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Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

influence and mutual enrichment that take place in the relationship between human beings,

and between them and their world, is dialogic in a broader and deeper sense. Dialogue in such

a broad sense is a very pivotal plank in the relations of humans with themselves and with the

world, and in their quest for collective synergy towards the improvement of life in general.

Paulo Freire says that dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in

order to name the world (cf Smith 2001).

Viewed from this broad perspective, dialogue according to Burbules is a kind of social

relationship that engages its participants (Burbules 1993: 19). On account of this engagement,

certain conditions are necessary for its fruitful evolution. The physicist David Bohm names

three of these. First, those involved must suspend their assumptions. Second, they must vieweach other as colleagues or peers, and then there must be a facilitator to hold the context of

dialogue (Bohm 2012). It is clear from this that Bohm is concentrating more on the technical

process of dialoguing in a set situation and for determined ends that he has worked so hard to

foster. Burbules (1993: 36-46) discourses other conditions which he calls the virtues or

emotions of dialogue and they include concern, trust, respect, appreciation, affection and

hope.

In line with the virtues and emotions of dialogue as discussed by Burbules (1993), we

can outline the following as necessary conditions for genuine and fruitful dialogue. In the first

place there must be recognition of the humanity of the human agents in the dialogic situation.

The necessity for this recognition is axed on the realisation that without it the give and take

process that is an essential result of dialogue is truncated. Recognition of humanity entails

certain equality as humans, since fruitful dialogue is atrophied once one party assumes the

position of superiority or inferiority. With a sense of humanity and equality, there arises respect

for the other persons, for the context of their lives and the world within which and with which

dialogue must take place. These requirements then make possible openness to the views of

the other. In this regard, Plato and Socratic dialogues may not be the best examples of

dialogues since in them Socrates invariably ends up as the victor in the verbal conversation

that is very often structured in such a way as to exhibit how untenable or impracticable the

opposing views are. But respect for and openness to the views of the other does not preclude


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Hail, thou Flame, which comest and goest, I have not spoken lies

Hail, Crushe of bones, who comest forth from Suten-henen, I have not snatched away food

Hail, thou who shootest forth the Flame, who comest forth from Het-Ptah-ka, I have not caused

pain.

Hail, thou who comest from Amentet, I have not committed fornicatio (Hord & Lee 1995: 21).

The dialogic intent of the declaration is seen in its effort to convince the celestial audience of

the standard of morality which the declarant has tried to live by. In a sense it is an appeal to

the divinity to fulfil its part of the bargain since the human agent has, in his own assertion,

fulfilled his own part. The awaited reaction is admittance of Ani, the innocent, into the abode of

the righteous. But in a real sense the declaration is addressed to living human beings. In

outlining different aspects of social morality, Maat, it is both an argument and an affirmation.

The declaration argues about the authenticity of these ethical standards and underlies the

necessity of embracing them for the fulfilment of the demands of Maat. As argumentation and

affirmation, it is to be expected that in the real context of the declaration, the human audience

is also expected to elicit a reaction, perhaps a presentation of an opposed view or

acquiescence with the standard announced. Thus the declaration becomes just one side of a

dialogue comprehensively viewed has many parts. It is clear that in this case the other side is

not expressed and needs some interpretation before being made more explicit.

While dialogic and dialectical implications could be read in other genres, it is in the

dialogues of Plato that the literary philosophic style assumes a prominent place in Western

philosophy. Gilbert Ryle (1967: 315) asserts that the usual way of publishing compositions

be they verses or prose was oral delivery, and thus the dialogues of Plato, like others of its

kind, were also meant to be recited to the public by the author. The dialogues were therefore

dramatic in form and were meant to be recited to a drama-loving audience. That explains why

dialogues had to be short in order to capture and retain the attention of the audience. Thus

only the Republic and the uncompleted Laws were the exception and must have been

intended for special academic audience that would reassemble many times to follow up the

conversation. Through Platos dialogue the discussions of Socrates with his Athenian


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interlocutors are outlined. In the opinion of Francoise Armengaud (1989: 364), through these

dialogues philosophy attains its plenitude and also manifests for the first time its creative-

destructive power. Thus the Socratic dialogue traces what for Armengaud is the essence of

philosophy, the shared research where the master forms the students and is at the same time

formed by them. Therefore, philosophic dialogue is really dialectical, generated by necessity

and movement and aimed at being and plenitude.

The presentation of philosophic reflections in the form of dialogue was also a strong

trade mark of the Roman writer Cicero, whose De amititia (On Friendship) and the Tusculan

Disputationsover the question of death and immortality were presented in dialogic forms. Also

in the medieval times, scholastic philosophy tried to imitate the dialectical form of philosophicdialogue. Its dialogic method starts by identifying the question for discussion and stating to the

full the points opposed to the conviction the author was going to argue for, and then stating a

sed contra, which is usually a statement that puts into question the major objection of the

supposed opponent. It then goes on to outline as many points as possible against the

opposing view before taking a final position. For Armengaud, scholastic dialogue is not a

shared research and concern but a rhetorical form of intellectual dogmatism (une forme

rhethorique de la dogmatique intellectuele) (Armengaud 1989: 364). It is important to note the

dialogic character of scholasticism that first recognised the presence of contrary and opposing

views, and was able to develop a method that afforded the possibility of listening and taking

due consideration of the opponents views.

It remains true, however, that the strict structuring of dialogue procedure among the

scholastics aided what Armengaud calls intellectual dogmatism. This is evident in the disputes

between the Franciscan and Dominican scholars at the University of Paris, for example, in

which there is a surprising consistency among lines of scholars determined strictly by whether

they were Franciscan or Dominican. For Armengaud though, scholastic dogmatism is believed

to have strongly influenced subsequent dialogues in the history of Western philosophy. Among

them Nicholas Malebranches Entretiens sur la metaphysique et la religion (1688); Bishop

Berkeleys Two Dialogues between Hylas and Philonus (1713); as well as Denis Diderots Le

reve de dAlembert(1769). JG. Fichtes The Destination of man; SpinozasShort treatise; as


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well as Aelread of Rivaulxs Spiritual friendshipare among the works that tried to imitate the

written conversational model of presentation (Armengaud 1989).

Also of major importance is the tradition of philosophic correspondence in the modern

period of Western philosophy. Its importance is axed on the increased openness of the

interlocutors in these letters much more than in the written works of the authors. Some of the

famous correspondences include that of Descartes with Princess Elizabeth; the

correspondence of Spinoza; Malebranches correspondence with JJ Dortous de Mairan on the

doctrines of Spinoza; and the correspondence on liberty between Leibniz and Arnauld.

Another form of dialogue in the art of philosophising is debate on important issues in

philosophy. One remembers the famous debate between Frederick Copleston and BertrandRussell on the existence of God (1948), and between AJ Ayer and Frederick Copleston on

logical positivism (1949). These forms of verbalised dialogue have certainly marked the history

of philosophy in a special manner. But there are aspects of dialogic interaction not spoken in

the form of words. Philosophys engagement with its context, with the problems of ethics, with

the socio-economy, and politics of its time, is a way of bringing the principles of its reflection to

an encounter with its actual context. Philosophical hermeneutics brings this aspect of the

philosophic engagement to the foremost level. It zeroes into the historical, cultural,

educational, religious and more background of the society and the individual philosopher. The

relationship which exists between these non-philosophical raw-materials or symbols of

reflection and the outcome of individual reflection is the foundation on which philosophy is

actually based (Okere 1983). Real and relevant philosophising must at the end of the day be

in some very real way hermeneutical. Two examples elucidate this assertion: the quest for

identity in much of contemporary African philosophy, and the results of John Rawls (1971) in

his famous book,A theory of justice.

The issue of identity is a central issue in much of contemporary African philosophy. The

main reason behind the emergence of the question of identity is the historical racism of the

European society against Africans and the creation of Africa in Western libraries (Mudimbe

1988). This attitude finds most prominent expression among the philosophers of the

Enlightenment. It is oblique in some, and open in others like David Hume, Immanuel Kant and


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Michelle de Montesquieu, but it was a much generalised sentiment underlying the whole of the

colonial enterprise. The fall-out of this on the psyche of contemporary African philosophic

thinkers is the issue of identity, that of who and what we are. On the positive note it is sort of

unconscious self-assertion in the face of a barrage of historical denigration. On the negative

side, its strangle hold gives rise to what Kwasi Wiredu (1985: 222) describes as the fallacy of

uniqueness, which is the supposition that for Africans to have an authentic identity, they need

to be unique in their social and political forms and in many other things besides.

The book of John Rawls,A theory of justice,is another example of the way in which the

context can strongly influence if not predetermine the outcome of philosophic reflections. There

is no gainsaying that justice is always a central issue in human communal existence. It is infact the reason for the existence of social and political institutions, and thus for Augustine

(1952), a human community turns into a band of robbers once justice is removed from its

operations. Still, be justice as general and as fundamental as it wants, Rawlss theory has as

its fulcrum the liberal Western society. That is why in spite of the ingeniously crafted original

position and the veil of ignorance, what comes out in the form of his two principles of justice, is

very much biased in favour of the liberal society where the freedom of the individual is the

most basic desideratum. It is interesting to remark that under Rawlss background, the groups

quest for identity can hardly arise. These examples indicate that hermeneutics which take

account of the total life experience and circumstances that surround the results of human

thinking is like a palimpsest that underlies much of the results of philosophic engagement,

irrespective of the tradition in question. This act of proper weighing, this taking into account of

the total influence on philosophy is in a very deep sense dialogical, since dialogue as we have

seen is much broader than mere verbal conversation but includes total reflexive interaction

with the agents humanity, that of his interlocutors and the total context of his philosophising.

4. ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN DIALOGUE WITH AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

From the above viewpoint, Greek philosophy and African philosophy have been in deep

dialogue since antiquity. More specifically, Ionian philosophy and ancient Egyptian philosophic


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traditions were in mutual interaction and influence with each other. We do not need to be

distracted by the debate over the colour of ancient Greek thinkers or the different ethnic groups

that built up the Egyptian civilization. Suffice it to note that modern researches, especially by

Egyptologists, have unfolded the philosophical profundity of this ancient culture. The

philosophical patrimony of Egyptian civilization has been documented by such researchers as

M Bilolo, Theophile Obenga, JP Allen, and JH Breasted. It is possible that the reception of

these works has been prejudiced by such titles as Onyewuenyis African origin of Greek

philosophy (1993) which is in turn a milder form of George G James title, Stolen legacy

(1992). Our point here is that ancient Egypt at its zenith scratched the limits of both civilization

and philosophy within its epoch. On the philosophic terrain, for instance, a passage from thePapyrus of Leiden I 350 on the nature of the divinity contains the following statement:

Secret of development but glittering of forms,

Wonderful god of many developments,

All gods boast in him,

In order to magnify themselves in his perfection, like his divinity.

..

No god knows his appearance,

No processional image of him is unfolded through inscription,

No one testifies to him accurately.

He is too secret to uncover his awesomeness,

He is too great to investigate, too powerful to know.

Instantaneously falling face to face into death

Is for the one who expresses his secret identity, unknowingly or knowingly.

There is no god who knows how to invoke him with it.

Manifest God whose identity is hidden, inasmuch as it is inaccessible.

JP Allen (1988: 53) describes this passage as perhaps the clearest surviving expression of

the Egyptian concepts of immanent and transcendent divinity, and of the acceptance of both in

Egyptian thought. The first sentence of the passage expresses the presence of the two


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opposed attributes, describing the divinity as secret of development but glittering of form. In a

similar style, the closing line describes it as a being that is both manifest and has hidden

identity. Here we see what the scholastics will much later call Concordia oppositorum, and it is

interesting to see how much Thales of Miletus with his simple assertion that all is water, pales

before such level of philosophic reflection.

The relationship between ancient Greek and ancient Egyptian philosophy is seen clearly

in the acknowledgement of Aristotle in his Metaphysicsof the Egyptian origin of mathematical

arts on account of the leisure of its priests. This acknowledgement is like a harbinger of more

doctrinal connection between the two ancient philosophical traditions. In an article published by

the eminent Egyptologist James Henry Breasted, more than one century ago, there is athorough study of what he described as the oldest known formulation of a philosophical

Weltanschauung (Breasted 1901: 39). Titled The philosophy of a Memphite priest, the study

highlights the role of the Egyptian deity Ptah as inscribed in an old and badly damaged ancient

Egyptian stone. The kernel of the finding is that the inscription presents a philosophical

understanding of the function of Ptah as the mind and speech of the Gods (Breasted 1901:

46). The priestly thinker chants of Ptah as the source of the power by which heart and tongue

carry out the plans and ideas which he furnishes (Breasted 1901: 48). Ptah both suggests

every plan and idea and at the same time furnishes the power of its execution. He is the divine

source of all things:

Everything comes forth form him, whether offering, or food, or divine oblation, or any

good thing . Since he formed the gods in their adyta, he made the towns, he equipped

the nomes, he placed the gods in the adyta, he made their offerings flourish, he

equipped their adyta, he made the likeness of their bodies to the satisfaction of their

hearts (Breasted 1901: 48).

In spite of the paradoxes involved in Ptahs creation of the gods, Breasted presents a clear

picture of the philosophy of the Memphite priest in terms very close to Greek concepts of nous

and logos. Assuming the existence of matter, it affirms that all things first existed in the mind.


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Speech or tongue is the channel through which they translate into objective reality. In the

ensuing world, the thought impulses of all living creatures are owed to the same mind that

created them. The outcome of their thought is therefore primarily due to the all pervasive

mind, and only in a secondary manner to the creatures in question. Their work is therefore a

further affirmation of the statement that all things exist first in the mind of the god (Breasted

1901: 51). Breasteds study of the ancient Egyptian inscription arrives at the following

conclusions:

First: that the early Egyptian did much more and much better thinking on abstract

subjects than we have hitherto believed, having formed a philosophical conception of theworld of men and things, of which no people need be ashamed. Second: it is obvious

that the above conception of the world forms quite a sufficient basis for suggesting the

later notions of nous and logos hitherto supposed to have been introduced into Egypt

from abroad at a much later date. Thus the Greek tradition of the origin of their

philosophy in Egypt undoubtedly contains more of truth than has in recent years been

conceded (Breasted 1901: 54).

These conclusions pinpoint the acknowledgment of ancient Greek thinkers of Egypt as thesource of their philosophy, but the study went on to prove by a deep archaeology of the

concept of logos that in fact it originated from ancient Egypt. JP Allen reached the same

conclusion and referred to Breasteds study in a book Genesis in Egypt(Allen 1988). What is

important for our purpose is that there was clear traffic between the two regions and that the

philosophical minds were in dialogue, leading to mutual influence. From the inscription of the

Memphite priest this influence appears to have had more impact on later development of

Greek philosophy but it is reasonable that following the natural order of things, there could

have been some mutuality of influence even at this early time.


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5. AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: FERTILE TERRAIN FOR GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL

INFLUENCE

The interface between Greek and African philosophy experienced a boost with North African

patristic thinkers. These include Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Lactantius, Cyprian of

Carthage, and so forth. But by far the greatest among them, and also the greatest non-biblical

theologian of the Christian world, was Aurelius Augustine of Hippo. Augustines philosophy and

theology were suffused by the structure of Platos philosophy. Augustine is widely known to

have Christianised Plato mainly by making use of the pivotal role of the transcendence in the

explanation of being and its varied operations in terrestrial existence. Augustines philosophy isthus a thinly veiled dialectic of Platos theory of Ideas. After a tour of all the available

philosophical schemes of his time in the City of God (Augustine 1958: 150), Augustine

proclaimed Plato most suitable for the interpretation and understanding of Christianity. One

obvious idea that is endemically Platonic is the conviction that the material and worldly are

always of lower value than the transcendent and immaterial, which are the archetypical origin

and explanation of the material, its susceptibility to change and inconstancy as well as its

inability to be a lasting explanation for accepted standards and values. Thus in general the

material or the worldly is always lower than the transcendent and the other worldly. For Plato

the other worldly is encapsulated in the world of Ideasand ultimately in the Idea of the good,

while for Augustine, the heavenly, God himself becomes in some way the real value of the

mundane and the changeable.

A clear illustration of this thought structure is Augustines thought on Friendship in the

Confessions (Augustine 1952). Augustine praises friendship almost in hyperboles and is

known to have tried on several occasions to form a community of friends in order to enjoy the

full advantages of friendship relationship. In book 4 of the Confessions (4:8), Augustine

recounts the different acts that show the joy of a friendship relationship: talking, laughing,

giving and receiving kindness, reading good books, disagreeing as one with himself, teaching

and learning from one another, missing the absent and welcoming them on their return:


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these and such-like things proceeding from our hearts as we give affection and

receive it back, and shown by face, by voice, by the eyes, and a thousand other pleasing

ways, kindled a flame which fused our very souls and of many made us one (Augustine

1952: 4:8).

Yet this moving experience of friendship does not grant it any lasting value in the Neoplatonic

scheme of Augustine. He goes on in the next section to recount the pain felt at the death of a

friend which makes the living friend to feel as though he himself were dead. Augustine then

zeroes in on the transcendent friendship: blessed is the man that loves Thee, O God, and

his friend in Thee, and his enemy for Thee. For he alone loses no one that is dear to him

(Augustine 1952: 4:9). It means that, given the pains of the loss of a friend, the mundane

friendship has no lasting value, but is rather like a pointer to the true friendship in God, in the

same way that sensible realities point us to the world of forms in Plato.

Still it is in the twentieth century, in what we can call the contemporary period in African

philosophy, that we encounter even more overwhelming influence of ancient Greek philosophy.

This came as a consequence of colonial history. Western academic philosophy reached most

of Africa in the company of modern Western education after colonisation. The first departments

of philosophy were established at the time new universities were built first in South Africa.

They were built under the background of rejection and denigration of the context of their

insertion. They were meant to serve Africans but also structured as instruments of assimilation

into the Western culture, history, and civilization of the superior colonisers. The consequence

of this policy was that the study of all branches of the arts and humanities meant European

studies. When philosophy was introduced it came with the weight of this prejudice. The study

of philosophy became the study of Western philosophy and so history of philosophy for

instance, became synonymous with history of Western philosophy.In most of African philosophy departments and faculties, ancient philosophy is simply

the study of ancient Greek philosophy, usually starting from Thales, and for several reasons

this practice has come to stick. Being schooled in the different periods of Western philosophy,

African historians of philosophy have now been unconsciously borrowing the standard


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periodization of the history of Western philosophy. Abanukas (2011) recent book, A history of

African philosophy,has exactly four periods: ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary as

though there is standard periodization which the history of every regional philosophy must

follow. The implication is that philosophical studies turn to be veritable instruments for cultural

alienation.

There are two points to note about this development. Philosophic alienation generated

the debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy in the late 1960s and 1970s. It

was an almost inevitable debate since most of the participants are those schooled in

programmes in which philosophy was taken to be so exotic that it started only in ancient

Greece and developed further in the West. Hence to speak of African philosophy and in factany other regional philosophy was an aberration. While this not very useful debate (Oguejiofor

2003: 484) was going on, and while since then a consensus of thinkers has come to accept

African philosophy both in its normative and prescriptive senses, there has been virtually no

serious reversal in the colonial philosophy curriculum in the Africa continent. It means that

students of philosophy in much of Africa today still go through a curriculum in which ancient

philosophy still means ancient Greek philosophy. Most of these on graduation remain

completely ignorant of ancient Egyptian philosophy.

The project of Afrocentrism has not succeeded in changing the alienating content of

philosophical studies in Africa. In summary, the Afrocentric movement tried to prove that in fact

ancient Greek philosophy owed its existence to a stolen legacy, to borrow the title of James

(1992). Onyewuenyi (1993) followed James project in his African origin of Greek philosophy.

Granted that these works contain a lot of polemics, their aim was to puncture the pride of the

absolute origin of philosophy in ancient Greece. Still the polemical content of the works, as well

as ingrained prejudice in Western philosophy, appears to have precluded favourable reception

and in a sense appreciation of other more academic researches on ancient Egyptian

philosophy such as those of Molefi Kete Asante, Theophile Obenga, M Bilolo and Jacob

Carouthers. The thesis of Afrocentrists was given a boost by Martine Bernals controversial

Black Athena. Bernal (1987) presents two models of Greek history, the Aryan and Ancient

models. While the Aryan speaks of an invasion from the north and the resultant mixture of


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Indo-European speaking Hellenes and their indigenous subjects, the ancient model suggests

ancient Egyptian dominance which civilized the native inhabitants, creating a channel for the

influence of ancient Egyptian thought. The controversy attendant on Bernals Black Athena is

more an indication of the strength of academic prejudice than any other factor. Bernals thesis

and the reaction to it expose what can be called the colour of otherwise presumed neutrality of

philosophic reflections. On this Bernal writes:

If a Black were to say what I am now putting in my books, their reception would be very

different. They would be assumed to be one-sided and partisan, pushing a Black

Nationalist line, and therefore dismissed (cf Mudimbe 1988: 103)

6. HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS

The attitude that Bernal describes in the above statement represents one of the strongest

obstacles to fruitful dialogue between different traditions of philosophy. It is in one guise

historical, but its historicity predates colonial denigration and consequent complexes generated

both on the side of the colonised and colonisers. It can be traced back to the period of the

Enlightenment. Its focal point is the erection of philosophy to the status of being the

determinant of humanity. Tsenay Serequeberhan (1996: 3) points out that this was done

without the benefit of an argument. Almost half a century ago, this assumption generated the

debate on whether Africa had a philosophy or not. Precisely because it was based on

uncritically accepted presuppositions, it neglected the historicity of African philosophy. Placides

Tempels project was like a contradiction of this assumption which somehow tailored the

development of contemporary African philosophy. For Tempels (1948: 15), the importance of

Bantu philosophy lies in the fact that if the so called primitive people had no system of thought(philosophy), they would not be human (Celui quie pretend que les primitifs ne possedent point

de systeme de pensee, les rejette doffice de la class des home). This is also the point of

debate on the existence of African philosophy. In the whole of contemporary African

philosophy, there is hardly any serious questioning of this latent assumption. What instead was


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generated was the effort to give the lie to the assumption by proving the existence of African

philosophy. In some way this is an unconscious or surreptitious reaction, since the events of

history had already created what Nyasanyi calls superiority in inferiority. Thus the effort of

African thinkers who opposed the existence of African philosophy was equally exerted in the

name of philosophy in the real sense as opposed to the debased sense (Oruka 1975: 45) as

though philosophers have ever agreed on the definition and nature of their engagement.

But the debate itself is meta-philosophical. Objectively speaking it called attention to the

almost chimeric nature of a discipline in which, for instance, Nicholo Machiavelli and Thomas

Hobbes are graded on the same pedestal; a discipline in which GW Hegel is foisted into the

hall of fame even though his knowledge of Greek philosophy, of human nature and of history isvery minimal. Debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy could have been an

opportunity for self-questioning by all traditions of philosophy. But this was not to be. Till today

it is hardly surprising how little is known of African philosophy in Western departments of

philosophy. In this regard, Western philosophy still remains covered by hallows of superiority

and arrogance, thinly veiled in the guise of specialisation. It is the same thin veil that tends to

influence philosophical interest in many parts of Africa and it represents a throwback to the

colonial era when dialogue in the sense of engagement with total humanity of the other was

not prominent in the philosophical terrain. It is why some philosophy workers still think it is

possible to live and work in Africa and have almost nothing to do with the African philosophic

community and the shared problems of the continent. The result of such philosophy will

certainly not be meaningful or relevant to its context.

7. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD

The central point of our essay is that broadly understood dialogue is a pivotal feature of the

philosophical engagement and that African and Greek philosophies have been in dialogue

starting from the ancient times. The result of this dialogue is evident in the long history of

mutual influence which is marked by the interplay of the basic features of philosophic dialogue,

such as respect and openness. In contemporary times, the inroad of ancient Greek philosophy


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into the African cultural world through colonialism ensured that instead of being mutually

enriching, the study of Greek philosophy in many ways turned to be one additional factor in

African cultural alienation. The reaction to this historic legacy has been a spur to further

creativity in the contemporary African philosophy. That the situation of philosophic alienation

still remains a dominant feature of philosophy in the African continent, is a pointer to the

ambivalence of the African cultural reality which is replicated in contemporary African

philosophy. Given the reality of our fast globalising world, the legacy of the historic dialogue

between Greek and African philosophy should be seen beyond the factor of intellectual

colonialism in view of imbibing the best attitudes of mutually enriching dialogue freed from both

superiority and inferiority complexes. It is in so far as the different regional philosophies areable to engage with one another in that manner that the much needed inter-cultural and

philosophic dialogue will answer to the real needs of our contemporary world. It is a world in

which such needs are no longer exclusive to specific people, cultures, countries or continents.

The world which is gravitating very fast to a pan-human community is realising that most of its

major dilemmas are now common to humanity as a whole. Genuine dialogue in philosophy is

one of the most fruitful ways of confronting these dilemmas, and the long history of the

relationship between African and Greek philosophy is a useful guide to this all important

project.

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