A Path Forward for Libya By Gabriele Masetti, October 2015

Executive Summary:Libya lacks a viable national government and is mired in internecine conflict. The international community is engaging all Libyan parties in peace talks aimed at a cessation of hostilities and a nationally unified government. Nation building is constrained by the reality on the ground and limited resources. A more pragmatic policy would focus available on the internationally recognized authorities in Cyrenaica, which are more likely to bring about the long-term stability of the country. Absent that, radical Islamism will continue to exploit the ungoverned territory in Libya.

The United States has three stakes in Libya:1. Preventing further destabilization of the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa;2. Eliminating the threat of violent extremist emanating from the country;3. Secure NATO’s southern flank and the Mediterranean.

Any action in Libya will be impacted by a number of country-specific challenges that needs to be taken into due consideration: Libya has a weak tradition for a functioning national military. The solution to Libya’s problems should be regional and focusing on security and stability. A new round of national political elections is extremely unlikely in the near future. The role of elites from the former regime is a hotly debated and highly divisive domestic

issue in Libya. United State’s domestic politics constrain the range of available strategies.

In line with the approach of the international community, the United States has sought to exert diplomatic pressures for a broader political reconciliation and a nationally unified government in Libya, while assisting the fledging Libyan authorities with security sector reform support, which were ultimately unsuccessful.

Drawing from the experiences in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that:1. Creating an effective military after a regime change requires coopting the most skilled and

experienced service members of the former regime and is a long-term endeavor.2. Military training and modern equipment can’t make up for the lack of a sense of identity,

purpose and motivation.3. Bureaucratic corruption is reflected among the ranks of the military and results in inefficiency.4. The size of the military to be created needs to be firmly anchored to the long-term financial

capabilities of the host country, not foreign contributors.

The United States should immediately enact the following steps in Libya:1. Lifting the U.N. enforces arms embargo that affects the internationally recognized authorities

in Cyrenaica. Libya has the financial resources to acquire the defense equipment it needs to re-establish the monopoly of the use of force in Libya. The U.S. should limit its financial contributions to what it is requested by local defense authorities.

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2. Renewing security sector reforms assistance to the internationally recognized authorities in Cyrenaica.

3. Regional allies should take the lead in deploying assets to Libya. U.S.’s footprint should be light, including up to 300 Special Forces trainers and advisers.

4. Libya needs a new national military, created in a centralized format and units by units, starting with platoons, companies and battalions. A 20,000 men strong military to secure Cyrenaica. Additional 20,000 are required to secure Tripolitania, and 20,000 more for the Fezzan. A 10,000 men strong police and border patrol force to secure Cyrenaica. Additional 10,000 are required to secure Tripolitania, and 10,000 more for the Fezzan. The United States should assist internationally recognized authorities in Cyrenaica to meet these requirements.

Beside the essential first steps highlighted above, the United States has three possible courses of action in Libya:

1) Continuing the present course of action of no direct involvement in the absence of a universally agreed truce encompassing all Libyan factions;

2) Promoting the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission;3) Focusing on Cyrenaica.

The U.S. should adopt the third course of action highlighted above.Its financial costs are minimal and pertain to the training and assist mission for up to 300 Special Forces for up to 5 years, plus what the local authorities will require but be unable to afford with the oil export profits.Without a radical change in the distribution of power and military resources Libya will not achieve peace and stability.The United States requires a reliable security counterpart in Libya and the nascent military force in Cyrenaica under Khalifa Haftar is the most promising candidate for direct support.

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Background Four years after the NATO intervention and the fall of Qadhafi, Libya lacks a viable national government and is mired in internecine conflict.1

Notwithstanding a preliminary agreement in July 2015 for a government of national unity, Libya today has two parliaments, two governments, and a plethora of loose and ever shifting coalitions of militias, all clashing to control territory and the country’s oil and gas profits. The Council of Deputies (also known as the “House of Representatives” in English language media) is the internationally recognized government of Libya and is now based in the eastern region of Cyrenaica. It came to power in June 2014 during an election characterized by rising domestic turmoil and a very low turnout. It was forced to flee the state’s capital soon afterwards and declared void by a hotly contested ruling of the Libyan Supreme Court in November 2014.2

In the west, a coalition of various Islamist groups and revolutionaries, collectively known as Libya Dawn, took over Tripolitania in August 2014 from the Council of Deputies and reinstated the previously disbanded legislature without holding elections. Caught in the crossfire, the democratically elected Libyan Constitutional Assembly so far has proved unable to craft a solution that is palatable to all parties and their respective militias, and capable of shaking the Libyan population out of their political apathy.3

During the last year, the conflict in Libya has also taken on a regional dimension. Countries such as Turkey, Qatar and Sudan have been providing material and diplomatic support to Libya Dawn, whereas Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have sided with the Council of Deputies. Those external regional interferences have been further polarizing the internal struggle and have complicated national reconciliation. Yet ironically Libyans today remain fiercely independent and reject foreign intervention, both from neighboring countries and from the rest of the world.4

The United Nations is engaging all Libyan parties in peace talks aimed at a cessation of hostilities and a nationally unified government.5 Although some progress has been made, the

1 See Blanchard, Christopher M, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2015, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yNSdfFC9bh4J:https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf+&cd=2&hl=it&ct=clnk&gl=us : “U.S. officials have joined representatives of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom in saying that they “stand ready to support the implementation” of the Skhirat Agreement “in order to help ensure that a Government of National Accord and all the new institutions function effectively.” U.S. plans to develop a General Purpose Force were shelved as conflict broke out in 2014, but a senior U.S. military officer testified in July 2015 that “Should diplomatic efforts to form a unity government succeed, I believe the U.S. should be prepared to revisit security assistance programs for legitimate Libyan security services.” AFRICOM has signaled its readiness to provide such assistance if conditions allow and has stated its intention to “work with partners to improve our overall effectiveness in containing the spillover effects of Libyan insecurity; preventing the movement of terrorist fighters, facilitators, and weapons into Libya; and simultaneously disrupting the violent extremist networks within.”2 See: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-supreme-court-decision-thats-ripping-libya-apart/3 Anderson, Jon, Lee, The Unraveling, The New Yorker, February 23, 2015.4 See, Varvelli, Arturo, Un piano per la Libia (A plan for Libya), Policy Brief no. 224, October 2014, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), http://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/un-piano-la-libia-115145 See Blanchard, Christopher M, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2015 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yNSdfFC9bh4J:https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf+&cd=2&hl=it&ct=clnk&gl=us : “Over the last year, the United States has backed the United Nations-led negotiation process that produced the GNA agreement. The process brings together representatives of Libya’s two rival governments, local political leaders, militia members, and other Libyan interest groups, who have met mainly in Skhirat, Morocco, and Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative for Libya Bernadino León. Some Libyans have stated their willingness to create a GNA that would include members of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, its appointed government, and their Tripoli-based rivals in the General National Congress (GNC). However, to date, members of the GNC have rejected the proposed agreement, and some allied militia leaders have vowed to resist what they describe as the imposition of solutions by foreign powers. León has urged GNC representatives to initial the framework document and to participate in planned negotiations over implementation annexes and the formation of the GNA.

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reality on the ground is that the composition of the opposing sides continues to shift and the domestic political elites are unable to control the armed militias that ostensibly support them.6

The unique mix of the North African country’s historical experience, the former regime’s policies, and the circumstances of the revolution in 2011 all contributed to the current situation of weak centralized institutions, a political tradition of public skepticism toward national institutions, and a tendency for multiple informal and localized centers of authority. International diplomacy’s focus on the ultimate goal of restoring a centralized government reflects an oversimplified view of the Libyan national experience since its independence in 1951.While certainly legitimate and theoretically justified, this objective faces considerable practical obstacles, especially when considering the limitations on the quantity and quality of resources that the international community is willing to devote. The available strategies are greatly constrained by material resources such as funds, manpower, and equipment as well as the relative priority attributed to the country within the broader Middle Eastern arc of crisis and the limited political will to engage in Libya.Under present circumstances, a more pragmatic policy would concentrate available resources on limited and achievable objectives, which are more likely to work synergistically toward the long-term stability of the country and are inherently preferable to the chaos and instability presently plaguing Libya. Providing substantial public support for the internationally recognized government of Libya and its military might well be the most practical way to create a stable partner in the region at this critical juncture.For reconciliation to succeed, the Libyan body politic will need to align the positions of the post-2011 revolutionary elites and former regime officials. The price for the continued failure to find a compromise is evident. Violent Islamist extremists are exploiting the instability that has followed the violent collapse of the previous regime and has negated the earlier efforts of nation building.

What is really at stake for the United States in Libya? The United States has three critical interests that are threatened by the current situation in Libya.First, avoiding the destabilization of the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa and of key allies and partners in the region.7 Second, eliminating the threat of violent extremism currently emanating from the country.8 Third, protecting the exposed NATO’s southern flank and safeguarding the Mediterranean’s international maritime trade routes.From those interests stem two overarching goals for Libya. The first is developing a capable and unified national military that will serve as a deterrent to other militias and terrorists.9 The second

Some observers have warned that without the participation of GNC supporters, parties to the agreement could face significant resistance in moving forward and risk more intense conflict”.6 Ibid:“Public and intra-General National Congress tensions were driven in part by differences of opinion over the future roles and responsibilities of armed militias, the relative influence of powerful local communities over national affairs, and the terms governing the political exclusion of individuals who had formerly served in official positions during the Qadhafi era. Disagreements between Islamist politicians and relatively secular figures also contributed to the gradual collapse of consensus over the transition’s direction. These groups differed over some domestic legal and social developments as well as Libya’s security relationships with regional and international governments”.7 Mohammed El-Katiri, Mohammed, State-Building Challenges in a post-revolution Libya, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2012.8 Ibid. The unrest in Libya threatens the security of neighboring countries and the international community (refugees to Tunisia, Egypt and across the Mediterranean toward Europe) and the disruption of oil production (possibly harming US and European interests). Also, the lack of a capable national army leaves Libya an open playing field for international criminal groups. 9 For a complete outlook of U.S. relations with Libya and U.S. goals see the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm

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is preventing the territory of Libya from continuing to be exploited as a safe haven for transnational violent extremists groups.10

What are the key issues and challenges?1) The country has a weak national military tradition.As far as effective security reform in Libya is concerned, the main difficulty lies in the direct military power wielded by local militias. Further complicating the picture is the weak national military tradition dating back to the last 20 years of Qadhafi’s rule. To consolidate his power and prevent the formation of potential antagonists, Qadhafi subjected the Libyan military to various cycles of purging and underfunding, progressively marginalizing it politically and operationally in favor of a plethora of unofficial regime security forces.11 The present situation desperately calls for a national force at a time when one does not exist.2) The strategy toward Libya should reflect regional differences and security should take precedence.In order to achieve its goals in the area, the United States has a general interest in a stable and unified Libyan state. However such interest is more closely associated with Libya’s strategic position rather than with the exact institutional and political architecture of the Libyan State. A liberal-democratic system and a unified country along the lines of the one that emerged from independence in 1951 would be optimal. Yet the realities on the ground are require different approaches for the three historic provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. While contemplating any action in Libya, the United States should take into account the continued role of tribalism, the lack of a strong centralized military, and the presence of armed militias deriving their impetus from regional and local divisions within the country.12 Presently, revolutionary brigades control 75-85% of trained non-state fighters and non-state weapons in the country.13 Building a cohesive security apparatus that answers to a single legitimate center of authority should thus be priority number one to stop infighting among militias and all other types of political violence. The challenge here is to avoid the “rotten-door transition”14 and to build a professional national military benefitting from the experience of regime-era military officials while collecting weapons from armed militias and reintegrating revolutionary fighters with differing degrees of legitimacy.15

3) A new round of national political elections is extremely unlikely in the near future.

10 “Three failures had led to the fiasco in Libya: “The lack of a single national-security apparatus, replaced by militias; a real terrorist problem, which was small but has gotten much worse; and a proliferation of arms .” Anonymous US official, quoted in: Anderson, Jon Lee, The Unraveling, The New Yorker, February 23, 2015.11 See, Sayigh, Yezid, Libya’s New Military Politics: Back to the Future?, http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=5571412 Ibid. 13 McQuinn, Brian, After the Fall: Libya’s Evolving Armed Groups, Small Arms Survey, October 2012, defines Revolutionary Brigades as those operating as part of the authority of local councils. This form of militia is compared to the Unregulated Brigades (those operating outside of the authority of local councils), the Post-Revolutionary Brigades (those operating in cities and neighborhoods), and Militias proper (defined as armed groups that range from criminal networks to violent extremists).14 Mohammed El-Katiri, Mohammed, State-Building Challenges in a post-revolution Libya, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2012. The term was created by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, in their article titled Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, to describe when elements of the old regime weaken the transition, especially in cases of extreme state and civil society weakness. The difficulty lies in making sure the know-how and expertise of Qadhafi-era military officials helps the transition by making sure the security sector becomes the backbone of state and institution building.15 Ibid.

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The Council of Deputies just extended its mandate until such times as new national elections can be held.16 The former parliament reinstated in Tripoli last summer by Libya Dawn has no electoral mandate and has yet to declare when it will end its current term. Given the turmoil currently plaguing the country, the notion of organizing national political elections anytime soon is simply wishful thinking. Due to this, any solution to the Libyan crisis must be long term and involve the reestablishment of a credible monopoly of force by a national military. 4) The active participation of regime-era elites in the political life of the country is a hotly debated and highly divisive issue.A targeted amnesty for regime-era military officers is a requirement for effective security in Libya. At least in the early stages of nation building, experience and knowhow are disproportionately concentrated in the hands of the military personnel of the former regime. Therefore the involvement of select officials from the political class and armed forces of the Qadhafi era is unavoidable. Some sort of amnesty and an amendment to the Political Isolation Law passed in 2013, which effectively prevents any individual previously associated with the ruling elites since 1969 to hold a public office,17 would be required.5) United States domestic politics greatly constrain the range of available strategies.The main challenge to renewed efforts in Libya derives however from purely domestic considerations. The strategy of the United States towards Libya has been largely constrained by the limited political will to engage proactively. Since the September 2012 Benghazi attack, Washington has largely refrained from direct intervention in Libyan affairs and has limited the extent of its engagement to a rhetorical preference for a negotiated solution.18Any long-term solution to Libya’s current woes in line with American strategic interests requires a new approach. The policy of working toward a unified and centralized Libyan state might need to be replaced with one based on independently targeting Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan.

The U.S. Strategy toward Libya to date The United States’ strategy toward Libya to date has been two-pronged.19 On the one hand, it has sought to provide broad diplomatic pressure toward a negotiated and inclusive political

16 See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/05/us-libya-security-parliament-idUSKCN0RZ27120151005

17 Fick, Maggie, A land of militias, Libya struggles to build a military, The Christian Science Monitor, February 2013, and Kersten, Mark, Libya’s Political Isolation Law: Politics and Justice or the Politics of Justice?, Justice in Conflict website, February 6, 2014.18 Anderson, Jon, Lee, The Unraveling, The New Yorker, February 23, 2015. The attack in Benghazi and the death of Ambassador Stevens determined a stop to US efforts to influence events in Libya. Critically it was the end of attempts to train and equip a nascent Libyan National security apparatus.19 Exempt from the Joint Statement on Libya, Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, August 16, 2015: “We reiterate that there is no military solution to the political conflict in Libya and remain concerned that the economic and humanitarian situation is worsening every day.We stand ready to support the implementation of a political agreement to ensure that a Government of National Accord and its national institutions can function effectively and meet the urgent needs of the Libyan people”, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/246145.htm.

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settlement.20 On the other hand, it has sought to provide security sector support via the creation of a General Purpose Force.21

Less than one year after the fall of Qadhafi, the internal situation in Libya was already showing clear signs of distress. Then the attacks on the American diplomatic complex in Benghazi radically changed international perceptions of the ongoing crisis in the country and greatly diminished the ability and willingness of the United States to deploy personnel, assets, and resources in the country. Notwithstanding, from September 2012 through the beginning of 2014, the focus of American policy toward Libya remained institution building and the reform of the security sector. While the plan was sound in principle, failures in the development of the security component of the strategy severely hindered progress at the social, political and economic level. Ultimately, the lack of progress in nation building and in establishing a single security provider for the country proved to be the undoing of the Libyan transition process.The eruption of open conflict in the summer of 2014 resulted in the complete evacuation of foreign personnel and the almost total paralysis of American initiatives on Libyan soil. 22 Only a few efforts have been made since then, all conducted from outside the country and plagued by an increasing lack of understanding about what is actually happening in Libya.23 The lessons we should have learned by nowBefore the specifics of a new approach toward Libya can be argued, a preliminary step is necessary. An analysis of the lessons that should have been learned in the recent past in similar instances provides some insight into the way forward in Libya.

20 See Blanchard, Christopher M, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2015, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yNSdfFC9bh4J:https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf+&cd=2&hl=it&ct=clnk&gl=us: “Amid new reports of armed intervention and other apparent attempts by governments in the region to influence events in Libya, U.S. officials and other international actors now seek to convince Libyan factions and their regional supporters that inclusive, representative government and negotiation are preferable to competing groups’ attempts to achieve dominance through force of arms. […] For the time being, conflict mitigation appears to be the Obama Administration’s top policy priority in Libya, and political consensus among Libyans may remain elusive […] The United States and other countries have welcomed the apparent progress in the talks and called for all Libyan parties to support the emerging deal, amid warnings from U.S. security officials […] and León that the prevailing “vacuum of authority” in Libya is providing new opportunities for terrorists, criminals, smugglers, and human traffickers. Libya’s unpoliced borders continue to draw migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees to the country, where large numbers of them are making dangerous and often deadly attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.”21 Ibid: “Current U.S. policy initiatives are conducted outside the country and are focused on supporting multilateral efforts to encourage Libyans to reach consensus and seek to discourage spoilers through sanctions and diplomacy. If a GNA is established and/or security conditions improve sufficiently, U.S. personnel may return to the country and U.S. foreign assistance and/or military training may resume in support of security forces reporting to a unified government. In 2014, Congress enacted conditions and oversight requirements relative to U.S. assistance to Libya and made funding available for a new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund […]”. See also Nikala, Oscar, Multi-national training to rebuild Libyan Army, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31931:multi-national-training-to-rebuild-libyan-army&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=11122 See Blanchard, Christopher M, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2015: “Deteriorating security conditions led the State Department to withdraw U.S. diplomatic personnel from Libya in 2014, and the Obama Administration has not publicly described a timetable for their return”.23 Ibid: “From 2011 through 2014, U.S. engagement in Libya shifted from immediate conflict-related humanitarian assistance to focus on transition assistance and security sector support. Over $25 million in USAID-administered programs funded through the Office of Transition Initiatives, regional accounts, and reprogrammed funds were identified between 2011 and 2013 to support the activities of Libyan civil society groups and provide technical assistance to Libya’s nascent electoral administration bodies. The security-related withdrawal of some U.S. personnel from Libya in the wake of the Benghazi attacks temporarily affected the implementation and oversight of U.S.-funded transition assistance programs […] U.S. plans to develop a General Purpose Force were shelved as conflict broke out in 2014.”

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The fact that creating an effective security force requires critical experience and skills disproportionately concentrated among the existing military elites is clearly illustrated by the experiences in Iraq. The case highlights the dangers of disbanding a battle-hardened force in a post-conflict environment abroad, where it is imperative that capable indigenous elements provide effective security. Although officials who are the most compromised with the former regime need to be removed, the lessons learned in Iraq indicate that it is necessary to rely immediately and massively on personnel with previous military training and battle experience, especially veteran NCOs and officers. In 2003, the Iraqi military was considered untrustworthy. At the same time it was decided that it was necessary to create a 30,000-40,000 strong constabulary force to secure the country’s borders.24 From its training and equipping through its collapse against the Islamic State in June 2014, this newly created Iraqi military has proven that it takes a very long time for a newly assembled military force to become combat-effective, and that relying exclusively on weapons training and modern equipment is not enough.25 The lessons to be learned here are to not disband a force that can be selectively purged of unwanted elements or overlook intangible qualities such as national loyalty, unit cohesion, morale and fighting spirit.26 The experience in Iraq should also warn against the potential limitations of relying on foreign advisors with limited cultural awareness of the indigenous forces they are supposed to mentor and train. Drawing from the same case, it’s clear that military training and weaponry are not a substitute for a clear sense of identity, purpose, and motivation. It is also clear that an inefficient and non-representative government in an area characterized by strong local identities is less likely to win the loyalty of the solders fighting in its name.Furthermore, widespread corruption is reflected in the ranks of the military and produces subpar combat performance.27 A country where corruption is rampant is more likely to produce institutions that are inefficient and devoid of legitimacy. Out of 177 countries surveyed by the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2012, Afghanistan scored 175th, Libya 172nd, and Iraq 171st. In cases like these, corruption breeds inefficiency and needs to be eliminated if security sector reform is to be achieved.28

24 Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 200625 See the website of Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/nia.htm . In Iraq the US spent over $ 20 billion to train and equip the Iraqi security forces. According to William Astore (Why did the Iraqi Army collapse so easily, October 16, 2014, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/4-biggest-takeaways-americas-effort-build-iraqi-army) the bill was instead of USD 25 billion over 10 years, or USD 60 billion if other reconstruction costs are included. Yet in June 2014 an estimated 1200 ISIS fighters took Mosul, Iraq’s second largest town defended by 60.000 troops. In that period the Iraqi army was loosing 300 soldiers a day to desertion, death and injury. As the troops fled they abandoned their vehicles, discarded their weapons, uniforms onto the streets and changed into civilian clothes.26 Astore, William, Why did the Iraqi Army collapse so easily, October 16, 2014. According to Astore, when it comes down to battle effectiveness, what ultimately matters is if an army possesses spirit.27 Ibid. Astore quotes Patrick Cockburn: "A common source of additional income for officers is for soldiers to kickback half their salaries to their officers in return for staying at home or doing another job. […] the opportunity to make big money in the Iraqi Army goes back to the US advisers who set it up ten years ago. The Americans insisted that food and other supplies should be outsourced to private businesses: this meant immense opportunities for graft. A battalion might have a nominal strength of six hundred men and its commanding officer would receive money from the budget to pay for their food, but in fact there were only two hundred men in the barracks so he could pocket the difference. In some cases there were “ghost battalions” that didn’t exist at all but were being paid for just the same”. Astore also reports that in 2005 Eliot Weinberger in the London Review of Books quoted an Iraqi official admitting they were paying 135.000 troops salaries without knowing how many soldiers were actually part of the military and that the estimated was of about 50,000 ghost soldiers or invented names whose pay was collected by corrupted officers and bureaucrats.28 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results.

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Increasing the effectiveness of indigenous forces with divided loyalties, poor organization, defective leadership structures and a high degree of politicization and corruption is not a feat that can be achieved solely with increasing levels of funding, mentoring and training. These shortcomings reflect larger problems within the country and can only be solved in the long run – assuming peace and stability can be assured - by creating alternative, national loyalties to replace existing ones. In terms of lessons learned, as much funding as goes to security reforms should go to a robust, parallel program to bolster civilian structures of governance and nation building.29

The case of Afghanistan further highlights the points made above. Between 2002 and 2008 the United States spent an average of $1.468 billion per year to create a military that grew from 1,750 to 70,000 people. Seven years and an estimated $426 million were necessary to create such a force, plus an additional $822 million in equipment. Between 2009 and 2014 the Afghan military doubled again. Such a gargantuan effort might have been mandated by military considerations but fails to pass the test of durability. An important lesson to be learned is that the training and equipping of a foreign force must be sustainable in the long run without external resources. That is not currently the case in Afghanistan, and it is a source of pressing concerns.30

In contrast, NATO remained in charge of security in Kosovo from 1999 to the spring of 2014. An indigenous constabulary force of about 2,500 men was created only after the former Yugoslavian province obtained sovereignty in 2009. Today the country is transforming this force into a 5,000-strong army, a complex qualitative and quantitative upgrade that is set to take place in five years. It is a challenging task to build an effective force within a short timeframe, even when it is based on an existing core.31

All of the above lessons should be learned and applied to the building of a new Libyan military.

Essential steps toward stability in LibyaBased on what has been presented so far, these are the steps that need to be taken to set the country on a path of stability.The first step should be exempting the internationally recognized Libyan institutions and their military arm from the arms embargo enforced by the U.N. sanctions committee on Libya. The authorities in Cyrenaica have so far been denied the international authorization to procure the hardware to provide effective security in the areas they control.32 This obstacle needs to be removed, the legitimate party in the conflict needs to be given explicit preference and the thriving arms black market that currently undermines the security situation in the country needs to be controlled.Removing the obstacles to legitimately procure arms on the international market should only be viewed as the first step. Libya should not be left to its own devices to create the security framework it needs to prosper. In line with international political preferences and the antipathy of Libyans toward a large foreign military presence, the United States should offer a limited 29 Galbraith, Peter, Should we give up on the Iraqi Army?, The daily Beast, March 14, 2015,http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/04/can-we-just-give-up-on-the-iraqi-army.html . Galbraith states that: “It is impossible to build a real national army when Iraqis do not have a shared idea of the nation and when its components see each other as the enemy”.30 See the website of The Institute for the Study of War, http://www.understandingwar.org/afghanistan-national-army-ana. 31 Defense News, Kosovo to create own army to protect sovereignty, March 6, 2014, http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140306/DEFREG01/303060029/Kosovo-Create-Own-Army-Protect-Sovereignty-.32 See Michelle Nichols, Libya asks U.N. for arms, jets, tanks to battle Islamic State: letter, Reuters, March 4, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/us-libya-security-un-idUSKBN0M025420150304: “Libya has sought permission from the United Nations to import 150 tanks, two dozen fighter jets, seven attack helicopters, tens of thousands of assault rifles and grenade launchers and millions of rounds of ammunition from Ukraine, Serbia and Czech Republic”.

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number of military advisors to train the new Libyan security forces, if formally invited to do so. In any case, the foreign presence should be light (maximum 300), composed exclusively of Special Forces, and possibly include representatives of regional powers.33 Moreover, and more importantly, the new Libyan military needs to be assembled and trained with tactics, techniques and procedures that capitalize on the lessons learned above. In 2012-2014 Libyan soldiers were individually vetted and trained outside of Libya with a bottom up approach.34 The focus was mainly on shipping massive amounts of brand-new, advanced equipment to the country. The shortfalls of that approach need to be recognized and addressed. Libya today needs a top-down approach based on in-country and unit-by-unit training progressively affecting whole platoons, companies, and battalions. Although the quality of the gear and equipment is an essential element of a modern military force, the focus should also be on intangible but fundamental qualities such as cohesion, morale and effective leadership.35

The initial benchmark should be a 20,000 strong combat force that is reliable and loyal, to be used to secure and establish control over all of Cyrenaica. This initial force should ideally receive specialized training from foreign advisers and promptly assume the responsibility of training an additional 40,000 troops. Once trained, this 60,000 strong military would then be tasked with extending government control to the rest of the country.36

A police and border patrol force 10,000 strong should complement the military. This would subsequently be expanded with contingents of the same size for Tripolitania and Fezzan.Ultimately however, the size of the nascent security force should be solidly anchored to the long-term financial capabilities of Libya and not reliant on foreign aid. Libya is an oil and natural gas exporting country and, provided that outputs could return to the pre-2011 levels, it should have no problem assembling and sustaining an initial overall military strength of 20,000 plus a police and border patrol component of about 10,000 and a long-term strength of 90,000 service members.37 Additional strategiesThere are various paths open to the United States to better achieve its goals in Libya. As stated above, those paths needs to be informed by the lessons learned in similar instances in the past as well as in Libya since 2011. Moreover, the range of possible alternatives needs to be limited by American domestic preferences and the reality on the ground in Libya.

33 Ibid. Depending on the degree of local capabilities, it is generally accepted that a foreign component of 1 per 1000 inhabitants should not disrupt public security, as long as it acts as the tip of the sword of a sizeable, capable and loyal indigenous force.34 It is quintessential in this respect that the focus is not on tribes, and local loyalties, but on creating a military representative of all Libyans.35 Anderson, Jon Lee, The Unraveling, The New Yorker, February 23, 2015. NATO tried to design a national-defense system, but the Libyans failed to engage with them. The French were going to train three thousand policemen. Instead, they trained thirty. Then some cadets were sent to Jordan for training, but the Jordanians expelled them after they burned down a sports facility because they were angry about a flight delay. Three hundred Libyan soldiers that were being trained in the U.K. were expelled after half a dozen of them rampaged through a nearby village, sexually assaulting several women and raping a man. See also Barfi, Barak, Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2014.36 See Gaub, Florence, Libya in Limbo: How to Fill the Security Vacuum, NATO Defense College, September 2011. The accepted average is 13 troops per 1000 inhabitants, including all branches of the armed forces, the police and border patrol. Given Libya’s population of 6.6 million, the total strength should be about 85.000. In this case, taking into account that close to a third of the Libyan population of 2011was displaced to Tunisia, it is my opinion that the more correct figure would be 1 trooper per 1000 inhabitants.37 Gaub, Florence, Libya in Limbo: How to Fill the Security Vacuum, NATO Defense College, September 2011, and Barah Mikail, Libya’s Turbolent Transition: The Pressing Need for Security Sector Reform, The Project on Middle East Democracy, December 2013.

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Given those caveats, a first option for the United States would be to continue the present course of action and refrain from any direct involvement unless a viable national reconciliation has been obtained first. A low-key diplomatic strategy supporting a government of national unity under U.N. auspices is, in theory, a perfectly viable plan. Unfortunately, it is also an incredibly slow and uncertain one. Under the presently deteriorating circumstances, Libya might not have the luxury of waiting for this hands-off approach to bring about radically new circumstances. Additionally, absent a complete breakdown of the economy,38 or a major terrorist attack inducing the warring Libyan factions to settle their differences, there is no guarantee that a national reconciliation along the lines proposed by the international community would work.The second option involves a more direct and forceful employment of international diplomacy and a peacekeeping force to oversee the transfer of authority, the disarmament and reintegration of militias and the implementation of a peace agreement. Under this more proactive plan, the international security force should be expected to remain in the country for at least five years and be initially composed of about 10,000 military personnel, to be progressively phased down as domestic security forces are created and take over increasing areas of responsibility.39 This peacekeeping force could be deployed under U.N. or NATO banners. The benefit of the former would be its relatively low maintenance cost compared to the latter.40 Conversely, a NATO force would provide better war-fighting capabilities and rapid deployment assets.41 Independent from the chosen organization, a massive and sustained public diplomacy and strategic communication campaign must be initiated to refute the notion of an invasion. Fielding a force composed mainly of neighboring African and Sunni Muslim countries would also significantly reduce the potential negative effects of the presence of foreign forces on Libyan soil.This approach would not require significant American boots on the ground, would entail low financial costs and would preserve Libya’s unity.The tradeoff of this course of action is that the modus operandi of multinational peacekeeping forces would leave the United States with limited direct influence on the internal architecture and foreign alignment of the new Libyan authorities. The United States would also wield little or no power to directly influence events on the ground, the type of agreement reached between the warring parties, the effective disarmament of the militias, and the ability to direct Libyan counter-terrorism efforts within its borders. However, it must be noted that the traditional instruments of diplomatic and financial pressure could continue to be leveraged to influence the country’s politics and policy.

38 Libya is a rentier state and, as such relies heavily on its exports of oil and natural gas. Unfortunately the deteriorated security situation of the last twelve months has brought downs the production of those vital resources to 25 percent of its pre-2011 output.39 Gaub, Florence, Libya in Limbo: How to Fill the Security Vacuum, NATO Defense College, September 2011, and Barah, Mikail, Libya’s Turbolent Transition: The Pressing Need for Security Sector Reform, The Project on Middle East Democracy, December 2013. It is estimated that one international peacekeeper every 1000 indigenous inhabitants is sufficient if domestic security is managed by capable indigenous forces, or about 6.600. Otherwise the number should go up to 85.000, which is the optimal ratio of police forces per the current population of Libya (7 to 1 ratio).40 Ibid. Each NATO soldier costs an average of $ 200.000 per year, while each U.N. soldier costs only $ 45.000. Of course the difference in cost is also representative of the differing degrees of training, equipment, and overall capabilities of the two force packages.41 Ibid. It takes an average of three months for a U.N. peacekeeping force to deploy, whereas NATO troops deploy in few weeks. In the case a U.N. force is deemed too slow to make its appearance on the spot, a quick reaction force from a framework NATO and/or EU member state could be deployed to provide security in the interim. The final budget could vary between $ 3.8 billion over five years for a U.N. force consistent with the numbers highlighted in the footnote 26 above to $ 17 billion for a NATO task force. The EU has extensive police force training capabilities and track record. Especially for the type of forces most needed in post-conflict situations such as gendarmerie forces with a military character.

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The third option is to focus initial U.S. efforts on Cyrenaica. In this scenario the main targets of international pressure and support are the internationally recognized government and the Libyan Constitutional Assembly. Both would be coopted to support the already existing government structures in the eastern Libyan province and supervise and legitimize the institution-building effort.The main objective would be to make sure Cyrenaica has a strong and viable government, with sound governing structures and a functioning security apparatus. According to this paradigm, the rival authority in Tripolitania and the largely ungoverned space of Fezzan would only be engaged once the primary benchmarks in Cyrenaica have been achieved.Direct diplomatic pressure by the United States, and key NATO/EU allies such as Italy, France, and the United Kingdom, would be utilized to assist in the creation of a new Libyan security sector. Neighboring states should also be involved. Egypt is heavily affected by the instability emanating from Libya and is a United States ally and key player in the region. It is also a major supporter of the internationally recognized government. Tunisia, with its large Libyan refugee population, should also be included in the international response. Other regional players such as Turkey, Qatar, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates could play a constructive role in the stabilization of Cyrenaica and provide unique cultural insight.Still, given Libyans’ reservations about foreigners in general and in order to diffuse the potential negative consequences of a larger engagement, the direct help from foreign players should only come after an official invitation from Libyan authorities and be limited in duration. The disbanding and reintegration of militias would therefore also be initially limited in scope and geographic extension to Cyrenaica. The Libyan National Army would be used as the core of the legitimate security apparatus in the East to be trained and advised by local allies under the supervision of a very limited number of Western observers.Once ready, a new Libyan military could be used to pacify Cyrenaica and then extend its control south and southwest to Fezzan. The third stage of the offensive should be the campaign against Libya Dawn and the re-conquest of Tripolitania and Tripoli.While implementing this option, it is important not to repeat the errors made in Iraq. It needs to be recognized that a capable military leadership is a prerequisite to building a new security apparatus. Former regime officers with experience and the most capable militia fighters will need to find a place in the nascent structure and the others will need to be included in an effective demobilization and reintegration program. All attempts should be made so that the new security apparatus is as inclusive and representative of all venues of Libyan society as possible.42

The United States should also establish a bilateral agreement with its Libyan counterparts to deploy a limited counter-terrorism force capable of operating unilaterally when needed, but tasked mainly with mentoring specifically selected local units.Any effort to extend control to Fezzan and Tripolitania should be postponed until a stable and secure situation reigns uncontested in Cyrenaica. Still, the United States and its regional and

42 Gaub, Florence Libya in Limbo: How to Fill the Security Vacuum, NATO Defense College, September 2011, and Barah, Mikail, Libya’s Turbulent Transition: The Pressing Need for Security Sector Reform, The Project on Middle East Democracy, December 2013: “In the first two years after the fall of Qadhafi the new Libyan authorities tried to reform the security sector but failed to disband and demobilize militias. Instead they attempted integrating them, allowing them to maintain their existing structures of command and autonomy and started paying their salaries. Those units were plagued by divided loyalties and excessive powers by unit commanders. Attempts at training a General Purpose Force (GPF) – to be considered a constabulary force - abroad by the US, UK, Italy and Turkey were critically underfunded and resulted in little or no progress. Finally, the rule of no political involvement for the armed groups was broken when militias used violence and coercion to influence the passing of the Political Isolation Law and to undermine the central government”.

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international partners should continue to exert pressure via the U.N. and other multilateral outlets to pave the way for long-term reconciliation of differences with the ultimate goal being national unification.This approach makes Libya’s internal stability more likely by decisively empowering one of the two main factions involved in the conflict and giving it an advantage in the stalemated reconciliation process. Secondly, the presence of a unified and strong actor, even if not representative of the whole country, might deter violence in the short run and thereby make longer-term progress and political settlement a more realistic goal. This approach is sure to play an important role in addressing one of the root cause of violence in Libya: its status as a failing state. Libya’s weak institutional framework has resulted in a power vacuum that is being exploited by numerous militias for their own parochial security interests and by violent extremists to fulfill their puritanical interpretations of Islamic law.This option also recognizes General Khalifa Haftar and his Cyrenaica-based Libyan National Army as a reality on the ground - a proto-military force that could be turned into the strongest security actor in Libya with the immediate and direct application of United States training and equipment. To be sure, the Libyan National Army would need to be reformed to fairly represent all constituencies in Cyrenaica and molded into an effective combat force.Haftar is a respected military figure. He is also reportedly willing to take on the Islamist militias that refuse the very idea of a modern state and represent the major obstacle in the way of a stable Libya.This approach calls for limited material costs and political risks from the United States, and yet is consistent with its vital national security interests in at least part of the territory, without permanently compromising them in the rest of the country.The tradeoff of this course of action is that it empowers local and regional players to play a larger role in the stabilization of Libya with only limited assurances that the process will continue to comply with American strategic imperatives in the medium to long run. There is no absolute guarantee that Haftar or any successor will be a reliable partner once empowered with the means to establish military control over the country. Even assuming that the authorities in Cyrenaica emerge victorious from the confrontation and are capable of asserting civilian control over the military force it has used to establish national legitimacy, there is no practical way to ensure that Washington will have a significant influence over the future of Libya.Additionally, while militarily sound, the initial deployment of foreigners might cause domestic unrest in Libya. International advisors might not be welcome by the local population, which could result in unforeseen consequences.43 The situation in Tripolitania and Fezzan would also continue to be beyond immediate control, at the risk of allowing the consolidation of the rival authorities in Tripolitania and of violent extremists and local armed actors in ungoverned areas. In fact, there is a concrete risk that spoilers might exploit the presence of foreign personnel to galvanize popular resentment under their flag.Finally, increased involvement by the international community in Libya might escalate the internationalization of the conflict and result in further complicating the situation and causing the civil war to continue to drag on indefinitely.44

43 Barak Barfi, Barak, Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2014. Any level of visible foreign military presence in Libya, particularly from the West, risks igniting more political instability than it resolves. 44 Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Transnational Dimensions of Civil War, Journal of Peace Research, 2007 and Patrick Regan, Interventions into Civil Wars: A Retrospective Survey with Prospective Ideas, Civil Wars, December 2010.

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Policy RecommendationsAs stated above, the essential elements of the strategy toward Libya up to this point have been informed by the principles of neutrality and impartiality, and by the insistence on an inclusive domestic reconciliation process. Yet, without radically changing the internal distribution of power and military resources with a massive injection of exogenous resources, the situation in Libya is not likely to evolve for the better.The international community should double its efforts toward the goal of creating a reliable security partner in Libya, even at the cost of abandoning its earlier focus on inclusiveness and impartiality and focusing – at least initially - on selected areas of the country.Recent experiences and the literature on the subject of post-conflict stabilization all point to the fact that a stable security situation should be the obtained first. Effective security sector reform is, in fact, a prerequisite and provides a framework for progress in all other areas – political, economic, and social.Absent a serious effort to rectify the security situation, political reconciliation and nation building will continue to be secondary and Libya will continue to fall prey to international jihadist groups such as the Islamic State.45 Ideally the United States would seek to achieve its goals indirectly and multilaterally, and then only after an internationally encouraged and domestically accepted ceasefire is signed and a government of national unity surfaces. However, in the absence of a spectacular diplomatic breakthrough or an existential threat that would persuade the conflicting parties to set aside their differences, this scenario is not likely to materialize anytime soon. Regardless, the reality on the ground that it is unlikely that Libya has many options as it continues to descend into chaos and conflict and to be a safe heaven for violent extremism. Action is required now; it must be decisive and effective.Given the history of the international approach in Libya to date and the country’s current critical juncture, a response encompassing all its national territory is probably already out of the question.Bifurcating the American response in Libya by initially focusing on Cyrenaica is probably the most pragmatic way to create a solid domestic player with a reasonable chance to establish control over the rest of the country.This option is therefore the one that should be pursued. It could be adopted quickly and would provide the largest degree of direct control from Washington over the outcomes on the ground.In this course of action the vast majority of non-military resources necessary for nation and institution building will be delayed until each of the three main provinces of Libya are under the control of a single military actor, and effective governing structures have the necessary security framework to develop harmoniously.The United States should leverage its exclusive support with firm and verifiable commitments and benchmarks, beginning with the understanding that Haftar will limit his power to the military sphere and will not engage in political activities. Further, the United States should make

45 Ibid. “[…] Two competing governments claim legitimacy. Armed militias roam the streets. The electricity is frequently out of service, and most business is at a standstill; revenues from oil, the country’s greatest asset, have dwindled by more than ninety per cent. Some three thousand people have been killed by fighting in the past year, and nearly a third of the country’s population has fled across the border to Tunisia.” See also Fick, Maggie, A land of militias, Libya struggles to build a military, The Christian Science Monitor, February 2013: “The Libyan government wants a professional standing army, but the many militias still on the streets are too good at their job to be replaced with a fledgling, inexperienced military.”

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sure that the strong influence and charisma of Haftar is balanced with equally strong Defense and Interior Ministers.46 Public support for clear, undisputed civilian control over the military should be sought; a police force should be assembled as soon as possible to take over the administration of justice in areas that are under the control of official authorities.Equally essential to the resumption of normal political life in Libya will be instituting a functional party system, fair electoral contests, an effective legal system enforced by an independent judiciary, and an unrestricted and independent media sector.47 Yet all those benchmarks of progress will require a situation that is safe and stable in the long term, as well as the realization and acceptance that the exact institutional outlook of the country will be more of a reflection of Libya’s unique indigenous traditions of participatory politics than of a textbook case of a Western democracy. Additionally, the focus of American and international efforts should be engaging the younger generations to make sure the next group of civilian and security officials are socialized to adhere to internationally recognized principles and standards such as national allegiance, the rule of law, civilian control over the military, impartiality and institutional secularism. This goal should be the explicit focus of the mentoring and training effort. All new Libyan institutions must be made into a unifying factor in Libyan politics, an instrument for protecting national institutions, not factions and local interests.48

The best path to stability and, eventually, to democracy in Libya is the creation of a professional army to guarantee the secular nature of the country and of national institutions. This goal requires some modicum of reconciliation and amnesty for those former Qadhafi officials who disassociated themselves from the regime and did not flee abroad or come back after a long exile. The issue of amnesty and reconciliation might at first sight appear ancillary, yet it lies at the very heart of the battle for the hearts and minds of the Libyan public. The decisions made in this respect will determine who gets to decide how the narratives of the history of the Libyan State will be written. It is probably the most contentious issue in Libyan political discourse and one that cannot be resolved within a zero-sum framework. The rebellion’s revolutionary nature is not in question but preventing virtually all the individuals associated with the former regime from participating Libya’s political life is unrealistic. Somehow this vexed question will need to find a resolution. Ultimately, only a strong government backed by credible military clout can set Libya on its way to stability and progress. It is in the national interest of the United States to support the internationally recognized institutions of Libya because they represent a modern, secular version of the state.

46 Barak, Barfi, Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2014.47 Ibid.48 Ibid.

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