a note on the russian conquest of armenia (1827)

A Note on the Russian Conquest of Armenia (1827)Author(s): Glynn R. BarrattSource: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 50, No. 120 (Jul., 1972), pp. 386-409Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4206572 .

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A Note on the Russian Conquest

of Armenia (1827)

GLYNN R. BARRATT

This paper is concerned with one phase of the Russo-Persian war

of 1826-8?the capture of the fortress and khanate of Yerevan.

Specifically, it is proposed to emphasize events of late July and

August 1827?the storming of strategically essential Persian strong? holds in Christian Transcaucasia, notably Sardar-Abad, Abbas-

Abad and Yerevan, and the bloody battle fought on 17 August 1827

by the walls of Echmiadzin Cathedral. The discovery of unpublished Russian manuscripts including letters to and from General-Adjutant Count I. F. Paskevich, commander of the Caucasian Corps (1827- 30) and chief of military operations in Armenia and the Caucasus, enables more light to be cast on a neglected facet of 19th-century Russian imperialism. These letters are to be found in the Saltykov- Schchedrin State Library in Leningrad (Rukopisnyy otdel).

Fully to appreciate the significance of Krasovsky's fierce encounter with Abbas-Mirza, heir-apparent to Fath Ali Shah and the Persian

throne, as of the subsequent collapse of Persian strength in the re?

gions of Yerevan and Nakhichevan, one must know something of

preceding events: of General Benkendorf's capture of Echmiadzin and its venerable cathedral; of the manoeuvring of exhausted armies in mid-summer; and of Paskevich's and Abbas-Mirza's moves, in? tentions and ambitions. (For, as H. Algar remarks, the importance of Abbas-Mirza in the events of Fath Ali Shah's reign, 1797-1834, 'in

particular those concerning relations with Russia, was hardly less than that of the monarch himself.')1 Plainly, any such precis will tend to oversimplify the whole, stressing certain events and facts at the expense of others. However, it may be noted, first, that this phase of Russian imperialism has received but little attention in the West; and, second, that events in Transcaucasia in 1826-9 have a signi? ficance in Middle Eastern history yet to be satisfactorily gauged in

Western or Soviet scholarship. Since the time of Catherine Russia had single-mindedly followed a policy of territorial expansion and, subject to Paul's and Alexander's whims, continued to do so until the climax of Adrianople.2 Setbacks in the Balkans and the Caucasus

Glynn R. Barratt is an Assistant Professor in the Russian Department at Carleton University, Ottawa.

1 H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1J95-1906, Berkeley, California, 1969, p. 73. 2 On this, see C. W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, 1821-33, Cambridge 1930, PP- 3-6.



THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF ARMENIA 387

merely caused the process to falter; triumphs quickened its pace.3 Few land victories, perhaps, gave a greater stimulus to what was, by Yermolov's time, a traditional Russian policy of self-aggrandizement than those of Paskevich at Yerevan, Kars and Erzerum. The Russian

victories of 1827 marked the beginning of a new phase in Armenian

history. The emphasis here is on Russian, not Persian sources. Enquiries in

Leningrad, not Teheran, revealed no mention in official Soviet

historiography4 of an engagement that heralded the Russian storm?

ing of Yerevan so, by extension, bringing to an end organised Persian

resistance within the frontiers of contemporary Armenia; and in

which, by both Persian and Russian reckoning, at least three

thousand lives were lost. The tendentiousness of M. S. Ivanov's

Ocherki istorii Ir ana,^ not of Ali Asghar Shamim's Iran dar Daura-yi Saltanat-i Qajar, provoked me to consult original Russian sources.6 It

may be objected that full use has not been made here of all relevant

Iranian documents; there is no pretension to have done so?indeed, the few Iranian sources consulted are quickly named.7

Nicholas I's decision to remove A. P. Yermolov from his posts as

governor of Georgia and the Caucasus, commander of the Caucasian

Corps of the Imperial Army and, since 1817, unofficial ambassador

3 The point is made, disingenuously, in the Voyennaya entsiklopediya, Petrograd, 1914; see under 'Paskevich, I. F.', XVII, pp. 313-16.

4 There is more factual detail to be found in such a generalised work as F. H. Skrine's The Expansion of Russia, 1815-1goo, Cambridge, 1915.

5 Moscow, 1952. 6 In the Tsentral'nyy gosudarstvennyy arkhiv literatury i iskusstvo, Moscow (on the Griboyedov

embassy to Teheran), Pushkinskiy dom and the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Library (Rukopisnyy otdel), Leningrad. Fond and reference numbers are given separately.

7 Chief among Iranian sources for the period are the numerous chronicles commis? sioned, with or without royal patronage, throughout the 19th century. A most adequate list may be found in Sa'id Nafisi's Tarikh-i Ijtimat-i va Siyasi-yi Iran dar Daura-yi Mu 'asir, Tehran, 1961. First, use was made of the Ma athir-i Suttaniya of Abd ur-Razzaq Dunbuli ?most relevant to Abbas-Mirza's military adventures and reforms and a chronicle published, appropriately, on that prince's own press in Tabriz, in 1826. To complement this, Mirza Muhammed Taqi Lisan ul-Mulk Sipihr's Nasikh ut-Tavarikh was found illuminating. Though scarcely satisfactory by the criteria of modern scholarship, both chronicles are detailed and, by their lights, precise. Finally, I consulted Sir J. Malcolm's A History of Persia, London, 1815 (on Fath Ali Shah); J. Morier's A Second Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor to Constantinople, London, 1818 (on the state of the Armenian people in 1817); and the papers of Sir John McNeill, British Envoy in Tehran. For an admirable bibliography on Persian religion, reforms and war, see Algar, op. cit., pp. 267-77. Particularly valuable in regard to the conduct of the Russo- Persian war, Nicholas's ambitions and Paskevich's hypercaution, is the article 'Perepiska Paskevicha s Imperatorom Nikolayem I', Russkaya starina, V, VI, 1872; XXIX, 1880; XXXII, 1881 and XLI, 1884. Original documents are also published in A. Shcherbatov's General-Fel'dmarshal knyaz' Paskevich (St Petersburg, 1888-94), of which I have used IV, V and in 'Iz zapisok knyazya Paskevicha do avgusta, 1826', Russkiy arkhiv, I, 1889, pp. 44-67. Perusal of letters from Paskevich to other participants in the Russian advance to Tabriz, suggested this paper,



388 GLYNN R. BARRATT

to Transcaucasia, is explicable only in terms of the tsar's own

character. Imprisoned under Paul and exiled to the province of

Kostroma, where he passed the time studying Virgil, Yermolov had, since becoming head of staff to Barclay de Tolly (1805-7), pursued a brilliant military career. Supported by Alexander, who approved his plan of campaign in Dagestan (1817-19), he had added two khanates to the Empire?those of Karabagskoye and Shirvanskoye.8 His administrative achievements were remarkable; trade and in?

dustry were encouraged in regions subdued by his corps, health spas were opened, caravan routes guarded, those subordinates found

guilty of corruption removed and educated men encouraged, by promises of quick responsibility and promotion to those found

worthy of it, to serve in conquered Georgia. In Petersburg he was re?

garded as the victor of Georgia and Dagestan; fresh honours gained brilliance from memories of his service under Suvorov. Thoughtful of the future, and of almost inevitable Turkish and Persian counter? attacks from the south?from Adzhar, Yerevan and the district of Nakhichevan?he hastened to complete the Georgian military road. Nor was the road merely improved; forts were constructed at

strategically important points. It says much for Yermolov's logistic sense that the three main links in a chain stretching from the Terek to the Caspian Sea, the forts Vnezapnaya, Burnaya and Groznaya, were never seriously threatened by Persian or Turkish armies, and that the modern city of Groznyy, sixty miles north-east of Ordzhoni-

kidze, continues to grow in commercial importance at the expense of

Pyatigorsk. There had, of course, been earlier Russian victories in the

area?Yelizavetpol', once Ganzha, capital of the khanate of that

name, fell to Prince Tsitsianov in January, 1804 after a well-ordered

campaign and siege; and Ganzha, standing at the confluence of the rivers Kury, Alazani and Dzhegam, was a key to the Persian Cauca? sian possessions. But Yermolov had built impressively on these earlier foundations.

Nicholas chose, perhaps unconsciously, to belittle Yermolov's achievement. As his brother, in the last three years of his reign, he found Yermolov's repeated requests for reinforcements tiresome. Certain letters to Benkendorf of 1825 suggest that he suspected, or wished to be thought to suspect, Yermolov's reasons for wishing to increase the size of an army which was already large, devoted to its commander and conscious of numerous signal victories. Reinforce? ments were refused. When, therefore, the Mohammedan populace of

Nagorno-Karabag rose en masse, on the apparent instigation of

8 Except when there is a commonly accepted anglicised form, as in Tabriz, Russian spellings are used in preference to Persian, i.e. Karabag, not Qarabagh.




Abbas-Mirza, the Russians repulsed and suppressed them with

difficulty. Yermolov had predicted such a rising. Nicholas found the

news from Georgia 'unsatisfactory', and resolved to replace the

governor, 'without noise, without scandal, and without insult.'9 The

replacement he had in mind, even in March 1827, was Ivan

Fyodorovich Paskevich (1782-1856), General-Adjutant since 1825, commander of the First Foot Corps and, to Nicholas and his brother

Mikhail Pavlovich, 'the little commander'; in 1821, Paskevich had

commanded the First Guards Foot Division?in which the Grand-

Dukes each led a brigade. Nor was he a newcomer at court even in

1821. At the wish of the Empress Mariya Fyodorovna, he had in

1817 accompanied the Grand-Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, then aged

nineteen, on an extended tour of Russia and the West. From the

empress's viewpoint the tour was a qualified success?she had re?

quested Paskevich and General N. A. Orlov 'to occupy the Grand-

Duke as much as possible with civic matters, and as little as feasible

with military . . .' 'But the bearing of those at the front and its beauty alone engrossed him', reported Paskevich on their return to Peters?

burg in June 1819. Paskevich, unwilling to oppose his charge's natural propensity, found favour in his eyes.10 To Alexander and

later Nicholas he was unfailingly subservient, to the empress courteous to the point of folly.

Paskevich was approached by Dibich, acting on the tsar's behalf, and asked to proceed at once to the Caucasus, there to command all

Russian troops. Paskevich at once accepted, declining only 'to under?

take any civil or diplomatic tasks whatsoever'. Plainly it was under?

stood that Yermolov was to be superseded. And it is clear from Dibich's accounts of meetings between himself and Paskevich, as

from the tsar's own correspondence of the period,11 that Paskevich

agreed to Nicholas's proposal that he should go to Tiflis as though to

assist Yermolov and serve under his jurisdiction, but in fact to assess

his activities and to replace him 'should a contingent situation seem

to warrant it.' The passage in his journal dealing with these inter?

views casts light both on events and, more especially, on the man

himself; Paskevich, as the following extract shows, did not leave an

unvarnished record. Particularly interesting are his (supposed) equi? vocations on the impossibility of dual command in Tiflis, Yermolov

9 Letter to Dibich of 27 March 1827: Voyenno-uchonyy arkhiv, otdel I, shkaf 49, no. 4, quoted by Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, p. 262.

10 See V. Pertsov, Z^neopisaniye knyazya Varshavskogo graf a I. F. Paskevicha-Erivanskogo po ofitsial'nym dokumentam, Warsaw, 1870, chapter 3, and, for a less 'official', more readable account of the tour and Paskevich's earlier career, N. Patoksy (sic), 'Graf Paskevich- Yerivanskiy', Saltykov-Shchedrin Library, Rukopisnyy otdel, Fond 265, op. 2, no. 1972. Paskevich made little attempt to interest his charge in civilian matters,

11 See footnote 7.




not yet having been disgraced; neither Dibich nor Benkendorf record

any such hesitation:12

More than once, returning from the parade-ground, the desire took me to throw up everything and, in retirement, to devote myself entirely to

family life; but I sensed that I should soon be needed for a serious affair.

Russia, I then understood, could not manage without a war, and a war in the near future. A disturbance in Greece is the beginning of the de?

composition of the Turkish Empire; the Turks will not leave Europe without a war; consequently, there will be a war. For that reason I re? solved to be patient and to bide my time . . .

In August 1826, on the occasion of the coronation of His Majesty, we were in Moscow. Some days before the coronation I received, one

evening, a note from General-Adjutant Baron Dibich. He informed me that His Majesty the Emperor ordered me to appear before him on the

following day, and asked me, if possible to call on him, Dibich, as a pre? liminary. Not knowing why the Sovereign wanted me, I went to Dibich who said to me: 'His Majesty has received from the C.-in-C. of the Caucasian Corps, General Yermolov, a report that the Persians have invaded our Transcaucasian provinces, taken Lenkoran and Karabag and are marching on with 60,000 regular troops, 60,000 irregulars and some 80 harnessed guns; that he has insufficient forces to oppose the Persians and that he will not answer for the preservation of the region if two infantry and one cavalry divisions are not sent to him in reinforce? ment.' The tsar desires, Dibich told me, that you should go to the Caucasus and command the troops. The Persian strength must be

exaggerated, and His Highness, after such a report, has no faith in Yermolov. Here Dibich added that even the late Emperor Alexander had been dissatisfied with Yer. and wanted to recall him and replace him with Rudzevich; for Yermolov's actions were arbitrary, his troops slack and in a poor condition, discipline was lost, thieving not unusual, for several years the people had been wanting in everything . . .

I answered Dibich: How can I go to the Caucasus and what shall I do there, when Yermolov is there ? How can I help in the poor state of affairs if there are no forces there ? And, knowing the local climate by that of Moldavia and Wallachia, where I served five years, I do not think that I shall withstand it. . .

Nicholas acted promptly. In the absence of Paskevich, who was

presumably in Kakhetiya and, he hoped, pursuing Abbas-Mirza, N. M. Sipyagin was appointed military governor of Georgia. He left

at once for Tiflis, and arrived in the third week of April 1827.

Shortly afterwards, Dibich was also dispatched to the south, 'to re? view the general situation' and, particularly, to attempt to maintain

12 Useful extracts from the journals of both may be found in T. Schiemann's Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I, Berlin, 1904-19; see Index. The extract is taken from 'Iz zapisok Fel'dmarshala Paskevicha', Russkiy arkhiv, 1889, bk. I, pp. 415-7; translation mine,



THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF ARMENIA 39I

concord among the generals.13 Understandably, Nicholas was

anxious that Paskevich and Sipyagin should work well together; Dibich was to see that they had every chance to do so?and to scotch

intrigue and rumour.14 While the forces undermining him gathered

strength and cohesion, Yermolov, still deprived of necessary troops was kept in a state of ignorance of events in the capital.

Paskevich arrived in the Caucasus at the precise moment when an

infantry division commanded by Count Benkendorf was moving into

the region of Yerevan. Benkendorf's success, too, did no service to

Yermolov, whose disgrace had been heralded, albeit unheard by him. From published correspondence between the tsar and his new

Georgian protege, it is apparent that each trusted the other to a re?

markable extent for the period. But Paskevich's position was un?

paralleled in the army. In no real sense could 'the little commander'

be Yermolov's subordinate once Nicholas's resolve had been taken.

Sufficient indication of the tension that grew steadily between the

governor and Paskevich, and of its causes, is the following unpub? lished letter to the patient Dibich:

Feb. 9, 1827. S.Z. kN3i6/i827

Tiflis Esteemed Sir, Ivan Ivanovich,

Your Excellency will see, from the enclosed papers, what manner of documents are forwarded to me from General Yer? molov by his chancery; having glanced through them, you will see that from 20 January to 9 February I received 34 papers, 23 of which are concerned with the enlisting of rank and file. It may be seen from the numbers that some 500 different papers were brought out by that same

chancery. And so judge for yourself if I can in any way be of use here; for not only is my rank abased?I can know nothing of the ordering of the Corps.

I have the honour to remain, with true respect and perfect etc., Your Excellency's most humble servant,

Ivan Paskevich.15

Dibich was unable to settle the differences between Yermolov and

Paskevich. The two men had known and disliked each other since the summer of 1815, when Paskevich had served under Yermolov in

13 See letter of Nicholas to Dibich of 8 March 1827, quoted in part by Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, p. 264. Head of Staff of the Imperial Corps of Guards, N. M. Sipyagin was the publisher of the first Russian military journal (1817-19), and the founder of a school for private soldiers. Based on the Lancaster-Bell system, it survived briefly in Petersburg. He died in Tiflis in October 1828.

14 It is ironic that rumour should loom so large in Dibich's own field-reports to the tsar. 15 Preserved in the Sobraniye P. L. Vakselya, no. 3265 (Saltykov-Shchedrin, Rukopisnyy

otdel), the letter is in excellent condition. In the same folder, filed as no. 3266, is an un? published letter from Paskevich to Count A. I. Chernyshev, dated 8 January 1835. All further archive references are from the Rukopisnyy otdel of Leningrad Public Library.




France with the Corps of Grenadiers. Matters came to a conclusion.

According to A. Murav'yov-Karsky, a junior officer at Tiflis, the de?

parture of Yermolov was sad but dignified, 'and a deathly hush then

descended on General HQ,'.16 Paskevich presented a striking contrast to his predecessor. Lacking

both Yermolov's many-faceted talent and, more significantly, his

purer intelligence (it is impossible to conceive of Paskevich's studying Latin in disgrace, or dexterously countering diplomatic feints), he

regarded himself as a soldier and wished others to do so. But it was

hardly possible, in the context of a war in Asia Minor, to isolate

military mores from their political results. What Yermolov had under?

stood well he pretended to disregard; but Paskevich, unless clearly instructed by the tsar, tended simply to give no thought to the poten? tial diplomatic consequences of Russian victories in Persia.

As a professional soldier, he had a competent but scarcely brilliant

career behind him by 1826. As a subaltern, from 1806-12, he had

fought the Turks under Mikhel'son, coming to know and dislike the

terrain of the Principalities. Promoted brigadnyy komandir in 1811, he

took part in the actions at Smolensk, Borodino, Vyazma and

Dresden, distinguishing himself in none. Personally more successful

at Leipzig, where he was decorated, he advanced with the Russian

armies to Paris (1814). The rank of division commander (2nd Guards Foot), to which he was appointed in 1817, was precisely that

to which a thirty-five-year-old officer might properly have aspired; it promised a 'good', not a remarkable career.

Chance having brought him to the empress's notice, Paskevich

did not serve in his new post, but accompanied the Grand-Duke

Mikhail Pavlovich on a grand tour, remaining with his noble charge until 1821. As seen, he became the Grand-Duke's technical superior. Still he had no first-class order, and had earned the unstinting praise of no contemporaries of sound military sense.17 He was reputed to be

hypercautious and lacking in decisiveness, and this reputation was borne out by his extraordinary conduct at the beginning of the first

pitched battle of Nicholas's reign, that of Yelizavetpol' (Ganzha); the siege was unnecessarily prolonged.18

16 A. Murav'yov-Karsky, Vospominaniya, St Petersburg, 1883, II, p. 228. 17 Russian historians had accepted Paskevich's mediocrity as a tactician long before the

century ended; for a typical resume', see F. Brokgauz and I. Yefron (eds.), Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar', St Petersburg, 1897, XXII, p. 920. That mediocrity, and his customary dilatoriness showed to appalling effect in the Crimean War: see N. Shil'der, 'Fel'dmarshal Paskevich v Krymskuyu voynu', Russkaya starina, XII, 1875, pp. 55-78; also P. K. Men'kov, Zapiski, St Petersburg, 1898, pp. 105-8.

18 At that siege, Paskevich took a defensive stance?a curious policy, as Lieutenant Grekov and Count Simonich remarked to him: 'Our troops will unquestionably show wonders of bravery in an attack; but we advise Your Excellency that they are not used to a defensive position . . .'; quoted in Brokgauz and Yefron, see note 17.




It would be foolish to deny Paskevich credit for the Russian

victories of 1827-9. Not the storming of Warsaw, easily accom?

plished in 1831, but the capture of Kars (23 June, 1828) was, in the

view of several military historians, his greatest single triumph.19 Nor

can it be denied that he founded at least two fortresses of vital im?

portance to Russia, permanently subjected the people of the Za-

Alazan Valley and brought some semblance of stability to the

Armenian vassal state.20 The fact remains, however, that not only did Paskevich devote no more than seventeen months out of his fifty in the Caucasus to the tasks of civil administration?he delegated no

authority to others who, not burdened by the conduct of a war,

might well have accepted those tasks. Paskevich, it emerges from his

journal, disliked civil administrators.

Such, then, were the temperament and record of one entrusted by Nicholas with three interconnecting missions: the storming of as

many Persian fortresses as possible; the pursuit and annihilation of

the main Persian army under Abbas-Mirza; and the capture of

Tabriz. Nicholas placed particular emphasis on this third point,

wishing demonstrably to humble Persian pride. Paskevich, unwilling to contradict his tsar, suppressed his own opinion that the war might be prosecuted to a successful end without setting eyes on Tabriz.21

On 2 April, Benkendorf's infantry division moved into the area of

Yerevan, capital of Armenia, seat of the Catholicos and best de?

fended of the Persian Transcaucasian fortresses. Two days later

Benkendorf camped at Dzhelal-Oglii and there, on 8 April, the

exhausted Dibich arrived. Morale was high, despite an unabating heat, and the Russian advance towards the south seemed well in

hand.

Dibich recuperated, observed what he found around him and, in a

series of despatches to Nicholas remarkable for their indiscriminate use of bystanders' and coachmen's impressions and of his own,

generally perceptive views, described scenes of great physical hard?

ship. Of one thing Dibich was quickly convinced?that it was an

error to manoeuvre south of Georgia in the summer.

With each day, progress was slower, the advance more painful. Secured by ropes to crags and boulders, each cart was dragged by teams of sixty men over the passes which grew increasingly formid? able beyond the River Kura. Dibich watched, and reckoned that Benkendorf would take Echmiadzin, fourteen miles west of Yerevan,

19 Such is the view of Shcherbatov, Shil'der and A. Berzhe, in 'Knyaz' Paskevich v tsarstve Pol'skom . . .', Russkaya starina, XL VII I, 1885, pp. 89-114.

20 The forts were Novyye zakaty and AleksandropoP (Gumry). Stability, it must be emphasized, was relative in the former Persian possessions?local massacres occurred sporadically until 1915.

21 'Iz zapisok knyazya Paskevicha do avgusta, 1826', loc. cit.




by ii April, or possibly 13 April. Another difficulty which soon be?

came familiar had already been encountered: when they came at

last to an Armenian village, they found only empty streets and

houses. From some areas the entire Armenian population had with?

drawn south beyond the Araks, taking all livestock with them. There

was no food, communication lines were dangerously stretched al?

ready, and the heat increased daily. Benkendorf took Echmiadzin,

however, on 13 April without a battle. 'Depuis ce matin', he in?

formed Dibich, who lagged behind, 'Edzmiadzin appartient a

l'Empereur.'22 In Narzez (1770-1868), Catholicos of the Armenian

Church, the Russian General Staff found an essential ally. Without

his help, indeed, it may be questioned if Paskevich could have wrung such favourable terms from the shah as were elicited the following

spring. For conquest of Armenia and Nakhichevan made possible direct raids on Tabriz and the surrounding area; the Russians dealt

from strength. Narzez was not a Russophile, but a pragmatist. For his own good

reasons he entertained Benkendorf in his own quarters; thinking of

his own church and people he gave instructions that the Russian army be fed and assisted. The Persians had given no peace to the Armenian faithful in their cathedral; indeed, Benkendorf learned, on with?

drawing to Yerevan twelve hours before the Russians entered

Echmiadzin, the Persian garrison of four hundred had forcibly taken

with them many monks and deacons. Yerevan was now manned by a well-armed garrison of two thousand Persians, and Sardar-Abad, to the west, by a garrison of fifteen hundred.

Wasting no time, Benkendorf set off for Sardar-Abad with a strong detachment and, despite the constant harassing of Hassan-Khan, brother to the sardar of Yerevan, succeeded in taking the fortress.

Jubilation was muted, however, by a general awareness that the

torrid heat was beginning to spread sickness throughout the rank and file. Nor, clearly, had the shah chosen to give battle, sensing the

advantages of avoiding rather than seeking direct encounters with the

Russians. Dibich wrote apprehensively of the strength of British in?

fluence in Teheran; for, swayed in his judgment by McDonald, his

British 'adviser', the shah was unlikely to see any good reason for

hurrying into conflict while the terrain and heat alone continued to

oppress and contain his enemy.23 Meanwhile, Paskevich made his first reconnaissance of Yerevan. It

is still possible, walking towards the city from the east, to imagine how formidable a bastion it was in Abbas-Mirza's time. The deep

22 Quoted in part by A. Shcherbatov, op. cit., II, p. 230. 23 Moreover, thanks to the military reforms of Abbas-Mirza, the shah had a standing

army of no less than 100,000 men by July 1827.




trenches described by Paskevich have vanished, but broken sections

of 'two high walls with numerous towers' remain. There were, be?

sides the 2,000 regulars mentioned by Narzez, 2,000 irregulars, and

provisions for six months. All earlier Russian attempts to storm

Yerevan had failed; both Prince Tsitsianov, in 1804, an^ Count

Gudovich four years later had lost many men there, the latter during a bombardment lasting two months, and both had withdrawn.

Hardly surprisingly, Hassan-Khan, who commanded the besieged Persians in 1808, regarded himself as Gudovich's victor?to

Paskevich's intense annoyance. Yerevan was the key to the Persian

possessions. But it had been further strengthened since 1808, and

more forts built in the vicinity (Sardar-Abad in the west, Abbas-Abad

to the south). Nor were the Persian troops to be lightly dismissed.

Even in 1817 Yermolov had declared that, while Abbas-Mirza's

thirty battalions were armed most adequately, no European army could withstand the onrush of his foot-soldiers.24 Finally, unlike

Paskevich's, Abbas-Mirza's troops were accustomed to move in the

heat of the Persian summer.

By mid-June, Paskevich had decided that to blockade Yerevan

was impractical. On one day 225 men were on the sicklist, on an?

other, 240. A roaming Persian army, able but unwilling to give

battle, posed a constant and horrible threat. Psychologically and

physically delay told on the Russian army. Not only had siege

artillery not yet arrived from Tiflis; Major-General Truzsonov

assured him that more than 3,000 shots from twenty battery pieces would be needed to breach the walls. Paskevich hesitated. Then he

gave orders to camp outside Yerevan for not more than twenty days. Soon, however, it became apparent that Dzhelal-Oglu and the sur?

rounding fields could not sustain an army for three weeks; to remain

was to risk starvation. Food could not be brought to Nakhichevan

promptly or in bulk from either Girius or Alaverdi. 'I propose', wrote

the frustrated Paskevich at length,25 'to raise the blockade and to re?

move to the mountains, to a healthy situation affording sufficient

forage, pasturage and water.'

Still there was no sign of the main Persian force. Hassan-Khan, it is true, appeared once with three thousand cavalry, and was pursued, after a skirmish, by two Cossack and a Guards regiment; but this

merely whetted the appetite.26 Plainly, the Russian position by Yerevan could only grow quickly worse. Ignoring, therefore, a note from Abbas-Mirza, on io June, in which peace negotiations

24 See A. Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, pp. 287-9. 26 Ibid., IV, pp. 265-6, taken from Paskevich's Znurn(d voyennykh deystviy. 26 Hassan-Khan, Sardar of Yerevan and an enemy of Abbas-Mirza, as of Paskevich,

was pursued by a Guards regiment, under Col. Shipov, and a posse of Shamschev's Cossacks.




were tentatively mentioned, Paskevich gave orders to advance to the

high ground of Nakhichevan, away from Yerevan. A copy of Abbas-

Mirza's note was forwarded to Nesselrode, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Persians received no reply.

Paskevich's caution served him well. That caution, which earlier

critics dismissed as mere indecisiveness, has more recently been con?

demned as conducive to ponderous, unnecessary movements.27

Certainly his tendency to dilatoriness showed to deplorable effect

both in Warsaw, in 1830-31, and, more particularly, in the Crimean

War. But caution was no weak trait in Armenia in 1827; never again in his career, indeed, did circumstances so combine to suit Paske?

vich's strengths while not touching his weaknesses. His very character

is spelled out in the orders given on the advance to Nakhichevan.

The army was divided into two?a main section of 4,800 foot, 800 cavalry and 3,000 irregulars under Princes Yeristov and

Vadbolsky, and a detachment of 4,400 men, including 1,200

cavalry, under the general command of General Krasovsky. Krasovsky's section was to prolong the blockade of Yerevan and, when cooler days arrived, to start a siege of that town.28 The main section withdrew to the river Gorichnaya, twenty miles south-east.

Krasovsky reviewed his situation and considered the orders given, in

three instalments, by Paskevich. Because those orders, and their just

interpretation, bear directly on the coming battle near Echmiadzin

cathedral, they deserve consideration here.

Krasovsky was given three principal tasks. First, he was to con? tinue the blockade of Yerevan; second, when the heat decreased and

siege artillery arrived, he was to lay siege to it; third, he was to pre? vent attacks on the Russian frontiers, as against Tartars and other tribesmen loyal to the tsar. He was, in other words, to repel a Persian attack, should one materialise. Only the frontiers to which

27 There are broad similarities between the assessments of Paskevich's career in N. T. Dubrovin's invaluable Istoriya voyny i vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze, St. Petersburg, 1871- 88, and in any large Soviet history of 19th-century 'foreign relations'; see also, for a dif? ferent view of events in Transcaucasia in Paskevich's time, W. E. Allen and P. MuratofT, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921, New York, i953? chapters 1,2.

28 Order of 17 July: Voyenno-uchonyy arkhiv, no. 2438a, quoted by Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, p. 270. An illuminating description of Yerevan as it was in the 1850s may be found in Baron August von Haxthausen's Transcaucasia, translated by 'J.E.T.', London, 1854, pp. 191-202. Haxthausen also describes Echmiadzin (pp. 283-8) and a personal meeting with the Catholicos Narzez (pp. 291-304), whom he much admired and respected. For more detail of that city's social, commercial and administrative structure in 1826-8, see S. D. Lisitsian's well documented essay, 'Ocherki etnografii dorevolyutsionnoy Armenii', in Kavkazskiy etnogrqficheskiy sbornik, I, Moscow, 1955, pp. 182-264. A reading of the Chevalier J. F. de Gamba's Voyage dans la Russie miridionale, Paris, 1826, gives an idea of the unpleasantness of any strenuous activity in Yerevan in late July; de Gamba provides a detailed map of the city and region.




Paskevich referred were unclear?no truce having yet been signed with the Persians, frontiers changed from week to week.

Paskevich's instructions, however, were not so crude as this rough schema may suggest. There followed fifteen detailed points, covering all foreseeable aspects of the coming operation. From paragraph 6, for example, Krasovsky might see on what parts of the walls of

Yerevan, the town having been taken, he was to place guns; para?

graph 9 concerned arrangements for a hospital in Echmiadzin.

Little room was left for initiative; yet one contingency was over?

looked by the far-seeing Paskevich?that of a Persian advance from

the side of Mount Ararat. Admittedly, he had strengthened Krasov-

sky's division by two battalions of the Kabardinskiy Foot, and these

duly arrived from Tiflis, exhausted, on 17 July.29 But how could the

quantity of gold and 3,000 roubles in silver, which he personally en?

trusted to Krasovsky, help that officer in the event of a Persian on?

slaught ?

It is clear, from his actions as from his despatches, that Paskevich

did not for a moment expect the Persians to relieve the garrison of

Yerevan. And, in his defence, there were no grounds for thinking so; it was known that the main Persian force, under the shah in person, was encamped at Khoy, more than one hundred miles from Abbas-

Abad?too far away to give aid to Hassan-Khan and his less energetic brother?while Abbas-Mirza had last been heard of in the region of

Chors. Why should the shah attack, when Hassan-Khan could be

seen to be ineffective against trained Russian troops? It was thus

with an easy mind, on the score of Yerevan at least, that Paskevich

withdrew with the main body on 19 July, in a heat of 95 degrees. Four days later, the parched and weary Russians arrived in Nakhi?

chevan; the temperature then stood at 102 degrees. On that same day Paskevich received his first note from Krasovsky. In one battalion

alone of the Yerevan division, nine officers and ninety-seven men

were ill.30

The career of A. I. Krasovsky (1780-1849), last of the main Russian protagonists in the events of Echmiadzin, had been slower and less orderly than that of his new commander-in-chief. Unlike

Paskevich, he had fought with distinction at Leipzig, Rheims and had been given the Cross of St Anna first class; unlike Paskevich

again, he had served for some time in the West (1815-18); unlike

him, finally, he had retired from the army wounded (in 1819), and

29 See Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, pp. 270-1; on the background to this siege and cam? paign, seen through Armenian eyes, D. Ananoun, 'Rousahaiyeri hasarakakan Zargat soume', in Nor Hosank, nos. 2-6, St Petersburg, 1914, covering the period 1800-70?much attention is paid to Russian-Armenian relations.

30 In the 39th Chasseurs; illnesses were comparably alarming in the 40th, as well as in Krasovsky's four battalions of Crimean and Sevastopol' Infantry.




rejoined having lost four years of seniority. Though staff com?

mander of an infantry division by 1823, ^ was as General-Lieutenant, not General-Adjutant, that he arrived in Georgia in the autumn of

1826.

Krasovsky is mentioned in numerous despatches of 1806-15, sometimes in a neutral tone, often approvingly. But such mentions, like his record of promotion and decoration, allow one merely to

surmise his temperament and qualities, moral and military. He has

no biography. Clearly, he satisfied his seniors, and it is reasonable to

think that Paskevich was justified, holding him in esteem as a

Napoleonic veteran, in leaving him with the advance detachment by the walls of Yerevan. Krasovsky's bravery was unquestionable; his

tactical sense had been tested and not found wanting. Paskevich's actions in the south, details of which Krasovsky and

Benkendorf learned from frequent couriers, bear only indirectly on

Krasovsky's own movements, and so may be dealt with briefly here.

It may suffice to say that Abbas-Mirza, learning of Paskevich's

approach, hastily strengthened to 4,000 the garrison of Abbas-Abad; and that, having given battle by the hamlet of Dzhevan-Bulakh, where the shah's son-in-law was taken captive, the Persians had the

unhappy experience of seeing Abbas-Abad fall without a fight. In one sense only did Paskevich's actions affect Krasovsky's: the

mere fact of his absence from the area of Yerevan required that

Krasovsky show particular caution?for divided, the army was weakened and, should the shah advance from Khoy with his army of fifty thousand, the Yerevan division could offer no more than

token resistance. Retreat would be the only course.

But the shah had no intention of attacking. Convinced that lack

of food and the Persian sun could only bring more favourable peace terms when pourparlers began, he waited. True, he sent an addi? tional horde of 24,000 men to Abbas-Mirza (18 July), but it was not with the intention that the latter seize the initiative by charging the Russian cavalry. Meanwhile, bargaining proceeded. Why, said the shah's son-in-law taken at Dzhevan-Bulakh, should he not propose peace terms to the shah, since he had seen the Russian forces at first

hand, and could see (he said) that they were invincible? Unim?

pressed, Paskevich placed him in solitary confinement once again. The shah's first proposition was quite simple: he and the tsar should exchange provinces on either bank of the Araks.31 How could the Tsar not be satisfied, since his troops had not even crossed that river ?

Ignorant of these counter-proposals, Krasovsky's men also waited, 31 Paskevich reported the proposition to Nicholas (15 July, 1827), who dismissed it:

Voyenno-uchonyy arkhiv, otdel 3, shkaf 13, no. 2448.




and suffered in the heat. Horses died, officers grew restive. Finally,

Krasovsky gave orders for a general removal to a place near Suda-

gent, abandoning Yerevan and leaving only a small detachment by Echmiadzin cathedral. Days passed, and there was no action. No

sooner had the Russians left Yerevan, however, than the Persians

began to move. While one army descended on Abbas-Abad from

Chors, slaughtering the Russian garrison, another crossed the Araks

near Sardar-Abad, remaining out of sight. With this latter force was

Abbas-Mirza, impatient with the shah's delaying policy, conscious

of the support of a swelling army. As day broke on 14 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Lindenfel't, com?

manding the small detachment by Echmiadzin cathedral, became

aware of the presence of a considerable body. Accompanied by ten

thousand foot-soldiers, fifteen thousand cavalry and twenty-eight

artillery pieces, Abbas-Mirza waited on the hills, five miles to the

south. Messengers reached Krasovsky within the hour.

Krasovsky was conscious of two things: first, Echmiadzin had in?

sufficient provisions to withstand a protracted siege; second, the

Russians were outnumbered four to one. Worse, there had been time

enough to stock the cathedral and town, and responsibility for having failed to give orders to do so rested with him alone. To attack was to

invite destruction?and the loss of his division, or even its reduction

in numbers and morale, would seriously affect Paskevich's prospects of gaining substantial victories in Persia. But Paskevich's orders were

explicit; Krasovsky was expected to attack, for Abbas-Mirza was

already pressing the Russian frontiers. It would be foolish to suggest, moreover, that the Persians were not troubling Armenians who were

loyal, since Narzez's decrees had become known,32 to the Emperor of

Russia.

Facing the inevitable, therefore, Krasovsky gave orders for the

immediate departure to Echmiadzin of four battalions with a band of five hundred Cossacks?2,500 men in all. With them went twelve

cannon and ten days' provisions for two thousand men. Rather more

than one half of Krasovsky's division, in other words, were allowed to

remain in camp by Sudagent.33 In vain Paskevich sought to account

for Krasovsky's (as it seemed to him ten days later) inexplicably foolish decision.

Three hours' march from Sudagent, on the track following the river Abarani to Ushagau, the battalions came face to face with

twenty-eight Persian cannon. The Persian cavalry were massed

32 On Narzez's attitude towards the Russian armies of occupation, see von Haxthausen op. cit., pp. 298-306. Details of the arrangements made for Armenia, in and after the Treaty of Turkmanchai, are given in F. F. Martens Recueil des traites et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances etrangeres, II, St Petersburg, 1874-1909.

33 The Echmiadzin garrison was commanded by Lt.-Col. Lindenfert.




three deep on the heights of Ushagan. Leaving the Cossacks to guard the transports, the four Russian battalions of the 39th and 40th

Imperial Chasseurs galloped up to and through the Persians. One

Russian in three was wounded. The Persians were obliged to re?

treat.34

The sequence of events becomes, at this point, difficult to recon?

struct. The battle continued, Krasovsky informed Paskevich on the

evening of 17 August, from 7 a.m. until 4 p.m.; but in this case the

Russians must have passed under the heights of Ushagan and

reached the level ground by Echmiadzin?for it was certainly past

7 a.m. when the Persians appeared by the river Abarani. Presum?

ably, therefore, battle was joined on the following day, 17 August.

Assuming, as seems reasonable, that a day elapsed before Abbas-

Mirza attacked by Echmiadzin, the Persians, foiled earlier of a de?

cisive victory, regrouped leaving only a token force on the heights of

Ushagan. (Certainly, Krasovsky was convinced, on 17 August, that

the Persians had a strong force on these hills, but he could not know

and had no way of verifying this, it being thought too dangerous to

send out scouts.) At all events, a considerable army faced Krasovsky within sight of the cathedral buildings.

Such facts as are known of the battle that ensued are eloquent: three hundred Russians were killed, seven hundred wounded.

Krasovsky estimated Persian losses, dead and wounded, at approxi?

mately three thousand; he himself was shot through the shoulder and

was fortunate to live. Abbas-Mirza took no part in the decisive stages of the battle, preferring to wait on high ground with a large body of

horsemen. Perhaps he was waiting until a charge might prove fatal

to Krasovsky's infantry?speculation is as futile as it is tempting. One thing is plain: his decision to wait (or, rather, his indecision, and

failure to charge at a critical moment) saved Krasovsky's career and

life. Perhaps because neither commander emerged with credit, the battle of Echmiadzin finds little mention in official histories, Soviet or Iranian. Abbas-Mirza let slip an apparently certain victory.

Krasovsky was fortunate to reach the massive gates of the cathedral which he had taken little trouble to provision against such a con?

tingency. 'Abbas-Mirza has so strengthened the Ushagan position', wrote

Krasovsky to Paskevich on 17 August, 'that I could not reach the

camp of Dzhangili without great sacrifices and even the loss of

artillery. . . . On the other hand, even if I were to decide on that

dangerous enterprise, the loss of Echmiadzin would be inevitable.'35

Krasovsky, in other words, was trapped. Since the track to Dzhangili, 34 See Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, pp. 302-4. 35 Echmiadzin had provisions, Krasovsky added, to last only 18 days.



THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF ARMENIA 4OI

where General Berkhman had siege artillery, transports and even

extra provisions, was so dangerous as to be impassable, there could

be no troop movements. It was to be hoped that a messenger might reach Paskevich in Nakhichevan; for rescue was the only remaining

hope.

Learning that Abbas-Mirza was keeping guard over Echmiadzin

(26 August), Paskevich had no hesitation in assuming that Krasovsky had lost a battle, and wrote to the tsar to that effect: 'With that

same courage, but directed to a better end, guarding the siege artillery and transports with one battalion and not leaving 3,500 men in camp ... he might have attacked Abbas-Mirza with a detach?

ment then comprised of some 6,000 men . . .' What, Paskevich de?

manded rhetorically, could have inspired Krasovsky 'to wait until

the first Persian attack' until sending supplies to Echmiadzin ? How

had he passed the time at Sudagent? Krasovsky was damned with

faint praise; for surely Paskevich knew that he was ending that

officer's prospects of high command, when he wrote: 'Though he

[Krasovsky] has not proved himself fit for independent command, yet the feat of courage performed deserves Your Majesty's attention.. ,'36

The following documents make feasible reasoned reconstructions of the battle of Echmiadzin and of events preceding it:

I

To the Cavalier and General-Lieutenant Krasovsky. The difficulty of communication with Your Excellency's division

induces me to set forth in good time my suppositions and intentions

concerning the forces entrusted to you. In this way we may avoid

misunderstandings such as might later prejudice speed and decisive? ness of action.

From my earlier instructions, sent to Your Excellency direct, in code and in duplicate through Georgia, you must know of my order to

strengthen your detachment with two divisions of Uhlans from

Kakhetiya, and of my wish, once all the necessary siege weapons have been brought together, that you at once take decisive measures leading to an attack.

Accordingly I await information from you as to the precise time by which you propose to begin this action, so that, for my part, and not?

withstanding all difficulties, I may undertake an action forcing Abbas- Mirza to retreat from the region of Yerevan and generally securing you from all significant attacks from the Persian interior. In order that this information may reach me as quickly as possible, be so good as to select the most trustworthy persons of those born in this area, who can make their way directly to me in Karabag; having given them each 5 gold pieces, promise them, if they bring your report to me, a reward of

36 Quoted by Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, p. 324.




25 pieces. Send this in triplicate, written in code and in as few words as

possible, i.e., I am beginning the action on such a date, I shall come up to Yerevan on such a day, the enemy facing me are so many. Your letter must be rolled up into the tiniest cylinder and concealed or sewn in the

envoy's clothing. Your reinforcement with two divisions of Uhlans and the Kabardin-

skiy Foot Regiment in its full complement, as well as the numerical

strength of your artillery, permit one to hope that the siege may be

brought to a conclusion before the date estimated by the Engineers. It

may even be that illness and discontentment in the garrison, the self- interest of their commander or of some other important person (in the

perfect conviction that no help can come from Persia), may induce the fortress to agree to your terms and to surrender without a siege, or in its

early stages. On the capture of Yerevan we may hope, in a general way, to leave

there a minimal garrison, of approximately two battalions, part of the

siege artillery and all superfluous encumbrances?also, for the strength? ening of the fortress, a section of the Pioneers; with the remaining forces, a part of the siege artillery and of the Pioneer Corps, I shall proceed to

Sardar, to blockade it. It is entirely probable that this last fortress, having seen how substantial are our forces and our siege artillery, will not resist, especially should Yerevan have surrendered.

The capture of Sardar-Abad, where it will prove necessary to leave a

garrison of moderate size, will allow us to occupy Echmiadzin also with a small detachment of troops; there it will be necessary to leave the sick, should you not prefer to convey them to Yerevan, where all those weak and liable to impede the detachment's progress are to be left. On their

recovery, these persons left behind will enter and strengthen the garrison of Yerevan or Sardar-Abad, for which purpose form them into special companies.

On the capture of Sardar-Abad, Your Excellency will kindly proceed with the remaining infantry (of the 5th and 6th Battalions), the cavalry, some of the Cossacks and a large part of the artillery to Sarur-Magal. The supplies that you will no doubt find in Yerevan will furnish you, most probably, with ample rations. From Sarur, should Your Excellency consider it useful or necessary, a temporary advance may be made to? wards Mak?not losing from sight, however, the fact that on the

capture of Yerevan your movements must tend principally to assist the main corps in its march on Tabriz; for this reason your movement is

already indicated: circumstances permitting, straight through Nakhi? chevan or Khoy. In consequence of this, it will be necessary for you to enter into relations with Abas-Abad immediately on the capture of Yerevan and, with the aid of the fortress of Abas-Abad, to establish as soon as possible unbroken contact with me.

For the provisioning of troops entrusted to you, try by all means to make use of local resources; even beyond the supplies left in the fortress, your field forces should be so provided for that, should they join up with the main body, they will make no demands on rations prepared solely




for it. In accordance with the above, Your Excellency will establish contact immediately with the fort of Abbas-Abad, on the seizure of Yerevan. Abbas-Abad will be furnished with provisions to last until

15 November, possibly even a little longer. The garrison at Sidbe comprises some 2,000 men. Supposing that

Your Excellency will probably have at your disposal transports in con? siderable quantity, I very much desire that some of them be employed to increase the food supplies at Abbas-Abad, to which matter you must attend most carefully, detaching for the purpose two battalions, six field

pieces and a section of Cossacks. For your full information concerning our proposed movements, a

copy is enclosed herewith of my directions to the chevalier Prince

Vadbol'sky for the left flank detachment. Careful scrutiny of local con? ditions and your own experience will indicate to Your Excellency what retreats are necessary in view of my plans given above, and what move? ments will be most advantageous for the war's general success.

News of the enemy here is as follows: Abbas-Mirza, with three or four

battalions, is at Akkhora castle under Mount Ararat; he has little

artillery, several thousand cavalry. Hassan-Khan, left in Chors with

Ali-Nagi-Mirza and a detachment of eight thousand, has withdrawn to a strong ravine towards Khoy, fearing our attack. The Shah is in the

vicinity of Tabriz, having a forward detachment of three or four thousand on the Araks, between Dzhul'fa and Urdabad. On the

enemy's right flank troops have withdrawn from the Lower Araks, on which they have left merely a group of cavalry.

To conclude, may I inform Your Excellency that, should you not yet have advanced towards Yerevan on receipt of this, I strongly desire that

you postpone that movement until 1 September?for I trust without fail to have drawn Abbas-Mirza from Yerevan by that date. Should you, in

consequence of this, not be wholly sure of the safety of your advance to that place, do not until then expose your numerous artillery and trans?

port to enemy attacks. I have no news whatsoever from Your Excellency, and wait im?

patiently : it has reached me only by hearsay that you had a successful encounter by Echmiadzin, on which it is most pleasant for me to con?

gratulate you. Infantry General, General-Adjutant Paskevich.

Camp by the town of Karabab.37

II

(Secret) To the Commander, 20th Foot Division, General-Lieutenant

Krasovsky. I most humbly request Your Excellency to give me answers on the

following points:

1) Why did you advance to attack the enemy with so small a number of troops and what induced you to do so ?

37 Saltykov-Schchedrin Library (Rukopisnyy otdel), Fond 564, no. 2.




2) For how long a period was the cathedral at Echmiadzin supplied with provisions?

3) I gave orders verbally and in writing that the walls of all old build?

ings surrounding the monastery should be destroyed?why do they remain undestroyed to the present time ?

4) How did the officers and lower ranks conduct themselves during the battle? (For the number of killed does not prove bravery,)

5) What is the morale now of troops who were in that action ?

Infantry General, General-Adjutant Paskevich.

7 Sept. 1827; camp by Echmiadzin monastery.38

III

(Secret) To Infantry General, General-Adjutant Paskevich, Cavalier, C.-in-C, Caucasian Corps.

I have the honour to report in reply to your secret communication of the 7th of this month:

1) On the 16th day of August I received the most reliable report that the enemy was greatly embarrassing the monastery of Echmiadzin, constructing batteries with the firm intention of retreating under no circumstances and of using all means to gain the monastery. At that time the following units of the detachment entrusted to me were on duties elsewhere: one battalion with two field pieces to escort a pro? visions transport from Dzhelal-Oglu; two companies with a field

piece to occupy a post on Mount Pamba, safeguarding the passage of the siege artillery; two companies with one field piece to escort

General-Adjutant Sipyagin, who left my camp for Dzhelal-Oglu on

15 August; one battalion with five field pieces in Echmiadzin. There remained with me only five battalions.

Finding myself in such a situation, I could under no circumstances remain inactive and was obliged to decide either to force the enemy to leave Echmiadzin or to give him a position so important for us?

together with the garrison and artillery in it. Time pressed; the

slightest delay could produce the worst possible consequences. The

enemy would have attained his goal, occupying the monastery, in which case so grave a loss would already be quite irreparable for us.

It was thus the most loyal zeal and my sole desire always to act for the good of the service that brought me to my decision: leaving one battalion in defence and taking a ten-day supply of provisions, 60 quarters of flour and 20 of groats for Echmiadzin, I set out for the monastery with a detachment of four infantry battalions, twelve field pieces and 500 Cossacks?three thousand men. We encountered no hindrance whatever from an enemy ten times our superior in

strength. My intention met with the desired success in full measure: I met

the enemy by Ushagan, where my path was cut off, attacked and 38 Ibid.




overwhelmed him in a quick movement; having reached Echmiadzin

and saved it, with losses by no means as considerable as might have

been expected in view of the enemy's superior strength (he had sur? rounded me), I obliged him to leave the most advantageous of

positions by Ushagan, where, cutting off all communication with

my main detachment, he might have harmed us entirely at will? had my second advance up that road not alarmed him.

2) There were, in Echmiadzin monastery on 17 August, 87 quarters of

flour, 161 of sugar and 196 of wheat.

3) There are, in the environs of Echmiadzin, so many buildings within rifle shot that I could not entirely destroy them, having neither the time nor sufficient means to do so.

4) I have already had the honour to report to Your Excellency that in the battle of 17 August firmness and unshakable valour did not for one instant leave the officers and men?and now I can assure you on

my honour that each of my subordinates who shared with me danger and toil on that day did the greatest damage to the enemy?an enemy whose losses three times exceeded ours; by which conduct, in all justice, they deserve Your Excellency's especial attention and

protection. 5) Likewise, I can assure you on my honour that the forces present on

that day are filled with the spirit of firmness and unalterable zeal

proper to the Russian soldier.

I have the honour, in conclusion, to add that the battle of 17 August was a most bloody one and such as was hardly ever fought with the Persians. Engaged by Your Excellency at Dzhan Bulakh and seeing in the heart of their own country Russian arms, the strength of which they have already felt?last year by Yelizavetpol'?and which are near to the reduction of Yerevan, here, under the command of Abbas-Mirza and their highest authorities, the Persians concentrated all their forces?and acted from the limits of despair. Certain columns of Sarbaz were con?

stantly overturned by the bayonet, returning anew with fresh fury, rush?

ing into the fray, while other, countless masses of cavalry threw them? selves on our batteries in blind madness; enraged [?], they hurried towards suicide and were the victims of the excellent shooting of our

artillery?something to be expected from the Persian at hardly any time . . . So, without one moment's interruption, continued the battle from 8 a.m. until the fourth hour after noon?only Russians could have overcome such desperate impetuosity. Having lost all hope of defending their provinces, the Persians sought salvation in decisiveness alone. We

destroyed all their designs, maintaining to the battle's end firmness and

steadfastness, and this under the blazing, recalcitrant sun, having had not one drop of water all day, in a continual struggle with an enemy ten times out-numbering us, in command of the most useful positions and filled with utter despair.

Krasovsky, General-Lieutenant 8 Sept. 182739 39 Ibid.




The intrinsic value of such records, providing as they do both

topographical and fresh biographical information, would seem to be

apparent; such sources are painfully few for the period of Russian

imperialism dealt with here. Specifically, the documents cast light on

three interrelated questions: the state of Russian military com?

munications during the reign of Nicholas; the state and morale of

Abbas-Mirza's army; and the relationship between Paskevich and

Krasovsky. The questions will be considered separately. Paskevich took enormous trouble to foresee all possible con?

tingencies on leaving Krasovsky with a large detachment ten miles

from Yerevan. The fact is plain from his minutely, even excessively detailed orders (surely, one feels, Krasovsky might have been allowed

to judge how he would organise a small field-hospital for his own

wounded men ?). Messages were to be sent in triplicate, sewn into the

clothes of envoys. And yet, it emerges plainly, communications

between sections of the field army were parlous, even bad. It would

seem to have taken three weeks for clear news of the action of 17

August to reach Paskevich, no more than eighty miles away.

Equally plainly, the reforms introduced into the Persian army by Abbas-Mirza?reforms opposed by the ulema and by numerous

sardars?were beginning to be felt by 1827. Ten years earlier

Yermolov saw fit to praise the Persian infantry as the equal of any

European force; by the time Paskevich arrived in Armenia, the train?

ing provided first by fugitive Russian officers, later by French per? sonnel under General Gardane was clearly bearing fruit.40 Perhaps Abbas-Mirza's reforms were not radical by later Iranian standards.

Nevertheless, mighty changes were produced by his decision to re?

cruit on a permanent basis, providing not only modern weapons but

also regular and fixed allowances of clothing, food and silver.

Abbas-Mirza's measures brought him enemies among the Persian

military, as among the ulama; both, seeing their own positions threatened, were quick to declare him unworthy of the succession

('for', declared a spokesman for the clergy, 'he has become a

Farengi, and wears Farengi boots').41 Nor could his conduct strike re?

presentatives of the old regime in Teheran as anything but strange; where others had persecuted religious minorities, Abbas-Mirza

sought the cooperation of the ulema in securing legal rights for them. His patronage extended, as Yermolov quickly noted, to the Christians

of the Caucasus, whom Tsitsianov had attempted to stir up against their Moslem neighbours.42 Even missionaries found a friend in

Abbas-Mirza; the heir-apparent was prepared to sanction a mis-

40 See E. Pakravan, Abbas-Mirza, Prince reformateur, I, Paris, 1958, pp. 78-83. 41 Quoted by G. Drouville, in Voyage en Perse, Paris, 1825, P- 241- 42 See Pakravan, op. cit., p. 80.




sionary school in Tabriz to be attended by Muslim, as well as

Nestorian and Armenian children.43

It was the question of war, however, that brought enmity between

Abbas-Mirza and the ulema to a head. The ulema, in brief, were de?

termined that there should be war with Russia. Tension found ex?

pression chiefly in the form of border disputes, the Treaty of Gulistan

(1813) having left certain areas ill-defined?as Alexander wished.

On the invasion and annexation of Gokcha in the khanate of

Yerevan by Yermolov, Abbas-Mirza had sought negotiated de?

marcations. Yermolov, however, claiming competence to deal with

all matters relating to the Caucasus, both declined to countenance

such talks and stopped Persian envoys from continuing their journey from Tiflis to Petersburg. The ulema demanded war. Abbas-Mirza

then sought to send envoys to Petersburg via Constantinople; before

they had crossed the Hellespont war was seen to be imminent. The

envoys were recalled.

Abbas-Mirza himself had no reason to fear a second war with

Russia. His troops were adequately trained and well equipped. As the

British Envoy Sir John McNeill emphasized to the shah, climatic and

local conditions could only militate against an invading Russian

force; nor could the whole military might of Russia be brought to

bear on Persia in 1826-7?Nicholas would take no chances, leaving himself exposed to attacks in Poland or the Balkans. On a personal level, too, Abbas-Mirza had much to gain by such a war; his position had been questioned by Yermolov, during the latter's embassy of

1817. (Mohammed Ali Mirza, Yermolov suggested to the shah, would be 'a more suitable' successor.) Abbas-Mirza chose to post? pone the day of conflict for strategic reasons.44

Finally, the pressure of the ulema could no longer be withstood. War was declared, and the war declared jihad. The pretext was Russian barbarity (and it is worth remembering in this connection that Yermolov did habitually sell captive Chechen women at a

rouble each).45 There is no reason to suppose that Krasovsky exag? gerated the fanaticism of the troops opposing him on 17 August; the

war was jihad, and the Persians were clearly losing ground?the two

factors would explain why some cavalry sections, at least, 'threw

themselves on the Russian batteries in blind madness.'

43 See J. Wolff, The Missionary Journal, III, London, 1829, PP* 128-9. 44 Rightly considering that inept organisation and his own brothers' hostility, not Russian military or tactical superiority, chiefly contributed to his defeat in the war ending in 1812, Abbas-Mirza determined that events should not repeat themselves; see Algar, op. cit., pp. 74-6.

45 The tale is related indignantly by J. Baddeley in The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, London, 1908, pp. 148-53; Baddeley does not provide sources (which do, however, exist) to substantiate the 'rouble a head' claim.




There remains to be considered the relationship between Paskevich

and Krasovsky, as revealed by these three documents. That there is

irony in the first words of Paskevich's missive of early September (II), need not be laboured. It is echoed in Krasovsky's reply (T have the

honour to add . . . that the battle was a most bloody one ...'). In?

formation received between late August, and 6 or 7 September

plainly caused Paskevich drastically to alter his position on the en?

gagement of 17 August. What had been a presumed victory became

an apparent disaster. By direct implication, Krasovsky mismanaged the action and, indeed, his whole command. The onus was on him, as

a glance at II confirms, to explain and justify his action. Much is

questionable in his report?in vain, for example, one seeks corrobor?

ation of the movement in which a Persian force was attacked and

overwelmed by Ushagan; again (in point 2), is it not possible that

there were 87 quarters of flour and 196 of wheat only after Krasov?

sky's arrival at Echmiadzin ? The matter is deliberately left vague. One thing is amply clear: Krasovsky gave battle to Abbas-Mirza

on a major scale, albeit against his will?and that battle was the first

major engagement against Persian troops since Paskevich had come to replace Yermolov. Not only did Paskevich cast aspersions on

Krasovsky's competence in a separate command (in a letter to the tsar of 26 August, quoted earlier); he continued to compromise that

officer's prospects of subsequent active service even after having be? come acquainted with the facts, as presented in III. An extract from a letter to the tsar of 14 September, written by Sardar-Abas, speaks eloquently for itself. Krasovsky's detachment, although strong numerically, would not (Paskevich informed Nicholas) be able to storm Yerevan, 'for there is something like uncertainty in his com?

mands, noticeable even in the troops' somewhat fallen spirits . . ,'46 Such remarks, Paskevich must have understood, could do irrepar? able damage to Krasovsky's military career.

In the event, they did not; Paskevich's arrival at Echmiadzin

(1 September) sealed the Persian collapse in Armenia. Sardar-Abad was reduced (18 September), and the Russian offensive on Yerevan itself begun. On the fall of that fortress, twenty million roubles in silver were demanded of the shah; Abbas-Mirza might delay as best he could, ignoring the shah's command to enter into negotiations, but the end of the war was now chiefly a matter of time. Its successful conclusion reflected well on Krasovsky and Paskevich alike. The latter was voted one million roubles from the Persian indemnity and made a count; the former pursued a successful, even very successful

career, first as a soldier, later as an administrator. In 1830 he became

46 Quoted by Shcherbatov, op. cit., IV, p. 250.




Governor-General of Bessarabia, in 1841 a full (honorary) infantry

general. The storming of Yerevan assured Paskevich of a brilliant career;

by order of the tsar, he was known as Paskevich-Erivansky. Made

a prince for his undistinguished part in the reduction of Warsaw

(1831), his influence at court and in the Department of Foreign Affairs reached a peak in the years immediately following Miinchen?

gratz (of which treaty he wholly approved). Here, as a coda to this

paper and an indication of the harmony reigning between the

Austro-Hungarian and Russian High Commands throughout the fourth decade, is an unpublished letter to Paskevich from Clemens Wenzel Lothar Metternich. It is to be remembered that Russian ex?

pansion in the Caucasus was no more calculated to remove Austrian

apprehensions of an over-mighty neighbour than to placate the British.

Mon Prince!

Au moment que les fonctions que M. le Comte Caboga a rem-

plies jusqu'ici aupres du quartier general viennent a cesser, il me serait

impossible de ne pas exprimer a Votre Altesse combien Sa Majeste Imperiale et Royale Apostolique est sensible a Tacceuil plein de preve? nance et aux preuves de confiance et d'estime dont Elle a bien voulu honorer cet officier. Place aupres du Generalissime des forces russes pour constater par sa presence et son attitude Tunion intime qui lie les deux cours Imperiales, M. de Caboga aura su, je m'en flatte, remplir le but de sa mission et merite une approbation aussi flatteuse que la votre.

Je me felicite de trouver cette nouvelle occasion de vous offrir, mon

Prince, l'assurance des sentiments de haute consideration avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'etre

de Votre Altesse le tres humble, tres obeissant serviteur,

Metternich.47

47 Sobraniye P. L. Vakselya, opts' i, no. 1838 (Saltykov-Schchedrin Library, Rukopisnyy otdel).



a note on the russian conquest of armenia (1827)

Documents