DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 7, 145- 148 (1987)

A Note on Final Causes and Their Role in Contextualism

BRIAN O’CONNOR

University of Victoria

According to the contextualist world view, it is not possible to specify before- hand the formal characteristics of the outcomes of development. Some authors have claimed that this constitutes a rejection of final causes. This note distin- guishes between the two kinds of final cause, “end stages” and “functions,” both of which can be found in the literature and traced back to Aristotle. It is argued that only one kind of final cause (end stages) is rejected in contextualism and that the other kind (functions) may even be useful to contextualism. 0 1987

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According to the contextualist world view, the precise nature of the organizational states which emerge from development cannot be pre- dicted beforehand.

A major point of contrast between organicism and contextualism arises becauses the contextualist perspective excludes any notion of final cause (e.g., see Nagel, 1957; Pepper, 1942) and thus leads to a belief in the potential plasticity of the organism across life. That is, contextual-developmental formulations emphasize not the intrinsically predetermined or inevitable timetables and outcomes of devel- opment; instead, such formulations stress that the influence of the changing con- text on development is to make the trajectory of development less certain in re- spect to the applicability of norms to the individual. (Lerner & Kaufman. 1985, p. 321)

Similar statements regarding final causes in contextualism can be found in Lerner (1985, p. 163; 1986, p. 68) and in Hultsch and Hickey (1978, p. 79). However, there are different kinds of final cause, and the notion that changing contexts make the outcomes of development uncer- tain implies a rejection of just one kind. The definitions of tele, the Greek word for final cause, “fall into several categories” (Woodfield, 1976, p. 5). In fact, Baldwin (1957, p. 667) differentiated among 14 meanings of final cause. Two of the meanings seem particularly relevant to develop- mental psychology and can be found in the literature. In Aristotle’s words, “. . . the two meanings of ‘final cause.’ For the final cause may be (a) for some thing or (b) that for the sake of which, and of these the one may exist but the other may not” (Metaphysics, 1072Bl-4).

The author thanks Roger Dixon, David Hultsch, Alexander Milton, and Charles Tolman for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Reprint requests should be sent to Brian O’Connor, Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Colombia, Canada V8W 2Y2.

14.5 0273-2297187 $3.00 Copyright 0 1987 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproducflon in any form reserved.

146 BRIAN O’CONNOR

Aristotle was not consistent in matching his examples of final cause with these two definitions. The following examples, given by Aristotle, are based on the interpretation of the two meanings suggested by Apostle (1966, p. 402).

When detined as “that for the sake of which,” examples include (a) “the nature is the end or ‘that for the sake of which.’ For if a thing un- dergoes a continuous change and there is a stage which is last, this stage is the end or ‘that for the sake of which’ ” (Physics, 194A25-30); (b) “The wood carver . . . for it is not enough to say that by the stroke of his tool this part was formed into a cavity, that into a flat surface; but he must state the reasons why he struck his blow in such a way as to effect this, and what his final object was; namely, that the piece of wood should develop into this or that shape” (On the Parts of Animals, 641AlO-15); (c) “For generation is a process from a something to a something’ . . . the final cause is some definite form or similar end; for man generates man, and plant generates a plant” (On the Parts of Animals, 646A30-35).

When Lerner (1985, p. 163; 1986, p. 68; Lerner & Kaufman, 1985, p. 321) claimed that final causes are rejected in contextualism he was as- suming that a final cause is the “stage which is last.” Similarly, Hultsch and Hickey (1978, p. 87) referred to Piaget’s stage of formal operations as the final cause of intellectual development in that theory. Langer (1969, p. 168) also assumed that final cause is the “end stage,” wherein the end stage refers to the formal characteristics of the final stage of develop- ment. This kind of final cause is rejected in contextualism because changing contexts make the outcomes of development unpredictable.

When defined as “for some thing,” a final cause is the “function” or “purpose” of a thing’s coming to be-“the end of all generation and change” (Metaphysics, 983A33; see also Jones, 1969, p. 224). Examples include (a) “Thus the saw is made for sawing, for sawing is a function, and not sawing for the saw” (On the Parts of Animals, 645B15-20); (b) “The eye exists for a final cause” (On the Generation of Animals, 778A30); (c) “In dealing with respiration we must show that it takes place for such or such a final object” (On the Parts of Animals, 642A30); (d) “We must first grasp the final cause of the testes” (On the Generation of Animals, 718A15); (e) “Why does a house exist? For the preservation of one’s goods. The end in view . . . is preservation” (Posterior Analytics, 95AlO-15); (f) “Leaves, e.g. grow to provide shade for the fruit” (Physics, 199A26); (g) “It is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web” (Physics, 199A27). Janet (1905) gave similar examples.

This is the definition of final cause assumed by Overton and Reese (1973, p. 75; 1981, p. 109) and by Rychlak (1968, p. 120):

FINAL CAUSES 147

Formal cause is the pattern, organization, or form of an object. Thus the specifica- tion of psychological structures, for example, constitutes a formal cause. Final cause is the end toward which an object develops. The attribution of an endpoint of development, such as differentiation and hierarchical integration, is an example of final cause.

A modern illustration of the relationships among these determinants is provided by the paradigmatic Piagetian theory (Piaget, 1967; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) in its presentation of a necessary and sufficient account of development. In this account, genetic and maturational factors (material causes), although left unspecified, are presumed to interact with the physical and social environment (efficient causes) to produce a series of structures (formal causes). These factors, while being neces- sary conditions for development, are not sufficient to explain development. The equilibration process (final cause) is introduced to provide a sufficient explanation for the oriented development of the successive stages of structures (see also the analysis in Overton, 1972). (Overton & Reese, 1973, p. 75)

Apart from the orthogenetic principle and equilibration, another ex- ample of this kind of final cause is “adaptation.” These concepts, which are important to developmental psychology, are not necessarily rejected in contextualism, since they do not involve prior specification of the formal characteristics of the end states of development (i.e., Aristotle’s saying that of the two kinds of final cause, “the one may exist but the other may not” 1072Bl-4). In fact, the concept of “function” is impor- tant to the contextualistic view of development (see Dixon, 1986). Even Lerner (198.5) himself considers the orthogenetic principle useful:

the use made by contextually-oriented theorists (e.g., Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981) of the orthogenetic principle (Werner, 1957) to describe the nature of the change in the relationship between individuals and their contexts. (p. 162)

Contextualism is based on the assumption of continuous change (Hultsch & Hickey, 1978; Lerner, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1983), and although equilibration, adaptation, and orthogenesis can be described as “ends” toward which, or for which, development occurs, there is no necessary implication that these ends exclude the possibility of further change. A given state of equilibrium, for example, may be a very temporary “end” and development may occur “for” it again. Equilibration, for example, is the final cause of all stage transitions in Piaget’s theory.

In sum, past discussions of final cause are potentially confusing be- cause authors have not specified which definition they were using. In the case of contextualism, it is inaccurate to claim that final causes are re- jected. It is more precise to say that in contextualism final causes are defined as functions or purposes, with no reference to the formal charac- teristics of the “end stages.”

Furthermore, defining final cause as functions or purposes may solve another problem. The organism is considered to be “active” in contextu-

148 BRIAN O’CONNOR

alism (Hultsch & Hickey, 1978, p. 79; Lerner et al., 1983, p. 103). But if final causes are rejected then only efficient causes remain as causes of becoming, and “the view that the organism is inherently and spontane- ously active means that an external condition can never itself be the sole determinant of an effect” (Overton & Reese, 1973, pp. 77-78). Final causes such as adaptation and equilibrium are sources of inherent activity in the organism that do not necessarily involve prior specification of the formal characteristics of the outcomes of development.

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RECEIVED: June 2, 1986; REVISED: September 26, 1986.