A Note on Eristic and the Socratic Elenchus

Benson, Hugh H., 1956-

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 27, Number 4, October1989, pp. 591-599 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University PressDOI: 10.1353/hph.1989.0083

For additional information about this article

Access Provided by Fordham University Library at 03/04/13 4:14PM GMT

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v027/27.4benson.html

Notes and Discussions A Note on Eristic and the Socratic

Elenchus Recent discussions ~ o f the elenctic m e t h o d which Socrates employs in the early dia- logues have favored what migh t be called the constructivist account. Accord ing to this account o f the Socratic e lenchus individual e lenchi can establish more than m e r e consistency or inconsistency; they can establish that a par t icular propos i t ion is t rue o r that it is false. Despi te the popular i ty o f the constructivist account, it is my view that

' In chronological order these discussions are: R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951); N. Gulley, The Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Mac- millan, 1968 ), 33-73; T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 37-1ol ; P. Woodruff, Plato: Hippias Major (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), 136-6o; G. Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 27-58; R. Kraut, "Comments on Vlastos" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 59-7o; G. Vlastos, "Afterthoughts" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 71-74; T. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, "Vlastos on the Elenchus" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 185-96; M. Polansky, "Professor Vlastos' Analysis of Socratic Elenchus" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 247-6o; P. Woodruff, "The Skeptical Side of Plato's Method," Revue internationale de philosophie (1986): 92-37; P. Woodruff, "Expert Knowledge in the Apology and Laches: What a General Needs to Know," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 3, forthcoming; M. McPherran, "Commentary on Woodruff," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 3, forthcoming.

Kraut, Brickhouse and Smith, and Polansky all argue against Vlastos' particular version of constructivism, but not constructivism in general. Woodruff's view is somewhat idiosyncratic. He distinguished between "purgative," "defensive," and "definition-testing" elenchi in "The Skeptical Side of Plato's Method." The purgative/definition-testing distinction can be found in Plato: Hippias Major. I am not sure how the three uses--exhortation, interpretation, and disproof of knowledge--for the elenchus that Woodruff distinguishes in "Expert Knowledge" are meant to match up with the three types of elenchi distinguished in "The Skeptical Side." An anonymous referee for this journal brought to my attention that the distinction between the exhortation and interpretation uses was initially developed by Brickhouse and Smith, "Socrates' Elenctic Mission," unpublished manuscript; cf. McPherran, "Commentary on Woodruff," n. 9. While "purgative" elenchi are understood nonconstructively, Woodruff in "The Skeptical Side" claims they are "never illustrated in early Plato" (27). "Defensive" and "definition-testing" elenchi do not establish that a particular proposition is false, but rather that a purported definition fails to be a definition. Cf. also M. McPherran, "Socrates and the Duty to Philosophize," Southern Journal of Philosophy (1986): 541-6o; and K. Seeskin, Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

[591 ]

599 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 7 : 4 OCTOBER I 9 8 9

such an account is mistaken. ~ Indiv idual elenchi can establish only consistency or inconsistency. T h e ques t ion arises, then, how on such a nonconstruct ivis t account we are to unde r s t and Socrates 's dist inction be tween eristic and the elenchus. 3 It is this quest ion that I want to address in this essay.

Before t u rn ing to this quest ion, it will be useful to explain briefly what the e lenchus is and what it can establish on the constructivist and nonconstruct ivis t accounts. Let us begin with the fol lowing r o u g h sketch o f the f o r m of the elenchus: (a) Socrates gets the in ter locutor to express some belief, p, usually, but not always, concern ing the def ini t ion o f some mora l concept ; next, (2) Socrates gets the in ter locutor to express some o the r beliefs, q, r, and s, which (3) Socrates goes on to show entail the negat ion o f the original belief, p. T h u s (4) the conjunct ion p & q & r & s is false. 4 Accord ing to the nonconstruct ivis t , the e lenchus ends here. All that has been established is that p, q, r, and s are inconsistent. Acco rd ing to the constructivist, the e lenchus cont inues and establishes that a specific one o f the conjuncts at (4) is false--usual ly, but not always, p---since all the o the r conjuncts have some special alethic status (primafacie plausibility, bel ieved by Socrates, endoxa . . . ) . In this essay I want to a rgue that the Socratic distinc- tion be tween eristic and the e lenchus can be main ta ined already at (4) whe the r or not the e lenchus cont inues to not-p, i.e., whe the r o r not construct ivism is true.5

Given this b r ie f account o f the constructivist and nonconstruct ivis t positions, it is easy to see why the ques t ion conce rn ing the dist inction be tween eristic and the e lenchus arises on the nonconstruct iv is t account . For it is f requent ly though t that Socrates distin- guishes be tween eristic and the e lenchus on the g rounds that the f o r m e r unl ike the lat ter is only conce rned to establish consistency or inconsistency, never t ru th o r falsity. 6 Thus ,

This view is defended in H. Benson, "The Problem of the Elenchus Reconsidered," Ancient Philosophy, forthcoming. For others who have suggested a nonconstructivist account of the elenchus, see G. Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1875); G. Vlastos, Plato's Protagoras (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956); H. Teloh, Socratic Educa- tion in Plato's Early Dialogues (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); and perhaps M. C. Stokes, Plato's Socratic Conversations: Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues (Balti- more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 ) .

3 This is not the most serious question which can be raised concerning nonconstructivism. Clearly more difficult questions for the nonconstructivist to answer are: Why is it, then, that Socrates apparently takes his elenchus to have constructive results (Gorg. 479 e, 5o5 e, 5o9 a, Crito 46b-e, Charm. 166d., 165b)? Cf. Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," 46-47; Kraut, "Comments on Vlastos," 6o-61 ; Brickhouse and Smith, "Vlastos on the Elenchus," 185. How can Socrates defend his positive moral convictions, if his only philosophical method, the elenchus, is unable to do so? Cf. Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," 46; Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 37; Seeskin, Dialogue and Discovery, 2o n. 15. It is not my purpose in this essay, however, to defend nonconstructivism. Rather it is my purpose to clarify Socrates's distinction between eristic and the elenchus. It is fortunate for nonconstructivism that it is compatible with this clarification.

4 It should be noted that Woodruff, on the evidence of his Plato: Hippias Major, "The Skepti- cal Side," and "Expert Knowledge," would not accept this rough sketch for his "definition-testing" elenchi. The latter include premises concerning the nature of definition and knowledge.

Vlastos suggests such an argument in "The Socratic Elenchus," 31 n. 14. Thus, the central argument of this essay is independent of one's position vis-h-vis constructivism. Cf. note 3 above.

6 Cf., for example, H. Sidgwick, "The Sophists," in The Philosophy of Kant and Other Essays (London: Macmillan, 19o5), 335; E. R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959),

NOTES AND D I S C U S S I O N S 593

for example , at the beg inn ing o f the Euthydemus, a d ia logue in which Socrates purpor t s to want to learn eristic f r o m two o f its masters, Eu thydemus and Dionysodorus , Socrates describes thei r skill as the ability "to f ight in words and to re fu te whatever is said, whe the r it h appens to be false or t rue" (Euthd. 2 7 2 a 8 - b l ). Again, atLaches 196b, Laches accuses Nicias o f saying the things he says in o r d e r to avoid seeming to speak inconsis- tently, some th ing which Laches suggests would have been appropr i a t e i f Nicias were speaking in a law cour t (en dikasterioi). If, however , the nonconstruct ivis t account o f the e lenchus is correct , the e lenchus too appears to be concerned only to establish the inconsistency o f what is said by the in ter locutor , not its t ru th o r falsity. Thus , the distinc- tion be tween eristic and the e lenchus appears to collapse. How, then, is this dist inction to be main ta ined on the nonconstruct iv is t account?

We can begin to answer this ques t ion by cons ider ing more closely Socrates's dispar- agemen t o f eristic. 7 Socrates does not d isparage eristic merely on the g rounds that it is only c o n c e r n e d to establish inconsistency, but ra ther on the g rounds that it is only conce rned to establish a p p a r e n t o r verbal inconsistency, not inconsistency in what the in ter locutor believes. This is a l ready suggested by the two passages I have jus t cited above. T h e Euthydemus passage explicitly says that it is an inconsistency in what is said (to legomena), 8 while the Laches passage suggests that the one pract icing eristic is con- ce rned mere ly with a p p a r e n t o r verbal consistency or inconsistency (cf. the "dokein.. . legein" at 19664). T h e point , however , is b rough t ou t more clearly elsewhere.

213; R. K. Sprague, Plato's Use of FaUacy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 196~ ), 3; Gulley, The Philosophy of Socrates, 57ff.; T. Irwin, trans., Plato: Gorgias, Oxford Plato Series (Oxford: Claren- don Press, 1979) , 122-23; G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1981), 59-68; Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," 31 n. 14; and Teloh, Socratic Education, 195-2 lo. Most of these scholars are concerned with the general distinction between the eristical and dialectical methods according to which the former aims only at victory while the latter aims only at truth. In this essay I am concerned with a particular type of eristical method, one which aims at the consistency of the eristic's own statements or the inconsistency of his interlocutors (eristical antilogic, cf. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, 65) and a particular type of dialectical method, the elenchus. If the nonconstructivist account is accepted, the elenchus might be called dialectical antilogic. Thus, we might put the question of this essay as follows: How does Socrates distinguish between eristical and dialectical antilogic? That Socrates recognized that this distinc- tion was subtle is suggested by those passages in which his interlocutors appear to take him to be practicing eristic (cf., for example, Lysis e i lb and Gorg. 489b-c).

7 It should be noted that the following is not the only answer that can be given to this question. It might be suggested that the nonconstructive elenchus and eristic can be distinguished in terms of the wider context of the argument. The elenchus, that is, is only part of a more general procedure whose aim is the establishment of truth or falsity, while eristic is an end in itself. Thus, for example, Teloh (Socratic Education, 196 ) writes: "The crucial difference between dialectic and eristic is not method, but intent." Cf. also Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, 65. It is not my purpose here to deny that the elenchus is ultimately concerned with truth in a way in which eristic is not. On the contrary, I will argue that a "crucial methodological" difference between the elenchus and eristic explains the elenchus's concern and eristic's lack of concern for truth (see pp. 596-99 below).

8 Cf. Euthd. 287b where Dionysodorus suggests that he is only concerned to establish that what he says is consistent with the other things he has said in the last few minutes.

594 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 7 : 4 O C T O B E R ~989

In the Theaetetus, 9 Socrates asks Theaetetus whether six dice when compared to four dice are more than four, but when compared to twelve dice are fewer than twelve, and Theaetetus replies that they are. Socrates then asks Theaetetus whether there is anything that can become larger without being increased and the following exchange ensues:

Theaetetus: If I answer by saying what I think [to dokoun] with a view to this present question, Socrates, I'll say that there isn't. But if I answer with a view to the one before, I'll be on my guard against contradicting myself and say that there is. Socrates: . . . [I]f you answer that there is . . . . we'll find that your tongue is irrefut- able, but not your heart [he phren] . . . . [I]f you and I were clever and wise men [deinoi kai sophoi], and had searched into all the contents of our hearts [panta ta ton phrenon], we'd spend the rest of our time from now o n . . . in trying each other out; in the manner of sophists [sophistikos], w e ' d . . , bash argument against argument [tous logous tois logois] with each other. But s i n c e . . , we're ordinary people, we'll want first of all to inspect our thoughts themselves [ha dianooumetha], in relation to one another, to see what, exactly, they are, and whether we find they harmonize with one another [allelois sumphonei] or absolutely fail to do so. (154 c 1 o - e 5, McDowell translation)

The suggestion here is clear. The practitioner of eristic will answer questions so as to appear consistent. He is concerned with apparent consistency, verbal consistency, an irrefutable tongue (he glotta anelenktos). This is contrasted with the method which is concerned with the things that are in the mind (ha dianooumetha), what they are, and whether or not they are consistent with each other. This method is concerned not with an irrefutable tongue, but with an irrefutable mind (he phren anelenktos). It is important to notice here that nowhere in this passage is there any mention of truth. There is no suggestion that the methods are contrasted in virtue of their relation to truth or falsehood. Rather, the contrast is in terms of what the two methods are concerned to establish as consistent or inconsistent. Eristic is disparaged because it aims at establish- ing only the consistency or inconsistency of what the interlocutor says, not the consis- tency or inconsistency of what the interlocutor believes.

This is reinforced by another passage in the Theaetetus in which the description of eristic is no longer from the perspective of the one answering the questions, but from the one asking the questions. A little later in the dialogue, Protagoras, through the person of Socrates, complains about what might be called the eye-patch argument (x63c-t65e). He says that if Socrates wants to dispute his theory that aisthesis is episteme, that is fine with him, but that Socrates should do so in a just way, and that "behaving unjustly, in this sort

9 My appeal to the Theaetetus, Republic 5, and Meno here will be objected to on the grounds that they are dialogues which represent the views of Plato or an older Plato and so cannot be appealed to for evidence of the views of Socrates or the Plato of the early dialogues. In general, I am sympathetic with such an objection but I do not think that it succeeds in the present case since the passages from the later dialogues only serve to reinforce evidence which can be found in the early dialogues themselves. The Theaetetus and Republic passages only reinforce the evidence of Laches 196b, Euthydemus ~7~a-b, and Gorgias 47oc-472c (although the latter two may be more appropriately labeled transitional, rather than early), while the Meno passage evidences a view which in my view can be found in the Apology, although less straightforwardly (cf., for example, Apol. 23b ).

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 595

of pursuit, is what one is doing when one fails to keep separate the time one spends in controversy [agonizomenos tas diatribas] and the time one spends in dialectic [dialegomenos]. In controversy one may joke, and trip people up as much as one can: but in dialectic one should be serious, and help up the person one is talking to, showing up to him only those of his mistakes where his tr ipping up was his own fault or due to the company he used to keep" (167e3-168a2, McDowell translation). Once again, the suggestion here is that in eristic one is concerned only with the appearance of consistency or inconsistency, only this time since it is from the perpective of the eristic questioner that one is concerned to establish the appearance of inconsistency. In eristic it is appropriate for the questioner to employ any trick he can think of. He can speak quickly, hoping to slip some qualification by the interlocutor. He can disallow those qualifications which the interlocutor has managed to make (Euthd. 295b-296a; cf. Rep. 454a-b). '~ He can force the interlocutor to answer his questions before he has had time to consider whether or not he really does believe the things he is suggesting. 1' He can use ridicule (cf. Gorg. 467bao and 473e2-3) or peer pressure (cf. Gorg. 47 l c8 -d2 ,473e4-5 , and 474b6) or even various fallacies of ambiguity (cf., for example, Euthd. 275d-278e). These tricks are appropriate for the practitioner of eristic because he is only concerned to get the interlocutor to sa,~ things which are inconsistent with other things he has said, so that he will appear inconsistent. Since he is only concerned that his interlocutor appear inconsistent, he "may joke and trip [him] up as much as [he] can." (Cf. Rep. 454a-b.)

This idea that in eristic one is concerned only to establish apparent or verbal consistency or inconsistency is suggested in a slightly different way by a passage in the Gorgias (47oc-47~c). In this passage Polus offers to refute '2 Socrates's belief that when- ever someone kills, expels, or expropriates people justly, it is better and whenever one does these things unjustly, it is worse. Polus attempts this refutation by appealing to the case of Archelaus, the ruler of Macedon, a man whom all Athenian citizens would, or at least so Polus thinks, admit unjustly killed his uncle, his cousin, and his brother and yet is happy. According to Polus, if he can get Socrates to agree that Archelaus did these things unjustly and yet is happy, he will have refuted Socrates by getting him to assert something which is inconsistent with his earlier assertion that whenever one does these sorts of things unjustly, it is worse. Unfortunately for Polus, however, Socrates does not believe that Archelaus is happy and so will not agree. Socrates suggests, therefore, that Polus has failed to refute him, at least in the manner of refutation which Socrates employs. There is, however, Socrates suggests, a manner of refutation according to

,o According to W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ~975), 4: ~75-76, at Hippias Minor 375 b Socrates ignores Hippias's qualification of "the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily" with "'in the case of the archer." But far from ignoring this qualification, Socrates follows it with an epagoge to the effect that it also holds in the case of the medical doctor, the lute player, the flute player, all "artists" and "scientists," slaves and ourselves (375b-d).

1 1 Contrast Socrates's repeated recommendation that the interlocutor consider carefully be- fore answering (cf., e.g., Gorg. 476b2 and 496c-4).

'~ 'Refute' here is meant to be ambiguous between 'eristically refute' and 'elenctically refute' in the same way as Socrates's elenchus in this passage is ambiguous between 'the eristic method' and 'the elenctic method', as is clear from 472c~- 4.

596 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y '~7 :4 OCTOBER ~989

which he can he said to have been refuted. This is the manner of refutation practiced in the law courts (en tois dikasteriois), i.e., eristic.

According to Socrates in this passage, this manner of refutation proceeds by calling forth witnesses who assert things which are inconsistent with certain beliefs which the interlocutor has expressed. The audience to this refutation, having been persuaded by the testimony of these witnesses, takes the interlocutor to have been refuted, for he has been shown to believe something which is inconsistent with what they have come to believe is true. Whether or not we want to call this sort of inconsistency ' apparent inconsistency', ~3 it is clear that it is not what we might call doxastic inconsistency. The questioner has not tr ied to establish that what the interlocutor believes is inconsistent with other things he believes and it is for this very reason that Socrates disparages this method at the end of this passage from the Gorgias: "I, all alone, don' t agree; for you don' t compel me, but you produce all these false witnesses against me and try to dislodge me from my proper ty and the truth. But if I can't produce you, all alone by yourself, as a witness agreeing on the things I 'm talking about, I think I have achieved nothing of any account in what our discussion is about. And I don ' t think you'll have achieved anything ei ther unless I, all alone, bear witness for you, and you let all the others go" (472b2-c2, Irwin translation). Once again, Socrates disparages eristic not because it does not aim at establishing the truth or falsity of a part icular proposition, but because it does not aim at establishing doxastic inconsistency. It is concerned only with an apparen t or verbal consistency or inconsistency, not the consistency or inconsis- tency of what the interlocutor believes.

If, then, Socrates disparages eristic, not simply because it is concerned with consis- tency or inconsistency, but because it fails to be concerned with doxastic consistency or in- consistency, we can now see how the elenchus is distinct from eristic already by its fourth step. For Socrates repeatedly expresses his concern that no premise be accepted into the elenchus which is not believed by the interlocutor. At Crito 49 d, for example, Socrates reminds Crito to be careful never to agree to anything contrary to his opinion (para doxan). In the Laches, when Laches replies to one of Socrates's leading questions by saying, "What else is one to say?" Socrates says, "Nothing, if that is what one believes [oioito]." In the Gorgias Socrates tells Callicles, "You would no longer be sufficiently examining with me the things that are, if you speak contrary to the way things seem to you [para ta dokounta sautoi]" (495a), and later reminds him not to answer haphazardly contrary to the way things seem to him (med' hoti an tucheis para ta dokounta apokrinou) (5oob7). (Cf. also Meno 83d 1-2, Prot. 33 x c 4 - d 1, Gorg. 472b3-c4, Rep. 346a3. ) The suggestion of all these passages is the same: in an elenchus the propositions introduced must be believed by the interlocutor. This is what Vlastos has called the 'say what you believe' constraint, x4

~n I have chosen the name 'apparent inconsistency' because of the way that eristic depends on how things appear to the audience, but again, nothing depends on the name. It is sufficient for my purposes simply to claim that eristic does not establish doxastic inconsistency.

,4 Cf. also Robinson's "personal character of the elenchus" (Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 15-x7). While this constraint is generally accepted, Woodruff denies it. The "say what you believe" constraint is entailed by, but does not entail the doxastic constraint in Benson, "The Problem of the Elenchus."

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 597

Given, then, that Socrates requires that the propositions introduced during an elenchus are believed by the interlocutor, the inconsistency which the elenchus is concerned to establish is importantly different from the inconsistency which eristic is concerned to establish. The former is concerned to establish doxastic inconsistency, the latter is not. That this is important begins to emerge if we return to the passage in the Theaetetus in which Socrates qua Protagoras is lecturing Socrates concerning how he ought to behave in philosophical conversations. After distinguishing between behaving eristically and behaving dialectically, Protagoras goes on to explain to Socrates that if he behaves dialectically "the people who spend their time with you will blame them- selves, not you, for their confusion and difficulties [taraches kai aporias]; they'll run after you and like you, but they'll hate themselves and seek refuge from themselves in philosophy so as to become different people and get rid of those they used to be. But if you do the opposite [i.e., behave erisitically], like most people, you'll find the opposite will happen, and instead of making philosophers of those who associate with you, you'll make them turn out to hate the whole business of philosophy when they get older" (168a2-b2, McDowell translation). Here, Protagoras explains why establishing inconsis- tency in the interlocutor's beliefs is more important than establishing inconsistency merely in what he has said. In the former case the interlocutor feels as if there is really something wrong with what he believes; he will dislike himself for holding an inconsis- tent position, and will seek to rid himself of the inconsistency. In the latter case the interlocutor will simply feel as if he has been tricked into saying things that he doesn't believe; he will dislike "philosophical" conversation for treating him unfairly; he may seek to learn this art o f verbal trickery but - -and this is the important point--he won't seek to change his beliefs. He will feel as if his beliefs never really got aired. His tongue may have been refuted, he will say, but he has not. He does not feel perplexed, confused, or numbed. Here merely feels ill-used. It is only in the case of the elenchus, when it is the interlocutor's beliefs, not his words, that have been shown to be inconsis- tent, that the interlocutor feels genuinely perplexed. '5 Thus, for example, when Meno vividly expresses the perplexity into which Socrates has led him at Meno 79e-8ob, he points out that he has been numbed not only in his lips but in his mind as well (kai ten psuchen kai to stoma narko).

Once this distinction between the perplexity engendered by the elenchus and the "perplexity" engendered by eristic is recognized, we can begin to appreciate the impor- tance of the elenchus for Socrates. The elenchus, by aiming at genuine perplexity in the interlocutor, aims at the elimination of conceit. Throughout the dialogues, Socrates is constantly reiterating the need to eliminate conceit in order to attain knowledge. According to Socrates, the first step in the pursuit of truth is the recognition that one

~ I do not mean to suggest here that doxastic inconsistency guarantees genuine perplexity, nor even that genuine perplexity can only result from doxastic inconsistency. It is sufficient that doxastic inconsistency is more likely to produce genuine perplexity than apparent or verbal inconsistency. Since Socrates is concerned to produce genuine perplexity and since the elenchus is concerned to establish doxastic inconsistency, the elenchus will be a more useful tool for his purposes than eristic.

598 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 9 7 : 4 O C T O B E R 1 9 8 9

does no t have knowledge. T h e point is made most clearly in the slave-boy passage in the Meno.

Socrates: Observe, Meno, the stage he has reached on his path of recollection. At the beg inn ing he did not know the side of the square of eight feet. Nor indeed does he know it now, bu t then he though t he knew it and answered boldly, as was appropr i - ate [tharraleos apekrineto hos eidos]--he felt no perplexity [ouch hegeito aporein]. Now however he does feel perp lexed [hegeitai aporein]. Not only does he no t know the answer, he doesn ' t even th ink he knows . . . . Do you suppose then that he would have a t tempted to look for, or learn, what he thought he knew, though he did not, before he was th rown into perplexity, became aware of his ignorance, and felt a desire to know [prin eis aporein katepesen hegesamenos me eidenai, kai epothese to eidenai]? (84a3-c6, Guthr ie t ranslat ion; cf. also Ap. 2 xa-23d an d z 9 d - 3 o b , and Soph. 23oa-d )

Here Socrates explicitly reports the value of perplexity. Perplexity leads to the awareness of ignorance which leads to the desire to know.

Given that the funct ion of perplexity according to Socrates is to el iminate conceit it becomes clear why Socrates values the perplexity a imed at by the elenchus over the perplexity a imed at by eristic. It is the fo rmer sort of perplexity which can pe r fo rm this funct ion best. T h e inter locutor 's appa ren t or verbal perplexity which the eristic is concerned to establish does no t lead him to become aware of his ignorance conce rn ing virtue, for example. This sort o f perplexity does not encourage the in ter locutor to feel that he does no t know what vir tue is, only that he does not know how to engage in a "philosophical" conversat ion conce rn ing virtue with a prac t ioner of eristic. He does not now desire to inqui re into the na tu re of virtue. He feels as if he knows the na tu re of virtue. T h e only conceit which has been e l iminated is the conceit that he knows how to engage in "philosophical" debate, bu t this is no t the sort of conceit Socrates is con- cerned with. Socrates is conce rned to encourage the desire to know what vir tue is, what wisdom is, what courage is, no t the desire to know how to engage in "philosophical" debate. As a result Socrates is concerned to el iminate the conceit that one knows what virtue is, what wisdom is, what courage is. This sort o f conceit, however, can be elimi- na ted best when one feels as if one 's beliefs about virtue, for example, have come u n d e r fire; when one not merely appears perplexed but is genuine ly perplexed con- ce rn ing the n a t u r e of vir tue; when, that is, the perplexity is the sort the elenchus is concerned to establish, no t eristic.'6

~6 Thomas Brickhouse has objected that given such an account of the distinction between eristic and the elenchus one should expect Socrates to bring his elenchus to a close when genuine perplexity has been achieved. But at Euthyphro 1 l b l - 8 , Euthyphro admits to being perplexed and yet two more definitions are considered and refuted. Euthyphro, however, does not admit to genuine perplexity in this passage but rather only to apparent or verbal perplexity. He says: "But, Socrates, I am unable to say [eipo] to you what I think [noo] (1 lb6-7). That this is the only sort of perplexity to which Euthyphro admits is reinforced by his charge that the inconsistency which has resulted is not his fault but Socrates's (l lc8-d2). We know from Theaetetus 168a2-b2 that this is the sort of charge leveled by someone who has merely been apparently or verbally perplexed, not by someone who has been genuinely perplexed. Thus, the aim of the elenchus on the noncon- structivist account has not been achieved at this point in the Euthyphro and so it is perfectly appropriate for Socrates to continue it. This does not mean, however, that Socrates has been

NOTES AND D I S C U S S I O N S 5 9 9

In t he end , t hen , Socra tes does d i s t i ngu i sh be tween eristic a n d the e l enchus o n the g r o u n d s t ha t t he l a t t e r is c o n c e r n e d wi th t r u t h while the f o r m e r is not . T h e e l enchus ' s c o n c e r n wi th t r u t h , howeve r , is a c o n c e r n which is a p p a r e n t a l ready at s tep (4). Fo r in b e i n g c o n c e r n e d to es tab l i sh a n incons i s tency a m o n g the in t e r locu to r ' s beliefs, t he e l enchus is c o n c e r n e d to e l imina te conce i t which is the necessary first s tep in the pu r su i t o f t ru th . A f t e r this i g n o r a n c e has b e e n recognized , w h e t h e r Socrates employs the e l e n c h u s i tself in p u r s u i t o f t r u t h , as t he cons t ruc t iv is ts suggest , or employs some o t h e r m e t h o d likepsychagogia ~7 or hypo thes i s , ~8 o r s imply fails to e m p l o y any m e t h o d at all, ~9 his d i s t inc t ion b e t w e e n the e l e n c h u s a n d eristic can be ma in t a ined . For at s tep (4), the e l e n c h u s is c o n c e r n e d no t mere ly to es tabl ish an incons is tency bu t to es tabl ish an incons i s tency in the bel iefs o f the i n t e r l o c u t o r y

HUGH H . BENSON University of Oklahoma

merely employing eristic up to this point. The distinction between eristic and elenchus for which 1 have been arguing here is not in terms of their results, but in terms of their aims. It is because the aim of the elenchus is genuine perplexity that Socrates does not abandon his dialogue with Euthyphro after i lb. If he had been practising eristic, his aim would have been achieved by i ab and the dialogue should have been abandoned. In fact, it is because the aim of the elenchus has not even been achieved at the end of the Euthyphro that Socrates is even there unwilling to abandon the dialogue (cf. Euthyp. 15cl 1--16a4; contrast Laches. 2ooa4-2olc5). The elenchus is not a method which guarantees success. It is not even the only method which can bring about genuine perplexity. (Eristic might do this accidentally.) It is simply the method most likely to achieve its aim.

17 Cf. Teloh, Socratic Education, chap. 1. ,s Cf., e.g., Meno 86d- looc . This method, however, is traditionally thought to be found here

in the Meno for the first time and so not available to the Socrates of the earlier dialogues. ~9 This latter option would seem the least desirable. In fact, it is the belief that

nonconstructivism is committed to this option which has contributed to its demise. Cf. note 3 above.

2o For valuable comments on earlier versions of this essay, I wish to thank John Biro, Joe Mendola, Thomas Brickhouse and two anonymous referees of this journal. I am also grateful to the audiences of the presentation of earlier versions of this essay at the 1086 Workshop in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, the University of New Mexico, and the t986 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.