a less volatile crude oil price: supply rotation control
TRANSCRIPT
A Less Volatile Crude Oil Price:Supply Rotation Control
Huei-Chu Liao
PURPOSE
Smooth the crude oil price
reduce the volatility cost
APPROACH
Find Main Source of VolatilityPrinciple to Solve Problem(Incentive Compatibility) Method: Rotation ControlDetail: Market Situation/Demand ElasticityTechnique: Bootstrapping Method
WHY PRICE VOLATILE
Fundamental (Demand/Supply)(OPEC’s Influence)Financial Market(Technical Analysis/Information Noise)WAR
CRUDE OIL PRICE FORMULAS
Px = Benchmark Price + PremiumBenchmark Price(WTI/BRENT/DUBAI&OMAN)Spot price Futures price (-1) Futures Prices is Selected Due to Transparency Transparency in Futures Market Can’t Guarantee the (Physical Market Clear )
OIL MARKET TRANSPARANCY
Quota
N.E.
Production
Arbitrage
Financial marketOPEC marketWorld market
WHO SHOULD RESPONSIBLE FOR↓↑
OPEC OR FINANCIAL MARKET PLAYERS ?
No Market Imbalance(D/S Gaps or Info Bias)
No Arbitration tradeBetter control for OPEC would
help for less volatility
PERSUASIVE PRODUCTION(Incentive Compatibility)
Privilege Assignment
Responsible for price if I’m the only decision maker
(Each time only 1 member/groupin OPEC has privilege )
Supply Rotation Control
P
P*
0
Q
P
S0
PccS
bcS
Q*=76.9
Figure 1 The determination of market price.
HOW IT WORKS
More Stable Oil Supply Will Flow Into the MarketMore Reliable Information Is Perceived
Fewer Arbitration tradeMore Stable Oil Price
Simulation Techniques
Bootstrapping Method(Market Data Distribution/Simulation)Real Market Situation (Inelastic demand)Supply Rotation Control
Figure 2 Historical WTI Price Trend ( )
0 650 1300 1950 2600 3250 3900
20
30
40 p
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.05
0.10
Densityp N(s=5.29)
0 650 1300 1950 2600 3250 3900-10
-5
0
5dp
-10.0 -7.5 -5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25 Densitydp N(s=0.595)
, p p∆
Decide the Data Set of Calculating from 1986/1/2 to 2003/7/22
Equation (1)&(2)
Equation (3)
Market Price Determination
Demand Price Elasticity
Original Equilibrium
With ControlWithout Control
Random choosing 1000 from Data Set Possible Oil Price Path
Random choosing 1000 from Data SetBoom Period 3 ScenariosEach Has
( j =1, 2, 3)
Random choosing1000 from Data SetCollapse Period3 Scenarios Each Has
( j = 1, 2, 3)
Figure 3 Flow Chart of Simulation Process
( ) * ij jp or p p p= +∆
* 24.138p = * 76.9Q =
0.06dε = −
p∆
ip∆⇒
1t t ip p p−= + ∆ip∆
&j jp p
1t t ip p p−= + ∆
j t jp p p≤ ≤
ip∆
&j jp p
1t t ip p p−= + ∆
j t jp p p≤ ≤
Decide the Data Set of Calculating from 1986/1/2 to 2003/7/22
Equation (1)&(2)
Equation (3)
Market Price Determination
Demand Price Elasticity
Original Equilibrium
With ControlWithout Control
Random choosing 1000 from Data Set Possible Oil Price Path
Random choosing 1000 from Data SetBoom Period 3 ScenariosEach Has
( j =1, 2, 3)
Random choosing1000 from Data SetCollapse Period3 Scenarios Each Has
( j = 1, 2, 3)
Figure 3 Flow Chart of Simulation Process
( ) * ij jp or p p p= +∆
* 24.138p = * 76.9Q =
0.06dε = −
p∆
ip∆⇒
1t t ip p p−= + ∆ip∆
&j jp p
1t t ip p p−= + ∆
j t jp p p≤ ≤
ip∆
&j jp p
1t t ip p p−= + ∆
j t jp p p≤ ≤
Equation (1)
where : price elasticity of demand,
: change of supply quantity,
: change of price,
: equilibrium quantity,
: equilibrium price.
dη
Q∆
P∆
*Q
*p
** *
*
d
Qp QQ
P Q PP
η
∆∆
= = ⋅∆ ∆
Decide the Data Set of Calculating from 1986/1/2 to 2003/7/22
Equation (1)&(2)
Equation (3)
Market Price Determination
Demand Price Elasticity
Original Equilibrium
With ControlWithout Control
Random choosing 1000 from Data Set Possible Oil Price Path
Random choosing 1000 from Data SetBoom Period 3 ScenariosEach Has
( j =1, 2, 3)
Random choosing1000 from Data SetCollapse Period3 Scenarios Each Has
( j = 1, 2, 3)
Figure 3 Flow Chart of Simulation Process
( ) * ij jp or p p p= +∆
* 24.138p = * 76.9Q =
0.06dε = −
p∆
ip∆⇒
1t t ip p p−= + ∆ip∆
&j jp p
1t t ip p p−= + ∆
j t jp p p≤ ≤
ip∆
&j jp p
1t t ip p p−= + ∆
j t jp p p≤ ≤
Equation (2)
where : price elasticity of demand,
: change of supply quantity,
: change of price,
: equilibrium quantity,
: equilibrium price.
dη
Q∆
P∆
*Q
*p
* *d
QP QP
η∆ = ⋅ ⋅∆
Figure 4
Figure 4 Possible Crude Oil Price Path (without any control)
Figure 4a
0102030
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Figure 4b
010203040
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Figure 4c
0102030405060
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Table2 Price boom in less production with control US$/bbl
Figure 5c5.39429.24220.68841.228Constraint4
(Loss3 /3.138)
Figure 5b3.01525.49720.08833.923Constraint1
(Loss2 /1.888)
Figure 5a1.63825.53320.70828.698Constraint
(Loss1 /0.779)
FigureStandard errorAveragePriceMin PriceMax PriceScenario
(mb/d)
Note: Loss : the Total Loss Production of oil from OPEC. Loss1: Iraq excess capacity=0, Other Member loss 20%, Nigeria loss 40%, Venezuela loss 10%.Loss2: Iraq excess capacity=0, Other Member loss 20%, Nigeria loss 50%, Venezuela loss 25%.Loss3: Iraq excess capacity=0, Other Member loss 25%, Nigeria loss 90%, Venezuela loss 40%.
Figure 5 Possible Crude Oil Price Path in Boom Period (with control)
Figure 5a
0204060
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Figure 5b
010203040
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Figure 5c
010203040
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Table3 Price collapse in more production with control US$/bbl
Figure 6c3.80915.0667.89825.518Constraint(EC3 /3.101)
Figure 6b4.53319.46610.50325.948Constraint(EC2 /2.150)
Figure 6a1.68823.72217.99827.528Constraint(EC1 /1.075)
FigureStandard error
AveragePriceMin PriceMax PriceScenario
(mb/d)
Note: EC : the Total Excess capacity from OPEC.EC1: Iraq production capacity=2.5mb/d, and quota=2, total OPEC quota=25.401(2003/6/1 level),
Total OPEC excess capacity=5.376, but all used 20%, 1.075mb/d.EC2: Iraq production capacity=2.5mb/d, and quota=2, total OPEC quota=25.401(2003/6/1 level),
Total OPEC excess capacity=5.376, but all used 40%, 2.150mb/d.EC3: Iraq can’t take over, so he’s excess capacity=0, and total OPEC quota=25.401mb/d,
Total OPEC excess capacity=3.101mb/d, all used.
Figure 6 Possible Crude Oil Price Path, in collapse period with Control
Figure 6a
010203040
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Figure 6b
0102030
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Figure 6c
010203040
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901T
P(U
S$/b
b
Conclusion
Price Around Fair Price
Supply Rotation : Privilege Assignment
Less Volatile Price is Expected
Further Research
(capacity utilization in Bootstrapping simulation)
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