d . .. d o ga an e tvaarsav a et, o tas ct s1.sta argumentet ar et svar t
141 Se proposition 1970:156, s. 14.
142 Se Andra Kammarens protokoll 1970 nr 1, s. 36-37.
IV: 70
att se att det i praktiken ~r majligt att nnv~nda skattepolitiken fBr
att motverka overiwtt.nin13<H :i. vkonorr.iii, l s<1 fall skulle enclas:: krcdit-, . . k 0 • 1 " . . () lL>3 . 0 t po.dtl·en sta t:l 1 1>ucs s<tso::;1 f::1llet var unoer 196 ... , Sa fen.: som under
1967 gick det f6r sig att hoja orusen mitt under dct d~ g~llande tre5rs
avtalets 16ptid, (I det fa11et r~rde det sig dock o~ en hBjning med ~n
dast en proct::ntenlwt ,) hot tanl,,:;n att skattebetingade prishojningar inte
far Jndra 1ontagarnas ekonomiska villkor un]er en avtalsperiod kan ocks&
invandas att det fr2in Wntagarnar: synpunkt spelar mindre roll om det ar en morushojning eller en ut:ebliven atstrarr:ning som leder till hojda pri
ser, I cliskussionen1a om den utebl:i.vna atstramnin8c,n 1969-70 har man
iven pekat p5 en rad Bvervilganden av icke-ckonomisk art som t5nkbara
fork1aring;~r. Det h.1r t.ex. fr:lmh!l.llits att avta1sri.irelsen under vihen
1969 inte fick storas av en sk:irpning av den ekonomiskc politiken. Det
har ocksa anforts att r~n .1tstramning inte borde sammanfalla i ticlen n:et:
bytet p& statsministcrposten i oktober 1969. Slutligen har s1v!l or0n
pa den svensi<a arbetsmarknaden vintern 1969-70 och valet i septem}x;~
1970 n~mnts som omst§ndigheter som kunde motivera ett uppskov med ~t
stramningen, I vilkr~n utstrackning dessa hande1ser evcntuellt kan ha paverkat stabiliseringspolitikens utformning skall vara osagt hUr.
Den sklirvning av finanspolitiken som sent omsider genomfBrdes i slutet
av oktober 1970 ir fr&n m~nga synpunkter en intressant episod i svensk
ekonomisk politik. Ett motiv for sk§rpningen var uppenbarligen oro fBr
bytcsbalansutveck1ingen. Har k<m erinras orn att 1angtidsutredningen - som
hade b1ivit k1ar just i oktober 1970 - starkt betonade vikten av att elimi
nera bytesba1ansunderskottet. Vidare forutsags arbetskraftsbrist pa Ulngre
sikt. Det kan emellertid tillaggas att Langti.dsutrcdningen samtidigt utgick
ifrln '' ••• att sysse1sattningsmalet skall uppfy1las och att slledes en defla-
. tionistiskt allmant efterfrlgedampande politik inte far tillgripas for att
skapa balans i utrikesbeta1ningarna". 144 Da skattefors 1agen framla.des var
Konjunkturinstitutets hostrapport innu inte publicerad men i det n1:irmn.ste
k1ar. I rapporten betonades att hogkonjunkturen hade kulminerat under forsta
kvarta1et och att en dimpning frln den hoga aktivitetsnivln hade kunnat iakt
tas under de tva fo1jande kvartalen. Vad gal1er utvecklingen pa arbetsmarknaden
143 Denna uppfattning, som Strang utveck1ade under remissdebatten 1970 (se Andra kammarens protokcl1 1970 nr 2, s. 36-37), motsvarar ganska vil Sko1ds bedomning 16 ar tidigare.
144 Se SOU 1970:71, s. 46.
IV:J.i
angav institutet en klar uppg&ng <J..V a;:bet~;Eisheten un,i!2r 1971 som en mojlig-
,- het, Betraffande utrikeshandeln framho1.1.s o:::slaget mot exro;:otoverskottet un
der sonunaren och for handels- och bytesb2.l::msen foruteags forbJtningar under
1971 pa 1200-1500 mkr. Denna bedi:imning av det samhiillsC!konomiska lB.get lr.unde
s~Hedes knappast motivera en omedelbar och krafti~ atstramning. Som nan::ts
bifolls denna efter snabbehandling av Riksc!agen, dar aven oppositioncu tog
ansvar for skattehojningarna. ornede1bart eftcr skrev KonjunkturinsLitut0ts
Bengt Pettersson: "Desto mer anrnarkningsviird ar den senaste atstramningen,
Som ett led i spe1et infor avtalen ar den kanske berattigad. Savitt man kan
bedoma maste dock politiken snart Uittas for att undvika en okning av arbets-
1 .. h 11 145 D k •• 0 k t do f' 1 f'' 1' t 0 0 ~ os eten , et an aven pape as at a 1nansp_anen ore ag va man~~er
senare forutsag den en 1ika stor bytesbalansforbattring 1971 som en~igt
Konjunkturinstitutets bedomning. ·
Att atstramningen i oktober 1970 inte i forsta hand var motiver<!d av
stabiliseri:1gspolitisk~1 skill betonac1c:s vid en paneldiskusdou pf. ~:to;..\-·
helms universitet hosten 1971 nv en av finansdepartementets
som snarast ville se den scm en mer Hmgsil~t-tg fUrst:irkni!lf: <W clen
statliga sektorns resurser. Eetri:if£ande valet ;1v tirlpunkt n:r att
geno:;1fora forstarkningen hade den hl.a. bestnmts nv dct faktum att
regeringspartiet inte. ensamt skulle vara i :nnjorit<:t eftcr att de11 r.y::;_
enkammarriksdagen hade borj at sitt arbete vid inr,angN1 till 1971. Dct
foreliig siil~des en kcnflikt mellan kol"t·· och l?mgsiktiga h:·insyn ocl! i
detta fall fick stabiliseringshHnsynen ge vika. Situationen p!minncr
pa satt och vis om laget i slutet av 1959, d[i en forstarknin;; av stats
finauserna ocksa bedo:ndes som onskvUrd, Den avgorande ski ll.naden mellan
1959 och 1970 var emellcrtid att under det fHrra &ret talade s1v51 koa-
junkturhansyn som Uingsiktiga ml'dsattningar om den offE.ntliga sektorns
utveckling f8r en Atstramning,
Vad gallcr utvecklingen under 1971 ar det svart att forsta varfor en
radikal uppmjukning av den forda restriktiva politiken inte genomfordes
under sommaren ellcr tidigt pa hosten. Redan fore halvarsskiftet stod det
klart att det var fdiga om en rejal avmattning och att hojningen av momsen
och arbetsgivaravgiften fran arets borjan var raka motsatsen till vad kon
junkturlaget kravde, Vi stoter har pa ett snart klassiskt monster i svensk
ekonomisk politik som i praktiken gar det omoj ligt att anvanda de tunga
145 Se B. Pettersson 1970.
IV;72
skatteinstrumenten i konjunktuqwlitiken. Fi)rsl.aget om inkomstsk:J.tt!!reformen
f.o.m. 1971 och finansieringen av denna rned momsh6jningen aviserades i borjnn
av 1970 elle.r nastan ett ar fore ikrafttr::idandet. Tidsinterval let va1· sii
ledes for Ungt for att man skulle ha kunnat gora nngcr lunoa sakra korrjunl~
turbedomningar for 1971. Det som fran rent stabiliseringspolitiska utgangs
punkter forefaller helt irrationellt ar naturligtvis att aven finansieringen
av en reform beslutas Iangt i forvag utan moj lighet till senare av konjunk
turutvecklingen motiverade jus teringar. Ett betydande matt av konj unktu-r.
politisk flexibilitet skulle vinnas om det gick att skjuta pa avgorandet om
finansieringsdclen till relativt kort fore reformens ikrafttr:idande. Samma
monster upprepades i fjol da beslut £attades under varen om sankt inkomst.
skatt och hojd arb~tsgivaravgift fran arsskiftet. Ett tredjc exempd at
slopandet av omsen pa. investeringsvaror fr..ln 1969 som bade besUimts ett: 2r
innan skatten togs bort. Att inkomstskattcreformer tycks b~hovas med f& .f1rs
mellanrum i en relativt inflationistisk ekonomi utan indexreglcring av in
komstskat.terna okar naturligtvis ri:ickvidden av det hlir. diskuterade p~·c·blemct.
Faktorer som bidrog till den klena tillvixten i Sverige 1970-72 ha~ framfor
allt varit den betydande minskningen av 1agerinvestcringarna och den svaga
konsumtionsutvecklingen, En rad atgarder har som vi har sett insatts for
att oka lagerbildningen. Daremct llar inga gen~rella konsumtionsstimulerande
satsningar gj orts. Att myndigheterna i s tallet for generella s timulanser
' har valt att anvanda selektiva och overv~gande investeringsframjande atgar·
der beror sal~ert till en del pa onskan att oka industrins produktionskapaci.tet·
infer nasta hogkonjunktur sa att kapacitetstaket inte nas lika fort som 1969.
Ett problem med investeringsstimulerande atgarder ar emellertid att effekter
nas storlek och fordclning i tiden ar oberal<neliga inom vida marginaler, inte
minst under en djup avmattning. Den ovantat taga okningen av industriinvcste
ringarna under 1971 illustrerar detta ganska val. A andra sidan ar precisionen
sannolikt vasentligt storre da konsumtionsframjande atgarder anvands for att
styra konjunkturen. Hartill kommer att naringslivets investeringsplaner natur
ligtvis till en del ar beroende av den privata konsumtionens utvecklir:g. At:t
den privata konsumtionen anda inte har stimulerats generellt beror sannolikt
ocksa pa att de nodvandiga skattesankningarna inte har ansetts acccptabla
fran fordelningssynpunkt.
l Y.f • -, '1 .i ... J
I debattcn om en ewmtuell skattesiinkning h<•r det gjor.ts giiilande ntt ·~n
forsvagning av statsfinam:erna skulle forhir.dra kraftfulla insatser mot ar
betslosheten. Och det har kr~vts at~ en s~attc~Jnkning i givet fall skall
"finansieras" av hojningar av andra skat~er ell er utgiftf:minsknin~ar. :~ening
en tycks hiir vara att det statliga budgetun-;:\erskottets storlek ar ett ·vik.ti
gare kriterium an sysselsattningslaget df., stabiliseringspolitikens utformning
skall avgoras. Det ar naturligtvis en belt oacceptabel tanke. som tycks f6r
utsatta att det ar om~jligt att hantera cie problem sam eventuellt kan uppsti
i en senare hogkonjunktur till foljd av en expansiv finanspolitiks likvidi
tetsokande effekter.
En annan sorts brist pi flexibilitet i finanspolitiken beror pi att myr;dig
heterna avsdr fran att anvanda redan existeranJe instr1.1rr.ent i konjuuktur
utjamnande syfte. Goda exempel ar har ATP-avgifterna och den allma:-:r1.?. 'l.rb-:=ts
givaravgiften liksom inkomstskatt0rna for hush.lllen och. bolagen. Om raa-1 t.ex.
irligen anpassade utt:agct av arbetsgivu:uvgifter till det ;(Ktuella och fer··
vantade konjunkt:urlaget skulle efterfragan pa arbetskraft l<un'la paveriu:s i
gynnsam riktning. 6kad flexibilitet skulle utan tvivel ocksa kunna vit»l3S Gm
myndigheterna fick (och anvande) en befogenhct att pa administrativ vag Jt,dra
t.ex. de indirekta skatterna for att sedan i efterhand inhamta Riksd::lg(:ns . . .. ll;6
samtycke. Pa detta omrade ligger Sverlge en del efter Vl.SSa andra la.c!der.
Sedan 1961 har sa lunda den engelska regcri ngen ratt at.t andra indi:rd<:ta
skatter med hogst 10 % uppat eller nedit ("the regulator"). Bcfoger:het~~r
av liknande slag bar ocksi regeringarna i bl.a. Belgien, Frankrike och USA.
Denna och andra fragor rorande finanspolitikens flexibilitet ar for narva
rande foreruil for utredning inom Budgetutredningen.
146 1962 framlades en proposition om fullmakt for regeringen att andra vin··· och spritskatterna. Inom en manad skulle.Riksdagens godkannande HV
skatteandringen i givet fall uppnas. Riksdagen avslog som bckant propositionen (proposition 1962:140).
EXKURS
Dctta appendix inneh~t!ler en kompletteran
de redor;\.irc!se frjr de analysmctoci~r som har
anv:ints i Kapitd 5.
I en analys som syftar till att bcst:imma
finanspolitikcns cffckter pa den privata koa
sunllionsLiterir:~~;:n 3.r valet av kolEil!~ltio~s
funktinn a-.· uts):,:;~;z~·;:ttldc bctydclsc. Mcd stud
av g~!n:;se konsun1tiot1stct\ri 1 ~ 4 och s.":v;il ~\-en·
sk~ ~o1n u!.tindsk'~ t·stitnatiorH~r av 2..~:;r: __ ·::l.t'Ltd'::
konsurntiou~~funki.}u;ler syncs dct rin~E~t '"tlt an·
ta att den rcala privata ko:Jsuwtiv:.lcn :ir en
funk! ion av huslt[Jkns rc:-tla di.''lX.>r:ibh inkom,tcr inte bara i s:~mma period t't:\11 ocks?t
i ctt :~nta! pcriodcr dessf<irinn:m. Dct :5.r <.Ei.
IV:74
(3)
dar T = ~kattcb~Ioppet, t = skattes:J.tscn, :!3 ~ skattcbascn och k = k0l'5t~:Jt. 01n k li!· of:jr
lir.drad f:ts cfter diffcrcnticring
dT ~, tdS +Ddt (4)
I)cn r·.J~lLin~~l:t 2.!ldringcn av skatteLe1t)ppet
fr:cn p•:ri(Jd 1 till 2 !nr s:"dctles uppdcb~:; i s:~att(·r~~~~~i!·c1~:n 1\2 :.~ l\dt och !'ka~~cauto:-n:·.~~
ken ~·\2 = t! dB. S:.:.Jt~e5.tgl1rden i n:ala ~crrner
b<:'st}.in.> nu so!n
(.'i)
fri'tga 0111 nrtgon version av "perLl~nent i:1- D.:n n:;::1a skattc~:ltorn~tike!l ~er~iknas ~fJl11
CO!nc" hyJ)Otcscn. En. Enri.r .,~~ri:tat ~.!V t:n s:''t- s~t ~E::aclcn n!c1l:1n den tot2.ia n·~· ia s1.;.:~ u cfi·.r-
da~l !a)nstnntiunsfunktion kan skriv;:~s pi't fur- ~ir:drir:grn och rcala ~k~!.ttc!1.:.g~irJ<'n 1 lh·~. ~.ul~l
{1)
dlir ct = rc;c) privat kons~..:mtion och yt = ln:s
hftllens rc::·.h <;is;)o:J.ibla inknmsl. Den korts;k
tiga 1n:t~·ginel1;1 konsurn: ionsL-..~n:i~~cT:hcten
('.\JPC) ;ir ct. 1 ~:; En cstimalioa (u<fi):d mcd
rn_~esta l:v~Cratmctodcn) pl b~sis av ~\'Ctts!\:a
iirsclata Er 1950-GS ga\· folja:1de resuktt
C1 = o,43l:'1 + o,:Js cH- s?s,so (5,21) (6,27)
R2 =0,99S D/W= 1,93
(2)
D~nna konsumtio'1sfun\tion h~.r anv~.nts i :kn nun1criska analrsen.
For att il!;1~:trcra 5xilic.:H!cn :1H:ll~n s:,attd.t
glin.lcr och s~;:att.~autnrnatik kan v.l utg.(lt i!r!ln
den nomilldla ~bu tc:u•1klionen for 1)':riod
((I)
Lrtt os:-> ;:~nrc rncra prccist hur ~k:,oc: t£:)i!·dcr ..
n~s (och skatteautol!la!!kcn.s) cffcktr:r ]y~
sL?i'1t3. /\.nta aa en ~k(:tt('~:it:kning gcnn!n!·~~:·s
I1r t och att den i rcai~ tcrm':r uppi(t:· t.iil b·:h:_:>p::! i't
1• ivfcd l:onsnrn:i•.•nsfuu1:tioner'. (I)
blir i;:Jpactcffd;tcfl p:"t konsumtion~:voly:ner!
t!ndcr ~amma ar Z1 = (t:\. Fur de kl>:tclc ~trcn b!ir ir:1pactdfckt•:rna fiZ,, {l~Zv ;J'~Zt> ...
Den ~:1n~n1~~nl:t~~da ii~lpactf2ffckt('ll !Or £db.
[trc;· fr[m cch mer iir t blir al!ts[t r;.;\f( 1- fj) c;}ci.~ - ~)lCd d~. nnmeriska v~\rdt~11~ !rf..n t~cva
ti')!l (!) - 1,02:~ at. E~l viss real sk:tU(~:~:~nk
lL.lf!. ilc {,1:ar a1hs;i k()n~u~1!tioncn o1ned<"eJ~rt
n~ed t;.S c;~ av at Jr.cG~.n den tot:tla iu1p~~ctcf
fcktr.~ via '\:iisu:ihu~td lag"~n1ek~:nisntcn koxnmer ;).ct mot.s·:~ra l 02;!·% av •\ Den :mcJel
a·.; :•.::~;:1:\jXtc<cffc!.-ten m:n l!:n· ttppt>tttts cftt:r
n ; . .r ;:r 1--{J"'. Med fl='J,'SH b:1r knappt tva
~y·c:~jc·c~~":l~·li uppujt~~) cf~_cr tv:~ :,r, Ef!t~r ~rr_: 1\r
~ir anc1eien 80% och eftcr fyra ar knappt
30%. Den nt!merjska ?.n:1.lyscn 0!":1~:~ttelr ftren 1£li.7
-71. fi:ir var och en av s:C:<ttc:··-t~:lrdern"- :!~,7,
... , rt71 fflr \'i ::d!t~!t jn1p~:cte~fckter son1 fOrGe
Jar sir; i tidcn p~t dt·t ~!:i~t som just har beskri·
vits. Gero!n att :tdtlera alb de impactcf[,:;;tcr
till fOljd av skatt~·:ttgaHkr son1 - med !a8"g~·r
av viixl:1~1de l~ingd - inf:dler ett. visst ~u·, ftr
vi dttt:t ~rs tot a 1a impactt::fe!-:t av sk:Htc ;,._
r,:irdn. O!tl iirt:n J~H7-71 lllllllreras fr:m I til!
25 uch <,Jn Zt( = n.\) !lO!l1 fUu~t bctcckr!~~r den otncd,Jb:aa inlpa,:t,:!fckttiJ av skattt..~:ltg:ird,·u
•\ kan sk:llte:.tg:itd<:tt:.,s t0tab impactcffd-.t
IV:75
Dct wrc'!c v::1ra t~imligcn klart att politikcrna
intc ar.v:-\ader en Sa IJ:'-SS komp!icerad bc~tt\m
nl!16 a·.' s~'<at~c:~tg:·~rdcrEas irnpactc!fcktcr s0m
c!rn i ckvation '(7) angivna. Dct \'Ore bm:.:c
d~irH)r rin1~igt rncd en kon1;:>lcttcr~ncic bcst~im
ning av ~k:lttct~t~~:ird<~rtlas )mpacteffcktcr cl~ir
ridshorisc>~Jtcn bc~-o-'i11sas till c!r:1 m::n Jahorc
r;->.r nH·.d i koujtu~k~nrpros;noscrna, th·s. h(~gst
('tt ~t,-, Ett rtrs ~~-=attc~ttg~~rd(TS irnp;:.ctcffe~t
skullc d;l h.(·lt r:nke1t bE Zt rncc!~1n ~~;)!a tcr
mrn i ( 7) sku'lc hn•1a h:infi)ras till m::oma
tiken~' ~rfl!):,ctcffckt ~;~soul varanc>: )\ultotnat!::; ...
ka ., cf[cJ~.tcr .av 1 it~j~~~rc s~al ~;.::r<.';itlska. bcslut.
).I:~n skul1c v~il k~:llna s:t~:~ '!~t dcn1~a dcfini
tivn 1ncra a:1~~u~cr ~:ig till politi~:.C!T:t:ls si:ua-tion so:n tyi)~5l~t ;~r ~:tt bc·~.I(;;na tic~ l.:Pt11iH~l·1··
( 7) de ttrcts ckono:ui:;ka ut\·ccklin~~ soi~l dra kan furviint::s bli d:·t lli\t:syn t:\s till ..,_l~a rci~:Y:•••:a
Sis: a ll't :nnl reprcs~ut<·t ar ~:"dedc~ den Uel ~-~., orllsliindr£heLer ( inklusi\·e "g;unla" ; .. ~.t~:i:·der
totaL• i;::p;"-'":fcktrn fi!r ;,,. t sum gencreras orh den !orv:intade eftcrft!'•~;cut\·ccLlin•:cn
av ''<~i~!t i~u~td h·~''-ln·.:~ani\!l1CJ1. En kon:\t
h-cns :•\' "<'l al~\·:int~:t c!di:l;ti0ncn (7) och ~tt
rnedta l"l!'bq de :\t~:irJcr !'0111 ha;. vidt:t~;its
19-l-7 cllrr senare iir 11:Hurligtvis att laggadc
impactcffdter a,· t.<:x. l~H6 :Jrs skatteiitgtirJcr
intc kOJnmcr lllCd Ll:tml de effcktcr av at:~~ir
der som ltiinfurs till 1~·~7 och :trcn cl:ircf~cr.
lH Se t.cx. Eva!ls, ~'a;>. 2 uch 3. Sc iivcn Eisner. 14~ Den l:'ingsiktig.t ;.:pc olir cbtclllot a(l +r1,
( 1 + r-fJ) diir r :ir komtt!lltionens tillv:ixu"!,t (vi har eLi borbctt fr:ut kortsiktiga fluktu:t:io
ner). Ett alt(!r:tativt satt .ttl shiva konsumti<••l\
funktiog,_·n ~r
(!a)
Av dettc:t t.~ttr} ck fran1g.·1r direkt att Ct ~ir en funktion ;w real di:,ponibcl inkomst uudcr j·~
riodema 1, 2, .• . , t.
utanf<.ir den statE;a ~cktorn) I~~r ::ttl d~Lrefter
t:~ st:ii;i!ing tilt bcho\'~t av nya ::;l;~;)jli:<:rin~~s
po!!~!s!·~a [ttgiirc!er- l.1tfl~nl:t kalky1cr v:sJr ~t~
budget~ttgzirdcn,:~s toiala impactdfektcr p:"t\Tr
kas rclati\·t ]it~ av o:n !'k:-"..ttc~lt~:!rclcrnas irn-
p " t fr '-•·' · 1-. ·-r::., ·" · l,.sA --- Z 'I·~. .. C C 1C,.,_, \ 1 .. c:-; .. t .. 1S J0!.1 . ""t ·- ~t C1 c .• l ('11 ...
ligi•n tun] eK\·ation (7!. J>•:tta Lcror bl.:1.. p:"t
alt offcn;.J;~;;:t t:~tcrlr?!g~;!.ndrin&;~n· c!e fiesta ftr
svar;:.r f<:·r en doln!nt:r:::.ntlc dci av flt~;:·trd·~rnas
i:11pac:.dfcktn cflc!som at:louoma ~!:alt::-- och
transfen:rings:inl!ringar har upp\·?igl varandra
i s!or u:str:ickninr; (jfr. tabell 3).
Bud;ctpo!iti!u:z's ::cttoirn;:;:-::teffckt (pa total
cftt:rfr.\;~n C)J;], prkata invcsterir,gar) Et biir hiirdtcr
E = EsA + 11G + EA t t t t (8)
/:.. G 1 ar forlindri:1gcn av den offcntliga sck
u:-ns reala kon::umtion och im·r:st~ringar (ink!.
bostaclsbygsande). At:;ardcmas impacteffckt
lir siiJcclcs summan av E1
= E~.\ + 11G1• E'; ar
skattcauto:natikcns impactdiekt son'_ -ocst:i.rns
pa principicllt sarnma s:.!tt ~om E~\ jfr. ckvation (7). FOr att mUj1jgG:Ora FirnfO:clscr i tid en har sto:-hetr:rna i (8) utt:-yd:ts i procent
av n:irmasl furcgaendc [ti'S B?\l'.
IV:76
REFERENSER
Arvidsson, Guy, "tn f:nkiiL ro::-anJr: ·verkningarna av investerin2,savgiftt~n, kr.;,diL"itstramnin;.;en och r:(ntehojringcn paden sven;;kq iudustrins inves Leringar 195)", _Ekonc-:!•ir;k TidsJ:._rif t 1956, s. :,o--60.
Bos tad_~f~nansi~~ing ~ch krcd~ tpolit~k t Stockholm 1958,
Edgren, Gost:a; Faxen, Karl-Olaf; Odhner, Clas-ErikJ ];onebildni~?_och ~amh~-~l:.;~~kono~_i, Stockholm 1970.
Eisner, R., "Fisca 1 and Monetary Policy Reconsidered", A~er ican Economi~~ Revie~ 1969, s. 897-905,
Elias son, Gunnar, "Investment Funds in Operation", Occasional Pap~!:. nr 2, Konjunkturinstitutet, Stockholm 1965.
Kreditmarknaden och industrins investerinJ]ar, Stockholm 1967.
Evans, M.K., Macroec?nomic Ac:tivi~, New York 1969.
Hadenius, Stig; Wieslander, Hans; Holin, Bjorn, _Sver_ige cJter 1900, Stockholm 1967.
Hansen, Bent, Finanspolitikens ekonomiska teori, Stockholm 1955 (SOU 1955 :25):"------·----
"Den yttre och den inre inflationen" i Rcc~pt mot inflati~:~, Stockholm 1957.
(assister.ad av Snyder, Hayne, W.), Fi~<:l_P<:.li9'_~n S~~~-~:..'2-~;::;_tr~~~:~ 11~~-65, OECD, Paris 1969.
Jacobsson, Lars, An E£9~~et~i~3!odel o~Sw8den (stencil)~ Stockhclr. 1970.
"Industrins investcringnr ·och p~?nningpolitiker~.", Sk:::nJin<l.visl::>. En~;ld 1dr, BankC'ns kvartalssk:rift 1972, s. 156-6:L -------~---·-·"-----~-
Johansson, S.-E. och Edenhammar, H., Investerin~>,sfonders 1i:insamht::!:_~
Stockholm 1968.
Kragh, llorje, "Stabiliseringspolitik och san~h1illsek~momi.sk balans" i Svens~ykonomi (red. Bo S6dersten), Stockholm 1970.
Lindbeck, Ar.sar; Heller, Walter m.fl., Fiscal Policy for a Balancf~d -~conomt, OECD, Paris 1968.
Lindbeck, Assar och MatthiE:ssen 1 Lars, "Finanspolitiska tvangstr6jor", Tidcn 1968, s. 173-83. (Diskussion med Kjell-Olof Feldt, s. 262-65 och 380-81.)
Lindbeck, Assar, ~~~sb_~~r~;.~c ~~~_1~~--Y-~~~~mi nll!"::..~ _ _pa _!~~mj unk tt_:':._ut~ck l_5:..~!le_r~. Stocki,olm 1956. (SOU !956-Ltd.) En sammanfattning av undersokniPeen finns i KL h 56, s. 39-48.
~}5 ckonomisk politik, Stockholm 1968.
"Stabi liseringspoli tikens mo j ligheter - tidsefter.s lapningar och malkonflik ter" i Samhallsekonomisk po li t~k, Stockholm 1971.
Lindstrom, Ulla, I regeringen 1954-59, Stockholm 1969.
Lundberg, Erik och Karleby, Olle, "PM rorand2 vcrkningarna av omsattni·.~~:sskattens avveckli~g", Bihang I till proposition 1946:386 (s. 42-44).
Lundberg, Erik, Konjunkturer och eko~omis.l_<_ politi~, Stockholm 1953.
Instability and Economic Growth, New Haven 1968,
IV: 77
Matthiesse.n, Lars, "Bud{;etary Effects ,<>.s Determined by th'::: Svu~dish I·:Ld.~.try
of Finance", S•:•.,_:_i_0'_0._:!n~1rt.!:.'!~?_f E~~>_:i:_~::>. 1971, s. 252.-256.
''Finanspoli tikcn som stahi J i :.:c~: ingspoli ti skt ins trun:ent'' i Ed.k Luuclbu f m. f 1. , Svens k . .J.i.~!_:;~:_po ~ i til<__ i tco~-~~:~~~~-£!:..9k til;~ • Stockholm 1971 •
Inl~gg vid Nationalckonomiska f5reninGcns buJgctJebatt, National-ekono.1liska foreni.r:1'ens for hand lin(~Dr 197 2. G. 26-30. ----~-
---·-·------··---~--
Inve3_!~-:E_t Fun~~:..1~~·,vth an.~l the Effcc::_~h•e _Ta~~J~~~~~· Stockholm 19]::;,
Medel for stvrninR av by~~nadsv~~ksamhctcn, Stockholm 1970 (SOU 1970:33). __ ..___ ________ ··-·---.-- .. ··~----Meidner, Rudolf, Svensk arbetsmarknad vid full syssC' ls~it tning, Konj Uitktur
institutet, Stockholml9."J~4-.----------~--------
Metelius, Bengt, Utlandstransaktionerna och den svensku ckon01nin, Stockholm 1955 (sciu19557I3f:----·---· -···· .. -·---·-
Mal Ol:h medel i stal?__ili~eringse_olitiken, Stockholm 1961 (SOU 1961:42).
Pettersson, Bengt, "Foretagens lar,erpolitik oc:h konj unkturen", Aff?~.FE~(>d::_~•.:: -Finanstidninge~ 1970, s. 1232-34.
"Den offentliga sektorn stiJt:esten for konjunkture.n", A~fii~~~rJ~~~:·.::.: -~inans tidningt.:~ 1972, ;:; • 1294-1300.
Rehn, Gosta, "Pa vag mot en ra.ti.onell fin=mspolitik", 1 -~·~-~ c:_c:h _ _!-.:9..1:.0.~~_::'·:~ (Till Ernst Wigforss pa 80-irsdag~n), s. 76-92,
Rudberg, Karin och Ohr.1an, Chris ter, "Invcs tment Funds ·- tt-.r2. Rc ledc,e of 1.967". Occasional Paper nr 5. Konjunkturinstitutet, Stockholm 1971.
Snyder, \.Jayne \oJ., "Measurin~ Economic Stabilization 195<r-65", !::1~-ti~::.t.E. Economic Review 1970, s. 924-33.
~sk ek<?_:~i 1971-75, SOU 1970:71, Stockholn 1970.
Wigforss, Ernst, Minnen del III. Stockholm 1954.
1\mark, Karl, Kri.stidspolitik och kristidsht:~:hiillning i Sv.•t:i5~e unJer ach ef ter andra v~ir ldskriget, Del I, sou -1"952 ?49:-'-nel-~iT.sou-1952 :-56, -Stockholm 195i.---
V:l
~EA.PTEii. ~.r
A INTRODUCTION
1. Index tying does not seem to be one of the favourite topics among
writers on public finance. In political contexts in Sweden and other
countries it has dn the other hand been discussed a great deal h1
recent years. One reason for this is of course the present high rate
of inflation in Sweden - the average yearly rise of consumer pr1.::es
1970-72 has been about 7 per cent. Another obvious reason is the fact
that the incomes of a large part of Swedish taxpayers today are hit
by tax rates which are relatively high both with historical and inter
national standards. Finally, the discussion has probably bt~E:n stimu1 <>(:;,C.
by the recent introduction of index tied income taxes in Denmark and
Holland. When the Swedish government in 1972 asked a public committe~
to revie'v personal income taxation it was explicitly statE:.d that r.he
committee should not deal '.•lith index tying.
The aim of this chapter is to present different index tying schemeR and
to discuss some of the implications of index tying. In section B n brief
outline of the Swedish personal income tax system is presented. In the
following section the working from a distributional point of vie~v of
such a. tax system is studied in some detail. It is shown hmv average
tax rates and real disposable incomes are influenced by growing money
incomes in an inflationary economy without index tying. How over-all
measures of distributional une'Tenness are influenced under similar con
ditions is also discussed. A number of tables and diagrams illustrating
the properties of the present Swedish tax system have been included
in section C. In section D an index tied income tax system is introducecl.
In turn \ve consider the tying of taxes to an index of consumer prices
measured at market prices and factor cost and to an index of nominal per
capita income. In section E sam implications of index tying
for distribution, stabilization and allocation policies are discussed.
In section F, finally, a summary and some concluding comments are found.
V:2
B A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE !;\>.TE~HSa TAX SYSTEH
2. As the first step in the analysis we shall introduce a specific
income tax function for an individual taxpayer. We h<1V(, cbose·n a
standard tax schedule of Lhe type which is used ~n S\veden and (dis
regarding minor details) many ether countries. It may be written:
(1)
The meaning of the symbols is:
Tt =the taxpayer's nominal tax liabilities for year t,
Y t = the taxpayer 1 s ~~~ i.ncome (Hhich becomes taxal~le: income
when the basic excrr.ption yl is subtracted),
Yi = the level of (assessed) income which constitutes the lowe1: ~.J:>rdt.r for income bracket number i,
the highest ineome bracket bo:cJer which is smaller than the tax
payer's assessed income Yt'
the tax rate applicable t'J the iP..come bracket above Yi but h-::l01v
I d • 1 d' ) . i+l $n! ~nc u 1ng. Y , '1
the marginal tax rate applicable to income abc,ve Y'. ,
n = the number of income brackets which "exhausts" the ta.xahle income
under consideration. If the income is sufficiently large, n \dll
of course equal the total number of income brackets in the tax
schedule,
* Yt = the assessed ~ncome of the taxpayer's cohabitant,
tA = the rate at which the tax deduction is reduced if Y'lf risess
AC = the child allowance rate,
N -- the number of child r.:n in the family.
AH = the maximal housing allowance (given the number of children and
housing costs).
As appears the tax sc~edule is not expressed in terms of the tax base
or taxable income but in terms of assessed income. It is quite clear
that the formulation (1) is general enough to take account of all the
different components of income taxation ir• Sweden, i.e. statE\ and
municipal taxes, social security cm:tributions and housing allowances.
A detailed presentation of the Swedish tax system cannot be given here,
V: 3
but a fe~" comments should be made. Municipal income taxes in Sweden
are proportional to the. tax base and thus sl.ir,htly progressive when
related to assessed income, provided the income earner is entitled to
a basic exewption. Local to.x rates vary between the municipalities. In
some cases (e. g. \.Jhen the income earner lives in his own house) the
determination of taxable income for state and municipal tax purposes
differs somewhat. Such differences will be disregarded here. The basic
pension fee is levied at a fl~t rate (of 5 per cent) of taxable inco:ne
up to a certain level (30.000 'lcrs). Even sickness insurance fees are
maximized. Housing allowances in year t depend upon the family's assessed
income in year t-2, the numbeJ of children and housing costs, whereas
child allowances are related dnly to the number of children. Concerning
housing allowances the maximal amounts and the marginal rates 1973 are
presented in Table 2. As is seen the housing allowance per child declines
as the number of children increase. From 1973 the child allowance rate
will be 1320 crs. Both housing and child allmvances are tceated as neg<i
tive direct taxes in the analysis. To simplify \ve have also assumed
that income changes affect housing allowances "1ithout a lag.
The tax deduction represented in (1) by the term tA(yLy*) involvE::s ' t
a deviation from the single ~eturns principle introduced 1971 as far as
labour income is concerned. Needless to say this deduction cannot
become negative. The normal state of affairs is therefore that the tax
deduction is either of maxim~! size (tAyl) or zero. tA has been 40 per cent since 1971.
It should also be pointed out that the basic exemption (4. 500 crs) is re-·
duced by one fifth to the extent that assessed income exceeds 30.000 ~rs.
With an assessed income of 52.500 crs the basic exemption is in other
words lost altogether. This rule is equivalent to a 20 per cent "hidden"
increase of the statutory tax rates applicable 11:1 the 30.000-52.500 crs
income bracket.!) All that is needed to take account of this rule. is thus
to increase the appropriate tax rates in (1) by one fifth. ---------------·---·----·---1) Assume that the reducti'Jn. of tile basic ~xemption starts when assessed
income is yj, Letting B d¢note taxable 1.ncome we have
I
I
If Y l.S an arbitrary incote level in the bra:!ke.t in which the basic exemption is reduced, the corresponding taxable income is
B = y - (yl - tB(Y-Yh]
Here tB is the rate at which the exemption is reduced. The tax to be paid on 1.ncome in this bracket is of course
which after substitution becomes
or
I .,. ~
:$srm 44'11
r~··~ SSHTE 44·:i
! i .. L- •...••• ·-!
I -----·--·-- -v:-4 · --~
110
; I
-~-~1-·-- --t ···--···-· ~ ---···-· -! .. -·-·· ! i J
t -t n~- t g (;.) . . -. ;1_1~--~ ~-:--· _·-_ .. :,:. -
lA: A ma1ried taxpayer 1·1ho is the. only incon: ... : · · AJ·l--"------~--,----j-------·-----·---:-·:-- 1: .. _earner 111 a family vith children or A si·i~;; 1
1 l , taxpayer with children. The figure aft2r A ·' · · indicates the numbet· of children i:1 ::il8
12Cl i __ ! _______ , -----: ......... : ------·----- -·family. (Tax deduction admit ted.)
J \ , !B: A married taxpayer \vho is the only income 1A3 --- ----- -------~:L ____ ; --~-_.;--~----~---:--earner in a family without children. I ____ 1 . • ..... ! ......... (Tax deduction admitted.) ____________ .;. __ :-:-~~-:--.. ;~---L_ ____ j::: __ A __ single taxpayer\vithout children or a
1 • . 1 - ., - married taxpayer v.ri thout children 'vhose ' ·· - -~ • : -.. ·; cohabitant is an income earner.
.I
---· ----!-!
!Diagram V: l ~-'--------
. t.: "I
. -· -----~-- ------ -~--- --- ;---;-- :--,------ : - -- (Tax deduction not admitted.)
' . _:_:~.: .... ~.! _ _._ ---=-~~--····----~----:-- r:·.--:-----~-~:- ·_I . ___ ! ·· ··· ,... t --•
I. • - ~ j· ... •· '1.. . ,: . --· ------' ---~'~------•.
-- _---_·;=-· -----~-~~;~~~~ :-~~:~ -1'- v.: ~L_~-- r•- ~ ~~ ~ ___ :_: __ . -J .. c :~:~·:: : ~- _- I ·:·:.. -r- :. .. - i--- _j- __ :.-.1.:..: _ _: __ ..!-_ __
---- -:...:.:-----,----:--~~7"--l-:-~: -::• :• --:-:-'__: s ~ -. f::-'-:;·:·,:~---::';-::c:-:~ :--l ·-·-···- .: ·····------·------·· --~-:.:.. .. : ____ ;·~- ,. _____ -------- ·--··--·--· ----
: l _ : ___ L.:.L~.:t.:..c::_j~_L >~~~ ~-::f -----:::-- .---;----< ____ _:_ _____ __ ' I . ---~ --- ! . _ -. - ~ i . 1 • _
--\ :·[-• -_-_:---:-:·_-------:: .. ---•- -- - i-- --~-:~c.· .....
. : - ':},!, l\1,, ~ ---~----;~-~--!..:.:::.._._t:_ ____ ~~'-----C:::-~----.. ·_::·:-~-----:-------•--- ., ---~:: ..
l r . -- ------ -· ----.::-· ----- -- .. -- i·-. . -' I ~\~1 .. --·-----------•i-:~.:...-j .. :-'--~J:----d---;, __ __; _________ ;_:-7+~-----;·- . , :·:
... '\ \1'\ . ···-·r·· ··: --·r-- -~- --~---···. r: --···- --·-- . -------. --~--- ··-·::;·-~--:·····; .. ·-- -- +
-~ ----- . ~ -- ___ :__:_!.:~ .:.)::~::;~ ... ~~7":·--+ .:: .... : ---~-:.;~-,~ ___ ! ----~~-f_:.:__: ------ --~ :.:_ __ ~:~~--·, --;-~-- ~- ______ J.. __ _
i
\ 100
- !-
90 . . - . --------------
80
70. c..:::2..Al . . . . . ---·-···---------..------·- ---------------- --.
' -- ., --------- --.
': ~l :1' ''.··': .. : .. ----:--j :::::·-:·::•-- --.::1 .. ---•-:-- ... i· . ·-:-:-·::·:----· _; ...... ____ ,. __ _ f, l ·: ~----:·.-~ ~::
\1 . :1~' i ·······~-~ --:::[·:~·-:~-c-~:·:~-l-,~~:;;___:~-~"t-:-. --1 : ·:-·:.:-~~:...- ---.:-- --------\ _.::..____: .. ;- .. .:.:_~_ ····:----~----_-~_-.: ___ :..._, -__ ---:-:.::-:: __ -~---~;-----=-=~~=-7-::_~::· ~--- ·- .. ·--
-~-------- l.-- --· --t . -~-::.·.:.:: •. :-··-
'. ____ _:_=____;-i-:,:~--:-:~--=-~~t~:::: .• :;~- ;:::·:~=\-.. =-1_-~-~~~~:~::.:~:: .
I ~ ··-----=~--£~~_:·~-~:·~-~:i~~---.:_:_·.=.:.:...:~-:~~---·-: --------------- --·-·---
\ - ---------· -. -· .--- --· - -~ _-.-- ·:!'.:.:::: .::- _, .. -·. ----------- --- --- ---- ... _____ -::..:..:......::.:. _ __!_-:__-_· ==--=--~.:..=.:..:.--::-- -~-.::--~--~- -:- ---- ~- -~·- -;----- - ... ···- --···- ----- -· -.
., ______ --~-- .. --:_: ____ ·r ---- : --=--- _;_---_ . ___ .~:-~. :_:_·_J _____ _
. .. _ :. -;•:: ·; -- --- -'r:-~--- ------~ --~~~=-~;~~~ :c ~~~ ~:~~L~~,~~-: ~~~C"T~.,._-, ..... ~r- --c :~'--~·~· ____ __c ---~ .• --.
- _· __ ·._·_--~-----~~::-::'-~_:-__ --:~-·-------_· __ :.;_:_•_---_-_--~:::·:_: __ -f:,-~•_c-·7"' __ ::·-----~-- :· --; ---- .· .. _..; .. ·_:·_: .... :; -·. __ ·_; ·_ - ~- . ~ ··-·-. .. -- - :·_-~-i-~ ~~t-:·r:-~~~:~--~:p:--:.-.-.:~:----~-~~~:1~~--- ·· --!-~~-~-~-~~·-----_-.:---~-:--~:~--~~r --~---~ ;~---_---- ·-- · ---------~~~~-~~:i- ~~J~--------: _!~--~ ____ _: __ ·--~-----~~ ___ -_ __:._:.__:___:-·- __::_ __ :....._:_:_ __ :__~-------~-- -~---·;----:-;~-~----· ------- ··--- ----
• r~~! .•• : ]~~-~··>!_;}.. : 10~ -~t ::r~~~;i-~:· ~-~~ -C~·· -:·····
.... I--- . - --- ~- -
60
50
40
30 ·-·-··· . -·-· . . ' ---.! .::L·: : :: :·. -- ______ ·, -~..:._-~~-:.__:_: ____ ;_: ___ ~------
---- ·--
•· -:-----= --~- ---. ~~~ ~-=-=---~ I~- - -- . = --------. -·- : .. r-.
20
10 1: • . ---------·------ ----------' -T-~---c--~-r~--~----~----:---:----r~- , --- ,i -- --·-
. . I : · l ---... ·--:--- ---~--~-:---~----~----.-- __ .:._ ______ ~----~--------:~- ----·:--------;-----:-··T--:--_T _______ --- --"1·:---:·---------:---- ; . - . . . . : . ; -- . --: -- ~ -. . i ..... -: .. ! ··- -- - . - .. --. - . -~. ; ::
1--.J,-j,-_;:--+:!_~-_--.;..:_-_.-: ... · __ :-------_--+:·_·_· _--_,::1-:·_--_--_'-----f-r:·- ·:_ --t--:~ ·--·+I --·--t ·--f'---t----t---l---t---[.:_>
L<. 10 - 30 40 so no 70 slo 90 100 no 120 130 140 1so
J.\~:~~~;\:::..:..1::.,; __ :~----------L---- ~ ....... i .... ____ ----r----'----------- _______ Assessec1 incowc (JOOO c~s.)
.c
y:5
THE WORKING OF THE TAX. SYSTE,. EQUITY ASr:::CTS
3. \ole now turn to the behav.i.<f1ur of a pt·ogressive tax system wht:·n
money incomes are growing. We consider first equity aspects and J.n section V
stabilization and allocation aspects. By definition progression implit.s
that the average tax rate. tal increases
ing question is how this 1ncrease of the
come level. Given the relative chanee of
when incomes rise. An interest-·
tax burden dep~nds on the in-• a
income Y, ~t is determined
by the difference between the ma.rginal and the average tax rate since
(2)
What can b~ said about the s1ze of ( m a t 1 -to) when Y varies? l.iithin 8DY LJC.OiH:~
m a bracket (ti-to) is declining t"Onotonically since
m t 1 is constan~ \:hi.Je
a m a to is increasing. vlhe.n a br,cket border is crossed, (tJ-to) increases
"instantly" by 6tm and starlts to decline from the ne\-.7 higher level. I
Whether these changes taken together invPlve an increase of dc~crease of m a
(t 1-t0
) will of course depend upon the actual numerical vali.i(!f of the
tax parameters yl, ••• , Yn a!lid tl, ... , tn. It is quite clcm~, hov;-t=:ver,
that (t~-t~) eventually bec~es smaller and smaller since in thl? higl•~~st a ' n
income bracket t convergesi monotonically tm·mrd t To illustrate
these points Diagram V: 1 has been included. It shov1s how (tT-t~) varies
with assessed income for different categories of Swedish income earners
according to the 1973 tax ru~~s. Of the groups covered by Diagram V:l, group
C is by far the largest. Of ~weden's 5.573.000 income earners in 1971, '
about 62 per cent belonged to this category. The corresponding figures
for eroup B and group A (including families with more th2.n three
children) are 6 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. An important group
Hhich is not represented in qiagram V:l is taxpayers from families with !
children and two income earners. The reason for the omission of this
group - which in 1971 contained 23 per cent of all income earners - J.s
that calculations in this case would have to be based on a~:bi trary
assumptions about the size o~ the cohabitants income (since housing
allowances depend on family ~ncome). It may be added that of the one
million families with c:hi.ldren in 1970 46 per cent had one child, 37
per cent had two children, 13 per cent had three while 4 per cent had
four children or more.
V:6
It would of course be of interest to know for each group the distribu
tion of income earners according to size of income but such data are
not yet available for 1971, the first year of operation for the new . 1) 1ncome tax system.
We have thus seen that the rise of the tax burden resulting from a g1ven
uniform income increase does not depend on the initial income level in
any simple way. It is clear, however, that within a given income bracket
a certain Y will cause a smaller rise of the tax burden the larger the
initial income is. In the Swedish case the importance of this is accen
tuated by the fact that some of the income brackets are fairly wide,
as Diagram V:l shows. It is also evident that the tax burden increase,
generated by a certain Y, declines towards zero as the initial income
becomes very large. These conclusions are of course independent of the extent
to which the rise of nominal incomes represents an improvement of real
income.
1) Data showing the distribution of all income earners have been com--piled (by the Central Bureau of Stat-istics). These data are, hm-rever, based on total income and not assessed income. The former concept exceeds the latter by deficits in source of income and other gener&l deductions. After a rough correction for this difference the distribution becomes:
. assessed income percentage of all
(1000 of crs) income earners -0 6.1 0 9.5 27.3 9.5 - 18.9 21.2
18.9 - 23.4 10.2 23.4 - 28.1 11.0 28.1 - 32.7 8.9 32.7 - 37.4 5.5 37.4 - 56.1 7.1 56.1 - 91.5 2.1 91.5 - 0.6
V:7
4. The properties of an 1ncome tax system can of course be illustrated
1.n a number of different ways of which the study of the average tax
rate under vary1ng circumstances is one. An alternative approach would
be to look at real disposable income. The relative change of an income
earner's real disposable income
• d =
eDY y - p 1 + p
. d may be written
(3)
As before, Y is assessed income while P is a consumer price index measured
at market prices. eDY is the elasticity of nominal disposable incom<~ D
with respect to assessed income. Hence we have for year 1
111 = 1 - t]
a 1 - t 0
(4)
tT 1.s the marginal tax rate, applicable to the income change and
thus not necessarily a statutory tax in the initial position. An increase possible only if eDY 1.s greater than
a . rate< to l.S the av·~rage tax rette o[ real disposable 1ncome is thi..!S
the ratio PLY.
We may now ask how vary with Y. Evidently must incn::ase
monotonically in any income interval with a constant marginal tax rate.
When an income bracket border is reached eDY declines and then begins
to rise from the new lmver level. Since ta converges towards the
highest statutory tax rate, eDY must converge towards unity. as
a function of assessed income is shown in Diagram V:2 for the groups of
income earners which were represented in Diagram V: J. As Diagram V: 2 sho'I-7S,
eDY differs significantly between and within the groups considered
under the present tax and housing allmvance system. Hith a certain
price rise and a given uniform income increase, the resulting increase of
real disposable income will of course differ correspondingly. The
smallest improvements of real disposable income will, more precisely,
be obtained by income earners with children and incomes not exceeding
about 45.000 crs. This result is due to both relatively high marginal
tax rates and relatively smc.ll average tax rates for these groups.
As an illustration let us assume that all nominal incomes increase by
10 per cent and that prices increase 4.5 per cent (as they did on the
average 1960-72 in Sweden). It is nov1 easy to transform the eDY-scale
:!J
::.;...
l.Ui.J i I I I l i i
so 1
I I I
80-+ I I i
I .. 70:
I i I i
60 ~ I I
i
!•0 j 1
- ----- /o a
l-t 0
-'1
: ,/ t' c .:; . /
I II; t:'
.. \ ,._ .. :·:
30 l
i I '
I., ...
. I
! . ··-· ·- ~ .• -
I
; t I i
l
a 1o 5.26
.. Diagram V: 2
·--j-· . :.,
V:9
into a scale measur1ng the relative change of real disposable income.
The latter scale is shown to the right in Diagram V:2 and a horizontal
line has been drawn through zero. \-lith the assumed income and price in
creases income earners with children and rather lowassessed incomes or
assesse·dincomes from roughly 20.000 crs to 45.000 crs wi 11 experience
d . f h . 1 d' bl . l)lf . d . d d re uct1ons o t e1r rea 1sposa e 1ncome. 1nstea ive na assume
an income increase which is smaller than 10 per cent or a pr1ce rise
in excess of 4.5 per cent, then the horizontal zero-line should be shifted
upwards and the sector in Diagram V:2 with reductions of real disposable in-2) . ' . .
come would have been larger. It should be stresseu that D1agram V:2 J.n-
dicates an increase of real disposable income which is too large (small)
in the cases where the assumed income rise involves a movement from cne
income bracket to another with a higher (lo-v;er) marginal ta>~ rate. J)
What conclusions about the working of the present tax and allowance system
can be dra\m from the analysis in this s~ction? One inescapable cor.clusi oP_
is that, whatever combination of a uniform increase of taxable ir.co:ne A.nd
a price rise is assumed, the result is bound to be a change of the ir.ce>m0
1) Table V:S contains figures for this :::ase.
2) In the following table are shown e0y-val ucs implying an vnchangeJ re;~l disposable income with different assumpt.ions about the income and price 1ncrcase.
. • p . % 1 y 7. p = 3.5 % 0: 4.5 7. p = 5 • .5
10 0.35 0.45 0.55
9 0.39 0.50 0.61
8 0.44 0.56 0.69
7 0.50 0.64 0.79 I
6 0.58 0.75 0.92
5 0.70 0.90 (1.10)
3) A sharp decrease of the (combined) marginal tax rate occurs at the highest income level at which housing allowances are given. Even the reduction of the basic exemption implies 1.n certain cases falling marginal tax rates. See Table V: 3.
V:lO
distribution to the disadvantage of income groups with children and
incomes below say 45.000 crs. With prese~t trends in Sweden with regard
to income and price developments it 1s in fact very likely that this
automatic redistribution of incomes lS brought about through increases
of real disposable incomes for groups without children and/or high in
comes and outright reductions for other. Needless to say the actual
changes of the income distribution will of course be the net of auto
matic changes and government measures taken to influence the distribu
tion of income (for instance increases of: housing allowances).
5. In the government's long-term report ( 7 ) - in the following referred
to as LTR - the working of the 1971 income tax system as a redistributional
device is considered. The discussion is based on such well-known measure;;
of unevenness as Erik Lindahl's maximal redistribution rttio a.nd Lhc con
centration ratio. Lindahl's measure is defined as that share of total income
which must be transferred fran~ persons with incomes above the average to
persons with incomes below the average in order to secure that all in-
co~es are equally large. It may hence be written
n r lni -ol
i•l 0 0
m • ()
2 n D (5)
0
D is the average disposable income in the initial position and n is the 0
b f . . i i , i . ) 1) num er o 1ncome earners. S1nce D1 = D0
\1 + e1 Y the change .of m
caused by a unifor~ change of assessed incomes will be
1 i .
n (lni + e 1 y
'oi - iJ 1l -151 -I. 0 - . I o 1 + e 1Y
0 0 J i .... l
t:.m = (6) 2 n n
0
Whether the degree of inequality (as measured by m) rises or declines
depends thus upon the elasticities e~. A sufficient but certainly no~ a necessary condition for t:.m>o (t:.m<o) is that the covariation between Di
0
and e~ is strictly positive (negative). Th)_s covariation may be studied in
Diagram 2 (since - in the absence of marginal tax rates in ex~~ess of 100
per o:.nt - Di is a monotonically ir:.creasing function of Yi).
1) To simplify notation here the subscript DY has been om.i tted from e i:.
V:ll
A similar analysis could be made 1n terms of the concentration ratio. 1)
In LTR (p. 188) it 1s pointed out that a more rapid increase of the
marginal tax rates was built into the 1971 income tax schedule and
that the automatic equalizing effect each year thereby has increased
in comparison with the pre-1971 system. A number of comments should
be made to this conclusion which presupposes that e0y ~~ to be
negatively related to assessed income. When checking this in Diagram 2
it is in the first place worthwhile to note that the reduction of. tr~r
ginal tax rates at low income level and the rise for certai~ high 1n
come groups from the beginning of 1973 have been considerecl in Diagram 2
but not iu LTR. 2) These changes per se have probably increased thE: auto
matic equalizing capacity of the income tax system. In the second plac~
it is quite obvious that the over-all measures used in LTR cannot reveal
anything about distributional changes within subsets of income earners.
The importance of this is illustrated by the fact that a uniform rise of
assessed income actually leads to increased inequality if the maximum re
distribution ratio (or the concentration ratio) is appHed within any in
come bracket.
Thirdly it should be stressed that housing allowances - which in their
present form were introduced 1969 - have not been taken into account in
the LTR-analysis. We have already seen that, in the absence of specific
public measures and with uniform income changes, the share of disposable
income of income earners with children will decline. This tends to weaki:~n
the conclusion in LTR that the tax system acts as an automatic equaliz~r.
It is possible - and perhaps even likely - that the tax system, including
housing allowances, will respond to uniform income increases by increasi·.~
the degree of inequality as measured by e.g. the maximum redistribution
ratio. Whether or not this is so is an empirical question. Unfortunately
empirical measurements with housing allowances considered are not available.
1) The concentration ratio k is defined as
2)
n n . .
L L lot- n~l i=l j=l ko = __ ..__ ____ _
n(n - 1) Do With disposable income increasing from D~ but not necessary condition for ~k > 0 1s
a discussion cf different measures of distributional unevenness, see [1] appendix 2 and [2] chap. 2.
Tax rates were changed by 3 percentage units downwards in the interval O<YS-33.750 and upward in the income bracket 70.000<Y~lOO.OOO.
") . L
v: 12
INDEX TIED INCOME TAXES
6. The way an income tax system responds to inflationary development
1s of course of importance for income distribution policies as well as
for stabilization and allocation policies. For this and other reasons
neutrality of the tax system with regard to inflation is a somewhat arbi
trary concept. Here we shall speak of a neutral tax system if equally
large relative changes of incomes and prices do not lead to a change of
the average tax rate. This definition is probably in fairly good accor-
d:.;pc:~: ~-:itlr <-:;;;i$ting r;ctic'i'=", hut u(.her .lefinitions may be prefe:r:re(l in
other context: .• Uncle::.: a;:-1 i:1come tax system which is neutral in this
sense, the tax would be pr~gre~sive only in response to income incre~scs
in ex.:ess of the pr:i.ce increases, \·ihere&.s it would be proportionAl as
far as 11 inflationary11 income rises are concerned.
To make this definiticn prec1.se and operationally useful it 1s of course
necessary to specify in detail the tax, .income and price concepts l.n
volved. Wheth•::r or not a ce:r.tain type of income taxes or transfer payments
should be covered by the scheme a~ning at tax neutrality is clearly a
matter of political judgeme11t. For our purposes it seems natural to choose
a general approach. vie shall therefore assume that all components of
pen:onal income taxation and transfer payments mentioned in section B
will be index tied.
With regard to the income concept one possibility Hould be to define
the tax burden and neutrality on the basis of gross income, i.e. the
total income paid by the employer. This is hardly a feasible solution,
since it seems to presuppose that the sum of all permitted deductions
(for travel and other expenses, life insurance premiums, the basic
capital income deduction etc.) should be adjusted according to the movements
of the chosen index. Since taxable income in this connection seems to
be a less relevant income concept than Possessed income, our discussion
of tax neutrality will be based on income in the latter sens~.
We next come to the choice of price inde:x. One question to consider is
if the price index to be used should measure changes in consumer prices
at market prices or at fe.ctor cost. It seems n.:asonn.ble .to discuss both
B: 13
of these two cases. With hete~ogeneous expenditure patterns it might
be argued that the use of a single price index is not sufficient to
achieve tax neutrality. Instead, it would be necessary to operate with a
set of different price indices Tllhich reflect consumer price changes
weighted in accordance with the consumption pattern of each distinct
group of income earners. That such a differentiation would give rise to
considerable practical difficulties is obvious.
7. Neutrality in the sense outlined above is of cours.:: .lmpl:ieC.: J.n any
nominal tax function which is homogeneous of the first degree 1n incomes
and prices. A homogeneous version of our tax function (1) m;;y be uritten
The index Ht is determined by
H = f(Y , prices) t t
\\7hich is c>.l so a homogeneous function of the first degree in incomes and -
prices. lf the income earner is entitled to a tax deduction a condition
for neutrality is evidently either that the cohabitant is not earning
(7)
(8)
. ( ~ * 1ncome Y = 0) or that Y and Y increase at the sam<:>: rate. \ole shall make t t
the former assumption.
HO\v large are nor11 the average and marginal tax rates which the homoge
neous tax function imply? To ans"·er that question a few simplifications
are in order, We assume that income increases are limited so that in
come bracket borders are not crossed. We also take it for granted that
Y• + p" Tl t a tm and tmr ( ' · h d h 1 · 1 . 1e ax rates t t, t t \vftl c enote t e 2:!._<:_ marg1na tax
rate)may now be written:
• • t a 111 a Y-H 1-q __ = to + (to-to)
l+Y 1-q (9)
t~ • t
m m a _H 1-q_ = to - (to-to) . y 1-q
(10)
-vrhere
mr t
t
q =
V:l4
• • t m m a. H-P 1-q
-· to - (to-to) .Y-i> 1-q
(11)
y - H (12)
The base period is year zero. The first adjustment of tax rates under
the neutrality scheme is made in year one. t is thus the number of years
after the base year. We have supposed that the yearly changes of incomes
and the index H after the base year are constant and equal to Y and E. lL
The average and marginal tax rates under the index tied syste~ are thus a m mr n
weighted averages of to and to (= to = t ) under the nominal system. /,s
is seen, the s1ze of the weights is determined by the rate of inflJtio:t and
the relative changes of incomes and the selected H-index.
From (7) and (8) follows that tax neutrality can be secured by a number
(in fact an infinite number) of specifications of the H-function. 'i'hf:
choice between alternative H-functions satisfying (8) will therefore
have to be made on the basis of additional considerations such as for
instance practical feasibility, preferences regarding the structure of
tax rates and implications for stabilization and allocation policies.
8. It 1s now convenient to present and discuss different H-functions.
In the first place we shall assume that income taxes are tied to a
consumer price index at market prices such that H = P. Alternatively, it is
supposed that taxes are tied to consumer prices at factor cost or H ~ Pf.
Finally, we shall consider the possibility of tying taxes to an index of
(nominal) per capita income such that H = Y. The average and marginal
tax rates obtained in year one under these three neutrality schemes and
a nominal tax system are shown 1n Table V: 1. For the sake of sinplicity it
is assumed also in Table V:l that income changes do not involve crossings
of·income bracket borders.
1) This means that HQ • t = (l+H}_ .
V: 15
Table. V: 1 Average and marginal tax rates (in year one) under
different indexed tnx systems.
-------------r---------------------r------~·-----------~~---------------------
Average tax rate
a tl
Nominc:.l marginal tax rate
m tl
Real marginal tax rate
tTr -------------r----------------------r--------------------+------------------------
Case I: a nominal tax system (H=l)
a n a Y t 0 + (t -t 0 )-.-
l+Y
1
' n ( n a) P t + t -t 0 . --
Y-P
1---------+-------------+-----·--·---~-----~---···--------
Case II: taxe.s tied . . to consumer ta n a Y-P + (t -t 0)-prices at 0 . market prices l+Y
n n a P t - (t -t 0)-
Y .
(H=l+P)
-------+------------+----~-------1-~---------------··
Case III: taxes tied to consumer a prices at to +
factor cost •
(H=l+Pf)
. . Y-P-
(tn-t~)--1 . l+Y
• p n a f
(t -t 0):-Y
r-P n n a <= t + (t -t 0)---=-
Y-P
---~--+------------+------~-----~-----·--·----···--··
Case IV: taxes tied a to an index to + of average income
.!. (H=l+Y)
Equation
• . n a Y-Y
(t -t 0)-. l+Y
(9)
.... n a Y
(t -t 0)-;-Y
(10)
"'- . n n a.Y-r t - (t ·-to J·-·-
Y-P
(ll)
------------~--------------------~------~-------------~----------------------
V: 16
9. H = P. In this case tax neutrality is secured by inflating each year all
income bracket borders (including the basic exemption) at the same rate as
P has risen. This means of course that the nominal tax system is turned into
a system where real taxes are ahomogeneous function (of zero degree) ofinco~E
~f~~~. With such a system the income tax would be progressive only in
response to real income changes whereas it would be proportional - from
the individual taxpayer's point of view- as far as non-real income rises
are concerned. In the latter case 1 = ~ and as appears from Table 1,
tT = tf = tg. It is seen, moreover, that the real marginal tax rate is tn.
By choosing H = P the initial nominal tax schedule, given by t 1 , n
•.. , t
and yl, ... , Yn is in other words changed into an identical real tax schedule.
This means that the nominal marginal tax rate in case II will be smaller than
tn but the less so the larger the real income rise is~
An implication of tying taxes to a consumar price index measured at
market prices is evidently that an increase of indirect tax rates which
is shifted to prices will lead to an automatic decrease of income taxes.
A change of the consumption pattern in favour of relatively high-taxed
goods will have the same effect. Such a connection between direct and
indirect taxation may of course be seen as inappropriate and in that
case income tax neutrality would have to be based on an index of con
sumer prices at factor cost. \.Jhen index clauses recently were added to
the income tax systems in Denmark and Holland, a factor price index was
chosen and the reason for this choice was quite clearly the \Jish to avoid
the automatic link between direct and indirect taxes, 1
1) An act calling for index tying of income taxes in Denmark was passed in 1969. The tax schedule to be applied on incomes in year t is based on the development of a consumer price index at factor cost between quarter I in year t-2 and year t-1. Two adjustments have been made so far. In Holland index tying of income taxes were introduced in 1971 and the first adjustment of income brackets was assumed to take place in 1972.
V: 17
10 .. H· = Pf. In this case the ~eal -tnx liability will not be determined
by real income alone (as in case II), it will also depend on the price
ratio Pf/P. Let us compare the size of the tax rates in case III with
those of case I and II under varying circumstances regarding the income
and price changes between the base year and year one. One possibility
would be that real income before taxes, indirect taxes and factor prices . . . all rise or that Y > P > Pf > 0. With such a development it is hardly
· · h . ( . a m d mr) surprLsLng t at the average and marglnal tax rates L.e. t , t an t
will be highest under the nominal system and lowest when income taxf~s are
tied to a market price index (case II).l) In general it is of course true
that the average tax rate in cases II and III will be lo,ver (higher) than
in case I if both market and factor prices rise (decrease). It is also
obvious that the average tax rate in case II w·ill be smaller (higher)
than that of case III if indirect tax rates are increased (reduced). ~~at
has just been said about the average tax rate in the three cases also app
lies to the nominal marginal tax rate, provided nominal income Y increases
and to the real marginal tax rate if real income Y/P rises.
-11. H = Y. In this case income taxes are tied to an index of average
nominal income of all or a certain group of income earners. Such an index
may be seen as the product of a factor price index and a productivity
index. Index tying in this case means, in other words, that the income
tax LS progressive only in response to income improvements in excess of
the rate corresponding to the rise of prices and productivity. An index
tying of this type was suggested in 1966 by Tanzi [s] and by the Radical
Left party in Denmark [6] . 2)
1) The condition given is sufficient but not necessary.
2) Despite its name the party is located in the middle of the spectrum of Danish politics.
E SOHE IMPLICATIONS OF INDEX TYING
12. Let us begin \·Jith equity aspects. Assume that all taxpayers' nominal
income before taxes increases at the same rate as the H-index. In that
case tax liabilities also increase at the rate H which means that the a
marginal tax rate is equal to to and eDY equals unity. From this follows
that the real disposable income of all income earners is unchanged,
cf. equation (3). It also follows that the unevenness of the distribution
of incomes - as measured by the maximum redistribution ratio or the con
centration ratio - is invariant to uniform income changes Y which equal !"1. This conclusion is valid independantly of Hhether \ve consider disposable
incomes in nominal or real terms, provided the same price index is used
to deflate all nominal incomes.
As far as our analysis has carded us it is now easy to sE:e the distriuu
tional consequences involved in the choice between a nominal and an index
tied tax system. Diagram V: 1 can be used to indicate these conseq'.Jences ~n
terms of average tax rates. Let all (assessed) incomes and prices rise
by e.g. 5 per cent between the base period and year one while indirect
taxes are constant. In the absence of index tying, average tax rates at
different ~ncome levels would increase by roughly one twentieth of the
percentage units indicated in Diagram V:l.l) As appears, tas rate increases
tend to be negatively correlated with income. With taxes tied to prices,
average tax rates would not change at all.
In terms of real disposable income the result of the assumed development
under a nominal tax system would evidently be 1ncome reductions which are
proportional to the distance between the eDY-curve and the horizontal
line eDY = 1, cf. Diagram V:2. The income reductions would be rather uneven
and would especially hit income earners with children and relatively lm.r
incomes. With taxes tied to prices, no changes of real disposable income
would occur in the case discussed.
We finally come to the over-all measures of distributional unevenness. Non
real factor income rises will, as we have seen, increase inequality within
1) The share is more precisely 5/105, cf. equation (2).
V: 19
any income bracket and the same may be true for the population of 1ncome
earners as a whole. If, on the other hand, taxes had been tied to prices,
uniform and non-real income rises ~muld not have changed the maximuJll re
distribution ratio or the concentration ratio. This is true whether the
ratio is calculated for all income earners or a subset.
13. We next come to implications of index tying for stabilization policies.
One issue that has been dis~ussed a great deal in Sweden is the connection
between wage formation and income taxation. To deal \.Jith that problem it
is useful to make a distinction betueen price changes which are induced
and those which for our purposes may be considered autonomous. The latter • are denoted a. Induced price changes depend positively on income change.s
and negatively on the relative change of over-all labour productivity X. The total price change hence becomes
(13)
The s1ze of the elasticities k1 and -k2 will of course vary depending on
the share of the total period with induced price effects which is taken
into account. If k1 = k2 the induced price increase ~muld simply depend
on the excess of income increase over the productivity rise. With prices
endogeneously determined, equation (3) indicating the change of real dis
posable income becomes
(eDY - k1)Y - (~ - k2X) 1 + k 1Y + <~ - k 2x) (14)
One may now ask, as Er1k Lundberg did twenty years ago, how large an
increase of incomes before taxes is necessary to compensate \.;rage earners
for a given autonomous price increase taking induced price increases into
account. Lundberg's answer was his wellknown wage multiplier. Compensation . implies of course that d=O and from (14) it then follm·Js that
(15)
The factor Hithin brackets is the wage multiplier (or \-.1M) which depends
positively on the autonomous price increase itself. One reason for this
connection 1s that the relevant marginal tax rate, entering into eDY' 1n
V: 20
general will be larger the larger ; is. 1) WM is obviously greater the
more elastic prices are
tax system is (i.e. the
with respect to inccmes and the more progressive 2'
smaller eDY is). 1 v~1 is, on the other hand,
smaller the greater the expected productivity rise is and the more
strongly this productivity increase influences prices.
14. Still with a view to \vagE: negotiations a somewhat different question
may be asked. It may be relevant to inquire how large an increase of
incomes before taxes ~s necessary to obtain a certain improvement of real
disposable ~ncome. After rearranging (14) we get
(16)
d ~s now predetermined. The ratio within brackets may be called the wage • • factor (HF) since it indicates how many times larger than d Y must be in
order to secure the desired d.
the
Of crucial importance for the size of HF (and \.JM) ~s the size of the eJasti-
cities eDY and k 1 • HF will be larger the more strongly rising incoE1t::S
affect prices and the weaker the effect on disposable incomes is. In
the limiting case where eDY = k 1 (l+d) HF is infinitely large and the
desired improvement of real disposable income cannot be realized what-
ever the size of Y.
1) The autonomous price increase does not appear in Lundberg's ~~expression since he implicitly assumed a zero productivity increase in which case the numerator of the multiplier is reduced to unity. Alternatively Lundberg might have seen price changes induced by productivity changes as a part of the autonomous price change. See [4], p. 242.
2) It is hardly self-evident that the degree of progressivity should
be measured as eDY" For a discussion of this and other conceivable a m m a [ J measures (e.g. tt /!J.Y, !J.t /b.Y and eTY = t /t ), see 5 .
•a • Even t /Y could be seen as such a measure.
V:21
How are WM and ~~ influenced by the introduction of index tied Ll!come
taxes? In a given initial situation v1ith given incomes and average tax
rates and a certain expected price rise the marginal rate of taxation,
which income increases will be subject to, will of course be lm.;rer 1vith
index tying than without. Index tying will therefore make eDY at all
income levels somewhat higher than it otherwise would have been. If
the index H is used to indicate that the elasticity eDY refers to an
index tied tax system (and dropping subscript DY) we have for period 1:
(17)
It is thus clear that index tying reduces both WM and WF. To the extent
that income earners try to get compensation for price rises and demand
wage increases with a view to real disposable incomes, index tying
should be expected to dampen nominal wage demands and wage induced pnce
increases. This in its turn should m<lke it easier to maintain balance in
the transactions with foreign countries. Index tying may in fact be seen
as part of an incomes policy.
15. A few other implications for stabilization policy should be mentioned.
In the first place it is clear that the automatic stabilizers built int6
the tax system will be weakened by the lower marginal tax rates resulting
from an introduction of index tying. It should be added, however, that
automatic stabilizers are mixed blessings since they even counteract
economic expansion during recessions. Considering the passive or even
restrictive fiscal policies ,.,hich were conducted in S\veden during the
prolonged ''stagflations" 1966-68 and 1971-72 an index tying scheme would
probably ha.ve improved the over-all balance of the economy. During the
boom years 1969-70 the opposite would have been the case.
Another issue, which has been discusseJ, is ..,.;bet.h'2r yearly adjustments ot ':ax
rates will fit better or t.:cr.sc into the TJ~{tte;·n of cyclical de:elopmcnts t!:;~:-1
occasional adj nstments fror,1 time to time:. Since the authori t.ies naturally u.::.
free to combine an autOIJatic adjustment HiLh <Hscrctionary anti-cyclical t:>::
measures index tying nce<i not limit the flexibility of C01~1pens.:1Lory fiscal ;~ol :_
cies. Concerning Sweden it may be pointed out tiwt 1ncome taxation hardly has
been used as an instrument of stabilization policy in the post-Har period. Tax
rates have been changed fairly frequently (1948, 1952, 1953, 1957, 1960, 1962,
1966, 1971 and 1973) but with only two exceptions these chane.es \.rere propo~~ed
7-12 months before the changes 'actually took place. It is thus c1ear that the:
decisions in most cases Here marle before reasonably safe conjunctural fore~ast5
were available,
It has also been argued that index tying would weaken anti -inflationary
discipline. Such an argument: is of course difficult to evaluat:::. At this f.':Jint
it may be stresf'ed that index tying cannot hinder a decline of the real pur·
chasing power of income earners unless they have been fully com1,ensateJ for
inflation by rising wages. As is well-known the short-run possibiliri~s to
get such compensation vary considerably between groups of inccm~ earrer~. 1t
is also evident that index tying cannot prevent that many non··ta:~p3yers a.n· hit
by rising prices. Finally inflation may o[ course be seen as undesirable b~~ause
of its effects on the balance of payments, the distribution of v.'ealth etc.
16. We shall finally mention some implications cf indf'x tying for rh:i:·
allocation of resources.
An important consequence of index tying is of course that the automatie; grN.rth
of state taxes is reduced since progressive tax rates do not l1it that part of
the nominal income increase which corresponds to the rise of index H. In the
extreme case when taxes are tied to an index of per capita income the elasticity
of total taxes with respect to total income is wtity and over-all - though
not !ndividual - progressivity is eliminated. Index tying by means of a factor
price index would of course have a smaller negative impact on the growth of
tax incomes than if taxes were tied to a market price index provided indirect
taxes are rising.
V: 23
The importance of the probJ.em discussc-.:1 ltc1·e is accentu<.-\tcd by ~he fact
that productivity increases in t.hc pu\oli,: ;,ccto:r as a whole are sncaller
than in the rest of the econo;ny, At the sacH" tir:1c the pl,blir: ser.:tor has
to pay approximately the same prices a~d wages for goods and labour ser
vices as Clther sectors. This means that to secure the public sector an
unchanged share of total production in real terms a ~ising share of
comes should flmv to the public sector as taxes.
1• r;-
"'
With a giver; aim regarding the growth of the public s0ctor the loss of
automatic tax iocomes woulrl evidently make it necessary from time to time
to raise direct or indirect taxes by discretionary weasures. If the gLv~n
development of the public sector is in accord;:nc:e \vith the pr.efe1·ences ~;f
the population the changcJ financ:inz prucedure should make little OJ~ no
difference. If on the othe1: lwnJ autcwaLjc: fin.:mci.r,z
to undertake programs \Jhich could not be carried Oclt. if t,;z.es ll<Hi to :1:=~ 1 H-
creased at the same tin1e, ;-tn effect of introducing index tying 0Jight be. te
improve the allocation of resourc~s,
Lastly we come to the effects of inde~ tying on work efforts. Ls equatinn t·. r '~ _,. .
shows rising prices and index tying \lwuld le.ad to n~ducti.on:.> of tiw r.;nrf,in<.d
tax rates at all income levels. The size: ot these cuts depends en !:be ('>:te;,t·
to which the index rise il has been Coinpcntiated by income incr(~ases ~~. l,J•.;.-~:·r . 1 . h . f 1 . . L ( 1 m. 'I ' marg1na tax rates r.<use t e pr1ce o c1sure ·- 1., e. P :: - t )\11 > \>rr:er.:::
, .. is the hourly wage rate 1 ) - and would thus create a substi tutlon ef feet
in favour of more work effort. At the sam~ time index tying would in sub-
sequent periods lead to lower average tax rates at all income levels. Pro
vided leisure is not an inferior good we \.;oul d thus ~~xpect an income effect
in favour of less work effort. On a priori grounds it is therefore not
possible to decide whether an introduction of index tying will increase
or reduce work efforts. 2)
1) For the first year after the introduction of index tying the rise of the price of leisure would be from
PL to PLH PLH = PL ( m _ aJ.f! 1 1 or 1 1 + t1 to • ' ¥
2) Here it may be pointed uut that the introduction of housing allor,.Jances in 1969, while increasin.?, t~e income share of families with children, probably also reduced work incentives s1~ce it involved large increases of transfer paym,-,r.ts to tht~se families and at the same time significant ri.s,-s of mar.r.,inal tax rates.
V: 24
Two further consi~Pration~ should be ~ddc~ to the discussion about incentive
effects. ln the first pl3cc it is conceivable that the loss of automatic tax
incomes will h:ad t.o autrmomous t:tx inct·eases and in that case it would be
necessary to take the incen~ive effects of these into account, Secondly we
must of course consider all the ¥.'ell-known institutiunal difficulties in
volved in individual adjustments of work efforts. 1)
F CONCLUDING REHARKS
17. In the first pa:rt of the paper sam~ of the properties of a progressive
1ncome tax system of the type used in Sweden were analyzed. The working of
such a system (including housing and child allowances) was illustrated by
calculations showing the actual response of the average tax rate at different
initial income levels to uniform incor.1e chauges. Data sho·....ring the changes of
real disposable incomes resulting from given changes of nominal incomes and
prices, were also presented, As we have seen the response of both the avPrage
tax rate and real disposable income varied strongly according to income L.~vel.
and the number of children. Then the rossibility of index tying was irrtroc:uc.:.d.
In turn \Je have considered the tying of inconte taxes to a consumer price ir.ck'·:
measured at market prices and factor cost and to nn index of nominal per ca~ita
income. The latter scheme would of course be the most far-reaching since 1n
that case inco~e taxation would be neutrAl not only as far as inflatJon is con
cerned but also with regard to productivity changes.
Finally some implications of index tying for distribution, stabilization and
allocation policies have been discussed. It has been shown that the distribu
tion of real disposable incomes is invariant to uniform nominal income in
creases matched by equally large price increases under an index tied tax
system. It has also been shown that the nominal income increases which are
necessary to sccur~ a certain rise of real disposable income will be smaller
with index tied in.cone taxes than under a nominal tax system. Index tying Day
therefore dampen cost-push inflation, At the same time both automatic stabi
lizers and the automatic growth of central government taxes will be reduced.
18. It should be stressed that the distribution of disposable incomes at
best ca.n indicate how pri~~ consumption possibilities vary Letween groups
of income earners. The total well-being of any group is obviously also
1) See e.g. (3) p. 281.
V.25
strongly influenced 1-·y t'.\•'- u;<.-,-'.;-,t· to ~~~~d.cL :' ~: bencfi t;:; from J~ .. ~J..ic expendi tmcs
on goods and servic.-:~. ·:·:l<:·ce sPe•us to· be little ('!' r:o reason to <H;SUffiP that Llle
groups with relatively Si!l<dl eDY-elasticities (aad tln.!.; sn,;lll increaser, of: real.
disposable incomes given the rise of nomina] incom2s and prices) tend co be
compensated for this by benefitting relatively much from an expansion of public
expenditures on goods and services.
If it is not accepted that a given distribution of incomes after taxes 1s
altered by inflation it 1s of course possible to realize such an aim >·Iithout
relying on index tying. An alternative ap~roach would be to maintain the real
purchasing power of income earners by making appropriate autonomous chnngcs of
taxes and transfer payments e.g. once a year. The range of possibilities is
clearly wide if rather rough adjustments are seen as satisfactory. If such a
policy does not involve reduced marginal tax rates (and this is of course not
~ u~cessary element of the policy) the result would in all likelihood be re
duced work efforts since the incentive effects of increased transfers and
rising m.:J-q;:i nc.l tax ·u-.t·t•;-; (due to inflation) 'I-Jou1.d reinfot"ce each other.. l)
stitution effects in favour of more leisure shoul(t be avoided it Hould be
necessary to make rdductions (prevent increasPs) of the marginal tax rates.
This would make the alternative policy even more similar to index tying.
Needless to say, a political decision is involved in a simultaneous evaluation
of tha discussed and other impli.cations of index tying,
1) This would for instance be the case if the authorities - as has been suggested - raised the maximal housing allot..•ances autonomously e~ch year without lowering the marginal rates. The fact that the margLn~l•a rates in an ex post sense then would be lower than the statutory rate~ is of course irrelevant as far as substitution effects are concerned.
v·
Table V: 2. Harginal housing aJ.lm.rance rates 1973 in Greater-Stockholm (%)
---- L ------· I
Assessed ~ncome I 2 3 I 4 I ~hildrJ I
(1000 crs) 1 child I children children! children
0 - 5 6 6 6 I 6 6
5 - 10 6 6 6 6 6
10 - 15 6 6 6 6 6 ,. 15 - 20 6 6 6 6 6 I
I
I t 20 - 21 6 6 6 6 6
.. ------ . ---- -------· .. ···- ----- ·--· ----- . --- iS-- rls~-tts --· 21 - 23 18 18
23 - 25 18 18 ~ _ _:_~ - - _ _:_s__ J -lll_ __ l t······ ----------- ·-------- -------I 25 - 27 21 21 21 21 21
- -~-----·----- ----------------- ... ---------- -- --------- - -- -- . -- -------27 - 29 24 24 24 24 24
------------. -- --
I 29 - 31 24 21 24 24 24 ------~-------- ..
i 31 - 33 24 18
I 24 24 24
I 24 24 I
24 33 - 35 24 18 I I --------- --- 2i ----, .. --·;_-7 .... ---,
35 - 37 21 24 24 -····· ---------- -------1 --······--···,
37 - 39 24 24 I
24 24 30 I 39 - 39 3/4 24 24 24 24 30
-------------. ---------· 39 3/4 - 41 - 24 24 24 24
41 - 43 - 24 24 24 2ll
43 - 43 1/2 I - 24 24 24 2lf ···-···-----
43 1/2 - 45 - - 21; 24 24
45 - /17 - - 24 24 24
47 - 49 - - 24 24 24 I 49 - 51 - - 24 24 24 • 51 - 53 - - 24 2l! 24
53 - 53 1/4 - - 24 24 24 I ----~---
53 1/4 - 55 - - - 24 24
55 - 57 - - - 24 24 ' --·
57 - 59 - - - - 21+
59 - 61 - - - - 24
61 - 63 - - - - 24 I 63 - 65 - - - - 24 I 65 - 65 3/4 - - - - 24
-------65 3/4 - - - - - -
' Monthly rent 650 ___ 1 (crs) 650 800 800 925
' I I ' Maximal housing 5400 6000 : 8700 9600 12000 I : : I !
' ..
V:27
Table V:3. Harginal tax ra.tes 1973 (pex~cent.::<gl~ ':ln;t&)
E~sse~ orne
(1.000 crs)
----..---·-T--·----r----r----l--no children 1 child :2 children 11 children! 4 children. 5 children
' '---- -----.4--------------~
0 - 4 1/2 0 6 6 6 t 6 6 .... ·····-------------- ···- .. -------------- ------------------·- --- ... i· -- ---------------! .... ·- __________ , __
4 112- 19 112 ---~-6 ______________ 4_~ _____ _! -~-z __________ !---4~- _______ J __ '~_2 ________ l ____ 4~ fi'9' ii2-~'2'i- --- 42 --~8 ______ ~ --~~-- ------- j 48 ------1-- -~8 _______ l- _4_~. ~~~ i,~4=1~:-- ---- ~~ --- --- ---~~ 1---- :~- - - + ~~- ----- t-- :~- ------- --- -~~-l2s - 21 48 -69---------r 69---------r--6--9 ____ --------- t- -69 ------- : -- 69 I ------- --·: --- -·- ---- ------------i------------- -1---------------- ---· -------- -------------'
~: :~ :: I ; : i· :i- -- ! ; :, '1
; ~ l ::
1130 --I ' . 6 I 8 r. - 31 57,6 81.6 ! 78, ' l.u I 81.6 81,6 bl- 33 57.6 81.6 ;---81_6 ______ 1 816 ',· 81.6 81.6
133- 33 3/4 57,6 81.6 1---75~-6------l 81:6 ! 81.6 81.6
r33 3/4 ~-35-- 62.4 --~~-~~-----\ _ ~0:~- _____ 1
86.4 1
86.1· _ ---~-~·~ __ • '135- 37 62.4 83.4 j 83.4 i 86.4 f 86.4 89.4 37- 39 3/4
1 62.4 1-- a6:_4 ___ ·j 86.4 ·1 86.4 l 86.4 ,---9;-:z----~
1
39 3/4-41 1
62.4 r 6~~4--1 86.4 j 86.4 ~ 86.4 :---~~:~-----~ 41- 43 1/2 I 62.4 I 62.4 ) 86.1f I 86.4 86.4 86.1•
I;H li-~-~~ i; ~ 1 :i·"-- ~ :i· 4 r :P=~-t_::. 4 = 1 ::. 4
1 ::.4
53 1 I 4 - 57 6 2 6 2 ,~ 6 2 I 6 2 I __ 8 6 --i 8 6
s1 - 65 3/4 62 62 62 62 r 62 , sG
65 -~~~ _ _ _!~-- _______ ~2 _________ 6~--l- 62_ __ 1 __ 62 _ __ _ 1 62 _ r-62--- , 10 100 ~~ __ _ ____ 1 __ 1_1 ____ ~ _ _71 ______ J __ 1_~ _______ J __ ?~- _____ L n_ _ ____ _ 1oo - 15o 73 1 73 I 73 l 73 ! 73 I 73 --- ------------- --- ---------j-- ------- --~ ---------------------·r-·---- ·-----------~ -- --------------·1·-------------------
~;;!~ly rent
7
~ . :-J ::0 ~-~O ::0 I ::0 I_ ::5 J Note. A municipal tax rate of 24 per cent has been assumed. The marginal rate
of the general insurance fee (which is negligible) has been disregarded. The marginal housing allowance rates have been calculated on the basis of the schedule applying to Greater-Stockholm. Cases with more than one income earner in a family with children have not been considered.
V: 28
Ti:!ble V:4. Average tax r~<tes 1973 (%)
~ss-t:-;:cdj-----------~-- ----l--T ~ncome 1 1 j
(1000 p~?....0.!i:.~dreE:__: ~-Ling1e!_m:uried J 1 ch~~ ~ ~-hi~<:re_n_,_~~•-c.hi1_d_r_e_n __ ~- chi [dr·~~
5 8.7 o.o ; -128.4 -166.8 1-247.2 -zn.6 -366.0
10 22.8 4.8 -56.4 -75.6 l-115.8 -138,0 -175.2
-138.8 12 25.2 10.2 -39.8 -55.8 ! -88.8 -107,8
15 27.6 15.6 -23.2 -36.3 -62.8 -·77,6 -102.4
17
21
26
30
35
38
40
42
45
48
50
55
60
63
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
125
150
1000
28.7
30.7
33.3
35.4
38.8
40.8
41.8
42.8
44.1
1;5. 3
lf5. 9
47.4
'•8. 6
49.3
49.7
50.5
51.9
53.1
54.2
55.1
55.9
56.7
59.9
6Z.1
75.6
18,1
22.1
26.4
29.4
33.6
36.0
37.3
38.5
l,O .1
41.5
42.3
44.2
45,6
46.4
46.9
48.0
49.5
50.9
52.0
53.1
54,0
54.9
58.5
60.9
75.4
-15.4 -26.7 i -50.4 i
-63.4 -85.3
-3.9 -13.0 i -32.2 -60.5
. 1 ~-: :-- . --1~:-:--i ~-~::: ~r--------.,--
-36.8
26.8 20.4 9.8
31.4
34.0
35. t.
37.2
33.8
39.7
41.8
43,4
44.3
44.9
46.1
47.8
49.2
50.5
51.6
52.6
53.6
57.5
60,0
75.3
25.6 16.0
28.6 19.5
31.4 22.7
34.3 26.9
36.0 30.6
37.1 32.9
39.4 37.0
10.1
13.9
17.4
22.0
26,0
28. t.
33.7
41.2 39.0 36.8
42.2 40.1 38,0
42.8 40.8 38,8
44.2 42.3 40.4
46.0 44.2 42.5
47.6 45.9 44.3
48.9 47.4 45.8
0.6
5.2
18.9
21.6
27.5
32.3
34.9
36.5
38.5
40.7
lt2. 6
44.3
50.2 48.7 47.2 45.8
51.3 49.9 48.5 47.1
52.2 50.9 49.6 48,3
56.4 55.3 54.3 53.2
59.2 58.3 57.4 56.5
75.2--~--l__~5_._o ____ ~_7_4_._9 ____ L-___ 74_._s __ _
Note. A muni:ipal tax rate of 24 per cent (which corresponds to the national average 1973) has been assumed. Child and housing allm,Tance.s ha.ve been treated as negative direct taxes. The general insurance fees and housing allowances are according to the schedule applying to Greater-Stockholm. Cases with more than one income earner in a family \o,Tith children have not been considered.
l I (
I
! ! I I
I ! i
l ; ; !
i !
Table V:S.
V: 29
Per~entage change of real disposable income \vhcn nominal i.nco;r..:. incrce.ses by 10 per cent and prict:·s incr~a~;c 4.5 p<:'r cent according to tl:'.:! 1973 Lax
and allow;mce rull:!s. Only tllle inco;!~...: e<d.'DC" in fa.milies with cl1 :"ldren.
--·-------·-- .----::-1-Assessed income · no children
1 -.. cl>i~::::~:~=I--=i-~r~ ~~- c-~~,·~~:· (1.000 crs) single marriedj
5.0 2.4 1.8 I I
+ + I-
' I
1.9 -2.2 -2.1 -2.9 1 -3.1
10.0
12.0
15.0
1.7.0
21.0
26.0
30.0
35.0
38.0
40,0
42.0
45.0
48.0
50,0
55.0
60.0
63,0
65.0
70.0
75.0
80.0
85.0
90.0
I + 3.6
3.9 I + + 4.1
+ 4.3
+ 3.7
I + 3.2
+ 2.0
I + 1.6
!+ 1.8
+ 1.9
+ 2.0
+ 2.1
+ 2.3
+ 2.3
+ 2.7
+ 2.8
+ 2.9
+ 2.5
+ 1.3
+ 1.5
+ 1.6
+ 2.0
+ 1.9
+ 2.1
+ 2.5
+ 2.9
3.2 I +
I + 2.8 I I + 2.5 I I + 1.4 I 1.1
I +
+ 1.3
+ 1.4
+ 1.5
+ 1.7
+ 1.8
+ 1.9
+ 2.2
+ 2.4
+ 2.5
+ 2.2
+ 1.0
+ 1.2
+ 1.3
+ 1.5
+ 1.6
--+
+ ·-------
0.8 - 1..1
0.3 ' -0.7 0.2 o. 2. I
0,. 5 ( + 0,1 1 ----·- ·-··-t·---.. -----··
o.6 1 -0.9
1.2 I - 1.5
2.2 ! - 2.2 ! 2. 3 i 2.5 I
0.6 ! - 2.6 ·--~---~---;--,
+1.1 ~~ 2.1 I
- 1. 7
- 1.4
0.9
- 0,6
- 1.4
- 1.9
- 2.6
2.9
- 2.8
2.7
2.6
- 2.0
- 1.6
1.2
- 0.9
- 1.6
- 2.1
- 2.7
3.0
- 2.9
2,8
2.7
I - 2. 3
I - ~ .o I 1.6
! - 1. .·~: I - l. ~· 1 - 2. 3
i - ? . 9 l
li_'
3.5
- 3.4
3.1 ') 0 '-• ... + 1.3 i; 0.3
+ 1.4 1 ~-~2--ll -2.5
: ~ : ~ I : ~ : ~ I __ : : :_ i ~ : ~ ! ~ : ~ + 1.7 I + 1.5 I ~ - Oo1 ~ 2.5
2.8 2.6
+ 1. 9
+ 2.1
+ 2.2
+ 1.9
+ 0.8
+ 1.0
+ 1. 2
+ 1.9 + 1. 7 ~-r---;:· 1:4-1 -2.4 •
+ 2. 0 + 1. 8 i + l. 6 I ~_:_O_:~L ___ .,J + l. 7 + 1.5 l + 1.3 i + 0. 7 l + o. 1 + o.s I + o.4 I + o.z ,
i I I +0.7 i +0.5 I +O.Ii ; + 0.8
+ 1.0 I
+ 0 • 8 t + 0 • 7 I + 0 . 'j I I I •
+ 1.3 + 1.1 ll + 1..0 i + 0,8 ! + 0.7 l + 1.4 I + 1.3 + 1.1 I + 0.9 + 0.8
I 95.0 + 1.4 l + 1.2 I + 1.1 I + 0.9 + 0.8
1100.0 + 1. 3 .1'. + 1.1 1 + I. 0 ~ + 0. 8 + 0. 7
+ 1.8 + 1.5
+ 1.7 + 1.4
i 125.0 + 1.8 + 1.6 ,. + 1.5 ! + 1.3 -1- 1./.
I 150.0 + 1. 0 II + 0. 9 l + 0. 7 I + 0. 6 + u • . 'J
+ 2.1 + 1.9
+ 1.2 + 1.1
~000.0 + 4.2 + 4.2 1 + 4~1 + 4.1 + 4.0 ~------·--------~------~------~-------~~--------~~--------~~~---------------------·
+ 4.3 + 4.2
Note. Data similar to those in Tables 2-5 were used 1n two articles 1n DAGENS NYHETER May, 24th and 25th, 1972. The relatively minor differences bet\veen the tHo sets of data are due to the fact that only state but not municipal housing allowance rates were available in Hay 1972.
V:30
REFERENCES
(1) Bentzel, R.: InkomstfBrdelningen 1 S~erige (T~e Income Distribution
in Sweden), Stockholm 1952.
(2) Esberger, S.E. (with a contribution by Sten Malmqvist): A Statistical
Study of the Development of Incomes, Lund 1972.
(3) Johansen, L.: Offentlig ~konomikk (Public Economics), Oslo 1964.
(4) Lundberg, Erik: Business Cycles ;:nd Economi~_Po]~~' London 1957
(Swedish edition 1953).
(5) Musgrave, R.A. and Thin, T.: "Income Tax Progression 1929-48",
Journal of Political Economy 1948, pp. 498-514.
(6) Radikale Venstre: Forslag til reform af den dirckte personbestatning
til staten (Proposed reform of the direct personal state taxation),
October 14, 1966 (mimecgraphed).
(7) Svensk ekonomi 1971-75 (The Sv1edish Economy 1971-7.5), SOU 19/0:71,
Stockholm 1970.
(8) Tanzi, Vito: "A Proposal for a Dynamically Self-Adjusting Personal
Income Tax", Public Finance 1966, pp. 507-23.
APPENDIX I A 1:1
STATLIGA SKATTEPOLITISKA ATGARDER M.M. 1945-72 I KRONOLOGISK ORDNING
~--~-~---··-~- J ! At:TO~O~r I~c;D~;;TH}TI.\~:DI~Tr~G·---------,
~~~GA~~~--ro.\~~.:2. :: __ .j3•'.1Tl.f 1._! Y.P.AF:_l_~ _ _::_ T I n I _n_~-:- ~-- II ~ PROros~r~:<_ __ l -·- ~~--- r~~:;;-=l~-~~~7-~~.IBl--i;M.;··- _ 1~oo j
~oh~varoc U;Jfhil • - 637 ?.7.0.19~5 :01.9.1945 !.b.' 1 hansuncrh~t:e!\ ~~;v_l r I I Z Pdsutjar.tnln~s:lv-
gi!t~.r p-i e:;po:t 1945:255 6.4.1945 25\i
1
25,5.1945 8.6.1945 1. b. 3. On:!tit:p!r.~: av lot
tcrivinsthcskalt-nL'leen 1!14~:264 6.4.1945 407,411
1
n.6.1945 1.1.1946 ±o !o 4 Viss or~l!if.r.;ning
av noje~~s}:alt-nlngen 1945:314 112.10.1945 823 ,21.12.19·1~. 1.1.1946 -2 -2
5 H!5jd fordor.,sskatt 1945:352 ·19.10.194~ I 73~ li30.ll,l:;4s 1 1.1.1~4G +10 !o 6 Tlllli;;g~skatten p~ I
bensbt hort!aller cch ordi:l:trie sk:l.ttea Mjs 1945:352 19.10.1945 737 •30.11.1~45 1.1.1946 -8 -8
'l Tilla~;gssklttcn p~ l bra!1r.CJ!j:'l bortfal-ler och o~dinarie skattcn hojs · 19~5:352 19.10.1945 738 :30.11.1945 1.1.1946 to
8 K!ills!;attc;refcrmen! 19-15:370 19.10.194.5 8~6 :31.12.1015 1.1.1947
9 Kaffel'ansonC>ringel j U?Phor - 682 _26.10.1945 1.1.19·l6 .b.
10 Folkpension~rcr- I iorro 1946:220 5.4.1946 431,132.29. 6.1946 1. 1.1948
11 Viss irnporlsub- I , I . I I 12 a-.tten pa kafle I I
(T" I 1-222 -223
-16 , 1
-8 -5
ventior.erL1g bf0rsj'194G:3GO U.10.1S46 SG7•· :18.12.10·!6
118.12.19151
sL>kes 19·16:357,·25.10.1946 698 122.1l.lD46,·23.11.194£ , 13 Allnt~nna onts~tt- I I i
r.ing~s;:alten av\·cck l ' las (:ned vlssa j i t:nd:lntag) '194e:38G r:l.ll.lg46 767 20.12.1946 I 1. 1.1947 ; -195 -230 I I l
·14 A\-vcckling av viss~ j I I ' I hrcibru.;ssu!Jven· I I j : tioner '!194.5:~86 j29.1!.1946 l. 1.1947 ' +U -tU 1.
1
l! II
1 15 Dyrtidstill:it:;g till I ·
~;:~J~~~~:~~t~lt u j' 1' ro.m. a:-,dra halv- J
· aret 1941 tH7:9 3~~ s._s _ _._8_._2_.1947 ~t9H I. _ __.. __ .____.'---::_7_.__L ________ _ l i. b .... ifl~~r. bf:rcikning : '= F..i.As.~:·grr.a t.krivelser
lffi r- -------- -- --·-r-r-
174 . 2. 5.19-lJ ta:<.l!J47 ,t. b. I I I I I I 1 I I · ·
81 (4. 3. !&Hi 15. U94"1 1t. b. I I
s2 14. 3.104<l1s. 3.1047 ;, b.
1 I
I l
!947:1UQ• 14. 3.1047 9· :4 SkaU.!rE:fc&·mt!n
1!!.41.:--J 9 1\{!!.slo.:ld rr.rsonllg
ink.:.m:.t~s:Wttnir.g 19~7:212 · 1. 4.1017 576 26· 7.1!Wl! 1.·1.1948 20 E:t:ltllga hu:u~dra
gcn a's!;.l!!as 1947.?.12 11. 4.1947 2'. Dru·nhi<!r~g (2~0 kr)
- ,. 1. 1.1948
u.:ors 19·17:212 .u. 4.1917 5?.9 120. 7.101.71 J. 1.t943 2l' 0J'IJi:g:;nloJ och I . I f ~~~~~ I i'.tct;er.!;e:.s~!t:uten 1947:212
1
11. 4.1917 ~77 1
1
26. 7.19·17 •ax. 1~4~ 23 f:kcirt.-4. ar\"s .. oc~
i;;i ;ct;es!,~.t~ing, · ln!~r:mJ.~ a\· ~·~var· Ji:.ei.sl:.l!l~"~<.'\tt 1947:212 1
111. ol.1947 '1582
1
26. 7.1947_ 1. !.1911! 24 ·Bola.;·.· )i<'.tlan h!5Js I
(J2-•·:0 ·o) 1047:212 Ill. U947 576 26. 7.191,7 1. 1.1048 li.b. llt:bvcn'ic'l~rm~ 1·'17:250 !25, 1.1947 1 410• 3'l. G.19H ll. 7.!947 I ·, -6
26 Ny prtsre:;lerint:s- I ~7- .. ~~.aPJJ!~:?rin~~P..PJ!::.
I --111 ·451 I I·"' ·"I I ! I +30
I
-127· -1271
+&;! +65i I I
-210 ~-2HI I I I
+101 -+20 +10
25 F.:;rt~~•t il"'oort- I I lag !h7:257,(i!?. 5.1~47 303
1
30. 6,19•17
11
• 1. 'l.lC-17 l.b.
1 tirk b\.\.:c(t ian. 194
'1
27 ~~tii:~.~~~~ I - I - I - ll. 1.134.8 l!.b. II
:'ls THL1cr:·;·;·.·,tt pa .;· 1 !)4 ~....
1
I j 1 wnsi.!\~.,:,;1 _, • 0 ~ 3. 1.1G4S 61
1
5. 3.1~~9 i,l1. 4.:~48
1
. I ~63'!· T125
11:
1
+631 ! i 1
29 Till:i~.:;~k.t:t
~11:':"""" ! ""·' I'· "'"I " I '-'· ""' 11.4. ""' I I I ,, i ··' i . ' L ____________ ,,_, ____ J ... ____ .. _. --- ·-·- _______ L ______ L___i ___ j __ l_ ___ j ____ L
I I I : I 'I I I I I I '
_ .J ___ _! ______ l ___ L ___ l
A 1:2
I . ~ I b_l-- AUTOI\0~1 nuncETFon:'iNDHII\G
I PR~l'OSIT~O_:I __ [ ____ ~~~---- L!~ l~-~--~;;--L~~=~;-;s-1-· f INR ATGj\HDER ~m _ o.wt:M l ~~· "'"'""- '""'"'' · _1 _[!1 i I I n I' u 1
II
!'3o Hojd skatt 1'-' to- I I I ~ 1
I. \..;tksvaro.r j1948:6 3. 1.1C•l8 17 30. 1.194o L 2.018 .21 +25 +1
31 llllj•l skatt pl vin I I j I och sprit 1948:7 3. 1.1043 19 30. 1.1943 1. 2.19·15 +35
1
+45 +6
32 Hojd skatt p.l mall I I dryckcr · .1948:7 3. 1.19·18 20 30. 1.1~~8 1. 2.1948. +7 +8 I -1:1 , 33 J!l)j.! s'!:ott pa m~1:c- 1Hl48:7 3. 1.1948 22 lao. 1.1918 1. 2.1948 +4 ' +5 +1
134 ~~;::::at. ten f<lr t nillgar ~.bj.; 948:8 3. 1.1948 24 30. 1.1948 1. 2.1948 +12 +15 +2 I bio;;r"fforesdll-
35 Oknin~ a ·t dt:.tens
I and.:>l i to~li:;atol'l01Cd~l 948:9
1
36 Okning av statens andelilottcrl-medlen 948:9
137 Oknh~g av statcns
an<!el i tipsmEdlen 948:9
1 38 Omla(:~'lllng av denj I sarskilda palsvaru
skatten 1948:10 39 Skarpning av varu-
skatten j1948:10 40 Slutlig avveckling
1 av allm:innaomsiitt nlngsskattcn 1948:10
41 Sarski!d !OrsalJnin,;s~katt for mattor, ~,:uldsrtlcdsva-ror och grammo-
3, l.1SH
3. 1.1918
3. 1.1948
3. 1.1913 GS
3. 1.1948
3. 1.19~3 86
85 fonvaror ir.!urs jl ~48:10 3. 1.1948
4.2 Pappcrsslott infOn,J s.;~:215116. 4.1~48 283 i 43 Ordinarie skatt och1
1·
I tlllar;rss~;,tt pa motorsprit ioJors ;ts-:8:2171H. 5.1948 369
!44 Subve:1tlonering a\' I I 1 hushallen~ br!insle-. • 1 kostnader ::9~8:2841 a. ~.H•43 , 432 ~5 VinstaYdr:J.t;et pl I
totalisaton.1edel 1 juste:_ ----- 1~~=~ c~-~=~
1. 4.19·18 +4 +1
<15. 4.1948 +8
1. ue!3
'7. 2.19-13 1. 3.1S-i8 -1 -1
7. 2.19·!8 1. 3.19~8 -1·15 +23 +7
5. 3.1948 1. 'i'.l948 -14
5. 3.1948 1. 7.1943 ' +8
6.1948 1. 7.194811 I +Z6
6. 6.1948 1. 7.1S4$ I +2
3. 6.1948 I. 7.1948 I -13 -17H , I
1. 4.19,9 L. __ '----~- -2· --~.....l..---+--~-..... ---+--.....
;-8
+27
+1
,. fiN:6 ~~~~~\~:~~~~n
liudras
]-------·------·L- A~~ro~mt a-;-;-~~:;;oH:vmm;~
PROPOSITION LAG ~~~_-T;~4-;--~i:ioo r~-~~i~-F 19~2 _ NR ___ I~A~'_li~~---~ .J?~~Y._:!~.,-J~RAFJ_ ! __ I
1_i] __ 1 ~ __ !:_I II ! 1 II 1 n
102 1. .:.1049 ro. 4.1949 l.b.
I 47 BensL~n:1sone
rint;ca up11!uvs 567 11.11.1949 12.11.19-19 \.b.
1 48 Fo•·tsn.t• !mpa~t-
1
subventionering 19·19:172 49 Okad subventlo·
ncri!"tg r~\· import-varor, jorJbruks-1
II prod.~kte~ m. rn.
1
1913:217 50 Till~<;gstullen p:l ·
silke slop:1s 1950:53 51 Acclscn pa silke
1 avvecklas 1950:53
! 52 Andrade reglcr om besk.~ttning;m av fOrs~ikringsbolag, fUrsakringstaz,a rc m.m. il95(1:93
53 Fortsalt subv~ntio nering av import ... varor, liYi>mcdel m. m. ur.rlcr 1950 J1950:180
54 Pa!?per3:;kallP.n
I .... 1,.. 339' 2R. 5.1949 I. b.
387' I~O.Il.l~H (1.10.1349
e· 1.1950 128 121. 4.1950 30. 4.1950
7. 1.1950 128 21. 4.1950 1. 5.1950
17. 2.1950
1308-~5 2G. 5.1950 1. 1.1951 i.b.
10. 3.1951) 222• 16. 5.1950 l.b.
(fra.:1 1948) aweck las '
1
1950:193 17. 3.1S50 13~ •28. 4.1950 1. 5.1950
ss Tillaggsskatten pa bensin (fran 1948) 3\"''ec!das och ordi- , na.rie. skattcn hojs ·,1950:23_7
56 Till!i('gsskalt~:l pa br;(~~o!ja (fr.in 19~8) av•·tc:<l:t:; oehJ orciinarie skatten 1 hojs !!950:237
57 1'=·->vlsor!sk j!imk-J
I"· ...... 31. 3.1!.'50
414
4i5
nL~~ av s1>1ts:;katle ~k..ia.t it!l50:241 31. 3.1950 teo
1
58 l!c\jnin(; av b~n:hi- !
2. 6.1950 1. 1.1951
12. 6.1950 1. 1.1951
!::o. u 951 1. 1.19:;2
dl'af:d (260 -4 2"0l ['1950:241 31. ~.1950 1255 2. 6.1950 1. l.W52
sa11l:s till 30 or<!/
1 l59 .Marr;arinatciscn
__ _:______ ~ _ _j ___ ~- ·-- r:·~_r:~~';O ~-~- ~--·9~~ ]~~~--
-42 -43
-3 -8 -6
-1 -3 -2
-7 -22 -15
-88 -89
-7 -7
-4 -4
-25 -26
__ _L _________ 1_ __ ___ L_-
A 1:3
I l'HOPOSITJI)~.I-= _ _!·~~~=~ l:~ f ~~~ }..~G~nn_::~_. >."R ~.!:~~-~_1_ __ !~~--~-~~'l'u:.t _r_~~u~-r_:_j_r __ ~~ll=ff
51 II TI :J~
-·----1053 I l!
---· r--
I -9J
t;'l Cr.1I.,:~gm!:~ cch I t.Uj11!n!.: :\V j.:•.lf:'ln'l·· nal,, o:·t:;j,vJ~·ag:,;t 11050:2-ll 11. ·3.1~50 25J
~-v .sp•·itdryckcr 570 61 Ok:.d bes\:allninj1
62 Ol:ad bcs>:attning av n;:;lt · och
'13.10.1050 Ear.1t S\'a~dricka 573 1\
63 Ok2d besl-'.aUning j av chc:<.Jadvuor
64 Skatt J>a motor-
2. 6.1950 1. 1.1952
1.12.1950
m.m. 574 I sprit !'lop::tS 1950:251 \0.11.1951
1
659,660 .
1
15.12 .1 950 1. 1.1 ~51 65 Tlpsradp!'iset 1951:1,
·hojs 5 ore 1 il. 12 3. 1,1951 I 1. 7.1951 65 Hojd statli ~ lotteri~1951 :1,
,mcdelsandcl r;)n. 1% 3. 1.1951 ., I 15. 7.1951
67 lnvestcringssl:att ! 68
. med :o\"o infi.Jrs 1
1
1951:33 ll19. 1.19511!151 II so. 3.1951 1. 7.1951 I. b. Tr?.1H:slr.:ttten av-vc~khs jln1:51 116. 2.1951 14-l,Ha,·3o. 3.1~51 1. 5.19:;1
69 Skatt 'p.i eL':ra!t I infors 1951:143 16. 3.1951 ~H 1. ~-1~51 20. 6.1951
70 'l'llif~llig !or:!ons- I S~!tt i..lf6rs iOr ar 1951 1951:1H 16. 3.1J51 2S3 ·25. 5.1951
71 Sl:att \'id tillverk- I nin; C·<:h impox' a\' ~rs0nbil~r oc•• me {bilaccis) inl~r. i ~51:218 19.10.1931 G60 24.10.1951 ~(J.10.1B51
72 Tillialli~a hrd)r.s-! skattcn ;;b;,as \J$:;1:218
119.10.1951
n lnvestrrinzsskatter.l bo1·Ualler !119;',1:220 j19.10.195t)
'14 1Jwcster!ng5Ct\'gift 1 :
mcd 12"0 ini'Jrs ;!~51:Z20 ;19.10.1951 I 794 H.1:..1n1 tax. 19:;2 75 n_:mentillnedskriv-1 1
nm;; av van.!)at:<'r ..
1.11.1951
-;;; Sl;altcn pi chcklad- I I
I. b.
i.t..
I I
l
t;~'lingbegr;insas r951:220 :13.l0.135fjl 7a5 114.12.1951 1. 1.1:i52 ll.b. varor m.m. Sanks r951:230 9.ll,l~jl 724 30.11.1951 1.12.1951 j_
. t r)ort!aUer i. 1. 1 :?53
,NR A~o.,:=!'~-·.=:=~=:'=1:~ KR L~~TO'< I KRAn -!----· '---·
: 77 F!"l!=:l'.rFl!rmlncisav .. l I ; g;.!terr.a to.·tfallcr 11352.''ia 8. 2.\S52 663 23 10.1S52 1.11.1952
78 Kcr.j~nkturskatt lrJo1·s 1952:"i~ 22. 2.1952 ~03 30. 4.1952 tax. 1~53
79 Ylss omlag~ning I a~- Yinbes~:att,-;1r.;:cli1~~2:9: 7. 3.1952 97 21. 3.1952 1. 4.1952
80 Hcjdiorda!'lsskatt ~1~~2:h4
1
7. 3.19~2 328 23. 5.1952 1. 1.1953 81 Elskattcn s1'>p.~s
f()r sJniiorbrukare,1952:162
1
U. 3.19?2 356 23. 5.1952 2C. 6.DS2 112 Vlss'omUgg.ti.ng
aY tob:J.hsbcsi>ail-nln!;Cn 1~52:1"14 7. 3.<:>52 2-12 15. 5.Hi.i2 1. 7.1952
83 'l'i!litllliza hcgr:tns ningar :\V rat len t!ll \'lssa l'ok~luls-
I. b.
I. b.
:o
dispositioncr 1S52:2ttO 4. 4.1052 380 6. 6.1952 tax. 1953 l. b.
84 l\!insl:a:l pcrsonllr, 1'lkomstbes:..>.ttnin;:l952:~13 31. 3.1952 105-06 6. 6.1952 1. 1.1953
115 l-'orrn\ir:eahct:obc-slu.tinii.£;en ruild-ras 1952:213 31. 3.1952 407 6. 6.1952 tax. 1954
83 And1·~\rl:.: avr:lr:t~s-rt~hr IO.r foll:-
6. 6.195:1 1. 7.1W~
~0. 6.1952 1. 1.1951 pcnsior.:i~or 1952:~1~ !'21. 3.1952 S63 e7 E'•tra till'ir~ til\
tolkp-~nsicncrna 1S52:233 12s. ~.1952 326
88 Raft~~~ ti!ln~n- 1 6~-:I in:ir.g av vt.ru... I 1-l:;crokn::-g tc- I19.12.1S52 I ~;r:ir-•:ts 1~52:252 21.11.195_2,17c4,~·55!19.12.195ZI1. 1.1953
.i 89 l:i~l:lJad~ill:;;:!g lilli f(.1•.~.i':J3l::J;:(!''Jo'l i'19j3:15 2. 1.19. 53110·1 20. 3.195311. 5.19531 ! !10 FQl}'['(>~o;iom.:?v-
1, pit~" r.o;r. fr;.n J1n3:15 ~ 1.1~o3
tnu;,s I 11•o l'2o: 2.1'·.53,2:)1 I s. 6.1953 1. t.l951 •
i. b.l
I
-95 -30
•11 +53 +42
+2 +4' +~
+5 +19 +13
-3 -3
+2 +2
+2 +2
-6 -1'/ -12
+15 +37 +18
+105
! +7. +30 +13
I -10'11
-31 -131 -10
!0 '!:0 +52 '!:0
-9 -20 -11
'!:0 !O
-142 -143 -.\2 -431 -20 ~20
-i2 -13
-37
-B -130 -87
l ~! H~iJ1 s~· .. t•t r "\ drivl I I
,,,eJs: loll motor-i:.J;d .. ;, B';3:t3 20. 2.1~53 1 2_!,'l,2~(ll',8. 5 •. 19~.3 L .7.'1953 +21 +22
~~~~I . J ~·1 \'Uus;,;;utcn 11"53·!<.8 !3. :·1~ .. '3, 1 '.47 1_2, ·.' 19,"--Jil. 1.1953 '!:0 .!:0
I ~~~ J')yt"Cr!s~l' Jj:i' r . . - I ~ I slup.ts 10o3:!Z3 20. ~.IJo, ,QG 5. ti.1 •:>3 1. 1.1~54/ -14 -·13 •4 .
. ___________ _j _____ __L _____ _j___ __L _____ ,_ ___ c.... _ _,_ _ _,__...JL---'----'-~-
-30
··4 _j
I PROPOSITION.
( ~~R .ATGXHDER I
DATU:Vl
I 9·1 SjuYJOrs:·n:rih{;S .. • l'e~orm {lran5!c-
l: · :.·;:;ri.•;;sC:cl) 11953:178 27. 3.19:>3
95 llojrla arhetsgh·ar-,
I bidr<!G till SJ"Kfi:ir-1954:1H 12. 3.1954 s~kril>J m.m. •1953:178 27. 3.1953
9G Hujda medlcmsav-1 g!fter till sjuldi:ir-scikri."Z m. m.
1
1953:178 27. 3.1953
97 Allm~n;ast}~hets- o• . taxenr.u 19J2 ,(1953:1uo).27. 3.1953
98 Repartil\on~talct I I
l sliMs fran 5 till 4 :1953:186 27. 3.1953
99 Fastighctsskattcn I ersatls av kom- I munal ir.komstskaltl953:186 ~7. 3.1953
~00 Villaschabl01:en be~ I · stlms till 3\0
1
.1953:187 27. 3.1953 !101 lnnstcrin~sav-1 girt~n bo1·llallet
1
1953:227 24. 4 .1S53
r02 .S'atall vid tilh·erk
ning och lr.1port av bilar och me (bllaccis) bert· I Saller 11953:241 23.11.19~3
1
'103 Om1aggning och I 'hojninG av vin- och spritsi<atten j'J 954:28 4. 1.1954
!104 l16jd s~tt pi to-1 bal-:sv:.ror ;1954:28 4. 1.1S54 ci05 Yrk:.!sskade!ilrsak-1
!·
I rl-"i;src!or~n
106 liojd skatt p:l. b~n- I I (tr;;.ns!c·erir.;:sde!.) 1 :•5.::CO
sin och u:otors::>r:t '135~:112
115. 1.1954
tG. 2.1&54
A 1:4
LAG
~n-A_r_u_·~-~ --i
5Ga 1~~. 6.1953 1. 1.1955
2G6 21. 5.1951 243 H. 5.19~4 1. 1.1U55 +38 +38 +37 +37
:~3 14. 5.19:>4 1. 1.1955 +93 +93 -44 ·21 +25
tax. 1953 +24 +24
399 5. '6.1953 lax. 1954 -20 -~0
400 5. 5.1953 tax. 1956 ±o to
! 404 5. &.1953
1 tax. 1955 !o to.
364 . 6.1953 ! 1. 1.1954 i. b. "·
693 11.12.1553 20.12.1&53 -45 -44
72 26. 2.1954 1. 4.1951 +31 +76 +18
76 (6. 2.195~ 1. 4.1954
'243 (• 5.1954 1. 1.1955 Se 9l
+26 +27
+6 +12 +7
I io7 sankt sl:att pa ;n- I 11 hcmsil skillerbe:l· •
Si:l ·195·; :112
r:6-57 c ~·1:54 1. 7.1~:4 I bs. 2.1~s.;
r.cs bo9 h1o
1 -56 1-l. ~.L54 1. 7.1Jo4 liOjC fordonsskatt :1~:,-1:r12 ;:tj. ~.19~4 · ,55 121 5 1954 1 1 t:;sr.
Hiijd brannoljeskahl:t5.;:112 ;26. 2.1~5~ ' ;60 ~; -· s:m4 1: 1:195~ I ~3 -3 1
+22
,-h~l--r---..t----r--+---J I :w1oderskapsf0rsa.k..i I rine;£rcfonn I {trans!creringsde1),1954:144j12. 3.1954 2CG 5.1954 .1. 1.1955 i" ~;
lf9c•J i0lk~ensions- I j l-- -- ---~-;,,·p!tcn l:oj s _
--~----------.----------r------.
I 1954
AU"fO::-lOM BUDGETF9~A:t-.'DR:c\G
I PROPOSITION --¥G :mt A.rcii.RDEn NR o.;.;.;;·i-- NR 1 DATUM ,
·111 Moti:>oken slops 11;n4:15.1 1-;. 2.m·l- ~I26. 5.1954
:112 E'kaltcn p:\ 1a<;;rat
r.---r--1 KTIA FT ' __ I__ II
1955 t 1S56 · 1957 r-- ---, --·t-· I lll II 1 n
j svagdricka burt-1 fa!!er 1951:154 19. 2.1954 277 26. 5.1951 ,113 Hl:\)d 111--.'\tt p:\ j s!arkOl · 1954:154 19. 2.1~54 525 26. 5.1954 ! 114 J.ii!<emcdelsrc!c!'r,i 1~5·;:103 !12. 3.1954 •jl9,520 I 4. 6.1S54 1115 Fond~katt infOrs · '195·1:187 :2. 3.1954 264 121. 5.1954 116 H!Sjd s:tatt pa mo-
torsprit 1955:24 7. 1.1955 131 ,11. 3.1955 117 Hojd skatt pa mo-
torsprit 1955:24 · 7. 1.1955 131 11. 3.1955 118 S!irskild inv<.>stc-
motorfordon in· 1
. rlngs:wgilt pa f!Srs 1955:36 7. 1.1955
1
119 lnvcsteringsavgift na 12'~ tor 1955 in!ors 1955:36
120 Vlssa schablonav-1 7. 1.19:>5
drag vid inkumst-taxering il'l<lrs 1055:~9 21. 1.1955
121 Nw. re;;ler om avskrlmingar, Ia· gervardc ring oca amlra vinstrcg-lerande atgtirder 1955:100 4. 2.1£53
123 Andrad samordning mellan folk-
4. 2.1955
19 11. 2.1955
19 111. 2.1955
122-25 31. 3.1955
2531257 4. 6.19S5
I 256 r7. 5.1955
' 1.10.1955 'i. b. I
1. 7.1954 -1
1.10.1955 1. 1.1955 ta.~. 1955:1.li.
1. 7.19551
1. 7.1957
15. 1.19551
15. 1.1955 i.b.
l. 1.1956
( 1. 1.1956 i. b.
tax. 1956. i. b. 122 Ny la:;stiflning om
~wcslcringsfondcrl'1955:100
pensiotJering och 1 sjukforsikring nu:~.l955 :1 H 4. 3.1955 397 3. 6.195; 1. 1.19561
villig Wrs:i\:ring 1955:114 4. 3.1955 3~a 3. 6.1955 1. 1.1956 125 Hijjnlr,g a\' !irlkc-
~9-1,3~5~ 3. 6.1:>55 1. U.956 18. 2.1955
1 ?.4 S~at5bidr2.C: tlll fri-J
pension m. m. 1955:128 126 Prcmierh:r, a\· tr!
villiGI sparande 1955:193 15. 4.1955 127 l!ojd bol:\r;~s::!\tt
m.m. (40•50~c) 128 Tullh<Jjnir:;< fUr
vlssa tcxtilYl!ror m.m.
\955:196 2~. 4.1G55
I
304 l 3. 5.1955 15; •j.1955 I. h.
tO to tO -8 -9
+1 +1
+50 +•10 +10
-85 --85 -22
-4 -5
-7 -8
l i I
+22 +23
1958
I n f--
+1
-21
I
I I
I 300 II 3. 6.195. 5
1 sept. 1 u55
.:.;s .3~_. 6.19311~~.19-~----·-''----~--~ j1G:i3::!02 30. 0.1£•55 I r-43) '''" ]''"' . I ·-- L--!.--·'--"
A 1:5
------~---------------r--------------r---~-------r-----~--~~~T~UD0i.Tfc iflANDlll!\'G
li PROPOSITION L~~-- . r 1~56 1957 tass
( NR ATGARDER ---~lt---.r--D-A_T_U_M_ N~--- _?AT~~~~ll-'·~T II I J( I II I I J II !129 llwesiPrinr,sav- I I I
gift (p;\ 1 2' o) f<\r 1956 1955:205 7.10.1~55 695 16.12.1955 1. 1.1956 i. b.
1130 Okning a v stat ens
andel av lotteri-nlcdd
131 S>.nkt personlig 1nkomstska tt
132 Folkpen31onsavgiftcn h0)3Jran 1,8 till 2,5~0
1956:1 bil. 12
1S56:83
1956:107
4. 1.1956
23. 2.1956
2. 3.1956 133 SlanclarJtimg;:tlll I iolltpcnsioncr:~a 1956:107 2. 3.1956 134 Jr,\'c;terin;;_sav- I I
gilt (pa 12 :o) fOr 1957 19_56:188 ;19.10.19561
135 Oms:ittning.ssl:att I · pa rnoLOrlc;rdon infors 1956:188,19.10.1956
1 136 I~ves!e':ings~v
gi!ten P"- mo.orfordon bortfaller 1956:188
119.10.1956 I
137 Htijd zl<.a!l J'l sprildrycker 1956:193 :26.10.1356
138 'Forbno;t barll- 1957:1 I bidrag' infOrs bil. 10 i 3. 1.1957
139 Allm. harnbiclra!'CD ckas !ran 2!l0 till400 kr !1957:12 3. 1.1957
140 Nojesskatteo lind.\ ras j'1957:G6 125.1.1957
i41 Allm:tn fasllghcls taxcring 1957
142 Rcpartition3ta!et saru;s fran 4 till 2.G 1957:71 8. 2.1957
15. 4.1956 t:l +5
1. 1.1957\ -152!-1" I 1. 1.1957 I tG51' +65
1, 7.1956 I -73 -80
23.11.195611 """11 •• , i 123.11.1956,1.12.19561 I t9 I +64 j +48!
123.11.1956 1.12.1956!· I -1o i -90 ~-79 I I I I • 1 5.11.19:36 5.11.1956 1 • +53 :t136j +85
I i I i 15.11.1957
1
i. um 1 I ; I I .i
26. 4.195'/ 1. 1.1358 ! I . , "- . .,., : I
1. 6.1956
554
243 18. 5.1956
265
264 1. 6.1956
545
547
530
611
-6
114
125
I
! 1G5 1~. 4.1Q57
143 VUlaschalJlonen sanks !ril.n 3 till i
si'~ttnint,;ens sko.tt!·fria t,'Tund-
-9
-10
-6
·36
t15
-9
-10 1
tO
..
1G53
1 II
l -35.
+16 -30
±0
I
1900
I n
-31
I I I !
i •.• '"'"' •• '-'"' 105 12. '·'"l"· "" ' H4 Fcrmor;~n'hetslJc- II
belc.pp hojs till j · sooool:r ___ ,~~~~.:.~"' 1o6 12. 4.1357 tax. ma 1 -u ·-111 ___ L-...J __ j__j
r- ~J +,------- AUTm;o:.r IJl'::1GE~FbRAl\TIRr.-;G I PROPOSITION LAG 1957 1958 I 1959
~a .ATaxanr:R NR I oAT~;- 1\"R ~D~TuM 1 KP.AFT -~ --~ ~- n-ltf 145 Skattcfria grund-~---[-l ____ ------- ------ ~---,--,
-i 1960
nj 1 II
t"elowet ro.· hpi-tatinkornster hiijs 1957:71 , 8. 2.1957 105 12. 4.1957 tax. 1958 · -19 -2
146 Viss omltlgt;nlng I I j :w vln- och fiprit- .1
lx?skattnin~cn .
1
1957:91 1. 3.1957 209 24. 5.1957. 1.10.1057
1
-8 -15 -7 147 JWjda kommunala . I ! ortsavdrag
1
1957:97 .
1
2?., 2.1957 200 j'1G. 5.1957 1. 1,H•58I -172 -17a :148 Br;\r~,olj€skaltcn 1- I 1 stinks ,1~57:175 ~6. 4.1957 _ 264 131. 5.1957' 1. 7.195'11 -3, -4 I 149 l!ojd cl~rrcttsl:at~1957:1i5
1!26. 4.1957 I' 2G5 131. 5.1957 1. 7.1957: t2!l +29
150 Skatten p~ indu3tr1:1 1 I I ,. · E:il e:lkr:Ut ~lopas j19:i7:1'15 2u. 4.1057,262 31. 5.1~57 20. 6,1957 -1 1 -21 I -21
151 Allman energlskatl 1 1nfo~s · 1~57:175,26. 4.1957 262 31. 5.1957 1. 7.1957 +1 +177 • +187 ~10:
152 Jm·cztcringsav-giften l>ortialler i1957:175) 26. 4,1957 1. 1.1956 i.IJ.
153 Vinstavdraget p:l I totalisatormP.del 11958:1 Mjs · bU.1
115-1 H!Sjd energisl,att
3. 1.1958 1. 7.1958 +51
+5
, p:ft bcnsin cch I motorspl"it !tss Skatt pa socker
I och sirap infers 1958:50 7. 2.1958 31 15G l!ojd st--.att pa sprit
1&58:50 32 7. 2.1958 11. 2.1958
111. 2.1958
11. 2.1958
1.1. 2.1958
5. 2.1958
t38 .. l" +22 +27 +5
och vin 1955:50 7. 2.1958 30 1. 2.1953 +64 +87 1 +17 157 Hojd si<.att p:l
cigarrctter +22 t45 +23
t4 +7' +3
+7 +131 +5
+6 tiO +4
+8 +12
1: 4.1958 ,
1 158 miJd skalt pl maltdrycker
11958:~3 7. 2.1958 72 14. 3.1958 20. 3.19581
. 159 Hojd skatt pa 1 ! l:lskcdrycker 1958:53 7. 2.1958 74 114, 3.1958 20. 3,1958;
'jl60 lli:ijd sl:att pa I lotterivinsier 1958:5:t 7, 2.1958 75 14. 3.1958 1. 4.1958
161 Jl0jd cnergi~katt I I Jla s. k. boro;crlig
195~:53 7. 2.19?8 70 14. 3.1958
-40
1orbruJ.:ning 1958:53 7. 2.1958 71 · 14. 3.1958 20. 3:1!">581 162 Folk;:-cnsionsm·- I
~~i~tf1~\~fdn 1958:55 11,2.1958 182 j_2. 5.1-958
11. 1.1959)' L
'--------'---~--L-- j__~__ _ ___. _ __j_
-41
I
I I
l
I_L
--~ 1961
I 11
I
165 Ut-;tracknlng av tid for llo!~rc tilllii&L:~sjulq;enning :
1\!)j3:ll29 6. 6.1958
166 E~jd arvs- och ~;lvol'<::si'.attnlng 11!:.o8:145 28. 3.1e53
457
502 :167 Kval'la!cnskaps-1 skattcn slopas 1958:3:3 6. 6.1958 561
i 1(162)
1168 Ny tulll:lxa. 195S:B:4 6. 6.1958 475
, 169 Ytterll~re ett hs 1 upp~kov med till-
1 lampning~nav 19~~ :l.rs la~ervarde-
j rinpreg!er 1959:27 •170 Tip5r,.,dspriset 1195S:1
I. hOjs 5 ore I bil. D 171 Viss bo!rlclse
, Iran irokOinstprOv-
1 illng fOr !CIIl:pcn-sionar~r 11 r.5!i:29
1'172 Allm~n lill:i!!gS-. pcns~cn iilUrs oc.h: i avgi!tsuttnget !
j21.11.1 S53
13. 1.1959
3. 1.1 ~59
54
66
129. 8,1953 1. 1.1S59
21.11.1~58 1. 1.1959
21.11.1558 1. U959
12. 9.1958 1. 1.1959
I I!U~195~ , ta.-;. 1 C61 i.b.
1. 7.1959
20. 3.1959. 1. 7.1~5!?
, 1950-64 best~!llS :i95c:IC') 13. 3.1~59 ! till3-7 ':o ,. 1~5<:55) ;(11. 2.19'JP.);291-!.'2 28. 5.1959! 1. !.l~'G(I I
: 173 Bob~sskatt~nm.m. ! I I I i sx;.;:i; (50-•40 •:JJ \'1959:159 115. 5.1S59I295-26 , 5. 6.1959
1
tax. 61
' 174 Alb, :in varusl:alt 11 I
\ m.e~ ~·;;, inft-r~ . 1959.162 9.10.!959 ; 507 1.12.1959\ 1. l.ts·;o
-175 S!iru<t personhg I 1 illi<omslsl<.'ltl 1959:164 , !l.10.1~f,9 537 • 11.12.1959 · 1. 1.1~SO
i i
i 176 Allm'inr.a barn- I I I hiar::t,,en hojs rro~.n, I 400 lill·l50 1:: 1959:1C9 · 9.1C.H5~
i 177 Tel:nlsk omHiE;a.v tob::tlcsba·
53$ 4.12.1959 1. I 18~0 I ! lnln;;en 1950:177 23.10.1 9:>9
A 1:6
.--::·--· -·-·--·-----HtA~~l.Jf!j?\G
-----1%1 1902
---;---r-~1 I I II i-- l
-6 -5
+12 +12
-1 -11 -11 -S
+139 +139 +30 +31 -66 -66
iO !0
'
'
I I i
+G +61
' -2 -3
I I
r,., I
41 -19 -19 I
L."."' +594 +782
·93 -9
I -45 ·45
572 jllJ2.1959 1. us.:;o I j _ _L _ _j _________ --- lJ-'1: ---J
1 Berriknin~arna tterfinns e!lcr ~tgard .17": r----- ---~-------
1 PROPOSITIO:~-~~ itm ATGARDER ~'R DAT~ ~J (172) 1ia mtt till.rorlust-
utjanming inmrs 1960:30 15. 1.1960 65 179 l:~FTA-t•Jllsank-
19e0:32 4. 1.19GO 213-45 180 S!aml.1rdlillli['$ till
foL:qJCnsio:tCI'AA 1960:'/5 4. 3.1960 . !CO
181 hkc- och barn-pensio.!src!ornl De0:75 4. 3.1960
182 Vlssa lattn.'l.<lcr 1 f::tmi!jebcskaltnir.gen lrJfOrs
183 Sars'.:i!da oms!Htningsslr ... 'ttte:l pi
1liG0:76 jzs. 2.19GO
1 nya pr;rson- och s:«lpbilar hOjs 1%0:117 ·'j 3 1960 I
184 AUm. varuskatten ,... . . pa bcgapadc per-son- oc11 sl<apbilar, borUaller 19130:117 ;25, 3.1S&O
99
173
81
81
185 V!s,s .':'to!<~i~g av ! • SJU.:.forsa.:rmgs-form:J:cr 19GO:U7
1
1. 4.1960 179
1
166 V ins \a vdrag£·t pa totalisatormedel , 5ndras. 1960:150 :22. 4.1960
i 187 utjl.-r•nb.gsskatt 11
p:l. vlssa sotvaror in!tlrs 1960:154,'22. 4.1S60
188-ltl9 w·:es~rln!:Sfonder 188 Dcponcrin~;ssatscu
I hqs fr.ln .;o till 46.:, (3a':·iprop.) '19S0:157 22,4.1960
11S9 Speciella rcglcr vid avs~Utnir.g 1960 1%0:157 22. 4.1960
258
2:l5
236
ISO T"knisk oml:i~gni.ng Z!.V l:~nsinbc-skallnin;;rcn 1 Nil :7 16.12.1960 I 372
191 J';ils\'~l'ubcskalt-nin;;t·n minskas 1901 :lOG
1tn2 Td:nisk om Ia{!;;- I 3. 3.19Gl 637· 38
nin~ av l;r:innolj,~L~~kat~ningcn __ 119f,_1 :114 10. 2.19G1 653
DA TU~l I KRAFT
8. 4.1960 ta.x. 1961
13. 5.1!.'60 1. 7.t~GO
5. 5.19CO 1. 7.19CO
5. 5,1960 1. 7,1960
2'/. 5.1960 tax. 1961
29. 4.1960 1. 5.1%0
2~. 4,1960 1. 5.1960
27. 5.1960 1. 1.1%1
- I 1. 7.1960
1. 7.19~0 3. 6.1960
3. 6.1960 1. 7.1960
3. 6.1960 I 1. 7.1960
1. 7.1~~1 7. 4.19G0 1
e.IZ.1ss1! 1. 1.19.52
,15.12.1%1! 1. 1.1%2 -
--1D60
AUTOX0:\1 Bt:DG•:n~TrD-;Q 1961 I 1%2- ;963 19M J
I 11 I n I I n I I 11 I n
+157 +200 +47 +62 +196: +212 !+120 +HO +130 +149
·G -7
-20 -20
-110 -110
-14 -75
-42 -43
I +7 +Hi +12
-'7 -11 -11
-2 -2
+5 +6
-1 -1
1. b.
I. b. I -1-10 +11
. ' -1
'!:0 '!:o I ·- ·-
A 1:7
~---------,--------~-----T -- m -,\uro~oor nmct:·i·::on:~.n:lJNG----= I I I PRO"Ocl_I_!O~- _..J·Y~- ~-~G;--~---;;c;-- ;~;~2 ]-;a,;J -~ imt A-rci\nn~:u I t-1l n,;n,:.l I :-;u nxru:.1 IV.H.\H ~-~---~ ~-fiTir_I_I_I n llJil_l_li I tl103 e:~,~~~f~~~!if.t~~ ----~-- -- ---- --- -------- r----- --- ---, + ' ; l
_,,"l:''n 10~1:115 23. 3.19o1, ~04 16. G.l%1 1. 7.19o1
1. -o '!:o
lt94 EFTA-lul\s;i!'~-1 !iing (S0-70.o) 1%1:146 7. 4.tD6! 312 2, 6.1951 1. 7.1961 -10 -10
1195 l!Oj•.!:t fOfs~Uaings 1 och kapit·.tU.n ..
I kolllst:wdra.: ; 13r.1:160 •28. 4.19G1 623 15,12.1961 tax. 1962
196 St><'Ciclla re~;lcr I I vi<l :wsattniugtill
in'.•c::,tering.sf onde rl I 1961 '1051:162 i 197 Hojd bcn>inskalt i .(33~38 ore) 1961:138
1198 Hujd br~nnolje-
199 :~sen lor p§.- 11961
:188
fi'irL"tg av social .. forsf.krin~:sav-
28. 4.1961
2·i.10.19G1 1
27.10.1961
gi!ter hojs · 1961:188
127.10.1~61
200 Sli nkt pcrsonl!g i 201 Hojnir.g av orts- I I inkoms'sl<att 11961:188127.10.1951
155 2. 6.1961
626 15.12.1GG1
653 15.12.1961
624 115,12.1051
623 115.12.1061
7. 5.1~61
1. 1.1962
1. 1.1962
1. 1.1962
1. 1.1062
I a vdral:cn ~mnli- ! digt scm dJ!ercn-tieri.rir"cn p.'i dvr-orter slopas . /1961:158 2i.10.l~u1 622 15.12.1961 1. 1.1862
202 Omscn hOjs fd.n \ 4 till o\0 , 19~1:tea 27.10.l:,cl ~25 15.12.1961 1. 1.1962
203 Allm. b:lrnbl- ! dra!.:"n Okas fran 1 450 till 550 kr : 1961:190 :n.10.1(•ol 629 15.12.1961 1. 1.1902
204 H~jning av lor-11
Hi>!~~ ,..li'.trnbi;~rag , AL rl j fran oi till oO kr/ · \! I .mb. : 1961:73
I 205 EFTA-Iul!sank- I
nLo!: (70-GO'.o) j 1D62:22 29.1l.1951
5.12.Dii1 15.12.1961 1. 1.1951 630
25. 2.1962 1. 3.1%2 28
• penn:,.g, d\Jygg·
Lb.
nad 3V sjukponnint;sl:alan m. m. t:l62:90 B. 3.1 :J62
I 206 li5j<i gnmdsjck·l'
L-,. ---J~-
381
2S~.tS5:t_1_. __ 1_.1_9_63_L--~----L---L---~---L.--~--~----~---L---' Andra !agu\sko!tet
NR .ATGARDER
'20'1 H5jda m~rllem~av-rntcr tHL sjukfor
l sakrir.g Jll.m.
1208 H<ijda arb•Jtsgi-1 varbidrag till sjuk
fOrs~U:rin~ m.1n. 209 Sta.'!d:urltillagg till
folkpcnslonerna
1%2:90 9, 3.1062
1n62:9o 9 . .3.ID62
1~52:90 9. 3.1962
---·-------
LAG.
NR DATU~t 1 KRAFT - -- c_______
391 25. 5.1962 1. 1.1963
381 25. 5.1%2 1~ 1.19G3
202 25. 5.19u2 1. 7.1962
I
---·----· --AUTOl\0~ l Bl'DGETFORA~DH.l!o.'G
1962
n
-163
1\16 :~=r~ff4 -i9os--- -1966 ~ n ~- II _I I x:__ I
+50
+67
-163
I I
+59 +~ 11 +11 -30 -30 '
+6 +16 +17
210 Forb~i!tring av linkepcllsionen
211 Oniga !clkpcnsi.onsreformer
212 EFTA--tullsank. nL'lg {60+50~()
1962:90 I 9. 3.1962
1962:90 I 9. 3.1962
202 125. 5.19G2 1. 7.1962)
203,392 25. 5.10621 1. 7.1952 -11 -52 25. s.1uv2 1. 1.1963
213 Mlldrad inkomstprovning :w folkpensions.Wrm3.ner
1
214 Tr;..fikor,;laggntngs3!(att mfOrs
1
215 Sar~ki!da varuskatten pa glass bortlallcr
216 Sjll'itulsl;'inknings-
1
sk;·tt~n botliall~r
217 H<ljd &katt pi vin i c~h sr,rit
1213 Nojcg~kattcn av
\'cckla.s
! 219 AT£'-:!':g!ltcrna : ftlr 1915-60 fast-: ~:l!ils till 7 1/2-i 9 1/2 '0 l220 Visqn :hvlrin~ar 1 i in''t:!tr.:rings-
fcr.ds!~:;stiftnir.gcn
221 S.'ir3!<ild~ •'!cd!tcn p.t l:afic och teullen s!opa5
1962:180 5.10.196~ 531
1963:12 18. 1.1963 57,58
19?3:59 15. 2.1963 116
1963:~7 8. 3.1963 91
1903:9.0 8. 3.1963 53
1963:90 ~. 3.1963 52
11963:101 8. 3.1963 168
192
215
!!2,595
1963:123 29. 3.19631
1063:1591 29. 3.19631
1963:1&7 1C.1V.IOG3: --
30.10.1962 1.11.1962 -5 -12 -8
2~. 3.1963 1. 7.1963 -S -9
17. 5.1963 1. 1.196-1 +85
26. 4.1963 1. ';,1963 -9 -8
5. 4.19<33 9. 4.1963 -3 -10 -4
5. 4.19<33 9. 4.19€3 +44 +107 +52
31. 5.1053 1. 7.1963 -15 -15
31. 5.1963 1. 1.1965 • I 14. 6.1953 1. 7.1963 I. b.l
. ___ L_ 6.12.1953 l. 1.1~6·1
------·-·-·--- --
I I ____ J
A 1:8
___ [ ____________ T ______ 1_l ___ ---;~7;~;.~;-1 DUDCETFi'mX:>.'Dnr:;G
PP.OPOSITION _ L~\_~-- ··-·-;;'fi4]--lOJ5 - i%6 ______ i9S7--
\ Nn ATr. X r: ~~ NH DAT0l\! _!:~:_~ _ _1_):\TCM I KR.-\F~J! __ I 11 L I U -I ll I ix
1966
222 FFTA-tull.,onlt- I j 1 ning (5o~~u .'). ·1963:188 18.t0.1:!tl3 G10 I 6.12.1GG3 1. 1.19H -151·15
1223 Allm. brnhi<lra': 1 hojs (o50 ... 700 hr) 1961:16 3, 1.106-1 119 6. 5.1%·1 1. 7.1964 -127 -128
224 Avdrag;r:illca Or I folkpensiu:JS:\V• 2 .c214 17 _c 1 ~ giflen slop~s 1964:18 3, 1.1%1 76-78 3. 4.1964 1. 7.1964 +' 13 • + +17 +17 •
225 Jnvcsteri~~sav-dragp:i 1G' mcd-' I l (;CS 196HJr industriella maskin·· i invcsterinr;ar H. 1.1964 79 10. 4.1964 tax. 1365
I ~~100~
, 226 ~orandc av v:l.rd-i bidrag till handi-
1
, kappa de ha rn 1964:04
227 Uto!:;-d ind~xre~- I lerin;: av !c·lr.pen-
. sions!ormt.ncr j1n64:94 I .
'228 St.andardtillazg til~ folkpensionerna !'1964:94
229 Studiemedelsrc-form 1964:138
230 Sludiechj~.lpsrc-fotm !1964:138
231 l!ojnin~ av !Or- I l~r.gda Larnbidrag (50-•50 kr) 'l~G4:1:J8
232. EFTA-tullsank- I ninll: (40-3010'o)
11%3:188
233 Allm. b.rnbidrag ! hojs (?oo~90\lJ , 1%5:12
I 1 234 Ar,drade grunder ' f6r lxraknin~~ av , fcL~pcr.sionsavc;i1t 11905:14
,1· 235 Kol!lmunals'<attc·l
a.vrlr?get stha· blcniser:>.s 19<3:;:14
l2s£. Lagre st1 ~li£:a h1· '
I · k::nnstsl:.altt&atscr · 13e5:14
237 Allm. ~aru5k~.ttcnl
13. ~.1964 156 21. 5.1064
13. 3.1964 157 21. 5.1964
13. 3.1964 157 21. 5.19641
3. 4.1%·1 401 4. 6.1964
3. 4.1964 402 4. 6.1964
3. 4.1964 400 4. 6.1964
836 111.12.19611
4. 1.1965 31 ! 5. 3.1%5
4. 1.1965 74 9. 4.1965
4. 1.1905 72 9. 4.1865
72 9. 4.1965
I t,O)S fr~.n 6 lill . 9,1% 11:165:14 4. 1.1965 75 9. 4.1905
- - .. ---------L-- ----- ----'---
1. 7.1964 I -6 -6
1. 7.1964 I -6 -6
1. 7.1964 ! -1481·149
1. 1.196~. I -8! ·30 -34 -13
1. 7.1!)611 -67 -68
I I 1. 7.1964j -1~ -Z
1. 1 . ., .. I ! 1 _, _, I 1. '·""I I ! -1" -""
~: ~:~~~~ . j~ 1:::~ ::~r ., ·u' 1, '·"" --''"'i~-8~....19 _..J._l __.I_~~ I
r-------------· --1 r
------·------------------, , AUTO:>m! iJIJDGF.TFGHA:-mHJ:-;G _ ~
; ~nor-csn1ox LAG f---1-.965 I-2?~ __ _1_9~7 =P ~:-a-~ 195; ~~'!_-~GARDER -~;~ DA;t!:.l ]-;R-,,-n_A_T_l'-~.1-~ !KRAFT _!__ll __ L!-+-_u_~ _ _l__!!_i_.]_ IT __ !_ !!
238 ,.,r,kn"" ~ -·----F:--r------sl:attcn s!inhs elle
slopas li>r 'is"' I I \·aror 10C,5:14 4, 1.1%5 76,77 9. 4.1965 1. 7.1%5 239 li•;Jd .:btl p:i ci
~lrrcttcr cch ci· garrcttp.lf!>cr 1~u3:14 4. 1.1005 'o) 9. 4.19G5
1 1-. 7.1DGS
i240 Jiojd lx;nsinsl:.1tt ; mcd 5 ore/! 1963:14 i241 S~:rtttt•plikts~r~in-! H:n fOr fi:\rm<.l~(·n·
hctsskatl l;bjs .. till 1C0000kr 1965:14
242. Re~artitior.stalct 1 orh vilb.::cliablo~ 1
4. 1.1965 78
4. 1.196:i 73
nen f;t\nks fr:in ; 2,5 till?. j1965:30 5. 2.1865 120
243 Allm. !asti~hcts-bxerhi~ 1 Gt!5
?.H Shmlanl!ill:ig:~ lil~ !cli\pcnsior.crll:t 1955:45
12~5 Lh>drad !Ormi:lc;en
lot:"tsprUvnin~~ !0r loi!<p~nsior.arer 1965:-15
;246 M;··ilit:!lct tilllrlv.
f
s3r'-x-"~attn!ng in-lors 1965:&4
21~)
5. S.1965 145
146
153
I ........ 26. 2.1965
2·17 llojda !Or\'arvsav-, nu• I drag l~o5:t6 16. 3.1965 n !248 Hojnln5 av !Or- I I lJ.nc.da b:trnt,iJrag 1 1co:.75 kr) 1965:109
1
26. 3.1965 2:9 .249 EFT '.-tu!le!ir.k- [ ! nin;; (30-20'() {1%3:1CS) - 717
1250 ll•_;jct sl:~!t pi\ spri ! oc:. ·.-;" 1ous:1o
1
1 a. ugGG 20 ! :!jl ~jrf.':-:ild s:~:ltt lJ;\
9. 4.10Go 1. 7.1965
9. 4.1%5 tax. 1~66
I,._ ..,., .........
14. 5.D65 1, 7.1965
14. 5.196511. 7.1965
21. 5.1965 tax. 1967
9. 4.1965 1. 1.1966
3. 6.1965 1. 7.1965
3.12.1965 1. 1.1966
4. 2.1966 7. 2.1~GG
l•I:OfS 1965:10 . 3, 1.19G6 21 4. 2.1%61 7. 2.1966 IZS2 Bil.cccison hUjs 19oG:IO 3. 1.19?$ 1~ 1. 2.1966 1~ l.19C6
-57 ·58
+ 71
-10 -10
-SO -81
-5 -5
-1 ~ I -15
+92 +102 +103 +115 +35 •99 +101 t1151 +10~
I :r~?~orhr:-wslcn j 125J 1'J1l:~Hn~der Wr I'
. \'is~~ u::.:Lmdspro-i __ ~h.:-: tor 1 nGu:1_4_~-~· l.l ~[:6_U2__._:!§_._3. t 9~t_1_,_'LJ29.G __ Jl...--..l--.J......:.!.:!l.....:.!-"-L--1---'--
1 l>.·:itlningsutskottet
tl22
A 1:9
..--------.------- .. --;1--- ---··----~ ~ --- AUfO::o:,r~~;DGI::TFi.'m~~l)fiP.JG I
I I PP.OPOSJTIO~ LAG ~ - .. t~G6 ---;-;~~- r --l~il19~!l NH ATG;\r.DF. . .:...l:.:.1---J-----.:l"..:.-~:...-_~l-~;.;~2'! ~~=r~ 0\T~~~ ~'- !K~~£_ _ l 1~~~- I --;-
1
._1 _ _;1~r~~-; 251 Utjamnings.skattcil : hiljs 1 19GG:57 4. 3.19Go 224 ~~~7. G.19S6 1. 7.1%:3 +6 -+5
;zs5 siamhrdtilla:;g till i foll:fensJOncrna i 1960:~9 11. Z.l96G 237 27. 5.19C5 !. 7.1966 -90 -so 256 :Fort:ltb·adc lor- 1
miner !0r handi-lmppadc · 1066:59 11. 3.1966 236 2'1. 5.1066 1. 7.1065
257 Sarski!<h oms'lttnine;ssh"-' ten pl tckni£-k sprit a\~-sl<affas 1966:59 11. 3,1966 217 27. 5.1966 1. 7.1986
58 Lotttrivinslbcskattnir.~en 1nild· ras 1966:69
5~ Realisationsvinstbesl-:altnio•gen av aklicr sk:irps· 1966:90
260 R:itt.en till tullfri in!orscl av spritdn·cker och tobak
11. 3.1:166 219 27. 5.1966 1. 7.1966
25. 3.19Gu '215,216 3. G.1966 1. 7.1966
5. 3.1966 400 2.9, 6.1%6
-5 -5
-3 -3
-7 -8
i. b.
-t25 +25 +21 -t2"
be~rars:,s
1
1965:111 261 Sjukf<>rsakrlngs-, relorm 1966:113
262 Hoj<h arbctsgivar1 u:dr~g till sjuklor-l
1. 4.1966 350 16. 6.1966
1.10.1966
L l.l:l671 -390,-390
s:ikrin,; m.m. 11906:113 263 Hojcla Incdl~msav~
gi!ter till sjukiOr-:- 1 s;iki"ing m.m. · 19GG:113
1. 4.1966 350
1. 4.1066 350
264 Utjiimnhgsskatt pa m<cll>.n3l och starkOl in!Ors
265 \"ilLcscl,2tlonen differwtieras
1965:139 ,H.10.19G6 656
l 1966:151 U1.19G6 6~6
266 EFTA-tullcn • s1op3.s 1%3:188
1267 Trafi'<o:n!2ggnln£:s"
721
16. 6.1966
1G. 6.1966
1G.l2.19G6
16.12.1966
9.12.18C6
L 1.19<·7 +213 +214 +53 +54
L 1.1967 +48 +43 '+7 +7
1. 1.1:?G7
tax, 1963
1. 1.1967 I I I
+41 i4
• 50 I
-26 -27
u
1. 1.1968 ' I I
24. 2.1967 1. 1.1963
l 24. 2.1!!67 1. 7.1967
l __ _L
-107
-+250 +1001 J -'----'-·26 L_::_-j_~j__ -- -
3. 1.19617) -
3. 1.1957 sa
3. 1.1067 40
_...._ ____ ,__ __
I slcatl~n bortiall"r k1967:7
268 !Hijd sk:1.tt pa 1 rnctor!ordon 19G7 :7 '269 Schablonen fi'.r ! kommunals{.atte-i ~.vdn£: f0rcr.::las 1967:7
I
PROPOSIT!O!'<
NR ATGii.RDER NH DATUM
1971
II
·--~~:---- -----~ . .,,: A'f~~;.njp;~;i,"RF~;~ -·· NR D.\TU~I I KRAFT 1-;---~u- -;--~-r--;- -~ I T~
270 Allmanr.:tvaru- -------. --- -------- 1~-. . ~-··-·- -- --1--l
skattc;, hX~s lnl.n 911 tilllO o 1957:7 3. 1.1967 35 24. 2.1%7 1. 3.10~7 +lSI +324 dl2
271 llojd skall p;\ to-llak 1957:7 3. 1.1%7 36 21. 2.19?7 1. 2.1057 +C6 +97 +32
272 Folkpcnsionsav-gl!len hujs fran 4 tm5~o 1967:7 3. 1.1067 39 24. z.tc~., 1. 7.1967 +187 +187 +14' +14 +14 -+14
273 llojd asdragsratt f6r folkpcnsiona· rer 1967:7 3. 1.1967
274 ~ves~er~~;;saygi!l p.t 2o ,, pet oprioritcra<1c ny IP;g(;cn lnFirs
2'/5 Nya rcglcr li:ir vissa bo:{shJ~sdispositioner
276 Oknlng av staten andcl i loiter!-
. meC:cl 277 Stanchrdtilll!gg
tilllol:<pcnsionerna
278 Fort~ttril:o:nr av skatteu)_)plJird~n
279 Fiirb:lt! race Ukc medel:;fOrtnJ.:)cr
280 Htijda mccllctn5· avgiltcr !Or sjuk
1 fors'lkring
1967:10 3. 1.1967
1967:11 16.12.1966
19137:24 3. 1.1967
1967:73 17. 3.1967
1967:130 31. 3.1067
1967:135 12. 5.191)7
1~67:135 12. 5,1967
41 24. 2.1967 tax. IJ67 ~0
44 24. 2.1967 1. ~.1967 I. b.
94 7. 4.1967 26. 4.1067 i.b.
15. 4.1967 +12
207 9. 6.1967 1. 7.1907
625 17.11.1967 1. 1.19GB I. b.
737 24.11.1%7 1. 1.1967
II 281 !Hijnln~ och var
tles:i!-::rint~ av vr~·f"Sskac!cli'li-!intor
l. 1.19681
tss7:147 22. 9.b57 92o 15.12.1967 1. usGa \~ 282 Hi_ijni.'1g nv arbel - I
givan:~l.S yrkcs-skadeav;;iltcr -'1-- - 11 - 919 --"- _,,_ J
283 Scinkning av vissa I tull:tr enligt Kvn:!edvro1:dcn f
1
+30
·95
+1
-95
-30 -30
+30 +30
-2 -2 I
-GO (10o-iJo,,) 1%7:150 13.10.1967 125,26 ~!?. 1.1%81 L 7.1%8 234 _ ,. ___ I
1 _<co-~o%> ______ .=:=-_ -"- _,_ ~~-~t9GS ~~~~no --·---' ___ _ _________ . __ _,_1_·_45L~ I
___ l
: 2$7 Evig: realisations
I vinslbeskaUn!ng vid f:tstif;hc:t;;iOr slljnin!> ir.!ors
I l 289 Toba};s~};atlen j dlfl~rcnlicras
I 289 VL'l- och spt·lt-
1967:153 20.10.19u•
1068:12 3. 1.196
A I: 10
748 27.12.1967 1. 1.1968 +80
3 2. 2.1%8 5. 2.1968 '!;O
1 ska.\len hojs med lOS~ l1%8:12
1290 S:irskill investe-
2. 2.1SGS 5. 2.19C3
3 11"] 2 +BG +107 +21
1 rin?oa\'drag p.i 10.o medces fOr im·cste·
I rlnr,:tr i mr-tskinerl ; :xh ir.,·entaricr ' •;mkr 1968 l9G8:13
!291 !ifj<!~ bid"3gs!Orl I skott tiil \'is'a I ! blu·nfamilj~r 1 ~68:42 '1292 Familjebcs!adsbi•
dr?..&l?n a,·;;kaHas
1
1196G:42
2G3 Inkomstprovade
: :::~ " 8. 3.1961
15. 3.1\JGS tax. 1063
1.· 1.1969
1. 1.19G9
(-150
bost;>·bllllir,g til~ i barnf:a.tiljer in- 1 1 ftirs 119iiS:42
I 29-1 Arl:cts;;h·arav- I I gilt pi l''o in:t;rs j 1 P58:77
8. 3.1968:425-26 128. 5.19G3
! 8. 3.1Sti3! 419 I 6. t\.19G8
1. 1.1969
1. 1.19G3 !
II 295 Fysi~·l:a p~rsor;ers
arbets f'i rara ''bift I ror b}:~mst av rljl' relse och jord-brut:slastLdlet .
I blir av.dragst,ill I' 19GS;77 : &.
295 ATP-2.\'Ji;!erna f0rl9";0-74fcst-
l stallstill10-11 'Cj19SS:n
1 297 U!jamnmgs~btt
l p~mandelm~.ssa
---=~~: ----· :6S:S9 12_2·----'
421 6. 6.1968
1
\ax. 1970 i. b.
1
29. 3.18f~ 1. 1.1970 I I I 6. 6.1968 1. 7.l~~l __ j__+1
3GO
+150)
-11 -12
+75 +75
-222 -223
+360 I +3oO +40 +40•
+105 +118 +66 +73
~-' ---'-----'-----L-------·-
1~~-------l _____ .. _ ----- --~=.
1 u'"ro''"'""~mO,;,n".'IG
PiWP'.JSi11'JN LAG 19C;-· ~---- ~~70~- 1971
;-~{-~{;d~~~a~ .. ~-- ~=~-f~~·~!_'::~- !m . DAn;:,r ~~~~~ --~- -~1 -~-~_-;_I ___ I_-_ ~~~= j ~l!Ociluors 1C68:1~C,:2.3.1%S 430 6.6.19G.' 1.1.1%9}
1072
II I IT --
; 299 Allm;l~r.a vuu- +30 •30 i sl:.:-t.t~cn p!;. kons.; 1 va.r0r sl•ll"' 1 196S:100
1
. 22. 3.1068 430 G. 6.196f' 1. 1.1063 I 11300 Allrn~I·H3. varu
st-.atten pl !.JW.-! varor slo;•as 1~GS:100 :22. 3.1958 420 G. G.1GG8 1. 1.1969 (-450)(-450
j301 InvestcrlG•;sav-
1 ~~t;;/a2o':o
I! 302 \'is sa andri"gar
av mcrvarde-sk~ttc:-~s utrorm· nin~
i 31)3 l!Ojd bilaccis :304 1bximibcl'>pf.et
H:ir avdraz fi5r ' i m:lga hOjs fr;~n
1968:137 I11.10.19C8 1~CS:133 11.10.191)&
5RO
532
I noclsalt o;kat:c!orr
-l 500 till6 000 kr ; 1968:144 18.10.1968 'i10-19
c Bcst~mmelser omprelimizdrskatt p;l arti:;tarvoden m.m.
om sl~attea th•cr·
1968:159
sliG<r I 500 kr -
D~talnin;:!san
r.tand mcd ron::!onlskatten mcdt;es
307 Fordons.ckaltcn fiJr tu1:.;a slap-vagnar htl;s 11969:10
308 IE<jd omstitt-ni;l~Zskltt pi I DU motCJr·:ykhr l E~i;:l:25
309 Av<lrar:lot hi! re-I sckost-r.:'tCBr J:~js l19C'J:2~
310 Pcnsionstilhkottl tilllog:p,'nsio- 1· ,.:;rer med l:t~~ ATP-pcnsionheslut;,:; lilr 1969-'18 195~:S8
311 lnkomstproming , CBJ.Vkr.:.;'i~l~IUO:ll:l I ~!'itacl ... til~:i /t~ I
t ____ !._1!::~;:!~:!·~~---..1 !_~~~~-3~~-
'18.10.1968 722
423
110. 1.1969 296
3.1009 71 (' 2.1%9 103 121.
7. 3.19G9 205
~08
1.10.19•}8 I. b.
2G.11.1D~~I .,1. 1.1~~9~1.b. 15.11.19bJI .O.ll.Lo8 +8
1s.12.1~ca, 1. 1.! 969 Lb .
.. .. ""I 1. 1.1969 I. b.
1. 1.1959 20. 9.1PG8 i.b.
23. 5.196~! 1. 1.1370 : +20
18. 4.1 OG~ I 1. 5.1%g
9. 5.1 ~!j:) 1. 1.1£C) I !O -to !O
-·1:· -~- -10
I +2
-35
-95 -95
I --
' r AToX>•m
~r~"."?_lJe-. och 1
g.u:;n~~t\.3.tt 111-
fUrs Wr traklor
I och m•Jt,Jl·rcdS~.l1p avklass I
t313 Forc'cnsskc.ttp:l 1 tral'.tor inl~rs
1
314 Krirsrl8'<till:il!g befrias ldn sjoJnan5s!;a.t t
,315 Saml eskattning
II av Wraldrars
oc'l barns fi:irmo gen .. '>ct I vissa fall
;316 Reglerna om folk I pe!lsioniircrs av-
1 dragsr:itt mlldra upp
'317 Skattc:;atsen fOr sparl.nekcr m_,m~ hOjs (32 -··~0 <)
318 Av~.krhnin:;srerlerna f6r bY!:Gr.ader lirera
196~:45 7. 3.19C) 303
1909:45 7. 3.19GG 207
1969:50 14. 3.1969 1(17
19G9:92 ... '·""I 236
191)9:95 28. 3.1969 222
1969:99 28. 3.1 ~~9 742
1iscras 1969:100 21. 3.1%9 363 i 319 Arbelsgivarnas . sjukiOrsa~:rings ...
1
1 av~ilt hiijs (2,6- 2,9';:,)
1320 HGjda voirda.v .. 1 r;ifter vic n:ental
1969:125 17.10.1969 650
I sjuk1:~Js och s.tat-lip sjuiillus 1969:125117.10.1969 -
, 321 Rdorm a\· sjuk-
·1
, . v3.rd~ersJttnings 10ystemet (7-kro-
/322 UlJ"n;'~•·;ss,at- . 1 lfn P·• rn<·llan-
A I: 11
23. 5.1969 1. 1.1970 ±0 !0
23. 5.1009 1. 1.1070 +30
9. 5.1969 24. 5.1969 tO
rg· 5.1D69 tax. 1970 i. b.
129. 5.1369 tax. 1970 -15 -15
i. b., '25.11.1969 tax. 1971
13. 6.1963 1. 7.196~ i. b.
5. 10.191) 1. 1.1970 +100 +100
1. 1.1970 +22 ~23
5.12.1969 1. uno -125 -125 1 n•or-~rel1~rm~,"J 1
1
1969:125 17.10.19G9 1650
1 och starLol hojs 1 rnrd 2 o:-e/1 I'196H39 24.10.1%9 1 716 il2.12.1969 L 1.1970 u -.2 +3 :323 Furdonssl:a\t vl I I I : 11 trak!Ol er i jord- l I
I bruk Sa!1kS r9~-~:165 -~4~11.1~~~1~~1 117.12.1969 30.12.1969re 31 - --- _j_ J
[ PHOPo:,rno:' ··---~~= -- ~ "'~ ~A"ioi;;;• n=G~:~"'f~~ T"" ··1
c:GT<2_:-:R_!?_~~ -~~--~- DAT~~~ ___ NR -~~\__1li:\1 IKR.\FT , ~ _ ___!. ___ 21_ I II , II , I_~-' j324 Uerv!irdes3kat-~ ten hoj:; !Or I bilar{ b.1tar .f>Ch DU i 'IY ( 0--+H.o) 1970:7 2. 1.1970 :325 To1.,1ksskaltcn.
1 Mjs
:326 &'katie" p:\ maltoch J:isked•·yckc•
1970:8
h~s 1no~
327
328
329
330
ji_ndrade rantesatser fOr kvar-sb!t och :iterWring Vilbb.:skattllinccn lindras
Vissa ~r.drin~ar av sjukforsak-ringen Didra,:s!Orskotte o:<as (:so-· 40'J av basi::dorpct)
331 Il:unbitlra;;en hojs (900-+1200 kr)
332 Fi:ir;n(5;;enhctsgr:\Esen viJ beraknin~~ !Or barn famitjer h<;js
· 333 Ok:ad~ r.l;Jjli:;hct-1 cr till Wrtids-
}>ension
1
!334 lllcn'Oirdcsskattc:o hojs (10-+15 ':0)
i 335-;:.11 I:l1 ~nn"'~b~<:'ltte-
f ~ftt}im- (~JJJI·--
1 :1;35 1\t1dr:tci.J ~k.ttte ..
19'i0:9
1970:49
1970:60
1970:65
1970:es
1~70:65
1970:66
,1970:70
2. 1.1070
2. 1.1970 I
2. 1.197
20. 2.197
6. 3.1970
.6. 3.197\1
6. 3.197
27. 5.1970
13. 3.1970
6. 3.19'10
4 6. 2.1n70 9. ?.1070
5 G. 2.1970 9. Z.1970
6 6. 2.1970 9. 2.1970
10 G. 2.1970 tax. 1970
n 24. 4.1970 tax. 1071
141 27. 5.1970 1. 1.19'11
147 27. 5.H•70 1. 1.1971
140 2'1. 5.1970 1. 1.19'11
177 27. 5.1970 1. 1.1971
186 ~1. 5.1970 1. '1.10"10
165 27. 5.1970 1. 1.1071
I "kalur
1
19'10:70 6. 3.1970 1.33 i7. 5.1970 1. 1.1971
s'i.tts :l.v r;tu.u\-
•53
+82
+61
I. b.
13311 E::£~:~:~i~(~;;1_ 1~ill:71> s. 3.1970 163 f7. 5.197j 1. 1:1971
1337 Oct,;.tvdra•: cr- I j -- ~·-:~~!~"-': ____ _!_:~.2.:.!.0 __ o, __ 3.W~- ]S2 _ __ i'~-!G?O _1_._1_)~7.! _______ _
<66
+lL6
+78
-5
+13
+23
+17
+6
-46 -47 -·17
-7 -8
-50 -50
-270 -270
19091•20811
-17(101-i 700' -40
I
-80 -SO
------ ____ 1_::_ --~~---<
A I :12
I _j p-·-Ano~'C!~J2_[Ill'2_~:-~~-on:\!.;!)~j~-=-~=-=~~~- \ rnorosiTto:· __ I_ ___ T~~c- __ 1'1•~9 ____ }n7o _I_ En __ __ 1.?,~_1 1n~ !
:-m ATGiiHDF.H -~~- J)~~Tl:M_j__I\"R _111-D_·y~:::?:_,~~\AF'!' . r_ -~-_I __ ::_ -~--~- _I _ __uJ·r-·l 1338 ffi.3t~:rccl~~tio: I I r rc;;el irJ(ir~ 1970:70 6. 3.1 noi 167 '~7. 5.1£701 tax. 1972 - - • ! 330 Foll;rcnsionsav-
gUtcn indi\•idu- 1 aliscras ln0:70 6. 3.1S70I 165 27, 5.1970
1
. 1. 1.1971 f ' 3·10 Sj~:k!Or::::ikrings-
~-...-~~iiten i.ndivi-duiili.:;cras 1970:70 6. 3.1970 1. 1.1971
13H o.<adc folkpcn
lnor.cr i 342 Arvs- och t;lvo-i bes}:~.tlnint;cn
Jindras
343-344 Fonr.o,;c~PQ~~
§t,".\t<:B..~'"-d!'.'l)i .
1G0000-·150000
1970:70
19'10·'11
1
343 S'.<2.t!dria grans.:n hOjs
kr) 1970:71
1344 s,:ahn rtndras 1970:71 345 Allman ra~tig-
1
hdstaxering 1970
I 346 S:u;l!Pbidragcn
6. 3.1970· 162 27. 5.1970 1. 1.1071
6. 3.19"/o 171 ·21. 5.1970 1. un•
6. 3.1 no· no 6. 3.1970 170
'127. 5.1370 tax. 1971 27. 5.1970 tax. 1372
I ht>js (75- 100 l kr,ro"\tl) 1J7C:77 27. 2.13701 267 5, 5.1970 1. 1.1971 } I 347 f0rJ;inr.da barn- 11
i hidr~ ~ hojs (75-i.OO kr/miu.~1970:77 27, 2.1970. 270
1
5. 5.1~70 1. 1.1971 :•48 l!Ojc'a resebi- I
drag till studc-ran(ie 197u:77 27. 2.1970'267-68. 5. 5.1970 1. 7.1no
349 Hiijd:t ic~cko- I I derir.£.>till;Lgr; fOr Sl'.alcrar.-:le 11970:77 :7. 2.1 ?70: 2&7
35(J Viss~. andringar I I 5. 5.1970 1. 7.1970
-75 -150 -75
-'/ -8
-8 -10 -101 -10
+157 t158 1 +145
-15 ·-16
-3
-4 -5
av ~J'-'mans-skatten i' 1970:~8 20. 3.1970! 410 5. 5.1970 1. U9i0 -2 -3 I
351 lr.ves:erbg3av- I I j ' ciit pi 25·c b-fors !Or !ck<'· 1 I I
; ande 7 !loaj 19i0-. I I
-8 -9
priorit<'rat h:;:!;"·j ,. J ---'--, __ _;l_l_j•,!..IJ).P..U ____ ~1970:10_1_ .. _2Q, __ 3.1 970 99 ----~_._2_.1_9]0 _.?..,__U_giu_ ,,.b, '------·----·--- . ____ _ ;------- --·- ------J----------1 -----;:uio::o::iBuiic!:I-iXJ"n~'.xl5ru~G---·-~- -~
i _!'H.O~~ITIO~ -- LA"__ __ ~ I_ ·~~-I--:"" ! ,;;;- T::"'~- _,;;_;:-1 ~ AT?_~~~~~R -- ~;n __ -·· ~.\TU:\! - -- 1ill ll_~_ATU~~-i I icRA:!_I_r__ E__l_~,~,l_r_ll_ 1! I I- II t_ ni I ; 352 ViH:t lcknlska 1 fijrjr.drin~war ~V j mel\!ud...,s::.}~al- 1 1 ten 1970:123 3. 4.1~70,183
1
27. 5.1970 1. 7.1S70 +o . +o 1
, 353 Forclonsskalle- , - -justerin:; (tunca 6 ~ 0 +o 1 '!:0 !ardon) 1970:138 :!7. 5.1970t • :·;.11.19'10
1
1. 1.1~71 • 351 Partiellt prls-
storp b!Ors 512 28. 8.1870
1
. 31. 8.1~70
1
i. !J.
355 Prisslcrpet gars tolalt 552 9.10.1970 12.10.1970 i. b.
355-361 ~~?12.!1.Lsf:!:j'1g~=
ftJ.l i ~ ~~·}~__l_;!-.~~':f·it Qt_.!.?l'iX_! ~no
l3o6 1!en·;;,·dc31:attcn
h\;j,; pi ;·i~sa hu:::.JJ:ill~l:apit.ll~ varor (10-.. 15 oj 1970:156
35'1 V in- och fipritr.kallen J:ii)s
358 Ener:~ic;:~att\:'n p&
__ ,,_
J:"l'i\';:t:. !Dt1Jl'<'.t- I ningk'js (7~to'c -"-
359 S!ir;;:~.o.ilrl:'l sk:!tt-en pa rl,·iv:neud hojs _, _
I 3GO Albl~m;a arbds
gr·.;ara•;i!.:ft~a I h6js (l-.. 2'.)
1
361 ArhetSGJV:l rn~,s sjukfi:.ir~;;,Ll~ria~s-avr,_\11 H5js 2,94
I 3,h)
, 362 Den f .. ~l}kild~.
-It-
1G.l0.1970! 56!) 30.1J.1970 1.11.1970
-"-I !:\70 -11 -- 1.11.1970
_ .. __ I· 573 -'1 - 20.12.19'i0
_ ,._ 572 -u- 1.11.1C70
-"- 5G6 _,_ 1. 1.1971
_,_ 567 -··- 1. 1.1971
y:a,t::~::~\tc n 1•Jr ci~o!-:;l.!d- och Jl.un.f(::·.t vrvaror om!cc.;;s 1970:178 23.10.107;) 713. J't1.12.197011. 1.10'/t
363 J>rc·h\!cl'ir.~~ O'!V frivili~,;t sp:1r-aw!0 k. ~ r :tnc~- j
L-~~~~~-------1-~~_.o:J~3~1:·~970 616 __ 2~·:·10:C~--1-~~: i. !J.
~12 ;-83 +1261
I +30 +3
+42 +2501+208
+4501+450
·<751 +75
'!:0 to
I _____ l ___ ___ L_ __ L _______ _
.•
A I: 13
.. -·--·-· ··- ---- r--~H~~~:T~~i-1 ____ .,. -- .. LAG-- -.. -- ~ t···; ·"·i~- ~ fo~~~~-~~ f~l:~;i~~:c .{I~Y -- ·: --~ ~-----~~
:m ATci·,nnr.n ~-~;-, -~~~-:i~~~- I :~:~--F~~~~.;-11 :~~-'F7 r-r-_1'__;;}·_~]~!-~LL c~~:L_-~[ 1~1-· I ~l ;-~ $:\~~t-invr-,t-:;-.-------·-··--------~·-- __ T _____ ---j 1 I j
l'ings2vtira.~-~ U.'>r I I inn::JlC'l':n:~.u~ 1 I
I nla.S~>.in:r sn. m. I I 1 ~71 1'·"1'1 A1•c·z1" 1?"!"1'1"'·~· ... ' ~ o,;;j_:.. ·-· ,I..J I .)'J !1_ ... , -· ~' lit.· • .J,.Jii I !,l',
:3c5 stodtil!<!~<,;- I 1, prcsscnirtOrs 11S71:~7 13. 2.1271 j .;:?2 : -~. 5,1:,',~
1
1. 1.1£",1 -lS -17
'3C6 Annonssk:::lt in· · 1• _ ., 1 "" 1
: tors 1971:23 !~. 2.19<1 \ 1':'0 1.:.7. ~.1c7lll. 7.-"11
1
+24 +211 : 3G7 Statlict lidsk.riits- i I : st0d {;.r;:,.·s 11971:47
1
12. 3.1,711 ca 13. 6.1~~~
11. 7.19';1 I 4_) - 1 ,
i 368 Pal~varu~kl-.tt0n I \ I •1
slopas 11a?l:73 19. 3,19111 2~3 1
·L G.l9?l 1. 1.1t,7} -51 . 369 Forsaljnings- I I I 1 ~;kattcr: slopas 1S71:73 19. 3.1971
1
247 1 4. G.19;! 1. 7.1972 1 ,.
:370 Tcknis~:a fUr- ,, 1 I
i !indr ir.",c-u· i den I 1 iJldlrckt.a be- : . l 1i". 119"173 19 31"1•""""'' 51'•'"1 1 71~71 !:O I ; S'->•.il'<'~~n 1 :
1
... ,., 1.,c-.,
1
. ·•· ·-"I I ... 1 ,,'~1 ~:··.~-~~ b~'..lcl.ierr.e- I 1 ,;c.- •:·r .u . .ira I I hah··:·el1:!11
1
1&71:7a 19. 3.1~71 153 14. 5.15711 L 7.!971 i.b. I j372 Tdifr;;-.,,l Wr I I i in.pc.rt a-,· J-.:1 h·-·1 fa\J;·;.".;ct cc"t f.lr.-
1 ,.
digv:-{ror fran I utvcckling-si5."."' 1 der inlo~s 11:iil:93 2. 4.1~71 1. 1.1~72 -8
373 Skattc:rr __ it~l for I Kon·:L1r :';'llt bo-sl3drti';;i;.;; t 'll 1 handfit;.:-::11ade iniOrs - :1~71:1('4 '~6.
374 Forlsalt till~.lllp-1 ni:;g a.v .all:r::i;ma 1 pnsr<:-t;:..enn~:3· . i<!GE'l. !1~71:109 16.
3. U•~ 1 I 2f·'l
4.1nl I ;:.n
I 4. 6.H1ij :17. G.lS71 I i.b.
I i ~6. 3.1~71 fl. 7.1371 i.b.
-5
-18
-9
I 375 Jr.n-slcrinc:sav- i £ilt"'n fvr c.;n-io- I ritera~c t;:!;~;en I upphavs .1~71:11G ).Z. Ll~'l~ !CG
I I : - , , - I_ • , . . 27, ;, .. ~11j-9 .•. !o71
1
l.h. 1
____________ _J_ ______________ _j_ __ j_ ---- _j_ -- j ________ _L J
NR ATGARD
Nya regler om yrkesskadeforsakringen
Investeringsavdraget for investeringar i maskiner och inventarier hoj s (10 + 20 7.)
378 Dispens fran energiskatt for · vissa industribranscher under tiden 1.12.71 - 31.12.72
379 I 1
1380
1381
382
383
384
Bidrag till lagerokningar under 1972 for bade industri och handel 20 i.
Extra tillskott till folkpensionarerna under januari 1972
Extra bostadstillagg. Engangsutbetalning under l:a kvartal:et 1972
IBidrag till vatten- och luftvardande atgarder inom industrin
Hojda bostadstillagg
Tullbefrielse vid import av visst mtrl till flygindustri
Hojda bidrag till vatten- och luftvardande atgarder inom industrin
! AUTONOM BUDGETFORANDRING
PROPOSITION LAG
NR DATUM NR
22 19.2.71 282
140, 29.10. 71 923
140 29.10.71 928
140
1401
I 140
29.10.71 1249
29.10.71 945
29.10.71 944
1971 1972
DATUM I KRAFT II I II
17.6.71 1.1.72 +10 +10
10.12.71 21.12.71
10.12.71 21.12.71 -8 -47 -40
10.12.71 5.1.72 i. b.
10.12. 71 21.12.71 f-285
21.12.71 10.12.71 I t-125 I
I
'I
I 29.10.71 914 10.12.71 21.12.71
1973
I
157
29.10.71 1257 117.12.711 1.4.72 -65 -ll8 ,-ll7
29.10.71 1226 17.12.71 i 1.1.72 i.b. l
i.b.!
II
'• 1974
I II
I
I I I I ! I ! I I ! I I I I ~ I I
71 21.1.721 281 2.6.72 11.7.72 I [200) ! I 386 Andring i kommuna1skatte1agen. j I I ,. I 1
-·--l~~r~:g 1er fOr-:ppet_k:n::_n __ ---+---1--3-+--2-1_ •. _1_. _nj _ _:__- -2~~ 3. 7~ J _1. 7: 7~ --L1~b j - --- -- ___ _] __ _! _I
1) i.b. a ingen berakning
>
NR JI.TGARD
387 Sarskilt investeringsavdrag. I Avdrag aven for inventarier
som inte levereras forran ar 1973 resp. ar 1974
,388
i389 i
1390 I
j i I J39~.
1392 I I
1393 I
1 I 13941
I 'I l 13951
I I 396
Premiering av sparande
Hojt studiesocialt stod
Teknisk andring i reglerria for bostadstillagg p.g.a. de nya skatteregler som tillampas fr.o.m. 1972 ars taxer.
Reklamskatt infers (10 %). Se nr 366
Produktionsbidraget till dagspressen hojs
Samdistributionsrabatten till dagspressen hojs
Hojt arvsskattefritt belopp · vid livforsakringsutfall (fran 32 000 kr till 41 000 kr)
Andring av realisationsvinstbeskattningen m.a.p. s.k. vinstbolag
Sankt statsskatt
i397 Hoj t barnbidrag ! (100 -+ 110 kr/man)
398 j Hojt studiebidrag och forlangt · barnbidrag (fdin 1200 kr /ar till 1320 kr/ar)
PROPOSITION
NR DATUM NR
20 . 28 .1. 72 71
22 18. 2. 72 128
27 3.3.72 225
34 3.3.72 425
58 17.3.72 266
59 17.3.72 427
59 17.3.72 418
LAG
DATUM
7.4.72
26.4.72
19 • .5.72
26.5.72
2.6.72
26.5.72
2.6.72
I KRAFT
72 ars tax.
10.5.72
1.7.72
1.1. 73
' 1. 11. 72 ~~~~· 1.7.72
I 1.7.72
73 ars
AUTONOM BUDGETFORANDRING
1971 1972 1973 1974
II I II I II
i. b. I -10! -101
I
i. b. I ) l 1'
1+18 ; +171 +25
'\ 'I· . I I -18 -18! I
I I-s ~5 ~1 1
1
· J 1
1
_
-t-25
! I I I i I II
I ! ' ir ! , I, :,:
93 117 .3. 72 I 273 2 .6. 72 1.4. 72 I I I i.~. 95 \21.4. 72 I 375 I 2.6.72 I 1.1.73 II : I 1-1125 -1125 i -30 ~60 i
77 17.3.72 255 26.5.72 tax.
95 I 21.4.72 381 2.6.i2 1.1.73 I ! I : -108 -107 I I I
!21.~_::_; __ 2_.6~_1_._1.7_3_LUJ_-20-I~~~_l __ L-! 95 H .. ~
V1
AUTONOM BUDGETFORANDRING
PROPOSITION LAG 1971 1972 1973 1974 .. NR ATGARD NR DATUM NR DATUM I KRAFT II I II I II I II
I 399 Hojd tobaksskatt 95 21.4. 72 377 2.6.72 1.1. 73 I
400 Hojd skatt pa malt- och I Uiskedrycker 95 21.4.72 378 2.6.72 1.1.73 ~ +190 +190 ! I ! I • I
Hojd skatt pa vin och sprit I 401 95 21.4.72 379 2.6.72 1.1. 73 I I
~ i
I 402 Hojd arbetsgivaravgift ··'· i '
! I (2 + 4 %) SkU 1972:32 565 10.11. 72 1.1.73 ~1050 +1050 ' I •
I I i Omfordelning av automobi1skat- I 1403
I
ten mellan o1ika fordonss1ag 115 6.10.72 644 17.11.72 1.1. 73 I ~ ! I
l 1404
" - I '
I I l I Mervardeskatt; skattskyldighet t · for vissa tjanster och skatte- I I I befrielse for utlandska be-
I I skickningar infors 119 6.10.72 558 10.11.72 22.11. 72 I i.b. I 1405
I
l Utvidgning av varuomradet for I ! r I I I
tu1lpreferenser till forman I l for u- Hind erna I 121 ' 20.10. 72 806 1.1. 73 1.1.73 i.b. I l .
: I i ' 406 Sarski1t investeringsavdrag under I !
I tiden 1.11.72-30.6.73 om 30 % I ' I f for maskiner och inventarier 125 20.10.72 717 15.12.72 1.11. 72 I I i.b. ~ ' l 407 Sarskilt investeringsavdrag for I I
byggnadsinvesceringar 10 % ! I I
I 1.11. 72-30.6.73 125 : 20.10. 72 718 15.12.72 1.11. 72 ! i.bl-
I 408 Fortsatt dispens fran energi- •
I skatt for vissa branscher under tiden 1.1.73-31.12.73 (se nr 378) 125 20.10.72 716 15.12.72 22 .12. 72. I i.b
409 ATP-avgiften sanks under ar 1973 I fran 10.75 i. till 10.5 i.
I (se nr 296) 125 20.10.72 715 15.12.72 22.12.72 I > 410 Bidrag till utbildning av anstall- I -
' da inom foretag (5 kr/tim) 125 120.10.72 810 15.12.72 1.7.72 i.b
411 Bidrag till miljovardande atgar- I t t.ier inom industrin 1.9.72-30.4.73 125 (100) i 20.10. 72 j
1-1 ..
A 1:17
·Statliga skattepolitiska itgirJer 1945-1973 fordelade efter typ av ~tgird
Statlig inkomstskatt:
Personlig inkomstskatt
Fo1kpensionsavgifter
Inkomst av formogenhet (fastighet)
Premiering av sparande
·Aktiebolagsskatt
Investeringsskatt och investeringsavgifter
Konjunkturskatt och prisutjamningsavgifter
Avskrivningsreg1er
Avsattningar till pensionsstiftelser och investeringsfonder
Investeringsavdrag
Skatteuppbord
Statlig formoaenhetsskatt:
Ar1ig formogenhetsskatt
Arvs- och gavobeskattning
Socia1forsakringsavgifter:
Med1emsavgifter
Arbetsgivaravgifter
Transfereringar:
Barnbidrag
Fo1kpensioner
Annan socia1forsakring
Studiemedel
19, 20, 57, 60, 84, 86, 93, 115, 120, 131, 13 147, 164, 171, 175, 182, 195, 200, 201, 213, 224, 235, 236, 246, 247, 269, 273, 304, 305, 309, 314, 316, 327, 332, 335, 336, 337, 338, 340, 345, 350, 373, 396.
90, 132, 162, 234, 272, 339.
97, 98, 99, 100, 141, 142, 143, 145, 242, 243, 259, 265, 287, 315, 328, 343, 344, 345.
126, 363, 388.
24, 52, 83, 127, 173, 178, 275, 317, 386, 395
67' 73, 74, 101, 118, 119, 129, 134, '136, 152, 274, 301, 351, 375.
2, 27, 77, 78.
75, 88, 121, 169, 318.
16, 83, 122, 188, 189, 196, 220.
225, 290, 364, 377, 387, 406, 407.
8, 27 8.
22, 85, 144, 241, 245.
23, 166, 167, 342, 394.
96, 199, 207, 263, 280.
95, 208, 219, 262, 282, 294, 295, 296, 319, 360, 361, 376, 402, 409.
21, 58, 138, 139, 176, 203, 204, 223, 231; 233, 248, 331, 347, 397, 398.
10, 15, 87, 89, 133, 163, 180, 209, 211, 227, 228, 244, 255, 277, 310, 341, 380.
94, 105, 110, 114, 123, 124, 125, 165, 172, 181, 185, 206, 210, 226, 256, 261, 279, 281, 291, 292, 293, 311, 321, 329, 330, 333, 348, 349, 381, 383, 390.
229, 230, 346, 371, 389, 398.
A !:18
Motor fordons- och dri'-:.mede !:sbeskattnin.£: .. ~ Fordonsskatt inkl. trafik- 5., 68, 70, 71, 72, 80, 102, 108, 214, 252,
om1aggningsskatt 267, 268, 303, 306, 307, 313, 315, 323, 353.
Bensin- och brannoljeskatt 6, 7, 28, 29, 43, 55, 56, 64, 91, 106, 107, 109, 116, 117, 148, 190, 192, 197, 198, 240, 251, 312.
Omsattningsskatt a motorfordon m.m. 135, 136, 183, 308.
Tullar och acciser:
Tullmede1
Allmanna varuskatter
Sarskilda varuskatter
Skatt a vin och sprit
Skatt a malt- och 1askedrycker
Tobaksskatt
Nojesskatt och lotterivinstskatt
Energiskatt
Ransoneringar:
Pris- och importre&1eringar:
Subventioner:
SO, 128, 168, 179, 194, 205, 212, 221, 222, 232, 249, 253, 266, 283, 284, 285, 286, 372, 384, 405.
13, 40, 174, 184, 202, 237, 270, 298, 299, "300, 302, 334, 352, 356, 370, 404.
12, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 51, 54, 59, 63, 76, 92, 155, 187, 191, 215, 238, 254, 257, 297, 324, 359, 362, 366, 368, 369, 391, 403.
31, 61, 79, 103, 137, 146, 156, 216, 217, 250, 289, 357, 401.
32, 33, 62, 112, 113, 158, 159, 264, 322, 326, 400.
30, 82, 104, 149, 157, 177, 193, 239, 271, 288, 325, 399.
3, 4, 34, 35, 36, 37, 45, 65, 66, 130, 140, 153, 160, 170, 186, 218, 258, 276.
69, 81, 150, 151, 154, 161, 358, 378, 408.
1, 9, 17, 47, 111.
18, 26, 260, 354, 355, 374.
11, 14, 25, 44, 48, 49, 53, 365, 367, 379, 382, 385, 392, 393, 410, 411.
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